Arizona Supreme Court · CC&R Enforcement · Attorney Fees
A Tucson homeowner’s lawsuit over a neighbor’s air conditioner ended with a unanimous Supreme Court ruling on who pays the lawyers when one owner sues another under the CC&Rs.
Arizona Supreme Court | No. CV-25-0143-PR | Decided October 28, 2026 | Unanimous opinion by Justice Montgomery | Last reviewed October 29, 2026
Scope note: This educational page summarizes the Arizona Supreme Court’s October 28, 2026 opinion in Burkett v. Dryja, No. CV-25-0143-PR. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion (260 Ariz. 1 (App. 2025)) and sent the case back to the Pima County Superior Court to set the amount of the Dryjas’ reasonable attorney fees. The Supreme Court docket as of October 28, 2026 showed the decision rendered, no mandate yet issued, and the case not yet closed. This page is not legal advice.
The takeaway
When recorded CC&Rs make each covenant enforceable by “any Owner” and award fees to “the prevailing party or parties” in enforcement proceedings, an owner who sues a neighbor under those covenants and loses must pay the neighbor’s reasonable attorney fees, even if the same claim could also have been brought as an ordinary nuisance case.
Case snapshot
A homeowner sued her next-door neighbors over noise and vibration from the new air-conditioning unit they installed in a different spot on their patio, and sued the HOA for not enforcing the CC&Rs against them.
After a three-day bench trial, the neighbors and the Association won every count. The court found the noise annoying in her bedroom but not an actionable nuisance or a CC&R violation.
The Association was awarded $60,000 in fees and costs, and no one appealed that award. The neighbors’ fee request was denied, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.
Unanimous: the anti-nuisance covenant is a contract between neighbors, the CC&R fee clause applies by its terms, and the neighbors get their reasonable fees. The trial court will set the amount.
Case Dossier
This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | No. CV-25-0143-PR (Ariz. Oct. 28, 2026) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Arizona Supreme Court |
| Decision / key date | October 28, 2026 |
| Judge / panel | Justice William G. Montgomery (author), Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer, Vice Chief Justice John R. Lopez IV, Justice Clint Bolick, Justice James P. Beene, Justice Kathryn H. King, Justice Maria Elena Cruz |
| Parties | Stephanie Burkett, as trustee of the Stephanie Rae Burkett Revocable Trust dated January 28, 2011 (homeowner; plaintiff, appellee and respondent) v. John and Anita Dryja (her next-door neighbors; defendants, appellants and petitioners) |
| Governing law |
|
| Topics | CC&RsAttorney FeesCovenants |
| Outcome / holding | A written anti-nuisance covenant in recorded CC&Rs is a contractual obligation that one owner may enforce against another, and it remains enforceable even though the common law also prohibits nuisances. A CC&R provision awarding fees to "the prevailing party or parties" in court proceedings "instituted in connection with the rights of enforcement and remedies" is enforceable according to its terms as to all prevailing parties, so the neighbors who defeated the nuisance suit are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. |
| Primary public source | View hosted source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Reviewed source package | 5 PDFs |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | No separate litigation roadmap table on this page |
| Video overview | Burkett v. Dryja: CC&R nuisance claims and attorney fees |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 9 questions |
| Featured download links | 5 download links |
Key Issues & Findings
Stephanie Burkett sued her next-door neighbors, John and Anita Dryja, and the Moondance Estate Community Association in Pima County Superior Court. She alleged that noise and vibration from the new air-conditioning unit the Dryjas installed in a different spot on their patio violated the anti-nuisance covenant in the Moondance Estates CC&Rs. After a three-day bench trial, the court ruled for the Dryjas and the Association on every count. It awarded the Association $60,000 in fees and costs, but it denied the Dryjas' fee request, treating Burkett's claim against them as a tort nuisance claim outside the CC&Rs' fee clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A unanimous Arizona Supreme Court reversed that fee ruling. It held that a recorded anti-nuisance covenant is a contract one owner may enforce against another even when the same conduct is also a tort, that the statutory "but-for" test under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 does not govern an express fee clause, and that the CC&Rs' prevailing-party provision entitles the Dryjas to their reasonable attorney fees. It vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and remanded for the trial court to set the amount.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Montgomery began with the CC&Rs themselves. Section 10.2 makes every provision a personal covenant "for the benefit of the Association and with and for the benefit of any other Owner," and section 10.3 lets "any Owner" enforce "each provision" by injunction or by a suit for damages. Because a deed containing a restrictive covenant that runs with the land is a contract (Powell v. Washburn), the CC&Rs bind Burkett and the Dryjas to each other, not only to the Association. Every owner took title with notice of the nuisance rule, the right to enforce it, and the potential cost of losing.
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' view that the covenant was "a distinction without a difference" because it mirrored tort law. It gave three reasons. The preexisting-duty rule concerns consideration, and the CC&Rs are a comprehensive exchange of reciprocal obligations that needs no separate consideration for each term. Section 7.18 also reaches beyond common-law nuisance: it runs to every owner and the Association, covers "suffer[ing] to exist" a nuisance, separately bars objectionable noise, and bans exterior loudspeakers. And even complete overlap would not matter, because the same conduct may breach both a contract and a tort duty (Sirrah Enterprises v. Wunderlich), and freedom of contract lets parties choose their remedies.
Finally, the Court held that the "but-for" test of Sparks, Barmat and Ramsey interprets the discretionary fee statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which by its own terms does not alter contractual fee provisions. When the parties have a fee clause, the question is whether the claim falls within that clause. Burkett sued as an Owner to enforce section 7.18, sought the injunction and damages that section 10.3 provides, and requested her own fees under it. The Dryjas prevailed on every count, and "shall be entitled" makes their award mandatory. The Court did not define the clause's outer limits and did not reach the Dryjas' alternative argument based on Burkett's claims against the Association.
Prevailing-party fee clauses are common in Arizona CC&Rs. Under this decision, when one owner sues another to enforce a recorded covenant under a clause worded like this one, the loser can be required to pay the winner's reasonable attorney fees. That is true even if the same claim could have been brought as an ordinary nuisance case, and even when the defendant is a neighbor rather than the association. The clause works in both directions: it strengthens an owner's hand on a claim that succeeds, and it raises the price of a claim that fails.
Before an owner-versus-owner dispute reaches court, owners, boards and their lawyers should read the declaration's enforcement and fee provisions closely. The Court tied its result to this declaration's text and did not decide the outer limits of such clauses, so the exact wording still matters.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- John Dryja (Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner)
Next-door neighbor and Moondance Estates lot owner; won at trial and won review of the fee ruling. - Anita Dryja (Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner)
Next-door neighbor and Moondance Estates lot owner; sued and prevailed together with John Dryja. - Moondance Estate Community Association, Inc. (Co-defendant in the superior court; not a party to the appeal)
The homeowners association for Moondance Estates in Tucson. It prevailed at trial and was awarded $60,000 in fees and costs; it was not a party to the appeal or the petition for review. - Brian A. Laird (Counsel)
Laird Law PLLC, Tucson
Counsel for John and Anita Dryja; argued the case in the Supreme Court.
Respondent Side
- Stephanie Burkett (Plaintiff/Appellee/Respondent)
Moondance Estates lot owner who sued as trustee of the Stephanie Rae Burkett Revocable Trust dated January 28, 2011; lost at trial and on review of the fee ruling. - Evan L. Thompson (Counsel)
Thompson Krone, P.L.C., Tucson
Counsel for Stephanie Burkett. - Alan R. Hill (Counsel)
Thompson Krone, P.L.C., Tucson
Counsel for Stephanie Burkett; argued the case in the Supreme Court.
Neutral Parties
- Justice William G. Montgomery (Judge)
Authored the unanimous opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court. - Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Vice Chief Justice John R. Lopez IV (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Justice Clint Bolick (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Justice James P. Beene (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Justice Kathryn H. King (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Justice Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
Joined the opinion. - Judge Sklar (Judge)
Court of Appeals, Division Two; authored the 2025 opinion affirming the fee denial, joined by Presiding Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Vásquez. That opinion was vacated. - Hon. Wayne E. Yehling (Judge)
Pima County Superior Court judge who presided over the bench trial (No. C20224152).
Video overview of the ruling
An AI-generated video overview of Burkett v. Dryja, No. CV-25-0143-PR (Ariz. Oct. 28, 2026). It walks through the facts, the fee rulings in each court and the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The Court’s opinion controls.
Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling
An AI-generated audio discussion of the case: how a noise complaint about an air conditioner became a Supreme Court decision about who pays the lawyers when one homeowner sues another under the CC&Rs.
What happened
Stephanie Burkett and John and Anita Dryja own adjoining lots in Moondance Estates, a Tucson subdivision governed by the Moondance Estate Community Association, Inc. Their homes are patio homes that sit only a few feet apart, and both lots are subject to the Association’s recorded CC&Rs, formally the Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Moondance Estates. Burkett brought the case as trustee of her revocable trust.
In June 2021 the Dryjas replaced their air-conditioning unit with a new unit placed in a different position on their patio. Burkett complained that she could hear the new unit and feel its vibrations inside her home, particularly in her primary bedroom. Efforts to resolve the problem failed. Burkett also complained to the Association, which investigated, concluded that the unit was properly installed and was not objectionably loud, and declined to take further action.
Burkett then sued the Dryjas and the Association. Her second amended complaint alleged that the noise and vibrations were a nuisance prohibited by section 7.18 of the CC&Rs, that the CC&Rs are a contract among Burkett, the Dryjas and the Association, and that the Dryjas breached the CC&Rs by creating the nuisance and by not locating the unit as the CC&Rs and the Association’s design guidelines required. She alleged that the Association breached the CC&Rs by failing to enforce them. She asked the court to order the Dryjas to stop the noise and to remove, relocate or replace the unit, to order the Association to follow its governing documents, and to award damages and her attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and section 10.3 of the CC&Rs.
After a three-day bench trial, the superior court ruled for the Dryjas and the Association on every count. The court acknowledged that Burkett’s “concerns are not baseless,” but found that although the unit “makes annoying noise when heard within [Burkett]’s bedroom, such noise does not constitute an actionable nuisance.” It also found that the noise did not violate the CC&Rs and that Burkett had not proved that either the Dryjas or the Association breached any contract or obligation owed to her. That merits ruling was not appealed. Everything that followed concerned attorney fees.
Who asked for fees, and what each court did
Awarded the Association $60,000 for its fees and costs because Burkett’s claims against it were based on contract. Denied the Dryjas’ request and limited them to taxable costs, treating Burkett’s claim against them as “essentially a nuisance claim” that existed apart from the CC&Rs.
Affirmed the denial. Because the duty not to create a nuisance comes from tort law, it held that the suit kept its tort character; the CC&R nuisance ban “simply mirrors” that duty, and parties “may not contract to create duties that already exist as a matter of law.”
Vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and reversed the fee denial. The covenant is a contract between neighbors, the fee clause applies by its terms, and the Dryjas are entitled to reasonable fees, including their fees on appeal.
The three questions the Court answered
- Does the CC&R fee clause cover every prevailing party? “Where a written fee-shifting term in recorded CCRs requires an award of attorney’s fees to all prevailing parties in any Court Proceedings instituted in connection with the rights of enforcement and remedies under CCRs, is the term enforceable as to all prevailing parties in an enforcement action?” The Court answered yes.
- Is an anti-nuisance covenant enforceable as a contract between neighbors? “Is a written anti-nuisance term in the recorded CCRs of an Arizona HOA enforceable in contract, where the prevailing party is a next-door neighbor of the losing party and therefore has a pre-existing duty in tort?” The Court answered yes.
- Did the Court of Appeals err? “Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that a pre-existing tort duty renders unenforceable a written contractual term containing the same duty?” The Court answered yes.
Why the CC&Rs are a contract between neighbors
Burkett argued that the CC&Rs are a contract between the owners as a whole and each individual owner, so her claim against the Dryjas could only sound in tort. The Court held that the text of the CC&Rs forecloses that argument. Section 10.2 deems each provision incorporated in every deed and, once an owner accepts title, “a personal covenant to, with and for the benefit of the Association and with and for the benefit of any other Owner.” Section 7.18 binds every “Owner,” and section 10.3 authorizes “any Owner” to enforce “each provision” by injunction or by a suit for damages.
Relying on Powell v. Washburn (a deed containing a restrictive covenant that runs with the land is a contract) and Duffy v. Sunburst Farms (an owner who accepts a deed subject to recorded restrictions is bound by them), the Court concluded that the CC&Rs are a contract between Burkett and the Dryjas as much as between each of them and the Association. The burdens and benefits of section 7.18 are reciprocal.
The Court of Appeals had hesitated because individual owners rarely draft CC&Rs. The Supreme Court answered that nothing about sections 7.18, 10.2 or 10.3 is indirect, and that enforcing them reorders no one’s rights. Unlike the new affirmative obligations imposed without notice in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, the nuisance and fee provisions here appear in the recorded declaration itself, so every owner took title with notice of the duty, the right to enforce it, and the potential cost of losing.
Three reasons the overlap with nuisance law did not matter
That rule asks whether a promise is supported by consideration. The Court distinguished Travelers v. Breese, where an insurer promised nothing beyond what a statute already required. The CC&Rs are a comprehensive exchange of reciprocal obligations, and Arizona law does not require separate consideration for each term.
The covenant runs to every owner and to the Association, not only to a harmed neighbor. It forbids “suffer[ing] to exist” a nuisance, separately bars objectionable noise, and bans exterior loudspeakers except for security and alarms.
Even complete overlap would not matter. The same conduct can breach a contract and a tort duty (Sirrah Enterprises v. Wunderlich), and freedom of contract lets parties choose remedies, including fee shifting, unless a statute or a clearly outweighing public policy forbids it.
Why the statutory “but-for” test did not control
Both lower courts relied on cases applying A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), which gives a court discretion to award fees in “any contested action arising out of a contract.” To decide when a tort claim between contracting parties “arises out of” a contract, Arizona courts use a “but-for” test from Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., applied in Barmat v. John & Jane Doe Partners and Ramsey Air Meds v. Cutter Aviation: fees are available only when the tort could not exist but for the contract.
The Supreme Court held that the test does not govern here. Sparks, Barmat and Ramsey each involved a discretionary request under the statute and none had a specific fee agreement, as Burkett’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument. The statute itself says it “shall not be construed as altering, prohibiting or restricting present or future contracts or statutes that may provide for attorney fees,” and contractual fee provisions are enforced according to their terms, as in McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association v. Simons and Heritage Heights Home Owners Association v. Esser.
So when parties have agreed to a fee provision, the question is not whether a claim “arises out of a contract” under the statute, but whether it falls within the words of the agreement. Importing the statutory test into section 10.3, the Court said, incorrectly rewrote the parties’ agreement.
How the fee clause applied
Section 10.3 applies when (1) “any [c]ourt proceedings are instituted” (2) “in connection with the rights of enforcement and remedies provided in” the CC&Rs, and (3) there is a prevailing party entitled to recover from a losing party. The Court found each element met.
Burkett sued the Dryjas as an “Owner” for violating section 7.18 and for breaching the CC&Rs. She sought an injunction and damages, the remedies section 10.3 lists, and she asked for her own fees under section 10.3. Her suit therefore did not merely relate to the CC&Rs; it invoked the very enforcement rights and remedies the clause describes. The Dryjas were prevailing parties because judgment was entered for them on every count.
Nothing in section 10.3 limits recovery to the Association: it entitles “the prevailing party or parties” to recover from “the losing party or parties.” Because the clause says the prevailing parties “shall be entitled” to fees, the award is mandatory rather than discretionary. The Court also granted the Dryjas their reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal and in the Supreme Court, upon compliance with appellate Rule 21, and denied Burkett’s request for costs because she was not the successful party.
What the Court did not decide
- The outer limits of the fee clause. The Court said it did not suggest that section 10.3 reaches every lawsuit between owners that merely touches upon the CC&Rs, and it did not define the clause’s outer limits.
- The Dryjas' alternative argument. It did not decide whether the Dryjas could also recover fees because Burkett’s claims against the Association were brought to enforce the CC&Rs.
- How far the noise standard departs from nuisance law. It was enough that section 7.18 is not identical to the tort duty; the Court did not decide the precise extent of the difference.
- The amount of the fees. The superior court will determine the reasonable fees on remand. The Association’s separate $60,000 award was not appealed and was not before the Supreme Court.
- Whether the air conditioner was a nuisance. The trial court decided that question for the Dryjas, and Burkett did not appeal it. The Supreme Court addressed only attorney fees.
Case timeline
| Date | Court | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| June 2021 | Not yet in court | The Dryjas replace their air-conditioning unit and place the new unit in a different position on their patio. Burkett complains of noise and vibration; the Association investigates and declines to act. |
| Trial court phase | Pima County Superior Court, No. C20224152 | Burkett sues the Dryjas and the Association. After a three-day bench trial, judgment is entered for both defendants on every count. The Association is awarded $60,000 in fees and costs; the Dryjas’ fee request is denied except for taxable costs. |
| April 30, 2025 | Court of Appeals, Division Two, No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0291 | Opinion affirms the denial of the Dryjas’ fees, later reported at 260 Ariz. 1 (App. 2025). |
| May 28, 2025 | Arizona Supreme Court | The Dryjas file a petition for review. |
| November 4, 2025 | Arizona Supreme Court | Review granted; oral argument ordered; the Dryjas’ request for fees on appeal is continued. |
| November 24, 2025 | Arizona Supreme Court | Burkett files a supplemental brief. |
| January 15, 2026 | Arizona Supreme Court | Oral argument. Brian A. Laird argues for the Dryjas; Alan R. Hill argues for Burkett. |
| October 28, 2026 | Arizona Supreme Court, No. CV-25-0143-PR | Unanimous opinion vacates the Court of Appeals opinion, reverses the denial of the Dryjas’ fees, grants fees on appeal, and remands for the trial court to set reasonable fees. |
Practical lessons from Burkett v. Dryja
- Read your declaration’s enforcement and attorney-fee sections before suing a neighbor or the association.
- A clause like section 10.3 can make the losing owner pay the winning neighbors’ reasonable fees, not only the association’s.
- Here the owner who lost at trial faced two fee awards: $60,000 for the Association and the Dryjas’ fees, still to be set.
- Being allowed to enforce a covenant is not the same as proving a violation; the trial court still decides the facts.
- Fee clauses worded for “the prevailing party or parties” can apply in disputes between owners.
- Many covenants can be enforced by owners directly against each other, not only by the association.
- The Association here investigated the complaint and explained its conclusion; the opinion records that it found the unit properly installed and not objectionably loud.
- With an express CC&R fee clause, the clause’s own words decide fees, not the statutory “but-for” test.
- Pleading a CC&R violation and asking for fees under the CC&Rs helped make this suit one brought “in connection with” the CC&Rs.
- The Court did not define the outer limits of such clauses, so not every dispute that touches the CC&Rs will qualify.
Related Arizona decisions on this site
The Supreme Court relied on several decisions that have their own guides here: Powell v. Washburn (restrictive covenants are contracts read by their plain meaning), Duffy v. Sunburst Farms (owners are bound by recorded restrictions), Wilson v. Playa de Serrano (clear covenants are enforced according to their terms), and Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA (limits on adding new restrictions without notice).
On attorney fees, the Court cited McDowell Mountain Ranch Community Association v. Simons and Heritage Heights Home Owners Association v. Esser for the rule that contracts for attorney fees are enforced according to their terms. The vacated Court of Appeals opinion relied on Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Association for the elements of a nuisance claim.
FAQ
What did the Arizona Supreme Court decide in Burkett v. Dryja?
It held that a recorded CC&R covenant against nuisances is a contract that one owner can enforce against another, even though nuisance law already forbids the same conduct, and that the CC&Rs’ prevailing-party fee clause applies to such a suit. Because the Dryjas won Burkett’s lawsuit, they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees.
Did the Supreme Court decide whether the air conditioner was a nuisance?
No. The trial court found that the unit made annoying noise in Burkett’s bedroom but was not an actionable nuisance and did not violate the CC&Rs. That ruling was not appealed; the appeals concerned only the Dryjas’ attorney fees.
Why did the lower courts deny the Dryjas' fees?
They treated Burkett’s claim against the Dryjas as a tort nuisance claim that existed apart from the CC&Rs and applied the “but-for” test used under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The Court of Appeals added that the CC&R nuisance ban simply mirrored the tort duty.
Why did the Supreme Court say the “but-for” test did not apply?
That test interprets the discretionary fee statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which by its own terms does not alter contracts that provide for fees. When the parties have an express fee clause, the question is whether the claim falls within the clause’s words. Section 10.3 covers court proceedings instituted in connection with the CC&Rs’ enforcement rights and remedies, and Burkett’s suit was one.
Does this mean the loser of any HOA neighbor dispute pays the other side’s lawyers?
Not automatically. The result depends on the declaration’s wording, and the Court said it was not holding that the clause reaches every lawsuit between owners that merely touches the CC&Rs. It did not define the clause’s outer limits.
How much will Burkett have to pay the Dryjas?
No amount has been set. The Supreme Court remanded to the Pima County Superior Court to determine the reasonable fees, and it also granted the Dryjas reasonable fees and costs on appeal upon compliance with appellate Rule 21. The Association’s separate $60,000 trial-court award was not appealed.
Is the Court of Appeals opinion in Burkett v. Dryja still good law?
No. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion reported at 260 Ariz. 1 (App. 2025), so it no longer states Arizona law on this issue.
Is the case over?
The Supreme Court has decided the legal question. What remains is for the superior court to set the amount of the Dryjas’ reasonable fees. The Supreme Court docket as of October 28, 2026 showed no mandate yet issued.
Who represented the parties?
Brian A. Laird of Laird Law PLLC in Tucson represented John and Anita Dryja and argued for them. Evan L. Thompson and Alan R. Hill of Thompson Krone, P.L.C. in Tucson represented Stephanie Burkett; Hill argued for her.
Complete source-document index
This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.
Court Of Appeals Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Court of Appeals, Division Two, opinion (No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0291, filed April 30, 2025) affirming the denial of the Dryjas' fee request on the theory that the nuisance claim sounded in tort. Vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court on October 28, 2026.
Supreme Court Minutes Granting Review
Type: Court/source PDF
Arizona Supreme Court minutes of November 4, 2025 granting the Dryjas' petition for review, setting oral argument and supplemental-brief deadlines, and continuing the Dryjas' fee request. The Burkett v. Dryja entry (item 12) is on page 4; the minutes also list unrelated cases.
Oral Argument Case Summary
Type: Court/source PDF
Two-page oral argument case summary prepared by the Arizona Supreme Court Staff Attorneys' Office for the January 15, 2026 argument. Educational only; it is not official commentary by the Court.
Supreme Court Docket
Type: Court/source PDF
Arizona Supreme Court docket report as of October 28, 2026: the petition for review, the order granting review, Burkett's supplemental brief, the oral argument and the opinion.
Supreme Court Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Unanimous Arizona Supreme Court opinion (No. CV-25-0143-PR, filed October 28, 2026) holding that a recorded CC&R anti-nuisance covenant is enforceable in contract between neighbors and that the CC&Rs' prevailing-party clause entitles the Dryjas to their reasonable attorney fees.
Primary sources
- Arizona Supreme Court opinion, No. CV-25-0143-PR (October 28, 2026)
- Court of Appeals opinion, No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0291 (April 30, 2025; vacated)
- Staff Attorneys’ Office oral argument case summary (January 15, 2026 argument)
- Arizona Supreme Court docket report (as of October 28, 2026)
- Minutes granting review (November 4, 2025; Burkett entry on page 4)
Reviewed October 29, 2026 against the Arizona Supreme Court opinion filed October 28, 2026, the vacated Court of Appeals opinion, the Supreme Court docket report, the November 4, 2025 minutes granting review, and the Staff Attorneys’ Office oral argument summary. The Pima County Superior Court filings (No. C20224152), including the trial ruling, the fee rulings and the parties’ briefs, are not in this source set; facts about the trial come from the appellate opinions, and quoted trial-court language is as quoted there. The audio and video overviews were generated with Google NotebookLM from the two opinions, the case summary and an editorial guide. Their full narration and every video slide were checked against the opinion before publication; eight short unsupported passages were removed from the audio, one video slide was corrected so it no longer suggests the contract duty replaces the nuisance-law duty, and no speech was added. This page is educational information, not legal advice.