CC&R Amendments & Rental Restrictions | A.R.S. §§ 33-1227, 33-1260.01 | CV2015-091102
In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, condominium owners in the Scottsdale Astragal community argued that an amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required the unanimous consent of all unit owners under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). The court held the rental restriction was instead subject to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, noted that A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A) lets owners rent their units only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions, found the six-month rule not unreasonable, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102.
Scope note: This page covers Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment (downloadable above) and the February 24, 2016 judgment entry; the procedural timeline below tracks each collected minute entry. Currency caveat: the court entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c) on February 24, 2016, stating that no further matters remained in the case, and the collected minute entries show no later activity — this page does not track whether any appeal was taken. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
The superior court upheld the Association’s amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. It held the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) — which applies to amendments that, among other things, change “the use to which any unit is restricted” — but instead to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), which lets a unit owner rent a unit only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions. Finding the six-month restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and finding no due-process violation because the owners had ample notice the Declaration could be amended, the court denied the owners’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Final judgment including the Association’s attorneys’ fees followed in February 2016.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Richard J. Murtland (Plaintiff)
Condominium owner in the Scottsdale Astragal community who challenged the six-month minimum rental amendment, contending he was damaged because he could not generate income through short-term rentals. - Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiff)
Co-plaintiff condominium owner. The court found both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association. - Erin Selene Iungerich (Counsel)
Substituted in as the plaintiffs’ attorney of record in July 2015 (a substitution within the same firm as J. Roger Wood) and appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument. - J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
The plaintiffs’ original attorney of record, replaced by Erin S. Iungerich in a within-firm substitution in July 2015; he also appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.
Respondent Side
- Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant)
Scottsdale condominium association whose owners voted, under the Declaration’s 67% amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences; it prevailed on cross-summary judgment and recovered its attorneys’ fees. - J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association, appearing on its behalf at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.
Neutral Parties
- David K. Udall (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions for summary judgment, issued the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling, and signed the February 2016 final judgment.
What happened
Astragal is a Scottsdale condominium community governed by a Declaration. The Declaration includes a provision allowing 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration. Using that mechanism, the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association amended its Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all of its residences whenever owners lease or rent their units to third parties.
Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield, both owners of condominiums in the community, sued the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2015-091102). Their position was that they had been damaged because the amendment prevented them from generating income through short-term rentals. In July 2015 the court granted a notice of substitution of counsel within the plaintiffs’ firm, allowing attorney Erin S. Iungerich to substitute for J. Roger Wood as attorney of record.
The dispute was resolved on paper rather than at trial. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the Association filed a cross-motion for summary judgment; the court found that neither party disputed the significant facts. After full briefing, the court set oral argument, which Judge David K. Udall heard on January 8, 2016, with Iungerich and Wood appearing for the plaintiffs and J. Gary Linder for the Association. The court took the matter under advisement.
In an under-advisement ruling issued January 12, 2016, the court rejected the owners’ central statutory argument. A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) provides that, except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act, an amendment may not “change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interest of the unit or the use to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners.” The court found the rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also noted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), under which “[a] unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.”
The court then distinguished the plaintiffs’ lead case, Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to force non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs were already members of the Astragal Association and, in the court’s words, “knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future.” The court further found the six-month leasing restriction “is not unreasonable, and it has potential benefits for the community at large,” and that the plaintiffs’ due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties. It denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
The endgame was brief. On February 24, 2016, after reviewing the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and the plaintiffs’ response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in favor of the Association, in accordance with a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016. The court noted that no further matters remained in the case, making it a final judgment under Rule 54(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.
Procedural timeline
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/richard-j-murtland-v-astragal-condominium-unit-owners-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
FAQ
Can a condominium association restrict short-term rentals by amending its CC&Rs?
In this case, yes. The Astragal Declaration allowed 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the owners used that provision to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. The court upheld the amendment, holding it was subject to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, and found the six-month restriction was not unreasonable and had potential benefits for the community at large.
Didn’t changing how units can be used require unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D)?
That was the owners’ central argument. Section 33-1227(D) requires the unanimous consent of unit owners for amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or “the use to which any unit is restricted.” The court found the six-month rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement — it fell under the 67% amendment rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as the Astragal Declaration adopted it.
What role did A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 play in the ruling?
The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): “A unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.” In other words, the statute itself contemplates that a declaration can prohibit rentals or set rental time period restrictions — which is what the Astragal amendment did.
Why didn’t Dreamland Villa v. Raimey help the owners?
The plaintiffs relied on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010), but the court found it distinguishable. In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and knew when they bought their units that the Declaration could be amended by a 67% majority vote in the future. The court held the Dreamland holding did not apply.
Did the owners recover anything?
No. The court denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice on January 12, 2016. It then granted the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and, on February 24, 2016, entered a final judgment in the Association’s favor under Rule 54(c).
Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?
No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Maricopa County judge applied the Condominium Act’s amendment rules — the 67% supermajority in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) versus the unanimous-consent triggers in § 33-1227(D) — to a rental-restriction amendment, and it illustrates the fee-shifting risk owners face when a challenge to a CC&R amendment fails.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | CV2015-091102 (Maricopa County Superior Court) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Superior Court |
| Decision / key date | January 12, 2016 |
| Judge / panel | Hon. David K. Udall |
| Parties | Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiffs, condominium owners) v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | amendmentscc-and-rscovenantsrental-restrictionsattorneys-fees |
| Outcome / holding | The superior court granted the association summary judgment on its cross-motion and dismissed the owners’ case with prejudice, holding that a declaration amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) but to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the declaration, that the restriction was not unreasonable, and that the owners’ due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice the declaration could be amended. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 5 PDFs |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 7 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
Two owners of condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community sued their association after the owners amended the Declaration, under its 67%-vote amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The owners claimed they were damaged because they could not generate income through short-term rentals, and argued the amendment changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). On cross-motions for summary judgment, with the significant facts undisputed, the court held in a January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling that the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement but to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration. It distinguished Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, found the six-month restriction not unreasonable, denied the owners’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. A final Rule 54(c) judgment awarding the association its attorneys’ fees was entered February 24, 2016.
The court began from undisputed facts: both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community, the Declaration allowed 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the Association used that provision to amend the Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The plaintiffs claimed damage because they could not generate income through short-term rentals. The court set the statutory frame with A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), which — except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act — bars amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or “the use to which any unit is restricted” absent the unanimous consent of the unit owners. It also quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): a unit owner may use the unit as a rental property “unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.” On that framework the court found the rental restriction was not subject to § 33-1227(D)’s unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration.
The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and “knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future,” so the Dreamland holding did not apply. The court further found the six-month leasing restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and found no due-process violation because the plaintiffs had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties.
On those findings the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted judgment for the Association on its cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. After reviewing the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and the plaintiffs’ response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in the Association’s favor in a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016 — a final judgment under Rule 54(c), with no further matters remaining in the case.
Short-term-rental restrictions are one of the most common flashpoints in Arizona condominium communities, and this case shows how a Maricopa County judge sorted the key statutory question: which amendments require every owner’s consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), and which need only the supermajority the declaration itself sets under § 33-1227(A). Owners challenging a rental-restriction amendment often assume that limiting rentals “changes the use to which the unit is restricted” and so demands unanimity; here the court held a six-month minimum rental period adopted by the Declaration’s 67% vote was valid without unanimous consent.
The ruling also illustrates two recurring themes. First, courts weigh what buyers signed up for: because the plaintiffs bought into a community whose Declaration could be amended by a 67% vote, the court found they had ample notice that rental rules could change, and it distinguished Dreamland Villa, where a majority vote forced obligations onto people who had never joined the association. Second, losing a challenge like this can be expensive — the case ended with a final judgment awarding the association its attorneys’ fees. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent, but it is a clean, compact example of how these disputes get resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment.