Village of Oakcreek v. Bonham: Kalway and Arizona HOA Short-Term Rental Amendments

Posted on June 2, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Rental Restrictions | Kalway | 1 CA-CV 22-0780

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an HOA enforcement suit because the original declaration did not give fair notice that the HOA could later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Village of Oakcreek Association v. Lance E. Bonham, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 22-0780; Yavapai County Superior Court No. V1300CV202280081.

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Scope note: This page covers the nonprecedential Court of Appeals decision and the uploaded appellate/trial record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

A general business-use restriction in original CC&Rs does not necessarily give homeowners fair notice that the HOA may later ban short-term rentals by majority amendment.

Case snapshot

Court result

Dismissal for homeowner Bonham was affirmed.

Core doctrine

Kalway reasonable-and-foreseeable notice for CC&R amendments.

Rental issue

2016 and 2017 amendments banned short-term rentals.

Fee result

Bonham received appellate fees and costs subject to ARCAP 21.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 22-0780
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 3, 2023
Judge / panel	David D. Weinzweig, Michael S. Catlett, Maria Elena Cruz
Parties	A planned-community association sued a homeowner to stop short-term rentals after majority-approved CC&R amendments banned short-term rentals.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-2101 A.R.S. § 12-341 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	rental-restrictionscc-and-rsprocedureattorneys-fees
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham and held the challenged short-term-rental amendments were not enforceable against him because they were not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	70 PDFs, 1 supporting source/review file
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Village of Oakcreek v. Bonham: HOA Short-Term Rental Restrictions After Kalway
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Village of Oakcreek Association sued Lance Bonham to enforce 2016 and 2017 CC&R amendments that banned short-term rentals. Bonham moved to dismiss under Kalway, arguing the original declaration did not provide fair notice that a majority could later impose that kind of rental restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal. It rejected the association’s argument that a generic no-business covenant made short-term-rental restrictions foreseeable, because the original declaration did not address residential rentals or lease duration.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied Kalway and asked whether the original declaration gave objective notice of a future rental restriction. The declaration broadly barred business operations on lots, but it did not mention residential rentals. A business-use restriction was not enough to warn owners that a later majority amendment could ban short-term rentals. The court also treated Bonham as an owner with title before the relevant amendments based on the declaration’s broad definition of ownership and his trustee status.

Why It Matters

Bonham is a practical short-term-rental amendment case for Arizona HOAs and homeowners. It shows that an association cannot rely on generic business-use language as a substitute for a real leasing covenant when trying to enforce a later rental ban. It also pairs well with Gross: both cases apply Kalway to rental amendments and both warn boards to tie new rental restrictions to language already present in the original CC&Rs.

Why this case matters

Bonham is useful because it applies Kalway to the most common HOA amendment fight: short-term rentals. The association argued the original declaration barred business activity, so a later rental ban was foreseeable. The Court of Appeals disagreed because the business-use covenant did not say anything about residential rentals.

The decision gives homeowners a concrete argument when an HOA tries to convert a general residential-use or business-use clause into a later rental prohibition. It also gives boards a drafting warning: if rental restrictions are intended, the original declaration needs a clearer tether than a broad no-business provision.

Video overview: HOA short-term rental amendments after Kalway

Watch this overview for Village of Oakcreek v. Bonham, where the Court of Appeals held that a general business-use restriction did not give fair notice that the HOA could later ban short-term rentals by amendment.

Homeowner study guide: short-term rental enforcement questions

Homeowner question	Study-guide answer	Bonham-specific caution
What did the amended Village of Oakcreek leasing restriction define as a lease?	The study materials describe a broad definition covering any agreement, contract, grant, or arrangement giving a non-owner access to or use of a lot or unit.	That rule was part of the association’s enforcement theory; the appellate issue was whether the later restriction was valid and foreseeable.
Did the amended rule require at least a 30-day lease term?	Yes, the association relied on Section 4.23 language requiring lease terms of at least 30 days.	Bonham affirmed dismissal because the original declaration did not give fair notice that this later short-term-rental ban could be imposed by amendment.
What owner obligations did the association allege for allowed leases?	The study guide identifies whole-lot leasing, single-family use, no subleasing, owner responsibility for occupants, and a tenant registration form within five days.	Those are enforcement allegations and governing-document requirements to verify against the current declaration before relying on them.
What progressive enforcement steps did the association use?	The record describes a courtesy notice, notices of non-compliance, monetary penalties, and then litigation for injunction and money judgment relief.	The association alleged ongoing Airbnb activity, but the legal result turned on amendment validity, not just whether short stays occurred.
What penalty balance did the complaint allege?	The study materials identify an alleged $16,500.00 monetary penalty balance as of February 28, 2022.	An alleged account balance is not the same as a final judgment; always check the ruling and judgment.
Is a hearing required before fines?	A.R.S. 33-1803(B) requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before monetary penalties are imposed.	Procedural fine compliance is a separate issue from whether the underlying amended rental restriction is enforceable.
Can unpaid fines become a lien?	The study guide flags a distinction between fines themselves and enforcement costs such as attorney fees under the declaration.	Do not assume every fine is lienable; check A.R.S. 33-1803, the declaration language, and the specific account charge.
What is the homeowner takeaway?	A later rental restriction needs both procedural adoption and substantive foreseeability under Kalway.	Bonham is strongest as a fair-notice case, not as a general permission slip to ignore every rental rule.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Subject property

The enforcement action concerned Lot 75, Cathedral View, identified in the briefing as 40 Rio Verde Circle in Sedona.

Amended restriction

The association relied on a leasing restriction adopted in 2016 and re-recorded in 2017 that barred leases shorter than 30 days.

Owner status

Bonham acquired title by quitclaim deed recorded in January 2017, which placed him inside the association’s enforcement theory.

Association allegations

The association alleged ongoing Airbnb rentals, including advertised and reviewed stays shorter than 30 days.

Fines alleged

The complaint sought to collect a penalty balance the association alleged had reached $16,500.00 by February 28, 2022.

Why allegations did not decide it

Even assuming the alleged rentals, the dispositive issue was whether the later rental ban was valid and foreseeable under Kalway.

Enforcement history summarized from the briefing

Date or period	Association action or allegation	Relevance
June 22, 2021	Courtesy notice reportedly warned Bonham about alleged short-term-rental violations.	Shows the beginning of the association’s progressive enforcement record.
October-November 2021	The association alleged Airbnb reviews and short stays, then issued notices of non-compliance and fines.	Documents the alleged factual basis for enforcement, separate from the legal validity of the amendment.
December 2021-February 2022	Additional notices and alleged rentals increased the claimed penalty balance.	Frames the monetary judgment request in the complaint.
April 2022	The association sued for injunction, personal judgment, and implied-covenant relief.	Moves the dispute into the court system where Kalway controlled the amendment-validity question.
October 3, 2023	The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for Bonham.	The appellate court focused on the original declaration’s lack of fair notice for a short-term-rental ban.

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-11-28_000_order-awarding-attorneys-fees-and.pdf

Source 71 2024-04-24

Civil Mandate

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2024-04-24_000_civil-mandate.pdf

For homeowners using this case

Compare the original declaration to the new rental restriction line by line.
Do not stop at the amendment-vote percentage; Kalway asks whether the new burden was fairly foreseeable.
Look for older language that actually mentions leasing, occupancy, rental duration, transient use, or business use.
Use Bonham with Gross to separate invalid rental bans from narrower occupancy refinements.

For boards and managers

A majority vote alone may not save an amendment that creates a new rental burden.
Generic no-business language is a weak foundation for a short-term-rental ban.
Before enforcement, audit the original CC&Rs and any earlier leasing provisions against Kalway, Gross, and Bonham.
Fee exposure can follow if the association litigates an amendment that lacks a clear covenant tether.

FAQ

Did the HOA win in Bonham?

No. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the association’s suit against Bonham.

Is Bonham published precedent?

No. It is a memorandum decision, but it is still useful as a practical Kalway example and was cited in the later published Gross opinion.

What was missing from the original declaration?

The court found the original declaration generally barred business operations but did not provide fair notice of a future short-term-rental restriction.

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Dreamland Villa v. Raimey: Mandatory Assessments and New HOA Obligations

Posted on June 2, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Assessments | Deed Restrictions | 1 CA-CV 08-0388

Dreamland explains why a generic amendment clause cannot always turn a voluntary community club into a mandatory assessment regime. The Court of Appeals reversed and held the Second Amended Declarations unenforceable against the homeowners.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Daryle G. Raimey, et al., Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 08-0388.

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Scope note: This page covers the appellate opinion and uploaded appellate docket notices. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

A generic deed-restriction amendment power did not authorize a majority to impose new mandatory club membership, assessments, and liens on owners in a community with no common areas and historically voluntary club participation.

Case snapshot

Court result

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Community structure

Age-restricted residential community with no common areas.

Disputed amendment

Second Amended Declarations created mandatory association obligations and assessments.

Fee result

Homeowners were awarded reasonable appellate fees subject to ARCAP 21.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 08-0388
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	March 16, 2010
Judge / panel	Jon W. Thompson
Parties	A voluntary community club tried to enforce amended deed restrictions requiring mandatory membership, assessments, and lien rights against homeowners in an older age-restricted community.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 10-3601 A.R.S. § 33-1803 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	assessmentscc-and-rsboard-governanceattorneys-fees
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals held the Second Amended Declarations were invalid and unenforceable against the homeowners, reversed the judgment, and remanded. It awarded the homeowners reasonable appellate attorney fees subject to ARCAP 21.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF, 19 supporting source/review files
Step-by-step docket roadmap	3 roadmap entries
Video overview	Dreamland Villa v. Raimey: Can an HOA Create Mandatory Assessments Later?
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Dreamland Villa Community Club involved an older residential community with no common areas and historically voluntary club participation. The club relied on Second Amended Declarations that attempted to require association membership, assessments, and lien rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for the club and held the new declarations could not be enforced against the homeowners. A generic amendment clause did not give owners adequate notice that a majority could later impose new mandatory club and assessment obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

The court emphasized that Dreamland Villa had no common areas, that homeowners had no appurtenant right to use the club facilities by virtue of lot ownership, and that participation had long been voluntary. Because the original restrictions did not alert owners that mandatory assessments, liens, or club membership could later be imposed, a majority could not use a generic amendment power to create those new affirmative burdens.

Why It Matters

Dreamland is an important Arizona foundation for later Kalway-style amendment limits. It is especially useful for older subdivisions, recreation clubs, and hybrid HOA-like entities that try to convert voluntary participation into mandatory assessments. For homeowners, it supports the argument that a new economic burden must be tethered to the original covenant scheme, not simply approved by majority vote.

Why this case matters

Dreamland is a pre-Kalway building block for Arizona amendment-limit doctrine. It rejected the idea that a broad amendment clause could create an entirely new economic regime where owners had not been fairly warned that mandatory assessments and liens could be imposed later.

The opinion is especially useful for older Arizona communities, recreation clubs, and hybrid entities that try to move from voluntary participation to mandatory membership or mandatory assessments without a clear original covenant basis.

Video overview: mandatory assessments and new HOA obligations

Watch this overview for the central holding in Dreamland Villa v. Raimey: a majority amendment power did not give fair notice that a voluntary recreation club could later impose mandatory membership, assessments, and liens on objecting homeowners.

Homeowner study guide: amendment and assessment questions

Homeowner question	Short answer	Case lesson
Can a majority vote require everyone to join a private recreation club and pay annual fees?	Not through a generic amendment clause when that mandatory club structure was not part of the original recorded bargain.	Dreamland treats mandatory club membership, assessments, and lien exposure as a substantial new burden that requires fair notice in the original covenants.
Why did the lack of common areas matter?	The court emphasized that Dreamland Villa had no common areas owned for all lot owners’ use.	Without shared common property appurtenant to the lots, the club could not justify the new fees as ordinary common-area maintenance assessments.
Does broad language allowing restrictions to be changed mean owners accepted any future obligation?	No. Amendment power has limits even when owners bought subject to a change clause.	The key question is whether the later burden was reasonable and foreseeable from the recorded restrictions.
What happened to Section 18, where some fees already appeared in the original documents?	The court still did not treat Section 18 as proof of mandatory club membership.	The Section 18 language recognized non-member status and did not create a running covenant that guaranteed club rights in exchange for mandatory dues.
What happened to the Second Amended Declarations?	They were held invalid and unenforceable against the objecting homeowners.	The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment that had favored DVCC.
Who received appellate fee relief?	The homeowners prevailed on the appeal and cross-appeal fee issue.	The mandate reflected appellate costs and attorney fees awarded to the homeowners.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Community structure

Dreamland Villa was developed in 18 sections between 1958 and 1972, with separate recorded restrictions for the sections and an age-restricted residential profile.

Club history

DVCC was incorporated in 1961 as a nonprofit recreational club with clubhouses, pools, shuffleboard courts, and a ballroom. Participation had historically been voluntary.

No common-area hook

The appellate opinion treated the absence of common areas as central. The club facilities were not common property appurtenant to every lot.

Amendment target

The 2003-2004 Second Amended Declarations attempted to require membership, annual and special assessments, and liens to fund club operations.

Section 18 argument

The court rejected DVCC’s separate Section 18 theory because the original language did not create a running covenant for mandatory club membership.

Final financial result

The mandate reflected appellate costs of $805.30 and attorney fees of $33,477.50 awarded to the homeowners.

Procedural highlights from the briefing

Date	Event	What changed
September 2007	Superior Court summary judgment	The trial court accepted DVCC’s amendment theory and entered judgment in favor of the club.
May 12, 2009	Appeal taken under advisement	The Court of Appeals took the case under advisement after the appellate proceedings.
March 16, 2010	Opinion filed	The Court of Appeals reversed and held the Second Amended Declarations unenforceable against the objecting homeowners.
June 30, 2010	Mandate issued	The appellate mandate finalized the reversal, remand, costs, and fee award.

Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.

Download source file

undated_900_dreamland-villa-community-club-legal-documents-summary-table-1.csv

For homeowners

Ask whether the original deed restrictions warned owners about mandatory assessments or association membership.
Look for common areas or shared property obligations; Dreamland emphasized their absence.
Use Dreamland with Kalway when an amendment creates new affirmative obligations rather than refining existing restrictions.

For boards and clubs

Do not assume a majority amendment clause can create mandatory assessments in an older voluntary community.
Before imposing liens or assessments, identify the original covenant that authorizes that burden.
Expect fee exposure if the amendment materially changes the owners’ original bargain.

FAQ

Did Dreamland have common areas?

No. The opinion emphasized that Dreamland Villa had no common areas and that club membership had historically been voluntary.

What did the court do with the Second Amended Declarations?

The Court of Appeals held they could not be enforced against the homeowners and reversed/remanded.

How does Dreamland relate to Kalway?

Kalway later cited Dreamland as part of Arizona’s rule that amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable from the original declaration.

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Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows HOA: Unawarded Attorney Fees and Assessments

Posted on June 2, 2026 by

Arizona HOA Attorney Fees | Assessments | 1 CA-CV 16-0710

Bocchino limits an HOA’s ability to put litigation attorney fees directly on a homeowner’s account. The Court of Appeals held the association could not assess fees from a justice-court harassment injunction when no court had awarded those fees.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Patricia Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows Homeowners Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 16-0710; Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-012434.

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Scope note: This page covers the Court of Appeals opinion and the uploaded superior/appellate record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

An HOA cannot simply assess a homeowner for attorney fees incurred in a judicial proceeding when the tribunal did not award those fees and the governing documents do not expressly authorize that unilateral charge.

Case snapshot

Court result

Summary judgment for Bocchino was affirmed.

Fee source

Fees came from a justice-court workplace-harassment injunction proceeding.

Key statute

A.R.S. 12-1810 requires court handling of harassment-injunction fee awards.

Practical use

Account charges for litigation fees need a real award or clear authority.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 16-0710
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 3, 2018
Judge / panel	John C. Gemmill, Michael J. Brown, Maria Elena Cruz
Parties	A former homeowner challenged an HOA account charge for attorney fees the association incurred in a justice-court harassment-injunction proceeding but never obtained as a court award.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1810 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-2101
Topics	attorneys-feesassessmentscc-and-rsprocedure
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for Bocchino and held the HOA improperly assessed attorney fees against her when no court had awarded those fees in the underlying injunction proceeding.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	86 PDFs, 4 supporting source/review files
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows HOA: Wrongful HOA Escrow Charges
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Fountain Shadows obtained a workplace-harassment injunction against Patricia Bocchino in justice court but did not ask that court to award attorney fees. The association later charged those unawarded fees to Bocchino’s HOA account. Bocchino sued, and the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment requiring repayment. The court held the association waived any fee claim in the injunction proceeding by not requesting fees there and that the declaration did not expressly allow the HOA to assess unawarded litigation fees directly against a homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

A.R.S. § 12-1810 governs workplace-harassment injunctions and allows the court, after notice and hearing, to award costs and fees. Because the association did not request a fee award from the justice court, it could not later bypass that court by charging the fees directly to the owner. The declaration did not expressly authorize direct assessment of attorney fees incurred in judicial proceedings but not awarded by a tribunal.

Why It Matters

Bocchino is a practical limit on HOA fee accounting. It warns associations not to self-award litigation fees by placing them on an owner account after a separate court proceeding. For homeowners, it is a useful authority when an HOA account ledger includes attorney fees that were never awarded by the court or tribunal handling the underlying dispute.

Why this case matters

Bocchino is a practical fee-assessment case. The association obtained an injunction against Bocchino but did not ask the justice court to award fees. It later placed those attorney fees on her HOA account, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that the charge was improper.

The opinion matters because many governing documents contain broad enforcement-fee language. Bocchino shows that broad language does not automatically let an HOA bypass the court that handled the litigation and unilaterally convert unawarded fees into an owner-account debt.

Video overview: unawarded HOA attorney fees and owner accounts

Watch this overview for Bocchino v. Fountain Shadows HOA, where the court rejected an association’s attempt to place litigation fees on a homeowner’s account when the tribunal handling the injunction had not awarded those fees.

Homeowner study guide: escrow charges and fee recovery

Homeowner question	Study-guide answer	Why it matters
Can an HOA demand payment from escrow during a home sale?	An HOA may make a demand, but Bocchino shows the homeowner can sue to recover funds if the demand was not legally authorized.	The trial court awarded Bocchino the $3,887.28 collected from escrow.
Why did the escrow demand create practical pressure?	The homeowner argued she faced a Hobson’s choice: pay the disputed amount to close the sale or challenge the demand and risk the transaction.	Escrow timing can turn a disputed account charge into immediate leverage over a sale.
Can a homeowner recover attorney fees after successfully suing an HOA?	Potentially yes. A.R.S. 12-341.01 allows fee awards to a successful party in a contested action arising out of contract.	HOA disputes based on CC&Rs and assessment account rights often become contract-fee fights.
Can requested attorney fees exceed the disputed principal?	Yes. Bocchino’s fee application sought $22,937.50 after recovering $3,887.28.	Small account disputes can become expensive when an HOA refuses reimbursement and litigation proceeds through summary judgment and appeal.
What do courts consider when deciding whether to award fees?	Arizona courts may consider the Warner factors, including merits, avoidability, hardship, success, novelty, and deterrence.	The question is not just who won, but whether a fee award is appropriate under the circumstances.
How does the court evaluate whether a fee bill is reasonable?	Fee applications are tested under China Doll principles, including the work performed, rates, lawyer experience, difficulty, and result achieved.	A homeowner seeking fees should preserve detailed billing records and connect the work to the litigation result.
Does an HOA have to pay immediately if it appeals?	Not necessarily. The association may post a supersedeas bond to stay execution while the appeal is pending.	Fountain Shadows filed a bond for $4,149.67 during the appeal.

Briefing notes from the review packet

Escrow pressure point

The dispute arose during Bocchino’s property sale, when the association demanded payment through escrow and the homeowner completed the sale before suing to recover the funds.

Principal recovery

The Superior Court awarded Bocchino $3,887.28, the amount the court found had been wrongfully collected.

Trial-court fee request

After prevailing, Bocchino requested $22,937.50 in attorney fees under A.R.S. 12-341.01, supported by a China Doll-style billing submission.

Fee-application theory

The fee papers argued the association forced avoidable litigation by refusing to reimburse the charge before suit.

Supersedeas bond

During the appeal, the association filed a supersedeas bond for $4,149.67 to stay execution of the judgment while review was pending.

Appellate costs

After the appellate decision, the Court of Appeals awarded Bocchino $173.50 in costs.

Attorney-fee briefing context

Issue	Briefing position	Why it matters
Merits	Bocchino argued the association lacked a legal basis to self-assess fees that no tribunal had awarded.	This is the same practical point the appellate opinion later confirmed.
Avoidability	The fee application argued litigation could have been avoided if the association returned the escrowed funds before suit.	Shows why settlement posture became part of the fee dispute.
Degree of success	Bocchino sought to recover the full amount collected and obtained judgment for the principal recovery.	Explains why the requested fee award was much larger than the principal amount.
Deterrence	The briefing framed fee recovery as necessary for homeowners to challenge improper account charges.	Useful context for readers comparing litigation economics to the amount at stake.

Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.

Download source file

undated_900_bocchino-v-fountain-shadows-hoa-case-documents-summary-table-1.csv

For homeowners

Check whether the fees on your account were actually awarded by the court or tribunal that handled the proceeding.
Ask whether the invoice is for assessment collection, covenant enforcement, or a separate judicial proceeding.
Preserve closing statements, account ledgers, demand letters, and the order from the underlying proceeding.

For boards and managers

Ask the tribunal for fees when the statute or rules require a fee award there.
Do not assume a broad CC&R fee clause lets the association self-award litigation fees after the fact.
Separate ordinary assessment collection costs from fees incurred in separate court proceedings.

FAQ

Did the HOA have an injunction against Bocchino?

Yes, but the problem was that the justice court did not award the association attorney fees in that injunction proceeding.

Could the HOA rely on its declaration instead?

Not on this record. The Court of Appeals held the declaration did not expressly allow the association to assess unawarded litigation fees directly against Bocchino.

Does Bocchino ban all HOA fee recovery?

No. It addresses unilateral assessment of fees that were incurred in a judicial proceeding but not awarded by the court.

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Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominiums: Open Meetings, Records, Insurance, and Direct-versus-Derivative Claims

Posted on May 30, 2026 by

Arizona Condo Governance | Open Meetings | Direct Claims

This page organizes the uploaded Superior Court record in Marx v. Tara, including the June 2025 preliminary-injunction and derivative-claim rulings, Tara’s May 2026 Rule 12(c) motion, and Marx’s June 2026 response packet.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominiums Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-012980; Hon. Randall H. Warner and Hon. Adele Ponce.

Download June 26 order Download complaint June 2026 briefing Document roadmap Source index FAQ

Posture note: This is a pending Superior Court record guide, not a final merits summary. The uploaded packet includes important interim rulings, but it does not include a final judgment resolving every claim.

The posture in one sentence

Marx v. Tara is a pending Arizona condominium governance case where the central practical question is whether alleged open-meeting, records, insurance, voting, and declaration violations are enforceable as a member’s direct rights or must be handled as derivative association claims.

Case snapshot

Core dispute

A Tara condominium owner alleges the association acted without proper board votes, notice, records access, statutory compliance, and member approval.

Interim rulings

The court denied a preliminary injunction, denied Tara’s first derivative-claim dismissal motion against the association, and dismissed individual board members.

Current fight

Tara’s May 27, 2026 Rule 12(c) motion renews the derivative-claim issue after newer appellate authority; Marx’s June 2 response argues those claims remain direct member-right claims.

Source packet

The public source set preserves 168 uploaded PDFs; the generated index deduplicates them to 164 public PDF entries plus a normalized filing roadmap.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-012980
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 14, 2025
Judge / panel	Hon. Randall H. Warner, Hon. Adele Ponce
Parties	Lisa Marx, a Tara condominium owner, sued Tara Condominiums Association over alleged open-meeting, records, insurance, common-element, voting, and declaration/bylaw violations.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1248 A.R.S. § 33-1250 A.R.S. § 33-1258 A.R.S. § 33-1212 A.R.S. § 33-1247 A.R.S. § 33-1253 A.R.S. § 10-11601 A.R.S. § 12-1831
Topics	meetings-and-recordsboard-governancecc-and-rsrecords-requestsprocedureattorneys-fees
Outcome / holding	No final merits ruling appears in the uploaded public court-source file set. The June 2025 record denied preliminary injunctive relief, treated Marx’s association claims as member-right claims rather than derivative claims for that motion, and the July 2025 record dismissed individual board members. Tara’s May 27, 2026 motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending in the uploaded public court-source packet.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	164 PDFs, 1 supporting source/review file
Step-by-step docket roadmap	No separate litigation roadmap table on this page
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	12 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Lisa Marx filed Maricopa County Superior Court case CV2025-012980 against Tara Condominiums Association after disputes over board votes, open meetings, records inspection, landscaping/common-element decisions, insurance changes, amendments, expenditures, and alleged governance defects. The uploaded record shows a mixed pending posture: the court denied a preliminary injunction in June 2025, denied Tara’s first partial derivative-claims dismissal motion as to the association, dismissed individual board members Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson, and Tara’s May 2026 motion for judgment on the pleadings renewed the direct-versus-derivative issue after newer Arizona appellate authority.

Key Issues & Findings

The June 2025 preliminary-injunction ruling found that some alleged board-action defects could be addressed through later ratification or records handling and did not show irreparable harm warranting immediate injunctive relief. The June 26, 2025 derivative-claims ruling treated claims against the association as attempts to enforce Marx’s own membership rights under the declaration, bylaws, and statutes, with damages limited to her own proven harm. The July 31, 2025 dismissal ruling distinguished claims against the association from personal liability claims against individual directors.

Why It Matters

This pending condo case is useful because it places Arizona Condominium Act open-meeting, records, insurance, common-element, amendment, and direct-versus-derivative arguments in one source packet. It is especially relevant after Iqtunheimr and the Sunland Springs appellate decision because Tara’s May 2026 motion asks how those authorities apply when a homeowner frames governance defects as direct statutory and contractual injuries.

What the record shows

The Second Amended Complaint frames the case as breach of contract, Arizona Condominium Act, corporate-records, and declaratory-judgment claims against Tara Condominiums Association. Marx alleges that board actions were taken without proper notice, agenda, discussion, vote, or approval and that she was denied statutory inspection rights.

The early motion practice produced several important but limited rulings. The court denied preliminary injunctive relief in June 2025 because the record did not show irreparable harm requiring immediate intervention, even while noting that some board actions allegedly should have been voted on in an open meeting.

The court then denied Tara’s first partial motion to dismiss claims as derivative, treating the claims against the association as attempts to enforce Marx’s own membership rights under the declaration, bylaws, and law. A later ruling dismissed individual board members Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson from the case.

What the court has already done

Preliminary injunction denied

The June 2025 preliminary-injunction ruling did not give emergency relief on insurance, meeting, or records issues because the court did not find irreparable harm on that record.

Association derivative motion denied

The June 26, 2025 minute entry denied Tara’s first partial motion to dismiss, explaining that member-right claims against the association were not derivative as framed.

Individual directors dismissed

The July 31, 2025 ruling dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson, distinguishing association obligations from personal liability claims against board members.

Later derivative fight remains pending

Tara’s May 2026 Rule 12(c) motion asks the court to revisit parts of the direct-versus-derivative dispute after Iqtunheimr; Marx’s June 2026 opposition asks the court to deny the motion or narrow relief rather than dismiss claims with prejudice.

The May 2026 direct-versus-derivative motion

Tara’s May 27, 2026 motion for judgment on the pleadings argues that community-wide claims over common property, association funds, insurance, and governance belong to the association and must satisfy derivative-action requirements.

Marx’s June 2, 2026 opposition accepts that Iqtunheimr is published Arizona authority, but argues it decided only a common-area maintenance derivative claim and does not convert open-meeting, notice, voting, records, insurance-accounting, or declaration-amendment claims into derivative claims.

The same June 2 packet also opposes Tara’s request to stay the pending Colby Management discovery dispute. Marx argues the subpoenaed Colby materials go to direct claims already recognized by the June 26, 2025 ruling and that the motion to compel should be decided before discovery deadlines and trial preparation overtake the issue.

The uploaded packet includes two proposed orders. Those proposed forms are not court rulings; they show the relief Marx asked the court to enter.

What the June 2026 response packet adds

Rule 12(c) opposition

Marx argues her claims seek direct relief for her own Condominium Act, declaration, voting, inspection, and fair-administration rights, not recovery of association funds or generalized damages for all units.

Colby discovery stay opposition

Marx argues the court should not pause her motion to compel Colby Management records about the February 2024 insurance claim, board directives, communications, checks, and accounting treatment.

Claim organization exhibit

Exhibit D is Marx’s organizational aid. It asserts that 89 of 103 listed claim paragraphs are open-meeting violations and that Tara’s motion targets 60 open-meeting items.

Proposed orders

The proposed orders ask the court to deny the Rule 12(c) motion and deny the discovery stay. They should be read as requested relief, not as decisions entered by the judge.

June 2026 filings added to the record guide

Date	Document	What it adds	Download
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s response opposing stay of Colby Management production	Argues the Colby subpoena remains relevant to direct claims and should not be paused while Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion is pending.	Response opposing Colby stay
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s opposition to Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion	Argues Iqtunheimr does not eliminate direct member-right claims over open meetings, voting, records, insurance accounting, declaration amendments, or individualized statutory relief.	Rule 12(c) opposition
June 2, 2026	Exhibit D – Organization of Claims for Presentation	Organizes 103 claim paragraphs for presentation. Treat this as plaintiff’s categorization aid, not an independent court finding.	Claim organization exhibit
June 2, 2026	Proposed order denying Tara’s Rule 12(c) motion	Proposed form of relief that would deny judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, narrow relief/allow amendment rather than dismiss with prejudice.	Proposed Rule 12(c) order
June 2, 2026	Proposed order denying Tara’s motion to stay Colby discovery ruling	Proposed form of relief that would deny the stay and leave the pending Colby motion to compel for ordinary-course decision.	Proposed Colby stay order

Timeline highlights

Date	Event	Why it matters
April 2025	Original complaint packet begins the CV2025-012980 record.	The initial claims focused heavily on open meetings, board authority, records, committee action, and association governance.
June 23, 2025	The court held an evidentiary hearing on preliminary injunctive relief.	The hearing created the record for the June 2025 emergency-relief ruling.
June 25, 2025	The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.	The ruling matters because it separates alleged procedural defects from the emergency showing needed for immediate injunctive relief.
June 26, 2025	The court denied Tara’s partial motion to dismiss association claims as derivative.	This is the key early ruling treating the claims against the association as member-right claims rather than derivative claims, at least for that motion.
July 31, 2025	The court dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson.	The ruling draws a line between claims against the association and personal liability theories against individual directors.
October 2025	The record includes emergency TRO filings over master insurance, amendments, and owner insurance obligations.	The case expanded from meeting and records issues into insurance/amendment governance disputes.
March 2026	The uploaded record indicates related insurance/amendment litigation was treated as a supplemental pleading in this case.	That procedural move matters because later Rule 12(c) briefing addresses both the original and supplemental dispute.
May 27, 2026	Tara filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.	The motion asks the court to treat many community-wide claims as derivative after newer Arizona appellate authority.
June 2, 2026	Marx filed opposition papers and proposed orders addressing the Rule 12(c) motion and the Colby discovery stay.	This moves the live briefing posture from Tara’s motion alone to a disputed pending motion, with Marx asking the court to preserve direct claims or narrow relief rather than dismiss.

Curated document roadmap

After comparing the page against the AI-agent CSV, the missing piece was not the raw source coverage; it was a document-by-document narrative roadmap. The generated source index below already lists the public files, but the table here preserves the CSV’s chronology, document type, and stated case relevance so readers can understand how each filed or public-source item fits into the dispute.

This roadmap intentionally excludes unfiled draft materials that have not been confirmed as part of the court record.

The source-reference numbers in the final column are the CSV’s own reference numbers. They are not separate legal findings by this site, and the underlying PDFs remain the controlling source record.

Document roadmap from uploaded AI CSV

Date	Document	Type	How it fits the case	CSV refs
February 19, 1970	Declaration of Restrictions, Establishment of Board of Management and Lien Rights	CC&Rs	Foundational governing document defining common elements, board authority, maintenance, lien, and insurance duties. Marx uses it as the contract source for alleged breaches involving board authority, maintenance, and building-structure insurance.	1-7
March 29, 2022	CC&R Amendment Update from the Arizona Supreme Court – CHDB Law	Article / news	Kalway-related legal analysis used by Marx to argue that the 2025 insurance amendments were not reasonable or foreseeable enough to bind owners.	8
July 31, 2023	Homeowner Tara COA July 2023 Financials	Financial statement	Historical association financial record used as a comparison point for later disputed budget, insurance, and expense decisions.	7
January 11, 2024	Organizational Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Board organizational minutes. Marx cites them to show board-position decisions, knowledge of meeting requirements, and alleged inaccuracies about leadership and procedure.	9, 10
January 20, 2024	January 20, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Documents committee-volunteer discussion and the Landscaping Committee, which Marx later uses to challenge the committee’s dissolution and her removal.	7, 9
January 30, 2024	Trench on Newcastle done by Mark and Dennis	Evidence / report	Maintenance-work documentation used to support claims that individual board members acted unilaterally or performed unauthorized maintenance work.	7
February 1, 2024	Email removing Lisa from committees and dissolving them	Email	Evidence that Marx was removed from the Landscaping Committee and committees were dissolved, supporting alleged open-meeting violations and selective targeting.	7, 10
February 5, 2024	Email announcing new board member	Email	Announcement of a new board member without a recorded open board vote, supporting the A.R.S. § 33-1248 board-action theory.	7, 11
February 5, 2024	Gmail – Claim Message from USAA – 13601 N Newcastle Drive	Email	Insurance-claim correspondence used to support allegations about improper insurance handling and board-member maintenance involvement.	7
February 17, 2024	February 17, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Minutes reflecting discussion and speaking limits. Marx alleges those rules were used selectively and that board-membership status was misdocumented.	7, 9
March 16, 2024	March 16, 2024 Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Minutes referencing a workers-comp policy and Bermuda-grass plan, cited as examples of alleged unilateral chair action without open meeting votes.	7, 9
March 17, 2024	Spring newsletter 3-17-24	Newsletter	Association communication to residents, used as evidence of public board statements and owner-facing messaging.	7
May 27, 2024	Dennis working on the shutters	Evidence / report	Documentation of Dennis Anderson performing maintenance work, supporting allegations that board members acted outside authorized roles.	7
June 15, 2024	June 15, 2024 Tara Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Procedural record of board actions during summer 2024.	7
July 2, 2024	DAnderson 07 02 24 Expense Voucher	Expense voucher	Financial record used to test whether board-member reimbursement and expenditures were properly authorized.	7
July 16, 2024	07 16 24 Letter to Lisa Marx re Petition Response	Letter	Association correspondence to Marx about a petition, part of the pre-litigation governance-dispute history.	7
July 23, 2024	American Family Master Insurance Policy Invoice Voucher 2024 2025	Financial document	Shows prior master-insurance cost and coverage before the disputed 2025 insurance amendments and policy changes.	7
July 27, 2024	July 27 2024 Tara Board Meeting Minutes	Meeting minutes	Procedural record of board actions and decisions.	7
July 31, 2024	Travis Law Firm July Inv Voucher	Invoice voucher	Legal-fee invoice used to support claims about association legal spending and approval procedure.	7
August 29, 2024	Travis Law Firm August 2024 Invoice Voucher	Invoice voucher	Additional legal-fee record used in the unauthorized-expenditure and approval-procedure theory.	7
November 1, 2024	2025 Tara Condominiums Budget Letter	Budget letter	Board letter recommending a $50 assessment increase due to insurance, sewer, and legal-fee increases; part of the financial buildup to the insurance dispute.	12
November 3, 2024	Issues regarding the 2025 Budget Vote	Email	Marx email arguing that the budget-vote process violated statute, used to show an earlier voting-procedure objection.	13
April 11, 2025	Civil Complaint for Breach of Contract	Complaint	Original filing against the association and individual board members, opening the litigation and asserting governance and CC&R breach theories.	14-16
April 14, 2025	Minute Entry Denying TRO	Court order	Early ruling denying temporary restraining relief because emergency TRO requirements were not met.	17
April 16, 2025	Amended Emergency Orders: TRO and Temporary Injunctive Relief	Motion for injunctive relief	Request to preserve declaration and insurance status quo while the case proceeded.	18, 19
May 28, 2025	Association’s Partial Motion to Dismiss	Motion	Association argued many claims were derivative and Marx lacked individual standing to pursue community-wide harms.	20
June 4, 2025	Responsive Memorandum to Association’s Partial Motion to Dismiss	Responsive memorandum	Marx opposed dismissal by arguing the claims asserted direct individual harms and member-right violations.	14-16
June 6, 2025	Reply to Response to Request for TRO and Injunctive Relief	Reply memorandum	Reply supporting emergency relief and addressing alleged service-delay and response-timing issues.	18
June 26, 2025	Minute Entry – Claim not Derivative	Court order	Key early ruling treating Marx’s claims against the association as direct member-right claims rather than derivative claims for that motion.	21, 22
July 15, 2025	Motion to Dismiss Defendants Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson	Motion	Individual board members sought dismissal based on director protections and lack of personal liability.	23
July 20, 2025	Response Memorandum to Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendants	Responsive memorandum	Marx opposed dismissal by arguing Gottmann and Anderson acted in bad faith and outside their authority.	14, 24, 25
July 25, 2025	Minute entry order to file amended complaint	Court order	Order requiring a more definite statement, leading to amended pleadings.	26
July 31, 2025	Ruling dismissing Mark and Dennis	Court order	Dismissed individual defendants, creating a major procedural setback for the personal-liability claims.	27, 28
August 6, 2025	Travis Law Firm Budget Letter / Proposing Amendments	Budget letter / letter	Counsel letter explaining proposed amendments to shift insurance responsibilities to owners, initiating the core insurance-amendment dispute.	4-6, 29-31
August 10, 2025	Motion for Partial Reconsideration of July 31, 2025 Ruling	Motion	Marx sought reconsideration of the dismissal of the individual board members.	32
August 11, 2025	Exhibit N Cert of Ins for 25 26	Certificate of liability insurance	Insurance certificate showing property coverage effective August 1, 2025 to August 1, 2026, used to contrast later claimed coverage changes.	6, 33
August 12, 2025	Order Denying Motion for reconsideration	Court order	Maintained dismissal of Gottmann and Anderson.	34
August 15, 2025	First Amended Complaint (FAC)	Amended complaint	Updated pleading reasserting claims and refining the legal counts against the association and directors.	2, 14
September 6, 2025	Plaintiff’s Initial Rule 26.1 Disclosure Statement	Discovery disclosure	Mandatory disclosure identifying factual bases, witnesses, and evidence Marx expected to use.	35, 36
September 11, 2025	Stipulation for Extension of Time	Legal stipulation	Agreement extending Marx’s deadline to respond to fee applications; later relevant to arguments about premature fee rulings.	28, 37
September 15, 2025	Order Denying Motion to Strike Reply	Court order	Denied Marx’s request to strike Tara’s reply regarding the amended complaint.	38
September 15, 2025	Second Amended Complaint (SAC)	Amended complaint	Operative complaint against the association after dismissal of the individual defendants.	28, 39-41
September 15, 2025	Order on Stipulation to Extend Time	Court order	Granted an extension to respond to attorney-fee requests.	42
September 20, 2025	Minutes for a Board Meeting of the Tara Condominiums Association	Meeting minutes	Board minutes covering approval of the plan to present CC&R amendments for owner vote.	43
September 22, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint	Motion	Marx sought to reinstate direct claims against individual board members and add alleged post-filing violations.	14, 44, 45
September 24, 2025	Urgent Concerns on Proposed CC&R Amendments	Email / letter	Marx letter to owners identifying claimed risks of the proposed amendments, including costs, title, loan, and insurance issues.	4, 46
September 25, 2025	Meeting needs to be called to turn in ballots	Email	Marx demanded an open meeting for the amendment vote, preserving her objection to the voting process.	6, 47
September 27, 2025	Proposed Insurance amendments (Board/Owner Emails)	Email	Correspondence framing the association’s justification for the insurance shift and Marx’s objections under statutory and declaration duties.	5, 6, 30, 48
September 30, 2025	Minute Entry Denying Motion to Vacate	Court order	Denied Marx’s request to vacate a fee-related order before the fee award was entered.	49
October 1, 2025	Order Granting Application for Attorney’s Fees	Court order	Awarded individual defendants $5,957.70 in fees after dismissal; Marx contends the award was premature.	28, 49, 50
October 5, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction	Motion	Attempt to block implementation of proposed amendments based on alleged statutory and declaration violations.	6, 51
October 9, 2025	Motion for Expedited Hearing	Motion	Request for a hearing within five days before the amendment-vote deadline.	31, 52, 53
October 14, 2025	Scheduling Order	Court order	Set discovery tiers, litigation deadlines, and a September 14, 2026 trial date.	54
October 15, 2025	Action by Written Consent	Voting form	Owner written-consent form used for three proposed declaration amendments.	55
October 17, 2025	Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions	Recorded amendment	Recorded amendment No. 2025-0605584 shifting insurance responsibility to owners; Marx challenges its validity.	31, 56, 57
October 18, 2025	Results of Tara CC&R amendment vote	Email	Announcement that amendments passed and owners had to obtain insurance by November 15, 2025.	58, 59
October 22, 2025	Stipulation to Continue Case Deadlines	Legal stipulation	Joint extension of deadlines due to Marx’s medical hospitalization.	60
October 26, 2025	Meeting to view ballots (Transcript)	Transcript	Transcript in which Gottmann allegedly refused to show owner signatures or vote choices, supporting A.R.S. § 33-1258 inspection-right claims.	61, 62
October 29, 2025	Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order	Motion	Emergency request to stop cancellation of master insurance and implementation of recorded amendments.	31, 63
October 30, 2025	2025 Budget	Financial document	Association budget showing a $50 assessment increase for insurance premiums, part of the financial basis for the amendment dispute.	64
October 30, 2025	Order Granting Leave to File Reply Out of Time	Court order	Procedural relief allowing Marx to file a late reply related to the third amended complaint.	65
November 6, 2025	Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing	Motion	Request for an evidentiary hearing on the voting process and alleged harm from insurance lapse.	66, 67
November 10, 2025	Reminder to obtain homeowner insurance	Email	Board email setting a December 1, 2025 proof-of-structural-insurance deadline.	68
November 12, 2025	Notice of Appeal	Legal notice	Notice concerning dismissal of individual defendants and cost/fee issues.	69, 70
November 13, 2025	Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Consolidated Response	Motion / reply	Reply supporting preliminary-injunction relief based on claimed individualized harm and flawed amendment process.	71
November 17, 2025	Minute Entry (Dismissing TAC and Injunction)	Court order	Denied leave to file the Third Amended Complaint and denied injunction relief, prompting later judge-change efforts.	70, 72
November 21, 2025	Official Ballot 2026 Budget Ratification	Ballot	Budget ballot showing a proposed $15 assessment decrease after removing association insurance duties.	73, 74
November 21, 2025	Civil Complaint for Declaratory Judgment	Complaint	New action CV2025-062973 challenging the October 2025 amendments and potential master-policy cancellation.	75
November 23, 2025	Motion for Change of Judge for Cause	Motion	Marx sought to remove Judge Warner, leading to reassignment to Judge Adele Ponce.	72, 76
November 24, 2025	Request for Answers to Interrogatories	Discovery request	Interrogatories targeting board decisions and maintenance work to develop the ultra vires theory.	11
November 25, 2025	Case Reassignment / First Amended Civil Complaint	Court order / complaint	Case reassignment to Judge Ponce and amended pleading in the second insurance-shift action.	70, 75, 77-79
December 1, 2025	Motion for Reconsideration of Nov 17 Minute Entry	Motion	Marx asked Judge Ponce to reconsider denial of the third amended complaint and injunction relief.	70, 80
December 3, 2025	Minute Entry Case Consolidation	Court order	Consolidated CV2025-062973 with CV2025-012980, folding the insurance-amendment dispute into the main litigation path.	81
December 3, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Consolidation	Motion	Marx opposed consolidation, arguing the actions involved distinct facts and emergency concerns.	82
December 4, 2025	Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Expedited Hearing	Motion	Challenge to characterization of the complaint and request for expedited hearing on insurance risk.	75
December 5, 2025	Joint Notice of Outstanding Motions and Hearings	Legal notice	Catalog of pending matters for Judge Ponce after reassignment.	70
January 4, 2026	Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	Response memorandum	Opposition to dismissal of the second action, arguing insurance termination was a new occurrence requiring separate attention.	19
January 20, 2026	Certificate of Liability Insurance (Master Policy 2025-2026)	Insurance certificate	Certificate showing liability and D&O coverage but no building property insurance, used as key evidence that buildings became uninsured.	83, 84
January 20, 2026	Notice of Intent to Serve Amended Subpoena	Discovery notice	Notice for records subpoena to Colby Management, part of the discovery fight over association records.	85
January 30, 2026	Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Reconsideration	Legal memorandum	Filing using the January 20 insurance certificate as new evidence of claimed statutory insurance violations.	83
February 26, 2026	Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Compel	Legal notice	Procedural withdrawal of a discovery motion.	86
March 16, 2026	Minute Entry (Oral Argument and Rule 15d conversion)	Court order	Converted the second lawsuit into a Rule 15(d) supplemental-pleading path in the main case.	41, 87
May 27, 2026	Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Motion	Tara’s attempt to dismiss asserted community-wide claims as derivative after newer appellate authority.	88
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Stay Colby Management Discovery	Response memorandum	Marx opposes Tara’s request to stay a ruling on the Colby Management subpoena dispute, arguing the requested insurance-claim accounting, communications, checks, and board-directive materials remain relevant to direct claims and that discovery deadlines were approaching.	166
June 2, 2026	Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Response memorandum	Marx argues Iqtunheimr does not convert her open-meeting, notice, voting, records, insurance-accounting, amendment-validity, and individualized statutory-right claims into derivative claims, and asks the court to deny dismissal or narrow relief/allow amendment.	167
June 2, 2026	Exhibit D – Organization of Claims for Presentation	Exhibit / organizational aid	Marx’s exhibit groups 103 claim paragraphs for presentation, including her assertion that 89 are open-meeting violations and that Tara’s motion targets 60 open-meeting items.	168
June 2, 2026	Proposed Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings	Proposed order	Proposed form of order submitted by Marx. It is not a ruling unless and until the court signs or enters an order.	169
June 2, 2026	Proposed Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay Ruling on Colby Production	Proposed order	Proposed form of order submitted by Marx to deny Tara’s requested stay of the Colby discovery ruling. It is not a court ruling.	170
Not dated in CSV	Plaintiff’s First Requests for Production of Documents	Discovery request	Formal request for insurance, financial, and related records, aimed at evidence about the 2024 insurance claim and policy-rate increases.	90
September 10, 2020	Marx Warranty Deed	Deed	Warranty deed conveying Unit 5 to Lisa Marx, establishing her standing as unit owner and association member.	2, 91, 92

How to read this case without overclaiming it

Treat interim rulings as interim rulings. The June and July 2025 orders are important, but they do not equal a final merits judgment on every later claim.
Separate association claims from individual-director claims. The uploaded record shows the court was willing to let some claims proceed against the association while dismissing individual board members.
Track the exact injury theory. The direct-versus-derivative question turns on whether the claim seeks to remedy a member’s individual statutory/contractual injury or a generalized association injury.
Do not skip the procedural posture. Preliminary injunction, motion to dismiss, judgment on the pleadings, and final judgment apply different standards.
Use the source index. The upload is large. The normalized roadmap and complete source-document index are the safest way to follow the record in order.

Practical lessons for condo disputes

For owners

Tie each claim to the specific statute, declaration section, bylaw, vote, notice, record request, or personal harm.
Preserve agendas, minutes, emails, insurance notices, amendment materials, ballots, and records-request correspondence.
Do not assume that proving a board process defect automatically proves irreparable harm.
Keep direct personal injury theories separate from generalized association harm.

For boards and counsel

Document board authorization, open-meeting votes, executive-session limits, and ratification steps.
Handle records requests with clear statutory deadlines, production logs, and written explanations.
Treat insurance and amendment changes as high-risk governance events requiring clean notices, votes, and member communications.
Do not rely on derivative-action arguments without addressing member-right statutes and declaration enforcement language.

Complete source set

Download the filing roadmap

The source files were normalized into the standard court-case download layout. Use the roadmap CSV to cross-check original filenames against public filenames, then use the generated source-document index below for direct downloads.

Download roadmap CSV

FAQ

Is this case finally decided?

No. The uploaded packet includes important interim rulings and May/June 2026 briefing, but it does not include a final judgment resolving the full case.

Did the court say all of Marx’s claims are direct claims?

No. The June 26, 2025 minute entry denied Tara’s first partial derivative-claims motion as to the association and described the claims as member-right claims as framed. Tara’s May 2026 Rule 12(c) motion asks the court to revisit direct-versus-derivative treatment for asserted community-wide claims, and Marx’s June 2026 opposition disputes that characterization.

Were the individual board members kept in the case?

No. The uploaded July 31, 2025 ruling dismissed Mark Gottmann and Dennis Anderson, while distinguishing those personal-liability theories from claims against the association.

Why does insurance appear in an open-meeting case?

The record expanded beyond early open-meeting and records allegations. Later filings challenged master-insurance changes, declaration amendments, owner insurance obligations, and related voting/notice procedures.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Download source file

2025-09-15_015_10-order-9-15-25-denying-motion-to-strike-reply-in-support-of-motion-to-strike-portions-of-amended-complaint.pdf

Source 165 No docket date in filename

Source File Roadmap 2026 05 31

Type: Source roadmap CSV

Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.

Download source file

source-file-roadmap-2026-05-31.csv

Primary sources

Reviewed against the uploaded Superior Court filings through June 2, 2026 and the normalized source-file roadmap. Proposed orders are identified as proposed forms of relief, not signed court rulings. Unfiled draft materials are not treated as court sources. This page is educational information for Arizona HOA and condominium governance research. It is not legal advice for any specific dispute.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Gross v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake: Kalway, Rentals, and Occupancy Limits

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona HOA Rental Amendments | Kalway | 1 CA-CV 23-0394

Gross is the cleanest Arizona published rental-amendment roadmap after Kalway. The short-term lease ban was invalid, but the unrelated-person occupancy limit survived because it refined existing single-family use restrictions.

Last updated June 3, 2026. Case: Gordon Gross, et al. v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake Community Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 23-0394; Navajo County Superior Court No. S0900CV202200042.

Download appellate opinion Download trial ruling Watch video overview Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the published appellate opinion, amended opinion order, mandate, and uploaded trial/appellate record. The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder, including court PDFs, court DOC/DOCX notices, and AI/source CSVs where present. AI-generated CSV summaries were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority.

The rule in one sentence

Under Kalway, an HOA rental amendment can be partly invalid and partly valid: a new short-term rental ban may be unforeseeable while an occupancy limit can survive if it refines an existing single-family-use covenant.

Case snapshot

Court result

Judgment was affirmed.

Invalid part

Thirty-day minimum lease term was stricken.

Valid part

Four-unrelated-person occupancy limit survived.

Fee result

Each side bore its own appellate fees and costs.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 23-0394
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 10, 2024
Judge / panel	Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma, Judge Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge Michael J. Brown
Parties	Owners challenged a 2021 amendment that banned short-term rentals and limited occupancy by unrelated renters in a planned community.
Topics	cc-and-rsprocedure
Outcome / holding	The court held that the new short-term rental ban was invalid under Arizona amendment-notice principles, but the cap on unrelated renters was valid because it was reasonably foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	121 PDFs, 10 supporting source/review files
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Gross v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake: Kalway, Rentals, and Occupancy Limits
Study / briefing material	2 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	5 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Gross applied Kalway in a practical, highly relevant HOA setting: rental restrictions. The community amended its CC&Rs to prohibit rentals shorter than 30 days and to bar more than four unrelated individuals from leasing a property. The Court of Appeals split the amendment. It held the short-term rental ban was invalid because it prohibited conduct the earlier CC&Rs had allowed and was not reasonably foreseeable from the original declaration. But it upheld the unrelated-persons occupancy limit because that restriction was viewed as a clarification and refinement of existing use limits rather than a brand-new burden. The opinion is one of the clearest Arizona appellate examples of how courts separate an impermissible new use restriction from a permissible refinement of an existing one.

Key Issues & Findings

The court framed the dispute as one about owner notice and reasonable expectations. A recorded declaration can be amended, but only within the fair scope of what the original declaration put buyers on notice might later be refined. Under that approach, an amendment cannot simply reverse an existing freedom and call the result a refinement.

Applying that rule, the short-term rental ban was too much because the preexisting documents had not warned owners that leasing could later be cut off in that way. The unrelated-occupants limit came out differently because the original scheme already contained structure about occupancy and residential use, making the later cap a closer fit with the bought-for framework.

Why It Matters

Gross is one of the best Arizona Court of Appeals cases for short-term-rental disputes after Kalway. It gives both sides a usable analytic framework for asking whether an amendment is genuinely foreseeable or instead a new restriction in disguise.

Boards considering rental amendments should read it before drafting. Homeowners challenging new lease limits will cite it often.

Why this case matters

Gross gives Arizona homeowners and boards a detailed framework for rental amendments after Kalway. The court treated the short-term rental ban as a new burden because the original CC&Rs expressly allowed leasing and did not set a minimum lease duration.

At the same time, Gross rejected the idea that every rental-related amendment fails. The unrelated-person cap was upheld because the original CC&Rs already limited use to single-family residential use and defined Single Family. That made the cap a refinement rather than an entirely new covenant.

Video overview: Kalway, rentals, and occupancy limits

Watch this overview for Gross v. The Shores at Rainbow Lake, where the Court of Appeals split a rental amendment into an invalid short-term rental ban and a valid unrelated-person occupancy limit.

Homeowner study guide: Kalway, rentals, and occupancy limits

Homeowner question	Study-guide answer	Case lesson
Can The Shores enforce the 2021 minimum 30-day lease requirement?	No. The court held the short-term rental ban invalid and unenforceable.	A later amendment cannot add an unforeseeable rental-duration restriction where the original CC&Rs allowed leasing without a minimum term.
Why did the 30-day rule fail under Kalway?	The original declaration allowed leasing and did not contain a lease-duration limit.	The court treated the new 30-day minimum as an entirely new burden rather than a foreseeable refinement.
Did earlier Shores litigation matter?	Yes. Horton v. Hartsook had already treated similar community language as permitting short-term rentals.	Prior interpretation of the same or similar covenants can shape what later owners reasonably could foresee.
Can the association limit unrelated occupants?	Yes. The court upheld the four-unrelated-person limit.	That provision refined an existing Single Family residential-use covenant rather than creating a new rental ban.
Does Single Family residential use address only building type?	No. Gross treated the covenant as addressing use and occupancy, not just architecture.	Owners should read use restrictions as controlling how the property is occupied as well as how it is built.
Is a 67 percent amendment vote enough by itself?	No. Procedural approval does not override the common-law reasonable-and-foreseeable requirement.	An amendment can receive enough votes and still be unenforceable if it exceeds the original covenant notice.
What happened to voter-irregularity claims?	Those alternative claims were dismissed with prejudice after the homeowners chose not to pursue them to expedite final judgment.	Gross is mainly useful for the contract-enforceability analysis, not as a voting-process ruling.
Does the Planned Communities Act displace Kalway common law?	No. The court followed Kalway and held A.R.S. 33-1817(A) does not eliminate the reasonable-and-foreseeable amendment limit.	Arizona associations must satisfy both procedural amendment rules and substantive foreseeability limits.

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

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For homeowners

Use Gross when a new amendment restricts rental duration after the original CC&Rs allowed leasing.
Do not assume every rental-related restriction fails; compare each clause separately.
Preserve the original CC&Rs, the amended language, voting materials, and evidence of historical rental use.

For boards and managers

Draft rental amendments around the specific original covenants that already exist.
Separate lease-duration limits from occupancy limits; Gross analyzes them differently.
Expect courts to blue-pencil severable provisions rather than treat a multi-part amendment as all-or-nothing.

FAQ

Did Gross invalidate all rental restrictions?

No. It invalidated the 30-day minimum lease term but upheld the unrelated-person occupancy limit.

Why did the 30-day rental ban fail?

The original CC&Rs allowed leasing and had no minimum lease duration, so owners were not on notice that a majority could later ban shorter rentals.

Why did the occupancy cap survive?

The CC&Rs already contained a single-family residential use covenant and a Single Family definition, so the cap was treated as a permissible refinement.

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Richard B. Nolan and Patricia E. Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Association

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Richard B. Nolan and Patricia E. Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Association

1 CA-CV 06-0572 · Court of Appeals · October 9, 2007

At a Glance

Parties	Homeowners sued the HOA claiming disability discrimination and breach of contract because certain common-area access points were not wheelchair accessible.
Panel	Judge Johnsen
Statutes interpreted	A.R.S. § 41-1491.19

Summary

The Nolans claimed their HOA discriminated against a wheelchair-bound owner by failing to make parts of the development’s common areas easier to access. They also argued the HOA breached the CC&Rs and created a nuisance. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the HOA. The court recognized that Arizona fair-housing law can require accommodations in some settings, but it concluded the specific features challenged here did not create a viable claim on the record presented. It also held that the CC&R language granting owners a right to use common areas did not itself promise that the HOA would retrofit those areas to make them accessible in every circumstance. The opinion is useful because it shows the limits of access claims when the governing documents and the statutory theory do not fit the facts tightly enough.

Holding

The court held that the homeowners had not shown the HOA violated Arizona fair-housing law, breached the CC&Rs, or created a nuisance based on the common-area access conditions at issue.

Reasoning

On the contract claim, the court read the CC&Rs as granting a nonexclusive right to use common areas, not as an affirmative promise by the association to redesign or reconstruct those areas to accommodate every disability-related access problem. The language did not support the broader duty the homeowners urged.

On the statutory discrimination theory, the court distinguished earlier Arizona fair-housing cases in which an HOA had refused a specific accommodation request tied directly to housing access or occupancy. In this record, the challenged conditions and the requested changes did not establish the same kind of legally required accommodation claim. That left the nuisance theory unsupported as well.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This case matters because it shows that not every accessibility dispute in an HOA becomes a winning fair-housing or contract case. Plaintiffs still need a clear link between the requested accommodation, the statutory duty, and the actual housing-related barrier.

For boards, Nolan is not a license to ignore disability issues. It is a reminder that the analysis is fact-specific and that document language and the exact accommodation request matter.

Topics

fair-housingcc-and-rs

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John W. Shamrock, Arthur A. and Lois J. Gilcrease Family Trust, David H. Hemmings, The Pollard Family Trust, J.C. & C. Investments, L.L.C., Edward E. Smith and Margaret Smith, Lewis Revocable Trust, Joe Kaczmarski and Ada Kaczmarski, and William R. Detor v. Wagon Wheel Park Homeowners Association

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

John W. Shamrock, Arthur A. and Lois J. Gilcrease Family Trust, David H. Hemmings, The Pollard Family Trust, J.C. & C. Investments, L.L.C., Edward E. Smith and Margaret Smith, Lewis Revocable Trust, Joe Kaczmarski and Ada Kaczmarski, and William R. Detor v. Wagon Wheel Park Homeowners Association

1 CA-CV 02-0403 · Court of Appeals · August 26, 2003

At a Glance

Parties	Subdivision lot owners challenged a nonprofit association’s claim that ownership automatically made them mandatory members obligated to pay assessments.
Panel	Judge Ann A. Scott Timmer, Presiding Judge Daniel A. Barker, Judge William F. Garbarino
Statutes interpreted	A.R.S. § 10-3304 A.R.S. § 10-3601 A.R.S. § 33-1802

Summary

This case asks a basic but important HOA-law question: how do you turn a neighborhood with recorded restrictions into one with mandatory HOA membership and compulsory assessments? The court answered that it must be done through recorded deed restrictions, not just through articles of incorporation or bylaws of a nonprofit association. Wagon Wheel argued that its corporate documents and amended bylaws made all lot owners mandatory members. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that owners in an existing subdivision cannot be forced into mandatory membership unless the recorded land restrictions themselves impose that burden in the manner allowed by the existing declaration. Because those recorded restrictions did not do so during the relevant period, the association’s assessments and related encumbrances against nonmembers were not valid for that period.

Holding

The court held that mandatory membership in a new HOA for owners in an existing subdivision can be imposed only through properly recorded deed restrictions, not by corporate articles or bylaws alone.

Reasoning

The court began with nonprofit-corporation law and the principle that membership cannot be imposed without consent. It then turned to real-property law and explained that mandatory membership and assessment duties must arise from recorded covenants that run with the land.

The association tried to combine old declarations, articles of incorporation, and later bylaws into a single functional declaration. The court rejected that approach. The Planned Communities Act defined which associations are covered, but it did not supply a shortcut for creating mandatory membership burdens. Because the existing recorded declaration had not yet been properly amended to require membership, the association’s internal corporate documents could not do the job.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is a major Arizona authority on whether an association can bootstrap itself into mandatory status. It is especially useful in disputes involving older subdivisions, informal neighborhood associations, and retrofitted assessment schemes.

For boards and developers, the lesson is blunt: if the burden is supposed to run with the land, it must be created and amended through the recorded land documents, not by internal corporate paperwork.

Topics

cc-and-rsassessmentsboard-governance

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David C. Johnson and Wendee L. Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, Inc., Patrick Boyle, and Carol Boyle

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

David C. Johnson and Wendee L. Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, Inc., Patrick Boyle, and Carol Boyle

205 Ariz. 485 (Ct. App. 2003), 1 CA-CV 02-0160 · Court of Appeals · July 31, 2003

At a Glance

Parties	Homeowners sued their HOA and neighbors after the HOA declined to require compliance with architectural and exterior-maintenance restrictions in the declaration.
Panel	Judge Snow

Summary

The Johnsons claimed their HOA should have required their neighbors to obtain approval for an exterior stucco change and should have enforced declaration provisions dealing with exposed wiring. The trial court sided with the HOA after deciding it should defer to the association’s choices so long as they were made in good faith. The Court of Appeals vacated that ruling. It explained that recorded restrictions are contracts and that courts do not simply hand off contract interpretation to an HOA board whenever the text can be judicially read and applied. The opinion is useful because it separates deference to discretionary community management from the court’s independent role in interpreting and enforcing governing documents. Associations are not free to treat clear restrictions as optional just because they believe a relaxed approach is sensible.

Holding

The court held that the superior court erred by deferring as a matter of public policy to the HOA’s good-faith decisions on declaration compliance instead of independently analyzing the governing documents and the claimed violations.

Reasoning

The court treated the declaration as a contract running with the land and emphasized that contract interpretation remains a judicial function. That meant the trial court first needed to decide what the governing language required before deciding whether the HOA or the neighbors had complied.

The opinion rejected a blanket rule that would insulate HOA enforcement decisions whenever the board claimed good faith. The court distinguished between areas where an HOA truly exercises granted discretion and situations where the declaration itself imposes concrete obligations. Where the document speaks clearly, a court must determine its meaning and then decide whether it was violated.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is a foundational Arizona case for homeowners arguing selective or non-enforcement. It limits the idea that a board can avoid judicial review by labeling a dispute as an exercise of association discretion.

For boards, the case is a warning that they need a document-based reason for enforcement choices, especially when the declaration imposes specific exterior-control or maintenance rules.

Topics

cc-and-rsarchitectural-reviewselective-enforcement

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Scott Canady, Ralph and Margaret Canady, and Pamela Garapich v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association, Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association Board of Directors, and Don Larson, President

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Scott Canady, Ralph and Margaret Canady, and Pamela Garapich v. Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association, Prescott Canyon Estates Homeowners Association Board of Directors, and Don Larson, President

204 Ariz. 91 (Ct. App. 2002), 1 CA-CV 02-0138 · Court of Appeals · November 26, 2002

At a Glance

Parties	Disabled adult son and his parents, plus a seller, sued the HOA after the HOA refused to waive an age-restriction rule in a senior community.
Panel	Judge Ehrlich, Presiding Judge William F. Garbarino, Judge Jon W. Thompson
Statutes interpreted	A.R.S. § 41-1491.19 A.R.S. § 41-1491.04 A.R.S. § 36-551.01

Summary

This case arose after a 55-plus community refused to let a severely developmentally disabled 26-year-old live with his qualifying parents because the community’s CC&Rs separately barred residents under age 35. The Court of Appeals held that Arizona and federal fair-housing law required the association to make a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected the HOA’s argument that allowing the son to live there would destroy the community’s lawful status as housing for older persons. It explained that the older-housing exemption protects age-based occupancy rules from familial-status claims, but it does not erase the separate duty to accommodate disability. The court also emphasized that accommodation law can require changing an otherwise valid rule when that change is necessary to give a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.

Holding

The court held that the HOA violated Arizona fair-housing law by refusing a reasonable disability accommodation and that granting the accommodation would not jeopardize the community’s 55-plus status.

Reasoning

The court started with the disability-accommodation provisions in the Arizona Fair Housing Act and the parallel federal statute. It treated federal case law as persuasive because the Arizona provisions are materially similar. Under those statutes, a facially neutral rule can still be unlawful if the association refuses a reasonable exception that is necessary for a disabled person to use and enjoy housing on equal terms.

The HOA argued that its age restriction was lawful and that a waiver would undercut the development’s status as housing for older persons. The court disagreed. Because at least one occupant in the household would still be over 55, the statutory occupancy threshold stayed intact. And making an exception to comply with disability law did not show abandonment of the community’s senior-housing purpose. The accommodation was therefore both legally required and practically compatible with the governing scheme.

Why This Matters for HOAs

This is one of the clearest Arizona HOA cases on disability accommodations. Boards cannot assume that a valid CC&R or age restriction automatically ends the analysis when a disability-related request is made.

For homeowners and counsel, the case is a strong reminder that fair-housing duties can override otherwise enforceable private-use restrictions when a targeted exception is necessary and reasonable.

Topics

fair-housingcc-and-rs

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State of Arizona, et al. v. Foothills Reserve Master Owners Association, Inc.

Posted on April 30, 2026 by [email protected]

State of Arizona, et al. v. Foothills Reserve Master Owners Association, Inc.

CV-23-0292-PR · Arizona Supreme Court · January 28, 2025

At a Glance

Parties	The State and a master-planned-community HOA disputed compensation after condemnation of homeowners’ easement rights in common areas.
Panel	Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer, Vice Chief Justice John R. Lopez IV, Justice Clint Bolick, Justice James P. Beene, Justice William G. Montgomery, Justice Kathryn H. King, Justice John Pelander
Statutes interpreted	A.R.S. § 12-1122

Summary

Foothills Reserve is a recent Arizona Supreme Court HOA case involving condemnation of community rights in common areas. The homeowners in a master-planned community held appurtenant easements in HOA-owned open-space parcels. When the State condemned those easements for the South Mountain Freeway project, the key dispute became whether the homeowners could recover not just the value of the easements themselves, but also severance or proximity damages for the reduced value of their homes. The Arizona Supreme Court said yes. It held that appurtenant easements are part of the owners’ larger parcel for condemnation purposes and that A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2) allows severance damages in those circumstances. The case is not a typical internal-governance dispute, but it is directly useful whenever an HOA represents owners concerning common-area easement rights created by a declaration, plat, or master-plan structure.

Holding

Homeowners may recover severance-type damages when appurtenant easements in HOA common areas are condemned, because those easements are part of the owners’ larger parcel for purposes of A.R.S. § 12-1122(A)(2).

Reasoning

The court treated the owners’ easements as real property interests attached to and running with their homes. Because the homes and the easement rights form one integrated property package, taking the easements can damage the remaining homes even when the State does not physically take the lots themselves.

The court also relied on the declaration and plat structure of the community. The homeowners had both positive and negative easement interests in the common areas, and the HOA was authorized to represent them in condemnation proceedings. That framework supported a damages analysis that looked beyond the common-area parcel alone.

Why This Matters for HOAs

For Arizona HOAs, the case confirms that owner easement rights in common areas are not abstract amenities. They are compensable property interests. That matters in condemnation, utility, roadway, and infrastructure disputes involving common-area burdens.

The decision also reinforces the representative role of an HOA when the declaration authorizes the association to act on behalf of owners whose appurtenant rights are at stake.

Topics

procedurecc-and-rs

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