Tag Archives: open-meetings

The takeaway

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What happened

Sunland Springs Village is a planned community in Maricopa County, Arizona, subject to Arizona’s Planned Community Act (A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, §§ 33-1801 to 33-1820). The community is governed by a homeowners association that conducts its business through board of directors’ meetings, some of which are closed to residents. The homeowner in this case owns residential property in the community and holds it through the AZNH Revocable Trust.

According to the opinion, Sunland Springs did not permit residents to attend its closed meetings except by invitation, and its board president determined what business would be addressed in closed sessions. Before a closed meeting, the association gave members notice of the date, time, and place and quoted the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that allows meetings to be closed. Its closed-meeting agendas identified matters only by the paragraph of Section 33-1804(A) corresponding to the topic.

The opinion states that Sunland Springs conducted formal business and voting during its closed meetings. Among other things, the board approved a $917,000 budget item, granted the community manager up to $7,000 in discretionary spending authority, addressed 13 waivers of the community’s minimum-age requirement for residents, and authorized foreclosures against two homeowners—all in closed session.

In December 2023, the homeowner filed a declaratory-judgment action in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023-096192), alleging that Sunland Springs failed to conduct its meetings in compliance with Section 33-1804. After initial discovery, the homeowner moved for summary judgment on three points: that the board improperly voted and took formal action in closed meetings; that it had to designate closed-meeting agenda items by formal action at open meetings; and that its notices and agendas for closed meetings were deficient.

The superior court, the Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey presiding, granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part. It agreed that Section 33-1804 required votes to occur in open session, but held that the statute did not require the board to select closed-meeting agenda items by formal action at an open meeting, and did not require notices or agendas to describe closed-meeting topics beyond citing the applicable paragraph of Section 33-1804(A). The parties agreed the ruling resolved all claims, the court entered a final judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), and both sides appealed.

On April 28, 2026, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a published opinion authored by Judge James B. Morse Jr. and joined by Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya. The court affirmed that all votes and formal actions must occur at open meetings and that the content of the association’s notices complied with the statute. It reversed on the agenda issue, holding that closed-meeting agendas must reasonably describe the matters to be addressed, and it remanded for factual development on whether the board properly delegated to its president the duty to identify the reason for closing a meeting.

Because both parties prevailed in part, the court declined to award costs on appeal to either side and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. As of the opinion’s issuance, a petition for review was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), so the decision’s ultimate status could change.

This is a landmark 2026 interpretation of Arizona’s HOA open-meeting statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and it draws a bright line for planned-community and condominium boards: they may deliberate on sensitive matters such as legal advice, litigation, personnel, and member appeals behind closed doors, but they may not vote or take formal action there. Approving budgets, granting spending authority, ruling on waivers, or authorizing foreclosures must happen at an open meeting where members can be present and can speak before the vote. Boards that have historically finalized business in executive session will need to move those votes into open session. The decision also reshapes how boards must describe closed-session business. An agenda—even for a closed portion of a meeting—must give members information reasonably necessary to understand what will be addressed, not merely a citation to the statutory paragraph that authorizes closing the meeting, while still protecting personally identifying and privileged information. For homeowners, the ruling strengthens the right to meaningful notice and participation; for associations and managers, it signals a need to revise meeting notices, agendas, and closure procedures, including how the authority to state the reason for a closed meeting is delegated. Because the opinion is published it is binding Arizona precedent, but a petition for review is pending in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), so its status could change.

Open-meetings note: the published decision is treated here as a landmark Arizona planned-community open-meetings authority because it distinguishes deliberation from formal board action under A.R.S. section 33-1804.

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The rule in one sentence

Case Participants

What happened and why it matters

Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, a Tucson planned community, sued the association and the members of its board of directors after the 2011 board election was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the association’s annual meeting. She alleged the board breached its statutory obligations under A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 after withdrawing her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board and awarded them attorney fees and costs, and Tober appealed only the ruling on her breach-of-statutory-duty claim. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative and could not proceed as a direct action because she alleged no injury unique to herself, that neither the CC&Rs nor section 10-3304 authorized her particular statutory claim as pleaded, and that her challenge to the completed 2011 election and to speculative future elections presented no justiciable controversy for injunctive relief. The court added that, in any event, section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting. It also upheld the attorney-fee award and awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.

The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo because the material facts were undisputed, and it treated capacity to sue as a question of law. It first held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative rather than direct. An action by an association member is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members without any severance among individual holders. A member may sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from her membership, the wrongdoer owes her a duty for a reason other than membership, or her injury is unique to her rather than shared by the association. Tober alleged none of these; she asserted only a “personal stake in how her community is run,” and her theory was that Civano members as a whole were disadvantaged by the mail-in procedure. Because she did not follow the demand and standing requirements for a derivative suit under A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, that claim was properly dismissed.

The court next rejected the two authorities Tober said permitted her direct statutory claim. The CC&Rs’ section 16.1 gives owners a right to enforce the community documents, but Tober conceded her statutory claim was independent of the contract, and A.R.S. section 33-1812 could not be read into the CC&Rs because it was enacted after the CC&Rs were executed. A.R.S. section 10-3304 does let a planned community member sue the association to enjoin an ultra vires act, and the court agreed Tober could in theory bring such a claim. But injunctive relief was unavailable: she did not try to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground; her request to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore not a justiciable controversy.

Finally, and in any event, the court held the mail-in procedure did not violate section 33-1812. The statute’s phrase “if absentee ballots are used” shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by “some other form of delivery” such as mail; it does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections occur at the annual meeting, and section 33-1804 requires only that meetings be open, not that elections happen at them. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court’s discretion.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision illustrates how planned community election procedures are measured against A.R.S. section 33-1812 and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804. The court read section 33-1812 to permit an association to elect directors entirely by mail-in ballot, with ballots counted before the annual meeting, and concluded the statute does not compel in-person voting at every election or require that the election itself take place at the annual meeting. It also underscores a practical timing lesson: a member who believes an election procedure is unlawful generally must seek to enjoin it before the vote is finalized, because courts are reluctant to unwind a completed election or to issue advisory relief about future, speculative elections.

The opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, so under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure it is not precedent and generally may not be cited as legal authority; it is offered here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied. The decision also highlights procedural mechanics that recur in HOA disputes, including the derivative-versus-direct distinction for suits against a board and the risk that a member who loses such a suit may owe the association’s attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and a fee-shifting provision in the CC&Rs. The homeowner was represented by Elizabeth D. Bushell of Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C., and the association and its board by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt of Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Joan Tober, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; and Rick Hanson, Mark Levine, George Luis, Lee Rayburn, Bob Small, Chris Shipley, and Les Shipley, Defendants/Appellees (2 CA-CV 2012-0129). Under A.R.S. § 33-1812, a planned community association may conduct its board election exclusively by mail-in… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Joan Tober, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; and Rick Hanson, Mark Levine, George Luis, Lee Rayburn, Bob Small, Chris Shipley, and Les Shipley, Defendants/Appellees. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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Case Summary

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The rule in one sentence

Case Participants

What happened and why it matters

Three current or former members of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board — Cheryl “Cher” McCoy, Marcianne “Marci” Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a fellow homeowner, Leslie Johnson, for defamation and false light invasion of privacy over social-media posts and a comment at an August 2020 board meeting. The challenged statements accused board members affiliated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) of religiously motivated favoritism in selecting the board’s management committee (calling applicants “LDS hand-picked”) and questioned board members’ religion around the November 2019 board election and the June 2020 recall election that removed Marci and Melissa. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the claims under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures by reason of their board service and that the statements were non-actionable opinion. On appeal, Division One affirmed. It reasoned that the boards of large homeowners’ associations perform quasi-governmental functions and that their activities are matters of public concern to the community — reinforced by the Planned Communities Act’s open-meeting policy in A.R.S. § 33-1804 — so board members and candidates who inject themselves into HOA elections are limited-purpose public figures who must plead and prove actual malice. Because the plaintiffs failed to plead actual malice, and because limited-purpose public figures cannot maintain false light claims arising from their public duties, the court affirmed dismissal of both claims and denied Johnson’s unsupported request for appellate attorneys’ fees.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the Court of Appeals began with the settled rule that a court may decide as a matter of law whether a person is a public figure. Persons may be deemed public figures based on their positions, their purposeful activity in thrusting themselves into matters of public controversy, or their close involvement with the resolution of matters of public concern, and a person may become a limited-purpose public figure by voluntarily injecting themselves into, or being drawn into, a particular public controversy. Although Arizona courts had not decided in a written opinion whether board members of a large homeowners’ association can be limited-purpose public figures, the court found persuasive out-of-state authority holding that they can (Cabrera, Metge, Gulrajaney, Verna, and Martin). The superior court had relied on Verna, which viewed an association board position as essentially indistinguishable from membership on a town’s governing body because the board performs many quasi-municipal functions.

Applying that framework, the court observed that all three plaintiffs had been board candidates, had served on the Board, and had served as Board president at one time or another, so they either voluntarily injected themselves or were drawn into matters of concern to the Val Vista Lakes community. The court rejected the argument that a private association cannot produce public figures, citing Agar and Gulrajaney, and rejected the contention that plaintiffs did not start the “conversation” about their religion, explaining that voluntarily engaging in activity calculated to invite public scrutiny is enough. It also rejected the argument that the open-meeting provision of the Planned Communities Act shows HOAs are not governmental: the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) — that meetings be conducted openly and members be able to speak after discussion of agenda items — strongly suggests that board activities and decisions are matters of public concern. The court distinguished private business boards because the legislature extended First Amendment-type protections to HOA members (A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, -1808).

Because the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures, the false light claim failed under Godbehere, which bars such claims that relate to the performance of public duties; plaintiffs did not dispute that the statements related to their board service. On defamation, a public-figure plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice, and conclusory characterizations without supporting factual specificity fail Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, especially in defamation actions (BLK III; Cullen). Plaintiffs conceded two of the three statements were not actionable, and the remaining “LDS hand-picked” post was not in the record and was not pleaded with the specificity needed to show it made a verifiable factual assertion about Marci or Melissa. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal and denied Johnson’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees because she cited no legal basis for the award.

This memorandum decision addresses a recurring tension in community-association life: robust, sometimes bitter, debate about board elections and governance can collide with individual board members’ desire to protect their reputations. By treating board members and candidates of a large HOA as limited-purpose public figures, the court placed HOA electoral speech on a footing similar to speech about local government, requiring a defamation plaintiff to plead and prove actual malice and barring false light claims tied to public duties. In practice, that raises the pleading bar substantially for board members who sue critics over election-related statements, and it protects members’ ability to comment publicly on candidates and board decisions.

The decision also underscores how Arizona’s Planned Communities Act frames HOA governance as a matter of community-wide public concern. The court read the open-meeting policy of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (with A.R.S. § 33-1808) as evidence that board activities are open, participatory, and quasi-governmental, distinguishing HOA boards from ordinary private business boards. Because this is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule; even so, it illustrates how Arizona courts are likely to analyze defamation and false light claims arising from HOA elections, recall campaigns, and board management decisions. A separately docketed memorandum decision arising from the same community, McCoy v. Hassen, 1 CA-CV 21-0524, addresses related disputes.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Leslie Johnson, Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 21-0676). Members and candidates of a large homeowners’ association’s board are limited-purpose public figures for defamation… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Leslie Johnson, Defendant/Appellee. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The rule in one sentence

Case Participants

What happened and why it matters

Linda Greenberg and her neighbors, John and Eileen McGowan, own adjoining two-acre parcels in Inscription Canyon Ranch, a residential community in Williamson Valley, Arizona, that is governed by longstanding recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). After the Inscription Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC) approved the McGowans’ construction of a structure, Greenberg sued the McGowans, the ARC, and the ICR Water Users Association, Inc. The dispute centered on whether the structure was a permitted barn or a prohibited garage and whether the McGowans could keep two donkeys and a foal on their parcel. Greenberg’s operative complaint alleged breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of the homeowners’-association open-meetings statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The Yavapai County Superior Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, denied Greenberg’s requests to file a third amended complaint and for reconsideration, and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. On appeal, Division One reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact, no abuse of discretion in the procedural rulings, and no error in the fee award. The court also awarded the prevailing defendants their reasonable fees and taxable costs on appeal under the CC&Rs. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential.

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, the court treated the interpretation of the CC&Rs as a question of law, giving effect to the parties’ intent as shown by the language of the document read in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created (Powell v. Washburn). On the central animal question, the court rejected Greenberg’s premise that Paragraph 10 (“Livestock and Poultry”) created an exclusive list of permitted animals. Paragraph 10 expressly prohibits poultry, fowl, and swine and expressly permits horses and 4-H animal projects, but it never mentions donkeys and contains no catch-all establishing that the listed animals are the only ones allowed. Because the paragraph does not describe a class of prohibited animals, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply, and reading the covenant to bar donkeys would improperly render its broad references to “livestock,” “animals,” fences, and corrals superfluous. The court reinforced this reading with other provisions: Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 contemplate barns and outbuildings for animals of all kinds; Paragraph 6 describes a bridle path expressly for horses, mules, and donkeys; and Paragraphs 8, 13, and 19 show the drafters knew how to write comprehensive, all-encompassing prohibitions when they intended one — something Paragraph 10 conspicuously lacks. The court also noted A.R.S. § 3-1201’s definition of “equine” as including donkeys. On the barn-versus-garage issue, Greenberg conceded the structure had to date been used only as a barn (the approved use), so her theory that it might later be used as a garage presented an unripe, hypothetical dispute on which courts do not issue advisory opinions. Her breach-of-contract claim independently failed because she never disclosed a computation or measure of damages as required by Rule 26.1(a)(7); merely stating she would testify at trial could not create a triable issue under Rule 56(e). The court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint filed 20 months into the case after discovery closed and summary judgment was entered — the amendment came late, sought to add long-known parties, would have reopened discovery, and was partly futile — and no error in denying reconsideration that merely repackaged rejected CC&R arguments. Finally, because the CC&Rs entitle the prevailing party to reasonable fees and costs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 also applies, and because the defendants’ fee affidavits complied with Rule 54(g)(4), the fee award (including to the ARC) was proper.

For Arizona homeowners’ associations and their members, the decision illustrates a recurring principle of covenant interpretation: restrictions on the use of land are construed from the text of the recorded document as a whole, and a list of prohibited or permitted items is not treated as exhaustive unless the drafters said so. Because Paragraph 10 barred only certain animals and lacked any catch-all, the court would not read it to prohibit donkeys, and it pointed to the drafters’ use of sweeping language elsewhere in the CC&Rs as proof they knew how to impose a comprehensive ban when they wanted one. Boards, architectural committees, and owners drafting or enforcing covenants should note that ambiguity and omission tend to be resolved in favor of the free use of property, and that courts will avoid readings that render covenant language superfluous.

The case is also a practical reminder about litigation mechanics in HOA disputes. A breach-of-contract claim, even one tied to CC&Rs, still requires the plaintiff to disclose a computation and measure of damages; a promise to testify at trial will not defeat summary judgment. Motions to amend brought late — after discovery has closed and judgment entered — face steep odds, especially when they add previously known parties and would reopen discovery. And most owners bringing or defending covenant suits should anticipate that the CC&Rs’ prevailing-party fee clause, reinforced by A.R.S. § 12-341.01, can shift substantial attorneys’ fees to the losing side both in the trial court and on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision, however, the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Greenberg v. McGowan (1 CA-CV 19-0061). Greenberg showed no error in the interpretation and enforcement of the recorded CC&Rs — the covenants did not… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Greenberg v. McGowan. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings

The rule in one sentence

Case snapshot

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

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Case Participants

Why this case matters

McNally is one of the strongest Arizona HOA board-governance cases because it treats board service as a real office with enforceable participation rights. The board had confidentiality concerns, but the court held that excluding an elected director from every executive session prevented her from performing director duties.

The opinion does not say a director may disclose confidential information. It says the remedy for confidentiality concerns must come from lawful tools such as recusal in a particular conflict, judicial removal, or an injunction tailored to confidentiality, not a blanket board-created exclusion.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Colette McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. (1 CA-CV 15-0744). HOA board lacked authority to exclude a duly elected director from executive sessions. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Colette McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Homeowner study guide: director rights and executive sessions

Briefing notes from the review packet

Director-rights analysis from the briefing

Litigation roadmap

For homeowners and directors

• Use McNally when a board majority tries to silence or sideline an elected director without following removal procedures.
• Separate confidentiality rules from participation rights. A director may have duties, but the board needs authority for the remedy it chooses.
• Preserve meeting notices, executive-session exclusions, board minutes, and any conditions imposed on re-entry.

For boards and managers

• Do not use a blanket executive-session ban as informal discipline against a director.
• Use conflict-specific recusals, confidentiality orders, bylaws, or judicial remedies where legally supported.
• Document the legal authority for any limit placed on a director before voting on it.