Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments: Arizona Supreme Court Limits on Condominium Termination Forced Sales

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

cc-and-rs | A.R.S. § 33-1228 | 257 Ariz. 82 (2024)

This Arizona Supreme Court decision sets the constitutional and statutory ground rules for forcing the buyout of minority condominium owners after a supermajority votes to terminate. It upholds the termination statute against a takings challenge but requires that the entire condominium — not individual holdout units — be sold.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Cao, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-22-0228-PR, 257 Ariz. 82 (2024); Court of Appeals decision vacated, superior court affirmed in part and remanded. A later order (No. CV-25-0071-PR, Aug. 20, 2025) sent the unit’s valuation to binding arbitration.

Download the Arizona Supreme Court opinion (2024) Download the Supreme Court order on remand (Aug. 2025) Download the Court of Appeals opinion (now vacated) Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Supreme Court’s resolution of a condominium-termination forced sale — the March 22, 2024 opinion (257 Ariz. 82), which vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and the follow-on August 20, 2025 per curiam order (No. CV-25-0071-PR) sending the unit’s valuation to binding arbitration. The Court of Appeals’ 2022 opinion has been vacated and is no longer controlling. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act. However, the Court also held that, under these circumstances, § 33-1228 required the sale of the entire condominium upon termination, not the sale of only the minority owners’ individual unit. It vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirmed the superior court except as to that issue, and remanded.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jie Cao (Plaintiff)
Minority condominium unit owner of Unit 106 at Dorsey Place Condominiums who challenged the condominium termination and forced sale.
Haining “Frazer” Xia (Plaintiff)
Minority condominium unit owner of Unit 106, husband of Jie Cao, who challenged the termination and forced sale.
Stone Xia (Plaintiff)
Son of Jie Cao and Haining Xia, residing in Fountain Hills, Arizona, named as a plaintiff in the complaints.
Dennis I. Wilenchik (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial counsel representing Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia in Maricopa County Superior Court.
John “Jack” D. Wilenchik (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial counsel representing Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia in Maricopa County Superior Court.
Ross P. Meyer (Counsel)
Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
Trial and appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs in both Superior Court and Court of Appeals proceedings.
Eric M. Fraser (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellants Jie Cao and Haining Xia before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
John S. Bullock (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellants Jie Cao and Haining Xia before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court.
Thomas L. Hudson (Counsel)
Osborn Maledon, P.A.
Appellate attorney with Osborn Maledon, P.A. who assisted on the appellate briefing and oral argument preparation.
James M. Manley (Counsel)
Pacific Legal Foundation
Amicus curiae counsel representing the Pacific Legal Foundation in support of Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Respondent Side

PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC (Defendant)
Majority investor entity that acquired 90 of the 96 units at Dorsey Place Condominiums and voted to terminate the condominium.
Dorsey Place Condominium Association (Defendant)
The homeowners association for the condominium complex that executed and recorded the termination agreement and warranty deed.
Lorne Polger (Board Member)
Pathfinder Partners / Dorsey Place Condominium Association
Principal of Pathfinder Partners and self-appointed Secretary of the Dorsey Place HOA; initially named as an individual defendant.
Matt Quinn (Association President)
Pathfinder Partners / Dorsey Place Condominium Association
Vice President of Pathfinder Partners and self-appointed President of the Dorsey Place HOA; initially named as an individual defendant.
Michael A. Schern (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Trial attorney who represented PFP Dorsey and the individual defendants; initially named as an individual defendant before being dismissed.
Shawna M. Woner (Counsel)
Woner Hoffmaster Peshek & Gintert, PC
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC.
Stephanie K. Gintert (Counsel)
Woner Hoffmaster Peshek & Gintert, PC
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC.
Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee Dorsey Place Condominium Association.
Nicholas C.S. Nogami (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel representing Defendant/Appellee Dorsey Place Condominium Association.
Aaron M. Finter (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Co-counsel representing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern in Superior Court.
Aaron R. Clouse (Counsel)
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC
Co-counsel representing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern in Superior Court.
Jennifer Barry (Board Member)
Pathfinder Partners
General Counsel for Pathfinder Partners who coordinated defense strategy, mediation, and client representation.

Neutral Parties

Hon. Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial court judge originally assigned to the civil action in Maricopa County Superior Court.
Hon. Gary L. Popham Jr. (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial commissioner/judge who heard and ruled on early default and consolidation motions.
Hon. Daniel G. Martin (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Commercial Court judge who dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice and awarded taxable costs.
Hon. Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Presiding Appellate Judge who delivered the court’s published opinion reversing and remanding the case.
Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Chief Appellate Judge who sat on the Division One panel and joined the opinion.
Hon. David B. Gass (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Appellate Judge who sat on the Division One panel and joined the opinion.
Justice Clint Bolick (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Arizona Supreme Court Justice who authored the unanimous March 22, 2024 opinion (257 Ariz. 82).
Amy M. Wood (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals Division One who issued appellate clerk notices, record transmittals, and schedules.
Jeff Fine (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court who certified and transmitted the electronic record on appeal.
Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the 2024 opinion; as Chief Justice, signed the August 20, 2025 per curiam Decision Order.
Justice John R. Lopez IV (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice James P. Beene (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice William G. Montgomery (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.
Justice Kathryn H. King (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Joined the unanimous 2024 opinion.

What happened

In January 2018, Jie Cao and Haining Xia purchased Unit 106 of the Dorsey Place Condominiums in Tempe, Arizona, subject to the recorded Condominium Declaration. In November 2018, PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC acquired 90 of the 96 units in the complex, gaining approximately 94% of the voting power.

In March 2019, the Association notified members of a meeting to terminate the condominium, proposing to sell the entire complex to PFP Dorsey. At the April 4, 2019 meeting, the Association presented a modified termination agreement to sell only the minority-owned units to PFP Dorsey. Utilizing its 94% vote, PFP Dorsey ratified the agreement, and the Association recorded a deed transferring the Xias’ unit to PFP Dorsey.

The Xias sued PFP Dorsey and the Association, claiming the forced sale was an unconstitutional private taking and a breach of fiduciary duty. The Maricopa County Superior Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that an older version of the termination statute governed. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review.

On March 22, 2024, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision. It rejected the owners’ constitutional argument but held that A.R.S. § 33-1228 required selling the entire condominium, not just the Xias’ unit, and remanded. After the parties disputed the meaning of the mandate on remand, the Court issued a per curiam order on August 20, 2025 (No. CV-25-0071-PR) affirming the superior court, limiting the remaining issue to the unit’s fair market value as the owners’ total compensation, and sending that valuation to final and binding arbitration under § 33-1228.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments (257 Ariz. 82, 545 P.3d 459 (2024)). Condo termination statute allowed forced sale procedures, subject to constitutional compensation limits. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2019-11-20 Plaintiffs Jie Cao, Haining Xia, and Stone Xia file their initial Civil Complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2019-12-18 Defendants file a Notice Requesting Assignment to Commercial Court and a Motion for More Definite Statement.

Step 2019-12-20 Defendants file their formal Answer to the initial Complaint.

Step 2020-01-03 Carpenter Hazlewood files a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Lorne Polger and Matt Quinn.

Step 2020-01-17 Minute Entry orders the case referred for reassignment to Commercial Court.

Step 2020-01-22 Plaintiffs file a Motion requesting a sheriff lock up of Unit 106 and an injunction on Defendants.

Step 2020-01-24 Case is officially reassigned to the Commercial Court under Hon. Daniel Martin.

Step 2020-02-25 Minute Entry from status conference orders Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, denies Defendants’ MTD as moot, and Plaintiffs withdraw their injunction motion.

Step 2020-03-27 Plaintiffs file their First Amended Complaint.

Step 2020-07-06 Plaintiffs file their Second Amended Complaint.

Step 2020-07-24 Hon. Daniel Martin signs an order dismissing defendants Lorne Polger, Matt Quinn, and Michael A. Schern without prejudice.

Step 2020-08-13 PFP Dorsey and Dorsey Place Condominium Association file separate Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.

Step 2020-09-16 Plaintiffs file their Response to the Motions to Dismiss.

Step 2020-10-05 Defendants file their Reply briefs in support of the Motions to Dismiss.

Step 2020-12-15 Virtual Oral Argument is held on the Motions to Dismiss before Hon. Daniel Martin.

Step 2020-12-18 Court files a Minute Entry Under Advisement Ruling dated Dec 15, 2020, granting both Motions to Dismiss with prejudice.

Step 2021-01-07 Defendants file separate Applications for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

Step 2021-03-15 Hon. Daniel Martin issues a Minute Entry Ruling denying the defendants’ fee applications but granting taxable costs.

Step 2021-03-18 Court enters signed judgments in favor of both defendants under Rule 54(b).

Step 2021-04-19 Plaintiffs file their first Notice of Appeal from the March 18 judgments.

Step 2021-04-27 Court enters revised final judgment under Rule 54(c).

Step 2021-05-12 Plaintiffs file a stipulated motion to dismiss the first appeal as moot and file a new Notice of Appeal from the April 27 judgment.

Step 2021-05-18 Arizona Court of Appeals Division One assigns case number 1 CA-CV 21-0275 and issues Appellate Clerk Notice.

Step 2021-06-25 Osborn Maledon, P.A. (Eric M. Fraser) files Notice of Substitution of Counsel and Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Opening Brief.

Step 2021-07-07 Appellants file their Case Management Statement and Notice of Filing Transcript of the December 15, 2020 hearing.

Step 2021-08-18 Appellants file their Opening Brief and Appendix.

Step 2021-09-27 Appellees file their Answering Brief.

Step 2021-11-08 Appellants file their Reply Brief.

Step 2021-11-29 Pacific Legal Foundation files a Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2021-12-20 Court of Appeals issues an order accepting the Amicus Curiae brief of Pacific Legal Foundation.

Step 2022-01-10 Appellees file their Response Brief to the Amicus Curiae brief of Pacific Legal Foundation.

Step 2022-02-22 Oral Argument is held before the Court of Appeals Division One.

Step 2022-03-17 Court of Appeals issues an Order for Additional Briefing on the applicability of the 1986 versus the 2018 statutory versions of A.R.S. § 33-1228.

Step 2022-03-23 Court of Appeals issues an Order Re: Supplemental Authority requesting briefing on the impact of the newly issued Supreme Court case Kalway v. Calabria Ranch.

Step 2022-04-15 Parties file simultaneous supplemental briefs.

Step 2022-05-02 Parties file simultaneous responses to the additional briefing.

Step 2022-07-07 Arizona Court of Appeals Division One issues its published Opinion reversing and remanding.

Step 2022-07-22 Appellees file a Motion for Reconsideration and object to Appellants’ application for attorneys’ fees.

Step 2022-09-14 Court of Appeals denies Appellees’ Motion for Reconsideration and awards Appellants $230,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

Step 2022-09-23 Appellees file a Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-22-0228-PR).

Step 2023-08-22 Arizona Supreme Court grants the Petition and Cross-Petitions for Review in part, rephrasing four statutory and constitutional questions.

Step 2024-03-22 Arizona Supreme Court issues its Opinion (257 Ariz. 82), authored by Justice Bolick for a unanimous Court: vacates the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirms the superior court except as to Part II (the single-unit sale), and remands.

Step 2024-05-16 Arizona Supreme Court issues its Mandate and an order awarding the Xias $56,947.00 in fees and $316.32 in costs (denying appellate fees under ARCAP 21(d)).

Step 2024-08-08 On remand, the superior court denies PFP Dorsey’s motion to compel arbitration of the unit’s valuation (minute entry).

Step 2024-12-03 The superior court grants the Xias’ motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint realleging previously dismissed claims (minute entry).

Step 2025-02-25 The Court of Appeals declines special-action jurisdiction over PFP Dorsey’s petition challenging the remand rulings (No. 1 CA-SA 25-0015).

Type: Decision or judgment

Download source file

2024-03-22_193_0000-supreme-court-opinion.pdf

Source 191 2024-05-16

0000 Asc Order Filed 05162024 Re Awardin

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-05-16_194_0000-asc-order-filed-05162024-re-awardin.pdf

Source 192 2024-05-29

0000 Asc Order Filed 05292024 Re Denying

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-05-29_195_0000-asc-order-filed-05292024-re-denying.pdf

Source 193 2025-08-20

0000 Supreme Court Decision Order

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision holding that the Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act.

Download source file

2025-08-20_196_0000-supreme-court-decision-order.pdf

FAQ

Is Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. The controlling decision is now the Arizona Supreme Court’s published opinion, Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC, 257 Ariz. 82 (2024), which vacated the earlier Court of Appeals decision. The Supreme Court’s opinion is binding statewide; the 2022 Court of Appeals opinion is no longer good law.

Can a supermajority investor force minority condo owners to sell their units?

Under A.R.S. § 33-1228, a supermajority can vote to terminate a condominium. The Supreme Court held this forced sale does not violate Arizona’s constitutional ban on takings for private use, because the owners agreed to the recorded Declaration, which incorporates the Condominium Act. However, the Court held the statute requires the sale of the entire condominium upon termination — not the sale of only the holdout owners’ individual unit.

Did the unit owners win or lose?

It was a split result. The owners (Jie Cao and Haining ‘Frazer’ Xia) lost their constitutional eminent-domain argument but won on the statutory ground: because only their unit was force-sold while the investor kept the other 90 units, the sale was improper under § 33-1228. The case was remanded, and a later order limited the remaining issue to the fair market value of their unit as their total compensation.

What did the August 2025 Supreme Court order decide?

In a per curiam order (No. CV-25-0071-PR, Aug. 20, 2025), the Court clarified its mandate: the superior court was affirmed, the sole remaining issue is the fair market value of the owners’ unit (paid as their total compensation), and the matter was remanded for final and binding arbitration under A.R.S. § 33-1228 and the Condominium Termination Agreement.

What happened to the Court of Appeals’ ‘older statute governs’ reasoning?

The Supreme Court rejected it. The Court of Appeals had held that the 1986 version of § 33-1228 governed because the owners bought before the 2018 amendments. The Supreme Court disagreed: the Declaration incorporated the Condominium Act ‘as amended from time to time,’ that amendment was anticipated, and Kalway v. Calabria Ranch did not apply because the Declaration itself was never amended — so the 2018 version of the statute applied.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	257 Ariz. 82, 545 P.3d 459 (2024)
Court / tribunal	Arizona Supreme Court
Decision / key date	March 22, 2024
Judge / panel	Justice Clint Bolick (author), Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel, Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer, Justice John R. Lopez IV, Justice James P. Beene, Justice William G. Montgomery, Justice Kathryn H. King
Parties	Jie Cao and Haining ‘Frazer’ Xia (condominium unit owners) v. PFP Dorsey Investments, LLC (majority investor) and Dorsey Place Condominium Association (homeowners association)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1228 A.R.S. § 33-1201 Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Supreme Court held that a forced sale following a supermajority condominium termination under A.R.S. § 33-1228 does not violate the eminent-domain (private-takings) provision of the Arizona Constitution as applied to owners who agreed to a recorded declaration incorporating the Condominium Act. However, the Court also held that, under these circumstances, § 33-1228 required the sale of the entire condominium upon termination, not the sale of only the minority owners’ individual unit. It vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirmed the superior court except as to that issue, and remanded.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	193 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	48 roadmap entries
Video overview	Cao v. PFP Dorsey Investments
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Jie Cao and Haining ‘Frazer’ Xia owned one of 96 units at Dorsey Place Condominiums. After PFP Dorsey Investments acquired 90 units (about 94% of the vote), it invoked A.R.S. § 33-1228 to terminate the condominium and force the sale of the remaining minority units to itself. The Xias sued, arguing the forced sale was an unconstitutional private taking. The superior court dismissed the complaint; the Court of Appeals reversed on a statutory-retroactivity theory. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated that decision. It held the forced sale did not violate Arizona’s eminent-domain clause, because the owners agreed to the recorded Declaration incorporating the Condominium Act, but it also held that § 33-1228 required selling the entire condominium, not just the holdout unit. It remanded; a later 2025 order limited the remaining issue to the unit’s fair market value as the owners’ total compensation, to be fixed by binding arbitration.

Key Issues & Findings

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Bolick first addressed the constitutional challenge. The Xias argued that A.R.S. § 33-1228 — which lets a supermajority terminate a condominium and force the sale of objecting owners’ units — authorized an unconstitutional taking of private property for private use under Article 2, Section 17 of the Arizona Constitution. The Court disagreed. The sale authority derived not from the State’s eminent-domain power but from the recorded Declaration, a contract to which the Xias voluntarily agreed when they purchased their unit; the Declaration expressly submitted the property to the Condominium Act and provided for partition upon dissolution. Because the arrangement was contractual, it was not a governmental taking.

The Court then held, however, that the forced sale as carried out was not authorized by the statute. Termination under § 33-1228 required the sale of all of the condominium property, not the sale of individual holdout units while the terminating owner retained the rest. Here PFP Dorsey force-sold only the Xias’ unit and kept the other ninety units, which the statute did not permit. The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, affirmed the superior court except as to this issue (Part II of the opinion), and remanded.

Finally, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ premise that an older (1986) version of the statute governed because the Xias purchased before the 2018 amendments. The Declaration incorporated the Condominium Act ‘as amended from time to time,’ so the possibility of statutory amendment was anticipated; Kalway v. Calabria Ranch — which barred unforeseen amendments to a declaration itself — did not apply because the Declaration was never amended, only the incorporated statutes were. Accordingly, the 2018 version of § 33-1228 controlled. On remand the parties disputed the scope of the mandate, and in a per curiam order dated August 20, 2025 (No. CV-25-0071-PR), the Supreme Court clarified that the superior court was affirmed, the only remaining issue is the fair market value of the Xias’ unit as their total compensation, and the matter must proceed to final and binding arbitration under § 33-1228 and the Condominium Termination Agreement.

Why It Matters

For Arizona condominium owners, associations, and investors, this decision sets the ground rules for ‘bulk buyout’ terminations. It confirms that a supermajority may use A.R.S. § 33-1228 to terminate a condominium and that the resulting forced sale is not an unconstitutional taking, because owners agree to the Condominium Act through their recorded declaration. Investors cannot defeat a buyout simply by labeling it a private taking.

But the decision also imposes a critical limit: on termination, the statute requires selling the entire condominium, not cherry-picking and force-selling only holdout units while the majority owner keeps the rest. And owners who are bought out are entitled to the fair market value of their unit as total compensation, which — per the Court’s 2025 order — may be fixed through binding arbitration under the termination agreement. Boards and counsel structuring a termination must follow the whole-property sale mechanism and a defensible valuation process, or risk having the sale undone.

← Back to Arizona Supreme Court cases

Multari v. Gress: Developer Private Deed Restrictions Held Invalid

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 12-2101, 12-120.21 | 1 CA-CV 06-0221

This case highlights the strict limits placed on residential developers in Arizona. It illustrates that uniform subdivision covenants cannot be selectively altered by recording non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots without a proper vote.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Multari, Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 06-0221; reversed and remanded.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Court of Appeals decision declaring lot-specific private deed restrictions invalid when they selectively alter uniform subdivision covenants. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform covenants and restrictions otherwise applicable to those lots without following the uniform declaration’s formal amendment procedures.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Dominick Multari (Plaintiff)
Husband of Lynn Multari, owner of lot 290 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, and successor-in-interest to the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.
Lynn Multari (Plaintiff)
Wife of Dominick Multari, owner of lot 290 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, and successor-in-interest to the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.
John Maston O’Neal (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
Counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Dominick and Lynn Multari.
David E. Funkhouser III (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady Streich Lang LLP
Counsel representing Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants Dominick and Lynn Multari.

Respondent Side

Richard D. Gress (Defendant)
Husband of Carmen Gress, trustee under agreement dated April 15, 1998, and owner of lot 285 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, subject to the contested 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.
Carmen Gress (Defendant)
Wife of Richard D. Gress, trustee under agreement dated April 15, 1998, and owner of lot 285 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, subject to the contested 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.
Timothy J. Thomason (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel representing Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Richard D. and Carmen Gress.
Charles H. Oldham (Counsel)
Mariscal, Weeks, McIntyre & Friedlander, P.A.
Counsel representing Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees Richard D. and Carmen Gress.

Neutral Parties

Daniel A. Barker (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Authoring Appellate Judge on Department B who delivered the Court’s opinion reversing the summary judgment.
Patricia K. Norris (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Appellate Judge for Department B on Department B.
Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate Judge for Department B.
Janet E. Barton (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial Court Judge who presided over the underlying case (Cause No. CV 2005-009405) and granted summary judgment in favor of the Multaris.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who received the transmittal of the Petition for Review.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Minnesota Title Company (Other)
Original developer and legal owner of lots 244 through 297, which recorded the uniform 1973 Declaration of Deed Restrictions and subsequent lot-specific private deed restrictions.

What happened

In April 1973, Minnesota Title Company, the original legal owner of lots 244 through 297 in the Ocotillo Hills subdivision, recorded a uniform ‘Declaration of Deed Restrictions’ permitting accessory structures of any size and requiring a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants. Subsequently, between 1973 and 1978, the developer recorded individual ‘private deed restrictions’ on thirty-two of the fifty-four lots as they were sold.

In 1976, Minnesota Title recorded private deed restrictions on lot 285 (later owned by the Gresses) prohibiting structures under 1,400 square feet or higher than 13 feet, with a clause allowing the owner of lot 290 (later owned by the Multaris) to sue for violations and recover attorneys’ fees. In 2005, the Gresses began building a small accessory building. The Multaris sued to stop construction and enforce the 1976 restrictions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Multaris, which the Gresses appealed.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Multari v. Gress (1 CA-CV 06-0221). A developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Multari v. Gress. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 1973-04-04 Minnesota Title Company records the uniform Declaration of Deed Restrictions (1973 Declaration) for the Ocotillo Hills subdivision.

Step 1973-04-17 Minnesota Title conveys Lot 290 and records the 1973 Private Deed Restrictions.

Step 1975-12-16 Minnesota Title sells Lot 285 to the Gresses’ predecessors in interest.

Step 1976-01-06 Minnesota Title records the deed and the 1976 Private Deed Restrictions for Lot 285.

Step 2005-02-15 Richard and Carmen Gress begin construction of a small accessory building behind their home.

Step 2005-04-15 Dominick and Lynn Multari send a letter to the Gresses requesting that they cease construction.

Step 2005-06-08 The Multaris file a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court to enforce the 1976 Private Deed Restrictions.

Step 2005-09-19 A trial court transcript of proceedings is recorded in the Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2006-04-11 Superior Court Clerk files the index of record, and the Court of Appeals, Division One docket assigns Case No. 1 CA-CV 06-0221.

Step 2006-04-14 The Gresses pay their appellant filing fee in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2006-05-02 Court of Appeals issues notice reminding of appellant’s opening brief and appellee’s fee deadlines.

Step 2006-08-02 Court of Appeals orders the Superior Court Clerk to transmit the trial court record on appeal.

Step 2006-08-09 The record inventory from the Maricopa County Superior Court is filed with the Court of Appeals.

Step 2007-01-16 Court of Appeals issues Notice of Oral Argument setting the hearing for February 27, 2007.

Step 2007-02-27 Oral argument is held before Department B of the Court of Appeals; the court takes the case under advisement.

Step 2007-04-24 Court of Appeals files its published Opinion reversing summary judgment and remanding the case.

Step 2007-05-09 The Multaris file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.

Step 2007-05-25 Court of Appeals denies the Multaris’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Step 2007-08-10 The Multaris file a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2007-08-13 Clerk of Court of Appeals transmits the Petition for Review and appellate record to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2008-01-31_012_0000-div-1-civil-mandate-package.pdf

Source 13 2008-01-31

0000 Div 1 Westmeadbureau Package Lette

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2008-01-31_013_0000-div-1-westmeadbureau-package-lette.pdf

FAQ

Is the court’s decision in Multari v. Gress precedential?

Yes. This is a published Arizona Court of Appeals opinion, which makes it binding legal precedent in Arizona. It can be cited as authoritative case law in disputes involving subdivision deed restrictions.

Can a developer record separate private restrictions on individual lots that conflict with uniform CC&Rs?

No. The court held that a developer cannot use lot-specific private deed restrictions to alter or restrict rights granted under a previously recorded uniform declaration of covenants without following the formal amendment procedures specified in that uniform declaration.

What happens if a developer tries to bypass formal CC&R amendment procedures?

Any lot-specific private restrictions recorded by a developer that effectively change or restrict the rights guaranteed under the uniform subdivision declaration will be declared invalid and unenforceable if they did not follow the uniform declaration’s formal amendment processes.

Why did the Multaris lose their lawsuit to enforce the 13-foot structure height limit against the Gresses?

Although the Multaris had a private restriction recorded on the Gresses’ lot in 1976 that limited accessory structures to 13 feet in height, the court ruled this restriction invalid because it conflicted with the 1973 subdivision-wide uniform declaration, which allowed accessory buildings of any dimension and required a two-thirds owner vote to amend.

Can a homeowner recover attorneys’ fees if they sue based on an invalid private deed restriction?

No. Because the lot-specific private deed restriction was ruled invalid, the Multaris were not the successful party and could not recover attorneys’ fees or costs under either the statutory provision (A.R.S. § 12-341.01) or the invalid restriction itself.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 06-0221
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 24, 2007
Judge / panel	Hon. Daniel A. Barker, Hon. Patricia K. Norris, Hon. Jon W. Thompson
Parties	Dominick and Lynn Multari (Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants) vs. Richard D. and Carmen Gress, as trustees (Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-2101 A.R.S. § 12-120.21 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-341
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a developer cannot utilize private deed restrictions on multiple lots in a residential subdivision to alter uniform covenants and restrictions otherwise applicable to those lots without following the uniform declaration’s formal amendment procedures.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	22 roadmap entries
Video overview	Multari v. Gress
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Dominick and Lynn Multari sued their neighbors, Richard and Carmen Gress, seeking to enforce private deed restrictions recorded by the subdivision’s developer in 1976. The 1976 restrictions limited the size and height of accessory structures on the Gresses’ lot. The Gresses argued that these restrictions were invalid because they conflicted with a 1973 Declaration of Deed Restrictions that applied uniformly to all lots in the subdivision and permitted accessory buildings of any dimension. The 1973 Declaration required a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Multaris, enforcing the restrictions and awarding attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the developer could not bypass the 1973 Declaration’s amendment procedure by recording non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots. The private restrictions were declared invalid, and the case was remanded to enter judgment for the Gresses.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 1973 Declaration established uniform covenants and restrictions for the benefit of ‘each and every’ lot in the subdivision, which explicitly permitted accessory structures of any size. The subsequent 1976 Private Deed Restrictions placed by the developer on some but not all lots took away this right, which constituted an alteration or ‘change in part’ of the 1973 Declaration. Permitting developers to use private deed restrictions to bypass the formal amendment process would destroy the right of property owners to rely on restrictive covenants and completely upset the orderly plan of the subdivision.

Since the 1973 Declaration required a two-thirds vote of lot owners to change the covenants, and the developer’s private restrictions did not comply with this exclusive procedure, the non-uniform private restrictions limiting structure dimensions were held to be an invalid amendment. The court noted that this decision does not address scenarios in which a subsequent private property owner, rather than the developer acting on multiple lots, records private restrictions different from the uniform ones.

Why It Matters

For Arizona HOAs and homeowners, this case establishes that a developer cannot selectively or unilaterally impose non-uniform private deed restrictions on individual lots that conflict with or alter rights granted under a previously recorded uniform declaration, unless they adhere strictly to the declaration’s specified amendment procedures. This enforces the predictability and environmental stability of subdivisions by protecting the rights of lot owners to rely on the original uniform covenants.

For legal counsel and boards, the ruling serves as a warning that restrictive covenants must be uniform and amended only via the formal processes established in the original declarations. Unilateral developer carve-outs or non-uniform lot restrictions are highly vulnerable to being declared invalid. Furthermore, litigation to enforce such invalid restrictions will result in the loss of any contractual right to attorneys’ fees and costs.

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Garden Lakes v. Madigan: HOA Aesthetic Rules vs. Arizona Solar Rights

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

Architectural Review | A.R.S. §§ 33-439, 44-1761 | 1 CA-CV 00-0570

This landmark Arizona case demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power to enforce aesthetic architectural restrictions against solar installations. It establishes a case-by-case factual standard for evaluating whether association guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ solar devices. Crucially, the decision confirms that courts can consider compliance costs to determine if a restriction is void under state law.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. v. Madigan, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, No. 1 CA-CV 00-0570 (204 Ariz. 234, 62 P.3d 983); review denied by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Download appellate opinion Download petition for review Download docket & case information Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the published Arizona Court of Appeals opinion in Garden Lakes Community Association v. Madigan (1 CA-CV 00-0570), which the Arizona Supreme Court declined to review, together with the uploaded appellate record (briefs, amicus filings, petition for review, and orders). The complete uploaded source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder; AI-generated review materials were reviewed only as orientation and are not treated as court authority. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that whether a homeowners association’s architectural guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The court further held that while the homeowner bears the burden of proof, the trial court may properly consider the increased cost of complying with aesthetic restrictions as a relevant factor in determining whether an effective prohibition exists.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
The homeowners association (an Arizona non-profit corporation) that brought separate lawsuits (later consolidated) against the homeowners to compel the removal of roof-mounted solar energy devices.
Neal B. Thomas (Counsel)
Thomas & Elardo, P.C.
Represented Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
Beth Mulcahy (Counsel)
Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C.
Represented Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
James Howard Barnes (Witness)
Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc.
First chairman of the Garden Lakes Architectural Review Committee (ARC); testified on behalf of the Association.
Robert Hammond (Witness)
Solar expert with 20 years of experience hired by the Association to investigate alternative designs; admitted that several alternative screening designs were not viable.
Walter M. Mikitowicz (Witness)
Construction expert who testified on behalf of the Association regarding the costs of constructing proposed alternative screens and patio covers.

Respondent Side

William E. Madigan (Defendant)
Homeowner in Garden Lakes who installed a solar pool heater without ARC approval; passed away before trial, resulting in his case being dismissed after the solar equipment was removed.
Joan M. Madigan (Defendant)
Wife of William E. Madigan and co-owner of the property; removed the solar panels after her husband’s death, leading to dismissal of the case against her.
Henry T. Speak (Defendant)
Homeowner with arthritis who installed terra-cotta colored roof-mounted solar panels to heat his pool for therapeutic exercise; successfully defended under A.R.S. § 33-439.
LaVonne M. Speak (Defendant)
Wife of Henry T. Speak and co-owner of the property; prevailed alongside her husband.
Hyung S. Choi (Counsel)
Choi Rhee & Fabian, PLC
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Madigan and Speak. Also shown as Choi & Rhee, PLLC in Court of Appeals award order.
Gerald Pollock (Counsel)
Law Office of Gerald A. Pollock
Represented Defendants-Appellees Madigan and Speak.
John Gilchrist (Witness)
Solar expert with 20 years of experience who testified on behalf of the homeowners; testified regarding screening feasibility, setback issues, and efficiency loss.

Neutral Parties

Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Ekmark & Ekmark, L.L.C.
Represented Applicant/Amicus Curiae Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc.
Hon. David M. Talamante (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior court trial judge who presided over the consolidated trials and entered final judgment in favor of the homeowners.
Hon. John C. Gemmill (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the published opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Hon. Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge of Department B who concurred in the opinion.
Hon. Noel Fidel (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who concurred in the opinion; also appointed pro tempore by the Arizona Supreme Court to participate in and sign decisions on this case.
Bruce E. Meyerson (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate mediator assigned to conduct the appellate settlement conference on February 8, 2001.
Tom Brantner (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Donald LaMontague (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Bruce Bartley (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Kelly Dancer (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.
Michael Neary (Other)
Listed as a deponent in the record on appeal.

What happened

William and Joan Madigan and Henry and LaVonne Speak owned homes in the Garden Lakes subdivision in Avondale, Arizona. Both families installed solar panels on their roofs to heat their swimming pools without seeking prior approval from the Garden Lakes Community Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). The Association’s guidelines required roof-mounted solar equipment to match the roof material, be integrated into the roof design, and be screened from public view. Believing the homeowners violated these restrictions and breached the community’s Declaration, the Association filed separate lawsuits seeking permanent injunctions to compel the removal of the solar panels, along with over $100,000 in cumulative fines, and attorneys’ fees. The homeowners asserted that the guidelines were void and unenforceable under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) because they effectively prohibited solar energy devices.

The lawsuits were consolidated. Before trial, the Association waived the fines, and William Madigan passed away, prompting Joan Madigan to remove her solar panels and resulting in the dismissal of her case. The remaining case against the Speaks was tried to the court with an advisory jury. The advisory jury found that the Speaks installed the panels without prior approval, that the Association’s guidelines were not reasonable and unambiguous, but also found (under a confusingly worded interrogatory) that the guidelines did not effectively prohibit solar devices. Treating the jury’s findings as merely advisory, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the Speaks, concluding that the guidelines and the Association’s conduct ‘effectively prohibited’ the solar devices. The Association appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees to the homeowners.

Video overview: HOA aesthetic rules versus Arizona solar rights

A plain-English overview of Garden Lakes Community Association v. Madigan, where the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an HOA’s architectural guidelines and enforcement conduct ‘effectively prohibited’ solar energy devices in violation of A.R.S. § 33-439(A).

Procedural timeline

Step 1986-01-28 The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Garden Lakes is recorded.

Step 1997-01-15 Henry Speak submits an application to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for a solar pool heater, which is rejected. Henry Speak proceeds with the roof installation regardless.

Step 1997-05-15 The Garden Lakes Community Association files separate lawsuits in Maricopa County Superior Court against homeowners Henry Speak and William Madigan to compel removal of their solar panels.

Step 2000-01-11 The consolidated trial begins in the Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2000-12-29 Garden Lakes Community Association files a Notice of Appeal in the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, after the trial court enters judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Step 2001-02-21 Garden Lakes Community Association files its Opening Brief on appeal.

Step 2001-04-06 Appellees file their Answering Brief on appeal.

Step 2001-05-01 Garden Lakes Community Association files its Reply Brief.

Step 2001-08-10 Sun City Grand Community Association files an Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2001-09-06 Division One of the Court of Appeals hears oral arguments and takes the case under advisement.

Step 2003-02-18 Arizona Court of Appeals issues its published opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment.

Step 2003-03-21 Garden Lakes Community Association files a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2003-04-18 Appellees file their Response in Opposition to the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court.

Step 2003-04-24 Court of Appeals enters an order awarding Appellees their attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $20,024.05.

Step 2003-07-01 Arizona Supreme Court denies the Petition for Review and grants Appellees’ request for Supreme Court attorneys’ fees.

Step 2003-07-22 Original Mandate is issued, returning the record to the Maricopa County Superior Court and terminating the appeal.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/garden-lakes-community-association-v-madigan/raw/: 11 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2000-12-19

Docket And Case Information

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2000-12-19_001_docket-and-case-information.pdf

Source 2 2001-09-04

Response To Amicus Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.

Download source file

2001-09-04_002_response-to-amicus-brief.pdf

Source 3 2003-02-18

Final Appellate Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that whether a homeowners association’s architectural guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Download source file

2003-02-18_003_final-appellate-opinion.pdf

Source 4 2003-02-18

Opinion Affirmed

Type: Decision or judgment

Download source file

2003-02-18_004_opinion-affirmed.pdf

Source 5 2003-02-18

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

undated_011_undated-case-caption.pdf

FAQ

Is the Garden Lakes v. Madigan decision binding precedent for Arizona HOAs?

Yes. The decision was published as a precedential opinion by Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals, meaning it is binding on all Arizona homeowners associations and trial courts.

Can an Arizona HOA completely ban roof-mounted solar panels for aesthetic reasons?

No. Under A.R.S. § 33-439(A), any covenant, restriction, or guideline that effectively prohibits the installation or use of a solar energy device is void and unenforceable. While HOAs can regulate solar placement, they cannot use aesthetic rules to force a complete ban or make installation practically impossible.

Can an HOA enforce guidelines that make solar installation significantly more expensive?

It depends, but generally no if the cost is unreasonable. The Court of Appeals held that while cost is not the sole factor, courts must consider the increased financial burden of complying with HOA guidelines. If complying with aesthetic demands (like building massive screens or custom patios) drastically increases the system’s cost, those guidelines may be ruled an invalid ‘effective prohibition’ under A.R.S. § 33-439(A).

What factors do Arizona courts look at to decide if an HOA rule ‘effectively prohibits’ solar use?

The Court of Appeals established a flexible, ten-factor test. These factors include the language of the guidelines, the association’s conduct, the availability of feasible solar alternatives, the comparative cost and performance of those alternatives, the physical limits of the property, and whether the restrictions impose too great a cost relative to what a typical homeowner in the community is willing to spend.

Who has the burden of proving that an HOA rule effectively prohibits solar devices in court?

The homeowner bears the burden of proving that the HOA’s guidelines or conduct ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of their solar energy device. In this case, the Speaks successfully met their burden by presenting expert testimony showing that the HOA’s proposed screening and patio cover alternatives were technically unfeasible, violated city setback rules, and added thousands of dollars in unnecessary costs.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	204 Ariz. 234, 62 P.3d 983 (Ct. App. 2003), 1 CA-CV 00-0570
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	February 18, 2003
Judge / panel	Hon. John C. Gemmill, Hon. Ann A. Scott Timmer, Hon. Noel Fidel
Parties	Plaintiff-Appellant Garden Lakes Community Association, Inc. vs. Defendants-Appellees William E. & Joan M. Madigan and Henry T. & LaVonne M. Speak (homeowners)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-439 A.R.S. § 44-1761 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that whether a homeowners association’s architectural guidelines ‘effectively prohibit’ the installation or use of a solar energy device under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) is a question of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The court further held that while the homeowner bears the burden of proof, the trial court may properly consider the increased cost of complying with aesthetic restrictions as a relevant factor in determining whether an effective prohibition exists.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	11 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	16 roadmap entries
Video overview	Garden Lakes v. Madigan: HOA Rules vs. Arizona Solar Rights
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The Garden Lakes Community Association (the Association) brought separate lawsuits against homeowners Henry and LaVonne Speak, and William and Joan Madigan (which were later consolidated), seeking a permanent injunction to compel the removal of roof-mounted solar energy devices installed without Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approval. The homeowners defended under A.R.S. § 33-439(A), which voids any deed restriction that ‘effectively prohibits’ the installation or use of solar energy devices. Before trial, the Association waived $100,000 in alleged fines, and the Madigans were dismissed after removing their system following William Madigan’s death. Following a trial with an advisory jury, the court entered judgment in favor of the Speaks, finding that the Association’s aesthetic guidelines combined with its conduct effectively prohibited solar device installation. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, establishing that whether a restriction ‘effectively prohibits’ solar use is a case-by-case question of fact, and that courts may properly consider the added costs of compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

First, the Court of Appeals interpreted the statutory phrase ‘effectively prohibits’ under A.R.S. § 33-439(A) by rejecting the Association’s argument that it required ‘inevitable preclusion’ of solar devices. Instead, the court adopted a practical, flexible standard, emphasizing that the Arizona Legislature intended to encourage solar energy use by offering incentives and limiting disincentives. The court identified a non-exhaustive list of ten potentially relevant factors for evaluating these disputes, including the content of the guidelines, the association’s conduct, the availability of feasible alternatives, and the increased cost of compliance in relation to what typical homeowners in the community are willing to spend.

Second, the court explained that although the burden of proof remains on the homeowner, cost cannot be ignored in an effective prohibition analysis. It noted that with enough money, any solar system could be custom-engineered to meet strict architectural guidelines, but such exorbitant expenses would dissuade average homeowners from adopting solar energy. Thus, while cost alone is not dispositive, it is a proper factor to analyze, focusing on the motivation of the average homeowner within that specific community.

Finally, applying these factors, the court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s ruling in favor of the Speaks. The Association’s suggested alternatives—building a massive patio cover that would violate city pool setbacks, or constructing an experimental roof screen that matched the home’s stucco but reduced solar efficiency—were cost-prohibitive, impractical, and visually unappealing even to the Association’s own architectural review committee members.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOA boards, this case serves as a landmark ruling establishing that HOAs cannot use heavy-handed aesthetic guidelines or unreasonable conduct to block solar energy installations. Boards must adopt a cooperative and reasonable approach, as rigid screening or integration requirements that add substantial costs (such as doubling the system price) will be declared void under A.R.S. § 33-439(A). Additionally, the ruling clarifies that HOA decisions are not entitled to administrative-like judicial deference, protecting homeowners from unchecked board power.

For legal counsel, the opinion provides a clear blueprint of ten factors to utilize when evaluating, litigating, or settling solar-related HOA disputes. It highlights the importance of presenting detailed evidence regarding the technical feasibility, city setback restrictions, and comparative costs of alternative designs. It also underscores the risk to HOAs of facing significant attorney’s fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) if they unsuccessfully attempt to force homeowners to remove solar devices.

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Trilogy at Power Ranch v. John Doe: An HOA’s Anonymous-Critic Suit Dies on Service

Posted on June 22, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona HOA vs. Anonymous Critics | Maricopa County Superior Court CV2025-036877

Trilogy at Power Ranch v. John Doe: An HOA’s Anonymous-Critic Suit Dies on Service

An HOA sued 50 anonymous ‘John Doe’ email critics, got leave to take discovery to identify them, but never completed service. The court dismissed the case without prejudice.

Last updated June 22, 2026. Case: Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. John Doe #1-50, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-036877 (Hon. Michael J. Herrod).

Download dismissal order Download complaint

Scope note: This page covers a Maricopa County Superior Court trial-court matter (CV2025-036877) that was dismissed without prejudice for lack of service — the court never reached the merits. The complaint contained allegations against unidentified defendants; none were proven. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

An association cannot keep an injunction case alive against unidentified ‘John Doe’ defendants it never serves; without personal service inside the court’s deadline, the case is dismissed.

Case snapshot

Case name

Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. John Doe #1-50.

Superior Court docket

Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-036877 (Hon. Michael J. Herrod).

Result

Dismissed without prejudice on March 4, 2026 for failure to serve the defendants within the court-ordered deadline.

Relationship to CV2025-036771

Companion case filed the same day; the association’s identified-defendant claims continued in CV2025-036771 (Berman), which was itself later dismissed and settled.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-036877
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	March 4, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael J. Herrod
Parties	The companion suit Trilogy at Power Ranch filed the same day, targeting 50 unidentified ‘John Doe’ senders of the anonymous ‘Trilogy News’ emails and seeking to declare the emails unlawful and enjoin them.
Governing law	42 U.S.C. § 3601 (Fair Housing Act)
Topics	Board GovernanceFree SpeechProcedure
Outcome / holding	An association cannot keep an injunction case alive against unidentified ‘John Doe’ defendants it never serves; absent personal service within the court-ordered deadline, the case is dismissed without prejudice.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	3 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	3 roadmap entries
Video overview	Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. John Doe #1-50
Study / briefing material	0 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	0 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Filed the same day as CV2025-036771, this companion case targeted 50 anonymous ‘John Doe’ defendants behind the ‘Trilogy News’ email campaign, again pleading tortious interference, injurious falsehood, and (as to one sender) hostile housing harassment. The court granted the association leave to take discovery to identify the senders and set a service deadline, but the association never completed personal service. Judge Michael Herrod vacated the order-to-show-cause hearing on November 14, 2025 and dismissed the case without prejudice on March 4, 2026 for failure to serve. The court never reached the merits.

Key Issues & Findings

Recognizing the defendants were anonymous, the court granted limited discovery to identify them and set a deadline for service. The association did not effect personal service within that window, and email service on anonymous accounts was inadequate. Under the civil rules governing failure to serve, the court dismissed the case without prejudice rather than reaching whether the emails were actually wrongful.

Why It Matters

The case shows how hard it is for an association to weaponize the courts against anonymous online criticism: identification, personal jurisdiction, and service are real procedural hurdles that frequently end a case before any judge evaluates whether the speech crossed a legal line. ‘Without prejudice’ means the claims were not decided on the merits, but as a practical matter the anonymous-critic suit ended here while the identified-defendant case (CV2025-036771) was itself later dismissed and settled.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association (Plaintiff)
Association party that sued unidentified John Doe defendants.
Scott B. Carpenter (Counsel)
Carpenter Law Firm
Counsel for Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association.
Keegan Klein (Counsel)
Carpenter Law Firm
Counsel for Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association.

Respondent Side

John Doe #1-50 (Defendants) (Defendants)
Unidentified anonymous defendants named in the complaint.

Neutral Parties

Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
Superior Court judge who dismissed the John Doe case without prejudice.

Why this case matters

On the same day in October 2025, Trilogy at Power Ranch filed two suits over the anonymous ‘Trilogy News’ email campaign criticizing its board, staff, and committees. This one, CV2025-036877, targeted 50 unnamed ‘John Doe’ defendants and asked the court to declare the emails unlawful and enjoin them. The association alleged tortious interference, injurious falsehood, and (as to one sender) hostile housing harassment under the Fair Housing Act.

The problem was procedural and basic: you cannot sue people you cannot identify and serve. The court granted the association leave to take discovery to unmask the senders and set a service deadline, but the association never completed personal service. Judge Michael Herrod vacated the show-cause hearing in November 2025 and dismissed the case without prejudice in March 2026.

For homeowners, the case illustrates how hard it is for an association to weaponize the courts against anonymous online criticism. Identification, jurisdiction, and service are real hurdles that often end a case before any judge weighs whether the speech was actually wrongful.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. John Doe #1-50 (CV2025-036877). An association cannot keep an injunction case alive against unidentified ‘John Doe’ defendants it never serves… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. John Doe #1-50. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

What the court decided

Discovery to identify, granted

The court let the association take limited discovery to try to identify the anonymous senders.

Service never completed

The association did not personally serve the defendants within the court-ordered window, and email service on anonymous accounts was inadequate.

Dismissed without prejudice

Under the civil rules, Judge Herrod dismissed the case for lack of service; ‘without prejudice’ means it could in theory be refiled.

Filing roadmap and PDF downloads

Step 1 Oct 9, 2025

Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against John Doe #1-50.

Filed by: Association

The association sued 50 unidentified email senders.

Download source

2025-10-09_001_complaint.pdf

Step 2 Nov 14, 2025

Order vacating the order-to-show-cause hearing; leave to take discovery to identify defendants.

Filed by: Superior Court

With no one served, the court called off the injunction hearing and allowed discovery to find the senders.

Download source

2025-11-14_002_order-vacating-show-cause-hearing.pdf

Step 3 Mar 4, 2026

Order dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of service.

Filed by: Superior Court

Because no defendant was served by the deadline, Judge Herrod dismissed the case.

Download source

2026-03-04_003_order-of-dismissal-without-prejudice.pdf

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/trilogy-at-power-ranch-v-john-doe-cv2025-036877/raw/: 3 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2025-10-09

Complaint

Type: Opening pleading

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Download source file

2025-10-09_001_complaint.pdf

Source 2 2025-11-14

Order Vacating Show Cause Hearing

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-11-14_002_order-vacating-show-cause-hearing.pdf

Source 3 2026-03-04

Order Of Dismissal Without Prejudice

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2026-03-04_003_order-of-dismissal-without-prejudice.pdf

Primary sources

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Trilogy at Power Ranch v. Berman: When an Arizona HOA Sues a Critic and Loses

Posted on June 22, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona HOA vs. Critic | Maricopa County Superior Court CV2025-036771

Trilogy at Power Ranch v. Berman: When an Arizona HOA Sues a Critic and Loses

A self-managed 2,035-home HOA sued a vocal resident over critical mass emails. The Superior Court dismissed the claims, and the case settled with each side paying its own fees.

Last updated June 22, 2026. Case: Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. Steve Berman, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-036771 (Hon. Greg S. Como).

Download dismissal ruling Download first amended complaint Download stipulation of dismissal

Scope note: This page covers a Maricopa County Superior Court trial-court matter (CV2025-036771) that was dismissed and then settled. The association’s complaint contained allegations against the defendants; those allegations were never proven, and the case ended without any finding that the defendants did anything unlawful. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

An Arizona HOA cannot turn a member’s critical emails about board spending, salaries, and governance into a lawsuit by labeling them ‘tortious interference with business operations’ — a tort Arizona does not recognize — or ‘hostile housing harassment’; criticism of how an association is run is generally protected, not actionable.

Case snapshot

Case name

Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. Steve Berman, et al. (originally filed against John Doe defendants).

Superior Court docket

Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-036771 (Hon. Greg S. Como).

Result

Motion to dismiss granted on June 1, 2026; the parties then stipulated to dismiss with prejudice, each side bearing its own fees, on June 18, 2026.

What was at stake

The association sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop a resident’s mass ‘Trilogy News’ emails criticizing the board, staff, and committees.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-036771
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	June 1, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Greg S. Como
Parties	A self-managed 2,035-home Gilbert HOA sued a vocal resident (former Gilbert mayor Steve Berman) and Marc Herbener over a campaign of anonymous, critical ‘Trilogy News’ mass emails, seeking to declare the emails unlawful and to enjoin them.
Governing law	42 U.S.C. § 3601 (Fair Housing Act)
Topics	Board GovernanceFree SpeechProcedure
Outcome / holding	An Arizona HOA cannot convert member criticism — even repeated, anonymous, and harsh mass emails about board spending, salaries, and governance — into a civil claim by labeling it ‘tortious interference with business operations’ (a tort Arizona does not recognize) or ‘hostile housing harassment’; on the association’s pleadings the court found no viable legal theory and dismissed.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	15 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	15 roadmap entries
Video overview	Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. Steve Berman, et al.
Study / briefing material	0 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions	0 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association — a self-managed, 2,035-home active-adult HOA in Gilbert — sued resident Steve Berman (a former Gilbert mayor) and Marc Herbener over a series of anonymous ‘Trilogy News’ mass emails criticizing the board’s spending, executive and manager salaries, water management, contractor bidding, and committee appointments. The association sought declaratory relief and an injunction, pleading ‘tortious interference with business operations,’ injurious falsehood, and ‘hostile housing harassment’ under the Fair Housing Act, and amended its complaint three times. On June 1, 2026, Judge Greg Como granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and on June 18, 2026 the parties stipulated to dismiss the remaining case with prejudice, each side bearing its own attorney fees and costs. The complaint’s allegations were never proven.

Key Issues & Findings

The court concluded the operative complaint failed to identify a viable cause of action. Arizona does not recognize a freestanding tort of ‘interference with business operations,’ a core theory of the suit; the ‘hostile housing harassment’ framing under the Fair Housing Act did not fit what was, in substance, members criticizing how a nonprofit board governs and spends; and the gravamen of the case was protected commentary on association governance. The court therefore granted dismissal, after which the parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice with no fee award to either side. Because the case was resolved at the pleading stage and by stipulation, no factual findings were made about the truth of the emails.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and critics, the case is a clear marker that an association’s displeasure with a critic is not, by itself, a cause of action: speech about how a board spends money, pays staff, and appoints volunteers is ordinary community participation, not a tort, and boards that sue over it risk a quick dismissal and the ‘SLAPP’ label that this community’s own board raised when it voted to settle. For boards and managers, it is a caution that litigation is a costly and weak response to an unflattering email campaign. It does not immunize defamation — false statements of fact about identifiable people can still carry consequences — but the association here lost on the theories it chose.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association (Plaintiff)
Association party that sued Steve Berman and other defendants.
Adrian Gordon (Association Principal)
Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association
Listed as a Trilogy principal present at oral argument.
Lisa Gurtler (Association Principal)
Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association
Listed as a Trilogy principal present at oral argument.
Scott B. Carpenter (Counsel)
Carpenter Law Firm
Counsel for Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association.
Keegan Klein (Counsel)
Carpenter Law Firm
Counsel for Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association.

Respondent Side

Geoffrey G. Collins (Counsel)
Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Counsel of record for Steve Berman in later minute entries and the dismissal stipulation.
Steve Berman (Defendant)
Named defendant accused of sending critical emails.
Jane Doe Berman (Defendant)
Spouse defendant named in the second amended complaint.
Marc Herbener (Defendant)
Named defendant accused of authoring or sending Trilogy News emails.
Kevin R. Harper (Counsel)
Minute entries list him at the show-cause hearing for Steve Berman.

Neutral Parties

Greg S. Como (Judge)
Superior Court judge who granted the motion to dismiss.

Why this case matters

Trilogy at Power Ranch is a self-managed, 2,035-home active-adult community in Gilbert run by a volunteer board and its own staff. Beginning in 2025, residents received a stream of mass emails — branded as ‘Trilogy News’ and sent from a rotating set of anonymous accounts — that sharply criticized the board’s spending, executive and manager salaries, water management, contractor bidding, and committee appointments. The association attributed the campaign to former Gilbert mayor Steve Berman and resident Marc Herbener and took them to court.

Rather than answer the criticism through normal community channels, the association sued, asking a judge to declare the emails unlawful and to enjoin the defendants from sending more. It styled the claims as ‘tortious interference with business operations,’ ‘injurious falsehood,’ and even ‘hostile housing harassment’ under the Fair Housing Act. After three rounds of amended complaints, Judge Greg Como dismissed the case, and the parties settled with each side walking away and paying its own fees.

For homeowners, the case is a clean example of why an association’s displeasure with a critic is not, by itself, a lawsuit. When a board reaches for litigation to silence unflattering emails about governance, it risks a quick dismissal — and the ‘SLAPP’ label that the community itself raised when its board voted to settle.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. Steve Berman, et al. (CV2025-036771). An Arizona HOA cannot convert member criticism — even repeated, anonymous, and harsh mass emails about board… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Trilogy at Power Ranch Community Association v. Steve Berman, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

What Judge Como decided

No ‘interference with business operations’ tort

The court found Arizona does not recognize a freestanding tort of interference with business operations — a core theory of the association’s complaint.

Harassment theory failed

The ‘hostile housing harassment’ framing did not fit a dispute that was, at bottom, members criticizing how a nonprofit board governs and spends.

Dismissed, then settled

After the dismissal, the parties stipulated to dismiss the remaining case with prejudice, waiving fees and costs on both sides.

For homeowners and critics

Speaking out about how an association spends money, pays staff, and picks committee members is ordinary community participation, not a tort. This case shows that even repeated, anonymous, and harsh email campaigns are difficult for an association to convert into civil liability — and that a board that sues over them may end up dismissed and labeled as bringing a SLAPP-style suit.

It is not a license to defame: false statements of fact about identifiable people can still carry consequences under defamation law. But the association here did not win on that ground; its chosen theories failed at the pleading stage.

For HOA boards and managers

Download source

2026-06-01_014_ruling-granting-motion-to-dismiss.pdf

Step 15 Jun 18, 2026

Stipulation to dismiss with prejudice, each side bearing its own fees.

Filed by: Parties

The parties agreed to end the case permanently, with no fee award to either side.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Steve Berman’s motion to dismiss and dismissing the association’s third amended complaint without prejudice.

Download source file

2026-06-01_014_ruling-granting-motion-to-dismiss.pdf

Source 15 2026-06-18

Stipulation Of Dismissal With Prejudice

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2026-06-18_015_stipulation-of-dismissal-with-prejudice.pdf

Primary sources

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Rodriguez v. Gardens-Gilbert Community Association: CC&Rs as Contract, Negligence, and the Limits of HOA Tort Claims

Posted on June 19, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona HOA Litigation | PENDING | A.R.S. § 33-1805 | CV2024-005940

Rodriguez is an active, heavily litigated case on remand from the Court of Appeals. The latest substantive ruling narrowed it to negligence and CC&R-based contract claims, dismissed the retaliation, discrimination, and conspiracy theories, and sanctioned the pro se plaintiff. No final judgment has been entered.

Last updated June 19, 2026. Case: Sandra Rodriguez v. Gardens-Gilbert Community Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-005940 (consolidated with CV2024-013806; Hon. Christopher Coury). Status: pending / not final.

Download omnibus ruling Download motion to dismiss Source-file index FAQ

Status: PENDING / NOT FINAL (June 2026). This is an active Maricopa County Superior Court case on remand from the Court of Appeals; no final judgment has been entered and rulings may change. This page summarizes the uploaded record and is educational, not legal advice.

The takeaways so far

An HOA’s CC&Rs are the contract between owner and association, so breach-of-contract claims survive only against the association and only as to specific recorded CC&R terms — not against a management company that is not a party to that contract. Arizona recognizes no standalone tort of ‘retaliation,’ and the economic-loss doctrine can bar tort claims that merely restate CC&R breaches. But negligence and gross-negligence claims tied to common-area maintenance and management duties, and records-access claims under A.R.S. § 33-1805, can still proceed.

What the case is about

Sandra Rodriguez, a Gilbert homeowner appearing pro se, sued the Gardens-Gilbert Community Association, its management company (Focus HOA Management, LLC), and three individual agents, alleging they failed to maintain common areas and address health-and-safety hazards, obstructed remediation of water-intrusion damage at her property, denied her access to records and meetings under A.R.S. § 33-1805, and retaliated against her.

After the trial court dismissed several defendants, the Court of Appeals (1 CA-CV 24-0790/25-0040, August 2025 memorandum decision) reinstated her negligence, gross-negligence, and intentional-tort claims and remanded. On remand, Judge Coury’s May 27, 2026 omnibus ruling narrowed the case to surviving negligence and CC&R-based contract claims, dismissed the discrimination, retaliation, and conspiracy theories, sanctioned the plaintiff for a missed deposition, and imposed a filing restriction; a summary-judgment motion remains pending and a third appeal was filed June 1, 2026.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sandra Rodriguez v. Gardens-Gilbert Community Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-005940 (consolidated with CV2024-013806)). On the operative pleading, the court held that an HOA’s CC&Rs are the contract between owner and association, so… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sandra Rodriguez v. Gardens-Gilbert Community Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-03-21 Complaint filed (CV2024-005940)

Step 2025-08-12 Court of Appeals reinstates negligence/gross-negligence/intentional-tort claims; remands (1 CA-CV 24-0790/25-0040)

Step 2025-09-03 Cases CV2024-005940 and CV2024-013806 consolidated

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file

undated_218_summons.pdf

Source 219 Undated

Verified Answer

Type: Responsive pleading

Responding party’s first substantive response to the complaint or petition.

Download source file

undated_219_verified-answer.pdf

Key holdings (so far)

Breach-of-contract claims run against the association, limited to recorded CC&R terms.
A management company is not a party to that contract.

Arizona recognizes no standalone HOA retaliation tort.
The economic-loss doctrine bars tort claims that merely restate CC&R breaches.

Negligence and gross negligence tied to common-area maintenance.
Records-access theory under A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Sandra Rodriguez (Plaintiff)
Self-represented homeowner plaintiff.

Respondent Side

Gardens-Gilbert Community Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Association party named in Rodriguez’s complaint and appeal.
Focus HOA Management, LLC (Defendant/Appellee)
Management-company defendant in the case record.
Harman Cadis (Defendant)
Focus HOA Management
Individual defendant named in the verified partial answer.
Brooke Sortor (Defendant)
Focus HOA Management
Individual defendant named in the verified partial answer.
Anna Schultz (Defendant)
Focus HOA Management
Individual defendant named in the verified partial answer.
Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel for defendants in the verified partial answer.
Dominick D. Detente (Counsel)
Counsel for defendants in the verified partial answer.

Neutral Parties

Rodrick Coffey (Judge)
Superior Court judge listed in one order.
David McDowell (Judge)
Superior Court judge assigned in later pleadings.
Christopher Coury (Judge)
Superior Court judge addressed in later notices.

FAQ

Is this case final?

No. It is active and pending on remand, with a summary-judgment motion outstanding and a third appeal filed June 1, 2026. Nothing here is a final ruling and the outcome may change.

Can I sue my HOA’s management company for breach of contract?

Generally not on the CC&Rs alone. This ruling holds the CC&Rs are the contract between the owner and the association; a management company that is not a party to that contract is not liable for breach of it.

Does Arizona recognize an HOA ‘retaliation’ claim?

This ruling holds it does not as a standalone tort, and that the economic-loss doctrine can bar tort claims that simply restate CC&R breaches.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-005940 (consolidated with CV2024-013806)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	May 27, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Christopher Coury
Parties	A Gilbert homeowner, appearing pro se, sued her HOA, its management company, and three individual agents over common-area maintenance, records access, and alleged retaliation; the case is active on remand from the Court of Appeals.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1805 A.R.S. § 12-1809
Topics	ProcedureCC&RsNegligenceRecords RequestsEconomic Loss DoctrinePro Se Litigant
Outcome / holding	On the operative pleading, the court held that an HOA’s CC&Rs are the contract between owner and association, so breach-of-contract claims survive only against the association and only as to specific recorded CC&R terms (not against the non-contracting management company); the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires a contract; Arizona recognizes no standalone tort of ‘retaliation’ and the economic-loss doctrine bars tort claims that merely restate CC&R breaches; but the plaintiff’s negligence and gross-negligence claims tied to common-area maintenance and management duties, and her § 33-1805 records theory, survive for further litigation.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	219 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Sandra Rodriguez v. Gardens-Gilbert Community Association, et al.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

CURRENT STATUS (June 2026): NOT FINAL — this is an active, heavily litigated Maricopa County Superior Court case on remand from the Court of Appeals; no final judgment has been entered. Sandra Rodriguez, a homeowner in the Gardens-Gilbert community, sued the association, its management company (Focus HOA Management, LLC), and three individual agents, alleging the defendants failed to maintain common areas and address health-and-safety hazards, obstructed remediation of water-intrusion damage at her property, denied her access to records and meetings under A.R.S. § 33-1805, and retaliated against her. The trial court initially dismissed several defendants, but in August 2025 the Court of Appeals (1 CA-CV 24-0790/25-0040, memorandum decision) reinstated her negligence, gross-negligence, and intentional-tort claims and remanded. On remand, the latest substantive ruling is Judge Coury’s May 27, 2026 omnibus order, which narrowed the case to surviving negligence and CC&R-based contract claims, dismissed the discrimination, retaliation, and conspiracy theories, sanctioned the plaintiff for a missed deposition, and imposed a filing restriction; a summary-judgment motion remains pending and a third appeal was filed June 1, 2026.

Key Issues & Findings

Taking the well-pleaded allegations as admitted, the court held that several counts failed as a matter of law: breach of contract requires a contract, so claims against the management entity and individuals failed and the association claim was limited to the recorded CC&Rs; the implied covenant cannot exist without a contract; Arizona does not recognize a tort of retaliation, and to the extent the retaliation theory rested on CC&R duties the economic-loss doctrine barred it; and the discrimination count failed for lack of any protected-characteristic facts. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the appellate remand was narrow, reviewing each claim de novo because the earlier dismissal had been without prejudice. Applying the four-factor injunction test, it denied the plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order and harassment injunction, finding no likelihood of success or irreparable harm and noting the request appeared aimed at avoiding a deposition; it also denied her motion to declare defense counsel vexatious, imposed an intermediate sanction for the missed deposition, and restricted further motion practice pending decision on summary judgment.

Why It Matters

For Arizona HOA disputes, the case reinforces that CC&Rs are the contract between owner and association — breach-of-contract claims are confined to specific recorded CC&R terms and generally cannot be brought against a management company that is not a party to that contract. It confirms that Arizona recognizes no standalone tort of HOA ‘retaliation’ and that the economic-loss doctrine can bar tort claims that simply restate CC&R breaches, while showing that records-access claims under A.R.S. § 33-1805 and common-area maintenance failures can still proceed as negligence theories. It is also a cautionary example of how a sprawling pro se HOA case can draw sanctions, filing restrictions, and repeated appeals. Because the case is ongoing, nothing here is a final ruling.

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Gayer v. Willo Neighborhood Association: Challenging an HOA Bylaw-Amendment Vote for Lack of Quorum

Posted on June 19, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona HOA Bylaws & Quorum | A.R.S. §§ 10-3722, 10-11023 | CV2008-029900

Gayer is a practical, non-precedential illustration of a member challenging an Arizona nonprofit community association’s bylaw-amendment election for lack of statutory quorum and improper meeting notice. The court dismissed the claims against the association president individually but let the quorum claim against the association proceed past the pleading stage; the plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the case.

Last updated June 19, 2026. Case: Richard Gayer v. Willo Neighborhood Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2008-029900 (Hon. A. Craig Blakey II).

Download dismissal ruling Download complaint Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This is a trial-level matter that ended on the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice, so it set no binding precedent. This page summarizes the pleadings and the court’s motion-to-dismiss ruling from the uploaded record and is educational, not legal advice.

The takeaway

On a motion to dismiss, a member’s allegation that a bylaw-amendment election lacked the statutory quorum and was held at an improperly noticed meeting (A.R.S. §§ 10-3722 and 10-11023(A)) was legally sufficient to proceed against the association; claims against the association president individually were dismissed because the complaint alleged no personal wrongdoing by him and sought relief that ran against the corporation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard Gayer (Plaintiff)
Self-represented member who challenged the bylaw vote.

Respondent Side

Willo Neighborhood Association (Defendant)
Association party defending the bylaw-amendment vote.
Jon D. Schneider (Counsel)
Schneider & Onofry, P.C.
Counsel for Willo Neighborhood Association and Bradley Brauer.
Luane Rosen (Counsel)
Schneider & Onofry, P.C.
Counsel for Willo Neighborhood Association and Bradley Brauer.
Bradley Brauer (Association President)
Willo Neighborhood Association
Individual defendant dismissed from the complaint.

Neutral Parties

A. Craig Blakey II (Judge)
Superior Court judge who ruled on the motion to dismiss.

What happened

In June 2008 the Willo Neighborhood Association held an election that amended its bylaws — redrawing the eastern service-area boundary and shifting from automatic membership to an opt-in model with a lower voting quorum. Richard Gayer, a member appearing pro se, alleged the meeting was improperly noticed as a ‘board meeting’ rather than the required membership meeting and that only about 143 votes were cast against a statutory minimum near 270. He sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the election and an injunction restoring the prior bylaws.

The association and its president moved to dismiss. On July 8, 2009, the court dismissed the claims against the president but denied dismissal of the quorum/notice claim against the association, observing it might not survive summary judgment but passed the motion-to-dismiss standard. Because Gayer had already filed a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal without prejudice on June 19, 2009, the case ended without a merits decision.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Richard Gayer v. Willo Neighborhood Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2008-029900). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the member’s bylaw-amendment quorum and notice claim against the association stated a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Richard Gayer v. Willo Neighborhood Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2008-11-24 Gayer files complaint challenging the bylaw-amendment election (CV2008-029900)

Step 2009-03-13 Association and president move to dismiss

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-07-16_016_letter-to-court.pdf

Source 17 Undated

Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file

undated_017_summons.pdf

FAQ

Is this case binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished trial-court matter that ended on the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice. It is useful as an illustration, not as controlling authority.

Can a member challenge a bylaw-amendment vote in Arizona?

Yes. This case shows such a challenge — based on lack of statutory quorum and improper meeting notice under A.R.S. §§ 10-3722 and 10-11023(A) — can survive a motion to dismiss against the association.

Why were the claims against the president dismissed?

The complaint alleged nothing the president personally did wrong and sought relief that ran against the corporation, so he was not a proper individual defendant.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2008-029900
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	July 8, 2009
Judge / panel	Hon. A. Craig Blakey II
Parties	A neighborhood-association member, appearing pro se, sued the association and its president to invalidate a bylaw-amendment election he alleged was held without the statutory quorum and proper meeting notice.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 10-3722 A.R.S. § 10-11023
Topics	AmendmentsQuorumNonprofit CorporationProcedureBoard Governance
Outcome / holding	On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the member’s bylaw-amendment quorum and notice claim against the association stated a claim and survived dismissal, while the claims against the association president individually were dismissed for failure to allege any wrongful conduct by him personally; the action ultimately terminated on the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice, so no merits ruling was entered.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	17 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	4 roadmap entries
Video overview	Richard Gayer v. Willo Neighborhood Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This Maricopa County Superior Court matter is a useful, if non-precedential, illustration of how an Arizona nonprofit community-association member can challenge a bylaw-amendment vote for lack of quorum and improper meeting procedure. In June 2008 the Willo Neighborhood Association held an election that amended its bylaws — redrawing the eastern service-area boundary and shifting from automatic membership to an opt-in model with a lower voting quorum. Gayer, a member, alleged the meeting was improperly noticed as a ‘board meeting’ rather than the required membership meeting and that only about 143 votes were cast against a statutory minimum near 270 (ten percent of roughly 2,700 voting-age residents). He sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the election and an injunction restoring the prior bylaws. The association and its president moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the claims against the president individually but allowed the quorum/notice claim against the association to proceed past the pleading stage. Because Gayer had already filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the case ended without a merits judgment.

Key Issues & Findings

Applying the motion-to-dismiss standard and accepting the well-pleaded allegations as true, the court concluded that Gayer’s allegations under A.R.S. §§ 10-3722 and 10-11023(A) — that the amendment vote lacked the required quorum and was conducted at an improperly noticed meeting — were legally sufficient to state a claim against the corporation, even while observing that the claim might not survive summary judgment on a fuller record. As to the president, the court held the complaint alleged nothing he personally did wrong and sought relief that ran against the corporation rather than against him, so the individual claims were dismissed. Because a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal without prejudice is effective on filing, the case ended without a decision on the merits, leaving the member free to refile.

Why It Matters

For homeowners and members of Arizona nonprofit community associations, the ruling illustrates that a member has standing to challenge a bylaw-amendment election for failure to meet statutory quorum and meeting-notice requirements, and that such a challenge can survive a motion to dismiss. For boards, it is a reminder that volunteer officers generally cannot be held individually liable for governance disputes absent specific personal wrongdoing — the proper defendant is the association. Because the case ended in a voluntary dismissal, it sets no binding precedent, but it remains a practical example of quorum-based bylaw-amendment challenges and officer-immunity pleading in the HOA context.

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Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection: Arizona Timeshare Owners’ Right to Inspect Records

Posted on June 19, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona Timeshare & HOA Records | A.R.S. § 33-2209 | 1 CA-CV 16-0659

Zwicky is the leading published Arizona decision on a timeshare member’s statutory right to inspect association financial books and records. The Court of Appeals affirmed an order compelling production, adopted a member-friendly ‘proper purpose’ standard, and held the business judgment rule cannot defeat the statutory right — while protecting genuinely confidential financial data and barring litigation-recruitment notices.

Last updated June 19, 2026. Case: Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 16-0659, 244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018); Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-051911.

Download appellate opinion Download final judgment Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the published Court of Appeals opinion (1 CA-CV 16-0659) and the uploaded trial and appellate record. The complete source-document index below is generated from the local raw source folder. This page is an educational summary, not legal advice.

The rule

A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a ‘proper purpose’ — a desire to obtain information that reasonably relates to protecting the owner’s interest as a member — may compel inspection of the association’s financial and other records under A.R.S. § 33-2209, and the board’s discretion and the business judgment rule are no defense. But an association cannot be ordered under A.R.S. § 33-2210 to circulate member notices whose real purpose is recruiting plaintiffs rather than legitimate association business, and genuinely confidential or proprietary financial data may be protected by a properly supported protective order.

What happened

Norman Zwicky paid about $26,000 for his timeshare interest in 2004 and watched his annual assessments climb to roughly $2,162 by 2015. Suspecting that the developer-affiliated manager (tied to Diamond Resorts) was shifting hotel-operation and unsold-inventory costs onto members, he made a written statutory request to inspect the association’s financial books and records so he could investigate whether assessments were calculated in good faith.

The association refused. The trial court (Judge John R. Hannah, Jr.) granted Zwicky summary judgment compelling production of twelve categories of financial records. The association appealed. On January 23, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed the core inspection right, vacated a member-notice order and a protective-order modification, and remanded; the parties then entered a stipulated final order on remand keeping certain documents confidential.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association (244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018), 1 CA-CV 16-0659). A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a ‘proper purpose’ — a desire to obtain… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-05-13 Zwicky files verified complaint to compel records inspection (CV2015-051911)

Step 2016-03-11 Superior court grants Zwicky summary judgment; denies association’s cross-motion

Step 2016-09-16 Final judgment ordering production; attorneys’ fees denied (not an action ‘arising out of contract’)

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2018-08-21_076_stipulated-order.pdf

Source 77 2018-11-30

Notice Of Change Of Firm Address

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Download source file

2018-11-30_077_notice-of-change-of-firm-address.pdf

Why it matters

Statutory records-inspection rights are court-enforceable.
No board permission needed.
‘Proper purpose’ is read in the member’s favor.

Board discretion and the business judgment rule do not defeat the statutory right.
Confidential or proprietary financials can still be protected by a proper protective order.

An association cannot be forced to mail member notices that really serve class-action recruitment.
Inspection still runs through the statutory request procedure.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Norman Zwicky (Plaintiff/Appellee)
Timeshare member who sought to inspect association records.
Jon L. Phelps (Counsel)
Law Offices Phelps & Moore PLLC
Counsel for Zwicky in the verified complaint.
Edward L. Barry (Co-Counsel)
Law Office of Edward L. Barry
Appeared as co-counsel for Zwicky.

Respondent Side

Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association (Defendant/Appellant)
Association party defending the records-inspection case.
John E. DeWulf (Counsel)
Coppersmith Brockelman PLC
Counsel for Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association.
Katherine DeStefano (Counsel)
Coppersmith Brockelman PLC
Counsel for PVCOA; later filings use Katherine Hyde.
Brandon T. Crossland (Counsel)
Baker Hostetler LLP
Associated pro hac vice as counsel for PVCOA.
Kathy Wheeler (Director/Declarant)
Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association
PVCOA director who submitted a declaration about confidential records.

Neutral Parties

John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
Superior Court judge assigned to the case.
Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Authored the Court of Appeals opinion.
Kenton D. Jones (Presiding Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.
Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Joined the Court of Appeals opinion.

FAQ

Is Zwicky still good law?

Yes. It is a published Court of Appeals opinion (244 Ariz. 309) and was not further reviewed; it remains the leading Arizona authority on timeshare records inspection under A.R.S. § 33-2209.

Does it apply to ordinary HOAs and condos?

Zwicky construes the timeshare records statute (§ 33-2209). Its ‘proper purpose’ reasoning is frequently cited in disputes over member access to association financial records, but planned communities and condominiums have their own records statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1805 and 33-1258).

Did the owner get his attorneys’ fees?

No. The courts held the records-inspection action did not ‘arise out of contract’ under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, so fees were denied at both the trial and appellate levels.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	244 Ariz. 309, 418 P.3d 1108 (App. 2018), 1 CA-CV 16-0659
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	January 23, 2018
Judge / panel	Judge Patricia A. Orozco, Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones, Judge Jon W. Thompson
Parties	A timeshare member sued his owners’ association to enforce his statutory right to inspect the association’s financial books and records after his annual assessments roughly tripled.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-2209 A.R.S. § 33-2210 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	Records RequestsTimeshareAssessmentsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	A timeshare owner who follows the statutory request procedure and has a ‘proper purpose’ — a desire to obtain information that reasonably relates to protecting his interest as a member — may compel inspection of the association’s financial records under A.R.S. § 33-2209, and the business judgment rule is no defense; but an association cannot be ordered under A.R.S. § 33-2210 to circulate member notices whose real purpose is recruiting plaintiffs rather than legitimate association business.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	77 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Norman Zwicky v. Premiere Vacation Collection Owners Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	3 questions
Curated download aliases	4 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This is the leading published Arizona opinion on a timeshare owner’s right to inspect association records under A.R.S. § 33-2209. Norman Zwicky paid about $26,000 for his interest in 2004 and watched his annual assessments climb to roughly $2,162 by 2015. Suspecting that the developer-affiliated manager (tied to Diamond Resorts) was shifting hotel-operation and unsold-inventory costs onto members, he made a statutory written request to inspect the association’s financial books and records so he could investigate whether assessments were calculated in good faith. The association refused, and Zwicky sued. The trial court granted him summary judgment compelling production, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the core inspection right. The court borrowed the ‘proper purpose’ standard from shareholder-inspection law and defined it broadly in the owner’s favor, while separately protecting the association’s genuinely confidential financial data through a protective order and striking a trial-court order that would have forced the association to mail a member notice serving the owner’s class-action recruitment.

Key Issues & Findings

The court treated the statutory inspection right as analogous to a shareholder’s right to inspect corporate books, adopting the rule that ‘proper purpose’ means a desire to derive information that will enable the owner to protect his interest and that reasonably relates to his membership. Investigating a tripling of assessments easily satisfied that test, and the records sought — ADRE filings, management agreements, profit-and-loss statements, budgets, and occupancy and revenue data — fell within ‘financial and other records’ directly related to the timeshare plan. The court rejected the association’s argument that the board’s discretion under § 33-2209(C) and the business judgment rule could defeat the statutory right; an owner may judicially challenge the board’s records determination.

The court then balanced that access against confidentiality. It vacated the trial court’s modification of the protective order because the court had loosened confidentiality protections without reviewing the documents or letting the association show why proprietary financial data should stay protected, and it remanded for that evaluation. It also vacated the order forcing the association to mail a § 33-2210 notice, holding that the notice did not advance ‘legitimate association business’ because its real purpose was to help the owner and his lawyer assemble a group of plaintiffs for a proposed class action.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and timeshare owners, Zwicky is a strong, citable precedent that statutory records-inspection rights are enforceable in court, that an owner does not need the board’s blessing, and that ‘proper purpose’ is read in the member’s favor. For associations and managers, it confirms two things at once: members cannot be stonewalled on financial records by invoking board discretion or the business judgment rule, but associations retain the ability to protect truly confidential or proprietary financial information through a properly supported protective order, and they cannot be conscripted into circulating litigation-recruitment notices. The decision is frequently cited in Arizona disputes over member access to association financial records.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Cimmarron Superstition Hoa

Posted on May 6, 2026 by [email protected]

Cimmarron Superstition Hoa appears in 1 ADRE/OAH disputes.
Homeowners prevailed in 0 matters while the association secured
1 wins, leaving 0 split decisions. Explore the
statutes, representation, and outcomes below.

Contact & Management

Contact & Community

Website	https://heywoodmanagement.com
Phone	480-820-1519
Email	[email protected]
City	Apache Junction
County	Pinal
Postal Code	85119
Entity Type	HOA (nonprofit corporation)

Management

Management Company	Heywood Community Management
Management Address	42 S Hamilton Pl #101, Gilbert, AZ 85233
Management Phone	480-820-1519
Management Email	[email protected]
Management Website	https://heywoodmanagement.com

Governing Documents

Owner Portal

HOA for the Cimmarron / Cimmarron Superstition subdivision in Apache Junction (AZ). Community association management handled by Heywood Community Management.

Data on File

— CC&Rs on file
— Bylaws on file
— Rules & Regulations on file
— Amendments on file
✓ Association phone on record
✓ Association email on record
✓ Association website on record
✓ Management company identified
— AZCC corporate record linked

Total Cases1

Issues Litigated1

Homeowner Issue Wins0

Association Issue Wins1

Homeowner Win Rate0.0%

Dominant RoleRespondent

Respondent Appearances1

Petitioner Filings0

Last Decision2022-06-24

Penalties AssessedNone

Avg Penalty / CaseNone

Filing Fees RecordedNone

Key Statutes & Violations

Failure To Meet Required Burden Of Proof (1 cases)

Representation Snapshot

When Defending Complaints

Top Law Firms

Childers Hanlon & Hudson, PLC — 1 cases

Lead Attorneys

Christopher Hanlon — 1 cases

When Filing as Petitioner

No petitioner firm data recorded.

Case Volume by Year

Year	Cases
2022	1

Case Explorer

Frequently Asked Questions

Where is Cimmarron Superstition Hoa located?

Cimmarron Superstition Hoa is located at Apache Junction, AZ 85119.

Who manages Cimmarron Superstition Hoa?

Cimmarron Superstition Hoa is managed by Heywood Community Management (480-820-1519).

How many OAH cases involve Cimmarron Superstition Hoa?

1 Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings matter involving Cimmarron Superstition Hoa are on record. Homeowners prevail in about 0% of issues litigated.

Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on May 4, 2026 by [email protected]

Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association appears in 1 ADRE/OAH disputes.
Homeowners prevailed in 0 matters while the association secured
1 wins, leaving 0 split decisions. Explore the
statutes, representation, and outcomes below.

Corporate Registration

AZCC Business ID	11499008
Legal Name	FULTON RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
Entity Type	Domestic Nonprofit Corporation
Formation Date	08/26/2004
State of Formation	Arizona
Business Status	Active
Reason for Status	In Good Standing
Period of Duration	Perpetual
Character of Business	888888-Other-Other – Other – Other – HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
Known Place of Business	Fulton Ranch HOA – 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD STE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA
Annual Report Due	05/26/2026
Last Annual Report Filed	2025

Statutory Agent

Agent	CAPITAL CONSULTANTS MANAGEMENT
Agent Type	Business
Status	Active
Physical Address	ATTN: DELORES FERGUSON 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD STE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA
Mailing Address	ATTN: DELORES FERGUSON 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD STE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, 85258, USA

Current Officers & Directors

Title	Name	Address	Taking Office
Director	Jessica Pollack	C/O CCMC 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD SUITE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA	06/2025
President	Jennifer Cassavant	c/o CCMC – 8360 E Via De Ventura Blvd., Suite L-100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA	08/2024
Secretary	Christopher Chavkin	C/O CCMC 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD SUITE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA	09/2023
Treasurer	John Courson	C/O CCMC 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD SUITE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA	03/2021
Vice-President	Gonzalo Herrera	C/O CCMC 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD SUITE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA	09/2022

Name History

Name on File	Effective From	Ends	Filing #
FULTON RANCH HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION	08/26/2004 12:00 AM	Present	—

Contact & Management

Contact & Community

Website	https://www.fultonranchhoa.com/
Phone	480-624-7046
Alt. Phone	1-800-274-3165 (after-hours emergencies)
Email	[email protected]
City	Chandler
Entity Type	Community Association

Management

Management Company	CCMC
Management Phone	480-624-7046
Management Email	[email protected]
Management Website	https://ccmcnet.com/

Governing Documents

Fulton Ranch HOA (Chandler area) – resident website indicates on-site community manager (CCMC) and a homeowner portal with forms, payments, and inquiries.

Data on File

✓ CC&Rs on file
✓ Bylaws on file
— Rules & Regulations on file
✓ Amendments on file
✓ Association phone on record
✓ Association email on record
✓ Association website on record
✓ Management company identified
✓ AZCC corporate record linked

Filing History

Date	Type	Filing #	Status	Documents
10/16/2008 12:00 AM	Statement of Change – Corps	02572811	Approved	02572811.pdf
09/27/2004 12:00 AM	Affidavit of Publication	01028073	Approved	01028073.pdf
09/26/2005 12:00 AM	Affidavit of Publication	01339214	Approved	01339214.pdf
09/12/2024 11:17 AM	Annual Report(2024)	24091211175412	Approved	24091211175412.pdf
08/05/2025 04:39 PM	Annual Report(2025)	25080516394124	Approved	25080516394124.pdf
07/30/2012 12:00 AM	Statement of Change – Corps	03967152	Approved	03967152.pdf
07/05/2023 12:54 PM	Annual Report(2023)	23070512547520	Approved	23070512547520.pdf
06/09/2011 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2011)	03496877	Approved	03496877.pdf
06/04/2020 02:58 PM	Annual Report(2020)	20060414586524	Approved	20060414586524.pdf
05/31/2022 02:02 PM	Annual Report(2022)	22053114015816	Approved	22053114015816.pdf
05/28/2022 01:20 AM	Delinquent Annual Report (Day 1)	22052801200733	Approved	22052801200733.pdf
05/19/2021 08:55 AM	Annual Report(2021)	21051908559711	Approved	21051908559711.pdf
05/19/2010 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2010)	03160568	Approved	03160568.pdf
05/03/2012 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2012)	03890514	Approved	03890514.pdf
04/22/2016 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2016)	05500329	Approved	05500329.pdf
04/18/2016 12:00 AM	Statement of Change – Corps	05462066	Approved	05462066.pdf
04/04/2014 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2014)	04632523	Approved	04632523.pdf
04/02/2009 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2009)	02741517	Approved	02741517.pdf
03/27/2013 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2013)	04230021	Approved	04230021.pdf
03/25/2008 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2008)	02369127	Approved	02369127.pdf

Show older filings (9)

Date	Type	Filing #	Status	Documents
03/20/2019 05:30 PM	Annual Report(2019)	19032017304709	Approved	19032017304709.pdf
03/13/2007 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2007)	01912544	Approved	01912544.pdf
03/12/2018 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2018)	06279118	Approved	06279118.pdf
03/04/2015 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2015)	04986352	Approved	04986352.pdf
03/03/2017 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2017)	05855018	Approved	05855018.pdf
02/25/2005 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2005)	01141298	Approved	01141298.pdf
02/08/2016 12:00 AM	Statutory Agent Resignation	05387603	Approved	05387603.pdf
02/08/2010 12:00 AM	Statement of Change – Corps	03051505	Approved	03051505.pdf
01/30/2007 12:00 AM	Annual Report(2006)	01870299	Approved	01870299.pdf

Total Cases1

Issues Litigated1

Homeowner Issue Wins0

Association Issue Wins1

Homeowner Win Rate0.0%

Dominant RoleRespondent

Respondent Appearances1

Petitioner Filings0

Last Decision2022-07-11

Penalties AssessedNone

Avg Penalty / CaseNone

Filing Fees Recorded$500

Key Statutes & Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (1 cases)
A.R.S. § 33-1803 (1 cases)
A.R.S. §§ 33-1804 / 33-1248 (1 cases)

Representation Snapshot

When Defending Complaints

Top Law Firms

Phillips, Maceyko & Battock, PLLC — 1 cases

Lead Attorneys

Emily H. Mann — 1 cases

When Filing as Petitioner

No petitioner firm data recorded.

Case Volume by Year

Year	Cases
2022	1

Case Explorer

Frequently Asked Questions

Where is Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association located?

Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association is located at Chandler, AZ.

Who manages Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association?

Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association is managed by CCMC (480-624-7046).

How many OAH cases involve Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association?

1 Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings matter involving Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association are on record. Homeowners prevail in about 0% of issues litigated.

Who is the statutory agent of Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association?

The statutory agent of record for Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association is CAPITAL CONSULTANTS MANAGEMENT at ATTN: DELORES FERGUSON 8360 E VIA DE VENTURA BLVD STE L100, SCOTTSDALE, AZ, Maricopa, 85258, USA.