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Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Board Recall | A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) | CV2017-056168

A condominium board member removed by homeowners challenged the recall process. The court held the association and manager complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration, and that a board seat was not a contractual benefit protected by the Declaration.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-056168.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-056168) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the August 20, 2018 order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the August 20, 2018 summary-judgment ruling, which ordered defendants to submit a form of judgment by September 25, 2018. Any later judgment, appeal, settlement, or collection history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

For a condominium board recall, the court focused on compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration: a sufficient petition, written notice of the special meeting, a quorum, an opportunity to be heard, and a majority vote of those voting. Because the defendants showed that process was followed and the plaintiff offered only unsupported assertions of irregularities, the court granted summary judgment to the association, AAM, and Jensen on all claims.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert Peshek (Plaintiff)
    Former Anasazi Village board member removed by homeowners at a May 25, 2016 special meeting; challenged the recall process and asserted claims against the association, AAM, and Jensen.
  • Justin R. Cooley (Counsel)
    Counsel for Peshek at the August 17, 2018 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Condominium association whose homeowners voted to remove Peshek from the board; prevailed on summary judgment.
  • AAM, LLC (Defendant)
    Community-management company whose representative received the recall petition, assessed that it had more than 100 signers, and later gave Peshek notice of his removal; prevailed on summary judgment.
  • Paul Jensen (Defendant)
    Individual defendant whom Peshek identified as the catalyst for the recall; the court held motive was not material because the statute and Declaration allowed removal with or without cause if procedure was followed.
  • Emily H. Mann (Counsel)
    Counsel for Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM at the August 17, 2018 oral argument.
  • Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM in the case-party data and earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. Bruce R. Cohen (Judge)
    Judge who heard oral argument and issued the August 20, 2018 summary-judgment ruling.

What happened

Robert Peshek served on the board of the Anasazi Village condominium association from 2014 until May 2016. According to the court’s summary-judgment findings, homeowners removed him from the board on or about May 25, 2016, and he sued Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM alleging that the removal was improper.

The court found that a recall action began when homeowner Michael McGrane submitted a petition to AAM representative Wayne Yurk on or about May 2, 2016. Yurk assessed that the petition had more than 100 signers. The board then called a special meeting of members and sent a May 9, 2016 letter to homeowners with notice of the May 25 meeting, the location, the time, the subject matter, and an absentee ballot.

Peshek actually received the notice and ballot on or before May 18, 2016. He mailed in a ballot voting against his own removal, and the ballot was received by the board or AAM on May 24, the day before the special meeting. At the May 25 meeting, the board found a quorum, members were given an opportunity to be heard, Peshek did not appear, and more than 50% of those eligible to vote under the quorum voted to remove him. Wayne Yurk then gave Peshek notice that he had been removed.

The August 20, 2018 ruling treated the breach-of-contract and state-law claims together because both depended on the recall procedure. The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), including the petition threshold, special meeting, quorum, and majority-vote requirements, and found the Declaration allowed removal of a board member with or without cause while incorporating that statutory procedure. On that record, the court held the defendants had shown no genuine dispute that all statutory and Declaration requirements were met.

Peshek’s response did not create a triable factual issue. The court said he asserted possible irregularities in petition signatures, notice, and the opportunity to be heard, but offered no admissible or reliable evidence to support those claims or counter the defendants’ showing. It also held that even if Jensen initiated the recall or had an improper motive, that did not matter because the governing law required only proper procedure, which was followed.

The court also rejected good-faith-and-fair-dealing and tortious-interference theories. Under the Declaration, Peshek had rights such as undisturbed property use, common-area maintenance, and enforcement of behaviors affecting value, but he had no contractual right to be on the board. The court found no supported damages from removal from an uncompensated board position and no admissible evidence that defendants caused him to lose expected benefits under the Declaration. Summary judgment was granted in full.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. (CV2017-056168 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Condo board recall upheld where the association followed A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017-12-20 The court transfers the case to compulsory arbitration.
Step 2018-04-13 A telephonic status conference is held on Peshek’s Rule 56(d) request related to summary judgment.
Step 2018-05-17 The court sets oral argument on defendants’ January 31, 2018 motion for summary judgment.
Step 2018-06-26 The court waives compulsory arbitration by stipulation and refers the case for a mandatory settlement conference.
Step 2018-08-16 The court grants the parties’ emergency stipulation allowing telephonic appearance at the summary-judgment oral argument.
Step 2018-08-17 Oral argument is held on defendants’ summary-judgment motion; Peshek appears by counsel, defendants appear by counsel, and the matter is taken under advisement.
Step 2018-08-20 The court grants summary judgment in full to Anasazi, Jensen, and AAM on all claims.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/peshek-v-anasazi-village-condominiums-homeowners-association/raw/: 13 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2017-12-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2017-12-20_001_ruling.pdf
Source 2 2018-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-01-16_002_ruling.pdf
Source 3 2018-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-01-16_003_ruling.pdf
Source 4 2018-02-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-02-20_004_ruling.pdf
Source 5 2018-04-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-05_005_ruling.pdf
Source 6 2018-04-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-11_006_ruling.pdf
Source 7 2018-04-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2018-04-13_007_ruling.pdf
Source 8 2018-04-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2018-04-13_008_status-conference.pdf
Source 9 2018-05-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument setting order placing defendants’ summary-judgment motion for hearing after briefing on the motion was complete.

Download source file
2018-05-17_009_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 10 2018-06-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling waiving compulsory arbitration by stipulation and referring the matter to a mandatory settlement conference.

Download source file
2018-06-26_010_ruling.pdf
Source 11 2018-08-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the parties’ emergency stipulation allowing telephonic appearance at the August 17, 2018 summary-judgment oral argument.

Download source file
2018-08-16_011_ruling.pdf
Source 12 2018-08-17

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Oral-argument minute entry taking defendants’ summary-judgment motion under advisement after argument from Peshek’s counsel and defense counsel.

Download source file
2018-08-17_012_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 13 2018-08-20

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment in its entirety to Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM on all claims arising from Peshek’s removal from the board.

Download source file
2018-08-20_013_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

What statute did the court apply to the board recall?

The court applied A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), the condominium statute governing removal of board members by unit owners. The ruling quoted the provisions for petition threshold, special meeting notice, quorum, and majority vote.

Why did the recall procedure survive summary judgment?

The defendants showed that a homeowner submitted a petition, AAM assessed more than 100 signers, written notice and ballots were sent, Peshek received notice and voted, a quorum was present, members could be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him. Peshek did not provide admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute on those facts.

Did the court require cause to remove a board member?

No. The court found that both A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration allowed a board member to be removed with or without cause. Even a claimed improper motive by another board member was not material if the required procedure was followed.

Was serving on the board treated as a contractual right?

No. The court held that the Declaration gave Peshek rights such as property use and common-area maintenance, but did not give him a contractual right to serve on the board.

What happened to the good-faith and tortious-interference claims?

They failed on summary judgment. The court found no material fact showing that removal from the board denied Peshek benefits under the Declaration, no supported improper interference, and no supported damages from losing an uncompensated board position.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of how one trial court analyzed a condominium board recall under A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and a declaration.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2017-056168 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 20, 2018
Judge / panelHon. Bruce R. Cohen, Hon. Susan M. Brnovich
PartiesRobert Peshek (Plaintiff, former board member) v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc., Paul Jensen, and AAM, LLC (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
Board GovernanceElectionsCC&RsGood Faith & Fair Dealing
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted summary judgment to Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM on all claims, holding that Peshek’s removal from the condominium association board complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration, that a board seat was not a contractual right under the Declaration, and that Peshek did not present admissible evidence creating a triable issue on breach of contract, good faith and fair dealing, or tortious interference.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewRobert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Robert Peshek, a former Anasazi Village board member, sued Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Paul Jensen, and AAM, LLC after homeowners removed him from the board at a May 25, 2016 special meeting. The court granted the defendants summary judgment on every claim. It found that a homeowner submitted a recall petition to AAM’s representative, the board called and noticed a special meeting, Peshek received the notice and absentee ballot, Peshek voted against his removal, a quorum was present, members had an opportunity to be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him. The court held that the procedure complied with A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the condominium Declaration, that the Declaration did not give Peshek a contractual right to stay on the board, and that he produced no admissible evidence of irregularities, breach, tortious interference, or damages.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the recall process. It found that Michael McGrane submitted a recall petition to AAM representative Wayne Yurk on or about May 2, 2016, that Yurk assessed more than 100 signatures, and that the board called a special meeting. A May 9 letter to all homeowners gave the meeting date, location, time, and subject matter and included an absentee ballot. Peshek actually received the notice and ballot before the meeting, returned a ballot voting against his own removal, and did not appear at the May 25 meeting. The court found that a quorum existed, members had an equal opportunity to be heard, and more than 50% of eligible voters under the quorum voted to remove him.

On the governing law, the court quoted and applied A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), including the requirements for a petition, notice, special meeting timing, quorum, and majority vote. It also found that the Declaration allowed a board member to be removed with or without cause and incorporated the statute’s removal procedure. Because the defendants had shown compliance with both the statute and Declaration, the burden shifted to Peshek to produce evidence of a genuine factual dispute. The court found he had not done so: he raised alleged irregularities about petition signatures, notice, and the opportunity to be heard, but offered no admissible or reliable evidence to counter the defendants’ showing.

The remaining claims failed for the same reason. The court found no material issue showing breach of contract by Jensen or the association; even if Jensen had initiated the recall for an improper motive, the statute and Declaration required only that the proper procedure be followed. The good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim failed because the Declaration gave Peshek rights such as property use and common-area maintenance, but not a contractual right to serve on the board. The tortious-interference claim failed because the defendants showed no breach, no improper interference, and no supported damages from removal from an uncompensated board position.

Why It Matters

This is a useful Arizona condominium governance ruling because it applies the board-removal provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) to a contested recall. The court treated procedure as the decisive issue: petition threshold, written notice, special meeting, quorum, opportunity to be heard, and majority vote. It did not require cause for removal because both the statute and the Declaration allowed removal with or without cause.

The ruling also shows the limits of turning a board recall into damages litigation. A homeowner may disagree with recall politics or suspect bad motives, but at summary judgment the homeowner must produce admissible evidence of a procedural violation, breach, improper interference, and damages. Here the court held that service on the board was not a contractual right and was not compensated, so removal from the board did not itself show loss of benefits under the Declaration. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Lisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association

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Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge let 26 Fiesta Villas votes proceed after applying condominium CC&R purchaser language and A.R.S. § 33-1244.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Lisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-095464.

Download ruling

Scope note: This page covers Lisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-095464) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the September 10, 2013 under-advisement ruling quashing the temporary restraining order; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated October 31, 2013, shows the matter was dismissed with prejudice after Marx filed a notice of dismissal with prejudice. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court quashed a TRO that would have stopped Dwight Schrute Holdings from casting 26 votes in a condominium-association election. The key point was the CC&Rs’ purchaser definition: a buyer assigned special declarant rights was not treated as a purchaser required to pay the transfer and working-capital fees, and A.R.S. § 33-1244 supported the defendants’ position that those special declarant rights transferred through the trustee-sale/deed-of-trust process.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lisa Marx (Plaintiff)
    Sought temporary injunctive relief to stop 26 votes from being cast in the Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election.
  • Christina N. Morgan (Counsel)
    Counsel for Lisa Marx in the minute entries.
  • Scott L. Potter (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing with Christina N. Morgan for Lisa Marx at the order-to-show-cause hearing.

Respondent Side

  • Fiesta Villas Condominium Association (Defendant)
    Condominium association whose election was at issue.
  • Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC (Defendant)
    Entity whose 26 votes in the association election were temporarily restrained and then allowed after the TRO was quashed.
  • HUB Realty LLC (Defendant)
    Entity alleged to have transferred or held interests connected to the 26 units and disputed fees.
  • Spencer J. Lindahl (Defendant)
    The ruling states that HUB Realty and Dwight Schrute Holdings were managed by Spencer J. Lindahl.
  • Melinda C. Lindahl (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the case-party records and minute entries.
  • Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
    Counsel for Fiesta Villas Condominium Association in the minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • David M. Talamante (Judge)
    Judge who issued the August 30, 2013 temporary restraining order referenced in the ruling.
  • David K. Udall (Judge)
    Judge who heard the order-to-show-cause return hearing and quashed the TRO.
  • John Rea (Judge)
    Presiding civil judge who reassigned the case after a notice of change of judge.

What happened

Lisa Marx obtained a temporary restraining order before a Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election. The TRO prevented Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC from casting 26 votes at the September 10, 2013 election.

The theory behind the TRO was that Dwight Schrute Holdings and HUB Realty owed transfer-fee and working-capital-fund assessments for 26 units. Marx argued that because those sums had not been paid, the 26 votes should not be cast in the association election.

Judge David Udall held an order-to-show-cause return hearing on September 9, 2013 and took the matter under advisement. The next day, the court focused on the CC&Rs’ definition of “Purchaser” and on A.R.S. § 33-1244, which addresses transfer of special declarant rights after foreclosure, trustee sale, or similar transfer.

The court found that anyone with a declarant right was not required to pay the transfer or working-capital fees under the CC&Rs’ purchaser definition. The court also found that HUB Realty and Dwight Schrute Holdings had received their interests through trustee-sale and deed-of-trust instruments, giving defendants a strong argument that special declarant rights transferred and that their voting rights were not restricted.

On irreparable harm, the court found the claimed election harm speculative. Marx pointed to a possible special $2,000-per-unit levy for improvements, but the court was not persuaded that the evidence showed how the election would come out depending on the 26 votes. The court quashed the TRO, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on October 31, 2013.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Lisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association (CV2013-095464 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Special-declarant rights let 26 condo-unit votes proceed despite unpaid transfer and working-capital fees. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Lisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-08-30 Judge Talamante issues a temporary restraining order barring Dwight Schrute Holdings from casting 26 votes in the Fiesta Villas election, according to the later ruling.
Step 2013-09-09 Judge Udall holds an order-to-show-cause return hearing and takes the TRO issue under advisement.
Step 2013-09-10 Under-advisement ruling quashes the TRO after applying the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1244.
Step 2013-09-10 Separate minute entry reassigns the case to Judge Udall after a notice of change of judge.
Step 2013-10-31 The court dismisses the matter with prejudice after Marx files a notice of dismissal with prejudice.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/lisa-marx-v-fiesta-villas-condominium-association/raw/: 4 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2013-09-09

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Order-to-show-cause hearing minute entry taking under advisement whether to continue a temporary restraining order barring Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC from casting 26 votes in the Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election.

Download source file
2013-09-09_001_oral-argument.pdf
Source 2 2013-09-10

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling quashing the temporary restraining order after finding defendants had a strong argument that special declarant rights under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1244 meant the 26 votes were not barred by unpaid transfer and working-capital fees.

Download source file
2013-09-10_002_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 3 2013-09-10

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Case-reassignment minute entry assigning the case to Judge David K. Udall after Fiesta Villas Condominium Association filed a notice of change of judge.

Download source file
2013-09-10_003_minute-entry.pdf
Source 4 2013-10-31

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Dismissal order dismissing the case with prejudice after Marx filed a notice of dismissal with prejudice.

Download source file
2013-10-31_004_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

What did the TRO try to stop?

It stopped Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC from casting 26 votes in the Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election.

Why were the votes challenged?

Marx argued that HUB Realty and Dwight Schrute Holdings had not paid transfer-fee and working-capital-fund assessments for the 26 units, so the votes should be restricted.

Why did the court quash the TRO?

The court found defendants had a strong argument that an entity assigned special declarant rights was excluded from the CC&Rs’ purchaser definition and therefore was not required to pay those fees before voting.

How did A.R.S. § 33-1244 matter?

The court considered A.R.S. § 33-1244 because it provides that special declarant rights can transfer to a person acquiring title through foreclosure, trustee sale, or similar sale of declarant-owned units or development-rights property.

Did the court decide the final merits of every claim?

No. The ruling decided temporary injunctive relief by quashing the TRO. The case was later dismissed with prejudice after Marx filed a notice of dismissal.

Why is this marked must-read?

Even though it was a TRO ruling, it directly applies a condominium statute and CC&R voting/assessment language to an association election, which is a recurring governance issue.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2013-095464 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 10, 2013
Judge / panelHon. David M. Talamante, Hon. David K. Udall, Hon. John Rea
PartiesLisa Marx (Plaintiff) v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association, Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC, HUB Realty LLC, Spencer J. Lindahl, and Melinda C. Lindahl (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-1244
Topics
ElectionsAssessmentsCC&RsBoard Governance
Outcome / holding

The superior court quashed the temporary restraining order that had barred Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC from casting 26 votes in the Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election, finding defendants were likely to succeed on their argument that special declarant rights exempted them from the transfer-fee and working-capital-fund payment theory used to restrict voting.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package4 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewLisa Marx v. Fiesta Villas Condominium Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Lisa Marx obtained a temporary restraining order that prevented Dwight Schrute Holdings LLC from casting 26 votes in the Fiesta Villas Condominium Association election. The asserted basis was that HUB Realty LLC and Dwight Schrute Holdings had not paid transfer-fee and working-capital-fund assessments under the condominium CC&Rs. After an order-to-show-cause hearing, the superior court quashed the TRO. The court read the CC&Rs’ definition of “Purchaser” together with A.R.S. § 33-1244 on transfer of special declarant rights and found defendants had a strong merits position that an entity holding special declarant rights was not required to pay those fees and therefore was not barred from voting. The case was dismissed with prejudice the next month.

Key Issues & Findings

The court focused on the CC&Rs. Sections 7.9 and 7.11 required each purchaser of a unit to pay working-capital and transfer-fee assessments, but Section 1.2.30 defined “Purchaser” to exclude a person who, in addition to purchasing a unit, is assigned any special declarant right. The court found that HUB Realty and Dwight Schrute Holdings were managed by Spencer Lindahl and that they received their interest through trustee-sale and deed-of-trust instruments.

The court then considered A.R.S. § 33-1244, which provides for transfer of special declarant rights and states that, unless otherwise provided in the mortgage or deed of trust, a person acquiring title to all real estate being foreclosed or sold succeeds to special declarant rights related to that real estate whether or not the conveying instrument says so. On that record, the court found defendants had a strong position that the CC&Rs did not require them to pay the transfer and working-capital fees, and therefore their voting rights under the CC&Rs would not be restricted or prohibited.

For irreparable harm, Marx argued that the board intended to assess a special $2,000 levy on each unit for improvements. The court found the election outcome speculative regardless of whether Dwight Schrute Holdings cast its votes. Because defendants showed likelihood of success and the claimed harm was speculative, the court quashed the TRO.

Why It Matters

This is a compact but important condominium-election ruling. It shows how special declarant rights can affect both assessment obligations and voting eligibility, and it ties the CC&Rs’ purchaser definition directly to A.R.S. § 33-1244’s transfer rule.

The ruling is not appellate precedent and arose at the temporary-restraining-order stage, but it is still useful for Arizona condo readers because the issue was concrete: whether 26 unit votes could be blocked on the theory that transfer and working-capital fees had not been paid. The court allowed the votes to proceed by quashing the TRO.

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Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

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Assessments & CC&R Amendments | A.R.S. § 33-1803 | CV2016-051857

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowner whose annual assessment payment rose from $328 to $425 after her community voted to charge every residential unit the same amount argued that the reallocation was invalid because the board did not fix the specific dollar amount before the vote, put it on the ballot, and implement it immediately. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) requires only the approval of a majority of the association’s members — which the January 2015 vote supplied — and that no reasonable jury could find a material breach of the CC&Rs where the members received a fair vote on accurate, carefully explained ballot information.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-051857.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-051857) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 15, 2016 ruling dismissing the individually named defendants and the June 12, 2017 under-advisement summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: after the June 2017 ruling the parties filed a joint notice of settlement, and a formal stipulated judgment against the plaintiff was signed and entered on August 28, 2017 — the final entry in the collected record. No appeal appears in these minute entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on every claim. Assuming without deciding that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs even applied to a reallocation of the existing assessment, the court held the 2015 resolution satisfied both: the statute’s plain language requires only “the approval of the majority of the members of the association,” which the HOA obtained when its members voted in January 2015 to charge every residential unit the same amount, and the statute says nothing about ballot wording, the timing of the vote relative to the effective date, or separate board approval of the ballot document. The breach-of-contract and good-faith claims failed because no jury could find a material breach — the members received a fair vote on ballot information that was neither incorrect nor materially misleading — and a refund remedy would have forced the Association to disgorge revenues it had already spent, an outcome tantamount to a forfeiture. The class-certification motion was denied as moot.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rene Bishop (Plaintiff)
    Sunland Village member who had benefitted from the old occupancy-based assessment formula; her annual payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425, when the equalized allocation took effect in January 2016.
  • Jeffrey Miller (Counsel)
    Counsel for Plaintiff Rene Bishop; appeared with her at the May 26, 2016 and April 14, 2017 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

  • Sunland Village Community Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners’ association that placed the 2014 board resolution amending the CC&Rs on the annual ballot, obtained majority member approval in January 2015, and prevailed on summary judgment on every claim.
  • Graydon Mathison (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; the court’s August 15, 2016 ruling dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association.
  • Marianne Mathison (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Jon Holter (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Yvonne Holter (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Kevin Tracy (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Bonnie Tracy (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Kathryn Trebus (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Ron Trebus (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Paul Meiners (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Susan Meiners (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Jim Matre (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Bonnie Sims (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Carl Sims (Defendant)
    Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
    Appeared on behalf of Defendants Sunland Village Community Association, et al., at the May 26, 2016 and April 14, 2017 oral arguments; listed in the case-party records as counsel for the individually named defendants.
  • Nicole Payne (Counsel)
    Listed in the case-party records as counsel for Defendant Sunland Village Community Association; appears on the defense side of most minute-entry captions in the case.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided throughout the case; issued the August 2016 dismissal ruling and the June 2017 summary-judgment ruling, and signed the August 2017 stipulated judgment.

What happened

Sunland Village Community Association formerly allocated its annual assessment among members using a formula based in part on the number of residents in each unit. Rene Bishop was one of the members who benefitted from that formula — her share of the common expenses was less than what some of her neighbors paid. In late 2014 the Association’s board adopted a resolution placing on the annual ballot an amendment to the community’s CC&Rs under which every residential unit would pay the same amount regardless of the number of occupants. A “ballot document” explained the effect: using the 2015 budget, a single residential unit’s assessment would be about $414, meaning a single occupant would pay roughly $86 more per year (about $7 per month) and a two-occupant unit about $59 less. Copies went to every member who requested an early ballot and were placed in each voting booth. The members approved the resolution by majority vote in January 2015.

The reallocated assessment was collected for the first time in January 2016, and Bishop’s payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425. She sued the Association and thirteen individually named defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging breach of the CC&Rs — Article XI, Section 3, which refers any per-unit regular assessment increase of more than ten percent to a vote of the members — along with breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which bars a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s without majority member approval. In her view, those rules required the board to determine her specific payment amount before the vote, to put that specific amount on the ballot, and to put the increase into effect immediately upon approval.

The early motion practice split. On May 26, 2016, after oral argument, Judge John R. Hannah Jr. denied the Association’s motion to dismiss, finding that homeowners who are not similarly situated to Bishop were proper parties who could appear and argue their position if they chose, but were not necessary parties. On August 15, 2016, however, the court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The contract claim failed against the directors individually because they are not parties to the contract between the plaintiff and the Association, and the statutory claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but creates no cause of action against individual directors. The court acknowledged that an HOA director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association, citing Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P., but found the amended complaint alleged no specific facts supporting an inference of dishonesty or bad faith — a letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer opining that the directors’ actions were illegal was “not enough.”

In January 2017 the court referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and set oral argument on the Association’s motion for summary judgment and Bishop’s cross-motion for summary judgment; in March it added Bishop’s motion to certify the case as a class action to the same hearing. On April 14, 2017 the court heard argument on all three motions and took them under advisement.

The June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling resolved the case. Assuming for the sake of discussion that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 applied at all — the Association had argued that merely reallocating the existing assessment is not an “increase,” a question the court found unnecessary to decide — the 2015 resolution satisfied both provisions. The statute’s plain language requires only “the approval of the majority of the members of the association,” which the HOA obtained, and it says nothing about the timing of the vote, the ballot language, or board approval of the ballot document; Bishop cited nothing in election law or Title 33 mandating the steps she said were required. The contract and good-faith claims failed for lack of any evidence of a material breach: the reasonable expectation under the CC&Rs was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members, which is what happened, and nothing in the ballot document was incorrect or materially misleading. The one-year delay before the new allocation took effect, if anything, benefitted Bishop, and the refund she sought would have forced the Association to disgorge revenues already received and spent — an outcome the court called tantamount to a forfeiture. The court granted the Association summary judgment, denied Bishop’s cross-motion, and denied the class-certification motion as moot.

The endgame was brief. On July 6, 2017 the court noted a joint notice of settlement and a stipulation extending the attorneys’-fees application deadline, placed the case on the dismissal calendar, and vacated all pending hearings. On August 28, 2017 the court approved and entered a formal stipulated judgment against Plaintiff Rene Bishop — the final entry in the collected minute-entry record.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association (CV2016-051857 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Member vote validly approved equalizing annual assessments under A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the CC&Rs. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014 (late) The Association’s board adopts a resolution placing a CC&R amendment on the annual ballot to charge every residential unit the same assessment regardless of the number of occupants.
Step 2015-01 The members approve the resolution by majority vote; a ballot document had explained the estimated per-unit effect.
Step 2016-01 The reallocated assessment is collected for the first time; Bishop’s payment rises about thirty percent, from $328 to $425.
Step 2016-03-24 Bishop sues the Association and thirteen individually named defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2016-051857; docket filing date).
Step 2016-04-04 The Association files a motion to dismiss.
Step 2016-05-26 After oral argument, the court denies the Association’s motion to dismiss, finding homeowners not similarly situated to Bishop are proper but not necessary parties.
Step 2016-08-15 Ruling dismisses all claims against the defendants other than the Association: the directors are not parties to the CC&R contract, A.R.S. § 33-1803 creates no cause of action against individual directors, and no specific facts of dishonesty or bad faith are alleged.
Step 2017-01-17 The court orders a mandatory settlement conference through the ADR office and sets oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Step 2017-03-31 On its own motion, the court adds Bishop’s motion to certify a class action to the April 14 argument.
Step 2017-04-14 Oral argument on the class-certification motion and the cross-motions for summary judgment; all three are taken under advisement.
Step 2017-06-12 Under-advisement ruling grants the Association summary judgment on the statutory, contract, and good-faith claims, denies Bishop’s cross-motion, and denies class certification as moot.
Step 2017-07-06 A joint notice of settlement and stipulation to extend the fee-application deadline is received; the case goes on the dismissal calendar and all pending hearings are vacated.
Step 2017-08-28 The court approves and enters a formal stipulated judgment against Plaintiff Rene Bishop.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/rene-bishop-v-sunland-village-community-association/raw/: 10 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2016-04-28

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2016-04-28_001_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 2 2016-05-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2016-05-26_002_minute-entry.pdf
Source 3 2016-08-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing all claims against the defendants other than the Sunland Village Community Association.

Download source file
2016-08-15_003_ruling.pdf
Source 4 2017-01-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2017-01-17_004_minute-entry.pdf
Source 5 2017-01-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2017-01-17_005_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 6 2017-03-31

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
2017-03-31_006_oral-argument-set.pdf
Source 7 2017-04-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2017-04-14_007_minute-entry.pdf
Source 8 2017-06-12

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment and denying the homeowner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Download source file
2017-06-12_008_under-advisement-ruling.pdf
Source 9 2017-07-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
2017-07-06_009_minute-entry.pdf
Source 10 2017-08-28

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling the formal stipulated judgment against Rene Bishop.

Download source file
2017-08-28_010_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Why did one homeowner’s assessment go up about thirty percent if the total assessment never increased?

Because the community changed how the same total was divided. Sunland Village formerly allocated its annual assessment using a formula based in part on how many residents lived in each unit, and Bishop was among those who paid less under it. The 2015 amendment made every residential unit pay the same amount, so members of smaller households — like Bishop, whose payment went from $328 to $425 — paid more while multi-occupant units paid less. The court emphasized that the 2015 resolution “merely reallocated the total annual assessment, without increasing it.”

Didn’t A.R.S. § 33-1803 limit how much the assessment could rise?

The statute bars a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s “without the approval of the majority of the members of the association.” The court held the HOA obtained exactly that approval when the members adopted the 2015 resolution, and that nothing more was required. The statute says nothing about the timing of the vote relative to the effective date, the ballot wording, or whether the board separately approved the ballot document — details Bishop tried to read into the statute without any textual basis. The court noted, without deciding, the Association’s argument that the statute might not apply at all to a mere reallocation.

Why did the breach-of-contract claim under the CC&Rs fail?

Because a contract claim requires a material breach, and the court found no evidence from which a jury could find one. The reasonable expectation under Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members — which happened. The ballot document carefully explained how the resolution would affect assessments and contained nothing incorrect or materially misleading. The court also weighed forfeiture: refunding the excess to everyone in Bishop’s position would force the HOA to disgorge revenues it had already received and spent, leaving it poorer than if the resolution had never passed.

Why were the individually named defendants dismissed?

In its August 15, 2016 ruling the court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The directors individually are not parties to the contract between the homeowner and the Association, so the CC&R claim failed against them, and A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but does not create a cause of action against individual directors. While a director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association — the court cited Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P. — the complaint alleged no specific facts supporting that inference; receiving a demand letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer calling the board’s actions illegal was “not enough.”

What happened to the class-action motion?

Bishop moved to certify the case as a class action, and the court heard argument on that motion together with the cross-motions for summary judgment on April 14, 2017. Because the June 12, 2017 ruling granted the Association summary judgment on every claim, the court denied the class-certification motion as moot — there were no surviving claims left to certify.

How did the case end, and is the ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

After the summary-judgment ruling, the parties filed a joint notice of settlement, and on August 28, 2017 the court approved and entered a stipulated judgment against Bishop — the last entry in the collected minute-entry record; no appeal appears in these minutes. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent, but the case remains useful reading on when a member vote satisfies A.R.S. § 33-1803, how courts assess materiality for CC&R breach claims, and the limits of personal liability for HOA directors.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2016-051857 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJune 12, 2017
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesRene Bishop (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Sunland Village Community Association and thirteen individually named defendants (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsBoard GovernanceElections
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on all claims, holding that — assuming A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs applied to a reallocation of the existing assessment — the January 2015 majority member vote satisfied both provisions, that the statute’s plain language requires nothing beyond majority member approval, and that no reasonable jury could find a material breach of the CC&Rs where the members received a fair vote on ballot information that was neither incorrect nor materially misleading; the class-certification motion was denied as moot.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package10 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap13 roadmap entries
Video overviewRene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sunland Village Community Association formerly allocated its annual assessment using a formula based in part on the number of residents in each unit. In late 2014 the board placed a CC&R amendment on the annual ballot equalizing the assessment across all residential units; a ballot document explained the estimated per-unit effect, and the members approved the amendment by majority vote in January 2015. When the reallocation took effect in January 2016, Rene Bishop’s payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425. She sued the Association and thirteen individually named defendants for breach of the CC&Rs (Article XI, Section 3), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803, arguing the board had to fix the specific amount before the vote, put it on the ballot, and implement it immediately upon approval. The court dismissed all claims against the individual defendants in August 2016, and in a June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling granted the Association summary judgment on every claim, denied Bishop’s cross-motion, and denied her class-certification motion as moot. After a joint notice of settlement, a stipulated judgment against Bishop was entered on August 28, 2017.

Key Issues & Findings

The court resolved the case in two written rulings. First, in its August 15, 2016 ruling, it dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The breach-of-contract claim failed against the directors individually because they are not parties to the contract between the plaintiff and the Association, and the statutory claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but does not create a cause of action against individual directors. The court acknowledged, citing Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P. and the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 6.14, that an HOA director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association, but found the amended complaint alleged no specific facts supporting an inference of dishonesty or bad faith — a letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer opining that the directors’ actions were illegal was “not enough.”

On the merits, the June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling began from the statute’s plain language, citing North Valley Emergency Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana for the rule that clear statutory text must be applied without resort to other interpretive methods. A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) requires “the approval of the majority of the members of the association” before a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s may be imposed. The HOA obtained that approval when the members adopted the 2015 resolution equalizing the allocation; nothing more was required. The statute says nothing about the timing of the members’ approval relative to the effective date, the ballot language, or board approval of the ballot document, and Bishop cited nothing in election law or Title 33 mandating the steps she claimed were required. The court noted, without deciding, the Association’s argument that the statute and the CC&R provision might not apply at all because the total assessment was merely reallocated, not increased.

The contract and good-faith claims failed on materiality. Citing Ry-Tan Construction and Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann’s, the court explained that a material breach must defeat the very purpose of the contract, weighing the injured party’s expected benefit against the breaching party’s forfeiture. Bishop’s reasonable expectation under Article XI, Section 3 was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members — which occurred. The ballot document carefully explained the resolution’s effect on members’ assessments and contained nothing incorrect or materially misleading, and no alleged irregularity fundamentally compromised the fairness of the election. The one-year delay before the new allocation took effect, if anything, benefitted Bishop. Finally, the refund she sought would force the HOA to disgorge revenues already received and spent, leaving it poorer than if the resolution had never passed — an outcome tantamount to a forfeiture. The court granted the Association summary judgment, denied the cross-motion, and denied class certification as moot; after a joint notice of settlement, a stipulated judgment against Bishop was entered on August 28, 2017.

Why It Matters

This case answers a recurring question in Arizona planned communities: what does it take to validly change who pays how much? The ruling shows that when an assessment change is put to the members and approved by a majority vote, A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) is satisfied — courts will not read extra procedural requirements (specific dollar amounts on the ballot, immediate implementation, separate board approval of ballot materials) into the statute’s plain text. It also illustrates that a reallocation of the same total assessment is analytically different from an increase, a distinction the Association pressed and the court flagged without needing to decide.

For homeowners weighing a lawsuit over CC&R procedure, the decision is a caution on two fronts. Breach-of-contract claims against an association require a material breach — one that defeats the purpose of the provision — and courts will weigh the forfeiture a refund remedy would impose on the association and its other members. And claims against board members personally face a high bar: directors are not parties to the CC&R contract, A.R.S. § 33-1803 creates no cause of action against them individually, and personal liability requires specific facts showing dishonesty or bad faith, not just a demand letter calling the board’s conduct illegal. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Tarter, et al. v. Bendt, et al.: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on by

HOA Board Defamation | A.R.S. § 21-211; Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 404 & 411 | 1 CA-CV 19-0703

When an HOA board president is a limited-purpose public figure, provably false factual accusations about board finances and meetings — published without checking available records — can support a large defamation and punitive-damages verdict.

Arizona Court of Appeals | 1 CA-CV 19-0703 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 Jan. 28, 2021) (memorandum decision — not precedential under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)) | Decided 2021-01-28 | Nonprecedential / citation-limited

Download the ruling PDF FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes Tarter, et al. v. Bendt, et al., a Arizona Court of Appeals HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defamation judgment in full. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Sonia Bendt published provably false statements about Tim Tarter — a stipulated limited-purpose public figure by virtue of his HOA board presidency — with actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); that the substantial-truth and First Amendment (opinion/hyperbole) defenses failed; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings under Arizona Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 411 (including admitting insurance evidence after the defense opened the door) or in declining to strike a juror who ultimately served only as a non-voting alternate; and that the $500,000 compensatory award and the 2:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio ($1 million) were supported by the evidence and constitutionally permissible.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sonia Bendt (Defendant/Appellant)
    Fairway Lodge condominium owner who authored and emailed the July and September 2014 newsletters and related emails the jury found defamatory.
  • Douglas Bendt (Defendant/Appellant)
    Sonia Bendt’s husband and co-defendant; ran with his wife against Mr. Tarter in the 2013 HOA election.
  • Lori L. Voepel (Counsel)
    Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC
    Phoenix attorney for Defendants/Appellants (the Bendts).
  • Petra Lonska Emerson (Counsel)
    Jones Skelton & Hochuli, PLC
    Phoenix attorney for Defendants/Appellants (the Bendts).

Respondent Side

  • Tim Tarter (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Fairway Lodge condominium owner elected HOA board president for 2014; stipulated to be a limited-purpose public figure; won the defamation verdict below.
  • Christina Tarter (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Tim Tarter’s wife and co-plaintiff; Mrs. Bendt’s emails disparaged her though the two had never met.
  • William A. Richards (Counsel)
    Richards & Moskowitz, PLC
    Phoenix attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Tarters).
  • Shayna Gabrielle Stuart (Counsel)
    Richards & Moskowitz, PLC
    Phoenix attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Tarters).

Neutral Parties

  • James B. Morse Jr. (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Presiding Judge; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Judge; joined the decision.
  • Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Judge; joined the decision.
  • Hon. Margaret R. Mahoney (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Trial judge who presided over the eight-day jury trial, entered judgment on the verdict, and denied the post-judgment motions later affirmed on appeal.

What happened

Sonia and Douglas Bendt, a married couple, purchased a condominium in the Fairway Lodge community in 2008. Tim and Christina Tarter moved into Fairway Lodge in 2013. Fairway Lodge is a luxury condominium complex governed by a homeowners’ association board, and owners paid $795 in monthly HOA dues. Mr. Tarter and the Bendts ran against each other in the 2013 HOA election; Mr. Tarter won a seat, and his fellow board members elected him president for 2014.

During Mr. Tarter’s term as HOA president, Sonia Bendt launched a campaign attacking his reputation and his handling of the presidency, including a July 2014 newsletter titled ‘Fairway Times at the Biltmore’ — described as an ‘independent newsletter’ — emailed to fellow residents, followed by a September 2014 newsletter. The newsletters and related communications accused Mr. Tarter of lacking ethics or behaving unethically or illegally, concealing material financial information from members, misleading members and acting unlawfully, conducting and facilitating ‘secret’ board meetings, violating the HOA’s CC&Rs, failing to give timely meeting notice, and wrongfully overspending HOA funds — including a claim that the HOA was ‘$40,000 in the hole’ — such that monthly dues would soon rise.

The Tarters also introduced evidence that Mrs. Bendt called Mr. Tarter names such as ‘idiot,’ ‘fool,’ ‘spineless,’ ‘lowlife,’ ‘low-class sneak,’ ‘unethical,’ and ‘a complete fake’ in front of fellow members, disparaged his legal education and alma mater, called him a habitual liar, and accused him of violating his attorney ethical obligations — writing that he could be disciplined by the Arizona State Bar and investigated by the Attorney General. She also wrote emails calling Mrs. Tarter, whom she had never met, a ‘bitch’ and a ‘drinking dog walker.’ The Tarters sued the Bendts for defamation in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2015-002596).

The parties stipulated that Mr. Tarter, as HOA president, was a limited-purpose public figure, so the Tarters had to prove that Mrs. Bendt’s defamatory statements were made with ‘actual malice’ — knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether they were false. At trial the parties focused on whether Mr. Tarter had been asked to resign, an $8,000 exterminator payment, a tree removal, the Board’s executive sessions, roughly $40,000 in alleged overspending, and the monthly HOA fees. Witnesses including Mr. Tarter, a past president (‘Moe’), the treasurer (‘Steve’), a board member (‘Deborah’), and a successor president (‘Dan’) testified that the statements were false, and the jury heard that a 2015 independent audit found ‘zero deficiencies.’

After an eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Tarters, awarding $150,000 for reputational harm, $350,000 for emotional harm, and $1 million in punitive damages; the superior court (Hon. Margaret R. Mahoney) added $20,120.42 in taxable costs. The court denied the Bendts’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, noting that the evidence supporting the challenged areas was ‘both abundant and compelling.’ The Bendts timely appealed.

On appeal, the Bendts argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove actual malice (contending Mrs. Bendt’s statements were opinion, hyperbole, or protected political speech, were substantially true, or were reasonably believed based on information from others); that the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, including denying broad motions in limine, admitting emails disparaging other board members, admitting evidence of other lawsuits, and admitting evidence that Mrs. Bendt carried a defamation liability insurance policy; that the court violated due process by refusing to strike a juror whose daughter had attended Mr. Tarter’s law school; and that both the compensatory and punitive damages were excessive and unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed in full. It held that substantial evidence supported the finding that several newsletter statements were provably false facts published with actual malice; that the Bendts’ motions in limine were improper and preserved nothing, and the challenged exhibits were properly admitted under Rules 403, 404(b), and 411 (the defense having ‘opened the door’ to the insurance evidence); that the juror-bias challenge failed because the juror served only as a non-voting alternate; that the $500,000 compensatory award was supported by evidence of actual injury and did not shock the conscience; and that the 2:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio was constitutionally permissible under the State Farm guideposts. The court affirmed the judgment.

Tarter v. Bendt illustrates how ordinary HOA governance disputes — a contested board election, criticism of a president’s spending and meeting practices — can escalate into a large defamation judgment. Because the parties stipulated that Tarter was a ‘limited-purpose public figure’ by virtue of holding the HOA presidency, the case applies the demanding New York Times v. Sullivan ‘actual malice’ standard to a volunteer community leader, showing that heated criticism of board conduct is broadly protected as opinion or hyperbole, but that specific, provably false factual accusations (secret meetings, CC&R violations, a fabricated $40,000 shortfall, an imminent dues increase) published without checking readily available records can support liability and, here, $1 million in punitive damages. The decision is a caution to both HOA critics and boards about the line between protected political speech and actionable defamation. At the same time, the opinion’s weight is limited: it is an unpublished memorandum decision that, under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c), is not precedential and may be cited only as the rule allows. It applies settled defamation, evidence, and punitive-damages doctrine to a specific factual record rather than announcing new HOA law, and the association itself was not a party — the dispute was homeowner-versus-homeowner. Readers should treat it as an illustrative fact pattern about HOA-election defamation, not as binding authority, and consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their own situation.

Litigation record

Step 1 2008

Sonia and Douglas Bendt purchase a condominium in the Fairway Lodge community.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2013

The Tarters move into Fairway Lodge; Tim Tarter and the Bendts run against each other in the 2013 HOA board election, and Tarter wins a seat.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2014

Mr. Tarter’s fellow board members elect him HOA president for 2014.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2014-07

During Mr. Tarter’s term, Sonia Bendt emails residents her July ‘Fairway Times at the Biltmore’ newsletter accusing Tarter and the Board of secret meetings, CC&R violations, concealed finances, and overspending that would raise dues.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2014-09

Mrs. Bendt publishes a September 2014 newsletter repeating that the Board violated the CC&Rs, spent funds without authorization, had overspent by $40,000, and would soon raise HOA fees.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2015

The Tarters file a defamation suit against the Bendts in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2015-002596); the Board later hires an independent firm whose audit finds ‘zero deficiencies.’

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 7

After an eight-day jury trial before the Hon. Margaret R. Mahoney, the jury awards the Tarters $150,000 (reputational harm), $350,000 (emotional harm), and $1 million (punitive damages); the court adds $20,120.42 in taxable costs and denies the Bendts’ motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 8 2021-01-28

The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, issues a memorandum decision affirming the judgment in full.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Download source
2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/tarter-v-bendt/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-07-01

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion affirming the defamation judgment in full.

Download source file
2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was Tarter v. Bendt about?

It was a defamation lawsuit between neighbors in Fairway Lodge, a luxury Phoenix condominium community. Tim Tarter and the Bendts ran against each other in the 2013 HOA election; Tarter won and became board president for 2014. Sonia Bendt then emailed residents newsletters accusing Tarter of holding ‘secret’ meetings, violating the CC&Rs, concealing finances, and overspending so dues would rise, plus personal insults. The Tarters sued, a Maricopa County jury awarded them $1.5 million, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on January 28, 2021.

Why did Tim Tarter have to prove ‘actual malice’?

The parties stipulated that, as HOA board president, Tarter was a ‘limited-purpose public figure.’ Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a public figure suing for defamation must prove the false statements were made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge they were false or with reckless disregard for whether they were true. The court found substantial evidence of actual malice, including that Mrs. Bendt never reviewed the HOA’s available financial reports, her claimed sources denied giving her the information, and she admitted her $40,000-shortfall claim was incorrect.

Weren’t the newsletter statements just opinion or political speech?

Some heated language was protected opinion or hyperbole, but the court held that several statements asserted provable facts — that the Board held a ‘secret meeting,’ violated the CC&Rs, failed to give timely notice, and had overspent by $40,000 causing an imminent dues increase. Whether those things actually happened could be proved true or false, so they were actionable. Multiple board members testified the statements were false, and a 2015 independent audit found ‘zero deficiencies.’

Why was the defamation insurance evidence allowed?

Ordinarily, evidence that a person carries liability insurance is not admissible to prove fault under Arizona Rule of Evidence 411, but it can be admitted for other purposes. Here, defense counsel ‘opened the door’ by asking a successor board president why he had not sued Mrs. Bendt; his answer — that she was known to carry a $2 million defamation insurance policy and litigation would be too costly — became admissible to explain his decision. The trial court gave a limiting instruction, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion.

How were the damages calculated, and were they excessive?

The jury awarded $150,000 for reputational harm, $350,000 for emotional harm, and $1 million in punitive damages, plus $20,120.42 in costs. The Court of Appeals held the $500,000 compensatory award was supported by testimony of actual injury and did not shock the conscience, distinguishing an $11 million award vacated in another case. It also held the 2-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio was constitutionally permissible under the U.S. Supreme Court’s State Farm v. Campbell guideposts, given the reprehensible, intentionally malicious conduct and the substantial non-economic compensatory damages.

Is Tarter v. Bendt binding precedent for Arizona HOAs?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision. Under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), such decisions are not precedential and may be cited only as the rule allows. It is useful as an illustration of how HOA-election defamation and the ‘actual malice’ standard can play out, but it does not create binding law, and the association itself was not a party — the case was between individual homeowners. Anyone facing a similar situation should consult a qualified Arizona attorney.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 19-0703 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 Jan. 28, 2021) (memorandum decision — not precedential under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c))
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateJanuary 28, 2021
Judge / panelJames B. Morse Jr. (Presiding Judge, author), Maria Elena Cruz (Judge, joined), Paul J. McMurdie (Judge, joined)
PartiesTim and Christina Tarter (plaintiffs/appellees; Mr. Tarter served as Fairway Lodge condominium HOA board president) v. Sonia and Douglas Bendt (defendants/appellants; fellow Fairway Lodge owners who published the challenged newsletters and emails).
Governing law
  • U.S. Const. amend. I (First Amendment; actual-malice standard for defamation of a limited-purpose public figure)
  • A.R.S. § 21-211(4) (disqualification of biased or prejudiced jurors)
  • Ariz. R. Evid. 401-402 (relevance; admissibility of relevant evidence)
  • Ariz. R. Evid. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence for unfair prejudice)
  • Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)-(b) (character evidence; other-acts evidence admissible to show motive or intent)
  • Ariz. R. Evid. 411 (evidence of liability insurance; admissible for purposes other than fault)
  • Ariz. R. Evid. 105 (limiting instructions)
  • Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 (meaning and context of a defamatory communication)
  • A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (appellate jurisdiction)
Topics
DefamationElectionsProcedureMembership
Outcome / holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defamation judgment in full. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Sonia Bendt published provably false statements about Tim Tarter — a stipulated limited-purpose public figure by virtue of his HOA board presidency — with actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); that the substantial-truth and First Amendment (opinion/hyperbole) defenses failed; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings under Arizona Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 411 (including admitting insurance evidence after the defense opened the door) or in declining to strike a juror who ultimately served only as a non-voting alternate; and that the $500,000 compensatory award and the 2:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio ($1 million) were supported by the evidence and constitutionally permissible.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap8 roadmap entries
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Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tarter v. Bendt is an unpublished Arizona Court of Appeals (Division One) memorandum decision arising from politics within Fairway Lodge, a luxury Phoenix condominium community governed by a homeowners’ association that charged $795 monthly dues. Tim Tarter and Sonia and Douglas Bendt ran against each other in the 2013 HOA election; Tarter won a seat and his fellow board members elected him president for 2014. During his term, Sonia Bendt launched a campaign against him, including July and September 2014 newsletters emailed to residents accusing Tarter of lacking ethics, concealing financial information, misleading members, holding ‘secret’ board meetings, and overspending HOA funds so that dues would rise, while also hurling personal epithets at him and disparaging his wife. The Tarters sued for defamation. Because the parties stipulated that Tarter was a limited-purpose public figure through his board role, the Tarters had to prove ‘actual malice.’ After an eight-day trial, a Maricopa County jury awarded $150,000 for reputational harm, $350,000 for emotional harm, and $1 million in punitive damages, and the court added $20,120.42 in taxable costs. The Bendts appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of actual malice, several evidentiary rulings (including admission of insurance evidence and other-acts emails), the denial of a juror-bias challenge, and both damages awards. Division One affirmed in full, holding that substantial evidence supported findings that Sonia Bendt published provably false statements with reckless disregard for the truth, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, that the alternate juror rendered no verdict, and that the compensatory awards and 2:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio passed constitutional muster.

Key Issues & Findings

On actual malice, the court applied New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, exercising ‘independent appellate review’ to confirm the record established actual malice with convincing clarity while still deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations. It concluded that several newsletter assertions — that the Board held a ‘secret meeting,’ violated the CC&Rs, failed to give timely notice, and had overspent by $40,000 so dues would rise imminently — were provable statements of fact rather than protected opinion or hyperbole, and that a reasonable jury could find them false: Mr. Tarter, a past president (‘Moe’), the treasurer (‘Steve’), and a board member (‘Deborah’) testified the statements were untrue, and a 2015 independent audit found ‘zero deficiencies.’ On the malice element, the court found ample circumstantial evidence: Steve and Moe denied being Mrs. Bendt’s claimed sources, she admitted she never reviewed the HOA’s available financial reports and had no confirmation of the resignation claims, and she conceded her $40,000-deficit statement was incorrect, with any correction delayed and unproven.

On the evidentiary challenges, the court held that the Bendts’ sweeping motions in limine (listing 207 exhibits without argument, later a claimed thousand pages) were improper and preserved nothing, and that most exhibits drew no trial objection. Exhibit 13 — emails in which Mrs. Bendt disparaged other board members — was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show motive and intent (not conformity) and was relevant to punitive damages, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. On insurance, the court held that defense counsel ‘opened the door’ by asking successor president ‘Dan’ whether he had sued Mrs. Bendt, making the existence of her defamation policy admissible under Rule 411 to explain his answer; the trial court’s tailored limiting instruction accurately conveyed Rule 411, and the Bendts had waived any Rule 403 unfair-prejudice objection.

On juror bias, the court found no due-process violation because Juror 1 — whose daughter attended Tarter’s law school — was randomly selected as the alternate and rendered no verdict, and a limited connection through a family member does not establish disqualifying bias. On damages, the court held the $500,000 compensatory award was supported by testimony of actual reputational and emotional injury and did not shock the conscience (distinguishing the $11 million award vacated in Desert Palm Surgical Group v. Petta), and that under the State Farm v. Campbell guideposts the jury’s 2:1 punitive ratio — resting on reprehensible, intentionally malicious conduct against substantial, non-economic compensatory damages — was well within constitutional limits.

Why It Matters

Tarter v. Bendt illustrates how ordinary HOA governance disputes — a contested board election, criticism of a president’s spending and meeting practices — can escalate into a large defamation judgment. Because the parties stipulated that Tarter was a ‘limited-purpose public figure’ by virtue of holding the HOA presidency, the case applies the demanding New York Times v. Sullivan ‘actual malice’ standard to a volunteer community leader, showing that heated criticism of board conduct is broadly protected as opinion or hyperbole, but that specific, provably false factual accusations (secret meetings, CC&R violations, a fabricated $40,000 shortfall, an imminent dues increase) published without checking readily available records can support liability and, here, $1 million in punitive damages. The decision is a caution to both HOA critics and boards about the line between protected political speech and actionable defamation.

At the same time, the opinion’s weight is limited: it is an unpublished memorandum decision that, under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c), is not precedential and may be cited only as the rule allows. It applies settled defamation, evidence, and punitive-damages doctrine to a specific factual record rather than announcing new HOA law, and the association itself was not a party — the dispute was homeowner-versus-homeowner. Readers should treat it as an illustrative fact pattern about HOA-election defamation, not as binding authority, and consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their own situation.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Joan Tober, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; and Rick Hanson, Mark Levine, George Luis, Lee Rayburn, Bob Small, Chris Shipley, and Les Shipley, Defendants/Appellees: HOA Court Case Guide

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Elections & Open Meetings | A.R.S. §§ 33-1812, 10-3304 | 2 CA-CV 2012-0129

How an Arizona planned community lawfully elected its board entirely by mail-in ballot, and why a homeowner’s after-the-fact challenge to the procedure failed on standing and justiciability grounds.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Joan Tober, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., an Arizona nonprofit corporation; and Rick Hanson, Mark Levine, George Luis, Lee Rayburn, Bob Small, Chris Shipley, and Les Shipley, Defendants/Appellees; 2 CA-CV 2012-0129.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Under A.R.S. section 33-1812, a planned community association may conduct its board election exclusively by mail-in ballots counted before the annual meeting; the statute does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting, and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804, does not require elections to occur at an open meeting. A member’s suit against the board challenging such procedures is derivative, and, absent a justiciable controversy, it cannot support injunctive relief, so summary judgment and the attorney-fee award for the association were affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Joan Tober (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Mandatory member of Civano 1 who challenged the 2011 board election conducted exclusively by mail-in ballot.
  • Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Defendant/Appellee)
    Arizona nonprofit corporation managing a Tucson planned community; conducted the challenged mail-in board election.
  • Rick Hanson (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Mark Levine (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • George Luis (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Lee Rayburn (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Bob Small (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Chris Shipley (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Les Shipley (Defendant/Appellee)
    Individual Civano board member named as a defendant/appellee.
  • Elizabeth D. Bushell (Counsel)
    Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C.
    Tucson attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Joan Tober.
  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (Counsel)
    Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.
    Tucson attorney for Defendants/Appellees Civano and its board.
  • Philip G. Espinosa (Judge)
    Court of Appeals judge who authored the memorandum decision.
  • Garye L. Vasquez (Judge)
    Presiding Judge on the Court of Appeals panel; concurred.
  • Virginia C. Kelly (Judge)
    Judge on the Court of Appeals panel; concurred.

What happened and why it matters

Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, a Tucson planned community, sued the association and the members of its board of directors after the 2011 board election was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the association’s annual meeting. She alleged the board breached its statutory obligations under A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 after withdrawing her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board and awarded them attorney fees and costs, and Tober appealed only the ruling on her breach-of-statutory-duty claim. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative and could not proceed as a direct action because she alleged no injury unique to herself, that neither the CC&Rs nor section 10-3304 authorized her particular statutory claim as pleaded, and that her challenge to the completed 2011 election and to speculative future elections presented no justiciable controversy for injunctive relief. The court added that, in any event, section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting. It also upheld the attorney-fee award and awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.

The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo because the material facts were undisputed, and it treated capacity to sue as a question of law. It first held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative rather than direct. An action by an association member is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members without any severance among individual holders. A member may sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from her membership, the wrongdoer owes her a duty for a reason other than membership, or her injury is unique to her rather than shared by the association. Tober alleged none of these; she asserted only a “personal stake in how her community is run,” and her theory was that Civano members as a whole were disadvantaged by the mail-in procedure. Because she did not follow the demand and standing requirements for a derivative suit under A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, that claim was properly dismissed.

The court next rejected the two authorities Tober said permitted her direct statutory claim. The CC&Rs’ section 16.1 gives owners a right to enforce the community documents, but Tober conceded her statutory claim was independent of the contract, and A.R.S. section 33-1812 could not be read into the CC&Rs because it was enacted after the CC&Rs were executed. A.R.S. section 10-3304 does let a planned community member sue the association to enjoin an ultra vires act, and the court agreed Tober could in theory bring such a claim. But injunctive relief was unavailable: she did not try to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground; her request to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore not a justiciable controversy.

Finally, and in any event, the court held the mail-in procedure did not violate section 33-1812. The statute’s phrase “if absentee ballots are used” shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by “some other form of delivery” such as mail; it does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections occur at the annual meeting, and section 33-1804 requires only that meetings be open, not that elections happen at them. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court’s discretion.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision illustrates how planned community election procedures are measured against A.R.S. section 33-1812 and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804. The court read section 33-1812 to permit an association to elect directors entirely by mail-in ballot, with ballots counted before the annual meeting, and concluded the statute does not compel in-person voting at every election or require that the election itself take place at the annual meeting. It also underscores a practical timing lesson: a member who believes an election procedure is unlawful generally must seek to enjoin it before the vote is finalized, because courts are reluctant to unwind a completed election or to issue advisory relief about future, speculative elections.

The opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, so under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure it is not precedent and generally may not be cited as legal authority; it is offered here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied. The decision also highlights procedural mechanics that recur in HOA disputes, including the derivative-versus-direct distinction for suits against a board and the risk that a member who loses such a suit may owe the association’s attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and a fee-shifting provision in the CC&Rs. The homeowner was represented by Elizabeth D. Bushell of Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C., and the association and its board by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt of Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2011-03-01 The board mailed election ballots to all members with notice of the annual membership meeting, ballot instructions, and the election timeline; ballots were to be returned by mail or hand delivery by 5:00 p.m. on March 21.
Step 2011-03-15 The board adopted an administrative resolution for the 2011 election authorizing the (apparently exclusive) use of written mail-in ballots to elect board members.
Step 2011-03-21 The association’s election committee counted all ballots by the 5:00 p.m. deadline and certified the results to the board.
Step 2011-03-22 The election results were announced at the annual membership meeting; Tober had mailed her ballot and attended the meeting.
More than a month after the election was finalized, Tober sued Civano and the individual board members for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory obligation, and election tampering.
Tober amended her complaint to add requests for injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 (the section 10-3304 reference was added more than five months after the election).
Tober withdrew her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, conceding no individual damages and no disenfranchisement.
After a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that A.R.S. sections 10-3708 and 33-1812 did not prohibit an exclusively mail-in election counted before the annual meeting and entered final judgment for Civano and the board with attorney fees and costs.
Step 2013-03-12 Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its memorandum decision affirming the trial court’s judgment.

FAQ

What was the dispute in Tober v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association?

Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1 planned community in Tucson, challenged the association’s 2011 board election, which was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the annual meeting. She argued the board violated A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board, and Tober appealed only her breach-of-statutory-duty claim.

Did A.R.S. section 33-1812 require the HOA to hold in-person voting?

No. The Court of Appeals held that section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election. The statute’s phrase ‘if absentee ballots are used’ shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by ‘some other form of delivery,’ such as mail-in ballot. The court also held the statute does not require the election to be held at the annual meeting, and that the open-meeting law (A.R.S. section 33-1804) requires only that meetings be open to members, not that elections occur at them.

Why was Tober’s claim against the board members treated as derivative?

The court explained that a member’s suit is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members rather than an injury unique to the individual. A member can sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from membership, is owed a duty for a reason other than membership, or suffered a unique injury. Tober alleged none of these, asserting only a ‘personal stake in how her community is run,’ so her claim was derivative and, because she did not follow the derivative-suit procedures in A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, it was properly dismissed.

Why did the request for an injunction fail?

Although the court agreed a planned community member may in theory sue the association under A.R.S. section 10-3304 to enjoin an unauthorized act, Tober was not entitled to an injunction. She did not seek to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground. Her attempt to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore presented no justiciable controversy; courts do not issue advisory relief about hypothetical future conduct.

Why did the homeowner have to pay the association’s attorney fees?

The trial court awarded the association and board their attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 (fees in a contract action) and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, which provides that the successful party in litigation to enforce the Declaration is entitled to fees. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court. It also awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision from Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals. Under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, it does not create legal precedent and generally may not be cited as authority except as the rules allow. It is presented here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2012-0129
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMarch 12, 2013
Judge / panelPhilip G. Espinosa, Garye L. Vasquez, Virginia C. Kelly
PartiesJoan Tober (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, Inc., and its individual board members (Defendants/Appellees)
Governing law
Topics
ElectionsOpen MeetingsCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

Under A.R.S. section 33-1812, a planned community association may conduct its board election exclusively by mail-in ballots counted before the annual meeting; the statute does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting, and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804, does not require elections to occur at an open meeting. A member’s suit against the board challenging such procedures is derivative, and, absent a justiciable controversy, it cannot support injunctive relief, so summary judgment and the attorney-fee award for the association were affirmed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source packageNo raw source-folder files found for this slug
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Joan Tober, a mandatory member of the Civano 1: Neighborhood Association, a Tucson planned community, sued the association and the members of its board of directors after the 2011 board election was conducted exclusively by mail-in ballots that were counted before the association’s annual meeting. She alleged the board breached its statutory obligations under A.R.S. section 33-1812 by not allowing votes to be cast in person and by absentee ballot, and she sought injunctive relief under A.R.S. section 10-3304 after withdrawing her breach-of-contract and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and board and awarded them attorney fees and costs, and Tober appealed only the ruling on her breach-of-statutory-duty claim. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative and could not proceed as a direct action because she alleged no injury unique to herself, that neither the CC&Rs nor section 10-3304 authorized her particular statutory claim as pleaded, and that her challenge to the completed 2011 election and to speculative future elections presented no justiciable controversy for injunctive relief. The court added that, in any event, section 33-1812 does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections be held at the annual meeting. It also upheld the attorney-fee award and awarded the association its fees and costs on appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo because the material facts were undisputed, and it treated capacity to sue as a question of law. It first held that Tober’s claim against the individual board members was derivative rather than direct. An action by an association member is derivative when the gravamen is injury to the corporation or to the whole body of members without any severance among individual holders. A member may sue directly only if she has a relationship with the wrongdoer apart from her membership, the wrongdoer owes her a duty for a reason other than membership, or her injury is unique to her rather than shared by the association. Tober alleged none of these; she asserted only a “personal stake in how her community is run,” and her theory was that Civano members as a whole were disadvantaged by the mail-in procedure. Because she did not follow the demand and standing requirements for a derivative suit under A.R.S. sections 10-3631 and 10-3632, that claim was properly dismissed.

The court next rejected the two authorities Tober said permitted her direct statutory claim. The CC&Rs’ section 16.1 gives owners a right to enforce the community documents, but Tober conceded her statutory claim was independent of the contract, and A.R.S. section 33-1812 could not be read into the CC&Rs because it was enacted after the CC&Rs were executed. A.R.S. section 10-3304 does let a planned community member sue the association to enjoin an ultra vires act, and the court agreed Tober could in theory bring such a claim. But injunctive relief was unavailable: she did not try to enjoin the 2011 election before it was finalized, and a completed election cannot be undone on that ground; her request to control future elections was speculative, unsupported by any showing of likely future harm, and therefore not a justiciable controversy.

Finally, and in any event, the court held the mail-in procedure did not violate section 33-1812. The statute’s phrase “if absentee ballots are used” shows absentee voting is optional, and the statute expressly allows voting by “some other form of delivery” such as mail; it does not require in-person voting at every election or that elections occur at the annual meeting, and section 33-1804 requires only that meetings be open, not that elections happen at them. The court affirmed the attorney-fee award under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and section 16.2 of the CC&Rs, noting that voluntarily dismissing the contract claims did not defeat a contract-based fee award and that the missing hearing transcripts were presumed to support the trial court’s discretion.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision illustrates how planned community election procedures are measured against A.R.S. section 33-1812 and the open-meeting law, A.R.S. section 33-1804. The court read section 33-1812 to permit an association to elect directors entirely by mail-in ballot, with ballots counted before the annual meeting, and concluded the statute does not compel in-person voting at every election or require that the election itself take place at the annual meeting. It also underscores a practical timing lesson: a member who believes an election procedure is unlawful generally must seek to enjoin it before the vote is finalized, because courts are reluctant to unwind a completed election or to issue advisory relief about future, speculative elections.

The opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, so under Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure it is not precedent and generally may not be cited as legal authority; it is offered here only as a neutral, educational illustration of how these HOA-governance statutes have been applied. The decision also highlights procedural mechanics that recur in HOA disputes, including the derivative-versus-direct distinction for suits against a board and the risk that a member who loses such a suit may owe the association’s attorney fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01 and a fee-shifting provision in the CC&Rs. The homeowner was represented by Elizabeth D. Bushell of Elizabeth D. Bushell, P.L.C., and the association and its board by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt of Monroe, McDonough, Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C.

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Diana R. Shaffer, et al. v. Procaccianti AZ II, L.P., et al. (Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners) (consolidated with Whitmer and London): HOA Court Case Guide

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CC&Rs & Assessments | A.R.S. §§ 10-3704, 12-341.01 | 1 CA-CV 16-0628 (Consolidated)

In this 2018 unpublished decision, Division One affirmed judgments for a Scottsdale resort and its homeowners association in a long-running ground-rent dispute over 29 casitas, holding a prior stipulated judgment did not bar the HOA from re-approving the amendment and that a statutory “vote by pen” validly bound the owners.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Diana R. Shaffer, et al. v. Procaccianti AZ II, L.P., et al. (Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners) (consolidated with Whitmer and London); 1 CA-CV 16-0628 (consolidated with 1 CA-CV 16-0629 and 1 CA-CV 16-0654); CV2012-000363 & CV2012-051066 (Consolidated); CV2015-053091; CV2016-050379 (Maricopa County Superior Court, Hon. John R. Hannah).

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court in all three consolidated appeals, holding that the 2011 Willett Judgment had no preclusive effect on and did not resolve the HOA’s status and authority or the validity of the 2006 Amendment; that the HOA validly obtained approval of the 2006 Amendment (including through a statutory written “vote by pen” under A.R.S. § 10-3704) and could bind the owners under the 1999 Amendment; and that the owners’ remaining challenges failed. It awarded the Hotel and the HOA their reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs on appeal as prevailing parties.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Diana R. Shaffer (Appellant)
    Casita owner; a plaintiff/appellant challenging the HOA’s authority and the ground-rent allocation.
  • LPM Holdings, LLC (Appellant)
    Casita owner entity; plaintiff/appellant among the Shaffer appellants.
  • Zadock and Hana Eli (the Elis) (Appellant)
    Casita owners; plaintiffs/appellants whose separate damages claim was struck under Rule 26.1.
  • R.L. Whitmer (Appellant)
    Casita owner; plaintiff/appellant who sought appointment of a receiver over the HOA.
  • Colleen London (Appellant)
    Casita owner; plaintiff/appellant in the receiver and HOA-identity suits.
  • DRL Enterprises, Inc. (Appellant)
    Casita owner entity; separately appealed being held jointly and severally liable for the Hotel’s fee award.
  • Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel) (Appellee)
    Resort owner and ground lessor; defendant/appellee and intervenor; awarded fees below and on appeal.
  • Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners / Council of Co-Owners (the HOA) (Appellee)
    The casitas’ homeowners association; defendant/appellee whose authority, corporate status, and 2006 vote were challenged.
  • Robert S. Porter (Counsel)
    Porter Law Firm, Phoenix
    Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Diana R. Shaffer, LPM Holdings, LLC, the Elis, Colleen London, and R.L. Whitmer.
  • Andrew M. Federhar (Counsel)
    Spencer Fane, LLP, Phoenix
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Intervenor Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel).
  • Jessica Anne Gale (Counsel)
    Spencer Fane, LLP, Phoenix
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Intervenor Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel).
  • R. Corey Hill (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC, Phoenix
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (the HOA).
  • Ginette M. Hill (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC, Phoenix
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (the HOA).
  • Christopher Robbins (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC, Phoenix
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (the HOA).
  • David E. Shein (Counsel)
    Chester & Shein, P.C., Scottsdale
    Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant DRL Enterprises, Inc.
  • Sonia M. Phanse (Counsel)
    Chester & Shein, P.C., Scottsdale
    Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant DRL Enterprises, Inc.
  • Charles S. Bergen (Counsel)
    Roeser Bucheit & Graham, LLC, Chicago, Illinois
    Co-counsel (pro hac vice) for Plaintiff/Appellant DRL Enterprises, Inc.
  • John E. Bucheit (Counsel)
    Roeser Bucheit & Graham, LLC, Chicago, Illinois
    Co-counsel (pro hac vice) for Plaintiff/Appellant DRL Enterprises, Inc.
  • Lawrence F. Winthrop (Judge)
    Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
  • James B. Morse Jr. (Judge)
    Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
    Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • John R. Hannah (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge whose rulings in the 2012, 2015, and 2016 cases were affirmed on appeal.
  • Eileen Willett (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who entered the 2011 stipulated final judgment (the Willett Judgment).

What happened and why it matters

This consolidated appeal grew out of a decades-long dispute over ground rent for 29 casitas built on land subleased from a Scottsdale resort. In 1970 the resort’s predecessor leased twenty acres, later dividing it into a twelve-acre resort and an eight-acre condominium complex of 29 casitas. A 1972 sublease set the casita owners’ ground rent, and a 1999 amendment fixed the rent at $323 per month while authorizing the homeowners association (the HOA) to represent the owners in future rent negotiations and to use an appraiser if the HOA and the resort owner, Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel), could not agree. After a 2005 arbitration between the Hotel and the landowner, the Hotel and the HOA agreed the owners would pay 40% of the total ground rent, or $708.50 per unit per month, and 24 of 29 owners approved that allocation at a January 2006 special meeting and again through a mailed written amendment. A 2011 stipulated judgment (the Willett Judgment) had voided the 2006 special meeting for lack of a quorum. Various owner groups then sued the Hotel and the HOA, contesting the HOA’s authority, the validity of the 2006 amendment, the identity of the incorporated HOA, the denial of a receiver, a stricken damages claim, and joint-and-several liability for a roughly $459,000 fee award. In an unpublished memorandum decision, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court across all three consolidated appeals and awarded the Hotel and the HOA their fees and costs on appeal.

The court addressed each argument in turn. On issue preclusion, it reviewed de novo and applied the five-element test, holding that Appellants failed the first element because the status of the incorporated HOA and the validity of the 2006 Amendment were never “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.” The 2011 Willett Judgment was a stipulated judgment that addressed only the narrow question whether the January 12, 2006 special meeting and vote were valid; stipulated judgments generally lack preclusive effect, and its narrow findings did not bar the later courts from deciding the HOA’s status and authority or the validity of the 2006 Amendment. Interpreting the Willett Judgment de novo as a contract, the court found its plain terms voided only the actions taken at the January 2006 meeting for lack of a quorum; it made no findings about the validity of future amendments and did not extinguish the owners’ ground-rent obligations. On the HOA’s status, the court noted the question—whether the post-1994 incorporated entity succeeded the pre-1994 unincorporated association—had already been decided against Appellants, including in London v. Karatz, and declined to revisit it. On the “vote by pen,” the court held A.R.S. § 10-3704(A) permits nonprofit-corporation members to approve action by signed written consent absent contrary governing documents, that nothing showed the HOA’s documents forbade it, and that a jury on sufficient evidence implicitly found the owners validly approved the 2006 Amendment. It found no abuse of discretion in striking the Elis’ undisclosed damages under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26.1, and affirmed summary judgment for the Hotel because the owners’ 2011 settlement—barring the HOA from negotiating their ground rent—breached the 1999 Amendment’s grant of exclusive negotiating authority to the HOA. The court upheld the denial of a receiver because the HOA had a properly elected board and valid bylaws and was not incapacitated, and, alternatively, the declaration’s remedy was for the Hotel to assume control. It held DRL waived its challenge to joint-and-several fee liability by not raising it below, and awarded the Hotel and the HOA their fees and costs on appeal as prevailing parties under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

For Arizona associations and owners, this decision illustrates how governing-document amendment and voting rules interact with the Arizona Nonprofit Corporation Act. The court confirmed that a nonprofit HOA may obtain member approval through a written “vote by pen” under A.R.S. § 10-3704(A) when the governing documents do not prohibit it, and that whether owners actually approved an amendment can be a fact question for a jury. It also shows that an association’s authority, once conferred in the governing documents, can bind owners: because the 1999 Amendment gave the HOA exclusive authority to negotiate ground rent, individual owners who sidestepped that authority through a private settlement were found to have breached the sublease.

The opinion is also a caution about the limits of a favorable earlier ruling and about preserving arguments. A 2011 stipulated judgment that voided a defective 2006 meeting did not, by its narrow terms, permanently free the owners from ground rent or bar the association from later re-approving the amendment. And DRL’s challenge to being held jointly and severally liable for a roughly $459,000 fee award was waived because it was not raised in the trial court. Because the decision is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 1970 The Hotel’s predecessor and the Small Family Trust enter a ground lease and sublease of twenty acres; the property is later divided into a resort and 29 casitas.
Step 1972 Casita owners enter the Sublease with the Hotel; ground rent is calculated on the consumer price index and recalculated every five years after 1975.
Step 1999 The 1999 Amendment fixes ground rent at $323 per month and authorizes the HOA to represent the owners in ground-rent negotiations, with an appraiser to set rent if no agreement.
Step 2003-10-01 The first scheduled rent adjustment does not take effect because the Hotel and the Small Family Trust continue to dispute the total ground rent.
Step 2005 Arbitration between the Hotel and the Small Family Trust sets total ground rent and allocates 52.7% to the Hotel and 47.3% to the owners; the Hotel and HOA later agree on a 60/40 split.
Step 2006-01-12 At an HOA special meeting, 24 of 29 casita owners vote to approve the new $708.50 monthly ground-rent allocation; owners later sign a mailed Second Amendment (the 2006 Amendment).
Step 2011-08-22 A stipulated final judgment (the Willett Judgment) voids the January 2006 special meeting for lack of a quorum; no appeal is taken.
Step 2012-01 Shaffer appellants sue the Hotel (CV2012-051066) and the Elis file a separate suit against the Hotel and HOA (CV2012-000363); the cases are consolidated.
Step 2015-08 Whitmer, London, and Shaffer sue the HOA (CV2015-053091) seeking appointment of a receiver; the Hotel intervenes.
Step 2016-01 Whitmer and London sue (CV2016-050379) seeking a declaration that the incorporated HOA did not replace the 1972 Council of Co-Owners.
Step 2016-02 A jury finds for the Hotel, sets monthly ground rent at $708.50 (implicitly upholding the 2006 Amendment), and awards back-rent damages.
Step 2016-06-08 The superior court enters judgment holding DRL jointly and severally liable for the Hotel’s attorneys’ fees.
Step 2018-05-22 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, files its memorandum decision affirming the superior court in all three consolidated appeals and awarding the Hotel and HOA fees and costs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/shaffer-v-hilton-casitas/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-05-22

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court in all three consolidated appeals, holding that the 2011 Willett Judgment had no preclusive effect on and did not resolve the HOA’s status and authority or the validity of the 2006 Amendment; that the HOA validly obtained approval of the 2006 Amendment (including through a statutory written “vote by pen” under A.R.S. § 10-3704) and could bind the owners under the 1999 Amendment; and that the owners’ remaining challenges failed.

Download source file
2018-05-22_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was this consolidated case about?

It concerned ground rent for 29 casitas built on land subleased from a Scottsdale resort (owned by Procaccianti AZ II, L.P., the “Hotel”). A 1999 amendment authorized the homeowners association (HOA) to negotiate ground rent for the owners, and after a 2005 arbitration the Hotel and HOA agreed on a $708.50 per-unit monthly ground rent, which 24 of 29 owners approved. Several owner groups sued the Hotel and the HOA over the HOA’s authority, the validity of the amendment, and related rulings.

Did the 2011 Willett Judgment prevent the HOA from charging the higher ground rent?

No. The Court of Appeals held the Willett Judgment was a stipulated judgment that voided only the January 12, 2006 special meeting for lack of a quorum. By its plain terms it made no findings about future amendments and did not extinguish the owners’ ground-rent obligations, so it neither had preclusive effect nor barred the HOA from later obtaining a valid approval.

What is a “vote by pen” and why did it matter?

A “vote by pen” is member approval by signed written consent without a meeting. The court held that A.R.S. § 10-3704(A) allows a nonprofit corporation’s members to approve action this way when the governing documents do not prohibit it. Because nothing showed the HOA’s documents forbade it, and a jury found on sufficient evidence that the owners approved the 2006 Amendment, the approval was valid.

Why did the owners lose on summary judgment about the Hotel?

The 1999 Amendment gave the HOA exclusive authority to negotiate the casita owners’ ground rent. When some owners settled with the HOA in 2011 on terms barring the HOA from negotiating on their behalf, the court found they breached that contractual commitment, entitling the Hotel to summary judgment on its breach-of-contract claim.

Why was DRL’s challenge to the $459,000 fee award rejected?

DRL argued it should not be jointly and severally liable for the Hotel’s roughly $459,000 attorneys’ fee award, but it conceded it had not raised that argument in the superior court. The Court of Appeals held the argument was waived and did not present a sufficient question of public interest to excuse the waiver.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c) it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 16-0628 (consolidated with 1 CA-CV 16-0629 and 1 CA-CV 16-0654)
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMay 22, 2018
Judge / panelWinthrop, Morse, Cattani
PartiesDiana R. Shaffer and other casita owners (Plaintiffs/Appellants) v. Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel; Defendant/Appellee/Intervenor) and Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners / Council of Co-Owners (the HOA; Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law
Topics
CC&RsElectionsAssessmentsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court in all three consolidated appeals, holding that the 2011 Willett Judgment had no preclusive effect on and did not resolve the HOA’s status and authority or the validity of the 2006 Amendment; that the HOA validly obtained approval of the 2006 Amendment (including through a statutory written “vote by pen” under A.R.S. § 10-3704) and could bind the owners under the 1999 Amendment; and that the owners’ remaining challenges failed. It awarded the Hotel and the HOA their reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs on appeal as prevailing parties.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap13 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This consolidated appeal grew out of a decades-long dispute over ground rent for 29 casitas built on land subleased from a Scottsdale resort. In 1970 the resort’s predecessor leased twenty acres, later dividing it into a twelve-acre resort and an eight-acre condominium complex of 29 casitas. A 1972 sublease set the casita owners’ ground rent, and a 1999 amendment fixed the rent at $323 per month while authorizing the homeowners association (the HOA) to represent the owners in future rent negotiations and to use an appraiser if the HOA and the resort owner, Procaccianti AZ II, L.P. (the Hotel), could not agree. After a 2005 arbitration between the Hotel and the landowner, the Hotel and the HOA agreed the owners would pay 40% of the total ground rent, or $708.50 per unit per month, and 24 of 29 owners approved that allocation at a January 2006 special meeting and again through a mailed written amendment. A 2011 stipulated judgment (the Willett Judgment) had voided the 2006 special meeting for lack of a quorum. Various owner groups then sued the Hotel and the HOA, contesting the HOA’s authority, the validity of the 2006 amendment, the identity of the incorporated HOA, the denial of a receiver, a stricken damages claim, and joint-and-several liability for a roughly $459,000 fee award. In an unpublished memorandum decision, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court across all three consolidated appeals and awarded the Hotel and the HOA their fees and costs on appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

The court addressed each argument in turn. On issue preclusion, it reviewed de novo and applied the five-element test, holding that Appellants failed the first element because the status of the incorporated HOA and the validity of the 2006 Amendment were never “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.” The 2011 Willett Judgment was a stipulated judgment that addressed only the narrow question whether the January 12, 2006 special meeting and vote were valid; stipulated judgments generally lack preclusive effect, and its narrow findings did not bar the later courts from deciding the HOA’s status and authority or the validity of the 2006 Amendment. Interpreting the Willett Judgment de novo as a contract, the court found its plain terms voided only the actions taken at the January 2006 meeting for lack of a quorum; it made no findings about the validity of future amendments and did not extinguish the owners’ ground-rent obligations. On the HOA’s status, the court noted the question—whether the post-1994 incorporated entity succeeded the pre-1994 unincorporated association—had already been decided against Appellants, including in London v. Karatz, and declined to revisit it. On the “vote by pen,” the court held A.R.S. § 10-3704(A) permits nonprofit-corporation members to approve action by signed written consent absent contrary governing documents, that nothing showed the HOA’s documents forbade it, and that a jury on sufficient evidence implicitly found the owners validly approved the 2006 Amendment. It found no abuse of discretion in striking the Elis’ undisclosed damages under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 26.1, and affirmed summary judgment for the Hotel because the owners’ 2011 settlement—barring the HOA from negotiating their ground rent—breached the 1999 Amendment’s grant of exclusive negotiating authority to the HOA. The court upheld the denial of a receiver because the HOA had a properly elected board and valid bylaws and was not incapacitated, and, alternatively, the declaration’s remedy was for the Hotel to assume control. It held DRL waived its challenge to joint-and-several fee liability by not raising it below, and awarded the Hotel and the HOA their fees and costs on appeal as prevailing parties under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Why It Matters

For Arizona associations and owners, this decision illustrates how governing-document amendment and voting rules interact with the Arizona Nonprofit Corporation Act. The court confirmed that a nonprofit HOA may obtain member approval through a written “vote by pen” under A.R.S. § 10-3704(A) when the governing documents do not prohibit it, and that whether owners actually approved an amendment can be a fact question for a jury. It also shows that an association’s authority, once conferred in the governing documents, can bind owners: because the 1999 Amendment gave the HOA exclusive authority to negotiate ground rent, individual owners who sidestepped that authority through a private settlement were found to have breached the sublease.

The opinion is also a caution about the limits of a favorable earlier ruling and about preserving arguments. A 2011 stipulated judgment that voided a defective 2006 meeting did not, by its narrow terms, permanently free the owners from ground rent or bar the association from later re-approving the amendment. And DRL’s challenge to being held jointly and severally liable for a roughly $459,000 fee award was waived because it was not raised in the trial court. Because the decision is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

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Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Leslie Johnson, Defendant/Appellee: HOA Court Case Guide

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Defamation & HOA Elections | A.R.S. § 33-1804 | 1 CA-CV 21-0676

How Arizona treats HOA board members who sue critics over election-related statements — and why they must plead actual malice as limited-purpose public figures.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Leslie Johnson, Defendant/Appellee; 1 CA-CV 21-0676; CV2020-010557.

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Members and candidates of a large homeowners’ association’s board are limited-purpose public figures for defamation and false light purposes as to statements about their board service and HOA elections, so they must plead and prove actual malice. Because the plaintiffs failed to plead actual malice, and because limited-purpose public figures cannot maintain false light claims arising from their public duties, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Cheryl Marie McCoy (“Cher”) (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Former Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board president; brought defamation and false light claims against Leslie Johnson.
  • Marcianne Johnson (“Marci”) (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Val Vista Lakes Board member re-elected in November 2019 and chosen as Board president; removed in the June 2020 recall election.
  • Melissa Wilson (Scovel) (“Melissa”) (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Val Vista Lakes Board member and former Board president; removed in the June 2020 recall election.
  • Leslie Johnson (Defendant/Appellee)
    Fellow Val Vista Lakes Association member who authored the challenged social-media posts and meeting comment.
  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Non-party association)
    The approximately 2,280-member Gilbert, Arizona homeowners’ association whose board and elections were the subject of the challenged statements; not a party to the suit.
  • Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C.
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
  • Michael Warzynski (Counsel)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C.
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
  • Venessa J. Bragg (Counsel)
    Elardo, Bragg, Rossi & Palumbo, P.C.
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
  • Nathan Brown (Counsel)
    Brown Patent Law
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Leslie Johnson.
  • Cynthia J. Bailey (Judge)
    Court of Appeals judge; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Samuel A. Thumma (Judge)
    Presiding Judge on the Court of Appeals panel.
  • David B. Gass (Judge)
    Vice Chief Judge on the Court of Appeals panel.
  • Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who dismissed the complaint below.

What happened and why it matters

Three current or former members of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board — Cheryl “Cher” McCoy, Marcianne “Marci” Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a fellow homeowner, Leslie Johnson, for defamation and false light invasion of privacy over social-media posts and a comment at an August 2020 board meeting. The challenged statements accused board members affiliated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) of religiously motivated favoritism in selecting the board’s management committee (calling applicants “LDS hand-picked”) and questioned board members’ religion around the November 2019 board election and the June 2020 recall election that removed Marci and Melissa. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the claims under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures by reason of their board service and that the statements were non-actionable opinion. On appeal, Division One affirmed. It reasoned that the boards of large homeowners’ associations perform quasi-governmental functions and that their activities are matters of public concern to the community — reinforced by the Planned Communities Act’s open-meeting policy in A.R.S. § 33-1804 — so board members and candidates who inject themselves into HOA elections are limited-purpose public figures who must plead and prove actual malice. Because the plaintiffs failed to plead actual malice, and because limited-purpose public figures cannot maintain false light claims arising from their public duties, the court affirmed dismissal of both claims and denied Johnson’s unsupported request for appellate attorneys’ fees.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the Court of Appeals began with the settled rule that a court may decide as a matter of law whether a person is a public figure. Persons may be deemed public figures based on their positions, their purposeful activity in thrusting themselves into matters of public controversy, or their close involvement with the resolution of matters of public concern, and a person may become a limited-purpose public figure by voluntarily injecting themselves into, or being drawn into, a particular public controversy. Although Arizona courts had not decided in a written opinion whether board members of a large homeowners’ association can be limited-purpose public figures, the court found persuasive out-of-state authority holding that they can (Cabrera, Metge, Gulrajaney, Verna, and Martin). The superior court had relied on Verna, which viewed an association board position as essentially indistinguishable from membership on a town’s governing body because the board performs many quasi-municipal functions.

Applying that framework, the court observed that all three plaintiffs had been board candidates, had served on the Board, and had served as Board president at one time or another, so they either voluntarily injected themselves or were drawn into matters of concern to the Val Vista Lakes community. The court rejected the argument that a private association cannot produce public figures, citing Agar and Gulrajaney, and rejected the contention that plaintiffs did not start the “conversation” about their religion, explaining that voluntarily engaging in activity calculated to invite public scrutiny is enough. It also rejected the argument that the open-meeting provision of the Planned Communities Act shows HOAs are not governmental: the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) — that meetings be conducted openly and members be able to speak after discussion of agenda items — strongly suggests that board activities and decisions are matters of public concern. The court distinguished private business boards because the legislature extended First Amendment-type protections to HOA members (A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, -1808).

Because the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures, the false light claim failed under Godbehere, which bars such claims that relate to the performance of public duties; plaintiffs did not dispute that the statements related to their board service. On defamation, a public-figure plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice, and conclusory characterizations without supporting factual specificity fail Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, especially in defamation actions (BLK III; Cullen). Plaintiffs conceded two of the three statements were not actionable, and the remaining “LDS hand-picked” post was not in the record and was not pleaded with the specificity needed to show it made a verifiable factual assertion about Marci or Melissa. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal and denied Johnson’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees because she cited no legal basis for the award.

This memorandum decision addresses a recurring tension in community-association life: robust, sometimes bitter, debate about board elections and governance can collide with individual board members’ desire to protect their reputations. By treating board members and candidates of a large HOA as limited-purpose public figures, the court placed HOA electoral speech on a footing similar to speech about local government, requiring a defamation plaintiff to plead and prove actual malice and barring false light claims tied to public duties. In practice, that raises the pleading bar substantially for board members who sue critics over election-related statements, and it protects members’ ability to comment publicly on candidates and board decisions.

The decision also underscores how Arizona’s Planned Communities Act frames HOA governance as a matter of community-wide public concern. The court read the open-meeting policy of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (with A.R.S. § 33-1808) as evidence that board activities are open, participatory, and quasi-governmental, distinguishing HOA boards from ordinary private business boards. Because this is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule; even so, it illustrates how Arizona courts are likely to analyze defamation and false light claims arising from HOA elections, recall campaigns, and board management decisions. A separately docketed memorandum decision arising from the same community, McCoy v. Hassen, 1 CA-CV 21-0524, addresses related disputes.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2019 Before the November 2019 board election, Leslie Johnson allegedly published a social-media post inquiring about people’s religion and implying religious belief was affecting their actions.
Step 2019-11 The Association held its regular Board election; Melissa and Marci were re-elected, and Marci was chosen to serve as Board president.
Step 2020-06 A recall election removed Marci and Melissa from the Board.
Step 2020 After the recall, Leslie allegedly posted on social media that management-committee applicants were “LDS hand-picked” by LDS-affiliated board members.
Step 2020-08 At an August 2020 Board meeting, Leslie allegedly yelled a comment referencing a director’s religion (“Because you’re a MORMON . . .”) while director Dustin Snow was answering a question.
Step 2020 Shortly after the August 2020 meeting, plaintiffs sued Leslie and other defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2020-010557), alleging defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, private nuisance, and a Fair Housing Act claim later conceded.
Several defendants, including Leslie, moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); plaintiffs filed a written response and Leslie filed no reply.
Forty-five days after plaintiffs’ response, the superior court granted most of the motions, including Leslie’s, finding plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures and the statements non-actionable opinion, and dismissing the false light and emotional-distress claims.
The superior court entered a final Rule 54(b) judgment dismissing the complaint against Leslie; plaintiffs appealed, and co-defendant James Rosebrough was removed from the appeal by stipulation.
Step 2022-12-08 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, issued its memorandum decision affirming the dismissal and denying Leslie’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees.

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Source 1 2022-12-08

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that HOA board members and candidates were limited-purpose public figures for defamation purposes, so the plaintiffs had to plead and prove actual malice.

Download source file
2022-12-08_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was McCoy v. Johnson about?

Three current or former members of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board sued a fellow homeowner, Leslie Johnson, for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. The claims arose from social-media posts and a comment at an August 2020 board meeting that questioned board members’ religion and accused LDS-affiliated board members of favoring “LDS hand-picked” applicants for the board’s management committee, made around the November 2019 board election and the June 2020 recall election.

What is a “limited-purpose public figure,” and why did it matter?

A limited-purpose public figure is someone who voluntarily injects themselves into, or is drawn into, a particular public controversy. Such a plaintiff must prove “actual malice” — that the speaker knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity — to win a defamation claim, and cannot bring a false light claim arising from the performance of their public duties. The court held the board members were limited-purpose public figures as to their board service and HOA elections.

Why did the court treat HOA board members like public figures?

The court relied on out-of-state authority (including the New Jersey Verna decision) holding that boards of large homeowners’ associations perform quasi-municipal functions, making board members comparable to members of a town’s governing body. Because the three plaintiffs had run for the board, served on it, and served as board president, the court found they had voluntarily entered matters of public concern to the roughly 2,280-member Val Vista Lakes community.

What role did the Planned Communities Act play?

The plaintiffs argued the Planned Communities Act’s open-meeting provision showed HOAs are not governmental. The court disagreed, reasoning that the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) — requiring meetings to be conducted openly and members to be able to speak after discussion of agenda items — strongly suggests board activities and decisions are matters of public concern. The court also noted the Legislature extended First Amendment-type protections to HOA members (A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, -1808), distinguishing HOA boards from private business boards.

Why were the defamation and false light claims dismissed?

Because the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures, their false light claim about their public duties was barred, and their defamation claim required pleading actual malice. The court found the complaint offered only conclusory characterizations of the statements. Plaintiffs conceded two of three statements were not actionable, and the remaining “LDS hand-picked” post was not in the record and was not pleaded with the specificity needed to show a verifiable factual assertion about the plaintiffs.

Is this decision binding precedent, and who represented the parties?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), so it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule. The plaintiffs/appellants were represented by Bradley R. Jardine and Michael Warzynski of Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C., and by Venessa J. Bragg of Elardo, Bragg, Rossi & Palumbo, P.C. Leslie Johnson was represented by Nathan Brown of Brown Patent Law.

Case Dossier

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Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 21-0676
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateDecember 8, 2022
Judge / panelCynthia J. Bailey, Samuel A. Thumma, David B. Gass
PartiesCheryl Marie McCoy, et al. (Plaintiffs/Appellants) v. Leslie Johnson (Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law
Topics
ElectionsProcedureOpen Meetings
Outcome / holding

Members and candidates of a large homeowners’ association’s board are limited-purpose public figures for defamation and false light purposes as to statements about their board service and HOA elections, so they must plead and prove actual malice. Because the plaintiffs failed to plead actual malice, and because limited-purpose public figures cannot maintain false light claims arising from their public duties, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was affirmed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Three current or former members of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board — Cheryl “Cher” McCoy, Marcianne “Marci” Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a fellow homeowner, Leslie Johnson, for defamation and false light invasion of privacy over social-media posts and a comment at an August 2020 board meeting. The challenged statements accused board members affiliated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) of religiously motivated favoritism in selecting the board’s management committee (calling applicants “LDS hand-picked”) and questioned board members’ religion around the November 2019 board election and the June 2020 recall election that removed Marci and Melissa. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the claims under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures by reason of their board service and that the statements were non-actionable opinion. On appeal, Division One affirmed. It reasoned that the boards of large homeowners’ associations perform quasi-governmental functions and that their activities are matters of public concern to the community — reinforced by the Planned Communities Act’s open-meeting policy in A.R.S. § 33-1804 — so board members and candidates who inject themselves into HOA elections are limited-purpose public figures who must plead and prove actual malice. Because the plaintiffs failed to plead actual malice, and because limited-purpose public figures cannot maintain false light claims arising from their public duties, the court affirmed dismissal of both claims and denied Johnson’s unsupported request for appellate attorneys’ fees.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the Court of Appeals began with the settled rule that a court may decide as a matter of law whether a person is a public figure. Persons may be deemed public figures based on their positions, their purposeful activity in thrusting themselves into matters of public controversy, or their close involvement with the resolution of matters of public concern, and a person may become a limited-purpose public figure by voluntarily injecting themselves into, or being drawn into, a particular public controversy. Although Arizona courts had not decided in a written opinion whether board members of a large homeowners’ association can be limited-purpose public figures, the court found persuasive out-of-state authority holding that they can (Cabrera, Metge, Gulrajaney, Verna, and Martin). The superior court had relied on Verna, which viewed an association board position as essentially indistinguishable from membership on a town’s governing body because the board performs many quasi-municipal functions.

Applying that framework, the court observed that all three plaintiffs had been board candidates, had served on the Board, and had served as Board president at one time or another, so they either voluntarily injected themselves or were drawn into matters of concern to the Val Vista Lakes community. The court rejected the argument that a private association cannot produce public figures, citing Agar and Gulrajaney, and rejected the contention that plaintiffs did not start the “conversation” about their religion, explaining that voluntarily engaging in activity calculated to invite public scrutiny is enough. It also rejected the argument that the open-meeting provision of the Planned Communities Act shows HOAs are not governmental: the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) — that meetings be conducted openly and members be able to speak after discussion of agenda items — strongly suggests that board activities and decisions are matters of public concern. The court distinguished private business boards because the legislature extended First Amendment-type protections to HOA members (A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, -1808).

Because the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures, the false light claim failed under Godbehere, which bars such claims that relate to the performance of public duties; plaintiffs did not dispute that the statements related to their board service. On defamation, a public-figure plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice, and conclusory characterizations without supporting factual specificity fail Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, especially in defamation actions (BLK III; Cullen). Plaintiffs conceded two of the three statements were not actionable, and the remaining “LDS hand-picked” post was not in the record and was not pleaded with the specificity needed to show it made a verifiable factual assertion about Marci or Melissa. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal and denied Johnson’s request for appellate attorneys’ fees because she cited no legal basis for the award.

Why It Matters

This memorandum decision addresses a recurring tension in community-association life: robust, sometimes bitter, debate about board elections and governance can collide with individual board members’ desire to protect their reputations. By treating board members and candidates of a large HOA as limited-purpose public figures, the court placed HOA electoral speech on a footing similar to speech about local government, requiring a defamation plaintiff to plead and prove actual malice and barring false light claims tied to public duties. In practice, that raises the pleading bar substantially for board members who sue critics over election-related statements, and it protects members’ ability to comment publicly on candidates and board decisions.

The decision also underscores how Arizona’s Planned Communities Act frames HOA governance as a matter of community-wide public concern. The court read the open-meeting policy of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (with A.R.S. § 33-1808) as evidence that board activities are open, participatory, and quasi-governmental, distinguishing HOA boards from ordinary private business boards. Because this is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule; even so, it illustrates how Arizona courts are likely to analyze defamation and false light claims arising from HOA elections, recall campaigns, and board management decisions. A separately docketed memorandum decision arising from the same community, McCoy v. Hassen, 1 CA-CV 21-0524, addresses related disputes.

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Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al. v. Ken Hassen, et al.: HOA Court Case Guide

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Defamation & Public Figures | A.R.S. §§ 12-349, 41-1491.36 | 1 CA-CV 21-0524

Division One holds that presidents of a 2,280-member Arizona community association were limited-purpose public figures, so their defamation claims over a contested board recall required proof of actual malice.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Cheryl Marie McCoy, et al. v. Ken Hassen, et al.; 1 CA-CV 21-0524; CV2020-010557.

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Because the plaintiff HOA board members and past presidents were limited-purpose public figures as to community and board matters, and because their complaint failed to plead actual malice and the challenged statements were largely non-actionable opinion, dismissal of the defamation and false-light claims under Rule 12(b)(6) was affirmed; but the superior court’s summary denial of the Kartageners’ request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36 was reversed and remanded for further consideration.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Cheryl Marie McCoy (Appellant)
    Former Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board member and past President; plaintiff/appellant/cross-appellee. Her husband, Todd McCoy, continued to serve on the Board.
  • Marcianne Johnson (Appellant)
    Former Val Vista Lakes Board member who became Board President after the November 2019 election and was removed in the June 2020 recall; plaintiff/appellant/cross-appellee.
  • Melissa Wilson (Scovel) (Appellant)
    Former Val Vista Lakes Board President, removed in the June 2020 recall; plaintiff/appellant/cross-appellee.
  • Ken Hassen (Appellee)
    Fellow community member and former Board member; his Rule 12(b)(6) motion was granted after the court found he expressed only opinions.
  • Henry Kartagener (Appellee / Cross-Appellant)
    Community member and defendant; cross-appellant who challenged the denial of the couple’s fees-and-sanctions request. The court found certain of his statements were non-actionable opinion.
  • Claire Kartagener (Appellee / Cross-Appellant)
    Community member and defendant; cross-appellant on the fees-and-sanctions request.
  • Sharon Maiden (Appellee)
    Community member and defendant; the court found her post-election ‘secret scheme’ comment was non-actionable and distinguishable from Tarter v. Bendt.
  • Wilbur Maiden (Appellee)
    Community member and defendant, sued as part of the Maiden marital community.
  • Samantha Kelley (Appellee)
    Community member and defendant whose motion to dismiss was granted.
  • William Suttell (Appellee)
    Former Board member and defendant, sued as part of the Kelley marital community.
  • Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C. (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
  • Michael Warzynski (Counsel)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C. (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
  • Venessa J. Bragg (Counsel)
    Elardo, Bragg, Rossi & Palumbo, P.C. (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
  • Andrew T. Apodaca (Counsel)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Ruben, P.C. (Tucson)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sharon and Wilbur Maiden.
  • Christopher L. Enos (Counsel)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Ruben, P.C. (Tucson)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Sharon and Wilbur Maiden.
  • Maria Crimi Speth (Counsel)
    Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Samantha Kelley and William Suttell.
  • Aaron K. Haar (Counsel)
    Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Samantha Kelley and William Suttell.
  • Daniel Torrens (Counsel)
    Portmeirion Law Offices, PLLC (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee Ken Hassen.
  • Christopher Robbins (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee Ken Hassen.
  • R. Corey Hill (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee Ken Hassen.
  • Ginette M. Hill (Counsel)
    Hill, Hall & DeCiancio, PLC (Phoenix)
    Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee Ken Hassen.
  • Michael E. Hensley (Counsel)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Henry and Claire Kartagener.
  • John D. Lierman (Counsel)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Henry and Claire Kartagener.
  • Elizabeth B. N. Garcia (Counsel)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Henry and Claire Kartagener.
  • Cynthia J. Bailey (Judge)
    Presiding Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Peter B. Swann (Judge)
    Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • D. Steven Williams (Judge)
    Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • Joan M. Sinclair (Judge)
    Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court who presided over the case below.
  • Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
    Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court who presided over the case below.

What happened and why it matters

Three former board members and past presidents of the Val Vista Lakes Master-Planned Community Association in Gilbert, Arizona — Cheryl Marie McCoy, Marcianne Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a group of fellow community members and former board members for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Arizona Fair Housing Act violation, and private nuisance. Their claims arose from an online ‘hate and disinformation campaign’ surrounding a November 2019 board election and a June 2020 recall election that removed two of them from the Board. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed all counts under Rule 12(b)(6) and entered Rule 54(b) judgments. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the dismissal of their defamation and false-light claims against Ken Hassen, the Kartageners, the Maidens, and Samantha Kelley (and her spouse William Suttell); the Kartageners cross-appealed the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals, holding that because the plaintiffs had run for and held the presidency of an unusually large (2,280-member) community association, they were ‘limited purpose public figures’ who had to plead falsity and actual malice — which they failed to do — and that many of the challenged statements were non-actionable opinion or political speech about contested board elections. On the cross-appeal, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ fee-and-sanctions request and remanded for reconsideration. Because it is an unpublished memorandum decision under Rule 111(c), it is not precedential.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, the panel first rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural argument that the trial court should have converted the motions into summary judgment. Because the full text of the allegedly defamatory statements — which the defendants attached to their motions — was central to a complaint that otherwise offered only the plaintiffs’ own summaries, the court could consider those statements without conversion, consistent with Coleman v. City of Mesa and Strategic Development & Construction v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners.

The court then affirmed the threshold ruling that the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures. Each had not merely served on the Board but had run in elections for it and achieved the presidency of an unusually large association — the complaint alleged 2,280 members. Following the New Jersey decision Verna v. Links at Valleybrook Neighborhood Ass’n and decisions from California, Minnesota, and Wyoming, the court reasoned that HOA boards perform ‘quasi-municipal functions’ and that the Board’s composition was a matter of public concern to the community’s members. It rejected the argument that HOA governance is not of general public concern, explaining that protected speech need only concern matters interesting to ‘even a relatively small segment’ of the public, and it distinguished HOA boards from purely private boards because the legislature has extended First Amendment-type protections to association members through A.R.S. §§ 33-1804 and 33-1808. The court also found unavailing the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Planned Communities Act and their ‘private contract’ argument.

Because the plaintiffs were public figures, they had to prove — by clear and convincing evidence — falsity and actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan, Gertz v. Robert Welch, and Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers. The complaint, consisting largely of conclusory characterizations rather than the actual statements, failed that heightened standard under BLK III, LLC v. Skelton. Independently, the court held the statements attached to the motions were non-actionable opinion or political speech about hotly contested board elections, incapable of being proven objectively true or false, and that many were not ‘of and concerning’ all three plaintiffs. It distinguished Tarter v. Bendt because Sharon Maiden’s comment about a ‘secret’ scheme referred to ‘ex-board members,’ not a secret Board meeting. The plaintiffs conceded that their false-light claims failed if they were public figures.

On the cross-appeal, reviewed de novo, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ request for fees and sanctions. Under A.R.S. § 12-349 a court must assess reasonable fees and expenses (and may award limited double damages) against a party who brings a claim without substantial justification — meaning groundless and not made in good faith — proven by a preponderance of the evidence; under A.R.S. § 41-1491.36 a prevailing defendant may recover fees where the complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The court found McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners had no factual basis and were groundless; the Fair Housing Act claim was frivolous and was not withdrawn as to the Kartageners for roughly five months; and the private-nuisance claim had no factual or legal basis. It declined to find Johnson’s and Wilson’s public-figure arguments irrational, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the fee-and-sanctions request in light of the decision.

This memorandum decision is a clear Arizona illustration that people who run for and serve on a homeowners’ or community association board — especially as president of a large community — can be treated as ‘limited purpose public figures’ for defamation purposes. That status matters enormously: instead of the ordinary negligence standard available to private plaintiffs, a public-figure board member must plead and prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a challenged statement was both false and made with ‘actual malice’ (knowledge of falsity or conscious disregard of the truth). Statements of opinion and political speech about contested board elections generally cannot support a defamation claim at all. For board members bruised by online campaigns and recall fights, the case signals that heated criticism of association leadership enjoys strong First Amendment protection.

The decision also underscores the fee-and-sanctions exposure that comes with filing thin defamation and related claims. The court reversed the trial court’s routine denial of the Kartageners’ request under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36, emphasizing that a claim brought without any factual basis — such as McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners, the unfounded Fair Housing Act count, and the novel private-nuisance theory — can be ‘groundless and not made in good faith,’ exposing the filing party to attorneys’ fees, expenses, and even limited sanctions. Community-association litigants and their counsel should note both the substantive hurdle (public-figure/actual-malice) and the downside risk (mandatory fee-shifting) before suing neighbors over election-season speech.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2019-11 A regularly scheduled Val Vista Lakes Board election is held; Dustin Snow and Dean Sanders join the Board, Ken Hassen leaves it, and Marcianne Johnson becomes Board President.
Step 2020-06 A recall election removes Johnson and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) from the Board, following an alleged online campaign against the plaintiffs.
Step 2020-08 McCoy, Johnson, and Wilson file suit in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2020-010557) alleging defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Arizona Fair Housing Act violation, and private nuisance.
Step 2020-11 Various defendants, including Kelley, the Kartageners, and the Maidens, begin filing and joining Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, attaching the full allegedly defamatory statements.
Step 2021-01 In response to the Kartageners’ motion, plaintiffs agree to withdraw the Fair Housing Act claim as to the Kartageners — about five months after filing the complaint.
Step 2021-02 The superior court holds oral argument on the motions to dismiss; plaintiffs concede the Fair Housing Act claim may be dismissed without prejudice.
Step 2021-04 The court issues a minute entry granting the motions to dismiss for Kelley, the Kartageners, and the Maidens, finding plaintiffs are limited-purpose public figures and that certain statements were non-actionable opinion.
Step 2021 Hassen files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which the court grants; the Kartageners move for fees, expenses, and sanctions, which the court denies; the court enters separate Rule 54(b) judgments for each defendant.
Step 2022-08-30 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirms the dismissals of the defamation and false-light claims, reverses the denial of the Kartageners’ fee-and-sanctions request, and remands.

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This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/mccoy-v-hassen/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2022-08-30

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the fair-housing and fee-sanctions dispute.

Download source file
2022-08-30_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was McCoy v. Hassen about?

Three former board members and past presidents of the Val Vista Lakes Master-Planned Community Association in Gilbert, Arizona — Cheryl McCoy, Marcianne Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a group of fellow community members and former board members. They alleged defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Arizona Fair Housing Act violation, and private nuisance stemming from an online ‘hate and disinformation campaign’ surrounding a November 2019 board election and a June 2020 recall election. The Association itself was not a named party — the litigants were its board members and residents.

Why were the HOA board members treated as ‘limited purpose public figures’?

The court held the plaintiffs did far more than simply sit on a board: each ran in elections for and achieved the presidency of an unusually large association of about 2,280 members. Citing decisions from New Jersey, California, Minnesota, and Wyoming, the court reasoned that HOA boards perform ‘quasi-municipal functions’ and that the Board’s composition is a matter of public concern to community members. By voluntarily injecting themselves into contested board elections, the plaintiffs became limited-purpose public figures for those issues.

What must a public-figure plaintiff prove in a defamation case?

Unlike a private plaintiff, a public official or public figure must prove — by clear and convincing evidence — that the challenged statement was false and was made with ‘actual malice,’ meaning the speaker knew it was false or acted with reckless (indeed conscious) disregard of its truth. The court found the plaintiffs’ complaint, which mostly offered their own summaries and conclusory characterizations rather than the actual statements, failed to meet that heightened standard.

Why did the defamation claims fail on the merits?

Beyond the pleading deficiency, the court held the statements attached to the motions to dismiss were largely non-actionable opinion or political speech about hotly contested board elections — statements incapable of being proven objectively true or false. Many statements also were not ‘of and concerning’ all three plaintiffs. The court distinguished Tarter v. Bendt, noting Sharon Maiden’s comment about a ‘secret’ scheme referred to ‘ex-board members,’ not a secret board meeting, and the plaintiffs conceded their false-light claims failed if they were public figures.

What happened on the Kartageners’ cross-appeal about attorneys’ fees?

The court reversed the superior court’s summary denial of the Kartageners’ request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36. It found that McCoy had no factual basis for any claim against the Kartageners, that the Fair Housing Act claim was frivolous and not withdrawn as to the Kartageners for about five months, and that the private-nuisance claim had no factual or legal basis. The court remanded for the trial court to reconsider the fee-and-sanctions request.

Is McCoy v. Hassen binding precedent in Arizona?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), so it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by that rule. It nonetheless illustrates how Arizona courts apply the limited-purpose-public-figure doctrine and fee-shifting statutes in disputes among HOA board members and residents.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 21-0524
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateAugust 30, 2022
Judge / panelCynthia J. Bailey, Peter B. Swann, D. Steven Williams
PartiesCheryl Marie McCoy, Marcianne Johnson & Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — former Val Vista Lakes Community Association board members and presidents (Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees) v. Ken Hassen, Henry & Claire Kartagener, Sharon & Wilbur Maiden, and Samantha Kelley & William Suttell — fellow community members and former board members (Defendants/Appellees); the Kartageners cross-appealed the denial of their fees-and-sanctions request.
Governing law
Topics
ElectionsAttorney FeesFair HousingProcedure
Outcome / holding

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Because the plaintiff HOA board members and past presidents were limited-purpose public figures as to community and board matters, and because their complaint failed to plead actual malice and the challenged statements were largely non-actionable opinion, dismissal of the defamation and false-light claims under Rule 12(b)(6) was affirmed; but the superior court’s summary denial of the Kartageners’ request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36 was reversed and remanded for further consideration.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Three former board members and past presidents of the Val Vista Lakes Master-Planned Community Association in Gilbert, Arizona — Cheryl Marie McCoy, Marcianne Johnson, and Melissa Wilson (Scovel) — sued a group of fellow community members and former board members for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, an Arizona Fair Housing Act violation, and private nuisance. Their claims arose from an online ‘hate and disinformation campaign’ surrounding a November 2019 board election and a June 2020 recall election that removed two of them from the Board. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed all counts under Rule 12(b)(6) and entered Rule 54(b) judgments. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged only the dismissal of their defamation and false-light claims against Ken Hassen, the Kartageners, the Maidens, and Samantha Kelley (and her spouse William Suttell); the Kartageners cross-appealed the denial of their request for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and sanctions. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals, holding that because the plaintiffs had run for and held the presidency of an unusually large (2,280-member) community association, they were ‘limited purpose public figures’ who had to plead falsity and actual malice — which they failed to do — and that many of the challenged statements were non-actionable opinion or political speech about contested board elections. On the cross-appeal, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ fee-and-sanctions request and remanded for reconsideration. Because it is an unpublished memorandum decision under Rule 111(c), it is not precedential.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, the panel first rejected the plaintiffs’ procedural argument that the trial court should have converted the motions into summary judgment. Because the full text of the allegedly defamatory statements — which the defendants attached to their motions — was central to a complaint that otherwise offered only the plaintiffs’ own summaries, the court could consider those statements without conversion, consistent with Coleman v. City of Mesa and Strategic Development & Construction v. 7th & Roosevelt Partners.

The court then affirmed the threshold ruling that the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures. Each had not merely served on the Board but had run in elections for it and achieved the presidency of an unusually large association — the complaint alleged 2,280 members. Following the New Jersey decision Verna v. Links at Valleybrook Neighborhood Ass’n and decisions from California, Minnesota, and Wyoming, the court reasoned that HOA boards perform ‘quasi-municipal functions’ and that the Board’s composition was a matter of public concern to the community’s members. It rejected the argument that HOA governance is not of general public concern, explaining that protected speech need only concern matters interesting to ‘even a relatively small segment’ of the public, and it distinguished HOA boards from purely private boards because the legislature has extended First Amendment-type protections to association members through A.R.S. §§ 33-1804 and 33-1808. The court also found unavailing the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Planned Communities Act and their ‘private contract’ argument.

Because the plaintiffs were public figures, they had to prove — by clear and convincing evidence — falsity and actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan, Gertz v. Robert Welch, and Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers. The complaint, consisting largely of conclusory characterizations rather than the actual statements, failed that heightened standard under BLK III, LLC v. Skelton. Independently, the court held the statements attached to the motions were non-actionable opinion or political speech about hotly contested board elections, incapable of being proven objectively true or false, and that many were not ‘of and concerning’ all three plaintiffs. It distinguished Tarter v. Bendt because Sharon Maiden’s comment about a ‘secret’ scheme referred to ‘ex-board members,’ not a secret Board meeting. The plaintiffs conceded that their false-light claims failed if they were public figures.

On the cross-appeal, reviewed de novo, the court held the superior court erred in summarily denying the Kartageners’ request for fees and sanctions. Under A.R.S. § 12-349 a court must assess reasonable fees and expenses (and may award limited double damages) against a party who brings a claim without substantial justification — meaning groundless and not made in good faith — proven by a preponderance of the evidence; under A.R.S. § 41-1491.36 a prevailing defendant may recover fees where the complaint was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The court found McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners had no factual basis and were groundless; the Fair Housing Act claim was frivolous and was not withdrawn as to the Kartageners for roughly five months; and the private-nuisance claim had no factual or legal basis. It declined to find Johnson’s and Wilson’s public-figure arguments irrational, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the fee-and-sanctions request in light of the decision.

Why It Matters

This memorandum decision is a clear Arizona illustration that people who run for and serve on a homeowners’ or community association board — especially as president of a large community — can be treated as ‘limited purpose public figures’ for defamation purposes. That status matters enormously: instead of the ordinary negligence standard available to private plaintiffs, a public-figure board member must plead and prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a challenged statement was both false and made with ‘actual malice’ (knowledge of falsity or conscious disregard of the truth). Statements of opinion and political speech about contested board elections generally cannot support a defamation claim at all. For board members bruised by online campaigns and recall fights, the case signals that heated criticism of association leadership enjoys strong First Amendment protection.

The decision also underscores the fee-and-sanctions exposure that comes with filing thin defamation and related claims. The court reversed the trial court’s routine denial of the Kartageners’ request under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 41-1491.36, emphasizing that a claim brought without any factual basis — such as McCoy’s claims against the Kartageners, the unfounded Fair Housing Act count, and the novel private-nuisance theory — can be ‘groundless and not made in good faith,’ exposing the filing party to attorneys’ fees, expenses, and even limited sanctions. Community-association litigants and their counsel should note both the substantive hurdle (public-figure/actual-malice) and the downside risk (mandatory fee-shifting) before suing neighbors over election-season speech.

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Keith and Kathy Campbell, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Gail and Steven Haskett; Nick and JoAnn Treinen; Emily J. Webster; Gerald C. and Patricia M. Palmatier; Judith A. and Martin C. Weber, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants: HOA Court Case Guide

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CC&R Amendments & Pleading Procedure | A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, 33-1812, 33-1817 | 2 CA-CV 2021-0091

An unpublished Division Two decision affirming dismissal of a homeowner fiduciary-duty claim while reviving CC&R-amendment claims, holding a court cannot order a more definite statement of a meeting the HOA concedes never happened.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Keith and Kathy Campbell, husband and wife, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association, an Arizona non-profit corporation; Gail and Steven Haskett; Nick and JoAnn Treinen; Emily J. Webster; Gerald C. and Patricia M. Palmatier; Judith A. and Martin C. Weber, Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants; 2 CA-CV 2021-0091; S1100CV201901839.

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

The court affirmed dismissal of the homeowners’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, holding the allegations were conclusory and the challenged conduct — counting written CC&R concurrences after the 30-day window — did not involve any collection or misuse of funds giving rise to a fiduciary duty. It held, however, that the trial court erred in ordering a more definite statement, because the Association’s own motion admitted no membership or board meeting ever occurred, so it was impossible for the homeowners to supply a meeting date; the striking of the amended complaint and dismissal of the remaining claims were therefore vacated and remanded.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association (Appellee)
    Arizona non-profit corporation and mobile-home community HOA (Defendant below; Appellee/Cross-Appellant); counted the written concurrences and adopted the amended CC&Rs.
  • Keith Campbell (Appellant)
    Homeowner and former board president (Plaintiff below; Appellant/Cross-Appellee) who objected to counting late concurrences and resigned from the board.
  • Kathy Campbell (Appellant)
    Homeowner and co-plaintiff (Appellant/Cross-Appellee); Keith Campbell’s wife.
  • Gail Haskett (Appellee)
    Individual board-member defendant named in the caption.
  • Steven Haskett (Appellee)
    Individual defendant named in the caption (spouse of Gail Haskett).
  • Nick Treinen (Appellee)
    Individual board-member defendant named in the caption.
  • JoAnn Treinen (Appellee)
    Individual defendant named in the caption (spouse of Nick Treinen).
  • Emily J. Webster (Appellee)
    Individual board-member defendant named in the caption.
  • Gerald C. Palmatier (Appellee)
    Individual board-member defendant named in the caption.
  • Patricia M. Palmatier (Appellee)
    Individual defendant named in the caption (spouse of Gerald C. Palmatier).
  • Judith A. Weber (Appellee)
    Individual board-member defendant named in the caption.
  • Martin C. Weber (Appellee)
    Individual defendant named in the caption (spouse of Judith A. Weber).
  • Melanie C. McKeddie (Counsel)
    McKeddie Cooley G.P. (Scottsdale)
    Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees (the Campbells).
  • Justin R. Cooley (Counsel)
    McKeddie Cooley G.P. (Scottsdale)
    Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees (the Campbells).
  • Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (Tempe)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants (the Association and board members).
  • Nicholas C. S. Nogami (Counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (Tempe)
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appellants (the Association and board members).
  • Brearcliffe (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Judge who authored the memorandum decision.
  • Eppich (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Presiding Judge who concurred in the decision.
  • Staring (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Vice Chief Judge who concurred in the decision.
  • Steven J. Fuller (Judge)
    Pinal County Superior Court
    Trial judge who ordered a more definite statement, struck the amended complaint, and dismissed the suit with prejudice.

What happened and why it matters

Keith and Kathy Campbell own property in the Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association community, a Pinal County non-profit governed by CC&Rs recorded in 1998. In March 2019 the board mailed owners a letter, a proposed Amended and Restated Declaration, and a written-concurrence form, explaining that adoption required the written concurrence of 878 owners (two-thirds of the assessed lots) and asking owners to return the form within thirty days. The Association reached the required number of concurrences “shortly after the 30-day window” and counted them all; Keith Campbell, then board president, objected that late concurrences should not count, and resigned. The Campbells sued for breach of contract, negligence per se under the Planned Community Act, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ordered a more definite statement identifying the specific meeting date, then struck the amended complaint and dismissed the case with prejudice when no date was supplied. Division Two affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary-duty claim as conclusory and outside the fund-related duty recognized in Divizio, but held that ordering a more definite statement was error because the Association’s own motion admitted no relevant meeting ever occurred, making a meeting date impossible to provide. The court vacated the striking and dismissal, remanded, and awarded no fees or costs on appeal.

Reviewing the dismissals de novo under Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court analyzed the two rulings separately. On the fiduciary-duty claim, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not obtain relief under any provable interpretation of the facts, and the court may look only to the pleading itself. The Campbells alleged the Association “acts as a fiduciary with the fees collected from its members” and breached that duty by labeling the vote a “concurrence” and counting it past the statutory time frames. The court held these were merely conclusory statements insufficient under Cullen v. Auto-Owners Insurance: even assuming the collection of member fees could create a fiduciary relationship, the Campbells never alleged how the Association’s actions amounted to an improper use of funds. It distinguished Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises, where mobile-home-park members were entitled to accountings of dues collected for community upkeep; here the challenged conduct — collecting signed concurrences after the 30-day deadline — did not involve the collection or use of funds to which the Divizio duty would extend. Merely paying dues does not convert every alleged wrong into a breach of fiduciary duty.

On the striking of the amended complaint, the court explained that a defendant may move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) only when a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that it cannot frame a response, and a court may strike a pleading for disobeying such an order. But the Association’s own motion, while demanding that the Campbells identify the meeting date of the alleged statutory violations, candidly admitted that “there was no such meeting” and “no meeting of the membership related to the collection of the concurrences.” Because it was clear from the Association’s own filing that it was impossible for the Campbells to state a meeting date that never existed, ordering a more definite statement was error — and, that order being error, striking the amended complaint and dismissing the remaining claims for noncompliance with it was likewise error. Because neither party completely prevailed, the court declined to award appellate fees or costs and left the Association’s fee cross-appeal for the trial court on remand.

The decision is a mixed result that highlights two recurring HOA-litigation pressure points: whether a board owes homeowners a fiduciary duty, and how much factual specificity a complaint about governance procedures must contain. On the fiduciary-duty question, the court did not announce a categorical rule that HOA boards never owe fiduciary duties; instead it treated the claim as a pleading failure, distinguishing Divizio and emphasizing that a fiduciary theory tied to member dues requires concrete allegations of improper use of funds, not a general assertion that the board mishandled a vote. Homeowners advancing fiduciary-duty claims should therefore plead specific, fund-related misconduct rather than relabeling a covenant or voting dispute.

The striking ruling is the more consequential procedural lesson: a defendant cannot use a motion for a more definite statement to force a plaintiff to allege a fact the defendant itself concedes does not exist. Because the Association admitted no relevant meeting occurred, the trial court could not condition the survival of the suit on the Campbells’ identifying a meeting date, and dismissal on that basis was reversible. The case also confirms that CC&Rs constitute a contract among owners, so disputes over amendment and concurrence procedures can support contract-based claims and fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 — though here, with neither side fully prevailing, the court awarded no appellate fees. As an unpublished memorandum decision, it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 1998-04-16 Amended Declaration of CC&Rs for Florence Gardens dated (and recorded in 1998); governs the community until 2019.
Step 2019-02-08 Board’s proposed Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs is dated.
Step 2019-03 Board mails owners a letter, the amended and restated CC&Rs, a summary, and a written-concurrence form, requiring the written concurrence of 878 owners (two-thirds of assessed lots) and asking for return within 30 days.
“Shortly after the 30-day window,” the Association receives enough concurrences to adopt the amended CC&Rs and counts all of them; board president Keith Campbell objects to counting late concurrences and resigns.
Step 2019-12 Keith and Kathy Campbell file a verified complaint in Pinal County Superior Court (No. S1100CV201901839) alleging breach of contract, negligence per se, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The Association files a combined Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the fiduciary-duty claim and a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement, while admitting no relevant meeting occurred.
After a hearing, the trial court grants the more-definite-statement motion (ordering the specific meeting dates) and later grants dismissal of the fiduciary-duty claim.
Step 2020-06-03 The Campbells file an amended complaint that again does not identify any meeting dates.
The Association moves to strike; the trial court strikes the amended complaint, dismisses the suit with prejudice, denies the Association’s fee request, and enters final judgment under Rule 54(c).
Step 2022-07-05 Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirms the fiduciary-duty dismissal, vacates the striking and dismissal of the remaining claims, remands, and awards no fees or costs on appeal.

Complete uploaded source-document index

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Source 1 2022-07-05

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that the court affirmed dismissal of the homeowners’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, holding the allegations were conclusory and the challenged conduct — counting written CC&R concurrences after the 30-day window — did not involve any collection or misuse of funds giving rise to a fiduciary duty.

Download source file
2022-07-05_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

Who won Campbell v. Florence Gardens?

The result was split. Division Two affirmed the dismissal of the homeowners’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, but it vacated the trial court’s decision to strike the amended complaint and dismiss the remaining claims, remanding those for further proceedings. Because neither side completely prevailed, the court awarded no attorneys’ fees or costs on appeal and left the Association’s fee cross-appeal for the trial court.

What was the dispute about?

The Florence Gardens board circulated written-concurrence forms to adopt amended CC&Rs, asking owners to return them within 30 days. The Association reached the required two-thirds concurrence ‘shortly after the 30-day window’ and counted the late-returned forms. Homeowners Keith and Kathy Campbell — Keith was then board president — sued, alleging breach of contract, negligence per se under the Planned Community Act, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty.

Why did the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim fail?

The court held the allegations were merely conclusory. Even assuming the Association’s collection of member fees could create a fiduciary relationship, the Campbells never alleged how the Association improperly used those funds. The challenged conduct — counting concurrences after the 30-day deadline — did not involve the collection or misuse of funds to which the fiduciary duty recognized in Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises would extend.

Why did the court revive the homeowners’ other claims?

The trial court had ordered the Campbells to file a more definite statement identifying the specific meeting date of the alleged violations, then struck their amended complaint and dismissed the case when no date was given. But the Association’s own motion admitted ‘there was no such meeting.’ Because it was impossible for the Campbells to state a meeting date that never existed, ordering a more definite statement was error, and so was dismissing the case for failing to comply with that order.

Does an Arizona HOA board owe homeowners a fiduciary duty?

This decision did not adopt a categorical rule. It treated the claim as a pleading failure, distinguishing Divizio (where mobile-home-park members were entitled to accountings of dues collected for community upkeep) and stressing that a fiduciary theory tied to member dues requires concrete allegations of improper use of funds, not a general assertion that the board mishandled a vote. Because it is an unpublished memorandum decision, it sets no precedent on the issue.

Is this decision precedential?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two (Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f)). It does not create legal precedent and may be cited only as authorized by applicable rules.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2021-0091
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateJuly 5, 2022
Judge / panelBrearcliffe, Eppich, Staring
PartiesKeith and Kathy Campbell (homeowners / Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees) v. Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association and individual board members (HOA / Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants)
Governing law
Topics
CC&RsElectionsProcedureAttorney FeesGood Faith & Fair Dealing
Outcome / holding

The court affirmed dismissal of the homeowners’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, holding the allegations were conclusory and the challenged conduct — counting written CC&R concurrences after the 30-day window — did not involve any collection or misuse of funds giving rise to a fiduciary duty. It held, however, that the trial court erred in ordering a more definite statement, because the Association’s own motion admitted no membership or board meeting ever occurred, so it was impossible for the homeowners to supply a meeting date; the striking of the amended complaint and dismissal of the remaining claims were therefore vacated and remanded.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Keith and Kathy Campbell own property in the Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association community, a Pinal County non-profit governed by CC&Rs recorded in 1998. In March 2019 the board mailed owners a letter, a proposed Amended and Restated Declaration, and a written-concurrence form, explaining that adoption required the written concurrence of 878 owners (two-thirds of the assessed lots) and asking owners to return the form within thirty days. The Association reached the required number of concurrences “shortly after the 30-day window” and counted them all; Keith Campbell, then board president, objected that late concurrences should not count, and resigned. The Campbells sued for breach of contract, negligence per se under the Planned Community Act, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ordered a more definite statement identifying the specific meeting date, then struck the amended complaint and dismissed the case with prejudice when no date was supplied. Division Two affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary-duty claim as conclusory and outside the fund-related duty recognized in Divizio, but held that ordering a more definite statement was error because the Association’s own motion admitted no relevant meeting ever occurred, making a meeting date impossible to provide. The court vacated the striking and dismissal, remanded, and awarded no fees or costs on appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the dismissals de novo under Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court analyzed the two rulings separately. On the fiduciary-duty claim, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not obtain relief under any provable interpretation of the facts, and the court may look only to the pleading itself. The Campbells alleged the Association “acts as a fiduciary with the fees collected from its members” and breached that duty by labeling the vote a “concurrence” and counting it past the statutory time frames. The court held these were merely conclusory statements insufficient under Cullen v. Auto-Owners Insurance: even assuming the collection of member fees could create a fiduciary relationship, the Campbells never alleged how the Association’s actions amounted to an improper use of funds. It distinguished Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises, where mobile-home-park members were entitled to accountings of dues collected for community upkeep; here the challenged conduct — collecting signed concurrences after the 30-day deadline — did not involve the collection or use of funds to which the Divizio duty would extend. Merely paying dues does not convert every alleged wrong into a breach of fiduciary duty.

On the striking of the amended complaint, the court explained that a defendant may move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) only when a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that it cannot frame a response, and a court may strike a pleading for disobeying such an order. But the Association’s own motion, while demanding that the Campbells identify the meeting date of the alleged statutory violations, candidly admitted that “there was no such meeting” and “no meeting of the membership related to the collection of the concurrences.” Because it was clear from the Association’s own filing that it was impossible for the Campbells to state a meeting date that never existed, ordering a more definite statement was error — and, that order being error, striking the amended complaint and dismissing the remaining claims for noncompliance with it was likewise error. Because neither party completely prevailed, the court declined to award appellate fees or costs and left the Association’s fee cross-appeal for the trial court on remand.

Why It Matters

The decision is a mixed result that highlights two recurring HOA-litigation pressure points: whether a board owes homeowners a fiduciary duty, and how much factual specificity a complaint about governance procedures must contain. On the fiduciary-duty question, the court did not announce a categorical rule that HOA boards never owe fiduciary duties; instead it treated the claim as a pleading failure, distinguishing Divizio and emphasizing that a fiduciary theory tied to member dues requires concrete allegations of improper use of funds, not a general assertion that the board mishandled a vote. Homeowners advancing fiduciary-duty claims should therefore plead specific, fund-related misconduct rather than relabeling a covenant or voting dispute.

The striking ruling is the more consequential procedural lesson: a defendant cannot use a motion for a more definite statement to force a plaintiff to allege a fact the defendant itself concedes does not exist. Because the Association admitted no relevant meeting occurred, the trial court could not condition the survival of the suit on the Campbells’ identifying a meeting date, and dismissal on that basis was reversible. The case also confirms that CC&Rs constitute a contract among owners, so disputes over amendment and concurrence procedures can support contract-based claims and fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 — though here, with neither side fully prevailing, the court awarded no appellate fees. As an unpublished memorandum decision, it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

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Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

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Voting & Elections | A.R.S. §§ 10-3804, 10-3206 | 1 CA-CV 19-0341

How the Arizona Court of Appeals read a condominium association’s bylaws to determine when a valid board election occurred—and why a cancelled annual meeting meant no July election took place.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee, 1 CA-CV 19-0341.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 19-0341) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert Wollner (Appellant)
    Association member and plaintiff below; appeared pro se (In Propria Persona), Phoenix. Claimed he was validly elected to the board in July 2017.

Respondent Side

  • Spanish Hills Condominium Association (Appellee)
    Defendant condominium association; cancelled the July meeting and held the August board election under its bylaws.
  • Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Spanish Hills Condominium Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Lawrence F. Winthrop (Judge)
    Presiding Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
    Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • David B. Gass (Judge)
    Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
  • Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who granted summary judgment for the association below.

What happened

Spanish Hills Condominium Association’s bylaws provide that at each annual meeting the members elect three directors for one-year terms, and that nominations for the board are made either by a Nominating Committee or from the floor at the annual meeting.

In 2017, the association gave written notice that its annual meeting, including a board election, was set for July 27, 2017, and that members could vote in person or by absentee ballot. Robert Wollner expressed interest in serving, and his name was one of three placed on the absentee ballots mailed before the meeting.

On July 24, 2017, the association cancelled the July 27 meeting after realizing the candidates on the ballot had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee, as the bylaws required. It reset the annual meeting for August 29, 2017, convened a Nominating Committee that nominated candidates, and mailed a new ballot. Wollner was not among the committee’s nominees and was not on the new ballot.

Wollner attended and participated in the August 29 meeting but did not object to the cancellation, the reset, the discarding of the original ballots, or his exclusion, and he did not nominate himself from the floor as the bylaws allowed. Three candidates on the new ballot were elected.

On September 18, 2017, Wollner filed a civil complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking to nullify the August election and a declaration that he had been duly elected in July. The same day, he filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, which led to appointment of an arbitrator.

After a June 6, 2018 hearing, the arbitrator ruled he lacked jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1)(A) because Wollner sought relief other than a money judgment, and referred the matter back to the superior court. The court later denied Wollner’s motions challenging the arbitration.

On cross-motions, the superior court granted summary judgment for the association on February 5, 2019, ruling that no election was held in July and that the annual meeting and election were properly rescheduled to August 29 in accordance with the bylaws. Wollner appealed.

On March 3, 2020, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Spanish Hills and awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a provision in its CC&Rs.

Procedural timeline

Step Date not specified Spanish Hills bylaws (Article IV, section 2; Article V, section 1) provide that directors are elected at each annual meeting and nominated by a Nominating Committee or from the floor.
Step 2017-07-27 Date originally set for the association’s annual meeting and board election; Wollner’s name was on the mailed absentee ballots.
Step 2017-07-24 Association sends notice cancelling the July 27 meeting after realizing the ballot candidates were not nominated by a Nominating Committee.
Step 2017-08-29 Rescheduled annual meeting held; three candidates nominated by a Nominating Committee are elected to the board. Wollner attends but is not on the new ballot.
Step 2017-09-18 Wollner files a civil complaint seeking to nullify the August election, and also files a certificate of compulsory arbitration.
Step 2018-06-06 Arbitration hearing held; arbitrator rules he lacks jurisdiction under Rule 72(b)(1)(A) because the relief sought was non-monetary, and refers the case back to the superior court.
Step 2018-09-18 Wollner files a motion for summary judgment.
Step 2018-10-22 Spanish Hills files a response and cross-motion for summary judgment.
Step 2019-02-05 Superior court grants summary judgment for Spanish Hills, ruling no July election occurred and the August election complied with the bylaws.
Step 2020-03-03 Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirms summary judgment for Spanish Hills and awards the association its fees and costs on appeal.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/wollner-v-spanish-hills-condominium-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2020-03-03

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.

Download source file
2020-03-03_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What was the dispute in Wollner v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association about?

Robert Wollner, a condominium association member, claimed he had been validly elected to the Board of Directors through absentee ballots mailed before a July 2017 annual meeting. The association cancelled that meeting and held a rescheduled August meeting with a different, Nominating-Committee-approved slate. Wollner sued to nullify the August election, but the courts sided with the association.

Why did the court find there was no valid July election?

The association’s bylaws provided that directors are elected “at each annual meeting.” Because the July annual meeting was cancelled and never held, the court concluded no valid election occurred in July even though absentee ballots had already been mailed. The election properly took place at the rescheduled August annual meeting.

Why did the association cancel the July meeting?

The association realized the candidates on the initial ballot had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee, as its bylaws required. It cancelled the July 27 meeting, convened a Nominating Committee, and reset the annual meeting for August 29, 2017, with a new ballot. Wollner was not among the committee’s nominees.

What happened with the compulsory arbitration?

Wollner himself filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, which triggered appointment of an arbitrator. The arbitrator later found he lacked jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1)(A) because Wollner sought non-monetary relief, and referred the case back to the superior court. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration was proper and denied Wollner’s request for compensation.

Who won and what did the court order?

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Spanish Hills Condominium Association. It also awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a provision in its CC&Rs, upon compliance with the applicable appellate rule.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

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Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 19-0341
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMarch 3, 2020
Judge / panelLawrence F. Winthrop (Presiding Judge, author), Maria Elena Cruz, David B. Gass
PartiesRobert Wollner (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 10-3804(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3206(B)
Topics
ElectionsBoard GovernanceMeetings & RecordsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Robert Wollner, a Spanish Hills Condominium Association member, sought a seat on the association’s Board of Directors after his name appeared on absentee ballots mailed before a July 27, 2017 annual meeting. The association cancelled that meeting when it realized the candidates had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee as its bylaws required. It reset the annual meeting to August 29, 2017, where a Nominating Committee’s slate was elected; Wollner was not on the new ballot. Wollner sued to nullify the August election and be seated as elected in July. He also filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, and the appointed arbitrator later found he lacked jurisdiction because Wollner sought non-monetary relief. The superior court granted summary judgment for the association. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the bylaws provide for electing directors at the annual meeting and no July meeting occurred, no valid July election took place.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first rejected Wollner’s challenge to the compulsory arbitration. It emphasized that Wollner himself filed the certificate of compulsory arbitration that triggered the referral, and that under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72 the arbitrator was properly appointed and had no choice but to proceed. When it became clear the relief sought was non-monetary, the arbitrator correctly referred the matter back to the superior court under Rule 72(e). Wollner cited no legal authority entitling him to compensation for the time or money spent in an arbitration he himself initiated, so the court declined to award any.

Turning to the merits, the court treated the bylaws as a contract between the association and its members, to be enforced as written when clear and unambiguous. The bylaws stated that “[a]t each annual meeting the Members shall elect three (3) directors,” so the election necessarily occurs at the annual meeting. Because Wollner conceded no annual meeting was held in July, there could be no valid July election even though absentee ballots had already been mailed. This reading also conformed to A.R.S. § 10-3804(A)(2), which provides that directors are elected at each annual meeting, and the bylaws’ Nominating Committee requirement was a permissible provision under A.R.S. § 10-3206(B) that the association was obligated to follow.

The court held that Wollner waived his argument that the association should be sanctioned for its July process because he cited no supporting legal authority, and it found no basis to award him costs where the association was the successful party. Declining his invitation to apply public-election-law principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, the court affirmed summary judgment in full and awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a fee provision in its CC&Rs.

Why It Matters

This decision illustrates how Arizona courts treat community-association bylaws as binding contracts and read election and annual-meeting provisions according to their plain terms. For condominium and HOA governance, it underscores that mailing absentee ballots does not by itself constitute an election when the governing documents tie the vote to an annual meeting, and that a board may need to cancel and reschedule a defective process to comply with nomination requirements.

The case helps fill in the condo-governance side of association law—how elections and annual meetings interact—and shows how a member’s own procedural choices, such as filing for compulsory arbitration, can shape the course and cost of the litigation. It is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential; it may be cited only as authorized by court rule.

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