Tag Archives: cc-and-rs

Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Aziz: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Injunctive Relief | Uncontested Summary Judgment | CV2021-001880

The court record available here is limited. It shows Val Vista Lakes Community Association brought a civil action against Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe, that the complaint sought injunctive relief, and that Judge Randall H. Warner granted the association an uncontested motion for summary judgment after finding the motion supplied a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001880.

Download ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2021-08-03. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001880) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 21, 2021 arbitration minute entry and the August 3, 2021 uncontested summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the court granting the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion and giving the parties 30 days to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension; this draft does not include a later final judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The available minute-entry record is narrow. The court treated the case as one seeking injunctive relief, held it was not subject to compulsory arbitration, and later granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association an uncontested motion for summary judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(b). The ruling does not describe the underlying covenant, assessment, or property dispute, so this page should be read as a procedural case note rather than a substantive interpretation of HOA law.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that filed the civil action and obtained an uncontested summary-judgment ruling.
  • Gregory A. Stein (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Val Vista Lakes Community Association in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Safwat S. Aziz (Defendant)
    Named defendant. The minute entries list this defendant as self-represented.
  • Glenna L. Kincheloe (Defendant)
    Named defendant. The minute entries list this defendant as self-represented.

Neutral Parties

  • Randall H. Warner (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the default-procedure minute entry, the arbitration minute entry, and the uncontested summary-judgment ruling.
  • Susan White (Commissioner)
    Commissioner identified in the April 12, 2021 minute entry as handling Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings.

What happened

Val Vista Lakes Community Association filed a Maricopa County Superior Court action against Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe. The minute entries identify the association as the plaintiff and Gregory A. Stein as its counsel; the defendants are listed as self-represented. The entries do not describe the underlying property facts or the covenant provisions at issue.

On April 12, 2021, Judge Randall H. Warner addressed the association’s e-filed application or motion for default. The court took no action on that filing in the judge’s division and advised the parties that commissioners handle Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings. The minute entry also explained that the documents needed to support default judgment had to be e-filed and that a paper default-judgment packet had to be submitted to the assigned commissioner before a commissioner would act.

On April 21, 2021, the court addressed conflicting certificates about compulsory arbitration. Because the complaint sought injunctive relief, the court ruled that the case was not subject to arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). That entry is the only collected minute entry that identifies the type of relief sought.

The dispositive ruling came on August 3, 2021. The association had filed a June 17, 2021 motion for summary judgment, no response had been filed, and the court said it would summarily grant the motion as uncontested under Rule 7.1(b). Judge Warner added that he had reviewed the motion and that it provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

The court ordered the summary-judgment motion granted. It also ordered that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice in 30 days unless a form of final judgment was lodged with an appropriate notice of lodging or the deadline was otherwise extended by the court. The collected minute entries for this draft stop there.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al. (CV2021-001880 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA obtained uncontested summary judgment in an injunctive-relief case, with final judgment still to be lodged. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-04-12 The court takes no action in Judge Warner's division on the association's application or motion for default and directs the parties to the commissioner process for Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings.
Step 2021-04-21 The court rules that the case is not subject to compulsory arbitration because the complaint seeks injunctive relief.
Step 2021-06-17 Val Vista Lakes Community Association files the motion for summary judgment referenced in the later ruling.
Step 2021-08-03 The court grants the association's uncontested motion for summary judgment under Rule 7.1(b) and gives the parties 30 days to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 3 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2021-04-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2021-04-12_001_minute-entry.pdf
Source 2 2021-04-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2021-04-21_002_minute-entry.pdf
Source 3 2021-08-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Val Vista Lakes Community Association's uncontested motion for summary judgment and warning that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice unless a final judgment was lodged or the deadline extended.

Download source file
2021-08-03_003_ruling.pdf

FAQ

What did the association win in this case?

The collected minute entries show that the court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment. The ruling says the motion provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief, but it does not describe the underlying covenant facts or the exact judgment terms.

Why was the case not sent to compulsory arbitration?

The April 21, 2021 minute entry says the parties filed conflicting arbitration certificates. The court ruled the case was not subject to arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) because the complaint sought injunctive relief.

Did the court analyze any HOA statute or CC&R provision?

No such analysis appears in the collected minute entries. The dispositive ruling grants an uncontested summary-judgment motion under Rule 7.1(b), but it does not quote or interpret a statute, declaration, or CC&R provision.

Why is this page marked standard rather than must-read?

The record confirms an HOA plaintiff and an injunctive-relief case, but the dispositive minute entry is short and procedural. It does not provide substantive analysis of Title 10, Title 33, or a recorded declaration, so it does not meet the must-read standard used for broader HOA-law guidance.

What happened with default judgment?

The April 12, 2021 minute entry did not enter default judgment. It said Judge Warner’s division would take no action on the default filing and explained that commissioners handle Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings once the required filings and paper packet are submitted.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This entry is mainly useful as a procedural example of an uncontested HOA summary-judgment ruling where the complaint sought injunctive relief.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2021-001880 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 3, 2021
Judge / panelHon. Randall H. Warner
PartiesVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe (Defendants)
Topics
ProcedureCovenantsCC&Rs
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association's uncontested motion for summary judgment under Rule 7.1(b) after finding the motion supplied a legal and factual basis for the requested relief, and it set a 30-day deadline to lodge a final judgment or obtain an extension before dismissal without prejudice.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package3 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap4 roadmap entries
Video overviewVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Safwat S. Aziz, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Safwat S. Aziz and Glenna L. Kincheloe in Maricopa County Superior Court. The available minute entries show the complaint sought injunctive relief, which made the case ineligible for compulsory arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). After the association moved for summary judgment and no response was filed, Judge Randall H. Warner granted the motion as uncontested under Rule 7.1(b), finding that the motion provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief. The collected entries end with the court warning that the matter would be dismissed without prejudice in 30 days unless a final judgment was lodged or the deadline was extended.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first resolved a procedural issue: because the complaint sought injunctive relief, the case was not subject to compulsory arbitration under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). That minute entry does not describe the underlying injunction request, but it confirms the case involved equitable relief rather than only a money claim.

The dispositive ruling turned on the association's June 17, 2021 motion for summary judgment. No response was filed, so the court treated the motion as uncontested and granted it summarily under Rule 7.1(b). Judge Warner also stated that he reviewed the motion and found it provided a legal and factual basis for the requested relief. The minute entry contains no substantive interpretation of an HOA statute or governing document, and the court left final-judgment lodging as the next step.

Why It Matters

This is a narrow procedural HOA case note. It shows that an association case seeking injunctive relief will not be routed to compulsory arbitration, and it illustrates the effect of failing to respond to a summary-judgment motion: the court may summarily grant the motion as uncontested if it finds a legal and factual basis for the requested relief.

The case is not a strong source for homeowner or board guidance on the merits because the collected ruling does not identify the covenant dispute or interpret any HOA statute or CC&R provision. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Assessment Dispute & Derivative Standing | A.R.S. §§ 10-3631, 10-3632 | CV2015-053962

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows three recurring limits on owner litigation against an association, its board, and its counsel. Individual board-member claims failed because board duties were owed to the association, not directly to the owner, and any claim on the association’s behalf had to satisfy Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes. Claims against association counsel failed because the lawyer owed duties to the association, not individual members. The remaining claims then failed on summary judgment because the court accepted the defendants’ reading of the CC&R annual-assessment provision.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 19, 2016 partial dismissal ruling, the March 31, 2016 fiduciary-duty dismissal ruling, the September 19, 2016 summary-judgment ruling, and the November 10, 2016 judgment entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the November 10, 2016 entry approving formal written judgment against Mullins; any later appellate or collection history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court drew a line between claims an HOA member may bring directly and claims that belong to the association. Duties of board members were owed to Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, so an owner could pursue those claims only derivatively and only by satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The association’s lawyer likewise owed duties to the association, not to individual members. After those claims were dismissed, the remaining contract-related claims failed because the court accepted the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs regarding the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff)
    Homeowner plaintiff who represented himself and brought claims against the association, board-member defendants, neighboring individuals, Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Respondent Side

  • The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. Some contract-related claims initially survived dismissal, but the association and other defendants later won summary judgment on the remaining claims.
  • Bill Stevens, Ira Rose, Steven Scholfield, Kay Lynne Jacobson, Tina Stevens, and Kathleen Baughman (Board-member defendants)
    Defendants described in the January 2016 ruling as board members; the court dismissed personal claims against them because their duties were owed to the association and any association claim had to be derivative.
  • Andrea Stevens (Defendant)
    Individual defendant listed in the caption and later included in the defendants entitled to seek fees or costs after summary judgment.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Association counsel)
    Attorney defendant. The court dismissed claims against her with prejudice, holding that an association lawyer has no duty to individual association members and generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct.
  • Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendant)
    Law-firm defendant whose claims were dismissed with prejudice along with Beth Mulcahy’s claims; the March 2016 ruling also denied Mullins’s sanctions request against the firm and Mulcahy.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association and several defendants in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the dismissal, summary-judgment, reconsideration, and judgment-related entries.

What happened

Wayne L. Mullins sued The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., several board-member defendants, other individuals, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The collected minute entries do not reproduce the full complaint, but the January 19, 2016 ruling identifies claims against board members, claims against association counsel, breach-of-contract claims against the association, statutory-violation counts, tort claims, unjust enrichment, and an extortion theory.

The first ruling substantially narrowed the case. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. held Mullins lacked standing to bring claims personally against the board-member defendants because their duties were owed to the association. A member could bring causes of action on behalf of the association only as derivative claims under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, and Mullins had not pleaded derivative claims or satisfied the statutory prerequisites. The court dismissed the claims against the board-member defendants on that basis.

The court also dismissed claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice. It held that the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual members of the association. It also stated that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct, and that no narrow exception was alleged. Several other counts were dismissed as well: statutory-violation counts seeking damages because the sole remedy was injunctive relief, an extortion count because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, emotional-distress and punitive-damages counts because the alleged facts were not outrageous enough, and aiding-and-abetting because no tort claim remained.

Some claims against the association initially survived. The January ruling allowed factually distinct breach-of-contract claims, an unjust-enrichment claim, and at first a fiduciary-duty count against the association because the association had not developed its argument. On March 31, 2016, however, the court granted a renewed motion to dismiss Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty and denied Mullins’s sanctions and reconsideration-related requests.

The dispositive ruling came on September 19, 2016. The court considered the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. That interpretation controlled both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation of the CC&Rs, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to the defendants.

Mullins moved for reconsideration and asked the court to rule on leave to amend his complaint. The court denied that motion on October 5, 2016. On November 10, 2016, the court approved and settled a formal written judgment against Mullins.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association (CV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Owner claims failed because board duties were derivative and the CC&Rs allowed the assessment increases. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-01-19 The court grants dismissal in part: board-member personal claims, Mulcahy claims, statutory damages counts, extortion, emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories are dismissed; selected contract-related claims against the association survive.
Step 2016-03-31 The court dismisses the fiduciary-duty count, denies sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denies reconsideration or extension relief from the January ruling.
Step 2016-09-19 The court grants defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supports defendants’ interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.
Step 2016-10-05 The court denies Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment ruling and to rule on leave to amend.
Step 2016-11-10 The court approves and enters formal written judgment against Mullins.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2016-01-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing claims against board-member defendants, dismissing claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice, dismissing several statutory and tort counts, and allowing specified contract-related claims against the association to proceed.

Download source file
2016-01-19_001_ruling.pdf
Source 2 2016-03-31

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty, denying sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denying reconsideration or extension relief from the January 19, 2016 order.

Download source file
2016-03-31_002_ruling.pdf
Source 3 2016-09-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting defendants summary judgment because the court agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Download source file
2016-09-19_003_ruling.pdf
Source 4 2016-10-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Wayne Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment order and to rule on his motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Download source file
2016-10-05_004_ruling.pdf
Source 5 2016-11-10

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling formal written judgment against plaintiff Wayne L. Mullins.

Download source file
2016-11-10_005_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Why were the claims against individual board members dismissed?

The court held Mullins lacked standing to bring those claims directly because the board members’ duties were owed to the association. If Mullins wanted to assert claims on the association’s behalf, he had to plead derivative claims and satisfy A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, which the court found he had not done.

Can an association member sue the association’s lawyer for duties owed to the HOA?

Not on the theory pleaded here. The court held that the association’s lawyer has no duty to individual members of the association, and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct absent a narrow exception not alleged in the complaint.

Which claims survived the first dismissal ruling?

The January 2016 ruling allowed selected breach-of-contract claims against the association, an unjust-enrichment claim, and initially a fiduciary-duty count because the association had not developed that argument. The fiduciary-duty count was later dismissed on March 31, 2016.

What did the summary-judgment ruling decide?

The court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation, the court held they failed as a matter of law.

Did the court award sanctions against Beth Mulcahy or the Mulcahy Law Firm?

No. The March 31, 2016 ruling denied Mullins’s request for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one court handled direct-versus-derivative owner claims, claims against association counsel, and CC&R annual-assessment interpretation at summary judgment.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 19, 2016
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesWayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., board-member defendants, Andrea Stevens, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 10-3631
  • A.R.S. § 10-3632
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the direct board-member and association-counsel claims, held that claims belonging to the association had to satisfy Arizona’s derivative-action statutes, and granted defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supported their interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewMullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Wayne L. Mullins sued Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, board-member defendants, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm over claims that included breach of contract, statutory violations, fiduciary duty, tort theories, unjust enrichment, and alleged attorney misconduct. The superior court dismissed direct personal claims against board members because their duties were owed to the association and any claim on the association’s behalf had to be derivative under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. It dismissed claims against association counsel with prejudice because an HOA lawyer owes duties to the association, not individual members. After narrowing the case, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates, making all remaining claims fail as a matter of law.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first separated direct owner claims from claims belonging to the association. Board members owed their duties to the association, not directly to Mullins, so Mullins could sue on the association’s behalf only through derivative claims satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The court found he had not pleaded derivative claims and, even if he had tried, the statutory prerequisites were not satisfied. It dismissed the board-member claims on that basis.

The same dismissal ruling rejected claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The court held the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual association members and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct. The ruling also dismissed statutory damages counts because the sole remedy for those alleged statutory violations was injunctive relief, dismissed extortion because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, and dismissed emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories.

After the fiduciary-duty count was dismissed in March 2016, the remaining claims turned on the CC&Rs. At summary judgment, the court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because every remaining claim depended on Mullins’s contrary reading, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law, granted summary judgment, denied reconsideration, and entered judgment against Mullins.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact roadmap for several limits on owner suits against an HOA ecosystem. Members generally cannot convert alleged wrongs to the association into direct claims against board members; if the claim belongs to the association, Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes matter. Likewise, association counsel represents the association, not each individual member, so claims against HOA lawyers require more than dissatisfaction with counsel’s work for the association.

The merits ruling also matters for assessment disputes. The court treated the CC&R text, not the owner’s contrary assessment theory, as dispositive. Once it accepted the defendants’ interpretation of the annual-assessment provision, all remaining claims failed together. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is useful reading for assessment, board-governance, and association-counsel disputes.

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Boles v. Tarrell: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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HOA Foreclosure, Sheriff’s Sale & Quiet Title | A.R.S. §§ 12-1802, 12-341.01 | CV2018-053929

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows the limits of trying to unwind an HOA-related foreclosure after a sheriff’s sale. The court refused to stop a later eviction action, then granted Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles did not prove any valid chain of title or right of possession, had notice of the sheriff’s sale, and lost any possible property interest when the sale occurred. A later fee ruling denied the association’s contract-fee request because the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, not the essential basis of Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the May 12, 2020 preliminary-injunction ruling, the October 9, 2020 summary-judgment ruling, the November 30, 2020 Rule 60 ruling, and the December 1, 2020 fee-and-cost ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the January 5, 2021 order denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate; any later appellate or enforcement history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court treated Boles’s title and possession theories as defeated by the recorded title chain, an earlier foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to challenge those events in time. It refused to enjoin Maricopoly’s separate eviction case under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1), then granted Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. The court also rejected Northern Manor’s contract-fee request: the CC&Rs were at most a factual predicate to Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure theories, not the essential basis of claims “arising out of contract” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sky Boles (Plaintiff)
    Claimant who sought title, possession, injunctive relief against an eviction proceeding, and later relief from summary judgment.
  • Mark W. Horne (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Boles in the 2020 injunction proceedings.

Respondent Side

  • Jason Tarrell (Defendant)
    Defendant from whom Boles claimed a title transfer; the court found Tarrell had testified he never transferred title to Boles and had provided an affidavit to the same effect.
  • Northern Manor Townhouse Association (Defendant / Intervenor)
    Homeowners association that intervened, sought summary judgment, opposed the title and possession claims, requested vexatious-litigant relief, and later sought attorney fees and costs.
  • Maricopoly, LLC (Defendant in consolidated action)
    Entity that bought the property at sheriff’s sale and pursued a separate eviction proceeding; the court found the sheriff’s sale was conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership.
  • Erik Wright (Defendant)
    Defendant referenced in the court’s title-chain analysis; the court found no deed from Wright to Tarrell to support Boles’s claims.
  • Kathryn A. Battock, Emily H. Mann, Joseph M. Hoffman, and Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
    Attorneys appearing for Northern Manor in the collected minute entries.
  • Mark Zinman (Counsel)
    Counsel for Maricopoly, LLC in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key 2020 injunction, summary-judgment, fee, and post-judgment rulings.
  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Judge who issued early 2018 service and voluntary-dismissal entries.

What happened

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others in 2018. Northern Manor Townhouse Association later appeared as an intervenor, and the case was eventually consolidated with Boles’s 2020 action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. The consolidated dispute centered on whether Boles had title, ownership, or possession rights in a Northern Manor property after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale.

The first major merits ruling came after a May 12, 2020 evidentiary hearing. Boles asked the court to preliminarily enjoin an eviction proceeding brought by Maricopoly against Tarrell and Boles. Judge Theodore Campagnolo denied the injunction. He ruled that A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) gave the court little discretion to stop an eviction case filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and that consolidating the later action with the 2018 quiet-title case did not change each action’s filing date or party rights.

The court also found Boles had not shown the injunction factors. Based on the title chain, the prior foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to timely challenge those events, the evidence showed Maricopoly had a legitimate claim of possession. The court found no substantial likelihood of success, no irreparable harm because the possible damages were monetary, hardships favoring Maricopoly, and public policy favoring speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

Northern Manor’s dispositive motion was first filed as a motion to dismiss, then converted to a summary-judgment motion because the association attached exhibits outside the pleadings. After several scheduling and filing-protocol entries, the court heard argument on October 9, 2020. Boles had notice but did not appear. The court found she had wholly failed to show any ownership, title, or right of possession. It specifically found there was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even if the purported Tarrell deed were genuine, Tarrell had not been shown to hold legal title that he could transfer.

The court granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly. It found no genuine issue of material fact, held that any ownership or possession right had been lost at the sheriff’s sale, found the sheriff’s sale conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership as bona fide purchaser, and held future claims by Boles about the property were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The court dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, barred further title or possession filings about the property, and denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation as unnecessary and procedurally confusing.

Post-judgment rulings followed. The court denied Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate because a nonlawyer could not appear for her, the medical note submitted did not establish excusable neglect, and Boles had not shown a meritorious claim. It denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because Boles’s claims did not arise out of contract: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, while the essential basis of the claims was Boles’s alleged title transfer from Tarrell. The association did recover $73.70 in taxable costs as the successful party.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Boles v. Tarrell (CV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Quiet-title claimant lost after a sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession rights. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Boles v. Tarrell. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-06-07 The court grants alternative service on Tarrell and signs an order granting Boles’s voluntary-dismissal motion as to unspecified defendants.
Step 2018-12-18 At a status conference, Northern Manor appears through counsel; the court denies Boles’s motion to serve by publication and continues the dismissal calendar.
Step 2020-04-13 The court consolidates CV2018-053929 with CV2020-051900 and sets proceedings on Boles’s injunction request.
Step 2020-04-29 The court converts Northern Manor’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion because exhibits outside the pleadings were attached.
Step 2020-05-12 After an evidentiary hearing, the court denies Boles’s application to preliminarily enjoin Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding.
Step 2020-10-09 The court grants Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment, dismisses the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashes the lis pendens, and bars further title or possession filings about the property.
Step 2020-11-30 The court denies Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate and denies her Rule 62 stay request as moot.
Step 2020-12-01 The court denies Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 but awards $73.70 in taxable costs.
Step 2021-01-05 The court denies Boles’s renewed motion to vacate for the reasons stated in the December 2020 minute entry.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 39 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2018-06-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-06-07_001_ruling.pdf
Source 2 2018-06-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-06-07_002_minute-entry.pdf
Source 3 2018-08-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-08-07_003_minute-entry.pdf
Source 4 2018-09-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-09-13_004_minute-entry.pdf
Source 5 2018-09-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-09-26_005_minute-entry.pdf
Source 6 2018-09-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-09-28_006_minute-entry.pdf
Source 7 2018-10-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-10-24_007_minute-entry.pdf
Source 8 2018-12-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2018-12-17_008_status-conference.pdf
Source 9 2018-12-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2018-12-18_009_status-conference.pdf
Source 10 2019-02-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2019-02-06_010_minute-entry.pdf
Source 11 2019-03-20

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file
2019-03-20_011_default-judgment.pdf
Source 12 2019-07-17

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file
2019-07-17_012_default-judgment.pdf
Source 13 2020-04-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-04-13_013_minute-entry.pdf
Source 14 2020-04-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-04-21_014_minute-entry.pdf
Source 15 2020-04-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling converting Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion because the association attached exhibits outside the pleadings.

Download source file
2020-04-29_015_ruling.pdf
Source 16 2020-04-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling again converting Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion and setting a hearing-management path for pertinent materials.

Download source file
2020-04-29_016_ruling.pdf
Source 17 2020-05-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Sky Boles’s application for a preliminary injunction to stop Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding and denying reconsideration under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1).

Download source file
2020-05-12_017_ruling.pdf
Source 18 2020-05-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-05-14_018_minute-entry.pdf
Source 19 2020-05-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-05-18_019_minute-entry.pdf
Source 20 2020-05-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-05-19_020_minute-entry.pdf
Source 21 2020-06-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-06-03_021_minute-entry.pdf
Source 22 2020-06-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion to declare Sky Boles a vexatious litigant because A.R.S. § 12-3201(C) applies only to self-represented litigants and Boles was then represented by counsel.

Download source file
2020-06-04_022_ruling.pdf
Source 23 2020-06-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-06-09_023_minute-entry.pdf
Source 24 2020-06-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law and request for entry of order in connection with the preliminary-injunction hearing.

Download source file
2020-06-12_024_ruling.pdf
Source 25 2020-06-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-06-12_025_minute-entry.pdf
Source 26 2020-06-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-06-17_026_minute-entry.pdf
Source 27 2020-06-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s reconsideration motion without prejudice to re-urge it after the court ruled on the pending summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
2020-06-30_027_ruling.pdf
Source 28 2020-08-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-08-06_028_minute-entry.pdf
Source 29 2020-08-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-08-13_029_minute-entry.pdf
Source 30 2020-08-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly’s request for a telephonic hearing regarding attorney Mark Horne as moot.

Download source file
2020-08-13_030_ruling.pdf
Source 31 2020-08-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-08-14_031_minute-entry.pdf
Source 32 2020-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-08-20_032_minute-entry.pdf
Source 33 2020-08-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-08-21_033_minute-entry.pdf
Source 34 2020-10-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting summary judgment to Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly, dismissing the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashing Boles’s lis pendens, and barring further title or possession filings about the property.

Download source file
2020-10-09_034_ruling.pdf
Source 35 2020-11-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motions to vacate summary judgment and denying her Rule 62 stay request as moot.

Download source file
2020-11-30_035_ruling.pdf
Source 36 2020-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 but awarding the association $73.70 in taxable costs.

Download source file
2020-12-01_036_ruling.pdf
Source 37 2020-12-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Northern Manor Townhouse Association’s motion for reconsideration on its request to declare Boles a vexatious litigant.

Download source file
2020-12-02_037_ruling.pdf
Source 38 2020-12-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2020-12-03_038_minute-entry.pdf
Source 39 2021-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate for the reasons stated in the court’s December 2020 minute entry.

Download source file
2021-01-05_039_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Why did the court refuse to stop the eviction case?

The eviction action was filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) generally precluded the requested injunction. It also found Boles had not shown likelihood of success, irreparable harm, favorable hardship balancing, or public policy supporting an injunction.

Why did Northern Manor and Maricopoly win summary judgment?

The court found Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell-to-Boles deed would not help if Tarrell lacked title to transfer. The sheriff’s sale then cut off any possible ownership or possession rights and made Maricopoly the bona fide purchaser.

Did the court declare Boles a vexatious litigant?

No. The court denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation. It reasoned that Boles’s repeated filings concerned this property, and the court had already barred future filings claiming title, ownership, or possession about the property, so a broader A.R.S. § 12-3201 order would add procedural confusion.

Why were Northern Manor’s attorney fees denied?

Northern Manor sought fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which applies to actions arising out of contract. The court held Boles’s claims did not arise out of a contract with the association. The CC&Rs were only a factual predicate; the essential basis was Boles’s alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. The association did receive taxable costs.

What happened to Boles’s motion to vacate?

The court denied it. A nonlawyer had filed the motions for Boles, the submitted note did not establish excusable neglect for missing the summary-judgment argument, and Boles did not show a meritorious claim as required for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

Is this decision binding on other HOA foreclosure disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful for understanding how one court handled title-chain proof, sheriff’s-sale consequences, eviction-injunction limits, and contract-fee requests after an HOA-related foreclosure.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 9, 2020
Judge / panelHon. Theodore Campagnolo, Hon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesSky Boles (Plaintiff) v. Jason Tarrell, Northern Manor Townhouse Association, Erik Wright, and Maricopoly, LLC through consolidated proceedings (Defendants or Intervenor)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-1802
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
ForeclosureLiensCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court denied Boles’s request to enjoin a related eviction proceeding, granted summary judgment to Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly because Boles failed to prove title or possession rights after the sheriff’s sale, dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, and later denied Northern Manor attorney fees while awarding taxable costs.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package39 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewBoles v. Tarrell
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others, and Northern Manor Townhouse Association intervened in litigation later consolidated with Boles’s action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. Boles sought to stop Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding and claimed ownership, title, or possession rights after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale. The court denied the preliminary injunction under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) and the traditional injunction factors, then granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly because Boles did not prove a valid chain of title, any right of possession was lost through the sheriff’s sale, and Maricopoly was the bona fide purchaser. It later denied Boles Rule 60 relief, denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because the claims did not arise out of contract, and awarded the association $73.70 in taxable costs.

Key Issues & Findings

On the preliminary-injunction request, the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) left little discretion to enjoin an eviction action filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction case. Consolidation with the older 2018 quiet-title action did not change filing dates or party rights. The court also found Boles failed the injunction factors: Maricopoly had a legitimate possession claim based on the title chain, foreclosure action, and sheriff’s sale; monetary damages would not be irreparable harm; hardships favored allowing the eviction case to proceed; and public policy favored speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

On summary judgment, the court found Boles had wholly failed to show ownership, title, or possession. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn that he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell deed would not establish Boles’s title if Tarrell had no legal title to convey. The court found no genuine issue of material fact, held that the sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession interest, and treated the sale as conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title as bona fide purchaser.

The court denied broader vexatious-litigant relief but barred future filings by Boles claiming title, ownership, or possession of the property. It then denied Rule 60(b)(1) relief because Boles did not prove excusable neglect or a meritorious claim. On fees, the court held A.R.S. § 12-341.01 did not apply because Boles’s claims were not essentially contract claims: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, and the core dispute was her alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. Northern Manor recovered taxable costs as the successful party.

Why It Matters

This case is a practical example of how difficult it is to use a later quiet-title or injunction case to stop an eviction after an HOA-related foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The court separated possession in the eviction case from title claims in the civil action, then held that Boles’s chain-of-title proof failed and that the sheriff’s sale cut off any title or possession claim.

The fee ruling is also useful. Even though CC&Rs may be contractual between an association and an owner, the court would not award contract fees where the plaintiff was not claiming under a contract with the association and the essential basis of the case was title and wrongful foreclosure. The result was summary judgment and taxable costs for the association, but no attorney-fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Blakley v. Parker: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on by

Contractual Enforcement Duties | Fees & Costs | CV2023-014388

The superior court resolved all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association through summary-judgment rulings after oral argument, then entered judgment awarding the association fees and costs. The written fee ruling matters because it held that the homeowner’s claims against the association arose out of contract for A.R.S. § 12-341.01 purposes, even though CC&R 5.15 itself did not authorize fees when the association was defending rather than bringing an enforcement action.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-014388.

Download ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-06-01. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-014388) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the February 27, 2026 oral-argument ruling and the June 1, 2026 judgment-and-fee entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries show that all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III were resolved and judgment was entered for that association, while scheduling continued as to remaining parties. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

When a homeowner sues an association for allegedly failing to perform contractual enforcement duties, the association may be able to recover fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 if it prevails, even if the CC&R fee clause itself is limited to offensive enforcement actions by the association. Here, the court granted Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on all claims against it, then awarded fees and costs under § 12-341.01 while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as a standalone basis for fees.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Shawn Blakley (Plaintiff)
    Plaintiff represented by Sean Woods. The later fee ruling describes his claims against the association as alleging failure to fulfill contractual enforcement duties.
  • Sean Woods (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Plaintiff Shawn Blakley in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Roosevelt G. Parker (Defendant)
    Individual defendant represented by J. Gary Linder.
  • Patricia L. Parker (Defendant)
    Individual defendant represented by J. Gary Linder.
  • Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant that obtained summary judgment on all claims against it and later received an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
  • J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Roosevelt G. Parker and Patricia L. Parker.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association and affiant supporting the association's fee application.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned during the scheduling and amended-complaint phase.
  • Joseph Kreamer (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the association's summary-judgment motions and entered the fee-and-cost judgment.

What happened

Shawn Blakley filed suit against Roosevelt Grover Parker, Patricia L. Parker, and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint or identify the property-level facts, but the June 2026 fee ruling describes the claims against the association as claims that it failed to fulfill contractual enforcement duties rather than claims that it committed the underlying alleged torts.

The early minute entries are mostly procedural. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. entered trial-scheduling orders, reset scheduling conferences after stipulations to extend deadlines, and in November 2024 allowed Blakley to file and serve a First Amended Complaint. The case later moved before Judge Joseph Kreamer.

The association filed a June 17, 2025 motion for partial summary judgment. The Parkers joined that motion in July 2025, and the association later filed an October 27, 2025 motion for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint. Several entries reset oral argument on those motions before the court heard argument on February 27, 2026.

At the February 27, 2026 oral argument, the court granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts II and IV, denied the Parkers’ joinder in that motion as to Counts II and IV, and granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s summary-judgment motion as to Counts V and VI. The minute entry states that those rulings resolved all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III.

The association then sought attorneys’ fees and costs. On June 1, 2026, Judge Kreamer rejected CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because, on its face, it applied only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action. The court nevertheless held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported a fee award because, regardless of claim labels, Blakley sued the association for allegedly failing to fulfill contractual enforcement duties. The court found the claims intertwined, applied Associated Indemnity and China Doll, made a limited fee reduction, and entered judgment awarding the association fees and costs.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al. (CV2023-014388 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA won all claims and fees under § 12-341.01 for alleged contractual enforcement-duty failures. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-04-01 The court enters trial-scheduling and pretrial-practice orders.
Step 2024-11-22 By stipulation, the court allows Plaintiff to file and serve the First Amended Complaint.
Step 2025-06-17 Litchfield Vista Views III files the motion for partial summary judgment later heard by the court.
Step 2025-10-27 Litchfield Vista Views III files a summary-judgment motion on Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint.
Step 2026-02-27 After oral argument, the court grants Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on the association-targeted counts and states that all claims against the association are resolved.
Step 2026-03-09 The association files its application for attorneys' fees and costs.
Step 2026-06-01 The court grants the association fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, rejects CC&R 5.15 as an independent fee basis, and enters judgment for the association.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 12 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2024-04-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2024-04-01_001_minute-entry.pdf
Source 2 2024-11-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2024-11-19_002_minute-entry.pdf
Source 3 2024-11-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2024-11-22_003_minute-entry.pdf
Source 4 2025-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2025-03-06_004_minute-entry.pdf
Source 5 2025-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2025-05-15_005_minute-entry.pdf
Source 6 2025-08-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2025-08-15_006_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 7 2025-10-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2025-10-14_007_minute-entry.pdf
Source 8 2025-11-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2025-11-19_008_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 9 2026-01-13

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2026-01-13_009_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 10 2026-02-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2026-02-12_010_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 11 2026-02-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling after oral argument granting Litchfield Vista Views III partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, resolving all claims against the association.

Download source file
2026-02-27_011_ruling.pdf
Source 12 2026-06-01

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry granting Litchfield Vista Views III attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because it applies only to offensive enforcement actions by the association.

Download source file
2026-06-01_012_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Who won the association part of the case?

Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association won the claims against it. The February 27, 2026 minute entry says the court granted the association partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV, granted summary judgment on Counts V and VI, and that this resolved all claims against the association.

What did the court say the claims against the HOA were about?

The June 1, 2026 fee ruling says that, regardless of how the claims were labeled, Plaintiff sued the association for allegedly failing to fulfill contractual enforcement duties, not for committing the alleged underlying torts.

Did the CC&Rs themselves authorize the fee award?

Not under the clause the association cited. The court held that CC&R 5.15 did not provide a basis for fees because, on its face, it applies only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action.

Why did the association still receive fees?

The court held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported the award because the claims against the association arose out of contract. It also found the claims intertwined, that the Associated Indemnity factors supported fees, and that the submitted billing materials were sufficient under China Doll.

Did the individual homeowner defendants also win summary judgment on the same HOA counts?

Not through the association’s motion. The February 27, 2026 minute entry denied Roosevelt and Patricia Parker’s joinder in the association’s partial summary-judgment motion as to Counts II and IV, while granting the association’s motions.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA cases?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful as an example of how a court may separate a CC&R fee clause from A.R.S. § 12-341.01 when a homeowner’s claims against an association are contractual in substance.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2023-014388 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 27, 2026
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr., Hon. Joseph Kreamer
PartiesShawn Blakley (Plaintiff) v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, Patricia L. Parker, and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
CC&RsCovenantsAttorney FeesSelective Enforcement
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Litchfield Vista Views III summary judgment on all claims against it and later awarded the association attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, holding that the plaintiff's claims against the association arose out of alleged contractual enforcement duties even though CC&R 5.15 did not itself authorize fees for a defensive win.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewShawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Shawn Blakley sued individual homeowners and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association. The collected minute entries do not reproduce the complaint, but the court later described the claims against the association as alleging failure to fulfill contractual enforcement duties. After oral argument, Judge Joseph Kreamer granted the association partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, resolving all claims against the association. The court later entered judgment awarding the association attorneys' fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, while rejecting CC&R 5.15 as an independent fee basis because it applied only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action.

Key Issues & Findings

The merits minute entry is limited because the court stated that its reasons were set forth on the oral-argument record. The written order confirms the result: Litchfield Vista Views III obtained partial summary judgment on Counts II and IV and summary judgment on Counts V and VI, and those rulings resolved all claims against the association. The Parkers' joinder in the association's partial summary-judgment motion was denied as to Counts II and IV.

The later fee ruling supplies the most detailed written reasoning. Judge Kreamer first rejected CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because, on its face, that provision applies only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action. The court then held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported fees because the plaintiff's claims, however labeled, accused the association of failing to perform contractual enforcement duties rather than committing the alleged underlying torts.

Applying Associated Indemnity and China Doll, the court found the claims against the association arose out of contract and were intertwined, making apportionment unnecessary; the discretionary factors supported fees; the association's materials were sufficient; and most fees and all costs were reasonable, subject to a limited reduction before judgment entered.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for the fee question that often follows failed enforcement-duty claims against an HOA. A CC&R fee clause may be too narrow if it applies only when the association sues to enforce the documents, but A.R.S. § 12-341.01 can still support a fee award when a homeowner's claims against the association are contractual in substance.

The case is less useful on the merits of association enforcement duties because the summary-judgment minute entry does not reproduce the court's oral reasoning or the factual record behind Counts II, IV, V, and VI. As a superior-court case, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Assessment Liens & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | CV2012-094261

In this Maricopa County Superior Court assessment-lien case, the court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) does not let an escrow agent extinguish an HOA lien merely by requesting a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction. Later, the same court denied the association summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), rejecting the association’s argument that a foreclosure claim survives once filed even after the delinquent assessments themselves have been paid. The fee ruling treated the case in four parts: the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and the dismissed CC&R-violation claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2015-06-09. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 12, 2014 ruling on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory, the November 24, 2014 ruling on the association’s foreclosure motion, the March 11, 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 9, 2015 fee ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 9, 2015 fee ruling, which continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first; any later docket activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court read A.R.S. § 33-1807 in two different lien contexts. First, it rejected Forange’s argument that an HOA lien disappeared because an escrow agent requested a payoff statement and the association did not respond within ten days: the court held the escrow-agent penalty in § 33-1807(I) is meant to facilitate actual sale, transfer, lease, or other escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a freestanding power to make liens disappear. Second, when the association later sought summary judgment on foreclosure, the court denied it under § 33-1807(A) because late fees and attorney fees do not count toward the foreclosure threshold and the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case later ended through a stipulation that found for defendants on foreclosure and through a fee ruling awarding Forange costs and $18,000 in fees while denying the association’s fee applications.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Homeowners association that sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations; the court later found it succeeded on the unpaid-assessment claim and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, but not on lien foreclosure.
  • Lindsey O. Stearns (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in later minute entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint; the August 2014 ruling granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.
  • Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in multiple caption entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint.
  • Javier Delgado (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney defendant named by Forange in the consolidated action, according to the August 2014 ruling.
  • Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
    Attorney who filed the April 2015 motion for attorney fees on behalf of the association.

Respondent Side

  • 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant)
    Entity defendant in the association’s action; its answer was struck in December 2012 because a nonlawyer could not represent the LLC.
  • Forange, LLC (Defendant / Plaintiff in consolidated action)
    Entity that filed the consolidated action against the association and its attorneys, arguing that an escrow-agent payoff request extinguished the association lien under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I); it lost that claim but later prevailed on the association’s foreclosure claim and received fees and costs.
  • Michael D. Ripson (Defendant / LLC member)
    Individual listed as a defendant and as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC in the early order-to-show-cause minute entry.
  • Scottsdale Community Association (Defendant)
    Entity listed as a defendant in the association’s action; the collected minute entries do not show a merits ruling against it.
  • Citibank South Dakota N.A. (Defendant)
    Lienholder defendant listed in the caption; the collected minute entries do not show a substantive ruling about it.
  • Johnson Bank (Defendant (dismissed))
    Defendant dismissed with prejudice in August 2014 after no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.
  • Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for 4AAR Holdings, LLC and Forange, LLC in the later minute entries and fee applications.
  • Andrew J. Van Loon (Counsel)
    Attorney listed in several caption entries for the defense side before the later fee ruling noted that the court declined to award Forange fees incurred while represented by Van Loon.

Neutral Parties

  • Emmet J. Ronan (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled early order-to-show-cause and LLC-representation rulings.
  • Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key August 2014 payoff-statement ruling, the November 2014 foreclosure ruling, the March 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 2015 fee ruling.
  • Ruth H. Hilliard (Judge)
    Judge who signed the March 2013 consolidation order for Judge Ronan.

What happened

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued 4AAR Holdings, LLC and others in Maricopa County Superior Court over a planned-community assessment lien. The early minutes show an order-to-show-cause hearing where Michael Ripson appeared as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC, followed by a December 2012 ruling striking the LLC’s answer because a corporation or LLC cannot appear in court through a nonlawyer. In March 2013, the court consolidated this action with CV2012-018064, the related case brought by Forange, LLC against the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns.

Forange’s consolidated complaint turned on a payoff-statement theory. The August 12, 2014 ruling says Forange moved for partial summary judgment on its claims, while the association and its attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. The court identified the undisputed facts this way: A.R.S. § 33-1807 creates an HOA lien for unpaid assessments; subsection I requires an association to furnish a payoff statement within ten days after a request from a unit owner, lienholder, or escrow agent; and the special penalty for failure to answer an escrow-agent request is extinguishment of the lien. Here, an escrow agent asked for a payoff statement, but the request was not made in the context of any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction.

Judge Aceto rejected Forange’s statutory theory. The ruling framed the issue as whether § 33-1807(I) gives escrow agents a special power to make liens disappear simply because they are escrow agents, or whether the penalty provision is meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions by requiring prompt payoff responses. Applying a rational-interpretation approach, the court held the penalty provision was directed at real pending transactions. It denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

The association then moved for partial summary judgment on its own foreclosure claim. On November 24, 2014, the court denied that motion. The ruling noted that A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) allows foreclosure only if the owner “has been” delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count when deciding whether the right to foreclose exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that a homeowner cannot avoid foreclosure once the complaint has been filed. The court expressly left open the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments.

A March 11, 2015 ruling accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacated the scheduled trial, and found for defendants on Count I to the extent it sought foreclosure on the property. The June 9, 2015 fee ruling divided the consolidated case into four parts: the association’s unpaid-assessment claim, the association’s lien-foreclosure claim, the association’s CC&R-violation allegations, and Forange’s groundless-document claims. The court found the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations.

The fee ruling made Forange the prevailing party overall. It awarded Forange $994.05 in taxable costs, denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and awarded Forange $18,000 in attorney fees under § 12-341.01 to mitigate the expense of establishing just defenses. The last collected entry continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC (CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Escrow payoff requests do not erase HOA liens absent a real transaction; paid assessments defeated foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2012-09-12 At an order-to-show-cause hearing, the court gives 4AAR Holdings, LLC until October 12, 2012 to obtain counsel.
Step 2012-12-12 The court strikes 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because a nonlawyer cannot represent the LLC in court.
Step 2013-03-01 The court consolidates CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064.
Step 2013-08-26 The court denies the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions, finding there was no enforceable settlement.
Step 2014-08-12 The court denies Forange partial summary judgment and grants the association and its attorneys summary judgment on Forange’s A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory.
Step 2014-11-24 The court denies the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), while leaving monetary claims for penalties and fees unresolved.
Step 2014-11-24 The court separately denies the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Step 2015-03-11 The court accepts the parties’ dismissal stipulation, vacates trial, and finds for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim.
Step 2015-06-09 The court awards Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denies the association’s fee requests, and continues the case on the dismissal calendar.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 35 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2012-09-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2012-09-12_001_minute-entry.pdf
Source 2 2012-12-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling striking 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because Michael Ripson could not represent the LLC and no attorney had appeared for it.

Download source file
2012-12-12_002_ruling.pdf
Source 3 2013-01-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-01-09_003_minute-entry.pdf
Source 4 2013-03-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling consolidating CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064 on the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate.

Download source file
2013-03-01_004_ruling.pdf
Source 5 2013-03-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-03-20_005_ruling.pdf
Source 6 2013-07-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-07-05_006_minute-entry.pdf
Source 7 2013-08-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ July 2013 stipulation and ordering the association’s application for default judgment due by August 23, 2013.

Download source file
2013-08-07_007_ruling.pdf
Source 8 2013-08-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions because there was no enforceable settlement.

Download source file
2013-08-26_008_ruling.pdf
Source 9 2013-08-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-08-26_009_minute-entry.pdf
Source 10 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-10-31_010_minute-entry.pdf
Source 11 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-10-31_011_minute-entry.pdf
Source 12 2013-12-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-12-17_012_ruling.pdf
Source 13 2014-05-09

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file
2014-05-09_013_default-judgment.pdf
Source 14 2014-08-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing with prejudice any remaining unadjudicated claims against Johnson Bank because no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.

Download source file
2014-08-11_014_ruling.pdf
Source 15 2014-08-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granting summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment claims under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I).

Download source file
2014-08-12_015_ruling.pdf
Source 16 2014-08-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling clarifying that attorney-fee requests from the summary-judgment motions would be decided after all claims in the consolidated case were resolved.

Download source file
2014-08-21_016_ruling.pdf
Source 17 2014-08-22

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2014-08-22_017_status-conference.pdf
Source 18 2014-09-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2014-09-18_018_status-conference.pdf
Source 19 2014-10-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s request for an evidentiary hearing and sanctions and allowing the association to respond to its motion to quash.

Download source file
2014-10-17_019_ruling.pdf
Source 20 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange leave to submit a late cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Count 1 lien foreclosure after the dispositive-motion deadline.

Download source file
2014-11-04_020_ruling.pdf
Source 21 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado and Bolen’s motion to quash for the reasons argued by the movant.

Download source file
2014-11-04_021_ruling.pdf
Source 22 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2014-11-24_022_ruling.pdf
Source 23 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure because A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) did not allow foreclosure after the delinquent assessment amount had been paid.

Download source file
2014-11-24_023_ruling.pdf
Source 24 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Download source file
2014-11-24_024_ruling.pdf
Source 25 2014-12-16

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2014-12-16_025_status-conference.pdf
Source 26 2015-01-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-01-20_026_minute-entry.pdf
Source 27 2015-02-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-02-20_027_minute-entry.pdf
Source 28 2015-03-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2015-03-05_028_status-conference.pdf
Source 29 2015-03-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-03-09_029_ruling.pdf
Source 30 2015-03-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacating trial, finding for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim, and setting a fee-application deadline.

Download source file
2015-03-11_030_ruling.pdf
Source 31 2015-03-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2015-03-11_031_status-conference.pdf
Source 32 2015-03-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-03-25_032_ruling.pdf
Source 33 2015-04-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-04-27_033_ruling.pdf
Source 34 2015-05-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-05-07_034_ruling.pdf
Source 35 2015-06-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling awarding Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denying the association’s fee requests, and continuing the case on the dismissal calendar.

Download source file
2015-06-09_035_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Did the escrow-agent payoff request extinguish the HOA lien?

No. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent penalty was intended to facilitate actual pending escrow transactions. Because the escrow agent’s request was not connected to a pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, the request did not extinguish the association’s lien.

Why did the association win the August 2014 summary-judgment ruling?

Forange’s theory depended on treating any escrow-agent payoff request as enough to erase the lien if the association did not respond within ten days. The court rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

Why did the association lose its later foreclosure motion?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) to look only at the delinquent assessment amount when deciding whether foreclosure is available. Late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be part of a lien, but they do not count toward the foreclosure threshold. Because the delinquent assessments had been paid, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure.

Did the ruling eliminate all claims by the association?

No. The November 2014 foreclosure ruling expressly said it was not suggesting the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments was not viable. The June 2015 fee ruling later found the association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange paid the previously unpaid assessments in July 2013.

Who received attorney fees at the end?

Forange did. The court treated the consolidated case as mixed, found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Is this decision binding in other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one Arizona superior-court judge interpreted the escrow-payoff and foreclosure portions of A.R.S. § 33-1807 in a planned-community assessment-lien dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 12, 2014
Judge / panelHon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Emmet J. Ronan, Hon. Ruth H. Hilliard
PartiesTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff; defendant in consolidated action) v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, Forange, LLC, Michael D. Ripson, Scottsdale Community Association, Citibank South Dakota N.A., and Johnson Bank (Defendants or related parties); Forange, LLC also sued the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns in the consolidated action.
Governing law
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) did not extinguish an HOA assessment lien when an escrow agent requested a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction, so Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion was denied and summary judgment was granted to the association and its attorneys. The court later denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because foreclosure eligibility depends on the unpaid assessment amount, excluding late fees and attorney fees, and the delinquent assessments had been paid.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package35 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations, while the consolidated Forange action attacked the association lien and its attorneys based on an escrow-agent payoff request under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). In August 2014, Judge Mark F. Aceto held that § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent payoff-statement penalty applies to actual pending escrow transactions, not to a request made outside any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s lien-extinguishment claims. In November 2014, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), holding that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count toward foreclosure eligibility and that the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case ended through a dismissal stipulation and a fee ruling that awarded Forange taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees while denying the association’s fee requests.

Key Issues & Findings

On the payoff-statement claim, the court focused on the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). The statute requires associations to furnish payoff statements within ten days after requests from specified actors and creates a lien-extinguishment penalty for an unanswered request by an escrow agent. But the court found the undisputed escrow request here was not made in connection with any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction. Reading the statute rationally and in light of the policy behind it, the court concluded the penalty provision was meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a special power to erase HOA liens whenever someone asks them to request payoff information.

On the association’s foreclosure motion, the court applied A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) differently. It noted that foreclosure is available only if the owner has been delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be included in the lien but are excluded when deciding whether the foreclosure right exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that filing a foreclosure complaint locks in the right to foreclose regardless of later payment.

The fee ruling treated the consolidated case as mixed. The association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange ultimately paid the overdue assessments, and it also defeated Forange’s groundless-document claims. Forange prevailed on the lien-foreclosure issue and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations. Weighing those results, the court found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee applications.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it cuts in both directions on HOA assessment liens. It rejects a payoff-request strategy aimed at extinguishing an HOA lien through an escrow agent when there is no real pending escrow transaction, making the statutory penalty in A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) depend on the transaction context.

At the same time, it gives homeowners and associations a concrete reading of § 33-1807(A): for foreclosure eligibility, the court counted only delinquent assessments, not late fees, collection charges, or attorney fees. Once the delinquent assessments were paid, the association still could pursue monetary penalties and fees, but it did not receive summary judgment authorizing foreclosure. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but the reasoning addresses recurring assessment-lien and payoff-statement disputes.

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Tanglewood HOA v. Goode: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on by

Unopposed Summary Judgment | Redemption Period | CV2014-094502

This is a thin-record Maricopa County Superior Court HOA case. The collected minutes show scheduling orders, an unopposed summary-judgment ruling for Tanglewood HOA, and a later application to prevent waste before expiration of a redemption period. They do not provide the complaint, the requested judgment language, the amount at issue, or a written analysis of any HOA statute or CC&R provision, so this guide sticks to the procedural facts that appear in the minute entries.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Tanglewood HOA v. James E. Goode, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094502.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2017-09-01. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Tanglewood HOA v. James E. Goode (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094502) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 25, 2016 ruling granting the HOA’s unopposed summary-judgment motion and the September 1, 2017 order on the HOA’s redemption-period waste application; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the September 1, 2017 order requiring a response to the application to prevent waste; the collected records do not include the proposed judgment, any final signed judgment, or any later ruling on that application. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court granted Tanglewood HOA summary judgment after the homeowner filed no response. The ruling relied on Rule 7.1(b), treated the unexplained nonresponse as consent to granting the motion, and separately stated that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law. Because the collected minute entry does not identify the claim details or analyze an HOA statute or CC&R provision, the case is best read as a procedural example of unopposed summary judgment in a thin-record HOA matter, not as a substantive HOA-law ruling.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tanglewood HOA (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that obtained the January 2016 unopposed summary-judgment ruling and later filed an application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.
  • James Portman Webster (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the 2015 scheduling and trial-setting minute entries.
  • Lashawn D. Jenkins (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the September 2017 order on the application to prevent waste.

Respondent Side

  • James E. Goode (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant who appeared on his own behalf at the November 2015 status conference and did not file a response to the HOA’s summary-judgment motion by the time the January 2016 ruling issued.

Neutral Parties

  • Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the May 2015 scheduling order before reassignment.
  • Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who set the bench trial and later granted the HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment.
  • Joshua D. Rogers (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the September 2017 order requiring a response to the HOA’s application to prevent waste.

What happened

Tanglewood HOA sued James E. Goode in Maricopa County Superior Court. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint, the amount sought, or the specific covenants or statutes relied on. The May 19, 2015 scheduling order set discovery, disclosure, settlement-conference, dispositive-motion, and status-conference deadlines, and removed the case from the dismissal calendar.

At a November 23, 2015 telephonic status conference, counsel James Portman Webster appeared for the HOA and Goode appeared for himself. The court set a two-hour bench trial for March 3, 2016 and ordered a joint pretrial statement by February 25, 2016. The same minute entry also corrected Goode’s address in the court system; this public guide omits the address under the project’s privacy rule.

Before trial, the HOA moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 2016, Judge Robert H. Oberbillig ruled that Goode had failed to respond to the motion in any manner and that the response deadline under Rule 7.1(a) had expired. Citing Rule 7.1(b), the court found the unexplained inaction should be deemed consent to granting the motion.

The ruling did not stop at the nonresponse. It also stated that the HOA’s motion and the record established that Tanglewood HOA was entitled as a matter of law to the relief it sought. The court granted the summary-judgment motion, ordered the HOA’s counsel to submit an appropriate form of judgment and any fee-and-cost application by February 15, 2016, and vacated the March 2016 bench trial.

The last collected minute entry is from September 1, 2017. It says the court had before it Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste prior to expiration of the redemption period. Judge Joshua D. Rogers ordered Goode to respond by September 11, 2017 and warned that if no response was filed, the application would be granted. The collected records do not show the final judgment terms or the final outcome of that application.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Tanglewood HOA v. Goode (CV2014-094502 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Unopposed HOA summary judgment entered; later order addressed redemption-period waste. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Tanglewood HOA v. Goode. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-05-19 The court enters a scheduling order, sets discovery and motion deadlines, requires settlement efforts, and removes the case from the dismissal calendar.
Step 2015-11-23 At a telephonic status conference, the HOA appears through counsel and Goode appears pro per; the court sets a two-hour bench trial for March 3, 2016.
Step 2016-01-25 The court grants Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, orders a proposed judgment and any fee application, and vacates trial.
Step 2017-09-01 The court orders Goode to respond to Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period, warning that the application will be granted if no response is filed.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 4 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2015-05-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-05-19_001_minute-entry.pdf
Source 2 2015-11-23

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2015-11-23_002_status-conference.pdf
Source 3 2016-01-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, ordering counsel to submit a proposed judgment and fee application, and vacating the scheduled bench trial.

Download source file
2016-01-25_003_ruling.pdf
Source 4 2017-09-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order requiring James E. Goode to respond to Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period or have the application granted.

Download source file
2017-09-01_004_ruling.pdf

FAQ

What did the court decide in the summary-judgment ruling?

The court granted Tanglewood HOA’s motion for summary judgment. It found that Goode had not responded by the Rule 7.1 deadline, treated that unexplained inaction as consent under Rule 7.1(b), and also stated that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law.

Does the minute entry explain the underlying HOA dispute?

No. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint, the requested judgment terms, any assessment amount, or the CC&R provisions at issue. This page therefore does not add unsourced detail about the underlying claim.

Why is this still treated as an HOA case?

The named plaintiff is Tanglewood HOA, and the last collected order refers to an application to prevent waste before expiration of a redemption period. Those facts indicate an HOA enforcement or foreclosure posture, even though the written minutes do not provide the full claim details.

Was there a trial?

No trial appears in the collected records. The court set a bench trial for March 3, 2016, then vacated that trial after granting the HOA summary judgment on January 25, 2016.

What happened after the summary-judgment ruling?

The January 2016 ruling ordered the HOA’s counsel to submit a proposed judgment and any fee-and-cost application. The collected minutes do not include that judgment, but a September 2017 order later required Goode to respond to the HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.

Is this ruling precedent for other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This thin-record case is most useful as a procedural example: an unopposed summary-judgment motion can still require the court to determine that the moving party is entitled to judgment on the record.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2014-094502 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJanuary 25, 2016
Judge / panelHon. Robert H. Oberbillig, Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Joshua D. Rogers
PartiesTanglewood HOA (Plaintiff) v. James E. Goode (Defendant)
Topics
ProcedureForeclosureCC&RsLiens
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, finding that the homeowner’s failure to respond should be deemed consent under Rule 7.1(b) and that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package4 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap4 roadmap entries
Video overviewTanglewood HOA v. Goode
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tanglewood HOA sued James E. Goode in Maricopa County Superior Court. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint or the requested judgment terms, but they show the court set the case for a bench trial and later granted the HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment after Goode filed no response. The court relied on Rule 7.1(b), found the nonresponse should be treated as consent, and also stated that the motion and record established the HOA’s entitlement to relief as a matter of law. A later order required Goode to respond to the HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s written reasoning was procedural and brief. It noted that Goode, who was not represented by counsel, had failed to respond in any manner to Tanglewood HOA’s summary-judgment motion and that the response deadline under Rule 7.1(a) had expired. Under Rule 7.1(b), the court treated the unexplained nonresponse as consent to granting the motion.

The court also made the required merits statement: the HOA’s motion and the case record established that the HOA was entitled as a matter of law to the relief it was seeking. On that basis, the court granted summary judgment, ordered a proposed judgment and any fee-and-cost application, and vacated the scheduled bench trial. The collected records do not provide a substantive analysis of an HOA statute or CC&R provision.

Why It Matters

The case is a thin-record example of how an HOA can obtain summary judgment when the homeowner does not respond, but it should not be read as a substantive interpretation of Arizona HOA law. The ruling states both parts of the analysis: the nonresponse could be deemed consent under Rule 7.1(b), and the court still found the motion and record established entitlement to relief as a matter of law.

The later redemption-period waste order suggests a post-judgment enforcement or foreclosure posture, but the collected minutes do not include the final judgment or the details of the underlying claim. For readers, the useful lesson is procedural and practical rather than doctrinal.

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Maricopoly v. Tierra Santa Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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HOA Liens | Sheriff Sale | CV2020-013607

A purchaser alleged an HOA lien sale went forward after the lien was extinguished. The court let fraud-based claims survive summary judgment but rejected A.R.S. § 33-420 against the association’s law firm.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-013607.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2022-06-07. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-013607) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the February 7, 2022 under-advisement ruling on Maxwell & Morgan’s converted summary-judgment motion and the May 12, 2022 ruling on A.R.S. § 33-420 amendment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 7, 2022 order referring the case to a mandatory settlement conference and setting a March 27, 2023 pretrial or trial-setting conference. The collected records do not show a final judgment, settlement, trial, appeal, or dismissal after that order. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A bidder normally takes only whatever title exists at a judicial sale, but the court held that caveat emptor does not shield alleged fraud. Taking Maricopoly’s facts as true for summary judgment, the court let claims proceed where the buyer alleged Tierra Santa’s law firm falsely confirmed the HOA lien was valid and allowed a sheriff’s sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Maricopoly LLC (Plaintiff)
    Purchaser at the sheriff's sale who alleged the Tierra Santa HOA lien had already been extinguished and that the sale should not have gone forward.
  • Kyle A. Kinney (Counsel)
    Counsel for Maricopoly in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Association whose foreclosure judgment and asserted continuing statutory lien formed the basis for the sheriff's sale.
  • Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. (Defendant)
    Law firm alleged to have represented Tierra Santa in the foreclosure matter and to have told Maricopoly's agent that the HOA lien was valid; the court denied summary judgment on fraud-based allegations but later rejected A.R.S. § 33-420 against the firm.
  • Rod Sauaia (Defendant)
    Listed in the early minute-entry captions and represented with Maxwell & Morgan at the August 13, 2021 oral argument.
  • Ember Ann Van Vranken (Counsel)
    Counsel for Tierra Santa in the minute entries.
  • Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
    Counsel for Tierra Santa at the August 13, 2021 and December 9, 2021 oral arguments.
  • Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
    Counsel for Maxwell & Morgan and Rod Sauaia at oral argument on the converted summary-judgment motion.
  • Sean P. Healy (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Maxwell & Morgan in the May 12, 2022 ruling.
  • Aaron C. Schepler (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Maxwell & Morgan in the May 12, 2022 ruling.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. Pamela Gates (Judge)
    Judge who issued the February 7, 2022 and May 12, 2022 rulings.

What happened

Maricopoly alleged that it bought at a March 7, 2019 sheriff’s sale based on a judgment in favor of Tierra Santa Community Association against a Scottsdale property. The court’s February 7, 2022 ruling states that Maricopoly’s agent investigated the sale, found a prior foreclosure, and saw documents creating ambiguity about whether Tierra Santa still had a valid lien to foreclose.

For purposes of the converted summary-judgment motion, the court took Maricopoly’s facts as true. On that assumed record, Maricopoly’s agent called Maxwell & Morgan, Tierra Santa’s lawyers, the day before the sale and asked whether the lien was valid. The ruling says the agent was told the lien was valid, but Maricopoly alleged that was false because Tierra Santa had entered a stipulated judgment agreeing the HOA lien would be extinguished if another entity obtained title, and Maxwell & Morgan knew that condition had occurred.

The court also treated as true, for that motion only, Maricopoly’s allegations that a lawyer for Tierra Santa appeared at the sale and allowed it to proceed, that Maricopoly was the winning bidder for $44,000, and that Maxwell & Morgan later threatened fees when Maricopoly tried to secure return of the payment. The court emphasized it was not finding those allegations true; it was applying the summary-judgment standard.

Maxwell & Morgan relied on caveat emptor, the rule that a judicial-sale bidder must determine title and takes only the execution debtor’s interest. The court held that caveat emptor did not bar the case at summary judgment because Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception. Since Maricopoly alleged a knowingly false statement about the lien and a sale based on an extinguished lien, the court found material factual disputes and denied summary dismissal.

The court allowed amendment of factual allegations and some counts, but rejected several proposed new theories. It denied negligent misrepresentation because the case could proceed only if Maxwell & Morgan knowingly misrepresented the lien rather than merely making a mistake. It denied wrongful foreclosure because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, mortgage, note, or creditor-declared default. It also denied slander of title as insufficiently alleged.

On May 12, 2022, the court separately addressed A.R.S. § 33-420. It quoted the statute and held that liability applies to a person claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property. Because Maricopoly alleged Maxwell & Morgan was the law firm representing the client who claimed an interest, not a claimant itself, the court denied leave to add the § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan while granting leave to amend in part.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association (CV2020-013607 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Fraud allegations over an extinguished HOA lien sale defeated summary judgment; § 33-420 did not apply to the firm. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-04-12 The court takes no action on Maricopoly's application for default against Maxwell & Morgan and directs default-judgment materials to the commissioner process.
Step 2021-04-21 The court takes no action on Maricopoly's application for default against Tierra Santa and gives the same default-judgment process direction.
Step 2021-08-13 The court grants Maricopoly limited Rule 56(d) discovery and allows the deposition of Austin Slade before response to the converted summary-judgment motion.
Step 2021-12-09 The court hears oral argument on Maxwell & Morgan's converted summary-judgment motion and Maricopoly's motion for leave to amend, then takes both under advisement.
Step 2022-02-07 The court denies Maxwell & Morgan's converted summary-judgment motion and grants Maricopoly leave to amend only in part.
Step 2022-05-12 The court denies leave to add an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan because the law firm did not itself claim an interest in the property.
Step 2022-06-07 The court refers the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and sets a March 27, 2023 pretrial or trial-setting conference.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 9 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2021-04-12

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file
2021-04-12_001_default-judgment.pdf
Source 2 2021-04-21

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file
2021-04-21_002_default-judgment.pdf
Source 3 2021-07-29

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2021-07-29_003_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 4 2021-08-13

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry granting Maricopoly limited Rule 56(d) discovery by allowing the deposition of Austin Slade before response to the converted summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
2021-08-13_004_oral-argument.pdf
Source 5 2021-11-10

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2021-11-10_005_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 6 2021-12-09

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking Maxwell & Morgan's converted summary-judgment motion and Maricopoly's motion for leave to amend under advisement after argument.

Download source file
2021-12-09_006_oral-argument.pdf
Source 7 2022-02-07

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying Maxwell & Morgan's motion to dismiss converted to summary judgment, granting Maricopoly leave to amend in part, and denying proposed negligent-misrepresentation, wrongful-foreclosure, and slander-of-title amendments as futile.

Download source file
2022-02-07_007_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 8 2022-05-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Maricopoly leave to amend in part but denying leave to add an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan because the firm did not itself claim an interest, lien, or encumbrance against the property.

Download source file
2022-05-12_008_ruling.pdf
Source 9 2022-06-07

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Scheduling minute entry referring the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and setting a March 27, 2023 pretrial conference or trial-setting conference.

Download source file
2022-06-07_009_status-conference.pdf

FAQ

Why did the court deny summary judgment?

The court took Maricopoly’s factual allegations as true for the converted summary-judgment motion and found a genuine dispute about whether Maxwell & Morgan knowingly misrepresented that the HOA lien was valid and allowed a sheriff’s sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished.

What did caveat emptor mean in this case?

Caveat emptor meant that a bidder at a judicial sale normally must determine title and takes only whatever interest the execution debtor has. The court held that this rule did not end the case because Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception.

Did the court find that Maxwell & Morgan committed fraud?

No. The court expressly said it was taking Maricopoly’s allegations as true only for purposes of deciding the converted summary-judgment motion. The ruling decided that the allegations created material factual disputes, not that they were proven.

What happened to the proposed wrongful-foreclosure claim?

The court denied leave to add wrongful foreclosure as futile because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, recorded mortgage, note, or creditor wrongfully declaring default under a note.

Why did the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim fail against the law firm?

The court held that § 33-420 applies to a person claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property. Maricopoly alleged Maxwell & Morgan represented the client who claimed the interest, not that the firm itself claimed the lien.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of how one trial court handled an alleged HOA lien sale after the lien had been extinguished.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2020-013607 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 7, 2022
Judge / panelHon. Pamela Gates
PartiesMaricopoly LLC (Plaintiff) v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. and Rod Sauaia (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-420
Topics
ForeclosureLiensCC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court denied Maxwell & Morgan's motion to dismiss converted to summary judgment because, taking Maricopoly's facts as true, the fraud exception to caveat emptor could apply to allegations that the firm falsely confirmed a valid HOA lien and allowed a sheriff's sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished. The court also denied leave to add negligent-misrepresentation, wrongful-foreclosure, and slander-of-title claims, and later denied leave to add an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan while allowing amendment in part.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package9 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewMaricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A purchaser at a sheriff's sale sued Tierra Santa Community Association and its collection law firm after buying at a sale based on an HOA foreclosure lien that the plaintiff alleged had already been extinguished. The court denied the defense summary-judgment motion on fraud-based allegations, allowed some amendment, denied negligent-misrepresentation, wrongful-foreclosure, and slander-of-title amendments as futile, and later held that A.R.S. § 33-420 did not provide a claim against the law firm because the firm did not itself claim an interest in the property.

Key Issues & Findings

The February 7, 2022 ruling treated the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a summary-judgment motion and therefore took Maricopoly's factual allegations as true for that motion only. On that assumed record, Maricopoly's agent investigated a sheriff's sale based on a Tierra Santa foreclosure judgment, discovered a prior foreclosure and a stipulated judgment that allegedly extinguished the HOA lien if another entity obtained title, and called Maxwell & Morgan to ask whether the lien remained valid.

The court reasoned that ordinary caveat emptor principles make a judicial-sale bidder responsible for checking title, but that Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception. Because Maricopoly alleged that Maxwell & Morgan knowingly gave false information that the lien remained valid and then allowed the sale to proceed, the court found material factual disputes and denied summary dismissal.

The court separated that fraud theory from proposed new claims. It denied negligent misrepresentation because no claim existed if Maxwell & Morgan was merely mistaken, denied wrongful foreclosure because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, mortgage, note, or similar foreclosure structure, and denied slander of title as insufficiently pleaded. In the later A.R.S. § 33-420 ruling, the court held the statute did not create a claim against Maxwell & Morgan because the law firm represented a claimant but did not itself claim an interest, lien, or encumbrance against the property.

Why It Matters

The ruling is useful for HOA lien and foreclosure disputes because it shows that caveat emptor may not end the case when a purchaser alleges fraud in an HOA sheriff's sale based on an extinguished lien. It also draws a line between an association that claims a lien and a law firm representing that association for purposes of A.R.S. § 33-420.

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Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on by

Assessment Collection | Water Shutoff | CV2012-018443

The court refused to decide on summary judgment whether water shutoff was a reasonable collection rule, but dismissed the FDCPA claim against the management company.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-018443.

Download FDCPA summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-018443) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the July 2, 2014 ruling on water shutoff and the November 25, 2014 summary-judgment ruling on the FDCPA claim; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the March 19, 2015 order dismissing the entire action with prejudice after the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss. The water-shutoff issue was not finally decided on summary judgment; it was left for the factfinder before the later settlement and stipulated dismissal. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A condominium association may have authority under A.R.S. § 33-1242 to adopt reasonable rules, but this court would not decide as a matter of law that a water-shutoff assessment-collection rule was valid or invalid when the Declaration and Bylaws were silent. Separately, the manager was not an FDCPA debt collector where it had responsibility for regular assessment collection before the owner’s account became delinquent.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Andrew Kuhn (Plaintiff)
    Southern Village Estates condominium owner who challenged water shutoff or restriction and brought an FDCPA claim against Pride.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Counsel for Kuhn in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Southern Village Estates Condominium Association (Defendant)
    Condominium association that obtained a judgment for unpaid and accruing assessments and used water shutoff or restriction as part of collection efforts.
  • Pride Asset Management, Inc. (Defendant)
    Property-management company retained by the association to manage the development and collect maintenance assessments and related charges from members.
  • Nikita V. Patel (Counsel)
    Counsel for Southern Village Estates Condominium Association and Pride in many of the minute entries.
  • Diana J. Elston (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Pride at the November 13, 2014 pretrial/status conference.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. J. Richard Gama (Judge)
    Judge who issued the water-shutoff, discovery-sanctions, fee, and FDCPA rulings.

What happened

Andrew Kuhn owned a condominium unit at Southern Village Estates and was a member of the condominium association. The July 2, 2014 ruling states that he failed to pay past assessments, and the association obtained a judgment against him for all past-due and accruing assessments. The association retained Pride Asset Management for collection efforts.

The association paid a utility for water delivered to each condominium unit from monthly assessments. When Kuhn did not pay, defendants either shut off or significantly restricted water flow to his unit. Kuhn said the action made his home uninhabitable and argued that the association had no express statutory or governing-document authority to use water shutoff as a collection remedy.

Defendants relied on A.R.S. § 33-1242 and a rule adopted by the association’s board. The court noted defendants conceded that the Declaration did not expressly authorize water shutoff and that no statute expressly authorized it. The rule itself stated that the association had the right to turn off water to a unit for nonpayment of monthly assessment.

The court denied both sides summary judgment. It agreed that the association had authority to adopt rules if the rules were reasonable, but it held that reasonableness was a fact question on this record. The key issue was whether the rule bore a relationship to the health, happiness, and enjoyment of life of the unit owners, or instead was arbitrary or capricious.

The case also included a separate FDCPA claim against Pride. The November 25, 2014 ruling states that Pride became the HOA’s managing agent on July 1, 2008, that Kuhn did not become delinquent until 2010, and that the challenged collection activity occurred in 2012. Because Pride was responsible for collecting assessments before the debt went into default, the court held Pride fell within the statutory exception to the FDCPA definition of debt collector and granted Pride summary judgment.

Earlier discovery rulings also mattered procedurally. The court sanctioned Pride for failing to provide a knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) witness, compelled a new deposition, and awarded Kuhn $4,500 in fees and $12 in costs. The case later settled, Pride withdrew a proposed form of judgment, and the court dismissed the action with prejudice on March 19, 2015.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association (CV2012-018443 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Water shutoff collection rule went to factfinder; Pride was not an FDCPA debt collector for pre-default HOA dues. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-01-11 The court restrains Southern Village Estates from turning off Kuhn's water and orders the water turned back on pending an evidentiary hearing after counsel avowed that fees had been paid.
Step 2013-07-29 The court grants Rule 37 sanctions in part, compels Pride to provide an adequate Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and awards costs and reasonable attorney fees for the motion.
Step 2013-08-22 The court denies defendants' motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2013 discovery-sanctions ruling.
Step 2014-06-17 The court awards Kuhn $4,500 in fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions, reducing the requested amount as duplicative and excessive.
Step 2014-07-02 The court denies both sides summary judgment on whether the association's water-shutoff rule was lawful and reasonable.
Step 2014-11-25 The court grants Pride summary judgment and dismisses the FDCPA claim because Pride handled assessment collection before the debt went into default.
Step 2015-03-19 After settlement, the court dismisses the entire action with prejudice, with each party bearing its own fees and costs.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 21 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2013-01-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Preliminary-restraint minute entry ordering Southern Village Estates not to turn off Kuhn's water and ordering the water turned back on pending the evidentiary hearing after counsel avowed that fees had been paid.

Download source file
2013-01-11_001_ruling.pdf
Source 2 2013-02-04

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2013-02-04_002_status-conference.pdf
Source 3 2013-03-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2013-03-13_003_status-conference.pdf
Source 4 2013-04-10

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2013-04-10_004_status-conference.pdf
Source 5 2013-07-12

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2013-07-12_005_status-conference.pdf
Source 6 2013-07-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Discovery-sanctions ruling granting Kuhn relief in part, compelling Pride to provide an adequate Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees for the motion.

Download source file
2013-07-29_006_ruling.pdf
Source 7 2013-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-08-20_007_minute-entry.pdf
Source 8 2013-08-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying defendants' motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2013 Rule 30(b)(6) discovery-sanctions order.

Download source file
2013-08-22_008_ruling.pdf
Source 9 2013-09-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-09-19_009_minute-entry.pdf
Source 10 2013-10-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-10-15_010_minute-entry.pdf
Source 11 2013-11-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2013-11-19_011_minute-entry.pdf
Source 12 2014-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2014-05-15_012_minute-entry.pdf
Source 13 2014-06-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Fee ruling awarding Kuhn $4,500 in attorney fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions while reducing the requested fees as duplicative and excessive.

Download source file
2014-06-17_013_ruling.pdf
Source 14 2014-07-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying both Kuhn's and defendants' summary-judgment motions on whether the association's water-shutoff rule was lawful and reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the governing documents.

Download source file
2014-07-02_014_ruling.pdf
Source 15 2014-09-08

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2014-09-08_015_status-conference.pdf
Source 16 2014-09-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2014-09-23_016_minute-entry.pdf
Source 17 2014-11-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2014-11-13_017_status-conference.pdf
Source 18 2014-11-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Pride Asset Management summary judgment and dismissing Kuhn's FDCPA claim because Pride collected assessments before Kuhn's assessments became overdue.

Download source file
2014-11-25_018_ruling.pdf
Source 19 2015-02-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-02-23_019_minute-entry.pdf
Source 20 2015-03-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2015-03-04_020_minute-entry.pdf
Source 21 2015-03-19

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Dismissal order dismissing the entire action with prejudice after the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss following settlement.

Download source file
2015-03-19_021_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Did the court decide the association could shut off water for unpaid assessments?

No. The court denied both sides summary judgment. It held that whether the water-shutoff rule was reasonable under the circumstances was a factual issue for the factfinder.

What role did A.R.S. § 33-1242 play?

Defendants relied on A.R.S. § 33-1242 as authority for the association to adopt rules. The court agreed an association may adopt reasonable rules, but said the reasonableness of this water-shutoff rule could not be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Why did Pride win summary judgment on the FDCPA claim?

The court found that Pride was responsible for collecting monthly assessments before Kuhn’s assessments became overdue. Under the FDCPA exception discussed in the ruling, Pride was not a debt collector for that debt because the debt was not in default when Pride obtained collection responsibility.

Did the governing documents expressly authorize water shutoff?

The court stated that the parties agreed the Declaration and Bylaws did not expressly provide a right to shut off water as a way to collect unpaid assessments.

What discovery sanction did the court impose?

The court found Pride failed to provide a knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) corporate witness, ordered a new deposition, and later awarded Kuhn $4,500 in attorney fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of one trial court’s analysis of condominium water shutoff, assessment collection, and FDCPA manager liability.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-018443 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 25, 2014
Judge / panelHon. J. Richard Gama
PartiesAndrew Kuhn (Plaintiff) v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association and Pride Asset Management, Inc. (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsFDCPACC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment on the water-shutoff issue because the association could adopt reasonable rules under A.R.S. § 33-1242, but whether this rule reasonably related to the health, happiness, and enjoyment of the unit owners presented a fact question. The court later held that Pride was not an FDCPA debt collector because it obtained responsibility for collecting the assessments before Kuhn's assessments became overdue.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewAndrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A condominium owner challenged Southern Village Estates' use of water shutoff or restriction to collect unpaid assessments and asserted an FDCPA claim against Pride Asset Management. The court denied both sides summary judgment on whether the association's water-restriction rule was reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the governing documents, but later granted Pride summary judgment on the FDCPA claim because Pride was responsible for collecting assessments before the owner's account went into default.

Key Issues & Findings

On the water-shutoff motions, the court began with undisputed facts: Kuhn owned a condominium unit, was a member of the association, failed to pay past assessments, and the association obtained a judgment for unpaid and accruing assessments. The association and Pride then used water shutoff or water restriction as a collection method, and Kuhn argued that neither Arizona statute nor the governing documents expressly authorized that remedy.

The court agreed with the association that A.R.S. § 33-1242 gave the association authority to promulgate reasonable rules, but it did not treat that authority as unlimited. Because the Declaration and Bylaws did not expressly provide a water-shutoff remedy, and because the rule's reasonableness depended on whether it related to the general welfare of condominium residents, the court found a factual dispute and denied summary judgment to both sides.

On the FDCPA claim, the court focused on Pride's timing and role. Pride was the association's property manager and was responsible for collecting monthly assessments beginning July 1, 2008; Kuhn did not become delinquent until 2010; and the challenged collection activity occurred in 2012. Because the FDCPA excludes collectors whose collection activity concerns debt that was not in default when obtained, the court granted Pride summary judgment and dismissed the FDCPA claim.

Why It Matters

The case is useful for Arizona condominium readers because it shows one trial court refusing to decide on summary judgment whether an association may restrict water service as an assessment-collection rule when the declaration and bylaws are silent. It also shows how a management company may defeat an FDCPA claim when it was already responsible for assessment collection before the owner's account went into default.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Abodeely v. Oasis Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on by

HOA Fines | A.R.S. § 33-1803 | CV2020-001329

The court let fine and notice claims proceed where the record left questions about whether Oasis began fining before the homeowner’s statutory response period expired.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-001329.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2023-05-23. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-001329) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the June 30, 2021 under-advisement ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the May 23, 2023 ruling extending the time for Abodeely to submit a motion to enforce the settlement agreement through June 16, 2023. The collected records also show that the parties reported an official settlement reached on September 1, 2022, but funding and a Medicare consent issue remained unresolved at the May 5, 2023 status conference. Any later enforcement, dismissal, judgment, or appeal history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

When an Arizona HOA fine dispute turns on A.R.S. § 33-1803, timing matters. The court denied Oasis summary judgment because the record left genuine disputes about which violation notices were at issue, whether the statute was violated, and whether it was reasonable to begin imposing fines 14 days after the first notice while the homeowner still had 7 days left in the statutory response period.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marybeth Abodeely (Plaintiff)
    Homeowner who challenged Oasis violation notices and fines, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and opposed Oasis's summary-judgment motion.
  • Mark W. Horne (Counsel)
    Counsel for Abodeely at the June 21, 2021 oral argument and listed in the June 30, 2021 ruling.
  • F. Robert Connelly II (Counsel)
    Appeared for Abodeely on behalf of Jonathan A. Dessaules at the May 5, 2023 status conference.

Respondent Side

  • The Oasis Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association for the condominium complex; obtained summary judgment on dog-related issues but not on the remaining fine and violation-notice issues.
  • The Management Trust, Inc. (Defendant)
    Management company hired by Oasis to manage the condominium complex; dismissed on June 8, 2020 because the complaint did not allege direct duties or conduct outside the agency role.
  • Sadie Marsh and Gregory Marsh (Defendants)
    Dismissed by notice before the June 30, 2021 summary-judgment ruling; the remaining ruling discussed Oasis's handling of the Marsh dog issue.
  • Jeremy C. Johnson (Counsel)
    Counsel for Oasis and The Management Trust in the case-party data and later status-conference minute entries.
  • Evann M. Waschuk (Counsel)
    Counsel who argued for Oasis at the June 21, 2021 summary-judgment oral argument.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. Danielle J. Viola (Judge)
    Judge who dismissed The Management Trust and issued the June 30, 2021 summary-judgment ruling and July 22, 2021 reconsideration ruling.
  • Hon. Sara J. Agne (Judge)
    Judge who handled later settlement-status proceedings and granted the May 23, 2023 extension related to any motion to enforce settlement.

What happened

Marybeth Abodeely owned an Oasis condominium. The June 30, 2021 ruling states that The Oasis Association was the homeowners association for the condominium complex and that The Management Trust was hired by Oasis to manage it. The court described the governing documents as including Oasis’s CC&Rs and House Rules.

The dispute began with May 2018 notices directing Abodeely to clean up her patio and remove empty planters from common areas. The ruling quoted House Rules limiting porch areas to appropriate furniture and small potted plants, requiring unsightly items to be removed on HOA request, and restricting visible textile items. It also quoted CC&R section 15.2, which restricted what could be stored, placed, erected, hung, or permitted on patios, balconies, common elements, exterior building areas, windows, and outside doors except for customary patio furniture and potted plants.

Abodeely did not comply with the request to remove the empty planters, and Oasis began fining her on June 8, 2018. She hired counsel to dispute the fines, and counsel exchanged letters about the fines and policies. Earlier in the case, the court dismissed The Management Trust because Abodeely had not alleged that the manager owed statutory or common-law duties to her or acted outside its agency role for Oasis. The Marsh defendants also had been dismissed before the summary-judgment ruling.

Abodeely moved for partial summary judgment on a claimed breach of statutory and common-law duties, declaratory relief, and an injunction. She argued that Oasis had failed to enforce the CC&Rs against the Marsh dog, sent successive and harassing violation notices, photographed her property, and adopted arbitrary rules targeted at her. The court denied her motion, finding it rested on conclusory statements and did not show an absence of disputed facts.

Oasis also moved for summary judgment. The court granted Oasis summary judgment on the dog-related portions of the statutory-duty, injunction, and declaratory-judgment claims because Oasis showed that it had to make reasonable accommodations to its no-pet policy and could not enforce that policy against the Marsh dog. But the court denied Oasis summary judgment on the remaining violation-notice and fine issues. It found genuine disputes or an unclear record about which notices were at issue, whether Oasis violated A.R.S. § 33-1803, and whether it was reasonable to start fines 14 days after the first notice while Abodeely still had 7 days to respond.

Oasis later moved for reconsideration on damages. On July 22, 2021, the court denied reconsideration and clarified that it had not concluded Abodeely would recover emotional damages; it had only concluded that it could not rule out such damages on the record. Later entries show the parties reported an official settlement reached on September 1, 2022, with funding and Medicare consent issues still being discussed in May 2023, and a May 23, 2023 order extended the time for any motion to enforce settlement.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association (CV2020-001329 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Fine claims survived where Oasis may have fined before the A.R.S. § 33-1803 response period expired. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2020-06-08 The court grants The Management Trust's motion to dismiss because the complaint did not allege direct duties or conduct outside its agency role.
Step 2021-05-10 The court sets oral argument on Abodeely's partial summary-judgment motion and Oasis's summary-judgment motion.
Step 2021-06-21 The court hears oral argument from Abodeely's counsel and Oasis's counsel and takes both summary-judgment motions under advisement.
Step 2021-06-30 The court denies Abodeely's partial summary-judgment motion, grants Oasis summary judgment on dog-related issues, and denies Oasis summary judgment on the remaining fine and notice issues.
Step 2021-07-22 The court denies Oasis's motion for reconsideration and clarifies that it had not decided Abodeely was entitled to emotional damages.
Step 2023-05-05 At a status conference, the parties report a September 1, 2022 settlement, and the court orders Abodeely to sign a Medicare consent form by May 12, 2023.
Step 2023-05-23 The court grants an extension through June 16, 2023 for Abodeely to submit a motion to enforce settlement if needed.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 17 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2020-05-29

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2020-05-29_001_status-conference.pdf
Source 2 2020-06-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting The Management Trust, Inc.'s motion to dismiss because the complaint did not allege that the manager owed Abodeely statutory or common-law duties or acted outside its agency role for the association.

Download source file
2020-06-08_002_ruling.pdf
Source 3 2020-12-07

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2020-12-07_003_status-conference.pdf
Source 4 2021-05-10

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument setting order setting Abodeely's partial summary-judgment motion and Oasis's summary-judgment motion for June 21, 2021 argument.

Download source file
2021-05-10_004_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 5 2021-06-21

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking Abodeely's partial summary-judgment motion and Oasis's summary-judgment motion under advisement after argument by both sides.

Download source file
2021-06-21_005_oral-argument.pdf
Source 6 2021-06-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying Abodeely's partial summary-judgment motion and granting Oasis summary judgment only on dog-related issues while denying summary judgment on the disputed fine, notice, declaratory, injunction, and emotional-damages issues.

Download source file
2021-06-30_006_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 7 2021-07-07

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2021-07-07_007_status-conference.pdf
Source 8 2021-07-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Oasis's motion for reconsideration and clarifying that the court had not found Abodeely entitled to emotional damages, only that it could not rule them out on the record.

Download source file
2021-07-22_008_ruling.pdf
Source 9 2021-08-09

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2021-08-09_009_status-conference.pdf
Source 10 2022-03-14

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2022-03-14_010_status-conference.pdf
Source 11 2022-03-14

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2022-03-14_011_status-conference.pdf
Source 12 2022-05-10

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2022-05-10_012_status-conference.pdf
Source 13 2022-06-03

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2022-06-03_013_status-conference.pdf
Source 14 2022-07-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2022-07-05_014_minute-entry.pdf
Source 15 2023-04-27

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2023-04-27_015_status-conference.pdf
Source 16 2023-05-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry recording that the parties reported a September 1, 2022 settlement, ordering Abodeely to sign a Medicare consent form, and setting a deadline for any motion to enforce settlement.

Download source file
2023-05-05_016_status-conference.pdf
Source 17 2023-05-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Abodeely more time, through June 16, 2023, to submit a motion to enforce the settlement agreement if needed.

Download source file
2023-05-23_017_ruling.pdf

FAQ

What part of A.R.S. § 33-1803 mattered in this ruling?

The court focused on the homeowner’s ability to respond in writing within 21 calendar days after a written violation notice and the association’s response obligations. The court found a jury question about whether it was reasonable for Oasis to impose a fine after 14 days when Abodeely still had 7 days left to respond under the statute.

Did the homeowner win summary judgment?

No. The court denied Abodeely’s partial summary-judgment motion because her arguments about unfair treatment, harassment, targeted rules, and dog-related enforcement relied on conclusory statements and did not eliminate disputed facts.

Did Oasis win summary judgment?

Only in part. Oasis won summary judgment on the claims tied to the Marsh dog, but it did not win summary judgment on the remaining violation-notice, fine, declaratory, injunction, and emotional-damages issues.

Why was The Management Trust dismissed?

The court dismissed The Management Trust because Abodeely had not alleged that the management company owed her statutory or common-law duties or that it acted outside the course and scope of its agency with Oasis.

Did the court decide emotional-distress damages were available?

The court did not decide that Abodeely was entitled to emotional damages. It denied Oasis’s request to rule them out because disputed facts remained and the record was unclear, then later clarified the same point when denying reconsideration.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of how one trial court analyzed HOA fines, CC&Rs, House Rules, and A.R.S. § 33-1803 notice timing.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2020-001329 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJune 30, 2021
Judge / panelHon. Danielle J. Viola, Hon. Sara J. Agne
PartiesMarybeth Abodeely (Plaintiff) v. The Oasis Association, The Management Trust, Inc., Sadie Marsh and Gregory Marsh (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
FinesCC&RsSelective EnforcementCovenantsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court held that The Management Trust was dismissed because the complaint did not allege that it owed statutory or common-law duties to Abodeely or acted outside its agency role for Oasis. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court denied Abodeely's partial motion, granted Oasis summary judgment on claims tied to the Marsh dog, and denied Oasis summary judgment on the remaining fine and violation-notice issues because disputed facts or an unclear record remained under A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the governing documents.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package17 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewMarybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowner challenged fines and violation notices issued by The Oasis Association after patio and common-area disputes, and also challenged the association's treatment of a neighbor's companion or service dog. The court dismissed The Management Trust early, denied the homeowner's partial summary-judgment motion, and granted Oasis summary judgment only on the dog-related portions of the case while leaving disputes over fines, violation notices, and emotional-distress damages for further proceedings.

Key Issues & Findings

The June 30, 2021 ruling treated the patio and common-area dispute as a record-specific enforcement case under the Oasis CC&Rs, House Rules, and A.R.S. § 33-1803. The court noted that Oasis's first notice gave Abodeely an opportunity to respond, but it also found a triable question about the reasonableness of imposing a fine 14 days after the initial notice when she still had 7 days to respond under the statute.

The court rejected Abodeely's request for affirmative summary judgment because her motion relied on conclusory statements about unfair treatment, harassment, selective enforcement, and rules allegedly targeted at her. The court also found that Oasis had addressed the Marsh dog issue and that the dog-related allegations did not support judgment in Abodeely's favor.

For Oasis's motion, the court separated the dog issue from the fines and notices. It granted Oasis summary judgment on claims based on the Marsh dog because Oasis showed that it had to make reasonable accommodations to its no-pet policy. It denied summary judgment on the remaining notice, fine, declaratory, injunction, and emotional-distress issues because the record left genuine disputes about which notices were at issue, whether § 33-1803 was violated, and whether fines began too soon.

Why It Matters

This ruling is useful for Arizona HOA readers because it shows how one superior-court judge analyzed the 21-day written-response process in A.R.S. § 33-1803 when an association begins fining a homeowner. It also separates a manager's agency role from direct liability and shows how pet-accommodation issues may be resolved apart from an owner's separate fine and selective-enforcement claims.

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Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Board Recall | A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) | CV2017-056168

A condominium board member removed by homeowners challenged the recall process. The court held the association and manager complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration, and that a board seat was not a contractual benefit protected by the Declaration.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-056168.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2018-08-20. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-056168) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the August 20, 2018 order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the August 20, 2018 summary-judgment ruling, which ordered defendants to submit a form of judgment by September 25, 2018. Any later judgment, appeal, settlement, or collection history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

For a condominium board recall, the court focused on compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration: a sufficient petition, written notice of the special meeting, a quorum, an opportunity to be heard, and a majority vote of those voting. Because the defendants showed that process was followed and the plaintiff offered only unsupported assertions of irregularities, the court granted summary judgment to the association, AAM, and Jensen on all claims.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert Peshek (Plaintiff)
    Former Anasazi Village board member removed by homeowners at a May 25, 2016 special meeting; challenged the recall process and asserted claims against the association, AAM, and Jensen.
  • Justin R. Cooley (Counsel)
    Counsel for Peshek at the August 17, 2018 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Condominium association whose homeowners voted to remove Peshek from the board; prevailed on summary judgment.
  • AAM, LLC (Defendant)
    Community-management company whose representative received the recall petition, assessed that it had more than 100 signers, and later gave Peshek notice of his removal; prevailed on summary judgment.
  • Paul Jensen (Defendant)
    Individual defendant whom Peshek identified as the catalyst for the recall; the court held motive was not material because the statute and Declaration allowed removal with or without cause if procedure was followed.
  • Emily H. Mann (Counsel)
    Counsel for Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM at the August 17, 2018 oral argument.
  • Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM in the case-party data and earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. Bruce R. Cohen (Judge)
    Judge who heard oral argument and issued the August 20, 2018 summary-judgment ruling.

What happened

Robert Peshek served on the board of the Anasazi Village condominium association from 2014 until May 2016. According to the court’s summary-judgment findings, homeowners removed him from the board on or about May 25, 2016, and he sued Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM alleging that the removal was improper.

The court found that a recall action began when homeowner Michael McGrane submitted a petition to AAM representative Wayne Yurk on or about May 2, 2016. Yurk assessed that the petition had more than 100 signers. The board then called a special meeting of members and sent a May 9, 2016 letter to homeowners with notice of the May 25 meeting, the location, the time, the subject matter, and an absentee ballot.

Peshek actually received the notice and ballot on or before May 18, 2016. He mailed in a ballot voting against his own removal, and the ballot was received by the board or AAM on May 24, the day before the special meeting. At the May 25 meeting, the board found a quorum, members were given an opportunity to be heard, Peshek did not appear, and more than 50% of those eligible to vote under the quorum voted to remove him. Wayne Yurk then gave Peshek notice that he had been removed.

The August 20, 2018 ruling treated the breach-of-contract and state-law claims together because both depended on the recall procedure. The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), including the petition threshold, special meeting, quorum, and majority-vote requirements, and found the Declaration allowed removal of a board member with or without cause while incorporating that statutory procedure. On that record, the court held the defendants had shown no genuine dispute that all statutory and Declaration requirements were met.

Peshek’s response did not create a triable factual issue. The court said he asserted possible irregularities in petition signatures, notice, and the opportunity to be heard, but offered no admissible or reliable evidence to support those claims or counter the defendants’ showing. It also held that even if Jensen initiated the recall or had an improper motive, that did not matter because the governing law required only proper procedure, which was followed.

The court also rejected good-faith-and-fair-dealing and tortious-interference theories. Under the Declaration, Peshek had rights such as undisturbed property use, common-area maintenance, and enforcement of behaviors affecting value, but he had no contractual right to be on the board. The court found no supported damages from removal from an uncompensated board position and no admissible evidence that defendants caused him to lose expected benefits under the Declaration. Summary judgment was granted in full.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. (CV2017-056168 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Condo board recall upheld where the association followed A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017-12-20 The court transfers the case to compulsory arbitration.
Step 2018-04-13 A telephonic status conference is held on Peshek's Rule 56(d) request related to summary judgment.
Step 2018-05-17 The court sets oral argument on defendants' January 31, 2018 motion for summary judgment.
Step 2018-06-26 The court waives compulsory arbitration by stipulation and refers the case for a mandatory settlement conference.
Step 2018-08-16 The court grants the parties' emergency stipulation allowing telephonic appearance at the summary-judgment oral argument.
Step 2018-08-17 Oral argument is held on defendants' summary-judgment motion; Peshek appears by counsel, defendants appear by counsel, and the matter is taken under advisement.
Step 2018-08-20 The court grants summary judgment in full to Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM on all claims.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 13 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2017-12-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2017-12-20_001_ruling.pdf
Source 2 2018-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-01-16_002_ruling.pdf
Source 3 2018-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-01-16_003_ruling.pdf
Source 4 2018-02-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-02-20_004_ruling.pdf
Source 5 2018-04-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-05_005_ruling.pdf
Source 6 2018-04-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-11_006_ruling.pdf
Source 7 2018-04-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-13_007_ruling.pdf
Source 8 2018-04-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2018-04-13_008_status-conference.pdf
Source 9 2018-05-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument setting order placing defendants' summary-judgment motion for hearing after briefing on the motion was complete.

Download source file
2018-05-17_009_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 10 2018-06-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling waiving compulsory arbitration by stipulation and referring the matter to a mandatory settlement conference.

Download source file
2018-06-26_010_ruling.pdf
Source 11 2018-08-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the parties' emergency stipulation allowing telephonic appearance at the August 17, 2018 summary-judgment oral argument.

Download source file
2018-08-16_011_ruling.pdf
Source 12 2018-08-17

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Oral-argument minute entry taking defendants' summary-judgment motion under advisement after argument from Peshek's counsel and defense counsel.

Download source file
2018-08-17_012_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 13 2018-08-20

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment in its entirety to Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM on all claims arising from Peshek's removal from the board.

Download source file
2018-08-20_013_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

What statute did the court apply to the board recall?

The court applied A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), the condominium statute governing removal of board members by unit owners. The ruling quoted the provisions for petition threshold, special meeting notice, quorum, and majority vote.

Why did the recall procedure survive summary judgment?

The defendants showed that a homeowner submitted a petition, AAM assessed more than 100 signers, written notice and ballots were sent, Peshek received notice and voted, a quorum was present, members could be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him. Peshek did not provide admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute on those facts.

Did the court require cause to remove a board member?

No. The court found that both A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration allowed a board member to be removed with or without cause. Even a claimed improper motive by another board member was not material if the required procedure was followed.

Was serving on the board treated as a contractual right?

No. The court held that the Declaration gave Peshek rights such as property use and common-area maintenance, but did not give him a contractual right to serve on the board.

What happened to the good-faith and tortious-interference claims?

They failed on summary judgment. The court found no material fact showing that removal from the board denied Peshek benefits under the Declaration, no supported improper interference, and no supported damages from losing an uncompensated board position.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of how one trial court analyzed a condominium board recall under A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and a declaration.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2017-056168 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 20, 2018
Judge / panelHon. Bruce R. Cohen, Hon. Susan M. Brnovich
PartiesRobert Peshek (Plaintiff, former board member) v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., Paul Jensen, and AAM, LLC (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
Board GovernanceElectionsCC&RsGood Faith & Fair Dealing
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted summary judgment to Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM on all claims, holding that Peshek's removal from the condominium association board complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration, that a board seat was not a contractual right under the Declaration, and that Peshek did not present admissible evidence creating a triable issue on breach of contract, good faith and fair dealing, or tortious interference.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewRobert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Robert Peshek, a former Anasazi Village board member, sued Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Paul Jensen, and AAM, LLC after homeowners removed him from the board at a May 25, 2016 special meeting. The court granted the defendants summary judgment on every claim. It found that a homeowner submitted a recall petition to AAM's representative, the board called and noticed a special meeting, Peshek received the notice and absentee ballot, Peshek voted against his removal, a quorum was present, members had an opportunity to be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him. The court held that the procedure complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the condominium Declaration, that the Declaration did not give Peshek a contractual right to stay on the board, and that he produced no admissible evidence of irregularities, breach, tortious interference, or damages.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the recall process. It found that Michael McGrane submitted a recall petition to AAM representative Wayne Yurk on or about May 2, 2016, that Yurk assessed more than 100 signatures, and that the board called a special meeting. A May 9 letter to all homeowners gave the meeting date, location, time, and subject matter and included an absentee ballot. Peshek actually received the notice and ballot before the meeting, returned a ballot voting against his own removal, and did not appear at the May 25 meeting. The court found that a quorum existed, members had an equal opportunity to be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him.

On the governing law, the court quoted and applied A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), including the requirements for a petition, notice, special meeting timing, quorum, and majority vote. It also found that the Declaration allowed a board member to be removed with or without cause and incorporated the statute's removal procedure. Because the defendants had shown compliance with both the statute and Declaration, the burden shifted to Peshek to produce evidence of a genuine factual dispute. The court found he had not done so: he raised alleged irregularities about petition signatures, notice, and the opportunity to be heard, but offered no admissible or reliable evidence to counter the defendants' showing.

The remaining claims failed for the same reason. The court found no material issue showing breach of contract by Jensen or the association; even if Jensen had initiated the recall for an improper motive, the statute and Declaration required only that the proper procedure be followed. The good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim failed because the Declaration gave Peshek rights such as property use and common-area maintenance, but not a contractual right to serve on the board. The tortious-interference claim failed because the defendants showed no breach, no improper interference, and no supported damages from removal from an uncompensated board position.

Why It Matters

This is a useful Arizona condominium governance ruling because it applies the board-removal provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) to a contested recall. The court treated procedure as the decisive issue: petition threshold, written notice, special meeting, quorum, opportunity to be heard, and majority vote. It did not require cause for removal because both the statute and the Declaration allowed removal with or without cause.

The ruling also shows the limits of turning a board recall into damages litigation. A homeowner may disagree with recall politics or suspect bad motives, but at summary judgment the homeowner must produce admissible evidence of a procedural violation, breach, improper interference, and damages. Here the court held that service on the board was not a contractual right and was not compensated, so removal from the board did not itself show loss of benefits under the Declaration. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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