Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge upheld Desert Mountain’s short-term-rental amendment, rejected open-meeting and voting-threshold challenges, and awarded the association fees and costs.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-015165.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2020-05-19. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-015165) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the July 29, 2019 under-advisement ruling and the October 24, 2019 under-advisement rulings on clarification, amendment, fees, and costs; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated May 19, 2020, shows the court denied Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely and granted Nicdon’s motion to quash after a supersedeas bond was posted; the minute entries reviewed here do not show the appellate outcome. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court upheld Desert Mountain’s short-term-rental amendment. It held that the Master Declaration expressly allowed the board to add use restrictions through the Section 5.20 major-decision procedure, that the association used the correct voting threshold when more than two-thirds of the votes cast at the called meeting approved the amendment, and that Arizona law did not make the restriction invalid. Later, the court denied Nicdon leave to add an open-meeting theory because the request came after summary judgment and would be futile, then awarded Desert Mountain its fees and costs as the prevailing party.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nicdon 10663 LLC (Plaintiff)
    Owner of a residence within Desert Mountain Master Association that challenged the association’s 2018 short-term-rental amendment.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Counsel for Nicdon in the minute entries, including the February 2019 hearing and later proceedings.
  • Jacob A. Kubert (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Nicdon at the May 2019 status conference and June 2019 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association that adopted and defended the 2018 amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals.
  • Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
    Counsel for Desert Mountain throughout the minute entries.
  • Gregory A. Stein (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing with Curtis S. Ekmark for Desert Mountain at the February, June, and October 2019 hearings.

Neutral Parties

  • Colleen L. French (Judge)
    Judicial officer who handled the February 2019 order-to-show-cause return hearing.
  • Danielle J. Viola (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the July 2019 and October 2019 under-advisement rulings.
  • M. Scott McCoy (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled post-judgment bond, stay, subpoena, and supplemental-fee matters.

What happened

Nicdon 10663 LLC owned a residence in Desert Mountain. In 2018, Desert Mountain Master Association recorded an amendment to its Master Declaration that restricted short-term rentals to eligible renters and generally barred rentals to ineligible renters for periods of less than thirty days. The court described the core dispute as whether the association followed the correct procedure to adopt that rental restriction and whether the restriction was valid.

The association first tried a 60-day rental proposal, received substantial owner objections, then rescinded that proposal and moved forward with a 30-day minimum. The February 2018 board resolution triggered the Section 5.20 objection process. More than ten percent of members objected, so the matter went to a member vote. The ruling states that 1,323 owners voted for the amendment, 430 voted against it, and 8 abstained out of 1,761 votes cast.

Nicdon argued the amendment was invalid because the declaration did not warn buyers that the association could add a new 30-day rental minimum, because the amendment allegedly favored the Desert Mountain Golf Club, because Arizona law required a different level of consent, and because the amendment process allegedly violated open-meeting requirements and the governing documents. Desert Mountain argued Section 4.2 expressly allowed use restrictions to be amended or added, and Section 5.20 supplied the voting process for that major decision.

Judge Danielle J. Viola granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on July 29, 2019. The court held that Section 4.2 expressly contemplated adding use restrictions, Section 5.20 required two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at the called meeting rather than a majority of all members, the amendment applied uniformly, and A.R.S. § 33-1806 supported enforcement of declaration-based rental time-period restrictions. The court also found Nicdon had not shown that alleged open-meeting problems voided the later owner vote.

On October 24, 2019, the court clarified that the July ruling did not give Nicdon any new right to rent to prospective club members who were not eligible renters under the amendment. The same ruling denied Nicdon leave to file an amended complaint, awarded Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees and $4,673.79 in costs, and denied Nicdon’s fee request. Later entries denied Nicdon’s new-trial motion, set a supersedeas bond, temporarily stayed enforcement after a subpoena dispute, and denied Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (CV2018-015165 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). CC&R amendment adding a 30-day rental minimum upheld under the declaration’s voting procedure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-07 Desert Mountain records an amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals.
Step 2019-02-14 The court denies Nicdon Rule 56(d) relief and sets a response deadline on Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment motion.
Step 2019-06-07 The court hears argument on the competing summary-judgment, strike, Rule 56(d), and Rule 11 filings and takes several motions under advisement.
Step 2019-07-29 Under-advisement ruling grants Desert Mountain summary judgment, denies Nicdon summary judgment, denies the motion to strike and Rule 11 motion, and holds the rental amendment valid.
Step 2019-10-21 The court hears argument on proposed judgments, fee applications, clarification, and Nicdon’s motion for leave to amend.
Step 2019-10-24 Under-advisement ruling grants Desert Mountain clarification, denies Nicdon leave to amend, awards Desert Mountain fees and costs, and denies Nicdon’s fee request.
Step 2020-01-15 The court denies Nicdon’s Rule 59 motion for new trial.
Step 2020-04-03 The court sets the supersedeas bond at $113,818.79.
Step 2020-04-07 The court stays Bank of America document production and stays judgment enforcement for thirty days.
Step 2020-05-19 The court denies Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely and grants Nicdon’s motion to quash because a supersedeas bond had been posted.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 17 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2019-02-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry denying Nicdon's Rule 56(d) relief and setting a deadline for its response to Desert Mountain's summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
Source 2 2019-05-07

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting oral argument on Desert Mountain's summary-judgment motion.

Source 3 2019-05-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry adding all pending summary-judgment, strike, Rule 56(d), and Rule 11 motions to the June 7 argument.

Source 4 2019-05-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry ordering Desert Mountain to clarify its Rule 56(d) request or have the request deemed abandoned.

Download source file
Source 5 2019-06-07

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking Nicdon's summary-judgment motion, Desert Mountain's motion to strike, and Desert Mountain's Rule 11 motion under advisement.

Download source file
Source 6 2019-07-29

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Desert Mountain summary judgment, denying Nicdon summary judgment, denying the motion to strike and Rule 11 motion, and holding the rental amendment valid under the declaration and Arizona law.

Source 7 2019-10-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting argument on proposed judgments, fee applications, Desert Mountain's clarification motion, and Nicdon's motion for leave to amend.

Source 8 2019-10-21

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking the competing fee applications, proposed judgments, clarification motion, and motion for leave to amend under advisement.

Download source file
Source 9 2019-10-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Correcting minute entry revising the July 29 summary-judgment ruling's cross-motion standard while leaving the balance of the ruling unchanged.

Download source file
Source 10 2019-10-24

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Desert Mountain clarification, denying Nicdon leave to amend, awarding Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys' fees and $4,673.79 in costs, and denying Nicdon's fee request.

Source 11 2020-01-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Nicdon's Rule 59 motion for new trial without oral argument.

Download source file
Source 12 2020-02-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry correcting Judge McCoy's division contact information.

Download source file
Source 13 2020-03-10

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Hearing-set minute entry denying expedited treatment and setting an evidentiary hearing on Nicdon's supersedeas-bond and stay motion.

Source 14 2020-03-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry converting the supersedeas-bond evidentiary hearing to a telephonic hearing because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Download source file
Source 15 2020-04-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling setting the supersedeas bond at $113,818.79 and vacating the scheduled evidentiary hearing.

Download source file
Source 16 2020-04-07

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Emergency-hearing minute entry staying Bank of America document production and staying enforcement of the judgment for thirty days.

Download source file
Source 17 2020-05-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Desert Mountain's supplemental fee-and-cost application as untimely and granting Nicdon's motion to quash because a supersedeas bond had been posted.

Download source file

FAQ

What rental restriction did the court uphold?

The court upheld Desert Mountain’s amendment to its Master Declaration restricting rentals to ineligible renters for periods of less than thirty days, while allowing rentals to eligible renters as defined in the amendment.

Why did the court say the association used the right voting threshold?

Section 5.20 allowed a major decision to proceed, after more than ten percent of members objected, if approved by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at a meeting called for that purpose. The court held that language required two-thirds of the votes cast at the called meeting, not a majority of all members.

Did the court require unanimous owner consent?

No. The court rejected Nicdon’s unanimous-consent argument, including its reliance on the Arizona Condominium Act’s A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), because the case involved a homeowners association and the declaration itself contained a specific amendment process for use restrictions.

How did A.R.S. § 33-1806 matter?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1806 as supporting enforcement of rental time-period restrictions when those restrictions are in the declaration, and it noted that A.R.S. § 33-1802 includes amendments within the declaration.

What happened to Nicdon’s open-meeting theory?

The court found the theory was not clearly pleaded before summary judgment and, even if considered, Nicdon had not cited authority showing that an alleged A.R.S. § 33-1804 problem would void a later properly noticed owner vote approving the amendment.

Why were fees awarded to Desert Mountain?

The court treated Desert Mountain as the prevailing party under the declaration’s fee provision and as the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. It awarded $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees and $4,673.79 in costs after reducing the requested fees for excessive amounts tied to unsuccessful procedural motions.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2018-015165 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 24, 2019
Judge / panelHon. Colleen L. French, Hon. Danielle J. Viola, Hon. M. Scott McCoy
PartiesNicdon 10663 LLC (Plaintiff, owner) v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant, homeowners association)
Governing law
Topics
AmendmentsRental RestrictionsOpen MeetingsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court upheld Desert Mountain's short-term-rental amendment, granted the association summary judgment, denied Nicdon's competing summary-judgment motion, denied leave to amend, and awarded Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys' fees plus $4,673.79 in costs.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package17 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Nicdon 10663 LLC challenged Desert Mountain Master Association's 2018 amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals. The superior court granted Desert Mountain summary judgment, holding that Section 4.2 expressly allowed the board to add use restrictions through the Section 5.20 major-decision process, that Section 5.20 required approval by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at the called meeting rather than a majority of all members, and that the amendment was not inconsistent with Arizona law. The court rejected Nicdon's open-meeting and procedural-defect theories as either not properly pleaded or not a basis to void the member-approved amendment, denied leave to amend as delayed, prejudicial, and futile, and awarded Desert Mountain attorneys' fees and costs.

Key Issues & Findings

On the CC&R amendment issue, the court read Section 4.2 and Section 5.20 together. Section 4.2 said the board had the right to amend, repeal, or add use restrictions in Exhibit E, subject to member approval under Section 5.20. Section 5.20 then created a major-decision process: after board approval and notice to owners, if more than ten percent objected, the decision could be authorized by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at a meeting called for that purpose. Because the board adopted a written resolution, more than ten percent objected, and 1,323 of 1,761 votes cast favored the amendment, the court held the declaration's voting requirement was satisfied.

The court rejected Nicdon's arguments that unanimous consent, a majority of all members, or the Arizona Condominium Act's A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) standard controlled. It distinguished cases such as Dreamland and Wilson because Desert Mountain's declaration already gave notice that use restrictions existed and could be amended, and because the rental amendment did not force owners into a new association or assessment structure. The court also concluded A.R.S. § 33-1806 supported enforcement of declaration-based rental time-period restrictions, and A.R.S. § 33-1802 included amendments within the declaration.

On procedure and open meetings, the court found Nicdon had not clearly pleaded the theory that earlier board conduct invalidated the amendment, and in any event had not cited authority showing that an alleged A.R.S. § 33-1804 violation would void a later properly noticed member vote. After summary judgment, the court denied Nicdon leave to amend because the request came after briefing, argument, and ruling; the proposed amendment would be futile in light of the court's earlier analysis; and delay and prejudice weighed against reopening the case. The court then treated Desert Mountain as the prevailing party under the declaration's fee provision and, independently, as the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, while reducing the requested fee award for excessive amounts tied to unsuccessful procedural motions.

Why It Matters

This ruling is useful for Arizona HOA rental-restriction disputes because it shows how much turns on the recorded declaration's amendment language. The court did not treat a short-term-rental restriction as automatically invalid merely because it added a new practical limit on rentals; it enforced the amendment because the declaration expressly allowed new use restrictions and specified a member-vote process that the association followed.

The case also shows the limits of open-meeting and procedural objections when the requested remedy is to void an owner-approved amendment. The court recognized A.R.S. § 33-1804 but found no authority in the record requiring invalidation of a later properly noticed member vote. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is a detailed example of how a trial court analyzed CC&R amendment authority, rental-period restrictions, and fee-shifting after an association prevailed.

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Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

CC&R Amendments & Short-Term Rentals | Kalway v. Calabria Ranch | CV2022-004188

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association’s authority to adopt a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs banning rentals of less than 30 days. Invoking Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, she argued the original declaration — which allows “rent signs” and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants — gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be prohibited. The court denied her motion to dismiss because terms like “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” are undefined in the CC&Rs and required factual development. The parties settled before the question was ever answered on the merits.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2022-12-14. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling on the motion to dismiss; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated December 14, 2022, shows the court accepted a notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The collected entries do not include a final dismissal order, and the terms of the settlement are not part of the court’s minute-entry record. The court never ruled on the merits of the amendment’s validity. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court denied homeowner Diana Costain’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Whether the Association’s 2020 Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs — which prohibits rentals of less than 30 days — was properly adopted could not be decided on the pleadings, because key terms in the CC&Rs are undefined: “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent.” The court held that further development of those terms was appropriate during the case, and it noted that Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA — the Arizona Supreme Court amendment-notice decision both sides fought over — was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The court also held that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. The parties settled about four months later, so the validity of the short-term-rental ban was never decided on the merits.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that adopted the Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs in 2020 prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days; the named plaintiff in this action, which filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022.
  • Chandler W. Travis (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Plaintiff Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. throughout the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Diana Costain (Defendant)
    Homeowner who purchased her Villa Sendero property in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking. She moved to dismiss, challenging the Association's authority to adopt the short-term-rental restriction.
  • Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Defendant Diana Costain throughout the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Joseph P. Mikitish (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the case and issued the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling denying the motion to dismiss.
  • John D. Lierman (Judge Pro Tempore)
    Judge pro tempore appointed through the court's Alternative Dispute Resolution department; conducted the parties' settlement conference and signed the Civil Settlement Conference Report reflected in the December 14, 2022 minute entry.

What happened

Villa Sendero is a homeowners-association community governed by a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). Diana Costain purchased her property there in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking — and the property has been subject to the CC&Rs since her purchase. In 2020 the Association adopted an amendment to the CC&Rs, the “Fifth Amendment,” prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.

The dispute reached Maricopa County Superior Court in 2022 with the Association as the named plaintiff and Costain as the defendant; the Association filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022. At an April 22, 2022 return hearing before Judge Joseph P. Mikitish, the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule for a motion to dismiss from Costain, and the court held the Association’s preliminary-injunction application in abeyance until that motion could be argued. Costain filed her motion on May 19, 2022, and the court heard oral argument on June 17, 2022 — a virtual hearing that six residents of the Villa Sendero community also attended.

Costain’s motion framed the core question: could the Association validly adopt a new short-term-rental restriction by amendment? She argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law, and that under the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), an original declaration must give owners sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Here, she argued, the original CC&Rs did not restrict rentals at all and in fact contemplated them — Article VIII allows “rent signs,” and Article III, Section 2 lets a homeowner delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — so the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could later be banned. She also argued the restriction decreased her property’s value.

The Association responded on two fronts. Procedurally, it argued Costain’s Kalway theory failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had. Substantively, it argued the original CC&Rs already required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes” — so residents had notice of use restrictions from the start, and the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that no declaratory counterclaim is required to raise the defense, that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental is.

In an under-advisement ruling issued August 9, 2022, Judge Mikitish denied the motion to dismiss. The court agreed with Costain that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. But it found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association’s allegations, and it noted that Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss.

The case then moved toward resolution rather than trial. On September 27, 2022 the court adopted the parties’ stipulated scheduling order, referred the case to the court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution department for a mandatory settlement conference to be held by January 5, 2023, and set a trial setting conference for February 24, 2023. The settlement conference worked: after receiving the Civil Settlement Conference Report signed by Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms do not appear in the minute-entry record, and the validity of the short-term-rental amendment was never decided.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (CV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court denied the homeowner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2020 The Association adopts the Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs, prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.
Step 2022-04-04 The Association files an Application for Preliminary Injunction in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2022-004188).
Step 2022-04-22 Virtual return hearing before Judge Mikitish. By stipulation, the court sets a briefing schedule for Costain's motion to dismiss, sets oral argument, and holds the preliminary-injunction application in abeyance.
Step 2022-05-19 Costain files her Motion to Dismiss; the Association responds June 3 and Costain replies June 9.
Step 2022-06-17 Virtual oral argument on the motion to dismiss, attended by six Villa Sendero residents; the court takes the motion under advisement.
Step 2022-08-09 Under-advisement ruling denies the motion to dismiss: key CC&R terms are undefined and require factual development before the Fifth Amendment's validity can be determined.
Step 2022-09-27 The court adopts the parties' stipulated scheduling order, orders a mandatory settlement conference (to be held by January 5, 2023), and sets a trial setting conference for February 24, 2023.
Step 2022-12-14 After a settlement conference before Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, the court accepts the notice of settlement, deems pending matters moot, vacates the trial setting conference, and places the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2022-04-22

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2022-06-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2022-09-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2022-12-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What was this case about?

The validity of an HOA CC&R amendment restricting short-term rentals. In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. Homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Association’s authority to adopt that restriction, arguing the original CC&Rs gave owners no notice that such a ban could later be imposed by amendment.

What is Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA and why did it matter here?

As described in the court’s ruling, Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), is an Arizona Supreme Court decision holding that for CC&Rs to be amended, the original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Costain relied on it to argue the general amendment clause in Villa Sendero’s CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that a sub-30-day rental ban could be adopted. The court noted that Kalway was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment — a stage with a developed factual record — rather than on a motion to dismiss.

Did the court decide whether the short-term-rental ban was valid?

No. The August 9, 2022 ruling decided only that the question could not be answered on the pleadings. Because the CC&Rs do not define key terms — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — the court held further development of those terms was appropriate to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The case settled in December 2022 before any merits ruling.

Does a homeowner have to file a declaratory judgment action to challenge a CC&R amendment?

Not to raise the issue defensively. The Association argued Costain’s challenge failed because, unlike the Kalway plaintiff, she had not filed a declaratory relief action. The court disagreed, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs.

How did the case end?

By settlement. The court ordered a mandatory settlement conference in September 2022, and after Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman conducted the conference and submitted a Civil Settlement Conference Report, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms are not part of the minute-entry record.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent — and here the court never even reached the merits of the amendment’s validity. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Kalway notice challenge to a short-term-rental amendment is litigated, that undefined CC&R terms can keep such a dispute alive past the pleading stage, and that these fights often resolve through court-ordered settlement conferences rather than trial.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 9, 2022
Judge / panelHon. Joseph P. Mikitish
PartiesVilla Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Diana Costain (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics
CC&RsProcedureAmendmentsCovenantsRental Restrictions
Outcome / holding

The superior court denied the homeowner's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs, but that whether the Fifth Amendment prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days was properly adopted could not be resolved on the pleadings because key CC&R terms — "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," and "rent" — are undefined and require further development; the case settled before any merits ruling.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap8 roadmap entries
Video overviewVilla Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. The resulting Maricopa County Superior Court case — filed with the Association as plaintiff, which also applied for a preliminary injunction in April 2022 — turned on homeowner Diana Costain's motion to dismiss, in which she challenged the Association's authority to adopt the restriction. Relying on Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), Costain argued the original CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be banned: the declaration allows "rent signs" and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants. The Association countered that the original CC&Rs' single-family-residence requirement and ban on "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes" gave owners notice, and that the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term bed-and-breakfast-style leases. In an August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the motion to dismiss because key CC&R terms are undefined and required factual development. The parties then settled at a court-ordered settlement conference, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard: a claim is dismissed only when the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts, the court looks only to the pleading and its well-pled factual allegations, conclusory statements are insufficient, and factual allegations are assumed true in the light most favorable to the pleading party. Against that standard, Costain argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law and that under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA an original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. She pointed to features of the original CC&Rs that contemplate renting — Article VIII allows "rent signs" and Article III, Section 2 permits a homeowner to delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — and argued the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could be prohibited, a restriction she said also decreased her property's value.

The Association raised a threshold procedural objection — that Costain's position failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had — and a substantive defense: the original CC&Rs required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," so owners had notice of use restrictions and the amendment provisions could be used to clarify that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, that short-term rentals are consistent with single-family-residence use, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental.

The court resolved the motion on two grounds. It first rejected the Association's procedural argument, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. It then found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," and "rent" — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the course of the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. Because the court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association's allegations, and because Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, the motion was denied. The case never reached that developed record: after a September 27, 2022 scheduling order requiring a mandatory settlement conference, the parties settled before Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement, deemed pending matters moot, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar.

Why It Matters

Short-term-rental amendments are one of the most contested moves an Arizona HOA can make, and this case shows how a Kalway notice challenge to such an amendment actually plays out in superior court. Two practical points emerge from the ruling. First, the procedural holding: a homeowner does not need to file her own declaratory judgment action to attack an amendment's validity — she can raise it as a defense when the association litigates against her. Second, drafting matters: because Villa Sendero's CC&Rs never defined "single-family residence," "business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes," or "rent," the court could not resolve the amendment's validity on the pleadings and sent the dispute into discovery.

The case also illustrates a common endgame. Rather than litigate through summary judgment the way Kalway itself was decided, the parties settled at a court-ordered settlement conference roughly four months after the motion to dismiss was denied, and the case went onto the dismissal calendar. That means the ruling offers no merits answer on whether the 30-day rental ban survives Kalway — and as a superior-court decision it binds only these parties in any event.

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Richard J. Murtland v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

CC&R Amendments & Rental Restrictions | A.R.S. §§ 33-1227, 33-1260.01 | CV2015-091102

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, condominium owners in the Scottsdale Astragal community argued that an amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required the unanimous consent of all unit owners under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). The court held the rental restriction was instead subject to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, noted that A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A) lets owners rent their units only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions, found the six-month rule not unreasonable, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment (downloadable above) and the February 24, 2016 judgment entry; the procedural timeline below tracks each collected minute entry. Currency caveat: the court entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c) on February 24, 2016, stating that no further matters remained in the case, and the collected minute entries show no later activity — this page does not track whether any appeal was taken. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court upheld the Association’s amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. It held the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) — which applies to amendments that, among other things, change “the use to which any unit is restricted” — but instead to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), which lets a unit owner rent a unit only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions. Finding the six-month restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and finding no due-process violation because the owners had ample notice the Declaration could be amended, the court denied the owners’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Final judgment including the Association’s attorneys’ fees followed in February 2016.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard J. Murtland (Plaintiff)
    Condominium owner in the Scottsdale Astragal community who challenged the six-month minimum rental amendment, contending he was damaged because he could not generate income through short-term rentals.
  • Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiff)
    Co-plaintiff condominium owner. The court found both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association.
  • Erin Selene Iungerich (Counsel)
    Substituted in as the plaintiffs' attorney of record in July 2015 (a substitution within the same firm as J. Roger Wood) and appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.
  • J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
    The plaintiffs' original attorney of record, replaced by Erin S. Iungerich in a within-firm substitution in July 2015; he also appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant)
    Scottsdale condominium association whose owners voted, under the Declaration's 67% amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences; it prevailed on cross-summary judgment and recovered its attorneys' fees.
  • J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
    Counsel for the Association, appearing on its behalf at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

  • David K. Udall (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions for summary judgment, issued the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling, and signed the February 2016 final judgment.

What happened

Astragal is a Scottsdale condominium community governed by a Declaration. The Declaration includes a provision allowing 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration. Using that mechanism, the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association amended its Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all of its residences whenever owners lease or rent their units to third parties.

Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield, both owners of condominiums in the community, sued the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2015-091102). Their position was that they had been damaged because the amendment prevented them from generating income through short-term rentals. In July 2015 the court granted a notice of substitution of counsel within the plaintiffs’ firm, allowing attorney Erin S. Iungerich to substitute for J. Roger Wood as attorney of record.

The dispute was resolved on paper rather than at trial. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the Association filed a cross-motion for summary judgment; the court found that neither party disputed the significant facts. After full briefing, the court set oral argument, which Judge David K. Udall heard on January 8, 2016, with Iungerich and Wood appearing for the plaintiffs and J. Gary Linder for the Association. The court took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling issued January 12, 2016, the court rejected the owners’ central statutory argument. A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) provides that, except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act, an amendment may not “change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interest of the unit or the use to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners.” The court found the rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also noted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), under which “[a] unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.”

The court then distinguished the plaintiffs’ lead case, Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to force non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs were already members of the Astragal Association and, in the court’s words, “knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future.” The court further found the six-month leasing restriction “is not unreasonable, and it has potential benefits for the community at large,” and that the plaintiffs’ due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties. It denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The endgame was brief. On February 24, 2016, after reviewing the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and the plaintiffs’ response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in favor of the Association, in accordance with a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016. The court noted that no further matters remained in the case, making it a final judgment under Rule 54(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (CV2015-091102 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). A declaration amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period was not subject to the unanimous-consent… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Before suit The Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association amends its Declaration — under the Declaration's provision allowing amendment by a 67% vote of owners — to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties.
Step 2015 Condominium owners Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield sue the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2015-091102), claiming damages because they cannot generate income through short-term rentals.
Step 2015-07-06 The court grants the plaintiffs' notice of substitution of counsel (within firm), allowing Erin S. Iungerich to substitute for J. Roger Wood as attorney of record.
Step 2015-10-23 With the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the Association's cross-motion fully briefed, the court sets oral argument for January 8, 2016 before Judge David K. Udall.
Step 2016-01-08 Oral argument is held on the cross-motions for summary judgment; the court takes the matter under advisement.
Step 2016-01-12 Under-advisement ruling: the rental restriction is not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1227(D)'s unanimous-consent requirement but to the 67% rule of § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration; Dreamland Villa is distinguished; the plaintiffs' motion is denied, the Association's cross-motion is granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.
Step 2016-02-24 The court grants the Association's application for attorneys' fees and awards judgment in its favor; the formal written judgment, signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016, is a final judgment under Rule 54(c), with no further matters remaining.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2015-07-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2015-10-23

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2016-01-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2016-01-12

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the owners’ summary-judgment motion, granting the association summary judgment, and dismissing the rental-restriction challenge with prejudice.

Source 5 2016-02-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

Can a condominium association restrict short-term rentals by amending its CC&Rs?

In this case, yes. The Astragal Declaration allowed 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the owners used that provision to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. The court upheld the amendment, holding it was subject to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, and found the six-month restriction was not unreasonable and had potential benefits for the community at large.

Didn't changing how units can be used require unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D)?

That was the owners’ central argument. Section 33-1227(D) requires the unanimous consent of unit owners for amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or “the use to which any unit is restricted.” The court found the six-month rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement — it fell under the 67% amendment rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as the Astragal Declaration adopted it.

What role did A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 play in the ruling?

The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): “A unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.” In other words, the statute itself contemplates that a declaration can prohibit rentals or set rental time period restrictions — which is what the Astragal amendment did.

Why didn't Dreamland Villa v. Raimey help the owners?

The plaintiffs relied on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010), but the court found it distinguishable. In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and knew when they bought their units that the Declaration could be amended by a 67% majority vote in the future. The court held the Dreamland holding did not apply.

Did the owners recover anything?

No. The court denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice on January 12, 2016. It then granted the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and, on February 24, 2016, entered a final judgment in the Association’s favor under Rule 54(c).

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Maricopa County judge applied the Condominium Act’s amendment rules — the 67% supermajority in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) versus the unanimous-consent triggers in § 33-1227(D) — to a rental-restriction amendment, and it illustrates the fee-shifting risk owners face when a challenge to a CC&R amendment fails.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-091102 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJanuary 12, 2016
Judge / panelHon. David K. Udall
PartiesRichard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiffs, condominium owners) v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant)
Governing law
Topics
AmendmentsCC&RsCovenantsRental RestrictionsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the association summary judgment on its cross-motion and dismissed the owners' case with prejudice, holding that a declaration amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) but to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the declaration, that the restriction was not unreasonable, and that the owners' due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice the declaration could be amended.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewRichard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Two owners of condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community sued their association after the owners amended the Declaration, under its 67%-vote amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The owners claimed they were damaged because they could not generate income through short-term rentals, and argued the amendment changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). On cross-motions for summary judgment, with the significant facts undisputed, the court held in a January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling that the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement but to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration. It distinguished Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, found the six-month restriction not unreasonable, denied the owners' motion, granted the association's cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. A final Rule 54(c) judgment awarding the association its attorneys' fees was entered February 24, 2016.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began from undisputed facts: both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community, the Declaration allowed 67% of the Association's owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the Association used that provision to amend the Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The plaintiffs claimed damage because they could not generate income through short-term rentals. The court set the statutory frame with A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), which — except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act — bars amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or "the use to which any unit is restricted" absent the unanimous consent of the unit owners. It also quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): a unit owner may use the unit as a rental property "unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration's rental time period restrictions." On that framework the court found the rental restriction was not subject to § 33-1227(D)'s unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration.

The court then rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and "knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future," so the Dreamland holding did not apply. The court further found the six-month leasing restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and found no due-process violation because the plaintiffs had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties.

On those findings the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, granted judgment for the Association on its cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. After reviewing the Association's application for attorneys' fees and the plaintiffs' response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in the Association's favor in a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016 — a final judgment under Rule 54(c), with no further matters remaining in the case.

Why It Matters

Short-term-rental restrictions are one of the most common flashpoints in Arizona condominium communities, and this case shows how a Maricopa County judge sorted the key statutory question: which amendments require every owner's consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), and which need only the supermajority the declaration itself sets under § 33-1227(A). Owners challenging a rental-restriction amendment often assume that limiting rentals "changes the use to which the unit is restricted" and so demands unanimity; here the court held a six-month minimum rental period adopted by the Declaration's 67% vote was valid without unanimous consent.

The ruling also illustrates two recurring themes. First, courts weigh what buyers signed up for: because the plaintiffs bought into a community whose Declaration could be amended by a 67% vote, the court found they had ample notice that rental rules could change, and it distinguished Dreamland Villa, where a majority vote forced obligations onto people who had never joined the association. Second, losing a challenge like this can be expensive — the case ended with a final judgment awarding the association its attorneys' fees. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent, but it is a clean, compact example of how these disputes get resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment.

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Village of Oakcreek v. Bonham: Kalway and Arizona HOA Short-Term Rental Amendments

Arizona HOA Rental Restrictions | Kalway | 1 CA-CV 22-0780

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an HOA enforcement suit because the original declaration did not give fair notice that the HOA could later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 22-0780; Yavapai County Superior Court No. V1300CV202280081.

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers the nonprecedential Court of Appeals decision and the uploaded appellate/trial record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

A general business-use restriction in original CC&Rs does not necessarily give homeowners fair notice that the HOA may later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Case snapshot

Court result

Dismissal for homeowner Bonham was affirmed.

Core doctrine

Kalway reasonable-and-foreseeable notice for CC&R amendments.

Rental issue

2016 and 2017 amendments banned short-term rentals.

Fee result

Bonham received appellate fees and costs subject to ARCAP 21.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 22-0780
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateOctober 3, 2023
Judge / panelDavid D. Weinzweig, Michael S. Catlett, Maria Elena Cruz
PartiesA planned-community association sued a homeowner to stop short-term rentals after majority-approved CC&R amendments banned short-term rentals.
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-120.21
  • A.R.S. § 12-2101
  • A.R.S. § 12-341
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
Rental RestrictionsCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not enforceable against him because they were not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package70 PDFs, 1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewVillage of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham
Study / briefing material2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions3 questions
Curated download aliases4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Village of Oakcreek Association sued Lance Bonham to enforce 2016 and 2017 CC&R amendments that banned short-term rentals. Bonham moved to dismiss under Kalway, arguing the original declaration did not provide fair notice that a majority could later impose that kind of rental restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. It rejected the association's argument that a generic no-business covenant made short-term-rental restrictions foreseeable, because the original declaration did not address residential rentals or lease duration.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied Kalway and asked whether the original declaration gave objective notice of a future rental restriction. The declaration broadly barred business operations on lots, but it did not mention residential rentals. A business-use restriction was not enough to warn owners that a later majority amendment could ban short-term rentals. The court also treated Bonham as an owner with title before the relevant amendments based on the declaration's broad definition of ownership and his trustee status.

Why It Matters

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case for Arizona HOAs and homeowners. It shows that an association cannot rely on generic business-use language as a substitute for a real leasing covenant when trying to enforce a later rental ban. It also pairs well with Gross: both cases apply Kalway to rental amendments and both warn boards to tie new rental restrictions to language already present in the original CC&Rs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Village of Oakcreek Association (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Association party seeking to enforce short-term-rental restrictions.
  • Alexis G. Firehawk (Counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Village of Oakcreek Association.
  • Tessa Knueppel (Counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Village of Oakcreek Association.

Respondent Side

  • Lance E. Bonham (Defendant/Appellee)
    Homeowner defendant in the short-term-rental dispute.
  • Mark J. Bainbridge (Counsel)
    The Bainbridge Law Firm, LLC
    Counsel for Bonham.

Neutral Parties

  • Linda Wallace (Judge Pro Tempore)
    Superior Court judge listed in the memorandum decision.
  • David D. Weinzweig (Presiding Judge)
    Authored the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.
  • Michael S. Catlett (Judge)
    Joined the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.
  • Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
    Joined the Court of Appeals memorandum decision.

Why this case matters

Bonham is useful because it applies Kalway to the most common HOA amendment fight: short-term rentals. The association argued the original declaration barred business activity, so a later rental ban was foreseeable. The Court of Appeals disagreed because the business-use covenant did not say anything about residential rentals.

The decision gives homeowners a concrete argument when an HOA tries to convert a general residential-use or business-use clause into a later rental prohibition. It also gives boards a drafting warning: if rental restrictions are intended, the original declaration needs a clearer tether than a broad no-business provision.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham (1 CA-CV 22-0780). The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Homeowner study guide: short-term rental enforcement questions

Homeowner questionStudy-guide answerBonham-specific caution
What did the amended Village of Oakcreek leasing restriction define as a lease?The study materials describe a broad definition covering any agreement, contract, grant, or arrangement giving a non-owner access to or use of a lot or unit.That rule was part of the association’s enforcement theory; the appellate issue was whether the later restriction was valid and foreseeable.
Did the amended rule require at least a 30-day lease term?Yes, the association relied on Section 4.23 language requiring lease terms of at least 30 days.Bonham affirmed dismissal because the original declaration did not give fair notice that this later short-term-rental ban could be imposed by amendment.
What owner obligations did the association allege for allowed leases?The study guide identifies whole-lot leasing, single-family use, no subleasing, owner responsibility for occupants, and a tenant registration form within five days.Those are enforcement allegations and governing-document requirements to verify against the current declaration before relying on them.
What progressive enforcement steps did the association use?The record describes a courtesy notice, notices of non-compliance, monetary penalties, and then litigation for injunction and money judgment relief.The association alleged ongoing Airbnb activity, but the legal result turned on amendment validity, not just whether short stays occurred.
What penalty balance did the complaint allege?The study materials identify an alleged $16,500.00 monetary penalty balance as of February 28, 2022.An alleged account balance is not the same as a final judgment; always check the ruling and judgment.
Is a hearing required before fines?A.R.S. 33-1803(B) requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before monetary penalties are imposed.Procedural fine compliance is a separate issue from whether the underlying amended rental restriction is enforceable.
Can unpaid fines become a lien?The study guide flags a distinction between fines themselves and enforcement costs such as attorney fees under the declaration.Do not assume every fine is lienable; check A.R.S. 33-1803, the declaration language, and the specific account charge.
What is the homeowner takeaway?A later rental restriction needs both procedural adoption and substantive foreseeability under Kalway.Bonham is strongest as a fair-notice case, not as a general permission slip to ignore every rental rule.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Subject property

The enforcement action concerned Lot 75 in the Cathedral View development in Sedona.

Amended restriction

The association relied on a leasing restriction adopted in 2016 and re-recorded in 2017 that barred leases shorter than 30 days.

Owner status

Bonham acquired title by quitclaim deed recorded in January 2017, which placed him inside the association’s enforcement theory.

Association allegations

The association alleged ongoing Airbnb rentals, including advertised and reviewed stays shorter than 30 days.

Fines alleged

The complaint sought to collect a penalty balance the association alleged had reached $16,500.00 by February 28, 2022.

Why allegations did not decide it

Even assuming the alleged rentals, the dispositive issue was whether the later rental ban was valid and foreseeable under Kalway.

Enforcement history summarized from the briefing

Date or periodAssociation action or allegationRelevance
June 22, 2021Courtesy notice reportedly warned Bonham about alleged short-term-rental violations.Shows the beginning of the association’s progressive enforcement record.
October-November 2021The association alleged Airbnb reviews and short stays, then issued notices of non-compliance and fines.Documents the alleged factual basis for enforcement, separate from the legal validity of the amendment.
December 2021-February 2022Additional notices and alleged rentals increased the claimed penalty balance.Frames the monetary judgment request in the complaint.
April 2022The association sued for injunction, personal judgment, and implied-covenant relief.Moves the dispute into the court system where Kalway controlled the amendment-validity question.
October 3, 2023The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham.The appellate court focused on the original declaration’s lack of fair notice for a short-term-rental ban.

Litigation roadmap

Step 1 April 2022

Sued Bonham to stop short-term rentals under amended CC&Rs.

Filed by: Association

Frames the enforcement action as a CC&R amendment validity dispute.

Download source
Step 2 2022

Moved to dismiss under Kalway, arguing the amendments were not foreseeable from the original declaration.

Filed by: Homeowner

Shows how Kalway can be raised at the pleading stage.

Download source
Step 3 December 2022

Granted dismissal and entered judgment for Bonham.

Filed by: Superior Court

Created the final judgment appealed by the association.

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Step 4 October 3, 2023

Affirmed dismissal and held the declaration did not provide sufficient notice of a future rental restriction.

Filed by: Court of Appeals

This is the key appellate analysis for short-term rental amendments.

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Step 5 April 24, 2024

Issued mandate after the appellate process concluded.

Filed by: Court of Appeals

Marks the final procedural close of the appeal.

Download source

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/village-of-oakcreek-association-v-bonham/raw/: 70 PDFs, 1 other source file. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; non-court review materials, when present, are labeled separately from court filings.

Source 1 2022-12-29

Index Of Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 3 2022-12-29

Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 11 2022-12-29

Order For Alternative Service

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 12 2022-12-29

Proof Of Service By Certified

Type: Procedural/service filing

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 13 2022-12-29

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 20 2022-12-29

Stipulation To Vacate June 72022 Or

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 22 2022-12-29

Stipulation Of Material Facts And E

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 26 2022-12-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 29 2022-12-29

Attachment 1 Of 1 Defendants Applic

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 30 2022-12-29

Defendants Statement Of Costs And N

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 33 2022-12-29

Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 37 2022-12-29

Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file
Source 38 2022-12-29

Village Of Oak Creek Associations N

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 39 2022-12-29

Initial Notice Re Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 41 2022-12-29

Record Electronically Transmitte

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 43 2023-01-11

Village Of Oakcreek Associations N

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 45 2023-01-23

Case Management Statement

Type: Court/source PDF

Case-management filing; it tells the court how the parties propose to schedule and manage the case.

Source 47 2023-01-31

Defendantappellee Lance Ebonhams

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 48 2023-01-31

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 49 2023-03-06

Appellants Opening Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Opening merits brief; this is where the appellant or moving party frames the legal argument.

Source 55 2023-05-04

Appellants Reply Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Reply paper; usually the final written response before the court takes the issue under advisement.

Source 59 2023-10-03

Memorandum Decision Distribution

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not enforceable against him because they were not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration.

Source 60 2023-10-03

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not enforceable against him because they were not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration.

Source 62 2023-10-12

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 67 2023-11-02

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 68 2023-11-06

Div 1 Transmittal Of Partial Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 71 2024-04-24

Civil Mandate

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

For homeowners using this case

  • Compare the original declaration to the new rental restriction line by line.
  • Do not stop at the amendment-vote percentage; Kalway asks whether the new burden was fairly foreseeable.
  • Look for older language that actually mentions leasing, occupancy, rental duration, transient use, or business use.
  • Use Bonham with Gross to separate invalid rental bans from narrower occupancy refinements.

For boards and managers

  • A majority vote alone may not save an amendment that creates a new rental burden.
  • Generic no-business language is a weak foundation for a short-term-rental ban.
  • Before enforcement, audit the original CC&Rs and any earlier leasing provisions against Kalway, Gross, and Bonham.
  • Fee exposure can follow if the association litigates an amendment that lacks a clear covenant tether.

FAQ

Did the HOA win in Bonham?

No. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the association’s suit against Bonham.

Is Bonham published precedent?

No. It is a memorandum decision, but it is still useful as a practical Kalway example and was cited in the later published Gross opinion.

What was missing from the original declaration?

The court found the original declaration generally barred business operations but did not provide fair notice of a future short-term-rental restriction.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Gross v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake: Kalway, Rentals, and Occupancy Limits

Arizona HOA Rental Amendments | Kalway | 1 CA-CV 23-0394

Gross is the cleanest Arizona published rental-amendment roadmap after Kalway. The short-term lease ban was invalid, but the unrelated-person occupancy limit survived because it refined existing single-family use restrictions.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Gordon Gross, et al. v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 23-0394; Navajo County Superior Court No. S0900CV202200042.

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers the published appellate opinion, amended opinion order, mandate, and uploaded trial/appellate record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

Under Kalway, an HOA rental amendment can be partly invalid and partly valid: a new short-term rental ban may be unforeseeable while an occupancy limit can survive if it refines an existing single-family-use covenant.

Case snapshot

Court result

Judgment was affirmed.

Invalid part

Thirty-day minimum lease term was stricken.

Valid part

Four-unrelated-person occupancy limit survived.

Fee result

Each side bore its own appellate fees and costs.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 23-0394
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateOctober 10, 2024
Judge / panelPresiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Judge Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge Michael J. Brown
PartiesOwners challenged a 2021 amendment that banned short-term rentals and limited occupancy by unrelated renters in a planned community.
Governing law
Topics
CC&RsProcedureAmendmentsRental RestrictionsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The court held that the new short-term rental ban was invalid under Arizona amendment-notice principles, but the cap on unrelated renters was valid because it was reasonably foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package121 PDFs, 10 other source files
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewGordon Gross, et al. v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association
Study / briefing material2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions3 questions
Curated download aliases5 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Gross applied Kalway in a practical, highly relevant HOA setting: rental restrictions. The community amended its CC&Rs to prohibit rentals shorter than 30 days and to bar more than four unrelated individuals from leasing a property. The Court of Appeals split the amendment. It held the short-term rental ban was invalid because it prohibited conduct the earlier CC&Rs had allowed and was not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration. But it upheld the unrelated-persons occupancy limit because that restriction was viewed as a clarification and refinement of existing use limits rather than a brand-new burden. The opinion is one of the clearest Arizona appellate examples of how courts separate an impermissible new use restriction from a permissible refinement of an existing one.

Key Issues & Findings

The court framed the dispute as one about owner notice and reasonable expectations. A recorded declaration can be amended, but only within the fair scope of what the original declaration put buyers on notice might later be refined. Under that approach, an amendment cannot simply reverse an existing freedom and call the result a refinement.

Applying that rule, the short-term rental ban was too much because the preexisting documents had not warned owners that leasing could later be cut off in that way. The unrelated-occupants limit came out differently because the original scheme already contained structure about occupancy and residential use, making the later cap a closer fit with the bought-for framework.

Why It Matters

Gross is one of the best Arizona Court of Appeals cases for short-term-rental disputes after Kalway. It gives both sides a usable analytic framework for asking whether an amendment is genuinely foreseeable or instead a new restriction in disguise.

Boards considering rental amendments should read it before drafting. Homeowners challenging new lease limits will cite it often.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gordon Gross (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Owner plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Liliana Gross (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Owner plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Steven A. Kernagis (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Trustee plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Sandra K. Kernagis (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Trustee plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Thomas P. Zehring (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Trustee plaintiff named in the complaint and appellate caption.
  • Jeannette Rose Zehring (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Trustee plaintiff named in the complaint and appellate caption.
  • Ronald D. Kyer Jr. (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Owner plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Desiree Kyer (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Owner plaintiff named in the appellate caption.
  • Matthew A. Klopp (Counsel)
    Dyer Bregman Ferris Wong & Carter PLLC
    Counsel for the owner plaintiffs on appeal.
  • Rick K. Carter (Counsel)
    Dyer Bregman Ferris Wong & Carter PLLC
    Counsel for the owner plaintiffs on appeal.
  • Stockton D. Banfield (Counsel)
    Dyer Bregman Ferris Wong & Carter PLLC
    Counsel for the owner plaintiffs on appeal.
  • Joseph R. Rainey (Counsel)
    Dyer Bregman Ferris Wong & Carter PLLC
    Counsel for the owner plaintiffs on appeal.

Respondent Side

  • The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association (Defendant/Appellant)
    Association party challenging the judgment over rental and occupancy restrictions.
  • James L. Csontos (Counsel)
    Jennings Haug Keleher McLeod LLP
    Counsel for The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association.
  • Jack R. Cunningham (Counsel)
    Jennings Haug Keleher McLeod LLP
    Counsel for The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association.
  • Lauren Elliott Stine (Counsel)
    Quarles & Brady LLP
    Later appearance for The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association.
  • Kristin N. Leaptrott (Counsel)
    Quarles & Brady LLP
    Later appearance for The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Michala M. Ruechel (Judge)
    Superior Court judge listed in the appellate opinion.
  • Samuel A. Thumma (Presiding Judge)
    Authored the Court of Appeals opinion.
  • Jennifer B. Campbell (Judge)
    Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.
  • Michael J. Brown (Judge)
    Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.

Why this case matters

Gross gives Arizona homeowners and boards a detailed framework for rental amendments after Kalway. The court treated the short-term rental ban as a new burden because the original CC&Rs expressly allowed leasing and did not set a minimum lease duration.

At the same time, Gross rejected the idea that every rental-related amendment fails. The unrelated-person cap was upheld because the original CC&Rs already limited use to single-family residential use and defined Single Family. That made the cap a refinement rather than an entirely new covenant.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Gordon Gross, et al. v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association (1 CA-CV 23-0394). The new short-term rental ban was invalid under Arizona amendment-notice principles, but the cap on unrelated… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Gordon Gross, et al. v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Homeowner study guide: Kalway, rentals, and occupancy limits

Homeowner questionStudy-guide answerCase lesson
Can The Shores enforce the 2021 minimum 30-day lease requirement?No. The court held the short-term rental ban invalid and unenforceable.A later amendment cannot add an unforeseeable rental-duration restriction where the original CC&Rs allowed leasing without a minimum term.
Why did the 30-day rule fail under Kalway?The original declaration allowed leasing and did not contain a lease-duration limit.The court treated the new 30-day minimum as an entirely new burden rather than a foreseeable refinement.
Did earlier Shores litigation matter?Yes. Horton v. Hartsook had already treated similar community language as permitting short-term rentals.Prior interpretation of the same or similar covenants can shape what later owners reasonably could foresee.
Can the association limit unrelated occupants?Yes. The court upheld the four-unrelated-person limit.That provision refined an existing Single Family residential-use covenant rather than creating a new rental ban.
Does Single Family residential use address only building type?No. Gross treated the covenant as addressing use and occupancy, not just architecture.Owners should read use restrictions as controlling how the property is occupied as well as how it is built.
Is a 67 percent amendment vote enough by itself?No. Procedural approval does not override the common-law reasonable-and-foreseeable requirement.An amendment can receive enough votes and still be unenforceable if it exceeds the original covenant notice.
What happened to voter-irregularity claims?Those alternative claims were dismissed with prejudice after the homeowners chose not to pursue them to expedite final judgment.Gross is mainly useful for the contract-enforceability analysis, not as a voting-process ruling.
Does the Planned Communities Act displace Kalway common law?No. The court followed Kalway and held A.R.S. 33-1817(A) does not eliminate the reasonable-and-foreseeable amendment limit.Arizona associations must satisfy both procedural amendment rules and substantive foreseeability limits.

Litigation roadmap

Step 1 February 2021

Adopted amendment restricting leases shorter than 30 days and limiting unrelated occupants.

Filed by: Association

Creates the CC&R amendment challenged by rental owners.

Download source
Step 2 February 2022

Filed suit challenging the amendment under Kalway.

Filed by: Homeowners

Frames the case as a property-rights and contract-notice dispute.

Download source
Step 3 September 2022

Invalidated the short-term lease ban but upheld the remaining challenged provisions.

Filed by: Superior Court

The split trial ruling became the appellate issue.

Download source
Step 4 May 2023

Entered amended final judgment.

Filed by: Superior Court

Created final appeal/cross-appeal posture.

Download source
Step 5 October 10, 2024

Published opinion affirmed the split result.

Filed by: Court of Appeals

This is the key statewide authority.

Download source
Step 6 March 26, 2025

Issued civil mandate after later review proceedings concluded.

Filed by: Court of Appeals

Marks appellate finality.

Download source

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/gross-v-the-shores-at-rainbow-lake-community-association/raw/: 121 PDFs, 10 other source files. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2023-06-29

Index Of Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 2 2023-06-29

Verified Complaint

Type: Opening pleading

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Source 3 2023-06-29

Attachment 1 St To Index Number 001

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2023-06-29

Attachment 2 Nd To Index Number 001

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 004

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2023-06-29

Summon Issuedre The Shores At Rainb

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 8 2023-06-29

Acceptance Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 9 2023-06-29

Notice Of Appearance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 10 2023-06-29

Judicial Noticesetting Hearing

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 12 2023-06-29

Answer To Complaint

Type: Opening pleading

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Source 16 2023-06-29

Stipulation For Entry Of Prelimina

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 015

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 20 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 017

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 24 2023-06-29

Judicial Noticesetting Hearing

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 26 2023-06-29

Combined Reply And Response

Type: Briefing paper

Reply paper; usually the final written response before the court takes the issue under advisement.

Source 30 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 027

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 32 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 029

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 37 2023-06-29

Declaration Of Counsel In Support O

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 38 2023-06-29

Notice Of Lodging

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 39 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 035

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 40 2023-06-29

Objection To Form Of Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.

Source 41 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 037

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 43 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 039

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 47 2023-06-29

Judicial Orderre Attorney Fees

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 49 2023-06-29

Final Judgmentfiled 12062022

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 50 2023-06-29

Motion For New Trial

Type: Motion/application

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 51 2023-06-29

Notice Of Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 52 2023-06-29

Notice To Court Re Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 53 2023-06-29

Response To Motion For New Trial

Type: Motion/application

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 54 2023-06-29

Notice Of Crossappeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 57 2023-06-29

Order Denying Motion For New Trial

Type: Court order/minute entry

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 59 2023-06-29

Appellate Clerk Notice

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 66 2023-06-29

Attachment To Index Number 63

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 67 2023-06-29

Hearing

Type: Court notice/document

Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.

Download source file
Source 68 2023-06-29

Hearing

Type: Court notice/document

Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.

Download source file
Source 69 2023-06-29

Notice Of Lodging

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 70 2023-06-29

Objection To Form Of Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.

Source 71 2023-06-29

Reply Supporting Entry Of Final Jud

Type: Briefing paper

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 74 2023-06-29

Amended Final Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 75 2023-06-29

Hearing On Amended Jugment

Type: Court notice/document

Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.

Source 76 2023-06-29

Hearing On Amended Jugment

Type: Court notice/document

Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.

Source 78 2023-06-29

Notice Of Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 79 2023-06-29

Transcript 17 May 2023

Type: Court/source PDF

Adds hearing transcript material to the record for later review or appeal.

Source 82 2023-07-06

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 83 2023-07-13

Case Management Statement

Type: Court/source PDF

Case-management filing; it tells the court how the parties propose to schedule and manage the case.

Source 84 2023-07-13

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 86 2023-07-28

Case Management Statement

Type: Court/source PDF

Case-management filing; it tells the court how the parties propose to schedule and manage the case.

Source 88 2023-08-08

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 90 2023-08-10

Order Supplementing Record

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 92 2023-08-10

Appellate Clerk Notice

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 93 2023-08-10

Notice Of Crossappeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 95 2023-08-17

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 98 2023-08-28

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 99 2023-09-18

Opening Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Opening merits brief; this is where the appellant or moving party frames the legal argument.

Download source file
Source 100 2023-09-18

Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 101 2023-09-18

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 103 2023-10-27

Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 104 2023-10-27

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 107 2023-12-06

Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 108 2023-12-06

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 109 2023-12-21

Reply Brief On Cross Appeal

Type: Briefing paper

Reply paper; usually the final written response before the court takes the issue under advisement.

Source 110 2023-12-21

Request For Oral Argument

Type: Motion/application

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 111 2023-12-21

Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 112 2023-12-21

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 113 2023-12-21

Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 115 2024-01-04

Court Of Appeals Memorandum

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 120 2024-03-06

Sign-in Sheetcase Is Under Adviseme

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 122 2024-10-10

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that the new short-term rental ban was invalid under Arizona amendment-notice principles, but the cap on unrelated renters was valid because it was reasonably foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs.

Download source file
Source 123 2024-10-16

Order Amending Opinion Decision Vi

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that the new short-term rental ban was invalid under Arizona amendment-notice principles, but the cap on unrelated renters was valid because it was reasonably foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs.

Source 124 2024-11-07

Notice Of Appearance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 128 2024-12-12

Div 1 Transmittal Of Partial Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 129 2025-03-05

Letter From Asc 03052025 Re Petitio

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 130 2025-03-26

Civil Mandate

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

For homeowners

  • Use Gross when a new amendment restricts rental duration after the original CC&Rs allowed leasing.
  • Do not assume every rental-related restriction fails; compare each clause separately.
  • Preserve the original CC&Rs, the amended language, voting materials, and evidence of historical rental use.

For boards and managers

  • Draft rental amendments around the specific original covenants that already exist.
  • Separate lease-duration limits from occupancy limits; Gross analyzes them differently.
  • Expect courts to blue-pencil severable provisions rather than treat a multi-part amendment as all-or-nothing.

FAQ

Did Gross invalidate all rental restrictions?

No. It invalidated the 30-day minimum lease term but upheld the unrelated-person occupancy limit.

Why did the 30-day rental ban fail?

The original CC&Rs allowed leasing and had no minimum lease duration, so owners were not on notice that a majority could later ban shorter rentals.

Why did the occupancy cap survive?

The CC&Rs already contained a single-family residential use covenant and a Single Family definition, so the cap was treated as a permissible refinement.

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