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College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA: Enforceability of CC&R Non-Waiver Clauses and Property Access Rights

Posted on June 29, 2026 by AZ HOA Watch

CC&Rs & Private Condemnation | A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) | 1 CA-CV 08-0450

This case illustrates the high legal threshold required to prove that an Arizona homeowners’ association has waived its CC&Rs. It also highlights how a landlocked property owner may still use statutory private condemnation to bypass restrictive covenants, provided they pay just compensation to affected owners.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: College Book Centers, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 08-0450; reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2011-06-15. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page details the Arizona Court of Appeals’ published, precedential decision regarding the enforceability of CC&R non-waiver clauses, the requirements for establishing common law implied easements of necessity, and the framework for statutory private condemnation of restrictive covenants. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the homeowners’ association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a seventy-six-lot subdivision did not constitute frequent violations, and the CC&Rs contained an enforceable non-waiver clause. It also held that Vanyo failed to establish a common law implied way of necessity because there was no historical evidence that the property was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

David B. Vanyo (Plaintiff)
College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trustee
Trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan and purchaser of Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim.
College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trust (Plaintiff)
The 401 profit sharing plan and trust entity holding title to Lot 24 and the landlocked Mamie Maude Mining Claim.
Jeffrey D. Gross (Counsel)
Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A.
Attorney representing the plaintiff/appellee David B. Vanyo and the College Book Centers Profit Sharing Plan.
Timothy Berg (Counsel)
Co-counsel representing the plaintiff/appellee David B. Vanyo on appeal and in the petition for review.
Valerie Biederbeck (Other)
Vanyo's predecessor-in-interest who sold Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Vanyo's pension plan.
Richard Biederbeck (Other)
Vanyo's predecessor-in-interest who sold Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Vanyo's pension plan.
James Farris Murphy (Witness)
Vanyo's former real estate transaction attorney who testified at trial regarding pre-closing meetings and notice from the HOA.
Donald Duncan (Witness)
Licensed real estate appraiser called by Vanyo who testified on valuation and lack of financial impact of the road on subdivision lots.
Greg Gentsch (Witness)
Licensed professional engineer called by Vanyo who testified on the road design and infeasibility of constructing a road across the steep slope.

Respondent Side

Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association (Defendant)
The homeowners' association for the subdivision, serving as the certified class representative of the subdivision lot owners.
John P. Dwyer, Jr. (Defendant)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Homeowner who initially opted out of the defendant class, participated individually at trial, and rejoined the class post-trial.
Janet G. Dwyer (Defendant)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Homeowner who initially opted out of the defendant class, participated individually at trial, and rejoined the class post-trial.
Thomas H. Crouch (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Association.
Kevin T. Minchey (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Association.
Kurt M. Zitzer (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Association.
Ralph W. Applegate, Jr. (Association President)
Carefree Foothills Corporation
Original subdivision developer who drafted the CC&Rs and acted as the HOA board prior to its official formation; granted historical easements.
Denton L. Ingle (Other)
Carefree Foothills Corporation
Partner of developer Ralph Applegate, subdivision manager, original owner of Lot 43, and draftsman of the Thiele easement.
Barbara L. Ingle (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and co-owner of Lot 43 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Fo O. Buck (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and owner of Lot 42 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Deborah R. Buck (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and co-owner of Lot 42 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Jack Anderson (Board Member)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Subdivision homeowner, principal of Calver Capital, and Architectural Control Committee chair responsible for denying Vanyo's road proposal.
Whitney Smelser (Witness)
Licensed Land Surveyor and expert witness called by the HOA who testified on historical physical access to the mining claims.

Neutral Parties

John A. Buttrick (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
The trial court judge who presided over the jury trial and entered final judgment in favor of Vanyo.
Michael J. Brown (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the court's opinion reversing the waiver and implied easement claims.
Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge on Department B who concurred with the court's opinion.
Patricia K. Norris (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge on Department B who concurred with the court's opinion.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued docketing notices and orders to transmit the superior court record.
Ruth Willingham (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued electronic notifications of the opinion and the final civil mandate.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who processed the petition for review and issued letters on the denial of review.
Heinrich J. Thiele (Other)
The Heinrich J. Thiele and Gertrude A. Thiele Trust
Co-grantee of the perpetual 1984 access and utility easement across Lot 7 to access an adjacent unsubdivided parcel.
Gertrude A. Thiele (Other)
The Heinrich J. Thiele and Gertrude A. Thiele Trust
Co-grantee of the perpetual 1984 access and utility easement across Lot 7 to access an adjacent unsubdivided parcel.
Jefferrey Rybarszyk (Witness)
Professional engineer whose deposition testimony was entered into the court record.
John Ratliff (Witness)
Developer of the adjacent Carefree Vistas subdivision who offered Vanyo a limited roadway easement for $50,000.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of Maricopa County Superior Court.

What happened

In March 2005, David B. Vanyo, acting as trustee of the College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchased Lot 24 in the seventy-six-lot Carefree Foothills residential subdivision in Maricopa County, Arizona, alongside an adjacent nine-acre rectangular parcel called the Mamie Maude Mining Claim. Lot 24 is subject to the subdivision’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which restrict lot use exclusively to single-family residential purposes and prohibit non-residential structures. Mamie Maude, which is not part of the subdivision, is bisected by a steep, impassable slope that prevents building a safe roadway connecting its elevated northern portion to its lower southern portion. Seeking to develop the lower portion into four residential lots, Vanyo’s predecessors-in-interest and later Vanyo himself proposed building a fifty-foot roadway across Lot 24 to connect the cul-de-sac of Languid Lane to Mamie Maude. The HOA rejected both proposals, advising that a roadway is a non-residential structure that violates the CC&Rs.

In August 2006, Vanyo filed a class action lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court against all subdivision property owners, naming the HOA as the class representative. Vanyo sought a declaratory judgment that the HOA had waived its right to enforce the CC&R restriction because it had previously permitted two roadway easements (the Thiele roadway in 1984 and the Applegate roadway in 1987) to cross subdivision lots. Vanyo also claimed he possessed a common law implied way of necessity over Lot 24, or alternatively, that he was entitled to privately condemn the CC&R restriction under Arizona’s private way of necessity statute (A.R.S. § 12-1202(A)). Following a trial in November 2007, the jury returned a verdict in Vanyo’s favor on the waiver claim without reaching the other two claims. The trial court entered judgment for Vanyo, awarded him $100,000 in attorneys’ fees, and denied the HOA’s motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial.

The HOA appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for JMOL. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of JMOL on Vanyo’s waiver and implied way of necessity claims. It held that the two prior roadway easements did not constitute frequent violations to establish a waiver, and that the clear non-waiver provision in the CC&Rs barred Vanyo’s waiver claim because the subdivision covenants had not been completely abandoned. The court also held that Vanyo failed to prove an implied way of necessity because he provided no evidence that Mamie Maude was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912. However, the court affirmed the denial of JMOL on the statutory private condemnation claim, remanding it for a new trial because the jury had never reached a verdict on whether removing the CC&R restriction was reasonably necessary and what just compensation was due. Vanyo filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on May 24, 2011, and the Court of Appeals issued its civil mandate package to the Superior Court on June 15, 2011.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA (1 CA-CV 08-0450). The homeowners’ association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

1912-04-01

The United States Government issues a land patent for the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Charles W. Cheney and F.H. Summeril, severing it from federal land.

1956-06-15

The United States Government issues land patents for adjacent property including what is now the Carefree Foothills subdivision.

1983-11-23

CC&Rs containing a single-family residential use restriction and a non-waiver clause are executed and recorded for the Carefree Foothills subdivision.

1984-09-12

Developer Ralph Applegate causes Carefree Foothills Corporation to grant a perpetual access and utility easement across Lot 7 to the Thiele Trust.

1987-01-21

Lot owners (including Ralph Applegate) execute the Mutual Ingress and Egress Agreement and Easement over Lots 42, 43, and 44, which is recorded on April 2, 1987.

2005-03-22

David B. Vanyo, as trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchases Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim.

2005-11-14

Carefree Foothills HOA formally rejects David Vanyo's written proposal to build a roadway across Lot 24 to access Mamie Maude.

2006-08-08

David B. Vanyo files a putative class action complaint against Carefree Foothills HOA in Maricopa County Superior Court (Cause No. CV2006-011927).

2006-11-02

Maricopa County Superior Court certifies the case as a defendant class action, appointing the HOA as the class representative.

2007-11-13

A three-day jury trial begins in Maricopa County Superior Court.

2007-11-20

The jury returns a unanimous verdict in Vanyo's favor, finding the HOA waived enforcement of the CC&R single-family use restriction.

2008-04-17

Maricopa County Superior Court enters final judgment in favor of Vanyo, declaring the CC&R restriction waived and awarding $100,000 in attorneys' fees.

2008-04-25

Carefree Foothills HOA files a post-trial Motion for New Trial or Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL).

2008-06-24

Maricopa County Superior Court Judge John A. Buttrick enters an order denying the HOA's motion for JMOL and new trial.

2008-07-03

Carefree Foothills HOA files a Notice of Appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals and posts a supersedeas bond.

2008-08-13

The Arizona Court of Appeals denies the HOA's motion to challenge the supersedeas bond amount.

2008-08-20

The Court of Appeals Division One issues a Notice to Counsel docketing the appeal as Case No. 1 CA-CV 08-0450.

2008-11-10

College Book Centers / David Vanyo files Appellee's Answering Brief.

Download source

0000 Appellees Answering Brief

2008-11-18

Court of Appeals Clerk Philip G. Urry enters an order directing the Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal.

2008-12-03

Clerk of the Court of Appeals files the Inventory of Record on Appeal.

Download source

0000 Div 1 Inventory

2008-12-05

Carefree Foothills HOA files Appellant's Reply Brief.

Download source

0000 Appellants Reply Brief

2009-04-01

The Court of Appeals issues a Notice of Oral Argument setting the hearing for May 5, 2009.

Download source

0000 Notice Of Oa Or Conference

2009-05-05

Court of Appeals Department B hears oral argument and enters an order taking the appeal under advisement.

2010-10-26

The Arizona Court of Appeals Division One Department B files its Opinion, reversing the waiver and implied easement rulings but remanding the statutory condemnation claim for a new trial.

Download source

0000 Opinion

Download source

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2011-06-15_012_0000-civil-mandate-package.pdf

FAQ

Is this Arizona Court of Appeals ruling binding precedent?

Yes, this is a published, precedential opinion by the Arizona Court of Appeals. It establishes binding legal rules across Arizona regarding the strict enforceability of CC&R non-waiver clauses, the high evidentiary hurdles for common law implied easements of necessity, and the framework for statutory private condemnation of restrictive covenants.

Can an HOA waive its right to enforce CC&Rs if it allowed past violations?

Generally, no, if the CC&Rs contain a clear non-waiver clause. The Court of Appeals held that an unambiguous non-waiver clause remains enforceable despite past violations unless the restrictions have been so thoroughly disregarded as to constitute a ‘complete abandonment’ that destroys the fundamental character of the neighborhood.

How many past violations are needed to prove that an HOA has waived a covenant restriction?

The court ruled as a matter of law that two historical roadway violations over a twenty-year period in a seventy-six-lot subdivision do not constitute ‘frequent’ violations. To establish waiver in the absence of a non-waiver clause, violations must be frequent, habitual, or regular, occurring often or at close intervals.

What must a property owner prove to establish a common law implied way of necessity?

The claimant must prove that the dominant and servient properties were under common ownership, followed by a severance, and that the landlocked property had no outlet at the exact time of that original severance. Silence regarding access in a 1912 federal land patent is legally insufficient to prove that the property lacked an outlet.

Can a landlocked owner condemn an HOA's CC&R restriction to build an access road?

Yes. Arizona law allows a landlocked property owner to utilize statutory private condemnation under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) to condemn a restrictive covenant on an adjacent lot. Because this statutory right only arises if no common law implied easement exists, the court remanded this claim for a new trial to let a jury determine if the road is reasonably necessary and to decide the ‘just compensation’ owed to the subdivision lot owners.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 08-0450
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 26, 2010
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael J. Brown, Hon. Patricia A. Orozco, Hon. Patricia K. Norris
Parties	College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trustee David B. Vanyo (Plaintiffs/Appellees) v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners' Association (Defendants/Appellants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 33-416
Topics	CC&RsSelective EnforcementAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the homeowners' association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a seventy-six-lot subdivision did not constitute frequent violations, and the CC&Rs contained an enforceable non-waiver clause. It also held that Vanyo failed to establish a common law implied way of necessity because there was no historical evidence that the property was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	30 roadmap entries
Video overview	College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This case arose when David B. Vanyo, as trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchased undeveloped Lot 24 within the Carefree Foothills subdivision and an adjacent landlocked nine-acre parcel known as the Mamie Maude Mining Claim. To develop the lower portion of Mamie Maude into residential lots, Vanyo requested the homeowners' association's (HOA) permission to build a short roadway across Lot 24. The HOA denied the request because the subdivision's CC&Rs prohibited non-residential structures. Vanyo sued the HOA, claiming that the HOA waived this restriction by previously allowing two other roadways (the Thiele and Applegate easements), and that he was entitled to a common law implied easement or statutory private way of necessity. A jury found in Vanyo's favor on waiver, and the trial court entered judgment with attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the waiver and implied easement rulings, remanding the statutory private condemnation claim for a new trial.

Key Issues & Findings

The court's reasoning on the waiver claim turned on the frequency of violations and the effect of the CC&R non-waiver clause. It concluded that two prior roadway easements granted in the 1980s did not constitute frequent violations in a seventy-six-lot subdivision to establish waiver of the non-residential structure restriction. Furthermore, the court held that the CC&Rs contained an unambiguous non-waiver clause that remained fully enforceable since the subdivision covenants had not been completely abandoned. Complete abandonment occurs only when restrictions have been so thoroughly disregarded that the fundamental character of the neighborhood has been destroyed, which Vanyo did not argue. The court also rejected Vanyo's action versus inaction distinction, holding that both act as a failure to enforce that is covered by the non-waiver clause.

On Vanyo's common law implied way of necessity claim, the court held that Vanyo failed to establish a prima facie case. Under Arizona law, a claimant must prove that the dominant and servient properties were under common ownership, followed by severance, that the dominant property had no outlet at the time of severance, and that access was reasonably necessary when severance occurred. The court found no evidence in the record establishing that Mamie Maude was landlocked in 1912 when the land patent was issued. Silence regarding access in the 1912 land patent was insufficient to prove the lack of an outlet, particularly since a historical 1909 survey depicted roads crossing the mining claims.

Finally, the court addressed the statutory private condemnation claim under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A). Because private condemnation only comes into existence if no other access exists by common law implication, Vanyo's failure to establish an implied way of necessity cleared the path for statutory condemnation. Since the jury, having found for Vanyo on the waiver claim, did not decide whether removing the CC&R restriction was reasonably necessary for Vanyo's proper use and enjoyment of Mamie Maude, or what just compensation was due, the court remanded the statutory private condemnation claim for a new trial.

Why It Matters

This decision is highly significant for Arizona homeowners' associations, boards, and their legal counsel because it strongly reinforces the enforceability of clear and unambiguous non-waiver clauses within CC&Rs. The ruling establishes that an HOA's prior failure to enforce a covenant, or even its affirmative granting of historical variances, does not constitute a wholesale waiver of those covenants unless the violations are so rampant as to completely destroy the neighborhood's character. At the same time, it reminds associations that their discretionary design-control and enforcement powers are always constrained by duties of fairness and reasonableness, which protects members against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

For property litigation counsel, the case highlights the high evidentiary hurdles required to establish a common law implied way of necessity in Arizona. Specifically, it confirms that silence in a century-old federal land patent is legally insufficient to prove that a parcel was historically landlocked at severance. Lastly, the case confirms that restrictive covenants represent valid property rights that can be privately condemned under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A), opening a potential, though costly, pathway for landlocked owners to acquire access by paying just compensation to all affected lot owners in the subdivision.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments: Arizona Supreme Court Limits on Condominium Termination Forced Sales

Posted on June 29, 2026 by AZ HOA Watch

cc-and-rs | A.R.S. § 33-1228 | 257 Ariz. 82 (2024)

This Arizona Supreme Court decision sets the constitutional and statutory ground rules for forcing the buyout of minority condominium owners after a supermajority votes to terminate. It upholds the termination statute against a takings challenge but requires that the entire condominium — not individual holdout units — be sold.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Cao, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-22-0228-PR, 257 Ariz. 82 (2024); Court of Appeals decision vacated, superior court affirmed in part and remanded. A later order (No. CV-25-0071-PR, Aug. 20, 2025) sent the unit’s valuation to binding arbitration.

Download the Arizona Supreme Court opinion (2024) Download the Supreme Court order on remand (Aug. 2025) Download the Court of Appeals opinion (now vacated) Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2025-08-20. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Supreme Court’s resolution of a condominium-termination forced sale — the March 22, 2024 opinion (257 Ariz. 82), which vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and the follow-on August 20, 2025 per curiam order (No. CV-25-0071-PR) sending the unit’s valuation to binding arbitration. The Court of Appeals’ 2022 opinion has been vacated and is no longer controlling. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act. However, the Court also held that, under these circumstances, § 33-1228 required the sale of the entire condominium upon termination, not the sale of only the minority owners’ individual unit. It vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirmed the superior court except as to that issue, and remanded.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jie Cao (Plaintiff)
Minority condominium unit owner of Unit 106 at Dorsey Place Condominiums who challenged the condominium termination and forced sale.
Haining "Frazer" Xia (Plaintiff)
Minority condominium unit owner of Unit 106, husband of Jie Cao, who challenged the termination and forced sale.
Stone Xia (Plaintiff)
Son of Jie Cao and Haining Xia, residing in Fountain Hills, Arizona, named as a plaintiff in the complaints.
Dennis I. Wilenchik (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial counsel representing Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia in Maricopa County Superior Court.
John "Jack" D. Wilenchik (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial counsel representing Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia in Maricopa County Superior Court.
Ross P. Meyer (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial and appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs in both Superior Court and Court of Appeals proceedings.
Eric M. Fraser (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellants Jie Cao and Haining Xia before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
John S. Bullock (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellants Jie Cao and Haining Xia before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
Thomas L. Hudson (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate attorney with Osborn Maledon, P.A. who assisted on the appellate briefing and oral argument preparation.
James M. Manley (Counsel)
Pacific Legal Foundation
Amicus curiae counsel representing the Pacific Legal Foundation in support of Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Respondent Side

PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC (Defendant)
Majority investor entity that acquired 90 of the 96 units at Dorsey Place Condominiums and voted to terminate the condominium.
Dorsey Place Condominium Association (Defendant)
The homeowners association for the condominium complex that executed and recorded the termination agreement and warranty deed.
Lorne Polger (Board Member)
Pathfinder Partners / Dorsey Place Condominium Association
Principal of Pathfinder Partners and self-appointed Secretary of the Dorsey Place HOA; initially named as an individual defendant.
Matt Quinn (Association President)
Pathfinder Partners / Dorsey Place Condominium Association
Vice President of Pathfinder Partners and self-appointed President of the Dorsey Place HOA; initially named as an individual defendant.
Michael A. Schern (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Trial attorney who represented PFP Dorsey and the individual defendants; initially named as an individual defendant before being dismissed.
Shawna M. Woner (Counsel)
Woner Hoffmaster Peshek & Gintert, PC
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC.
Stephanie K. Gintert (Counsel)
Woner Hoffmaster Peshek & Gintert, PC
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC.
Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee Dorsey Place Condominium Association.
Nicholas C.S. Nogami (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee Dorsey Place Condominium Association.
Aaron M. Finter (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Co-counsel representing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern in Superior Court.
Aaron R. Clouse (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Co-counsel representing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern in Superior Court.
Jennifer Barry (Board Member)
Pathfinder Partners
General Counsel for Pathfinder Partners who coordinated defense strategy, mediation, and client representation.

Neutral Parties

Hon. Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial court judge originally assigned to the civil action in Maricopa County Superior Court.
Hon. Gary L. Popham Jr. (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial commissioner/judge who heard and ruled on early default and consolidation motions.
Hon. Daniel G. Martin (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Commercial Court judge who dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice and awarded taxable costs.
Hon. Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Presiding Appellate Judge who delivered the court's published opinion reversing and remanding the case.
Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Chief Appellate Judge who sat on the Division One panel and joined the opinion.
Hon. David B. Gass (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Appellate Judge who sat on the Division One panel and joined the opinion.
Justice Clint Bolick (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Arizona Supreme Court Justice who authored the unanimous March 22, 2024 opinion (257 Ariz. 82).
Amy M. Wood (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals Division One who issued appellate clerk notices, record transmittals, and schedules.
Jeff Fine (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court who certified and transmitted the electronic record on appeal.
Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the 2024 opinion; as Chief Justice, signed the August 20, 2025 per curiam Decision Order.
Justice John R. Lopez IV (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice James P. Beene (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice William G. Montgomery (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice Kathryn H. King (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.

What happened

In January 2018, Jie Cao and Haining Xia purchased Unit 106 of the Dorsey Place Condominiums in Tempe, Arizona, subject to the recorded Condominium Declaration. In November 2018, PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC acquired 90 of the 96 units in the complex, gaining approximately 94% of the voting power.

In March 2019, the Association notified members of a meeting to terminate the condominium, proposing to sell the entire complex to PFP Dorsey. At the April 4, 2019 meeting, the Association presented a modified termination agreement to sell only the minority-owned units to PFP Dorsey. Utilizing its 94% vote, PFP Dorsey ratified the agreement, and the Association recorded a deed transferring the Xias’ unit to PFP Dorsey.

The Xias sued PFP Dorsey and the Association, claiming the forced sale was an unconstitutional private taking and a breach of fiduciary duty. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that an older version of the termination statute governed. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review.

On March 22, 2024, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision. It rejected the owners’ constitutional argument but held that A.R.S. § 33-1228 required selling the entire condominium, not just the Xias’ unit, and remanded. After the parties disputed the meaning of the mandate on remand, the Court issued a per curiam order on August 20, 2025 (No. CV-25-0071-PR) affirming the superior court, limiting the remaining issue to the unit’s fair market value as the owners’ total compensation, and sending that valuation to final and binding arbitration under § 33-1228.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments (257 Ariz. 82, 545 P.3d 459 (2024)). Condo termination statute allowed forced sale procedures, subject to constitutional compensation limits. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

2019-11-20

Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia file their initial Civil Complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court.

2019-12-18

Defendants file a Notice Requesting Assignment to Commercial Court and a Motion for More Definite Statement.

2019-12-20

Defendants file their formal Answer to the initial Complaint.

2020-01-03

Carpenter Hazlewood files a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Lorne Polger and Matt Quinn.

2020-01-17

Minute Entry orders the case referred for reassignment to Commercial Court.

2020-01-22

Plaintiffs file a Motion requesting a sheriff lock up of Unit 106 and an injunction on Defendants.

2020-01-24

Case is officially reassigned to the Commercial Court under Hon. Daniel Martin.

2020-02-25

Minute Entry from status conference orders Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, denies Defendants' MTD as moot, and Plaintiffs withdraw their injunction motion.

2020-03-27

Plaintiffs file their First Amended Complaint.

2020-07-06

Plaintiffs file their Second Amended Complaint.

2020-07-24

Hon. Daniel Martin signs an order dismissing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern without prejudice.

2020-08-13

PFP Dorsey and Dorsey Place Condominium Association file separate Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

2020-09-16

Plaintiffs file their Response to the Motions to Dismiss.

2020-10-05

Defendants file their Reply briefs in support of the Motions to Dismiss.

2020-12-15

Virtual Oral Argument is held on the Motions to Dismiss before Hon. Daniel Martin.

2020-12-18

Court files a Minute Entry Under Advisement Ruling dated Dec 15, 2020, granting both Motions to Dismiss with prejudice.

2021-01-07

Defendants file separate Applications for Attorneys' Fees and Costs.

2021-03-15

Hon. Daniel Martin issues a Minute Entry Ruling denying the defendants' fee applications but granting taxable costs.

2021-03-18

Court enters signed judgments in favor of both defendants under Rule 54(b).

2021-04-19

Plaintiffs file their first Notice of Appeal from the March 18 judgments.

2021-04-27

Court enters revised final judgment under Rule 54(c).

2021-05-12

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision holding that the Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act.

Download source file

2025-08-20_196_0000-supreme-court-decision-order.pdf

FAQ

Is Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. The controlling decision is now the Arizona Supreme Court’s published opinion, Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC, 257 Ariz. 82 (2024), which vacated the earlier Court of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court’s opinion is binding statewide; the 2022 Court of Appeals opinion is no longer good law.

Can a supermajority investor force minority condo owners to sell their units?

Under A.R.S. § 33-1228, a supermajority can vote to terminate a condominium. The Supreme Court held this forced sale does not violate Arizona’s constitutional ban on takings for private use, because the owners agreed to the recorded Declaration, which incorporates the Condominium Act. However, the Court held the statute requires the sale of the entire condominium upon termination — not the sale of only the holdout owners’ individual unit.

Did the unit owners win or lose?

It was a split result. The owners (Jie Cao and Haining ‘Frazer’ Xia) lost their constitutional eminent-domain argument but won on the statutory ground: because only their unit was force-sold while the investor kept the other 90 units, the sale was improper under § 33-1228. The case was remanded, and a later order limited the remaining issue to the fair market value of their unit as their total compensation.

What did the August 2025 Supreme Court order decide?

In a per curiam order (No. CV-25-0071-PR, Aug. 20, 2025), the Court clarified its mandate: the superior court was affirmed, the sole remaining issue is the fair market value of the owners’ unit (paid as their total compensation), and the matter was remanded for final and binding arbitration under A.R.S. § 33-1228 and the Condominium Termination Agreement.

What happened to the Court of Appeals' 'older statute governs' reasoning?

The Supreme Court rejected it. The Court of Appeals had held that the 1986 version of § 33-1228 governed because the owners bought before the 2018 amendments. The Supreme Court disagreed: the Declaration incorporated the Condominium Act ‘as amended from time to time,’ that amendment was anticipated, and Kalway v. Calabria Ranch did not apply because the Declaration itself was never amended — so the 2018 version of the statute applied.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	257 Ariz. 82, 545 P.3d 459 (2024)
Court / tribunal	Arizona Supreme Court
Decision / key date	March 22, 2024
Judge / panel	Justice Clint Bolick (author), Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel, Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer, Justice John R. Lopez IV, Justice James P. Beene, Justice William G. Montgomery, Justice Kathryn H. King
Parties	Jie Cao and Haining 'Frazer' Xia (condominium unit owners) v. PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC (majority investor) and Dorsey Place Condominium Association (homeowners association)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1228 A.R.S. § 33-1201 Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act. However, the Court also held that, under these circumstances, § 33-1228 required the sale of the entire condominium upon termination, not the sale of only the minority owners' individual unit. It vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the superior court except as to that issue, and remanded.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	193 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	48 roadmap entries
Video overview	Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Jie Cao and Haining 'Frazer' Xia owned one of 96 units at Dorsey Place Condominiums. After PFP Dorsey Investments acquired 90 units (about 94% of the vote), it invoked A.R.S. § 33-1228 to terminate the condominium and force the sale of the remaining minority units to itself. The Xias sued, arguing the forced sale was an unconstitutional private taking. The superior court dismissed the complaint; the Court of Appeals reversed on a statutory-retroactivity theory. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated that decision. It held the forced sale did not violate Arizona's eminent-domain clause, because the owners agreed to the recorded Declaration incorporating the Condominium Act, but it also held that § 33-1228 required selling the entire condominium, not just the holdout unit. It remanded; a later 2025 order limited the remaining issue to the unit's fair market value as the owners' total compensation, to be fixed by binding arbitration.

Key Issues & Findings

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Bolick first addressed the constitutional challenge. The Xias argued that A.R.S. § 33-1228 — which lets a supermajority terminate a condominium and force the sale of objecting owners' units — authorized an unconstitutional taking of private property for private use under Article 2, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution. The Court disagreed. The sale authority derived not from the State's eminent-domain power but from the recorded Declaration, a contract to which the Xias voluntarily agreed when they purchased their unit; the Declaration expressly submitted the property to the Condominium Act and provided for partition upon dissolution. Because the arrangement was contractual, it was not a governmental taking.

The Court then held, however, that the forced sale as carried out was not authorized by the statute. Termination under § 33-1228 required the sale of all of the condominium property, not the sale of individual holdout units while the terminating owner retained the rest. Here PFP Dorsey force-sold only the Xias' unit and kept the other ninety units, which the statute did not permit. The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the superior court except as to this issue (Part II of the opinion), and remanded.

Finally, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals' premise that an older (1986) version of the statute governed because the Xias purchased before the 2018 amendments. The Declaration incorporated the Condominium Act 'as amended from time to time,' so the possibility of statutory amendment was anticipated; Kalway v. Calabria Ranch — which barred unforeseen amendments to a declaration itself — did not apply because the Declaration was never amended, only the incorporated statutes were. Accordingly, the 2018 version of § 33-1228 controlled. On remand the parties disputed the scope of the mandate, and in a per curiam order dated August 20, 2025 (No. CV-25-0071-PR), the Supreme Court clarified that the superior court was affirmed, the only remaining issue is the fair market value of the Xias' unit as their total compensation, and the matter must proceed to final and binding arbitration under § 33-1228 and the Condominium Termination Agreement.

Why It Matters

For Arizona condominium owners, associations, and investors, this decision sets the ground rules for 'bulk buyout' terminations. It confirms that a supermajority may use A.R.S. § 33-1228 to terminate a condominium and that the resulting forced sale is not an unconstitutional taking, because owners agree to the Condominium Act through their recorded declaration. Investors cannot defeat a buyout simply by labeling it a private taking.

But the decision also imposes a critical limit: on termination, the statute requires selling the entire condominium, not cherry-picking and force-selling only holdout units while the majority owner keeps the rest. And owners who are bought out are entitled to the fair market value of their unit as total compensation, which — per the Court's 2025 order — may be fixed through binding arbitration under the termination agreement. Boards and counsel structuring a termination must follow the whole-property sale mechanism and a defensible valuation process, or risk having the sale undone.

← Back to Arizona Supreme Court cases

Multari v. Gress: Developer Private Deed Restrictions Held Invalid

Posted on June 29, 2026 by AZ HOA Watch

CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 12-2101, 12-120.21 | 1 CA-CV 06-0221

This case highlights the strict limits placed on residential developers in Arizona. It illustrates that uniform subdivision covenants cannot be selectively altered by recording non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots without a proper vote.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Multari, Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 06-0221; reversed and remanded.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Court of Appeals decision declaring lot-specific private deed restrictions invalid when they selectively alter uniform subdivision covenants. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform covenants and restrictions otherwise applicable to those lots without following the uniform declaration’s formal amendment procedures.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Dominick Multari (Plaintiff)
Husband of Lynn Multari, owner of lot 290 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, and successor-in-interest to the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.
Lynn Multari (Plaintiff)
Wife of Dominick Multari, owner of lot 290 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, and successor-in-interest to the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.
John Maston O’Neal (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
Counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Dominick and Lynn Multari.
David E. Funkhouser III (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
Counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Dominick and Lynn Multari.

Respondent Side

Richard D. Gress (Defendant)
Husband of Carmen Gress, trustee under agreement dated April 15, 1998, and owner of lot 285 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, subject to the contested 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.
Carmen Gress (Defendant)
Wife of Richard D. Gress, trustee under agreement dated April 15, 1998, and owner of lot 285 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, subject to the contested 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.
Timothy J. Thomason (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel representing Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Richard D. and Carmen Gress.
Charles H. Oldham (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel representing Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Richard D. and Carmen Gress.

Neutral Parties

Daniel A. Barker (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Authoring Appellate Judge on Department B who delivered the Court's opinion reversing the summary judgment.
Patricia K. Norris (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Appellate Judge for Department B on Department B.
Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate Judge for Department B.
Janet E. Barton (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial Court Judge who presided over the underlying case (Cause No. CV 2005-009405) and granted summary judgment in favor of the Multaris.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who received the transmittal of the Petition for Review.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Minnesota Title Company (Other)
Original developer and legal owner of lots 244 through 297, which recorded the uniform 1973 Declaration of Deed Restrictions and subsequent lot-specific private deed restrictions.

What happened

In April 1973, Minnesota Title Company, the original legal owner of lots 244 through 297 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, recorded a uniform ‘Declaration of Deed Restrictions’ permitting accessory structures of any size and requiring a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants. Subsequently, between 1973 and 1978, the developer recorded individual ‘private deed restrictions’ on thirty-two of the fifty-four lots as they were sold.

In 1976, Minnesota Title recorded private deed restrictions on lot 285 (later owned by the Gresses) prohibiting structures under 1,400 square feet or higher than 13 feet, with a clause allowing the owner of lot 290 (later owned by the Multaris) to sue for violations and recover attorneys’ fees. In 2005, the Gresses began building a small accessory building. The Multaris sued to stop construction and enforce the 1976 restrictions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Multaris, which the Gresses appealed.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Multari v. Gress (1 CA-CV 06-0221). A developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Multari v. Gress. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

1973-04-04

Minnesota Title Company records the uniform Declaration of Deed Restrictions (1973 Declaration) for the Ocotillo Hills subdivision.

1973-04-17

Minnesota Title conveys Lot 290 and records the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.

1975-12-16

Minnesota Title sells Lot 285 to the Gresses' predecessors in interest.

1976-01-06

Minnesota Title records the deed and the 1976 Private Deed Restrictions for Lot 285.

2005-02-15

Richard and Carmen Gress begin construction of a small accessory building behind their home.

2005-04-15

Dominick and Lynn Multari send a letter to the Gresses requesting that they cease construction.

2005-06-08

The Multaris file a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court to enforce the 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.

2005-09-19

A trial court transcript of proceedings is recorded in the Maricopa County Superior Court.

2006-04-11

Superior Court Clerk files the index of record, and the Court of Appeals, Division One docket assigns Case No. 1 CA-CV 06-0221.

Download source

0000 Div 1 Civil Notice To Counsel Appell

2006-04-14

The Gresses pay their appellant filing fee in the Court of Appeals.

2006-05-02

Court of Appeals issues notice reminding of appellant's opening brief and appellee's fee deadlines.

Download source

0000 Div 1 Notice To Counsel Appellees Fe

2006-08-02

Court of Appeals orders the Superior Court Clerk to transmit the trial court record on appeal.

2006-08-09

The record inventory from the Maricopa County Superior Court is filed with the Court of Appeals.

2007-01-16

Court of Appeals issues Notice of Oral Argument setting the hearing for February 27, 2007.

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2008-01-31_012_0000-div-1-civil-mandate-package.pdf

Source 13 2008-01-31

0000 Div 1 Westmeadbureau Package Lette

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2008-01-31_013_0000-div-1-westmeadbureau-package-lette.pdf

FAQ

Is the court's decision in Multari v. Gress precedential?

Yes. This is a published Arizona Court of Appeals opinion, which makes it binding legal precedent in Arizona. It can be cited as authoritative case law in disputes involving subdivision deed restrictions.

Can a developer record separate private restrictions on individual lots that conflict with uniform CC&Rs?

No. The court held that a developer cannot use lot-specific private deed restrictions to alter or restrict rights granted under a previously recorded uniform declaration of covenants without following the formal amendment procedures specified in that uniform declaration.

What happens if a developer tries to bypass formal CC&R amendment procedures?

Any lot-specific private restrictions recorded by a developer that effectively change or restrict the rights guaranteed under the uniform subdivision declaration will be declared invalid and unenforceable if they did not follow the uniform declaration’s formal amendment processes.

Why did the Multaris lose their lawsuit to enforce the 13-foot structure height limit against the Gresses?

Although the Multaris had a private restriction recorded on the Gresses’ lot in 1976 that limited accessory structures to 13 feet in height, the court ruled this restriction invalid because it conflicted with the 1973 subdivision-wide uniform declaration, which allowed accessory buildings of any dimension and required a two-thirds owner vote to amend.

Can a homeowner recover attorneys' fees if they sue based on an invalid private deed restriction?

No. Because the lot-specific private deed restriction was ruled invalid, the Multaris were not the successful party and could not recover attorneys’ fees or costs under either the statutory provision (A.R.S. § 12-341.01) or the invalid restriction itself.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 06-0221
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 24, 2007
Judge / panel	Hon. Daniel A. Barker, Hon. Patricia K. Norris, Hon. Jon W. Thompson
Parties	Dominick and Lynn Multari (Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants) vs. Richard D. and Carmen Gress, as trustees (Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-2101 A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-341
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform covenants and restrictions otherwise applicable to those lots without following the uniform declaration's formal amendment procedures.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	22 roadmap entries
Video overview	Multari v. Gress
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Dominick and Lynn Multari sued their neighbors, Richard and Carmen Gress, seeking to enforce private deed restrictions recorded by the subdivision's developer in 1976. The 1976 restrictions limited the size and height of accessory structures on the Gresses' lot. The Gresses argued that these restrictions were invalid because they conflicted with a 1973 Declaration of Deed Restrictions that applied uniformly to all lots in the subdivision and permitted accessory buildings of any dimension. The 1973 Declaration required a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Multaris, enforcing the restrictions and awarding attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the developer could not bypass the 1973 Declaration's amendment procedure by recording non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots. The private restrictions were declared invalid, and the case was remanded to enter judgment for the Gresses.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1973 Declaration established uniform covenants and restrictions for the benefit of 'each and every' lot in the subdivision, which explicitly permitted accessory structures of any size. The subsequent 1976 Private Deed Restrictions placed by the developer on some but not all lots took away this right, which constituted an alteration or 'change in part' of the 1973 Declaration. Permitting developers to use private deed restrictions to bypass the formal amendment process would destroy the right of property owners to rely on restrictive covenants and completely upset the orderly plan of the subdivision.

Since the 1973 Declaration required a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants, and the developer's private restrictions did not comply with this exclusive procedure, the non-uniform private restrictions limiting structure dimensions were held to be an invalid amendment. The court noted that this decision does not address scenarios in which a subsequent private property owner, rather than the developer acting on multiple lots, records private restrictions different from the uniform ones.

Why It Matters

For Arizona HOAs and homeowners, this case establishes that a developer cannot selectively or unilaterally impose non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots that conflict with or alter rights granted under a previously recorded uniform declaration, unless they adhere strictly to the declaration's specified amendment procedures. This enforces the predictability and environmental stability of subdivisions by protecting the rights of lot owners to rely on the original uniform covenants.

For legal counsel and boards, the ruling serves as a warning that restrictive covenants must be uniform and amended only via the formal processes established in the original declarations. Unilateral developer carve-outs or non-uniform lot restrictions are highly vulnerable to being declared invalid. Furthermore, litigation to enforce such invalid restrictions will result in the loss of any contractual right to attorneys' fees and costs.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Garden Lakes v. Madigan: HOA Aesthetic Rules vs. Arizona Solar Rights

Posted on June 29, 2026 by AZ HOA Watch

Architectural Review | A.R.S. §§ 33-439, 44-1761 | 1 CA-CV 00-0570

This landmark Arizona case demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power to enforce aesthetic architectural restrictions against solar installations. It establishes a case-by-case factual standard for evaluating whether association guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ solar devices. Crucially, the decision confirms that courts can consider compliance costs to determine if a restriction is void under state law.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. v. Madigan, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, No. 1 CA-CV 00-0570 (204 Ariz. 234, 62 P.3d 983); review denied by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Download appellate opinion Download petition for review Download docket & case information Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the published Arizona Court of Appeals opinion in Garden Lakes Community Association v. Madigan (1 CA-CV 00-0570), which the Arizona Supreme Court declined to review, together with the uploaded appellate record (briefs, amicus filings, petition for review, and orders). The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder; AI-generated review materials were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that whether a homeowners association’s architectural guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The court further held that while the homeowner bears the burden of proof, the trial court may properly consider the increased cost of complying with aesthetic restrictions as a relevant factor in determining whether an effective prohibition exists.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
The homeowners association (an Arizona non-profit corporation) that brought separate lawsuits (later consolidated) against the homeowners to compel the removal of roof-mounted solar energy devices.
Neal B. Thomas (Counsel)
Thomas & Elardo, P.C.
Represented Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
Beth Mulcahy (Counsel)
Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C.
Represented Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
James Howard Barnes (Witness)
Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
First chairman of the Garden Lakes Architectural Review Committee (ARC); testified on behalf of the Association.
Robert Hammond (Witness)
Solar expert with 20 years of experience hired by the Association to investigate alternative designs; admitted that several alternative screening designs were not viable.
Walter M. Mikitowicz (Witness)
Construction expert who testified on behalf of the Association regarding the costs of constructing proposed alternative screens and patio covers.

Respondent Side

William E. Madigan (Defendant)
Homeowner in Garden Lakes who installed a solar pool heater without ARC approval; passed away before trial, resulting in his case being dismissed after the solar equipment was removed.
Joan M. Madigan (Defendant)
Wife of William E. Madigan and co-owner of the property; removed the solar panels after her husband's death, leading to dismissal of the case against her.
Henry T. Speak (Defendant)
Homeowner with arthritis who installed terra-cotta colored roof-mounted solar panels to heat his pool for therapeutic exercise; successfully defended under A.R.S. § 33-439.
LaVonne M. Speak (Defendant)
Wife of Henry T. Speak and co-owner of the property; prevailed alongside her husband.
Hyung S. Choi (Counsel)
Choi Rhee & Fabian, PLC
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Madigan and Speak. Also shown as Choi & Rhee, PLLC in Court of Appeals award order.
Gerald Pollock (Counsel)
Law Office of Gerald A. Pollock
Represented Defendants-Appellees Madigan and Speak.
John Gilchrist (Witness)
Solar expert with 20 years of experience who testified on behalf of the homeowners; testified regarding screening feasibility, setback issues, and efficiency loss.

Neutral Parties

Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Ekmark & Ekmark, L.L.C.
Represented Applicant/Amicus Curiae Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc.
Hon. David M. Talamante (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior court trial judge who presided over the consolidated trials and entered final judgment in favor of the homeowners.
Hon. John C. Gemmill (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the published opinion affirming the trial court's judgment.
Hon. Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge of Department B who concurred in the opinion.
Hon. Noel Fidel (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who concurred in the opinion; also appointed pro tempore by the Arizona Supreme Court to participate in and sign decisions on this case.
Bruce E. Meyerson (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate mediator assigned to conduct the appellate settlement conference on February 8, 2001.
Tom Brantner (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Donald LaMontague (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Bruce Bartley (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Kelly Dancer (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Michael Neary (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.

What happened

William and Joan Madigan and Henry and LaVonne Speak owned homes in the Garden Lakes subdivision in Avondale, Arizona. Both families installed solar panels on their roofs to heat their swimming pools without seeking prior approval from the Garden Lakes Community Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). The Association’s guidelines required roof-mounted solar equipment to match the roof material, be integrated into the roof design, and be screened from public view. Believing the homeowners violated these restrictions and breached the community’s Declaration, the Association filed separate lawsuits seeking permanent injunctions to compel the removal of the solar panels, along with over $100,000 in cumulative fines, and attorneys’ fees. The homeowners asserted that the guidelines were void and unenforceable under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) because they effectively prohibited solar energy devices.

The lawsuits were consolidated. Before trial, the Association waived the fines, and William Madigan passed away, prompting Joan Madigan to remove her solar panels and resulting in the dismissal of her case. The remaining case against the Speaks was tried to the court with an advisory jury. The advisory jury found that the Speaks installed the panels without prior approval, that the Association’s guidelines were not reasonable and unambiguous, but also found (under a confusingly worded interrogatory) that the guidelines did not effectively prohibit solar devices. Treating the jury’s findings as merely advisory, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the Speaks, concluding that the guidelines and the Association’s conduct ‘effectively prohibited’ the solar devices. The Association appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees to the homeowners.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. v. Madigan and Speak (204 Ariz. 234, 62 P.3d 983 (Ct. App. 2003), 1 CA-CV 00-0570). Whether a homeowners association’s architectural guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. v. Madigan and Speak. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

1986-01-28

The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Garden Lakes is recorded.

1997-01-15

Henry Speak submits an application to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for a solar pool heater, which is rejected. Henry Speak proceeds with the roof installation regardless.

1997-05-15

The Garden Lakes Community Association files separate lawsuits in Maricopa County Superior Court against homeowners Henry Speak and William Madigan to compel removal of their solar panels.

2000-01-11

The consolidated trial begins in the Maricopa County Superior Court.

2000-12-29

Garden Lakes Community Association files a Notice of Appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, after the trial court enters judgment in favor of the homeowners.

2001-02-21

Garden Lakes Community Association files its Opening Brief on appeal.

2001-04-06

Appellees file their Answering Brief on appeal.

2001-05-01

Garden Lakes Community Association files its Reply Brief.

2001-08-10

Sun City Grand Community Association files an Amicus Curiae Brief.

2001-09-06

Division One of the Court of Appeals hears oral arguments and takes the case under advisement.

2003-02-18

Arizona Court of Appeals issues its published opinion affirming the trial court's judgment.

Download 3 sources

Final Appellate Opinion Opinion Affirmed Opinion Affirmed

2003-03-21

Garden Lakes Community Association files a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court.

Download source

Petition For Review

2003-04-18

Appellees file their Response in Opposition to the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court.

Download source

Response In Opposition To Petition For Review

2003-04-24

Court of Appeals enters an order awarding Appellees their attorneys' fees and costs totaling $20,024.05.

2003-07-01

Arizona Supreme Court denies the Petition for Review and grants Appellees' request for Supreme Court attorneys' fees.

2003-07-22

Original Mandate is issued, returning the record to the Maricopa County Superior Court and terminating the appeal.

View all 11 source documents for this case ↓

Complete source-document index

This index contains 11 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2000-12-19

Docket And Case Information

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2000-12-19_001_docket-and-case-information.pdf

Source 2 2001-09-04

Response To Amicus Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.

Download source file

2001-09-04_002_response-to-amicus-brief.pdf

Source 3 2003-02-18

Final Appellate Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that whether a homeowners association's architectural guidelines 'effectively prohibit' the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Download source file

2003-02-18_003_final-appellate-opinion.pdf

Source 4 2003-02-18

Opinion Affirmed

Type: Decision or judgment

Download source file

2003-02-18_004_opinion-affirmed.pdf

Source 5 2003-02-18

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

undated_011_undated-case-caption.pdf

FAQ

Is the Garden Lakes v. Madigan decision binding precedent for Arizona HOAs?

Yes. The decision was published as a precedential opinion by Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals, meaning it is binding on all Arizona homeowners associations and trial courts.

Can an Arizona HOA completely ban roof-mounted solar panels for aesthetic reasons?

No. Under A.R.S. § 33-439(A), any covenant, restriction, or guideline that effectively prohibits the installation or use of a solar energy device is void and unenforceable. While HOAs can regulate solar placement, they cannot use aesthetic rules to force a complete ban or make installation practically impossible.

Can an HOA enforce guidelines that make solar installation significantly more expensive?

It depends, but generally no if the cost is unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that while cost is not the sole factor, courts must consider the increased financial burden of complying with HOA guidelines. If complying with aesthetic demands (like building massive screens or custom patios) drastically increases the system’s cost, those guidelines may be ruled an invalid ‘effective prohibition’ under A.R.S. § 33-439(A).

What factors do Arizona courts look at to decide if an HOA rule 'effectively prohibits' solar use?

The Court of Appeals established a flexible, ten-factor test. These factors include the language of the guidelines, the association’s conduct, the availability of feasible solar alternatives, the comparative cost and performance of those alternatives, the physical limits of the property, and whether the restrictions impose too great a cost relative to what a typical homeowner in the community is willing to spend.

Who has the burden of proving that an HOA rule effectively prohibits solar devices in court?

The homeowner bears the burden of proving that the HOA’s guidelines or conduct ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of their solar energy device. In this case, the Speaks successfully met their burden by presenting expert testimony showing that the HOA’s proposed screening and patio cover alternatives were technically unfeasible, violated city setback rules, and added thousands of dollars in unnecessary costs.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	204 Ariz. 234, 62 P.3d 983 (Ct. App. 2003), 1 CA-CV 00-0570
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	February 18, 2003
Judge / panel	Hon. John C. Gemmill, Hon. Ann A. Scott Timmer, Hon. Noel Fidel
Parties	Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. vs. Defendants-Appellees William E. & Joan M. Madigan and Henry T. & LaVonne M. Speak (homeowners)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-439 A.R.S. § 44-1761 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that whether a homeowners association's architectural guidelines 'effectively prohibit' the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The court further held that while the homeowner bears the burden of proof, the trial court may properly consider the increased cost of complying with aesthetic restrictions as a relevant factor in determining whether an effective prohibition exists.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	11 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	16 roadmap entries
Video overview	Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. v. Madigan and Speak
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The Garden Lakes Community Association (the Association) brought separate lawsuits against homeowners Henry and LaVonne Speak, and William and Joan Madigan (which were later consolidated), seeking a permanent injunction to compel the removal of roof-mounted solar energy devices installed without Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approval. The homeowners defended under A.R.S. § 33-439(A), which voids any deed restriction that 'effectively prohibits' the installation or use of solar energy devices. Before trial, the Association waived $100,000 in alleged fines, and the Madigans were dismissed after removing their system following William Madigan's death. Following a trial with an advisory jury, the court entered judgment in favor of the Speaks, finding that the Association's aesthetic guidelines combined with its conduct effectively prohibited solar device installation. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, establishing that whether a restriction 'effectively prohibits' solar use is a case-by-case question of fact, and that courts may properly consider the added costs of compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

First, the Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory phrase 'effectively prohibits' under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) by rejecting the Association's argument that it required 'inevitable preclusion' of solar devices. Instead, the court adopted a practical, flexible standard, emphasizing that the Arizona Legislature intended to encourage solar energy use by offering incentives and limiting disincentives. The court identified a non-exhaustive list of ten potentially relevant factors for evaluating these disputes, including the content of the guidelines, the association's conduct, the availability of feasible alternatives, and the increased cost of compliance in relation to what typical homeowners in the community are willing to spend.

Second, the court explained that although the burden of proof remains on the homeowner, cost cannot be ignored in an effective prohibition analysis. It noted that with enough money, any solar system could be custom-engineered to meet strict architectural guidelines, but such exorbitant expenses would dissuade average homeowners from adopting solar energy. Thus, while cost alone is not dispositive, it is a proper factor to analyze, focusing on the motivation of the average homeowner within that specific community.

Finally, applying these factors, the court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's ruling in favor of the Speaks. The Association's suggested alternatives—building a massive patio cover that would violate city pool setbacks, or constructing an experimental roof screen that matched the home's stucco but reduced solar efficiency—were cost-prohibitive, impractical, and visually unappealing even to the Association's own architectural review committee members.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOA boards, this case serves as a landmark ruling establishing that HOAs cannot use heavy-handed aesthetic guidelines or unreasonable conduct to block solar energy installations. Boards must adopt a cooperative and reasonable approach, as rigid screening or integration requirements that add substantial costs (such as doubling the system price) will be declared void under A.R.S. § 33-439(A). Additionally, the ruling clarifies that HOA decisions are not entitled to administrative-like judicial deference, protecting homeowners from unchecked board power.

For legal counsel, the opinion provides a clear blueprint of ten factors to utilize when evaluating, litigating, or settling solar-related HOA disputes. It highlights the importance of presenting detailed evidence regarding the technical feasibility, city setback restrictions, and comparative costs of alternative designs. It also underscores the risk to HOAs of facing significant attorney's fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) if they unsuccessfully attempt to force homeowners to remove solar devices.

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Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection: Arizona Timeshare Owners’ Right to Inspect Records

Posted on June 19, 2026 by AZ HOA Watch

Arizona Timeshare & HOA Records | A.R.S. § 33-2209 | 1 CA-CV 16-0659

Zwicky is the leading published Arizona decision on a timeshare member’s statutory right to inspect association financial books and records. The Court of Appeals affirmed an order compelling production, adopted a member-friendly ‘proper purpose’ standard, and held the business judgment rule cannot defeat the statutory right — while protecting genuinely confidential financial data and barring litigation-recruitment notices.

Last updated June 19, 2026. Case: Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 16-0659, 244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018); Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-051911.

Download appellate opinion Download final judgment Source-file index FAQ

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Scope note: This page covers the published Court of Appeals opinion (1 CA-CV 16-0659) and the uploaded trial and appellate record. The complete source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder. This page is an educational summary, not legal advice.

The rule

A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a ‘proper purpose’ — a desire to obtain information that reasonably relates to protecting the owner’s interest as a member — may compel inspection of the association’s financial and other records under A.R.S. § 33-2209, and the board’s discretion and the business judgment rule are no defense. But an association cannot be ordered under A.R.S. § 33-2210 to circulate member notices whose real purpose is recruiting plaintiffs rather than legitimate association business, and genuinely confidential or proprietary financial data may be protected by a properly supported protective order.

What happened

Norman Zwicky paid about $26,000 for his timeshare interest in 2004 and watched his annual assessments climb to roughly $2,162 by 2015. Suspecting that the developer-affiliated manager (tied to Diamond Resorts) was shifting hotel-operation and unsold-inventory costs onto members, he made a written statutory request to inspect the association’s financial books and records so he could investigate whether assessments were calculated in good faith.

The association refused. The trial court (Judge John R. Hannah, Jr.) granted Zwicky summary judgment compelling production of twelve categories of financial records. The association appealed. On January 23, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed the core inspection right, vacated a member-notice order and a protective-order modification, and remanded; the parties then entered a stipulated final order on remand keeping certain documents confidential.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association (244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018), 1 CA-CV 16-0659). A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a ‘proper purpose’ — a desire to obtain… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

2015-05-13

Zwicky files verified complaint to compel records inspection (CV2015-051911)

Download 5 sources

Certificate Of Compulsory Arbitration Certificate Of Compulsory Arbitration Civil Cover Sheet Summons Verified Complaint

2016-03-11

Superior court grants Zwicky summary judgment; denies association's cross-motion

Download source

Minute Entry

2016-09-16

Final judgment ordering production; attorneys' fees denied (not an action 'arising out of contract')

2018-01-23

Court of Appeals affirms inspection right; vacates member-notice and protective-order modification; remands (1 CA-CV 16-0659)

Download source

Opinion Of The Court

2018-08-23

Stipulated final order on remand resolves confidentiality

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2018-08-21_076_stipulated-order.pdf

Source 77 2018-11-30

Notice Of Change Of Firm Address

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Download source file

2018-11-30_077_notice-of-change-of-firm-address.pdf

Why it matters

Statutory records-inspection rights are court-enforceable.
No board permission needed.
‘Proper purpose’ is read in the member’s favor.

Board discretion and the business judgment rule do not defeat the statutory right.
Confidential or proprietary financials can still be protected by a proper protective order.

An association cannot be forced to mail member notices that really serve class-action recruitment.
Inspection still runs through the statutory request procedure.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Norman Zwicky (Plaintiff/Appellee)
Timeshare member who sought to inspect association records.
Jon L. Phelps (Counsel)
Law Offices Phelps & Moore PLLC
Counsel for Zwicky in the verified complaint.
Edward L. Barry (Co-Counsel)
Law Office of Edward L. Barry
Appeared as co-counsel for Zwicky.

Respondent Side

Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association (Defendant/Appellant)
Association party defending the records-inspection case.
John E. DeWulf (Counsel)
Coppersmith Brockelman PLC
Counsel for Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association.
Katherine DeStefano (Counsel)
Coppersmith Brockelman PLC
Counsel for PVCOA; later filings use Katherine Hyde.
Brandon T. Crossland (Counsel)
Baker Hostetler LLP
Associated pro hac vice as counsel for PVCOA.
Kathy Wheeler (Director/Declarant)
Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association
PVCOA director who submitted a declaration about confidential records.

Neutral Parties

John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
Superior Court judge assigned to the case.
Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Authored the Court of Appeals opinion.
Kenton D. Jones (Presiding Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.
Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.

FAQ

Is Zwicky still good law?

Yes. It is a published Court of Appeals opinion (244 Ariz. 309) and was not further reviewed; it remains the leading Arizona authority on timeshare records inspection under A.R.S. § 33-2209.

Does it apply to ordinary HOAs and condos?

Zwicky construes the timeshare records statute (§ 33-2209). Its ‘proper purpose’ reasoning is frequently cited in disputes over member access to association financial records, but planned communities and condominiums have their own records statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1805 and 33-1258).

Did the owner get his attorneys' fees?

No. The courts held the records-inspection action did not ‘arise out of contract’ under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, so fees were denied at both the trial and appellate levels.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018), 1 CA-CV 16-0659
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	January 23, 2018
Judge / panel	Judge Patricia A. Orozco, Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones, Judge Jon W. Thompson
Parties	A timeshare member sued his owners' association to enforce his statutory right to inspect the association's financial books and records after his annual assessments roughly tripled.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-2209 A.R.S. § 33-2210 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	Records RequestsTimeshareAssessmentsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a 'proper purpose' — a desire to obtain information that reasonably relates to protecting his interest as a member — may compel inspection of the association's financial records under A.R.S. § 33-2209, and the business judgment rule is no defense; but an association cannot be ordered under A.R.S. § 33-2210 to circulate member notices whose real purpose is recruiting plaintiffs rather than legitimate association business.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	77 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Featured download links	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This is the leading published Arizona opinion on a timeshare owner's right to inspect association records under A.R.S. § 33-2209. Norman Zwicky paid about $26,000 for his interest in 2004 and watched his annual assessments climb to roughly $2,162 by 2015. Suspecting that the developer-affiliated manager (tied to Diamond Resorts) was shifting hotel-operation and unsold-inventory costs onto members, he made a statutory written request to inspect the association's financial books and records so he could investigate whether assessments were calculated in good faith. The association refused, and Zwicky sued. The trial court granted him summary judgment compelling production, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the core inspection right. The court borrowed the 'proper purpose' standard from shareholder-inspection law and defined it broadly in the owner's favor, while separately protecting the association's genuinely confidential financial data through a protective order and striking a trial-court order that would have forced the association to mail a member notice serving the owner's class-action recruitment.

Key Issues & Findings

The court treated the statutory inspection right as analogous to a shareholder's right to inspect corporate books, adopting the rule that 'proper purpose' means a desire to derive information that will enable the owner to protect his interest and that reasonably relates to his membership. Investigating a tripling of assessments easily satisfied that test, and the records sought — ADRE filings, management agreements, profit-and-loss statements, budgets, and occupancy and revenue data — fell within 'financial and other records' directly related to the timeshare plan. The court rejected the association's argument that the board's discretion under § 33-2209(C) and the business judgment rule could defeat the statutory right; an owner may judicially challenge the board's records determination.

The court then balanced that access against confidentiality. It vacated the trial court's modification of the protective order because the court had loosened confidentiality protections without reviewing the documents or letting the association show why proprietary financial data should stay protected, and it remanded for that evaluation. It also vacated the order forcing the association to mail a § 33-2210 notice, holding that the notice did not advance 'legitimate association business' because its real purpose was to help the owner and his lawyer assemble a group of plaintiffs for a proposed class action.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and timeshare owners, Zwicky is a strong, citable precedent that statutory records-inspection rights are enforceable in court, that an owner does not need the board's blessing, and that 'proper purpose' is read in the member's favor. For associations and managers, it confirms two things at once: members cannot be stonewalled on financial records by invoking board discretion or the business judgment rule, but associations retain the ability to protect truly confidential or proprietary financial information through a properly supported protective order, and they cannot be conscripted into circulating litigation-recruitment notices. The decision is frequently cited in Arizona disputes over member access to association financial records.

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Village of Oakcreek v. Bonham: Kalway and Arizona HOA Short-Term Rental Amendments

Posted on June 2, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Rental Restrictions | Kalway | 1 CA-CV 22-0780

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an HOA enforcement suit because the original declaration did not give fair notice that the HOA could later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 22-0780; Yavapai County Superior Court No. V1300CV202280081.

Download appellate decision Download trial ruling Watch video overview Source-file index FAQ

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers the nonprecedential Court of Appeals decision and the uploaded appellate/trial record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

A general business-use restriction in original CC&Rs does not necessarily give homeowners fair notice that the HOA may later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Case snapshot

Court result

Dismissal for homeowner Bonham was affirmed.

Core doctrine

Kalway reasonable-and-foreseeable notice for CC&R amendments.

Rental issue

2016 and 2017 amendments banned short-term rentals.

Fee result

Bonham received appellate fees and costs subject to ARCAP 21.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 22-0780
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 3, 2023
Judge / panel	David D. Weinzweig, Michael S. Catlett, Maria Elena Cruz
Parties	A planned-community association sued a homeowner to stop short-term rentals after majority-approved CC&R amendments banned short-term rentals.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-2101 A.R.S. § 12-341 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	Rental RestrictionsCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not enforceable against him because they were not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	70 PDFs, 1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Village of Oakcreek Association sued Lance Bonham to enforce 2016 and 2017 CC&R amendments that banned short-term rentals. Bonham moved to dismiss under Kalway, arguing the original declaration did not provide fair notice that a majority could later impose that kind of rental restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. It rejected the association's argument that a generic no-business covenant made short-term-rental restrictions foreseeable, because the original declaration did not address residential rentals or lease duration.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied Kalway and asked whether the original declaration gave objective notice of a future rental restriction. The declaration broadly barred business operations on lots, but it did not mention residential rentals. A business-use restriction was not enough to warn owners that a later majority amendment could ban short-term rentals. The court also treated Bonham as an owner with title before the relevant amendments based on the declaration's broad definition of ownership and his trustee status.

Why It Matters

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case for Arizona HOAs and homeowners. It shows that an association cannot rely on generic business-use language as a substitute for a real leasing covenant when trying to enforce a later rental ban. It also pairs well with Gross: both cases apply Kalway to rental amendments and both warn boards to tie new rental restrictions to language already present in the original CC&Rs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Village of Oakcreek Association (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Association party seeking to enforce short-term-rental restrictions.
Alexis G. Firehawk (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel for Village of Oakcreek Association.
Tessa Knueppel (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel for Village of Oakcreek Association.

Respondent Side

Lance E. Bonham (Defendant/Appellee)
Homeowner defendant in the short-term-rental dispute.
Mark J. Bainbridge (Counsel)
The Bainbridge Law Firm, LLC
Counsel for Bonham.

Neutral Parties

Linda Wallace (Judge Pro Tempore)
Superior Court judge listed in the memorandum decision.
David D. Weinzweig (Presiding Judge)
Authored the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.
Michael S. Catlett (Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.
Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.

Why this case matters

Bonham is useful because it applies Kalway to the most common HOA amendment fight: short-term rentals. The association argued the original declaration barred business activity, so a later rental ban was foreseeable. The Court of Appeals disagreed because the business-use covenant did not say anything about residential rentals.

The decision gives homeowners a concrete argument when an HOA tries to convert a general residential-use or business-use clause into a later rental prohibition. It also gives boards a drafting warning: if rental restrictions are intended, the original declaration needs a clearer tether than a broad no-business provision.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham (1 CA-CV 22-0780). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Homeowner study guide: short-term rental enforcement questions

Homeowner question	Study-guide answer	Bonham-specific caution
What did the amended Village of Oakcreek leasing restriction define as a lease?	The study materials describe a broad definition covering any agreement, contract, grant, or arrangement giving a non-owner access to or use of a lot or unit.	That rule was part of the association’s enforcement theory; the appellate issue was whether the later restriction was valid and foreseeable.
Did the amended rule require at least a 30-day lease term?	Yes, the association relied on Section 4.23 language requiring lease terms of at least 30 days.	Bonham affirmed dismissal because the original declaration did not give fair notice that this later short-term-rental ban could be imposed by amendment.
What owner obligations did the association allege for allowed leases?	The study guide identifies whole-lot leasing, single-family use, no subleasing, owner responsibility for occupants, and a tenant registration form within five days.	Those are enforcement allegations and governing-document requirements to verify against the current declaration before relying on them.
What progressive enforcement steps did the association use?	The record describes a courtesy notice, notices of non-compliance, monetary penalties, and then litigation for injunction and money judgment relief.	The association alleged ongoing Airbnb activity, but the legal result turned on amendment validity, not just whether short stays occurred.
What penalty balance did the complaint allege?	The study materials identify an alleged $16,500.00 monetary penalty balance as of February 28, 2022.	An alleged account balance is not the same as a final judgment; always check the ruling and judgment.
Is a hearing required before fines?	A.R.S. 33-1803(B) requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before monetary penalties are imposed.	Procedural fine compliance is a separate issue from whether the underlying amended rental restriction is enforceable.
Can unpaid fines become a lien?	The study guide flags a distinction between fines themselves and enforcement costs such as attorney fees under the declaration.	Do not assume every fine is lienable; check A.R.S. 33-1803, the declaration language, and the specific account charge.
What is the homeowner takeaway?	A later rental restriction needs both procedural adoption and substantive foreseeability under Kalway.	Bonham is strongest as a fair-notice case, not as a general permission slip to ignore every rental rule.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Subject property

The enforcement action concerned Lot 75 in the Cathedral View development in Sedona.

Amended restriction

The association relied on a leasing restriction adopted in 2016 and re-recorded in 2017 that barred leases shorter than 30 days.

Owner status

Bonham acquired title by quitclaim deed recorded in January 2017, which placed him inside the association’s enforcement theory.

Association allegations

The association alleged ongoing Airbnb rentals, including advertised and reviewed stays shorter than 30 days.

Fines alleged

The complaint sought to collect a penalty balance the association alleged had reached $16,500.00 by February 28, 2022.

Why allegations did not decide it

Even assuming the alleged rentals, the dispositive issue was whether the later rental ban was valid and foreseeable under Kalway.

Enforcement history summarized from the briefing

Date or period	Association action or allegation	Relevance
June 22, 2021	Courtesy notice reportedly warned Bonham about alleged short-term-rental violations.	Shows the beginning of the association’s progressive enforcement record.
October-November 2021	The association alleged Airbnb reviews and short stays, then issued notices of non-compliance and fines.	Documents the alleged factual basis for enforcement, separate from the legal validity of the amendment.
December 2021-February 2022	Additional notices and alleged rentals increased the claimed penalty balance.	Frames the monetary judgment request in the complaint.
April 2022	The association sued for injunction, personal judgment, and implied-covenant relief.	Moves the dispute into the court system where Kalway controlled the amendment-validity question.
October 3, 2023	The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham.	The appellate court focused on the original declaration’s lack of fair notice for a short-term-rental ban.

Download source file

2023-11-28_000_order-awarding-attorneys-fees-and.pdf

Source 71 2024-04-24

Civil Mandate

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2024-04-24_000_civil-mandate.pdf

For homeowners using this case

Compare the original declaration to the new rental restriction line by line.
Do not stop at the amendment-vote percentage; Kalway asks whether the new burden was fairly foreseeable.
Look for older language that actually mentions leasing, occupancy, rental duration, transient use, or business use.
Use Bonham with Gross to separate invalid rental bans from narrower occupancy refinements.

For boards and managers

A majority vote alone may not save an amendment that creates a new rental burden.
Generic no-business language is a weak foundation for a short-term-rental ban.
Before enforcement, audit the original CC&Rs and any earlier leasing provisions against Kalway, Gross, and Bonham.
Fee exposure can follow if the association litigates an amendment that lacks a clear covenant tether.

FAQ

Did the HOA win in Bonham?

No. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the association’s suit against Bonham.

Is Bonham published precedent?

No. It is a memorandum decision, but it is still useful as a practical Kalway example and was cited in the later published Gross opinion.

What was missing from the original declaration?

The court found the original declaration generally barred business operations but did not provide fair notice of a future short-term-rental restriction.

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Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows HOA: Unawarded Attorney Fees and Assessments

Posted on June 2, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Attorney Fees | Assessments | 1 CA-CV 16-0710

Bocchino limits an HOA’s ability to put litigation attorney fees directly on a homeowner’s account. The Court of Appeals held the association could not assess fees from a justice-court harassment injunction when no court had awarded those fees.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Patricia Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 16-0710; Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-012434.

Download appellate opinion Download trial ruling Watch video overview Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the Court of Appeals opinion and the uploaded superior/appellate record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

An HOA cannot simply assess a homeowner for attorney fees incurred in a judicial proceeding when the tribunal did not award those fees and the governing documents do not expressly authorize that unilateral charge.

Case snapshot

Court result

Summary judgment for Bocchino was affirmed.

Fee source

Fees came from a justice-court workplace-harassment injunction proceeding.

Key statute

A.R.S. 12-1810 requires court handling of harassment-injunction fee awards.

Practical use

Account charges for litigation fees need a real award or clear authority.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 16-0710
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 3, 2018
Judge / panel	John C. Gemmill, Michael J. Brown, Maria Elena Cruz
Parties	A former homeowner challenged an HOA account charge for attorney fees the association incurred in a justice-court harassment-injunction proceeding but never obtained as a court award.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1810 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-2101
Topics	Attorney FeesAssessmentsCC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for Bocchino and held the HOA improperly assessed attorney fees against her when no court had awarded those fees in the underlying injunction proceeding.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	86 PDFs, 4 other source files
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Patricia Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Fountain Shadows obtained a workplace-harassment injunction against Patricia Bocchino in justice court but did not ask that court to award attorney fees. The association later charged those unawarded fees to Bocchino’s HOA account. Bocchino sued, and the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment requiring repayment. The court held the association waived any fee claim in the injunction proceeding by not requesting fees there and that the declaration did not expressly allow the HOA to assess unawarded litigation fees directly against a homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

A.R.S. § 12-1810 governs workplace-harassment injunctions and allows the court, after notice and hearing, to award costs and fees. Because the association did not request a fee award from the justice court, it could not later bypass that court by charging the fees directly to the owner. The declaration did not expressly authorize direct assessment of attorney fees incurred in judicial proceedings but not awarded by a tribunal.

Why It Matters

Bocchino is a practical limit on HOA fee accounting. It warns associations not to self-award litigation fees by placing them on an owner account after a separate court proceeding. For homeowners, it is a useful authority when an HOA account ledger includes attorney fees that were never awarded by the court or tribunal handling the underlying dispute.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Patricia Bocchino (Plaintiff/Appellee)
Former homeowner who challenged the fee assessment.

Respondent Side

Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association (Defendant/Appellant)
Association party challenging the fee ruling.
Chad P. Miesen (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Counsel for Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association.
Charlene Cruz (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Counsel for Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association.

Neutral Parties

Douglas Gerlach (Judge)
Superior Court judge listed in the appellate opinion.
John C. Gemmill (Judge)
Authored the Court of Appeals opinion.
Michael J. Brown (Presiding Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.
Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.

Why this case matters

Bocchino is a practical fee-assessment case. The association obtained an injunction against Bocchino but did not ask the justice court to award fees. It later placed those attorney fees on her HOA account, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the charge was improper.

The opinion matters because many governing documents contain broad enforcement-fee language. Bocchino shows that broad language does not automatically let an HOA bypass the court that handled the litigation and unilaterally convert unawarded fees into an owner-account debt.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Patricia Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association (1 CA-CV 16-0710). The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for Bocchino and held the HOA improperly assessed attorney fees against her… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Patricia Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Homeowner study guide: escrow charges and fee recovery

Homeowner question	Study-guide answer	Why it matters
Can an HOA demand payment from escrow during a home sale?	An HOA may make a demand, but Bocchino shows the homeowner can sue to recover funds if the demand was not legally authorized.	The trial court awarded Bocchino the $3,887.28 collected from escrow.
Why did the escrow demand create practical pressure?	The homeowner argued she faced a Hobson’s choice: pay the disputed amount to close the sale or challenge the demand and risk the transaction.	Escrow timing can turn a disputed account charge into immediate leverage over a sale.
Can a homeowner recover attorney fees after successfully suing an HOA?	Potentially yes. A.R.S. 12-341.01 allows fee awards to a successful party in a contested action arising out of contract.	HOA disputes based on CC&Rs and assessment account rights often become contract-fee fights.
Can requested attorney fees exceed the disputed principal?	Yes. Bocchino’s fee application sought $22,937.50 after recovering $3,887.28.	Small account disputes can become expensive when an HOA refuses reimbursement and litigation proceeds through summary judgment and appeal.
What do courts consider when deciding whether to award fees?	Arizona courts may consider the Warner factors, including merits, avoidability, hardship, success, novelty, and deterrence.	The question is not just who won, but whether a fee award is appropriate under the circumstances.
How does the court evaluate whether a fee bill is reasonable?	Fee applications are tested under China Doll principles, including the work performed, rates, lawyer experience, difficulty, and result achieved.	A homeowner seeking fees should preserve detailed billing records and connect the work to the litigation result.
Does an HOA have to pay immediately if it appeals?	Not necessarily. The association may post a supersedeas bond to stay execution while the appeal is pending.	Fountain Shadows filed a bond for $4,149.67 during the appeal.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Escrow pressure point

The dispute arose during Bocchino’s property sale, when the association demanded payment through escrow and the homeowner completed the sale before suing to recover the funds.

Principal recovery

The Superior Court awarded Bocchino $3,887.28, the amount the court found had been wrongfully collected.

Trial-court fee request

After prevailing, Bocchino requested $22,937.50 in attorney fees under A.R.S. 12-341.01, supported by a China Doll-style billing submission.

Fee-application theory

The fee papers argued the association forced avoidable litigation by refusing to reimburse the charge before suit.

Supersedeas bond

During the appeal, the association filed a supersedeas bond for $4,149.67 to stay execution of the judgment while review was pending.

Appellate costs

After the appellate decision, the Court of Appeals awarded Bocchino $173.50 in costs.

Attorney-fee briefing context

Issue	Briefing position	Why it matters
Merits	Bocchino argued the association lacked a legal basis to self-assess fees that no tribunal had awarded.	This is the same practical point the appellate opinion later confirmed.
Avoidability	The fee application argued litigation could have been avoided if the association returned the escrowed funds before suit.	Shows why settlement posture became part of the fee dispute.
Degree of success	Bocchino sought to recover the full amount collected and obtained judgment for the principal recovery.	Explains why the requested fee award was much larger than the principal amount.
Deterrence	The briefing framed fee recovery as necessary for homeowners to challenge improper account charges.	Useful context for readers comparing litigation economics to the amount at stake.

Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.

Download source file

undated_900_bocchino-v-fountain-shadows-hoa-case-documents-summary-table-1.csv

For homeowners

Check whether the fees on your account were actually awarded by the court or tribunal that handled the proceeding.
Ask whether the invoice is for assessment collection, covenant enforcement, or a separate judicial proceeding.
Preserve closing statements, account ledgers, demand letters, and the order from the underlying proceeding.

For boards and managers

Ask the tribunal for fees when the statute or rules require a fee award there.
Do not assume a broad CC&R fee clause lets the association self-award litigation fees after the fact.
Separate ordinary assessment collection costs from fees incurred in separate court proceedings.

FAQ

Did the HOA have an injunction against Bocchino?

Yes, but the problem was that the justice court did not award the association attorney fees in that injunction proceeding.

Could the HOA rely on its declaration instead?

Not on this record. The Court of Appeals held the declaration did not expressly allow the association to assess unawarded litigation fees directly against Bocchino.

Does Bocchino ban all HOA fee recovery?

No. It addresses unilateral assessment of fees that were incurred in a judicial proceeding but not awarded by the court.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominiums: Open Meetings, Records, Insurance, and Direct-versus-Derivative Claims

Posted on May 30, 2026 by

Arizona Condo Governance | Records and Voting | Direct and Derivative Claims

This condominium-governance case concerns records access, recordkeeping, voting, open meetings, insurance and governing-document changes. The October 6, 2026 ruling dismissed specified claims and allowed specified individual-right theories to proceed. A September order had already recorded withdrawal without prejudice of thirteen summary-judgment motions, including eight featured in the July packet. On October 20 the court denied reconsideration. These procedural rulings do not establish liability on the remaining allegations.

Last reviewed October 26, 2026. Case: Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominiums Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-012980 (consolidated with CV2025-062973); Hon. Adele Ponce, following earlier rulings by Hon. Randall H. Warner. Latest reviewed ruling: October 20, 2026, filed October 22.

Download Oct. 6, 2026 ruling Watch updated video Listen to updated audio Download July 16 order Download complaint July 2026 motions Document roadmap Source index FAQ

Current-status note: This case guide was checked October 26, 2026, including the October 20 order filed October 22 denying reconsideration without further reasoning. No final disposition of the full case appears in the reviewed orders.

The September 11 order records thirteen summary-judgment motions withdrawn without prejudice, including eight of the nine July 5–21 motions featured here. The July 5 declaration-amendment motion is not listed withdrawn; no merits disposition of it was identified in the reviewed orders. Withdrawal does not decide the underlying claims.

The October 6 final dismissal paragraphs name Count IV/DJ IV, Count V/DJ V and the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim. The analysis treats Count VI as derivative without separately enumerating it there. The court declined to dismiss the challenged open-meeting and insurance-change claims. Records and voting allegations are not findings of liability, and their absence from those dismissal paragraphs does not establish every requested remedy.

The replacement audio and video were reviewed against the public filings and orders. They explain records, voting and participation allegations alongside Tara’s defenses and the actual dismissals. Surviving the pleading challenge is not proof of liability.

Updated record guide: This page was corrected on October 26, 2026 after review of the August 28 and September 11 minute entries and the October 20 reconsideration ruling. An earlier version described all nine featured July summary-judgment motions as pending; eight were withdrawn without prejudice. Withdrawal is not a merits judgment against those claims.

This is a pending-case guide, not a final merits judgment. The October 6 ruling dismissed specified claims and left other theories for further proceedings. Party allegations and proposed orders are not court findings. The replacement audio and video below were reviewed against the public court records through October 26, 2026.

Current case status

The October 6, 2026 ruling granted Tara’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in part: Count IV/DJ IV and Count V/DJ V were dismissed, and the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim was separately dismissed as not valid. The court declined to dismiss the challenged open-meeting and insurance-change claims. Records-access, recordkeeping and voting allegations also appear in the pleadings and were not enumerated in the final dismissal paragraphs. Thirteen summary-judgment motions were withdrawn without prejudice in September; the July 5 declaration motion was not listed withdrawn. The October 20 order denied reconsideration without further explanation. No final disposition of the entire case appears in the reviewed orders.

Case snapshot

Core dispute

An owner seeks enforcement of alleged individual contractual and statutory rights concerning meetings, records inspection, accurate records, voting, insurance and declaration changes. Tara denies unlawful conduct and disputes the available relief.

Latest reviewed orders

October 6: partial judgment on the pleadings. October 20, filed October 22: reconsideration denied without additional reasoning. The case has not been fully resolved in the reviewed orders.

Motion status corrected

The September 11 order records thirteen withdrawals without prejudice. Eight of the nine motions featured from July 5–21 are on that list; the July 5 declaration-amendment motion is not. Withdrawal of a motion is not dismissal of the underlying claim.

Public source packet

The public index contains 218 distinct PDFs and the historical July roadmap. The three added official orders supply the withdrawal and reconsideration updates; the roadmap alone is not a current docket. Loose intake materials remain outside the approved public source set.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-012980
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	October 20, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Randall H. Warner, Hon. Adele Ponce
Parties	Lisa Marx, a Tara condominium owner, sued Tara Condominiums Association over alleged open-meeting, records, insurance, common-element, voting, and declaration/bylaw violations.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1248 A.R.S. § 33-1250 A.R.S. § 33-1258 A.R.S. § 33-1212 A.R.S. § 33-1247 A.R.S. § 33-1253 A.R.S. § 10-11601 A.R.S. § 12-1831 A.R.S. § 33-1254 A.R.S. § 10-3631
Topics	Meetings & RecordsBoard GovernanceCC&RsRecords RequestsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The October 6, 2026 ruling granted judgment on the pleadings in part: Count IV/DJ IV and Count V/DJ V were expressly dismissed, as was the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim. The court declined to dismiss the challenged open-meeting and insurance-change claims; it discussed Count VI as derivative but did not separately name it in the final dismissal paragraphs. Records-access, recordkeeping and voting counts are not enumerated there. The October 20 reconsideration denial adds no reasoning or additional claim disposition.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	218 PDFs, 1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap	No separate litigation roadmap table on this page
Video overview	Marx v. Tara: records, voting and October 2026 rulings
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	8 questions
Featured download links	33 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Lisa Marx, a self-represented condominium owner, challenges Tara Condominiums Association over alleged records-access, recordkeeping, voting, meeting, insurance and governing-document violations in CV2025-012980, consolidated with CV2025-062973. The operative Second Amended Complaint alleges individual participation and property-related harm; Tara denies wrongdoing and liability. On October 6, 2026, Judge Adele Ponce dismissed Count IV/DJ IV and Count V/DJ V and separately dismissed the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim, while declining to dismiss challenged open-meeting and insurance-change claims. The analysis treats Count VI as derivative without separately naming it in the final dismissal paragraphs. A September order had recorded thirteen summary-judgment motions withdrawn without prejudice, including eight of nine featured July motions; the July 5 declaration motion was not on that list. The October 20 order denied reconsideration without further reasoning. The reviewed orders do not finally resolve the entire case.

Key Issues & Findings

The court distinguished harm to the association or another owner from an individual owner’s statutory and contractual participation rights and personally borne insurance costs. It found no particularized injury for the dismissed unit-boundary/upkeep theories, but did not extend Iqtunheimr to extinguish individual procedural claims merely because a decision affected all owners. Technical violations, prejudice and later ratification remained reserved. The fiduciary-duty claim was separately held not valid under Rohde. None of this establishes the truth or remedy of every overlapping records, voting or governance allegation.

Why It Matters

This pending case illustrates the need to distinguish a pleaded member-right injury, a derivative claim, a withdrawn motion and a merits judgment. Records inspection, accurate records, voting, meeting procedure and an owner’s insurance obligations deserve separate attention rather than treating the whole dispute as a disagreement over collective spending. The exact ordering paragraphs and later withdrawal/reconsideration orders control the status described here.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Lisa Marx (Plaintiff)
Self-represented condominium owner plaintiff.

Respondent Side

Tara Condominiums Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Association party named in Marx’s condominium-governance claims.
Mark Gottmann (Former individual defendant)
Tara Condominiums Association
Dismissed by the July 31, 2025 ruling; the association remained a defendant.
Dennis Anderson (Former individual defendant)
Tara Condominiums Association
Dismissed by the July 31, 2025 ruling; the association remained a defendant.
Charles H. Oldham (Counsel)
CHDB Law LLP
Counsel served by Marx in the case filings.
Ari Bowhay (Counsel)
CHDB Law LLP
Counsel served by Marx in the case filings.

Neutral Parties

Randall H. Warner (Judge)
Superior Court judge listed in the amended complaint and orders.
Adele Ponce (Judge)
Later Superior Court judge listed in the case metadata.

Video: claims, defenses and the October rulings

This updated overview explains the records, voting and participation allegations, Tara’s defenses, the claims expressly dismissed and the insurance challenge allowed to proceed. It distinguishes Count VI’s analysis from the final ordering paragraphs. The court’s filings and orders control.

Synthetic narration generated with Google NotebookLM; source-based slides reviewed separately. Educational information, not legal advice.

Listen: the broader case and what the rulings mean

The replacement discussion covers individual member rights, the derivative-action defense, the earlier adverse rulings, the distinct insurance theories and the September motion withdrawals. Surviving a pleading challenge does not prove liability.

Synthetic voices generated with Google NotebookLM. Reviewed against the public court record; educational information, not legal advice.

What the record shows

Marx’s September 15, 2025 Second Amended Complaint asserts overlapping contract, statutory and declaratory theories. It alleges personal losses of participation, voting and inspection rights, monetary and property-value harm, and interference with property enjoyment. Those are pleaded allegations, not findings that she proved each injury.

The dispute is broader than roof repairs or master-policy spending. Count II concerns access to non-exempt association records; Count VII concerns maintaining accurate minutes and records of actions; Count VIII concerns printed ballots, ballot-return information and in-person voting. Counts I and III challenge notice, meetings, discussion, votes and authorization under the declaration and open-meeting statute. The same events sometimes support more than one theory, which does not make every theory equally viable.

A separate insurance/declaration dispute, CV2025-062973, was consolidated, and its complaint was treated as a Rule 15(d) supplemental pleading in March 2026. The public first amended filing describes challenged amendments, ballot inspection and a transfer of insurance responsibilities to owners. Tara’s March 30 response admits that amendments were approved, a vote occurred and the prior master policy expired, while denying unlawful conduct, injury and liability and asserting procedural and substantive defenses.

The July filings requested partial summary judgment on grouped issues. Later official orders changed that posture: the court directed withdrawal of fourteen motions, and the September 11 order listed thirteen withdrawn without prejudice. The July motion papers remain useful descriptions of Marx’s arguments, but eight of the nine featured July motions are no longer awaiting decision as filed.

Records, voting and participation are distinct issues

Inspection of records — Count II

Marx alleges that non-exempt financial, contract and governance records were withheld or delayed under A.R.S. § 33-1258. Tara’s May 27 motion expressly excludes Count II and its declaratory counterpart, while reserving defenses. The October 6 final dismissal paragraphs do not name this count.

Keeping records — Count VII

Marx separately alleges inaccurate minutes and missing records of association actions under A.R.S. § 10-11601. Tara’s May 27 motion expressly does not seek judgment on Count VII or its declaratory counterpart. The July 10 motion addressing two such allegations was later withdrawn without prejudice, without a merits ruling.

Voting — Count VIII

Marx alleges denial of printed ballot materials, omitted ballot-return information and loss of in-person voting under A.R.S. § 33-1250. Tara’s May 27 motion expressly excludes Count VIII and its declaratory counterpart while reserving defenses. The October 6 final dismissal paragraphs do not name this count.

Meetings and notice — Counts I and III

Marx challenges decisions allegedly made without required notice, an agenda, discussion, a vote or open proceedings. The October 6 court declined to dismiss the challenged participation-right theories, while reserving technical-violation, prejudice and later-ratification questions. No automatic victory on the merits follows.

What the court has already done

Preliminary injunction denied

In the June 24, 2025 order filed June 25, the court denied preliminary relief. It observed that certain board actions should have required a vote but did not find the necessary irreparable harm; it also rejected or found premature other requests. This was an interim-relief ruling, not a final decision of every claim.

Association derivative motion denied

The separate June 24 order filed June 26 denied Tara’s first derivative-claim dismissal motion as then framed, while limiting damages to harm Marx herself suffered and could prove. The October 2026 ruling later considered newer appellate authority and the operative pleadings.

Individual directors dismissed

The July 31, 2025 ruling dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson, distinguishing association obligations from personal liability claims against board members.

Discovery ruling postponed

The July 16, 2026 minute entry granted Tara’s request to postpone the Colby discovery ruling until after the Rule 12(c) motion was decided. It did not itself decide Rule 12(c), the merits, or Marx’s July summary-judgment motions.

Judgment on the pleadings granted in part

The October 6, 2026 ruling (Hon. Adele Ponce) applied the 2026 Iqtunheimr decision and dismissed Count IV/DJ IV (unit boundaries) and Count V/DJ V (upkeep) as derivative, and dismissed the consolidated breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. It declined to dismiss the open-meeting claims (Counts I and III) and the insurance-cancellation claims, holding those are direct, not derivative.

Summary-judgment motions withdrawn

Following the August 28 direction, the September 11 order recorded thirteen withdrawals without prejudice. It did not grant Tara judgment on the underlying claims or decide the declaration-amendment motion.

Reconsideration denied

The October 20 order, filed October 22, denied Marx’s October 13 motion for reconsideration. It gives no further reasoning and identifies no additional claims for dismissal.

The Rule 12(c) motion and the Colby discovery stay

Tara’s May 27, 2026 motion for judgment on the pleadings argues that community-wide claims over common property, association funds, insurance, and governance belong to the association and must satisfy derivative-action requirements.

The scope of Tara’s motion matters. Section IV.C, pages 13–14, expressly excludes the records-inspection and voting counts, personal subsets of Counts I and III, and personal inspection rights in the supplemental pleading, while reserving defenses. It also does not seek judgment on the corporate-records counts. The motion therefore does not ask the court to dispose of the entire case.

Marx’s June 2, 2026 opposition accepts that Iqtunheimr is published Arizona authority, but argues it decided only a common-area maintenance derivative claim and does not convert open-meeting, notice, voting, records, insurance-accounting, or declaration-amendment claims into derivative claims.

The same June 2 packet opposed Tara’s request to stay the pending Colby Management discovery dispute. Marx argued that the subpoenaed Colby materials go to direct claims already recognized by the June 26, 2025 ruling.

The court later granted Tara’s stay request in a July 16, 2026 minute entry, reasoning that deciding Rule 12(c) first could promote efficiency and might make the discovery request moot. The court said it would address Marx’s pending discovery issues after the Rule 12(c) ruling.

The October 6 ruling decided the Rule 12(c) motion in part. The October 20 order then denied reconsideration. The reviewed later orders do not resolve the separate Colby discovery dispute; the July stay should not be described as a merits denial of discovery.

The June packet’s two proposed orders remain only proposed forms of relief. They are not signed rulings.

The October 6, 2026 ruling on judgment on the pleadings

On October 6, 2026 (minute entry filed October 12, 2026), Hon. Adele Ponce ruled on Tara’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it in part. The court first denied Marx’s motion to file a sur-reply, adding that the sur-reply would not have changed the result.

The ruling applies Iqtunheimr, LLC v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, 586 P.3d 1081 (Ariz. App. 2026), which distinguishes an injury belonging to the association from an injury to an individual owner. A derivative action enforces a corporate claim and has separate standing and demand requirements. That does not prevent every individual claim involving the same subject matter.

Applying that framework, the court dismissed the claims it found derivative and let the individual-right claims proceed. It dismissed Count IV and Declaratory Judgment Count IV (unit boundaries, A.R.S. § 33-1212) and Count V and Declaratory Judgment Count V (upkeep, A.R.S. § 33-1247), reasoning that they concern a roof-repair assessment against a different owner and master-policy claims for unit damage—harm to the association or to another owner, not a particularized injury to Marx. In its analysis the court also agreed that Count VI (insurance, A.R.S. § 33-1253) alleging improper master-policy claims is derivative, though the court’s ordering paragraph enumerated only Counts IV and V and the fiduciary-duty claim.

The court declined to dismiss Marx’s open-meeting claims. It held that Counts I and III, and their declaratory counterparts, which allege violations of open-meeting requirements in the declaration and statutes, are not automatically derivative just because every owner was similarly affected; Marx clarified she seeks only to vindicate her own participation rights, to invalidate actions improperly taken, and to recover costs she personally bore. The court noted it will still need to consider whether any proven violation was merely technical and whether later board action ratified the challenged decisions.

The court also declined to dismiss the consolidated insurance-change claims at this stage. Marx challenges an amendment of governing documents that ended master-policy coverage for portions of units and alleges she must now pay for replacement coverage. The court treated the alleged insurance cost as distributed among individual holders. It separately dismissed the consolidated breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim as not valid under Rohde v. Beztak of Arizona.

The final ordering paragraphs expressly dismiss Count IV/DJ IV, Count V/DJ V, and the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim. Although the analysis describes Count VI as derivative, those paragraphs do not separately name Count VI. Counts II (inspection), VII (corporate records) and VIII (voting) are discussed in the complaint summary but not named in the final dismissal paragraphs. Neither that omission nor the survival of Counts I and III decides the truth, remedy or ultimate viability of every overlapping allegation. The October 20 reconsideration denial does not supply a new explanation or additional disposition.

What the October 6, 2026 ruling decided, claim by claim

Count IV & DJ IV — unit boundaries (A.R.S. § 33-1212)

Another owner’s roof-repair assessment and unit-damage master-policy claims. Count IV/DJ IV was expressly dismissed: the court found Marx lacked standing for the other owner’s assessment and no particularized injury for these pleaded theories. The complaint alleges personal harm elsewhere; this ruling concerns these specific acts and theories.

Count V & DJ V — upkeep (A.R.S. § 33-1247)

Common-element upkeep and the repeated assessment/master-policy allegations. Count V/DJ V was expressly dismissed as derivative because the court found no particularized harm for those pleaded theories. That is not a finding that the entire complaint contains no allegations of personal injury.

Count VI & DJ VI — insurance (A.R.S. §§ 33-1253, 33-1254)

Improper master-policy claims said to raise premiums. The analysis describes the theory as derivative; the final ordering paragraphs do not separately name Count VI/DJ VI among the dismissed counts.

Counts I & III and DJ I/III — open meetings / declaration (A.R.S. § 33-1248)

Participation, notice, meetings and votes concerning association decisions. The court declined to dismiss the challenged individual-right theories at this pleading stage. Technical violations, prejudice and potential later ratification remained reserved; no liability finding followed.

Counts II, VII and VIII, and related declaratory requests

Records inspection, accurate minutes and records of actions, and ballot information/voting opportunities. Tara’s specified motion did not seek judgment on these counts, and the final dismissal paragraphs do not name them. This does not establish every allegation or requested remedy.

Consolidated insurance-cancellation claims (CV2025-062973)

A governing-document amendment ending portions of master-policy coverage and shifting insurance costs to owners. The court declined dismissal because the alleged cost was distributed among individual holders. It did not decide the amendment invalid or award damages.

Breach of fiduciary duty (consolidated)

A fiduciary-duty claim against the association. The court separately dismissed it as not a valid claim under Rohde v. Beztak, rather than applying the IV/V derivative-claim reasoning to this claim.

Marx's motion to file a sur-reply

A request to add further briefing. Denied; the court noted that considering the proposed sur-reply would not have changed its ruling.

October 13 motion for reconsideration

A request to reconsider the October ruling. Denied October 20, filed October 22, without further reasoning or any additional claim disposition.

September withdrawals and the latest reconsideration order

The August 28, 2026 trial-setting conference minute entry directed withdrawal of fourteen partial-summary-judgment motions or they would be denied as moot. The September 11 order, filed September 17, then recorded thirteen motions withdrawn without prejudice in response to Marx’s September 2 notice. Eight are from the nine-motion July 5–21 group summarized below; five were filed from July 24 through August 2. The order states that the court will take no further action on the withdrawn motions.

The July 5 motion concerning the 2025 declaration amendment is not on that withdrawal list. The September order’s introductory description expressly distinguishes the fully briefed declaration motion. None of the reviewed orders decides that motion on its merits. The absence of that disposition is a limit of the reviewed record, not a prediction of the outcome.

On October 20, in a minute entry filed October 22, the court denied Marx’s October 13 motion for reconsideration. The one-page order provides no further reasoning. The docket checked October 26 also lists an October 16 clarification motion and Marx’s response; their contents and any later resolution have not been incorporated here.

These distinctions matter: a withdrawn motion is not a judgment against the underlying claim; a claim surviving Rule 12(c) is not a finding of liability; and an analytical discussion of a count is not a substitute for the final ordering paragraphs.

What the June 2026 response packet adds

Rule 12(c) opposition

Marx argues her claims seek direct relief for her own Condominium Act, declaration, voting, inspection, and fair-administration rights, not recovery of association funds or generalized damages for all units.

Colby discovery stay opposition

Marx argued the court should not pause her motion to compel Colby Management records. The court later granted Tara’s stay request, leaving the discovery issues for after the Rule 12(c) ruling.

Claim organization exhibit

Exhibit D is Marx’s organizational aid. It asserts that 89 of 103 listed claim paragraphs are open-meeting violations and that Tara’s motion targets 60 open-meeting items.

Proposed orders

The proposed orders asked the court to deny Rule 12(c) and the discovery stay. They are not rulings; the July 16 minute entry instead granted the stay request.

June 2026 filings added to the record guide

Date	Document	What it adds	Download
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s response opposing stay of Colby Management production	Argues the Colby subpoena remains relevant to direct claims and should not be paused while Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion is pending.	Response opposing Colby stay
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s opposition to Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion	Argues Iqtunheimr does not eliminate direct member-right claims over open meetings, voting, records, insurance accounting, declaration amendments, or individualized statutory relief.	Rule 12(c) opposition
June 2, 2026	Exhibit D – Organization of Claims for Presentation	Organizes 103 claim paragraphs for presentation. Treat this as plaintiff’s categorization aid, not an independent court finding.	Claim organization exhibit
June 2, 2026	Proposed order denying Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion	Proposed form of relief that would deny judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, narrow relief/allow amendment rather than dismiss with prejudice.	Proposed Rule 12(c) order
June 2, 2026	Proposed order denying Tara’s motion to stay Colby discovery ruling	Proposed form of relief that would deny the stay and leave the pending Colby motion to compel for ordinary-course decision.	Proposed Colby stay order

The July 2026 motion packet and its later withdrawals

The earlier public packet contains nine partial-summary-judgment motions filed July 5–21, 2026, with supporting statements, declarations and exhibit indexes. They divide the dispute into claim groups rather than seek judgment on the whole case. The later September 11 order records withdrawal without prejudice of eight of those nine motions; it does not list the July 5 declaration-amendment motion.

The table below preserves the history of what Marx asked the court to decide, with the later status made explicit. Party arguments and descriptions of evidence do not establish a legal violation. Withdrawal of these motions did not dismiss the underlying pleaded claims or adjudicate them for either side.

The exhibit notices and master index are public below. The 71 loose exhibit copies delivered with this update were reviewed for context but are not republished here because many are discovery or Bates-labeled materials containing private identifiers, and their status as public docket attachments was not independently established.

What the July motions argued, and what happened next

Filed	Claim group	Plaintiff's theory	Evidence map in the packet	Motion	Later status
July 5	2025 declaration amendment	Marx argues the recorded amendment improperly shifted property-insurance duties, changed unit or common-element burdens without the required consent, used an invalid written-consent process, and imposed an unforeseeable covenant burden.	Original and recorded declarations, amendment materials, written-consent and vote communications, Tara’s March response, and insurance/cancellation records.	Amendment motion	Not listed withdrawn in the September 11 order; no merits disposition identified in the reviewed orders.
July 10	Claims 120 and 121	Marx argues Tara failed to keep accurate June 2024 minutes and records of actions taken without a meeting, contrary to A.R.S. § 10-11601.	Meeting notice, minutes, audio/transcript, later minutes and emails, financial records, discovery responses, and the Marx declaration.	Corporate-records motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 11	Claims 46/91, 42/87/127, 98/126	Marx challenges a master-policy deductible increase, adoption of the 2025 budget and assessment by mail-only ballot, and ballot access or timing.	Governing documents, insurance renewals and minutes, budget records, ballots, vote results, owner communications, and objections.	Insurance, budget, and ballot motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 13	Claims 30/47/74/103/108, 48/92	Marx argues the chair negotiated roof-repair cost allocation before an authorized vote, shifted a common-element cost without owner culpability, and released a repair lien without full payment or proper approval.	Governing documents, roof-repair affidavit and communications, notices and minutes, financial records, lien documents, and executive-session materials.	Roof and lien motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 16	Claims 26/70, 27/71, 28/72, 29/73, 43/88	Marx challenges a reserve transfer, restrictions on correcting minutes, workers’ compensation coverage, Bermuda-grass spending, and a lighting reimbursement as actions lacking an open board vote.	Financials, notices, minutes and audio, policy records, seed invoices, vouchers, and the Marx declaration.	Reserve, minutes, policy, and spending motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 16	Claims 23/67, 24/68, 25/69, 33/34/77/78, 49/93	Marx challenges officer and director appointments, dissolution of a landscaping committee, and creation or enforcement of a two-minute owner-comment rule.	Bylaws, executive-session and open-meeting records, announcements, emails, admissions, audio/transcripts, and the Marx declaration.	Appointments and speaking-rule motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 19	Claims 32/76, 39/84, 83, 44/89	Marx challenges common-area work, a Home Depot purchase, creation and funding of a second bank account, and tree work outside the landscaping contract as actions taken without a majority vote in an open meeting.	Executive-session material, meetings, newsletters, affidavits/photos, records requests, vouchers, financials, bank records, and landscaping contracts.	Landscaping and spending motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 20	Claims 31/75, 35/79, 36/80, 37/81, 38/82, 45/90	Marx challenges sprinkler-trench work, retention and payment of association counsel, retroactive approval or preauthorization of work, and an association payment to Marx.	Work photos and affidavit, counsel engagement and invoices, financials, meeting records, demand/payment materials, and the Marx declaration.	Common-area work and legal-expense motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.
July 21	Claims 40/85, 41/86, 51/95, 53/97	Marx challenges off-record budget development, the board chair’s role in budget-committee meetings and membership, and landscaping or maintenance work and spending without a vote.	Executive and budget-committee records, audio/transcripts, competing budgets, emails, agreements, vouchers, bank statements, photos, and 2026 budget materials.	Budget-committee and maintenance motion	Withdrawn without prejudice, as recorded in the September 11 order; no merits decision on this motion.

How the July packet was incorporated

Docket-verified motion dates

The docket confirms the filings; the September 11 order supplies the later withdrawal status. Historical filing dates alone do not prove motions remain pending.

Party evidence is attributed

Separate statements and declarations explain what Marx says the evidence proves. The page does not convert those assertions into judicial findings.

Unsigned orders are not rulings

The intake contained nine distinct unsigned proposed orders, including an editable Count VII form. None is presented or indexed as an entered court order.

Loose exhibits remain off-page

The master index and filing notices show the exhibit structure. Loose discovery, financial, insurance, correspondence, affidavit, contract, and image copies remain outside the public download set pending privacy and public-status review.

Timeline highlights

Date	Event	Why it matters
April 2025	Original complaint packet begins the CV2025-012980 record.	The initial claims focused heavily on open meetings, board authority, records, committee action, and association governance.
June 23, 2025	The court held an evidentiary hearing on preliminary injunctive relief.	The hearing created the record for the June 2025 emergency-relief ruling.
June 24, 2025 (filed June 25)	The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.	The ruling matters because it separates alleged procedural defects from the emergency showing needed for immediate injunctive relief.
June 24, 2025 (filed June 26)	The court denied Tara’s partial motion to dismiss association claims as derivative.	This is the key early ruling treating the claims against the association as member-right claims rather than derivative claims, at least for that motion.
July 31, 2025	The court dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson.	The ruling draws a line between claims against the association and personal liability theories against individual directors.
October 2025	The record includes emergency TRO filings over master insurance, amendments, and owner insurance obligations.	The case expanded from meeting and records issues into insurance/amendment governance disputes.
March 30, 2026	Tara responded to Marx’s Rule 15(d) supplemental complaint.	The response acknowledges the amendment vote and expiration of the prior property policy while denying illegality and asserting defenses.
May 27, 2026	Tara filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.	The motion asks the court to treat many community-wide claims as derivative after newer Arizona appellate authority.
June 2, 2026	Marx filed opposition papers and proposed orders addressing the Rule 12(c) motion and the Colby discovery stay.	These were Marx’s arguments opposing Rule 12(c) and a discovery stay. Later July, September and October orders must be read alongside them.
July 5-21, 2026	Marx filed nine partial-summary-judgment motions on grouped claims.	These papers explain the requested partial relief. Eight of these nine motions were later withdrawn without prejudice; the declaration-amendment motion was not on the withdrawal list.
July 16, 2026 (filed July 20)	The court granted Tara’s request to postpone the Colby discovery ruling.	The court will address the discovery issues after deciding Rule 12(c); the order does not resolve Rule 12(c) or the merits.
August 28, 2026 (filed September 2)	The court directed withdrawal of fourteen partial-summary-judgment motions or they would be denied as moot.	A case-management direction, not a merits adjudication of each underlying claim.
September 11, 2026 (filed September 17)	The court recorded thirteen motions withdrawn without prejudice.	Eight of the featured July motions were withdrawn. The July 5 declaration-amendment motion was not on the list.
October 6, 2026 (filed October 12)	The court granted Tara’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in part.	The court dismissed the unit-boundary and upkeep claims under Iqtunheimr, and separately dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim as not a valid claim. The open-meeting and insurance-cancellation claims may proceed; the case remains pending.
October 20, 2026 (filed October 22)	The court denied the October 13 reconsideration motion.	The one-page order adds no reasoning or additional claim disposition.

Curated document roadmap

The complete source index below lists the reviewed public files. This earlier document-by-document roadmap preserves the chronology, document type, and stated case relevance supplied with the original packet so readers can understand how the pre-July materials fit together.

The separate July motion map above covers the new 2026 summary-judgment filings. This earlier roadmap intentionally excludes drafts that were not confirmed as part of the court record.

Reference numbers in the final column come from the supplied roadmap. They are not legal findings, and the linked court filings and orders remain the controlling sources.

Earlier document-by-document roadmap

Date	Document	Type	How it fits the case	Roadmap refs
February 19, 1970	Declaration of Restrictions, Establishment of Board of Management and Lien Rights	CC&Rs	Foundational governing document defining common elements, board authority, maintenance, lien, and insurance duties. Marx uses it as the contract source for alleged breaches involving board authority, maintenance, and building-structure insurance.	1-7
March 29, 2022	CC&R Amendment Update from the Arizona Supreme Court – CHDB Law	Article / news	Kalway-related legal analysis used by Marx to argue that the 2025 insurance amendments were not reasonable or foreseeable enough to bind owners.	8
July 31, 2023	Homeowner Tara COA July 2023 Financials	Financial statement	Historical association financial record used as a comparison point for later disputed budget, insurance, and expense decisions.	7
January 11, 2024	Organizational Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Board organizational minutes. Marx cites them to show board-position decisions, knowledge of meeting requirements, and alleged inaccuracies about leadership and procedure.	9, 10
January 20, 2024	January 20, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Documents committee-volunteer discussion and the Landscaping Committee, which Marx later uses to challenge the committee’s dissolution and her removal.	7, 9
January 30, 2024	Trench on Newcastle done by Mark and Dennis	Evidence / report	Maintenance-work documentation used to support claims that individual board members acted unilaterally or performed unauthorized maintenance work.	7
February 1, 2024	Email removing Lisa from committees and dissolving them	Email	Evidence that Marx was removed from the Landscaping Committee and committees were dissolved, supporting alleged open-meeting violations and selective targeting.	7, 10
February 5, 2024	Email announcing new board member	Email	Announcement of a new board member without a recorded open board vote, supporting the A.R.S. § 33-1248 board-action theory.	7, 11
February 5, 2024	Gmail – Claim Message from USAA	Email	Insurance-claim correspondence used to support allegations about improper insurance handling and board-member maintenance involvement.	7
February 17, 2024	February 17, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Minutes reflecting discussion and speaking limits. Marx alleges those rules were used selectively and that board-membership status was misdocumented.	7, 9
March 16, 2024	March 16, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Minutes referencing a workers-comp policy and Bermuda-grass plan, cited as examples of alleged unilateral chair action without open meeting votes.	7, 9
March 17, 2024	Spring newsletter 3-17-24	Newsletter	Association communication to residents, used as evidence of public board statements and owner-facing messaging.	7
May 27, 2024	Dennis working on the shutters	Evidence / report	Documentation of Dennis Anderson performing maintenance work, supporting allegations that board members acted outside authorized roles.	7
June 15, 2024	June 15, 2024 Tara Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Procedural record of board actions during summer 2024.	7
July 2, 2024	DAnderson 07 02 24 Expense Voucher	Expense voucher	Financial record used to test whether board-member reimbursement and expenditures were properly authorized.	7
July 16, 2024	07 16 24 Letter to Lisa Marx re Petition Response	Letter	Association correspondence to Marx about a petition, part of the pre-litigation governance-dispute history.	7
July 23, 2024	American Family Master Insurance Policy Invoice Voucher 2024 2025	Financial document	Shows prior master-insurance cost and coverage before the disputed 2025 insurance amendments and policy changes.	7
July 27, 2024	July 27 2024 Tara Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Procedural record of board actions and decisions.	7
July 31, 2024	Travis Law Firm July Inv Voucher	Invoice voucher	Legal-fee invoice used to support claims about association legal spending and approval procedure.	7
August 29, 2024	Travis Law Firm August 2024 Invoice Voucher	Invoice voucher	Additional legal-fee record used in the unauthorized-expenditure and approval-procedure theory.	7
November 1, 2024	2025 Tara Condominiums Budget Letter	Budget letter	Board letter recommending a $50 assessment increase due to insurance, sewer, and legal-fee increases; part of the financial buildup to the insurance dispute.	12
November 3, 2024	Issues regarding the 2025 Budget Vote	Email	Marx email arguing that the budget-vote process violated statute, used to show an earlier voting-procedure objection.	13
April 11, 2025	Civil Complaint for Breach of Contract	Complaint	Original filing against the association and individual board members, opening the litigation and asserting governance and CC&R breach theories.	14-16
April 14, 2025	Minute Entry Denying TRO	Court order	Early ruling denying temporary restraining relief because emergency TRO requirements were not met.	17
April 16, 2025	Amended Emergency Orders: TRO and Temporary Injunctive Relief	Motion for injunctive relief	Request to preserve declaration and insurance status quo while the case proceeded.	18, 19
May 28, 2025	Association’s Partial Motion to Dismiss	Motion	Association argued many claims were derivative and Marx lacked individual standing to pursue community-wide harms.	20
June 4, 2025	Responsive Memorandum to Association’s Partial Motion to Dismiss	Responsive memorandum	Marx opposed dismissal by arguing the claims asserted direct individual harms and member-right violations.	14-16
June 6, 2025	Reply to Response to Request for TRO and Injunctive Relief	Reply memorandum	Reply supporting emergency relief and addressing alleged service-delay and response-timing issues.	18
June 26, 2025	Minute Entry – Claim not Derivative	Court order	Key early ruling treating Marx’s claims against the association as direct member-right claims rather than derivative claims for that motion.	21, 22
July 15, 2025	Motion to Dismiss Defendants Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson	Motion	Individual board members sought dismissal based on director protections and lack of personal liability.	23
July 20, 2025	Response Memorandum to Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendants	Responsive memorandum	Marx opposed dismissal by arguing Gottmann and Anderson acted in bad faith and outside their authority.	14, 24, 25
July 25, 2025	Minute entry order to file amended complaint	Court order	Order requiring a more definite statement, leading to amended pleadings.	26
July 31, 2025	Ruling dismissing Mark and Dennis	Court order	Dismissed individual defendants, creating a major procedural setback for the personal-liability claims.	27, 28
August 6, 2025	Travis Law Firm Budget Letter / Proposing Amendments	Budget letter / letter	Counsel letter explaining proposed amendments to shift insurance responsibilities to owners, initiating the core insurance-amendment dispute.	4-6, 29-31
August 10, 2025	Motion for Partial Reconsideration of July 31, 2025 Ruling	Motion	Marx sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the individual board members.	32
August 11, 2025	Exhibit N Cert of Ins for 25 26	Certificate of liability insurance	Insurance certificate showing property coverage effective August 1, 2025 to August 1, 2026, used to contrast later claimed coverage changes.	6, 33
August 12, 2025	Order Denying Motion for reconsideration	Court order	Maintained dismissal of Gottmann and Anderson.	34
August 15, 2025	First Amended Complaint (FAC)	Amended complaint	Updated pleading reasserting claims and refining the legal counts against the association and directors.	2, 14
September 6, 2025	Plaintiff’s Initial Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement	Discovery disclosure	Mandatory disclosure identifying factual bases, witnesses, and evidence Marx expected to use.	35, 36
September 11, 2025	Stipulation for Extension of Time	Legal stipulation	Agreement extending Marx’s deadline to respond to fee applications; later relevant to arguments about premature fee rulings.	28, 37
September 15, 2025	Order Denying Motion to Strike Reply	Court order	Denied Marx’s request to strike Tara’s reply regarding the amended complaint.	38
September 15, 2025	Second Amended Complaint (SAC)	Amended complaint	Operative complaint against the association after dismissal of the individual defendants.	28, 39-41
September 15, 2025	Order on Stipulation to Extend Time	Court order	Granted an extension to respond to attorney-fee requests.	42
September 20, 2025	Minutes for a Board Meeting of the Tara Condominiums Association	Meeting minutes	Board minutes covering approval of the plan to present CC&R amendments for owner vote.	43
September 22, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint	Motion	Marx sought to reinstate direct claims against individual board members and add alleged post-filing violations.	14, 44, 45
September 24, 2025	Urgent Concerns on Proposed CC&R Amendments	Email / letter	Marx letter to owners identifying claimed risks of the proposed amendments, including costs, title, loan, and insurance issues.	4, 46
September 25, 2025	Meeting needs to be called to turn in ballots	Email	Marx demanded an open meeting for the amendment vote, preserving her objection to the voting process.	6, 47
September 27, 2025	Proposed Insurance amendments (Board/Owner Emails)	Email	Correspondence framing the association’s justification for the insurance shift and Marx’s objections under statutory and declaration duties.	5, 6, 30, 48
September 30, 2025 (filed October 2)	Historical fee minute entry — later vacated	Court order	Initially granted the individual defendants’ fee/cost application and denied Marx’s motion to vacate. The October 3 order, filed October 7, vacated this minute entry as premature. The October 15 ruling ultimately allowed $13.40 in costs only on that application.	49
October 1, 2025	Initial individual-defendant fee judgment — superseded	Court order	The initial judgment stated $5,957.70 in fees plus $13.40 costs. The court then vacated its September 30 fee minute entry as premature on October 3, filed October 7. Its October 15 ruling rejected attorneys’ fees for those dismissed individuals on this application and allowed only $13.40 costs; the modified signed judgment reflects that result.	28, 49, 50
October 3, 2025 (filed October 7)	Fee minute entry vacated	Court order	The court acknowledged that it granted the fee request prematurely under the parties’ stipulation and vacated the September 30 minute entry. It separately denied the September 7 motion to vacate and did not revive the dismissed individual defendants.	Later court order
October 5, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction	Motion	Attempt to block implementation of proposed amendments based on alleged statutory and declaration violations.	6, 51
October 9, 2025	Motion for Expedited Hearing	Motion	Request for a hearing within five days before the amendment-vote deadline.	31, 52, 53
October 14, 2025 (filed October 15)	Historical scheduling order	Court order	Set Tier 2 deadlines and an August 6, 2026 trial-setting conference. Section 7 records the parties’ proposed trial target of no later than September 14, 2026; it does not set trial on that date. Later conference orders superseded the scheduling history, and the August 28, 2026 minute entry says trial would not be set until pending motions were addressed.	54
October 15, 2025 (minute entry filed October 17)	Individual-defendant costs ruling and modified judgment	Court order	On the September 4 application, the court found the cited CC&Rs did not authorize attorneys’ fees for Gottmann and Anderson. It granted $13.40 costs only and entered a modified Rule 54(b) judgment, leaving the association claims to continue. This addresses that application, not every potential fee question in the case.	Later court order
October 15, 2025	Action by Written Consent	Voting form	Owner written-consent form used for three proposed declaration amendments.	55
October 17, 2025	Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions	Recorded amendment	Recorded amendment No. 2025-0605584 shifting insurance responsibility to owners; Marx challenges its validity.	31, 56, 57
October 18, 2025	Results of Tara CC&R amendment vote	Email	Announcement that amendments passed and owners had to obtain insurance by November 15, 2025.	58, 59
October 22, 2025	Stipulation to Continue Case Deadlines	Legal stipulation	Joint extension of deadlines due to Marx’s medical hospitalization.	60
October 26, 2025	Meeting to view ballots (Transcript)	Transcript	Transcript in which Gottmann allegedly refused to show owner signatures or vote choices, supporting A.R.S. § 33-1258 inspection-right claims.	61, 62
October 29, 2025	Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order	Motion	Emergency request to stop cancellation of master insurance and implementation of recorded amendments.	31, 63
October 30, 2025	2025 Budget	Financial document	Association budget showing a $50 assessment increase for insurance premiums, part of the financial basis for the amendment dispute.	64
October 30, 2025	Order Granting Leave to File Reply Out of Time	Court order	Procedural relief allowing Marx to file a late reply related to the third amended complaint.	65
November 6, 2025	Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing	Motion	Request for an evidentiary hearing on the voting process and alleged harm from insurance lapse.	66, 67
November 10, 2025	Reminder to obtain homeowner insurance	Email	Board email setting a December 1, 2025 proof-of-structural-insurance deadline.	68
November 12, 2025	Notice of Appeal	Legal notice	Notice concerning dismissal of individual defendants and cost/fee issues.	69, 70
November 13, 2025	Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Consolidated Response	Motion / reply	Reply supporting preliminary-injunction relief based on claimed individualized harm and flawed amendment process.	71
November 17, 2025	Minute Entry (Dismissing TAC and Injunction)	Court order	Denied leave to file the Third Amended Complaint and denied injunction relief, prompting later judge-change efforts.	70, 72
November 21, 2025	Official Ballot 2026 Budget Ratification	Ballot	Budget ballot showing a proposed $15 assessment decrease after removing association insurance duties.	73, 74
November 21, 2025	Civil Complaint for Declaratory Judgment	Complaint	New action CV2025-062973 challenging the October 2025 amendments and potential master-policy cancellation.	75
November 23, 2025	Motion for Change of Judge for Cause	Motion	Marx sought to remove Judge Warner, leading to reassignment to Judge Adele Ponce.	72, 76
November 24, 2025	Request for Answers to Interrogatories	Discovery request	Interrogatories targeting board decisions and maintenance work to develop the ultra vires theory.	11
November 25, 2025	Case Reassignment / First Amended Civil Complaint	Court order / complaint	Case reassignment to Judge Ponce and amended pleading in the second insurance-shift action.	70, 75, 77-79
December 1, 2025	Motion for Reconsideration of Nov 17 Minute Entry	Motion	Marx asked Judge Ponce to reconsider denial of the third amended complaint and injunction relief.	70, 80
December 3, 2025	Minute Entry Case Consolidation	Court order	Consolidated CV2025-062973 with CV2025-012980, folding the insurance-amendment dispute into the main litigation path.	81
December 3, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Consolidation	Motion	Marx opposed consolidation, arguing the actions involved distinct facts and emergency concerns.	82
December 4, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Expedited Hearing	Motion	Challenge to characterization of the complaint and request for expedited hearing on insurance risk.	75
December 5, 2025	Joint Notice of Outstanding Motions and Hearings	Legal notice	Catalog of pending matters for Judge Ponce after reassignment.	70
January 4, 2026	Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	Response memorandum	Opposition to dismissal of the second action, arguing insurance termination was a new occurrence requiring separate attention.	19
January 20, 2026	Certificate of Liability Insurance (Master Policy 2025-2026)	Insurance certificate	Certificate showing liability and D&O coverage but no building property insurance, used as key evidence that buildings became uninsured.	83, 84
January 20, 2026	Notice of Intent to Serve Amended Subpoena	Discovery notice	Notice for records subpoena to Colby Management, part of the discovery fight over association records.	85
January 30, 2026	Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration	Legal memorandum	Filing using the January 20 insurance certificate as new evidence of claimed statutory insurance violations.	83
February 26, 2026	Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Compel	Legal notice	Procedural withdrawal of a discovery motion.	86
March 16, 2026	Minute Entry (Oral Argument and Rule 15d conversion)	Court order	Converted the second lawsuit into a Rule 15(d) supplemental-pleading path in the main case.	41, 87
May 27, 2026	Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Motion	Tara’s attempt to dismiss asserted community-wide claims as derivative after newer appellate authority.	88
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Stay Colby Management Discovery	Response memorandum	Marx opposes Tara’s request to stay a ruling on the Colby Management subpoena dispute, arguing the requested insurance-claim accounting, communications, checks, and board-directive materials remain relevant to direct claims and that discovery deadlines were approaching.	166
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Response memorandum	Marx argues Iqtunheimr does not convert her open-meeting, notice, voting, records, insurance-accounting, amendment-validity, and individualized statutory-right claims into derivative claims, and asks the court to deny dismissal or narrow relief/allow amendment.	167
June 2, 2026	Exhibit D – Organization of Claims for Presentation	Exhibit / organizational aid	Marx’s exhibit groups 103 claim paragraphs for presentation, including her assertion that 89 are open-meeting violations and that Tara’s motion targets 60 open-meeting items.	168
June 2, 2026	Proposed Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Proposed order	Proposed form of order submitted by Marx. It is not a ruling unless and until the court signs or enters an order.	169
June 2, 2026	Proposed Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay Ruling on Colby Production	Proposed order	Proposed form of order submitted by Marx to deny Tara’s requested stay of the Colby discovery ruling. It is not a court ruling.	170
Not dated in CSV	Plaintiff’s First Requests for Production of Documents	Discovery request	Formal request for insurance, financial, and related records, aimed at evidence about the 2024 insurance claim and policy-rate increases.	90
September 10, 2020	Marx Warranty Deed	Deed	Warranty deed conveying Unit 5 to Lisa Marx, establishing her standing as unit owner and association member.	2, 91, 92

How to read this case without overclaiming it

Treat interim rulings as interim rulings. The June and July 2025 orders are important, but they do not equal a final merits judgment on every later claim.
Separate association claims from individual-director claims. The uploaded record shows the court was willing to let some claims proceed against the association while dismissing individual board members.
Track the exact injury theory. The direct-versus-derivative question turns on whether the claim seeks to remedy a member’s individual statutory/contractual injury or a generalized association injury.
Do not skip the procedural posture. Preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss, judgment on the pleadings, and final judgment apply different standards.
Use the source index. The upload is large. The normalized roadmap and complete source-document index are the safest way to follow the record in order.

Practical lessons for condo disputes

For owners

Tie each claim to the specific statute, declaration section, bylaw, vote, notice, record request, or personal harm.
Preserve agendas, minutes, emails, insurance notices, amendment materials, ballots, and records-request correspondence.
Do not assume that proving a board process defect automatically proves irreparable harm.
Keep direct personal injury theories separate from generalized association harm.

For boards and counsel

Document board authorization, open-meeting votes, executive-session limits, and ratification steps.
Handle records requests with clear statutory deadlines, production logs, and written explanations.
Treat insurance and amendment changes as high-risk governance events requiring clean notices, votes, and member communications.
Do not rely on derivative-action arguments without addressing member-right statutes and declaration enforcement language.

Complete source set

Earlier filing roadmap and updated official orders

The public index contains 218 distinct PDFs after adding the August 28, September 11 and October 20 official minute entries. The July 22 roadmap is a historical cross-reference to the earlier packet, not a current list of pending motions. Loose discovery exhibits and unsigned July proposed orders remain outside the approved public source set.

Download July 22 roadmap CSV

FAQ

Is this case finally decided?

No final disposition of the entire case appears in the reviewed orders. The October 6 ruling dismissed specified claims and allowed specified theories to proceed. The latest reviewed order, dated October 20 and filed October 22, denied reconsideration without further explanation. The docket was checked October 26, 2026.

Did the court say all of Marx's claims are direct claims?

No. The October 6 court dismissed Count IV/DJ IV and Count V/DJ V and separately dismissed the consolidated fiduciary-duty claim as not valid. Its analysis also treats Count VI as derivative, although the final dismissal paragraphs do not separately name that count. It declined to dismiss the challenged open-meeting and insurance-change claims. Counts II, VII and VIII concern records and voting and are not enumerated in those final dismissal paragraphs; that is not a finding that every allegation succeeds.

Are records and voting part of this case?

Yes. The Second Amended Complaint separately pleads records inspection under A.R.S. § 33-1258, corporate recordkeeping under § 10-11601 and voting rights under § 33-1250, alongside contract and open-meeting theories. The complaint alleges personal injury from losing these rights. Those allegations must be distinguished from what any particular order actually decided.

Were the individual board members kept in the case?

No. The uploaded July 31, 2025 ruling dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson, while distinguishing those personal-liability theories from claims against the association.

Why does insurance appear in an open-meeting case?

The record expanded beyond early open-meeting and records allegations. Later filings challenged master-insurance changes, declaration amendments, owner insurance obligations, and related voting/notice procedures.

Did Marx win the July 2026 summary-judgment motions?

The September 11 order records thirteen motions withdrawn without prejudice, including eight of the nine July 5–21 motions featured here. Withdrawal is not a merits victory or loss on the underlying claims. The July 5 declaration-amendment motion is not on that list, and no merits disposition of it was identified in the reviewed orders.

Why are the loose July exhibits not all available for download?

The master index and filed notices identify the exhibit sets, and the materials were reviewed for this update. The loose copies include discovery, financial, insurance, correspondence, affidavit, contract, and image records with private identifiers, and their status as independently public docket attachments was not established. They remain outside the public source index pending that review.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Download source file

2025-09-15_015_10-order-9-15-25-denying-motion-to-strike-reply-in-support-of-motion-to-strike-portions-of-amended-complaint.pdf

Source 219 No docket date in filename

Source File Roadmap 2026 07 22

Type: Source roadmap CSV

Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.

Download source file

source-file-roadmap-2026-07-22.csv

Primary sources

Reviewed through the October 20, 2026 order filed October 22 and the docket checked October 26. The September 11 withdrawal order corrects the earlier description of all nine featured July motions as pending. The public pleadings describe records, voting, participation and individual-harm theories; their allegations, statements, declarations and proposed orders are not treated as findings. No final disposition of the whole case is identified in the reviewed orders. This page is educational information, not legal advice.

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Gusich v. Sun City Grand: Arizona HOA Board Removal, Title 10, and Fee Exposure

Posted on May 25, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Board Removal | Superior Court CV2025-002634 | Court of Appeals 1 CA-CV 25-0929

Gusich is a useful Arizona HOA governance case because it separates several issues that often get blended together: recall petitions under A.R.S. § 33-1813, nonprofit-corporation removal authority under Title 10, standing after a director has been removed, director indemnification, and how a court can slash an oversized fee request even after the HOA wins.

Last updated May 25, 2026. Case: Thomas J. Gusich v. Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-002634; Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 25-0929; Hon. Jennifer Ryan-Touhill.

Download dismissal ruling Download fee judgment Appeal docket Homeowner guide Board guide Filing roadmap FAQ Primary sources

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2025-11-21. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Superior Court rulings in CV2025-002634 and the pending Court of Appeals docket 1 CA-CV 25-0929. The Superior Court rulings are trial-court decisions and the appeal remains pending in the uploaded docket. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

An Arizona planned-community board-removal dispute may involve both Title 33 recall procedure and Title 10 nonprofit-corporation authority, but a removed director still must show a live justiciable controversy, and even a winning HOA must prove that requested attorney fees are reasonable and tied to the litigation.

Case snapshot

Case name

Thomas J. Gusich v. Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc.

Superior Court docket

Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-002634.

Trial-court result

Motion to dismiss granted; final judgment entered for the association with reduced fees and taxable costs.

Appeal status

Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 25-0929 was pending in the uploaded May 22, 2026 docket, with reply/cross-answer briefing due June 30, 2026.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-002634 / 1 CA-CV 25-0929
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	September 23, 2025
Judge / panel	Hon. Jennifer Ryan-Touhill
Parties	A former Sun City Grand board member challenged his removal, the association’s board conduct standards, meeting exclusions, indemnification position, and later fee request.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1813 A.R.S. § 10-3808 A.R.S. § 10-3810 A.R.S. § 12-1831 A.R.S. § 10-3851 A.R.S. § 10-3852 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 33-1805
Topics	Board GovernanceProcedureAttorney FeesRecords Requests
Outcome / holding	The Superior Court dismissed the claims, entered final judgment for Sun City Grand, awarded reduced attorney fees and costs, and the matter was pending on appeal in 1 CA-CV 25-0929 in the uploaded docket.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	50 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	3 roadmap entries
Video overview	Thomas J. Gusich v. Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	4 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

CURRENT STATUS (June 2026): NOT FINAL — this trial-court matter is on appeal (1 CA-CV 25-0929); both sides appealed and briefing is ongoing. Thomas J. Gusich sued Sun City Grand Community Association after a board-removal dispute involving conduct standards, a special membership meeting, recall/petition procedure, executive-session exclusion allegations, and indemnification. The Superior Court granted the association’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that A.R.S. § 33-1813 did not eliminate Title 10 and bylaw-based director-removal paths, that claims about board-only conduct standards lacked a live controversy after removal, and that indemnification did not require the HOA to fund a former director’s affirmative lawsuit against the association. The court later awarded fees and costs to the association but reduced a $353,388 fee request to $44,619 plus $355.85 in taxable costs. The uploaded Court of Appeals docket showed the appeal and cross-appeal pending as of May 22, 2026.

Key Issues & Findings

The court distinguished petition-based removal procedure under A.R.S. § 33-1813 from other removal mechanisms under Title 10 and the association’s bylaws. Because the bylaws allowed a special membership meeting and member vote after notice, the court did not need to issue advisory rulings on disputed petition format or electronic-signature questions. The court also held that Gusich lacked standing to challenge board-only standards after he was no longer a director, and that indemnification language protects directors against liability to others rather than funding a director’s own lawsuit against the association. On fees, the court found entitlement but reduced rates, duplicative work, pre-suit work, and work tied to statutory records issues.

Why It Matters

Gusich is a practical roadmap for Arizona HOA board-removal litigation. It warns homeowners and boards not to assume Title 33 is the only authority source, shows why declaratory claims need a live controversy, limits director-indemnification theories when a director sues the HOA, and demonstrates that even a prevailing HOA’s fee request can be aggressively reduced when the bills are not reasonable or properly tied to the litigation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas J. Gusich (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Former Sun City Grand board member who challenged his removal.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Gusich.
David E. Wood (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Gusich.
Joseph D. Halow (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Appellate counsel listed for Gusich.

Respondent Side

Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc. (Defendant/Appellee)
Association party defending Gusich’s board-removal claims.
Lauren Elliott Stine (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP
Counsel for Sun City Grand Community Association.
Daniel G. Roberts (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP
Counsel for Sun City Grand Community Association.

Neutral Parties

Nancy M. Collins (Witness)
Filed a motion to quash a witness subpoena.
Jennifer Ryan-Touhill (Judge)
Superior Court judge assigned to the case.

Why this case matters

The dispute started after Thomas Gusich, an elected Sun City Grand board member, challenged the association’s board conduct standards, recall/removal process, meeting exclusions, and indemnification position. The Superior Court treated the case as a pleading-stage question: assuming the alleged facts, did the amended complaint state claims the court could decide?

The July 2025 ruling is important because it rejected a narrow reading of A.R.S. § 33-1813. The court reasoned that Title 33 recall-petition procedure did not eliminate other removal paths available under the association’s bylaws and Title 10 nonprofit-corporation statutes.

The September 2025 fee ruling is just as useful. The association won dismissal and was entitled to fees, but the court reduced a $353,388 request to $44,619 plus $355.85 in taxable costs after finding rates, duplicated work, pre-suit work, and record-request-related work were not fully shiftable.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Thomas J. Gusich v. Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc. (CV2025-002634 / 1 CA-CV 25-0929). The Superior Court dismissed the claims, entered final judgment for Sun City Grand, awarded reduced attorney fees… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Thomas J. Gusich v. Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

What Judge Ryan-Touhill decided

1. A.R.S. § 33-1813 did not displace Title 10

The court held that the HOA-removal statute governs petition-based removal procedure but does not eliminate other director-removal mechanisms available under Title 10 and the association bylaws.

2. The removal vote survived the motion to dismiss challenge

Because the bylaws allowed a special membership meeting and a member vote after notice, the court did not need to decide whether the disputed petition format or electronic signatures satisfied A.R.S. § 33-1813.

3. The Grand Standards claim lacked a live controversy

Once Gusich was no longer on the board, the court found he was not subject to the board-only conduct standards and therefore lacked standing for declaratory relief about those standards.

4. Indemnification did not fund a director’s lawsuit against the HOA

The court read the indemnification language as protection against liability to others, not as a promise that the association would finance a former director’s affirmative lawsuit against the association.

5. The HOA was entitled to fees

The court found fee entitlement under the governing documents, A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(f), and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, then moved to reasonableness.

6. The fee award was heavily reduced

The court reduced requested fees from $353,388 to $44,619, plus $355.85 in taxable costs, after reviewing rates, duplication, pre-suit work, record-request issues, and excessive staffing.

For homeowners and board members

If you are challenging a board removal, separate the removal mechanism from the political facts. This ruling turned on the governing documents and statutes, not on whether the recall campaign was wise, fair, or popular.

Do not assume A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the only removal statute in play. If the association is a nonprofit corporation, Title 10 and the bylaws may matter. A strong filing should explain why the specific statutory path used is exclusive, conflicting, or unavailable.

If you seek declaratory relief, preserve a live controversy. A claim about board-only conduct rules can become moot if you are no longer a director and cannot show a present legal effect.

Fee exposure is real, but this record also shows that a court may scrutinize HOA defense bills. The court declined to shift fees for statutory records issues, duplicative work, excessive rates, and work not clearly tied to the litigation.

For HOA boards and managers

This case supports a practical compliance point: before removing a director, identify every authority source being used. That means the declaration, bylaws, Title 10 nonprofit-corporation statutes, and A.R.S. § 33-1813 when removal by petition is involved.

Document notice, quorum, eligible voters, and the vote result. The court emphasized that the membership received notice and voted at a special meeting.

Do not assume every dollar of defense spend will be shifted to the opposing member. If the HOA hires multiple firms or high-rate counsel, a later fee application still has to show reasonable rates and reasonable work tied to recoverable claims.

Keep statutory records requests separate from litigation strategy. The fee ruling expressly noted that the court would not order the homeowner to pay fees related to records to which he was statutorily entitled.

Suggested workflow for similar disputes

Map the authority source. Identify whether the challenged action was taken under the bylaws, Title 10, A.R.S. § 33-1813, or a combination.
Preserve the meeting record. Keep the petition or request, notices, agenda, quorum proof, voting materials, minutes, and result certification together.
Define the live controversy. For declaratory relief, state exactly what current legal relationship the court needs to resolve.
Separate records rights from recall politics. A homeowner may have statutory records rights even when other claims fail.
Audit fee requests line by line. Compare rates, staffing, pre-suit work, duplicative work, and work tied to non-shiftable issues.

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Download source file

undated_050_motion.pdf

Current posture

Superior Court

Dismissed in the association’s favor with final judgment entered September 26, 2025.

Court of Appeals

Appeal and cross-appeal pending as 1 CA-CV 25-0929 in the uploaded May 22, 2026 docket.

Next listed date

Reply/cross-answer brief due June 30, 2026, according to the uploaded docket snapshot.

FAQ

Is this a published appellate precedent?

No. The uploaded merits and fee rulings are Superior Court rulings. The Court of Appeals case was pending in the uploaded docket, so the final appellate result may change the practical significance.

Did the court decide that every electronic recall signature is valid?

No. The court said it did not need to decide the disputed petition-signature issue because the membership-removal path under the bylaws and Title 10 was enough for the motion-to-dismiss ruling.

Does this mean an HOA can recover all fees whenever it beats a board-removal lawsuit?

No. The court found fee entitlement, but then reduced the requested fees sharply after reviewing reasonableness, duplication, hourly rates, and work not properly shifted to the homeowner.

Why does indemnification matter here?

Gusich argued the bylaws required the association to fund or reimburse his own lawsuit. The court rejected that theory, reading indemnification as protection against liability to others, not affirmative financing for a director’s suit against the HOA.

Primary sources

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R. L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas CV2021-050888: Statutory HOA Claims and Fee Awards

Posted on May 15, 2026 by

Arizona Condominium Act • Budget/Audit Claims • Attorney Fees

CV2021-050888 shows how a statutory HOA enforcement case can be dismissed on the merits while still producing an important fee issue: the Court of Appeals vacated fee awards because the claims did not arise out of contract.

Last updated May 16, 2026. Case: R. L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-050888; Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 22-0202.

Download appellate memorandum decision Download dismissal order Download 2021 judgment Case family map Filing roadmap + 82 PDFs Primary sources Homeowner guide Association guide FAQ

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Video/audio is held from this page until a fresh media package is generated from the approved source record.

Scope note: This page covers a Superior Court case and a nonprecedential Court of Appeals memorandum decision. The memorandum decision is not published precedent under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), but it explains the fee ruling in this case record. AI-generated briefing/audio files in the upload were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as source authority on this page.

The rule in one sentence

A statutory HOA enforcement suit is not automatically an action arising out of contract for A.R.S. § 12-341.01 fee purposes merely because the association is governed by recorded condominium documents.

Case snapshot

Case name

R. L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association.

Court and dockets

Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-050888; Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 22-0202.

Superior Court result

The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the trial court awarded fees and costs to the association.

Appeal result

The Court of Appeals vacated the attorney-fee awards, holding the lawsuit did not arise out of contract under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2021-050888 / 1 CA-CV 22-0202
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	January 19, 2023
Judge / panel	Hon. Sara J. Agne, Judge Michael J. Brown, Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins, Judge James B. Morse Jr.
Parties	A condominium owner brought statutory budget, assessment, audit, and administrative-order enforcement claims against Hilton Casitas; the Superior Court dismissed the claims and the Court of Appeals later vacated contract-based fee awards.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1243 A.R.S. § 33-1255 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	ProcedureAttorney FeesBoard Governance
Outcome / holding	The Superior Court dismissed the statutory enforcement claims, but the Court of Appeals vacated the contract-based attorney-fee awards because the case did not arise out of contract under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Primary public source	View hosted source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	65 PDFs, 2 other source files
Step-by-step docket roadmap	82 roadmap entries
Video overview	Temporarily unavailable while the expanded case record is reviewed
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	4 questions
Featured download links	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

R. L. Whitmer filed a 2021 Maricopa County Superior Court action against Hilton Casitas over alleged failures tied to Arizona condominium budgeting, assessments, audits, and a prior administrative order. The Superior Court dismissed the case with prejudice and awarded fees to the association. In a nonprecedential memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals vacated the attorney-fee awards because the lawsuit did not arise out of contract for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01; its essential basis was statutory enforcement, not breach or enforcement of the condominium declaration.

Key Issues & Findings

The Superior Court concluded the pleaded claims did not support contempt, prospective injunction, or audit relief. The later appellate fee ruling focused on the source of the dispute. Although the declaration was part of the condominium relationship, the claims were framed as statutory enforcement under the Arizona Condominium Act and a prior administrative order, so the declaration was not the cause or origin of the dispute for § 12-341.01 fee purposes.

Why It Matters

This docket is useful for separating merits loss from fee exposure. A homeowner can lose statutory HOA claims, but that does not automatically make the case a contract action for attorney-fee purposes. The memorandum decision is not published precedent, but the case record is a practical warning about pleading theory and fee motions in HOA litigation.

Appellate outcome: On appeal (1 CA-CV 22-0202, mem. dec. filed Jan. 19, 2023), the Court of Appeals VACATED the superior court’s attorneys’-fee award, holding the dispute did not “arise out of contract” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01; the dismissal of the underlying claims was not disturbed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

R. L. Whitmer (Plaintiff)
Homeowner plaintiff in the 2021 Hilton Casitas case.

Respondent Side

Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association (Defendant)
Association party defending Whitmer’s statutory HOA claims.
Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel for Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association.
Timothy D. Butterfield (Counsel)
Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Entered an appearance for Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association.

Neutral Parties

Sara J. Agne (Judge)
Superior Court judge assigned to the case.
Michael J. Brown (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge listed in the case record.
Jennifer M. Perkins (Presiding Judge)
Court of Appeals judge listed in the case record.
James B. Morse Jr. (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge listed in the case record.

Why this case matters

The case began as a budget, assessment, audit, and administrative-order enforcement dispute under Arizona condominium statutes. The Superior Court dismissed the claims, including requested contempt and injunctive relief.

The important appellate issue was fees. The Superior Court treated the dispute as contract-based because the condominium declaration was part of the setting. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that the essential basis of the suit was statutory enforcement, not breach or enforcement of the declaration.

For homeowners and associations, this case separates losing a statutory enforcement claim from automatically owing contract-based attorney fees. That distinction can matter as much as the merits in HOA litigation.

What the courts decided

Claims dismissed with prejudice

The Superior Court granted Hilton Casitas motion to dismiss and concluded the pleaded claims did not support contempt, prospective injunction, or audit relief.

Trial court awarded fees

The October 2021 judgment awarded fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Fee award vacated on appeal

The Court of Appeals vacated the fee awards because Whitmers suit did not arise out of contract.

Memo decision is nonprecedential

The appellate decision is useful record context but is not published precedent except as Arizona rules allow.

For homeowners: using the fee ruling carefully

The useful point in this docket is not that the homeowner won the case. He did not. The useful point is that a statutory HOA enforcement case is not automatically a contract action for A.R.S. § 12-341.01 fee purposes.

For homeowners, that means the way a claim is framed matters. If the essential basis is statutory enforcement or enforcement of an administrative order, the fee analysis may be different from a declaration-based contract dispute. The result still depends on the pleadings, record, and fee statute invoked.

Suggested statutory-claim workflow

Separate merits risk from fee risk. A dismissed statutory claim can still generate a fight over what fee statute applies.
Identify the source of each claim. Label whether the claim arises from statute, administrative order, declaration, contract, or some combination.
Preserve fee objections early. If the association seeks contract fees, respond with the essential-basis analysis before judgment is entered.
Remember the memorandum-decision limits. The appellate fee ruling is useful record context but is not a published precedential opinion.

For associations and managers: fee motions still need the right source

Do this

Tie any fee request to the actual source of the claims and the statute authorizing fees.
Distinguish contract claims from statutory enforcement claims in the fee application.
Preserve the dismissal record and the basis for the fee request separately.
Account for nonprecedential limits when relying on memorandum decisions.

Avoid this

Do not assume every condominium dispute arises out of contract.
Do not treat recorded CC&Rs as the automatic origin of every statutory claim.
Do not overlook fee exposure just because the merits claims were dismissed.
Do not cite this page as legal advice or as a substitute for the actual appellate memorandum decision.

What this memorandum decision does not do

The memorandum decision does not revive the dismissed statutory claims. It vacated contract-based fee awards because the action did not arise out of contract for A.R.S. § 12-341.01 purposes.

It is also not published precedent. Its value on this site is practical: it shows how fee framing can become a separate appellate issue after the merits case is lost.

Frequently asked questions

Did Whitmer win the 2021 Superior Court case?

No. The Superior Court dismissed the claims with prejudice.

What did the Court of Appeals change?

It vacated the contract-based attorney-fee awards because the case did not arise out of contract under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Is the appellate memorandum decision published precedent?

No. The page treats it as useful record context, subject to Arizona rules governing memorandum decisions.

Why does this matter for HOA cases?

Fee exposure can turn on whether the essential basis of a lawsuit is statutory, contractual, or something else.

Review note and disclaimer

Reviewed against the Superior Court docket materials and the Court of Appeals memorandum decision in No. 1 CA-CV 22-0202. This page is educational information and is not legal advice.

Whitmer / Hilton Casitas case family

These pages separate the three court dockets while keeping the shared administrative-order background visible.

Related page	Role in the case family	Connection
Published 2018 Whitmer case	Related docket	Earlier published jurisdiction decision about Superior Court enforcement of HOA administrative orders.
CV2022-014709	Related docket	Later contempt petition over the scope of the 2015 ALJ budget order.

Download source

Type: AI-generated source table

AI-generated review material from the upload. Use it only for orientation; verify any legal claim against the linked court filings and orders.

Download source file

ai-document-summary-cv2021-050888.csv

Source 67 No docket date in filename

AI The Brutal Machinery Of Civil Procedure

Type: AI-generated media review asset

AI-generated review material from the upload. Use it only for orientation; verify any legal claim against the linked court filings and orders.

Download source file

ai-the-brutal-machinery-of-civil-procedure.m4a

Primary sources

Core source documents used for this page.

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