Chula Vista Homeowners Association v. Olson

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Open Meetings | A.R.S. §§ 33-1804, 33-420 | 2 CA-SA 2018-0031

After homeowners won on open-meeting-law and slander-of-title claims against their HOA, Division Two clarified that the attorney fees in the judgment are not “damages” for setting the appeal bond — a published decision touching both board transparency and appellate procedure.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Chula Vista Homeowners Association v. Hon. Charles Irwin, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and Rodney Olson and Gloria Olson, husband and wife, Real Parties in Interest, 2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018).

Scope note: This page covers Chula Vista Homeowners Association v. Hon. Charles Irwin, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Cochise, Respondent, and Rodney Olson and Gloria Olson, husband and wife, Real Parties in Interest (2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018)) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division Two. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Attorney fees awarded on the homeowners’ declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims under fee-authorizing statutes (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) are not “damages” for purposes of calculating a supersedeas bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including those fees in the bond, so the bond order was vacated.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Petitioner)
Non-profit corporation organized pursuant to the Chula Vista CC&Rs; defendant below and appellant; petitioner in this special action challenging the supersedeas bond.
Jason E. Smith (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for petitioner Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Tucson).
Kaycee S. Wamsley (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for petitioner Chula Vista Homeowners Association (Tucson).

Respondent Side

Rodney Olson (Real Party in Interest)
Homeowner and plaintiff below who prevailed on all counts; opposed the special action.
Gloria Olson (Real Party in Interest)
Homeowner and plaintiff below who prevailed on all counts; opposed the special action.
Robert D. Stachel Jr. (Counsel)
Stachel & Associates P.C.
Counsel for real parties in interest Rodney and Gloria Olson (Sierra Vista).
Alberta Chu (Counsel)
Stachel & Associates P.C.
Counsel for real parties in interest Rodney and Gloria Olson (Sierra Vista).

Neutral Parties

Hon. Charles Irwin (Respondent Judge)
Cochise County Superior Court
Trial judge whose order setting the supersedeas bond was challenged; nominal respondent in the special action.
Hon. Peter J. Eppich (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Authored the opinion.
Hon. Garye L. Vásquez (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Presiding Judge; concurred.
Hon. Philip G. Espinosa (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Concurred.

What happened

The Olsons own property within the Chula Vista community in Cochise County, subject to the Chula Vista Protective Covenants (CC&Rs). In 2009 they obtained a permit to build a 6,000-square-foot steel structure intended to be ancillary to a planned residence. Unable to afford a separate primary residence, they obtained a county permit to convert the structure into a family residence. In 2011 the HOA rejected their conversion plan as noncompliant with the CC&Rs but granted a three-year variance allowing them to live in the structure while building a home.

The Olsons did not build another home. In 2015 the HOA took the position that they violated the CC&Rs because the structure was “nontraditional” and not a “First Class Private Dwelling” under the 2007 amendment to the covenants. The HOA recorded a Notice of Violation, removed it, then recorded a second Notice stating its purpose was to adversely affect the Olsons’ ability to convey marketable title. The HOA also imposed fines and denied the Olsons’ appeal.

In February 2016 the Olsons sued the HOA in Cochise County Superior Court (No. CV201600084). They sought declaratory relief that the 2007 CC&R amendment was invalid and the relevant section unenforceable; alleged the HOA violated the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(5); and brought a slander-of-title claim under A.R.S. § 33-420(A).

After trial, the respondent judge ruled for the Olsons on all counts, finding the HOA had violated the open meeting laws and slandered the Olsons’ title. The court directed the HOA to record a Notice of Removal to clear title, vacated the previously imposed penalty, and awarded $5,000 in statutory damages under § 33-420(A), $318 in costs, and $35,000 in reasonable attorney fees — a total judgment of $40,318.

The HOA filed a notice of appeal and moved for a supersedeas bond, arguing the bond should be based only on $5,318 (the statutory damages plus costs) and exclude the attorney fees. The Olsons argued the fees were part of the damages. The respondent judge concluded the fees were a legal consequence of the original wrongful act and recoverable as damages, and set the bond at the full $40,318. The HOA brought this special action.

The Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction, held that the attorney fees were not damages under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, vacated the order setting the bond, and directed the trial court to enter a new order consistent with the decision.

Procedural timeline

Step 2007 The Chula Vista CC&Rs are amended to include the “First Class Private Dwelling” provision later at issue.

Step 2009 The Olsons obtain a permit to build a 6,000-square-foot steel structure on their Cochise County property.

Step 2011 The HOA rejects the Olsons’ plan to convert the structure into a residence but grants a three-year variance to live in it while building a home.

Step 2015 The HOA declares the Olsons in violation of the CC&Rs, records (and removes, then re-records) a Notice of Violation, imposes fines, and denies their appeal.

Step 2016-02 The Olsons sue the HOA in Cochise County Superior Court (No. CV201600084), alleging invalid CC&R amendment, open-meeting-law violations, and slander of title.

Step 2016 After trial, the respondent judge rules for the Olsons on all counts and enters an amended judgment totaling $40,318 ($5,000 statutory damages, $318 costs, $35,000 attorney fees).

Step 2018-07-27 Division Two of the Court of Appeals accepts special-action jurisdiction, holds the attorney fees are not damages for the supersedeas bond, and vacates the bond order.

FAQ

What did the Court of Appeals decide in this case?

The court held that attorney fees awarded to the Olsons on their declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims are not “damages” for purposes of setting a supersedeas (appeal) bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including the fees in the bond, so the court vacated the bond order and directed a recalculation.

What is a supersedeas bond and why did the amount matter here?

A supersedeas bond is posted by a party appealing a judgment in order to stay (pause) enforcement or collection while the appeal is pending. Under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, the bond is generally the lesser of the total damages awarded (excluding punitive damages), fifty percent of the appellant’s net worth, or twenty-five million dollars. Here the $40,318 judgment included only $5,318 in statutory damages and costs but $35,000 in attorney fees, so whether fees counted as damages changed the bond substantially.

What were the underlying claims the homeowners won?

The Olsons prevailed on all counts in Cochise County Superior Court: declaratory relief that the 2007 CC&R amendment was invalid and unenforceable, a violation of the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(5), and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). They were awarded $5,000 in statutory damages, $318 in costs, and $35,000 in attorney fees.

Why aren’t attorney fees considered ‘damages’ for the bond?

Arizona courts treat “damages” and “judgment” as different things: fees and costs can be part of a judgment but are generally not damages. Only narrow exceptions (such as the “tort of another” principle or wrongful injunction, attachment, garnishment, or execution) treat fees as damages. Here the fees were awarded under statutes that independently authorize fees (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) and were incurred in the parties’ own litigation, so no exception applied.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. The opinion is published (precedential), so it can be cited and relied upon in later Arizona cases involving the calculation of supersedeas bonds and the treatment of attorney fees.

Does this case mean homeowners cannot recover attorney fees against an HOA?

No. The homeowners’ $35,000 fee award remained part of the judgment. The decision addresses only how the bond amount is calculated for an appeal — it holds that the fees are excluded from the bond figure, not that the fee award itself was improper.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	2 CA-SA 2018-0031, 426 P.3d 1228 (App. 2018)
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	July 27, 2018
Judge / panel	Hon. Peter J. Eppich (author), Hon. Garye L. Vásquez (Presiding Judge, concurring), Hon. Philip G. Espinosa (concurring)
Parties	Chula Vista Homeowners Association (petitioner) sought special-action relief from a Cochise County order setting a supersedeas bond; Rodney and Gloria Olson, the prevailing homeowners below, were the real parties in interest.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-2108 Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 7 A.R.S. § 33-420(A) A.R.S. § 33-1804 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-341
Topics	ProcedureAttorney FeesMeetings & RecordsCC&Rs
Outcome / holding	Attorney fees awarded on the homeowners’ declaratory-relief, open-meeting-law, and slander-of-title claims under fee-authorizing statutes (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) are not “damages” for purposes of calculating a supersedeas bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The trial court abused its discretion by including those fees in the bond, so the bond order was vacated.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	No raw source-folder files found for this slug
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In this published special action, Arizona’s Court of Appeals, Division Two, decided whether attorney fees awarded to prevailing homeowners count as “damages” when a trial court sets a supersedeas (appeal) bond under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. The Olsons had sued the Chula Vista Homeowners Association in Cochise County and won on all counts, including declaratory relief, violation of the open meeting laws under A.R.S. § 33-1804, and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A). The judgment totaled $40,318, which included $5,000 in statutory damages, $318 in costs, and $35,000 in attorney fees. When the HOA appealed, the trial court set the bond at the full $40,318. The Court of Appeals held that the fees were not damages, vacated the bond order, and directed the trial court to recalculate the bond.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the statutory text: under A.R.S. § 12-2108 and Rule 7, the bond amount is the lesser of the total damages awarded (excluding punitive damages), fifty percent of the appellant’s net worth, or twenty-five million dollars. Following City Center Executive Plaza v. Jantzen, the court emphasized that “damages” and “judgment” are not synonymous: attorney fees and costs may be part of a judgment, but they are generally not damages. Only narrow exceptions treat fees as damages, such as the “tort of another” principle, wrongful repudiation of insurance coverage, or wrongful injunction, attachment, garnishment, or execution.

The court found none of those exceptions applied. The fees here were awarded under statutes that independently authorize fees (A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and § 12-341.01) and were incurred in the litigation between these two parties, not in third-party litigation. That distinguished Desert Mountain Properties v. Liberty Mutual, a “tort of another” case on which the trial court appeared to rely. The court read A.R.S. § 33-420(A) by its plain language: the slander-of-title statute provides for a separate damages award (the greater of $5,000 per claimant or treble actual damages) and separately authorizes reasonable attorney fees, so the fees were distinct from the damage award.

The court also rejected the Olsons’ argument that their slander-of-title claim was “akin to a provisional remedy” like a wrongful writ of attachment or injunction; the claim was purely statutory and the statute itself separated damages from fees. And although the trial court found the action arose out of contract because CC&Rs are a contract, the court explained that a statute permitting a fee award does not transform those fees into damages, particularly where the Olsons brought no breach-of-contract claim. Because including the fees was an error of law, it was an abuse of discretion.

Why It Matters

This is a published Arizona appellate decision arising directly out of homeowner-association litigation that included open-meeting-law violations under A.R.S. § 33-1804 and slander of title under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) — the kinds of board-transparency and recording disputes that recur in Arizona communities. Because it is precedential, it can be cited in later cases, and it confirms that homeowners can prevail on open-meeting and slander-of-title claims and recover statutory damages, attorney fees, and costs.

Its central practical lesson concerns appeals. When an HOA (or a homeowner) appeals and posts a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of a judgment, the bond is calculated on the damages awarded, not on the attorney fees. Here that distinction mattered: of a $40,318 judgment, only $5,318 reflected statutory damages and costs, while $35,000 was fees. Clarifying that fees are generally excluded from the bond affects how much an appealing party must post to stay collection during an appeal.

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Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al.: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1260.01 | 1 CA-CV 25-0476

Why a board-adopted short-term-rental rule survived a Kalway challenge where the Declaration already prohibited leasing units for hotel or transient purposes.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al., 1 CA-CV 25-0476.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 25-0476) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Baoan Andy Gia Le (Appellee)
Plaintiff below; co-owner of two North Shore units purchased as investment/short-term rental properties.
Linda Sinat Som (Appellee)
Plaintiff below; co-owner of the two North Shore units (with Le, collectively the “Owners”).
Melanie C. McKeddie (Counsel)
McKeddie Cooley, G.P. (Scottsdale)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Owners).
Justin R. Cooley (Counsel)
McKeddie Cooley, G.P. (Scottsdale)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Owners).

Respondent Side

North Shore Condominium Association (Appellant)
Defendant below; condominium association whose board adopted the challenged 30-day minimum-lease rule.
Associated Property Management, Inc. (Appellant)
Defendant below; the association’s property manager (collectively with the association, the “Association”).
Lauren Elliott Stine (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP (Phoenix)
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants (the Association).
Kristin N. Leaptrott (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP (Phoenix)
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants (the Association).

Neutral Parties

Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge; authored the memorandum decision of the court.
D. Steven Williams (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision.
Cynthia J. Bailey (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision.
Timothy J. Ryan (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court (Judge, Ret.)
Trial judge who granted summary judgment and fees to the Owners; decision reversed on appeal.

What happened

North Shore is a planned condominium community in Tempe subject to Arizona’s Condominium Act and to a recorded Declaration. The Declaration limits units to residential use, generally bars trade or business uses (while allowing leasing), and prohibits leasing units “for hotel or transient purposes” without defining “transient.” An earlier version of the Declaration had also barred leases for an initial term of less than one year, but that language was removed by a 2008 amendment.

In 2020 and 2021, Baoan Andy Gia Le and Linda Sinat Som purchased two North Shore units as investment properties, intending to use them as short-term rentals. In February 2022, the association’s board voted to replace an existing one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule prohibiting leases of less than 30 days.

The owners sued the association and its property manager, Associated Property Management, Inc., seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued the 30-day rule was invalid because the Declaration contained no durational rental limits and short-term leases were neither hotel nor transient uses. On cross-motions for summary judgment supported by stipulated facts, the superior court agreed with the owners, held the rule invalid under Kalway, awarded the owners attorney fees and costs, and entered final judgment.

The association appealed. Division One reversed, holding the 30-day rule valid under Kalway as a reasonable and foreseeable clarification of the Declaration’s transient-use prohibition and consistent with the board’s rulemaking authority. It remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association and held the association, as prevailing party, may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 25-0476). A board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2005 A prior version of the Declaration is recorded, barring leases for hotel or transient purposes or for an initial term of less than one year.

Step 2008 The Declaration is amended to remove the “less than one (1) year” lease language, leaving only the prohibition on leasing for “hotel or transient purposes.”

Step 2009 The operative Declaration governing North Shore Condominiums is recorded.

Step 2014 The Arizona legislature enacts A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, addressing owners’ use of units as rental property subject to declaration rental time-period restrictions.

Step 2020 The owners begin purchasing North Shore units (2020-2021) as investment properties intended for short-term rentals.

Step 2022-02 The board votes to replace the existing one-year minimum-lease rule with the 30-day rule.

Step 2022 The owners file suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2022-009708).

Step Date not specified After oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court grants the owners’ motion, holds the 30-day rule invalid under Kalway, and awards the owners attorney fees and costs.

Step 2026-06-09 Division One files its memorandum decision reversing and remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the association.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/le-v-north-shore-condominium-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-06-09

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that a board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association.

Download source file

2026-06-09_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What did the Court of Appeals decide in Le v. North Shore Condominium Association?

Division One reversed the superior court and held the association’s 30-day minimum-lease rule valid. It remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association, ruling the rule was a reasonable and foreseeable clarification of the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and did not conflict with the Declaration.

What was the 30-day rule and who challenged it?

In February 2022, the association’s board replaced an earlier one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule barring leases of less than 30 days. Two owners, Baoan Andy Gia Le and Linda Sinat Som, who had bought units to operate short-term rentals, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the rule was invalid because the Declaration set no durational rental limits.

How did Kalway v. Calabria Ranch apply to a board-adopted rule?

The court held that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations standard applies to board-adopted rules, not just majority-vote amendments to CC&Rs. It reasoned that if unforeseeable use restrictions are unenforceable even when approved by a majority, the same limit should apply to a rule adopted by a board, which represents only a minority of owners.

Why was a rule defining “transient” as under 30 days considered foreseeable?

The Declaration prohibited leasing for “transient” purposes but did not define the term. The court found that clarifying an undefined term already in the governing document “fills a gap” and is tethered to existing restrictions. A 30-day threshold matched the ordinary meaning of “transient” and Arizona and Tempe definitions treating stays of less than 30 days as transient.

How does this case compare to Gross and Preston?

The court distinguished Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake, where a similar 30-day rule was invalidated because those CC&Rs contained no transient-purpose prohibition. It aligned instead with Preston v. Las Sendas, which upheld a comparable short-term-rental restriction where the original CC&Rs limited units to residential, non-transient use.

Who pays attorney fees after the decision?

The trial court had awarded fees and costs to the owners. On reversal, the association became the prevailing party and may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs under Section 13.1 of the Declaration and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, upon compliance with the appellate rules.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 25-0476
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	June 9, 2026
Judge / panel	Daniel J. Kiley, D. Steven Williams, Cynthia J. Bailey
Parties	Baoan Andy Gia Le & Linda Sinat Som (unit owners/appellees) v. North Shore Condominium Association (condominium association/appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1201 et seq. A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(1) A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A) A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) A.R.S. § 42-5070(F) A.R.S. § 33-1310(17)
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	A board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Two owners bought units in the North Shore condominium community in Tempe intending to operate short-term rentals. In February 2022 the association’s board replaced an existing one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule barring leases of less than 30 days. The owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the 30-day rule was invalid under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA because the Declaration set no durational rental limits. The superior court agreed and granted the owners summary judgment plus attorney fees. On appeal, Division One reversed. It held the board had statutory and declaratory authority to adopt rules that do not conflict with the Declaration, that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations test applies to board rules, and that a rule defining the Declaration’s undefined term “transient” as under 30 days was a reasonable, foreseeable clarification tethered to existing restrictions. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the cross-motions for summary judgment de novo on stipulated facts, the court first rejected the owners’ argument that the board could impose durational lease limits only by amending the Declaration through unanimous owner consent. The Condominium Act permits an association to adopt and amend rules subject to the declaration (A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(1)), and the Declaration expressly authorized the board to adopt rules governing unit use. Because the 30-day rule was consistent with, rather than in conflict with, the Declaration’s provisions limiting units to residential, non-transient use, the board did not violate the Act or the Declaration. The court also found nothing in the 2008 amendment (which removed earlier “less than one (1) year” language) evinced an intent to eliminate restrictions on short-term rentals.

The court then held that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations standard governs board-adopted rules, not just majority-vote CC&R amendments. It reasoned it would be illogical to exempt a rule adopted by a board (a minority of owners) from a standard that invalidates even majority-approved restrictions that were not reasonable and foreseeable. Applying that test, the court concluded that a rule defining the Declaration’s undefined term “transient” as leases under 30 days was a permissible clarification that “fills a gap” and is tethered to the original restrictions. That reading tracked the ordinary dictionary meaning of “transient” and Arizona and Tempe definitions treating stays of less than 30 days as transient (A.R.S. § 42-5070(F); City of Tempe Zoning & Development Code).

The court distinguished Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake, where a similar 30-day rule was struck down because those CC&Rs contained no transient-purpose prohibition, and aligned its result with Preston v. Las Sendas, which upheld a comparable short-term-rental restriction. It rejected the owners’ contention that requiring written leases made their use non-transient. Because only a legal question remained on stipulated facts, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association, which as the prevailing party may recover fees under the Declaration and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01.

Why It Matters

This decision marks where an Arizona short-term-rental restriction survives a Kalway-style challenge. Unlike disputes in which durational rental caps were invalidated as unforeseeable, the court found that the North Shore Declaration’s existing ban on “hotel or transient purposes” put purchasers on notice that short-term rentals could be restricted, so a board rule defining “transient” as under 30 days merely clarified an existing term rather than imposing an entirely new limitation.

Read alongside decisions such as Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake (and, in the broader body of Arizona short-term-rental cases, Bonham) that struck down comparable rental caps, it serves as a counterweight illustrating that the outcome under Kalway turns on the specific language of the governing documents. Where a declaration already limits units to residential, non-transient use, associations may have room to adopt clarifying rules; where it does not, similar restrictions have failed. The opinion is a non-precedential memorandum decision and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

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Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc.: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments & CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 12-1832, 12-341.01 | 1 CA-CV 25-0709

In this 2026 unpublished decision, Division One applied Kalway v. Calabria Ranch to affirm that a homeowners’ association could not impose a new $300 capital-improvement assessment tied to a golf course its CC&Rs had previously excluded from association responsibility, and it upheld the fee award to the homeowner.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc., 1 CA-CV 25-0709.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc. (1 CA-CV 25-0709) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the homeowner, holding that the 2021 amendment—which imposed a $300 capital-improvement assessment and authorized association funding for the golf course—was an unforeseeable new obligation under Kalway because the 2015 CC&Rs plainly excluded golf-course expenses, and that the homeowner had standing and raised a justiciable controversy.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jimmie Klatt (Appellee)
Homeowner and member of the Association who challenged the 2021 Amendment; prevailed in the superior court and on appeal.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Jimmie Klatt.
Jacob A. Kubert (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Jimmie Klatt.

Respondent Side

SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Appellant)
HOA managing the age-restricted SunBird community of about 1,600 homes; adopted and defended the challenged Amendment.
Gaurav Bobby Kalra (Counsel)
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
Christine B. Stutz (Counsel)
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

Michael J. Brown (Judge)
Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
Veronika Fabian (Judge)
Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
Randall M. Howe (Judge)
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals; joined the decision.
Michael D. Gordon (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge (Retired) who granted summary judgment for Klatt.

What happened

The SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners’ Association manages SunBird, an age-restricted (55 and older) active-living community of about 1,600 homes, many located near the separately owned SunBird Golf Course. In 1999, several homeowners’ associations within SunBird joined and adopted CC&Rs creating the Association, and those 1999 CC&Rs stated that the Golf Course does not constitute a common area of the Association.

When Jimmie Klatt bought a SunBird home in 2018, his lot was subject to an amended set of CC&Rs adopted in 2015. The 2015 CC&Rs provided in Subsection 9.2 that neither the Association nor its members would be responsible for the costs of operating and maintaining the golf course (apart from golf-related fees), and Section 6.3(A) specifically excluded the Golf Course from the common areas and expenses for which members were responsible.

In 2021, a majority of SunBird owners approved three amendments (together, the Amendment) establishing a fund to maintain, repair, replace, or improve the common areas and other areas affecting the Association, including the Golf Course. The Amendment applied only to people who become SunBird lot owners after its adoption and required those new owners to pay a $300 capital-improvement assessment.

In September 2023, Klatt sued the Association seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction, contending that under the 2015 CC&Rs owners owed no financial obligation to the golf course and that the Amendment violated Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC because the 2015 CC&Rs did not make it reasonably foreseeable that the Association could change the prohibition against financially supporting the golf course. He alleged the Amendment harmed his home’s marketability by requiring purchasers to pay a transfer fee supporting the golf course.

The superior court granted summary judgment for Klatt, applied Kalway, and found the Amendment was not foreseeable. It later entered final judgment declaring the Amendment void, invalid, and of no force and effect, and awarded Klatt attorneys’ fees plus costs. The Association appealed.

The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. It held the Association had waived any standing challenge and that, in any event, Klatt had standing and a justiciable controversy, and it concluded the Amendment was an unforeseeable new obligation under Kalway. The court denied the Association’s fee request because it did not prevail and awarded Klatt reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, subject to ARCAP 21.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc. (1 CA-CV 25-0709). CC&R amendment adding a $300 golf-course assessment was void as unforeseeable under Kalway. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 1999 Several SunBird homeowners’ associations join and adopt the 1999 CC&Rs creating the Association; the CC&Rs state the Golf Course does not constitute a common area.

Step 2015 The 2015 CC&Rs are adopted; Subsection 9.2 and Section 6.3(A) exclude the Golf Course from the association’s and members’ cost and common-expense responsibilities.

Step 2018 Jimmie Klatt buys a home in SunBird, becoming subject to the 2015 CC&Rs.

Step 2021 A majority of SunBird owners approve three amendments (the Amendment) creating a fund covering the Golf Course and imposing a $300 capital-improvement assessment on future lot owners.

Step 2023-09 Klatt sues the Association seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction, invoking Kalway.

Step Date not specified The superior court grants summary judgment for Klatt and later enters final judgment declaring the Amendment void and awarding Klatt attorneys’ fees and costs.

Step 2026-06-11 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, files its memorandum decision affirming and awarding Klatt fees and costs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/klatt-v-sunbird-golf-resort-homeowners-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-06-11

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision affirming that the $300 golf-course assessment amendment was void as unforeseeable under Kalway.

Download source file

2026-06-11_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What did the SunBird 2021 amendment do?

The 2021 Amendment (three amendments to the 2015 CC&Rs) established a fund to maintain, repair, replace, or improve the community’s common areas and other areas affecting the Association, including the separately owned SunBird Golf Course, and required people who buy SunBird lots after the amendment to pay a $300 capital-improvement assessment.

Why did the homeowner win?

The 2015 CC&Rs in effect when Klatt bought his home expressly stated that neither the Association nor its members would be responsible for golf-course costs and excluded the golf course from common areas and expenses. Under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch, associations cannot create new affirmative obligations the CC&Rs did not make foreseeable, so the amendment adding an assessment and golf-course funding was unforeseeable and unenforceable.

How does this case relate to Kalway v. Calabria Ranch?

Kalway holds that CC&R amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable and cannot impose entirely new obligations untethered to the original covenants. The Court of Appeals applied Kalway here and rejected the Association’s argument that Kalway did not apply because the amendment affected only future purchasers.

Could the homeowner challenge an amendment that applied only to future buyers?

Yes. The court explained that an amendment applying only to new owners is still a restrictive covenant that affects existing owners’ ability to sell their lots. Klatt had standing under the declaratory judgment statute (A.R.S. § 12-1832) and raised a justiciable controversy because the amendment affected his property’s marketability and authorized golf-course spending the prior CC&Rs barred.

Who paid attorneys’ fees?

The superior court awarded Klatt attorneys’ fees and costs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court denied the Association’s fee request because it did not prevail and, in its discretion, awarded Klatt reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, subject to ARCAP 21.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c) it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 25-0709
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	June 11, 2026
Judge / panel	Brown, Fabian, Howe
Parties	Jimmie Klatt (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Defendant/Appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1832 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	AssessmentsCC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the homeowner, holding that the 2021 amendment—which imposed a $300 capital-improvement assessment and authorized association funding for the golf course—was an unforeseeable new obligation under Kalway because the 2015 CC&Rs plainly excluded golf-course expenses, and that the homeowner had standing and raised a justiciable controversy.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	Jimmie Klatt v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowner in the age-restricted SunBird community sued his homeowners’ association after a 2021 amendment to the CC&Rs created a fund to maintain and improve common areas including the separately owned SunBird Golf Course, and imposed a $300 capital-improvement assessment on people who buy SunBird lots after the amendment. The 2015 CC&Rs in effect when the homeowner bought his home expressly stated that neither the association nor its members would be responsible for golf-course costs and excluded the golf course from common areas and expenses. The superior court granted summary judgment for the homeowner, declared the amendment void under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, and awarded him attorneys’ fees and costs. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the homeowner had standing and a justiciable controversy and that the amendment was unforeseeable because the earlier CC&Rs plainly barred using association funds for the golf course.

Key Issues & Findings

On standing and justiciability, the court first noted that the Association never raised standing in the superior court and had therefore waived it, arguing only that the homeowner did not present a justiciable issue. Even reaching the merits, the court explained that the declaratory judgment statute, A.R.S. § 12-1832, allows any person interested under a written contract to seek a determination of the contract’s validity, and that CC&Rs constitute a contract between the property owners as a whole and individual lot owners. Because the homeowner had a contractual relationship with the Association and the Association cited no authority that a lot owner cannot challenge the validity of CC&R amendments, his interest was neither speculative nor uncertain. He bought his home knowing the golf course and the community were separate and that association funds would not benefit the golf course; the amendment now subjected his property to the assessment on resale and granted the Association authority to spend funds on the golf course, creating a definite interest and a genuine controversy.

Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, the court rejected the Association’s attempt to distinguish that decision on the ground that the amendment applies only to future purchasers. Kalway holds that homeowners’ associations cannot create new affirmative obligations where the CC&Rs did not give notice that owners might be subject to them, and that amendments must be both reasonable and foreseeable and cannot be entirely new and different in character, untethered to an original covenant. That Kalway did not expressly address transfer fees for new buyers did not make it inapplicable. An amendment that applies only to new owners is still a restrictive covenant that affects existing owners’ ability to sell their lots, and nothing in Kalway would preclude an existing owner from challenging such an amendment.

Because the 2015 CC&Rs plainly stated that the Association would not use its funds for golf-course expenses, the amendment creating the assessment and golf-course financial support was unforeseeable, and the Association did not show error in the grant of summary judgment. The Association also waived any challenge to the trial court’s finding that the amendment was unreasonable and unforeseeable by not arguing that point on appeal. On fees, the court denied the Association’s request because it did not prevail and, in its discretion, granted the homeowner reasonable attorneys’ fees and taxable costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

Why It Matters

This 2026 decision is a notable post-Kalway application of the “new financial obligation” limit on CC&R amendments. Division One affirmed a homeowner victory that used Kalway v. Calabria Ranch to invalidate a capital-improvement assessment tied to a golf course the community’s CC&Rs had previously excluded from association and common-expense responsibility, and it upheld the trial court’s judgment declaring the amendment void along with an award of attorneys’ fees to the homeowner.

Although unpublished and non-precedential, the decision illustrates two points of continuing interest to Arizona associations and owners: that an amendment purporting to bind only future purchasers can still be challenged by existing owners because it affects the marketability of their lots, and that an amendment adding funding obligations for something the prior declaration expressly carved out may be treated as unforeseeable under Kalway.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia: HOA Foreclosure Right Fixed at Filing

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

HOA Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | 1 CA-CV 18-0276

This landmark Arizona case establishes that a homeowner cannot defeat an HOA foreclosure action by bringing delinquent assessments current after the lawsuit is filed. The court ruled that the right to foreclose is fixed at filing, allowing the HOA to proceed to collect outstanding legal fees.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Laveen Meadows, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 18-0276; opinion affirming.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the trial and appellate litigation history of Laveen Meadows v. Mejia, a precedential Arizona decision holding that a homeowner’s post-filing payment of delinquent assessments does not eliminate an association’s statutory right to foreclose for unawarded attorneys’ fees. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an association’s statutory right to foreclose its assessment lien is determined as of the date the foreclosure action is filed, and a homeowner’s subsequent partial payment of delinquent assessments does not divest the court of jurisdiction or eliminate the association’s right to pursue foreclosure for remaining fees and costs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
Arizona nonprofit corporation that initiated the foreclosure action for delinquent assessments.
Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Lead counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. throughout the case and appeal.
W. William Nikolaus (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. in trial and appellate proceedings.
Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc., participated in default and evidentiary hearings.
Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. in drafting default-related and appellate briefs.
Heather Yearack (Witness)
Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
Witness/representative for Laveen Meadows who testified regarding Mejia’s assessment ledger and late fees at the evidentiary hearing.
Mohammed al Sayed (Board Member)
Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
Laveen Meadows board member who attended the June 2, 2017 superior court hearing.
Lisa Riesland (Other)
Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association / Management Company
Community manager for Laveen Meadows, mentioned by witness Yearack in testimony.

Respondent Side

Carlos Mejia (Defendant)
Homeowner of Lot 63, Laveen Meadows Parcel 2
Homeowner who appealed the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Lead counsel representing Defendant Carlos Mejia on appeal.
Jacob A. Kubert (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Co-counsel representing Carlos Mejia in both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
David E. Wood (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Additional in-firm counsel representing Carlos Mejia during the appellate proceedings.
Paul Monaghan (Witness)
Dessaules Law Group
Witness for Carlos Mejia who testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding Mejia’s assessment payment of $5,000.
Davina Bressler (Counsel)
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office
Deputy County Attorney representing Defendant State of Arizona, which disclaimed interest and was dismissed.
State of Arizona (Defendant)
State of Arizona, Maricopa County Finance Department Collections Unit
Named as defendant due to a criminal restitution lien; filed a Disclaimer of Interest and was dismissed.
Lexington National Insurance Corporation (Defendant)
Lexington National Insurance Corporation
Named as defendant due to a recorded Deed of Trust; failed to appear and defaulted.
US Immigration Bonds and Insurance Services, Inc. (Defendant)
US Immigration Bonds and Insurance Services, Inc.
Named as defendant due to a recorded Deed of Trust; failed to appear and defaulted.
United States of America (Defendant)
Department of the Treasury – Internal Revenue Service
Named as defendant due to a federal tax lien; filed a Disclaimer of Interest and was dismissed with prejudice.

Neutral Parties

Hon. Margaret E. Benny (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Judge Pro Tempore/Commissioner who presided over the trial court proceedings, entered default judgment, and denied Rule 60(b) motion.
Hon. Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge who delivered the decision of the appellate court affirming the foreclosure judgment.
Hon. Kenton D. Jones (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge on the panel who joined the majority opinion affirming the foreclosure judgment.
Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who dissented, arguing that Mejia’s payment of assessments precluded foreclosure.
Hon. Michael J. Brown (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who was substituted for Judge Jones on the panel for the subsequent attorneys’ fees order.
Hon. Peter B. Swann (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals who signed the administrative memorandum substituting Judge Brown on the panel.
Hon. James P. Beene (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals / Arizona Supreme Court
Signed appellate procedural orders as Presiding Judge of Department M and Supreme Court orders as Duty Justice.
Hon. Melina Brill (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge Pro Tempore who signed initial procedural and dismissal orders on appeal.

What happened

In May 2016, Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association filed a judicial foreclosure complaint against homeowner Carlos Mejia, alleging that he was delinquent on assessments for over a year and in an amount exceeding $1,200. Mejia failed to file a timely answer, and the Association obtained an entry of default in December 2016.

Before the court entered default judgment, Mejia retained counsel and paid $5,000 – an amount that exceeded his delinquent assessments and late fees but did not cover the substantial attorneys’ fees the Association had incurred. Mejia moved to set aside the default, arguing that his payment eliminated the statutory basis for foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The trial court denied the motion and entered a judgment of foreclosure, recording a negative principal balance of -$2,152.08 (reflecting Mejia’s overpayment of assessments) but ordering foreclosure of the lien to satisfy $11,190.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,012.25 in costs. Mejia appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia (1 CA-CV 18-0276). HOA lien foreclosure judgment properly included assessments, fees, and statutory lien priorities. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-05-11 Complaint filed in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking foreclosure of assessment lien.

Step 2016-05-12 Carlos Mejia served with the Summons and Complaint by a private process server.

Step 2016-07-13 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Dismissal of Defendant State of Arizona.

Step 2016-08-22 IRS files Disclaimer of Interest; Laveen Meadows files Notice of Dismissal of Defendant United States of America.

Step 2016-10-12 Superior Court enters 150-Day Order Minute Entry.

Step 2016-12-08 Laveen Meadows files Application and Affidavit for Entry of Default against Carlos Mejia.

Step 2017-04-03 Laveen Meadows files Motion and Affidavit for Entry of Default Judgment, China Doll fee affidavit, and Statement of Costs.

Step 2017-04-14 Dessaules Law Group files Notice of Appearance for Carlos Mejia; Mejia files Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default, Answer, and Notice of Payment of $5,000 assessments.

Step 2017-04-17 Default hearing held; Superior Court resets hearing to June 2, 2017 to allow briefing on Mejia’s Motion to Set Aside Default.

Step 2017-04-28 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default.

Step 2017-05-10 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default.

Step 2017-05-19 Laveen Meadows files Motion to Strike Mejia’s Reply for improperly citing unpublished trial court rulings.

Step 2017-05-24 Mejia files Response to Motion to Strike and attaches copies of the cited trial court rulings.

Step 2017-05-26 Laveen Meadows files Reply to Motion to Strike and Notice of Exhibits for the damages hearing.

Step 2017-06-02 Hearing held; Superior Court grants Laveen Meadows’ Motion to Strike and denies Mejia’s Motion to Set Aside Default; schedules evidentiary hearing on damages.

Step 2017-06-06 Superior Court signs Order formally denying Mejia’s Motion to Set Aside Default.

Step 2017-06-09 Mejia files Defendant’s Hearing Memorandum regarding damages and right of foreclosure.

Step 2017-06-19 Laveen Meadows files Pre-Hearing Memorandum, Supplemental China Doll Fee Affidavit, and Supplemental Application for Attorney Fees.

Step 2017-06-20 Default Evidentiary Hearing on damages held; Heather Yearack and Paul Monaghan testify; Court takes matter under advisement.

Step 2017-07-03 Mejia files Objection to Proposed Judgment, Objection to Statement of Costs, and Response to Fee Application.

Step 2017-07-14 Laveen Meadows files Replies in support of its Proposed Judgment, Fee Application, and Statement of Costs.

Step 2017-08-04 Superior Court signs and files Judgment of Foreclosure, awarding -$2,152.08 principal, $11,190.00 in attorney’s fees, and $1,012.25 in costs.

Step 2017-08-16 Mejia files Notice of Appeal, initiating case 1 CA-CV 17-0539.

Step 2017-08-17 Mejia files Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond and Stay Enforcement of Judgment in Superior Court.

Step 2017-08-31 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Cross-Appeal.

Step 2017-09-28 Superior Court sets Mejia’s supersedeas bond at $0.00 and stays enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.

Step 2017-12-07 Court of Appeals issues Order terminating stay and dismissing appeal 1 CA-CV 17-0539 for lack of jurisdiction because a direct appeal cannot be taken from a default judgment without first seeking Rule 60(b) relief.

Step 2017-12-20 Mejia files Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment under Rule 60(b) in Superior Court; Court of Appeals dismisses the Association’s cross-appeal.

Step 2018-01-10 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Mejia’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.

Step 2018-01-30 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.

Step 2018-03-28 Superior Court enters signed Minute Entry denying Mejia’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and permitting Association to apply for post-judgment fees.

Step 2018-04-05 Laveen Meadows files Post-Judgment Application for Attorney Fees ($7,680.00) and Statement of Costs ($98.51).

Step 2018-04-20 Superior Court signs Order granting Laveen Meadows’ post-judgment attorney’s fees and costs.

Step 2018-04-25 Mejia files Notice of Appeal, initiating case 1 CA-CV 18-0276.

Step 2018-05-16 Mejia files Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond and Stay Enforcement of Judgment in Superior Court.

Step 2018-05-31 Appellate clerk files Index of Record from Superior Court for case 1 CA-CV 18-0276.

Step 2018-06-12 Court of Appeals dismisses appeal 1 CA-CV 18-0276 for lack of jurisdiction, believing the Superior Court’s April 20, 2018 fees order had not been resolved or signed.

Step 2018-06-14 Mejia files Motion for Reconsideration and to Reinstate Appeal in Court of Appeals, attaching the signed April 20 order; also files duplicate Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond in Superior Court.

Step 2018-07-10 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2018-07-13 Court of Appeals enters Order vacating its dismissal and reinstating appeal 1 CA-CV 18-0276; Mejia files Notice of No Response to his bond motion in Superior Court.

Step 2018-07-23 Mejia files Case Management Statement and Notice of Transcript Order in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2018-09-12 Mejia files Appellant’s Opening Brief.

Step 2018-11-21 Laveen Meadows files Appellee’s Answering Brief.

Step 2018-11-26 Laveen Meadows files Motion for Leave to Have Clerical Error Corrected by the Trial Court.

Step 2019-01-07 Mejia files Response opposing Laveen Meadows’ Motion to Correct Clerical Error.

Step 2019-01-14 Laveen Meadows files Reply in Support of Motion to Correct Clerical Error.

Step 2019-01-28 Court of Appeals enters Order denying Laveen Meadows’ Motion to Correct Clerical Error.

Step 2019-03-26 Mejia files Appellant’s Reply Brief.

Step 2019-04-23 Mejia files Request for Oral Argument.

Step 2019-05-01 Court of Appeals enters Order granting the request for oral argument.

Step 2019-07-24 Laveen Meadows files Notice of New Binding Authority regarding the 2019 legislative amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1807.

Step 2019-07-29 Mejia files Motion to Strike Notice of New Authority or, alternatively, to order supplemental briefing.

Step 2019-08-07 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Mejia’s Motion to Strike Notice of New Authority.

Step 2019-08-13 Court of Appeals enters Order granting request for supplemental briefs on the meaning and application of newly-amended A.R.S. § 33-1807.

Step 2019-08-27 Both parties file simultaneous Supplemental Briefs in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2019-09-03 Oral argument held before Court of Appeals Department A.

Step 2020-05-01 Court of Appeals enters Order amending the short caption to ‘Laveen Meadows v. Mejia.’

Step 2020-05-05 Court of Appeals files its published Opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure.

Step 2020-05-20 Mejia files Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2020-05-26 Court of Appeals enters Order denying Mejia’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Step 2020-06-04 Mejia files Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court, assigned No. CV-20-0167-PR.

Step 2020-06-18 Court of Appeals enters Order granting Laveen Meadows’ appellate attorney’s fees ($33,005.00) and costs ($512.00).

Step 2020-09-22 Arizona Supreme Court enters Order denying Mejia’s Petition for Review and granting Laveen Meadows’ request for Supreme Court attorney’s fees.

Step 2020-11-25 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Settlement in the Arizona Supreme Court.

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2020-12-03_237_0000-civil-mandate.pdf

FAQ

Does paying off delinquent assessments after an HOA foreclosure lawsuit is filed stop the foreclosure under Arizona law?

No. In the binding precedent of Laveen Meadows v. Mejia, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an association’s statutory right to foreclose is determined as of the date the lawsuit is filed. Bringing the assessment balance current after filing does not eliminate the HOA’s right to proceed with foreclosure to recover outstanding attorneys’ fees and costs.

What is the statutory threshold for an HOA to file a foreclosure lawsuit in Arizona?

Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an HOA can only foreclose its assessment lien if the owner has been delinquent in the payment of assessments (excluding collection fees, late charges, and attorneys’ fees) for a period of one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first.

Can an HOA foreclose on a home solely to collect unpaid attorneys’ fees and costs?

Yes, if the statutory foreclosure threshold for assessments was met on the date the lawsuit was filed. While attorneys’ fees alone are not foreclosable assessments, if a foreclosure action is properly initiated based on delinquent assessments, the HOA can continue the foreclosure process to recover its reasonable collection fees, attorneys’ fees, and late charges.

Is the Laveen Meadows v. Mejia ruling binding precedent for all Arizona HOAs and homeowners?

Yes. This decision is a published, precedential opinion from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. It was subsequently clarified and codified by the Arizona Legislature in amendments to A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), confirming that eligibility for foreclosure is determined on the date the action is filed.

How can a homeowner stop an HOA foreclosure once a lawsuit has been filed?

Once a foreclosure action is filed, a homeowner cannot unilaterally stop the process merely by paying the delinquent assessments. To completely stop the foreclosure and redeem the property, the homeowner must satisfy the entire secured debt, which includes all delinquent assessments, late fees, costs, and the HOA’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 18-0276
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	May 5, 2020
Judge / panel	Hon. Margaret E. Benny, Hon. Maria Elena Cruz, Hon. Kenton D. Jones, Hon. Kent E. Cattani
Parties	Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. Carlos Mejia (Defendant/Appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807 A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) A.R.S. § 33-1807(C) A.R.S. § 33-1807(F) A.R.S. § 33-1807(H)
Topics	ForeclosureAssessmentsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an association’s statutory right to foreclose its assessment lien is determined as of the date the foreclosure action is filed, and a homeowner’s subsequent partial payment of delinquent assessments does not divest the court of jurisdiction or eliminate the association’s right to pursue foreclosure for remaining fees and costs.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	234 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	66 roadmap entries
Video overview	Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association filed a judicial foreclosure action against homeowner Carlos Mejia for delinquent assessments exceeding $1,200. Mejia subsequently paid $5,000, which covered the delinquent assessments and late fees but did not cover the HOA’s unawarded attorney’s fees. Mejia argued that bringing the assessments current eliminated the statutory basis for foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The trial court denied Mejia’s motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure, holding that the statutory threshold delinquency must exist when the action is filed, and subsequent partial payments do not divest the court of jurisdiction or extinguish the foreclosure right. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in a 2-1 opinion, holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), the right to foreclose is determined at the inception of the lawsuit, and subsequent payments towards delinquent assessments do not eliminate the association’s right to proceed with foreclosure to recover its outstanding collection fees and attorney’s fees.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), concluding that the statutory conditions permitting foreclosure—such as delinquency for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more—act as a triggering event or ripeness element required to initiate the foreclosure action. Once this threshold is met at the time of filing, jurisdiction is established, and subsequent actions or partial payments by the homeowner do not divest the court of jurisdiction or extinguish the association’s lien foreclosure right.

The court distinguished the Arizona statute from California’s negative phrasing, which explicitly limits the ongoing right to foreclose. It also noted that the Arizona Legislature’s post-dispute amendment to § 33-1807(A), adding the phrase ‘as determined on the date the action is filed,’ serves as a clarifying declaration of the original statute’s intent.

The dissenting opinion argued that the majority’s decision leads to an absurd result where a homeowner who has paid all delinquent assessments can still have their home foreclosed upon solely to satisfy unawarded and unadjudicated attorney’s fees, which are otherwise non-foreclosable under the statute.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners, this case emphasizes the critical risk of allowing HOA assessment delinquencies to reach the statutory thresholds of $1,200 or one year. Once a foreclosure lawsuit is filed, homeowners cannot unilaterally stop the foreclosure process merely by paying the outstanding assessments; they must pay the entire debt, including the HOA’s substantial and often unadjudicated attorney’s fees, to protect their homes from a sheriff’s sale.

For HOA boards and managers, the ruling confirms their leverage in collection actions but also reinforces the necessity of strict compliance with statutory thresholds on the exact date of filing. For legal counsel, it highlights the importance of maintaining an accurate accounting of assessments versus attorney’s fees and demonstrates that contractual attorney’s fees provisions in CC&Rs do not merge with a default judgment, allowing the recovery of post-judgment collection costs.

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Turtle Rock III HOA v. Fisher: HOA Daily Fines Deemed Per Se Unreasonable Without Written Schedule

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

HOA Daily Fines & CC&Rs | A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) | 1 CA-CV 16-0455

An Arizona case illustrating the strict evidentiary standards homeowners associations must meet to legally impose fines. While homeowners must raise objections at trial to preserve them, HOAs must present their written fee policies to enforce monetary penalties.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Turtle Rock III, Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 16-0455; affirmed in part and reversed in part — opinion depublished by the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-17-0327-PR), so it is non-precedential.

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Scope note: This page covers the litigation between Turtle Rock III HOA and homeowner Lynne Fisher regarding property maintenance, daily fines, and subsequent appeal proceedings. While the opinion remains highly persuasive, it was depublished by the Arizona Supreme Court and therefore lacks precedential value. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The trial court’s injunction ordering property repairs is affirmed because the homeowner waived her interior maintenance objections by failing to raise them below, but the award of monetary penalties and attorneys’ fees is reversed because the association failed to present competent evidence of a pre-existing, promulgated fee schedule.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Arizona non-profit corporation and planned community association
Clint G. Goodman (Counsel)
Goodman Law Group, LLP
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
Scott L. Potter (Counsel)
Goodman Law Offices, P.C.
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
Maura A. Abernethy (Counsel)
Goodman Law Group, LLP
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
Ashley N. Moscarello (Counsel)
Goodman Law Group, LLP
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
Gregory J. Wahl (Board Member)
Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
HOA Board Member who verified the initial Complaint
Verl Curtiss (Witness)
Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
HOA representative who testified at the evidentiary hearing
Annette Milauskas (Witness)
Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
HOA member listed as witness and present at the evidentiary hearing

Respondent Side

Lynne A. Fisher (Defendant)
Homeowner and record owner of property located at 901 E. Michigan Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona
James Roger Wood (Counsel)
The Law Offices of J. Roger Wood, PLLC
Lead attorney representing Defendant/Appellant Lynne A. Fisher; later disbarred
Erin S. Iungerich (Counsel)
The Law Offices of J. Roger Wood, PLLC
Attorney representing Defendant/Appellant Lynne A. Fisher
James B. Sweeney (Counsel)
The Law Offices of J. Roger Wood, PLLC
Attorney representing Defendant/Appellant Lynne A. Fisher

Neutral Parties

Hon. David M. Talamante (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial court judge who presided over the consolidated trial and evidentiary hearing
Hon. David K. Udall (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Original trial court judge before reassignment
Hon. Randall H. Warner (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Presiding Civil Judge who reassigned the case to Judge Talamante
Hon. Margaret Benny (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior Court Commissioner assigned to handle default judgment proceedings
Hon. Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who delivered the opinion of the court
Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who participated in the decision
Hon. Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who participated in the decision
Hon. Scott Bales (Judge)
Arizona Supreme Court
Chief Justice who signed the order denying review and depublishing the appellate opinion
Hon. Melina Brill (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge Pro Tempore who signed procedural scheduling orders
Hon. Barbara Vidal Vaught (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge Pro Tempore who signed the order extending time for the answering brief
Amy M. Wood (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Ruth Willingham (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Former Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Division One
Janet Johnson (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County
Chris DeRose (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Superior Court of Maricopa County

What happened

Beginning in January 2014, the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association sent numerous notices of violation to Lynne Fisher regarding maintenance issues at her property, including weedy landscaping, damaged gates, and a wood-rotted garage door. The HOA also cited interior conditions, such as dilapidated blinds and excessive storage items visible from the street. When Fisher failed to cure these issues, the HOA began assessing a daily fine of $25 and eventually filed a lawsuit in November 2015 for breach of contract and injunctive relief.

At the April 2016 evidentiary hearing, which was consolidated with a trial on the merits, Fisher’s counsel appeared but Fisher did not, and her counsel presented no evidence or witnesses. The trial court subsequently entered an injunction ordering Fisher to replace her backyard door, keep her yard free of weeds, replace her front window blinds, and move interior items that prevented the blinds from closing properly. The court also entered judgment against Fisher for $3,850 in penalties, $10,839.70 in attorneys’ fees, and $474 in costs.

Fisher appealed the judgment to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed the injunction but reversed the fines and fee awards. The HOA petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court, which initially granted review on the issue of ad hoc penalties but later vacated its order as improvidently granted, denying the petition and depublishing the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Turtle Rock III HOA v. Fisher (1 CA-CV 16-0455). The trial court’s injunction ordering property repairs is affirmed because the homeowner waived her interior… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Turtle Rock III HOA v. Fisher. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-11-04 Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association files a Complaint for breach of contract and injunctive relief against record owner Lynne A. Fisher in Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2015-11-20 Superior Court issues an Order to Show Cause setting a preliminary return hearing.

Step 2015-11-30 Defendant Lynne Fisher is personally served with the summons, complaint, and application for injunction.

Step 2015-12-11 Counsel enters a Notice of Appearance for Fisher and files a Notice of Change of Judge as a Matter of Right.

Step 2015-12-16 The case is reassigned from Judge David Udall to Judge David Talamante.

Step 2015-12-30 Plaintiff files an Affidavit and Application for Entry of Default after Fisher fails to file a timely response.

Step 2016-01-04 Court enters a minute entry noting default paperwork issues regarding a default coversheet.

Step 2016-01-05 Court sets a return hearing on the application for preliminary injunction.

Step 2016-01-08 Fisher files her Answer admitting residency but denying CC&R violation allegations, alongside a Demand for Jury Trial.

Step 2016-01-12 HOA files an Objection to Defendant’s Demand for Jury Trial, arguing no jury right exists in equitable enforcement actions.

Step 2016-01-20 Court holds a status conference where it sets an evidentiary hearing.

Step 2016-02-26 Court issues an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing for April 15, 2016.

Step 2016-03-01 HOA files a Request for Clarification regarding whether the evidentiary hearing will be consolidated with a trial on the merits.

Step 2016-03-11 Court clarifies that the evidentiary hearing will address both injunctive relief and monetary penalties.

Step 2016-03-23 Court issues a 100-day notice directing the parties to submit a Joint Report and Scheduling Order.

Step 2016-04-02 Court issues a 150-day order providing scheduling directives.

Step 2016-04-08 HOA files its trial exhibits, including the CC&Rs, deed, account ledger, photographs, and warning letters.

Step 2016-04-12 The parties submit a Joint Pretrial Statement outlining uncontested facts and issues for trial.

Step 2016-04-15 Evidentiary hearing is held before Judge David Talamante; Fisher’s counsel is present, but Fisher fails to appear.

Step 2016-04-21 HOA files its Application for Monetary Penalties seeking $9,165.25 and Application for Attorney Fees and Costs seeking $10,839.70.

Step 2016-05-11 Fisher files her Objection to the Application for Monetary Penalties, arguing lack of proper notice under A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

Step 2016-05-12 Fisher files a Response and Objection to the HOA’s Application for Attorney Fees and Costs.

Step 2016-05-25 HOA files replies defending its applications for fees and monetary penalties.

Step 2016-06-07 Judge David Talamante signs the final Order and Judgment, awarding the HOA injunctive relief, $3,850 in penalties, $10,839.70 in attorney fees, and $474 in costs.

Step 2016-06-23 HOA files a Petition and Declaration for Supplemental Proceedings to discover Fisher’s assets.

Step 2016-07-03 Fisher files her Notice of Appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Step 2016-07-26 The parties file a Stipulation to Post Supersedeas Bond of $15,163.70 to stay execution of judgment during the appeal.

Step 2016-08-09 Court signs the order approving the supersedeas bond stay.

Step 2016-08-30 Fisher deposits a cashier’s check of $15,163.00 with the court as a supersedeas bond.

Step 2016-11-21 Fisher files her Appellant’s Opening Brief in the Court of Appeals (1 CA-CV 16-0455).

Step 2017-02-08 HOA files its Appellee’s Answering Brief.

Step 2017-03-06 Fisher’s counsel J. Roger Wood files a Notice of Disbarment attaching his Judgment of Disbarment in case PDJ-2016-9132.

Step 2017-10-26 The Arizona Court of Appeals issues its Opinion affirming the injunction but reversing the monetary penalties and attorney fees.

Step 2017-11-01 HOA files a Motion for Reconsideration challenging the Court of Appeals’ opinion on fines and damages.

Step 2017-11-02 Court of Appeals denies the HOA’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Step 2017-11-27 HOA files a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2018-05-08 The Arizona Supreme Court grants the Petition for Review on reframed issues regarding ad hoc penalties (No. CV-17-0327-PR).

Type: Court/source PDF

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Type: Court/source PDF

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FAQ

Can an Arizona HOA impose daily fines on a homeowner without a written fine schedule?

No. Under A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), an HOA must establish and timely distribute a written schedule of penalties before imposing fines. In this case, the court ruled that failing to introduce the written fine schedule into evidence makes any assessed daily penalties ad hoc and per se unreasonable.

Does this Court of Appeals decision set a binding legal precedent for other Arizona HOAs?

No. Although the Court of Appeals issued a published opinion in 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court subsequently vacated its review and ordered the opinion depublished in July 2018. Therefore, this decision is non-precedential and cannot be cited as binding authority, though it remains highly persuasive regarding how courts evaluate ad hoc HOA penalties.

Can an HOA regulate or issue an injunction regarding the interior of a home?

Yes, but only under limited circumstances. Here, the court affirmed an injunction requiring the homeowner to replace dilapidated front-window blinds and move interior storage items back so the blinds could close. The court noted that because these conditions were ‘visible from neighboring property,’ they fell under the HOA’s authority to maintain community aesthetics under the CC&Rs.

What happens if a homeowner fails to participate in the trial court proceedings but appeals the decision?

The homeowner will likely lose on appeal. In this case, because the homeowner failed to attend the trial and her attorney did not object to the property maintenance allegations, the Court of Appeals held she waived her right to contest the injunction. Unpreserved arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Can an HOA recover its attorneys’ fees if its daily fines are overturned on appeal?

If an HOA’s fine award is completely reversed on appeal, it may lose its status as the ‘successful party’ regarding those monetary claims. Here, because the Court of Appeals reversed the monetary penalties, it also reversed the trial court’s award of $10,839.70 in attorneys’ fees to the HOA, and denied appellate fee requests for both parties as neither was wholly successful.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 16-0455
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 26, 2017
Judge / panel	Hon. Jon W. Thompson, Hon. Kent E. Cattani, Hon. Paul J. McMurdie
Parties	Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. Lynne A. Fisher (Defendant/Appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsFinesAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The trial court’s injunction ordering property repairs is affirmed because the homeowner waived her interior maintenance objections by failing to raise them below, but the award of monetary penalties and attorneys’ fees is reversed because the association failed to present competent evidence of a pre-existing, promulgated fee schedule.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	97 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	39 roadmap entries
Video overview	Turtle Rock III HOA v. Fisher
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association filed a lawsuit against homeowner Lynne Fisher in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging multiple ongoing violations of the community’s CC&Rs regarding her property’s maintenance. The violations included missing and damaged gates, weeds, and a wood-rotted garage door, alongside interior conditions and dilapidated blinds visible from the street. Following an evidentiary hearing where Fisher failed to appear but was represented by counsel, the trial court granted a permanent injunction ordering repairs and awarded the HOA $3,850 in monetary penalties, $10,839.70 in attorneys’ fees, and $474 in costs. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, holding that Fisher waived her objections to both the exterior and interior repairs by failing to raise them below. However, the court reversed the monetary penalties and attorneys’ fees because the HOA failed to introduce its written fine schedule into evidence, making the fines per se unreasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction because Fisher failed to object to the required maintenance items at the trial court level, thereby waiving her arguments on appeal. Additionally, because the hearing transcript was missing, the court presumed the record supported the trial court’s injunctive order regarding both the exterior repairs and the interior adjustments to her window blinds and personal property.

On the issue of monetary penalties, the court held that under state statute (A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)) and established precedent (Villas at Hidden Lakes), community associations must timely promulgate and prove a written schedule of fines before imposing monetary penalties. Because the Association failed to introduce its fine schedule into evidence during the trial, the daily penalties were deemed ad hoc and per se unreasonable.

Finally, because the monetary penalties were reversed, the associated award of trial-level attorneys’ fees was also reversed, and neither party was awarded attorneys’ fees on appeal because neither was wholly successful.

Why It Matters

This case establishes a critical limit on the enforcement and regulatory powers of Arizona homeowners associations, declaring that ad hoc fines are per se unreasonable. To lawfully impose monetary penalties, an HOA must adopt and document a written fine schedule before any violations occur and must be prepared to introduce the actual written policy into evidence in court rather than relying on oral testimony.

For homeowners, the case underscores the severe procedural consequences of failing to participate in trial court proceedings or raise timely objections, as unpreserved arguments are deemed waived on appeal. For legal practitioners, it serves as a reminder under the Best Evidence Rule that proving contractual damages or fine authority requires entering the original written policies directly into the record.

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Tierra Ranchos HOA v. Kitchukov: Reasonableness Standard and Burden of Proof in HOA Architectural Disputes

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

Architectural Control | A.R.S. § 12-2101 | 1 CA-CV 06-0474

This landmark case establishes how Arizona courts evaluate architectural control disputes between homeowners associations and their members. By adopting the Restatement approach, the court balanced the collective interests of the community against individual property rights. It highlights the heavy factual burden homeowners must meet when challenging a board’s aesthetic decisions.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Tierra Ranchos, Arizona Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 06-0474; reversed and remanded.

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Scope note: This page analyzes the Arizona Court of Appeals’ landmark decision concerning the judicial review of homeowners association design-control powers and architectural committee decisions. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a community association’s discretionary decisions regarding property modifications are subject to a standard of reasonableness, and the challenging homeowner bears the burden of proving that the association breached its duty. Because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the reasonableness of the Association’s disapproval of the garage’s location and the uniqueness of the lot, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Arizona corporation and homeowners association for the Tierra Ranchos subdivision; Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant in the action.
James E. Brown (Counsel)
James E. Brown, P.C.
Co-counsel representing Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association.
Paul G. Ulrich (Counsel)
Paul G. Ulrich, P.C.
Co-counsel representing Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association.
Pamela B. Petersen (Counsel)
Paul G. Ulrich, P.C.
Co-counsel representing Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association.

Respondent Side

Todor Kitchukov (Defendant)
Homeowner of Lot 6 in the Tierra Ranchos subdivision; Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellee in the action.
Mariana Kitchukov (Defendant)
Homeowner of Lot 6 in the Tierra Ranchos subdivision, wife of Todor Kitchukov; Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellee in the action.
Roger C. Decker (Counsel)
Udall, Shumway & Lyons, P.L.C.
Attorney representing Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees Todor and Mariana Kitchukov.
Bret A. Maidman (Counsel)
Udall, Shumway & Lyons, P.L.C.
Attorney representing Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees Todor and Mariana Kitchukov.
Erin H. Walz (Counsel)
Udall, Shumway & Lyons, P.L.C.
Attorney representing Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees Todor and Mariana Kitchukov.

Neutral Parties

Neal B. Thomas (Counsel)
Attorney listed on the appellate court mandate and Supreme Court transmittal service lists.
Philip Hall (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the Department D court opinion.
Diane M. Johnsen (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding judge of Department D on the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One.
Lawrence F. Winthrop (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge of Department D on the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One.
Barry C. Schneider (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial court judge who presided over the case in the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Division One.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court.
Mark Rolls (Other)
Tierra Ranchos subdivision lot owner whose prior request for a relaxed five-foot setback was rejected.

What happened

In late 2003, Todor and Mariana Kitchukov submitted plans to the Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee to construct a guest house and detached garage on their lot. The plans, which proposed an eighty-two-foot setback from the north property line and a five-foot setback from the west property line, were approved. However, the Kitchukovs subsequently modified the plans to relocate both structures closer to the northern boundary without resubmitting them to the committee. After construction began, the committee requested they resubmit the modified plans. On December 17, 2004, the Kitchukovs submitted the new plans, which reduced the northern setback of the garage to between five and fifteen feet. The Architectural Committee approved the relocation of the guest house but disapproved the garage’s new location, stating a desire to remain consistent with other approved structures in the neighborhood.

Despite the disapproval and subsequent fines of five hundred dollars per day imposed by the Association, the Kitchukovs resumed construction of the garage in April 2005. In response, Tierra Ranchos filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, while the Kitchukovs counterclaimed to declare the disapproval arbitrary and the fines invalid. After appointing a Special Master to perform a site visit, the trial court granted summary judgment for the Kitchukovs, ruling that the garage minimized its impact on neighbors due to its unique location and that the committee’s decision was arbitrary. Tierra Ranchos appealed, leading the Arizona Court of Appeals to reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Tierra Ranchos HOA v. Kitchukov (1 CA-CV 06-0474). Architectural-review discretion is judged under the governing documents and record, not board preference alone. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Tierra Ranchos HOA v. Kitchukov. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2003-12-02 Architectural Committee approves Kitchukovs’ initial plans in writing.

Step 2004-12-17 Kitchukovs submit modified plans showing reduced northern setback for the detached garage.

Step 2005-01-05 Architectural Committee disapproves modified location of the detached garage.

Step 2005-04-01 Kitchukovs resume construction of the garage without approval, prompting daily fines.

Step 2005-05-16 Tierra Ranchos files a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief in Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2006-01-27 Special Master files site visit report with the trial court.

Step 2006-03-27 Trial court reconvenes oral argument on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

Step 2006-05-23 Trial court enters signed judgment and award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the Kitchukovs.

Step 2006-08-04 Court of Appeals issues civil notice to counsel regarding docketing and appellant’s opening brief.

Step 2006-08-11 Tierra Ranchos pays appellant’s filing fee in the Court of Appeals.

Step 2006-08-14 Court of Appeals issues fee notice to appellees and sets deadline for answering briefs.

Step 2007-01-09 Court of Appeals orders Clerk of Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal.

Step 2007-01-24 Record inventory filed with Court of Appeals.

Step 2007-04-20 Court of Appeals issues Notice of Oral Argument.

Step 2007-05-30 Oral argument held; Court of Appeals takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2007-08-09 Court of Appeals files opinion reversing summary judgment and remanding the case.

Step 2007-08-27 Motion for Reconsideration is filed.

Step 2007-11-14 Court of Appeals denies Motion for Reconsideration.

Step 2007-12-12 Kitchukovs file a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2007-12-18 Record is transmitted to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

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FAQ

Is the Tierra Ranchos v. Kitchukov decision binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. This is a published, precedential opinion from the Arizona Court of Appeals, which means it serves as binding legal authority for all community associations, homeowners, and courts across Arizona.

What legal standard do Arizona courts use to review an HOA’s architectural decisions?

Arizona courts apply a standard of reasonableness based on the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13. Under this standard, a homeowners association has a duty to treat members fairly and act reasonably when exercising its discretionary design-control and rulemaking powers.

Who bears the burden of proof in an Arizona HOA architectural dispute?

The homeowner challenging the HOA’s decision bears the legal burden of proving that the association breached its duty to act reasonably, fairly, and in good faith.

Can an architectural dispute between an HOA and a homeowner be easily resolved by summary judgment?

Generally, no. The Court of Appeals emphasized that determinations of reasonableness, aesthetic harmony, and visual impact are inherently factual questions. Because reasonable minds can differ on these elements, they must typically be resolved at trial by a trier of fact rather than through a pre-trial summary judgment.

What was the final procedural outcome of the appeal in this case?

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the homeowners. The case was remanded back to the Superior Court for further trial proceedings to resolve the disputed factual questions regarding the garage’s aesthetic impact and the reasonableness of the board’s decision.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 06-0474
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	August 9, 2007
Judge / panel	Hon. Philip Hall, Hon. Diane M. Johnsen, Hon. Lawrence F. Winthrop
Parties	Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant) v. Todor Kitchukov and Mariana Kitchukov (Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellees)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-2101
Topics	Architectural ReviewCC&RsFinesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a community association’s discretionary decisions regarding property modifications are subject to a standard of reasonableness, and the challenging homeowner bears the burden of proving that the association breached its duty. Because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the reasonableness of the Association’s disapproval of the garage’s location and the uniqueness of the lot, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	11 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	22 roadmap entries
Video overview	Tierra Ranchos HOA v. Kitchukov
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This case arises from a dispute between the Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Association and homeowners Todor and Mariana Kitchukov over the placement of a detached garage. The Kitchukovs originally obtained approval for their plans but later altered the garage’s setback from the north property line from eighty-two feet to between five and fifteen feet without resubmitting the plans. The Association’s Architectural Committee disapproved of the relocated garage to preserve the openness of the subdivision and maintain uniform twenty-five-foot setbacks, subsequently fining the Kitchukovs five hundred dollars per day when they resumed construction. The Kitchukovs filed a counterclaim arguing the disapproval was arbitrary. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Kitchukovs. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, adopting the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes approach. The court held that community associations have a duty to act reasonably, and homeowners bear the burden of proving any breach of this duty. Because the reasonableness of the Association’s decision and the uniqueness of the property involved disputed factual questions, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the case was remanded.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals began by determining the appropriate standard of judicial review for a community association’s discretionary decisions concerning property modifications. In doing so, the court rejected both the highly deferential “business judgment” rule and the strict objective “reasonableness” rule where the association bears the burden of proof. Instead, the court adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13, which requires associations to act reasonably and treat members fairly, but places the burden of proving unreasonableness on the challenging member. The court noted this standard balances protecting collective community decision-making with safeguarding individual owners from improper management.

Applying this standard, the court concluded that summary judgment was improper because the reasonableness of the Association’s decision involved disputed issues of material fact. The trial court’s finding that the Kitchukov property was uniquely situated next to a canal and a ranchette, thereby minimizing the garage’s visual impact, was contested. The Association presented evidence that five other lots bordered the ranchette, and that its Architectural Committee aimed to maintain a uniform twenty-five-foot setback to preserve the “open look and feel” of the luxury subdivision.

Furthermore, the court observed that whether moving the garage would make it more visible to other residents was highly disputed, with conflicting affidavits from the homeowners and committee members regarding its current visibility. Because issues of reasonableness and visual impact are generally questions of fact for a trier of fact to resolve, the court held that a jury or judge must decide the case on its merits. Finally, because the summary judgment was reversed, the court vacated the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees to the Kitchukovs, deferring any fee award until the merits of the case are fully resolved.

Why It Matters

This decision establishes a critical legal framework in Arizona by adopting the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13 standard for HOA architectural disputes. For Arizona homeowners, it clarifies that while they are protected from arbitrary or capricious board actions, they bear the legal burden of proving that an HOA board or architectural committee acted unreasonably. For HOA boards and managers, the case emphasizes that discretionary design-control decisions must be executed reasonably, consistently, and in good faith to withstand judicial review. Boards should document the specific aesthetic or community-wide rationale behind their decisions to help demonstrate reasonableness if challenged.

For legal counsel, the ruling highlights that “reasonableness” in architectural and aesthetic disputes is generally a question of fact rather than a question of law. Consequently, parties cannot easily resolve these disputes through summary judgment, potentially leading to lengthy and costly trials. Attorneys must advise their clients-whether HOAs or homeowners-of the high financial risks of litigation in design-control matters and the strategic importance of developing a strong evidentiary record, including affidavits and consistent past enforcement practices, before entering court.

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Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini: First Mortgage Priority Over HOA Assessment Liens

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | 1 CA-CV 10-0142 & 10-0235

This landmark Arizona case demonstrates that HOA assessment liens cannot extinguish senior first mortgages or deeds of trust, regardless of when they are recorded. It also serves as a critical warning to HOA attorneys regarding their duty of candor to the court, particularly during ex parte hearings where all material facts must be disclosed.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Cypress on Sunland, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235; reversing reinstatement of default foreclosure judgment.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the absolute priority of first mortgages over homeowners association assessment liens and the standards for finding fraud on the court. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association’s assessment lien regardless of when the two instruments were recorded. Obtaining an ex parte default foreclosure judgment by concealing the existence of a senior first deed of trust and misrepresenting the priority of the HOA assessment lien constitutes a fraud upon the court, justifying setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(c).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

James V. Orlandini, II (Defendant)
Intervenor who purchased the property from the bank following the senior trustee’s sale.
First American Title Insurance Company (Defendant)
Intervenor and title insurer that issued the lender’s title policy on the senior first deed of trust.
HSBC Bank, USA (Defendant)
Assignee bank holding the senior first deed of trust on the property.
Scott A. Malm (Counsel)
Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C.
Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.
Ari Ramras (Counsel)
Ramras Law Offices, P.C.
Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.
David N. Ramras (Counsel)
Ramras Law Offices, P.C.
Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.

Respondent Side

Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that initiated the original lien foreclosure action.
Scott Jacoby (Plaintiff)
Subsequent buyer of the property who filed the quiet title action.
Derrick Spearman (Defendant)
Original homeowner who defaulted on homeowners association assessments.
American Lending Corporation (Defendant)
Original lender of Spearman’s first and second deeds of trust.
Robert Draper (Other)
Purchaser of the property at the HOA sheriff’s sale who later sold it to Scott Jacoby.
Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
Warren Nikolaus (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Attorney with Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. who wrote the January 2, 2008 letter.
Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Scott Jacoby.
Michael C. Lamb (Counsel)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Scott Jacoby.

Neutral Parties

Alliance Bancorp (Other)
Intermediate assignee of the senior first deed of trust.
Sheldon H. Weisberg (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the court’s opinion.
Donn Kessler (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge on Department B.
Diane M. Johnsen (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge on Department B.
Edward O. Burke (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial judge who vacated the default judgment and sheriff’s sale for fraud on the court.
Kirby D. Kongable (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior Court Commissioner / Judge Pro Tempore who consolidated the actions and reinstated the default judgment.
M. Scott McCoy (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior Court Commissioner who signed the original ex parte default foreclosure judgment.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued several civil notices and records orders.
Ruth Willingham (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk / Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued notices, opinions, and mandates.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who sent notifications regarding the denial of petition for review.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
Marcus Reinkensmeyer (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Court Administrator listed on various court notifications.

What happened

Derrick Spearman owned a home in Phoenix subject to the CC&Rs of the Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association, which were recorded in 2003. In 2006, Spearman obtained two loans from American Lending Corporation secured by first and second deeds of trust. Spearman subsequently failed to pay his HOA assessments. In April 2007, the HOA, represented by Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., filed a foreclosure lawsuit against Spearman and American Lending Corporation. The complaint failed to disclose that one of the loans was a senior first deed of trust and falsely asserted that the HOA’s assessment lien had priority over all other interests.

American Lending Corporation did not answer the complaint, having already assigned the first deed of trust. At an ex parte default hearing in June 2007, the HOA’s attorney obtained a default judgment declaring the assessment lien a ‘valid first lien’ and purporting to foreclose all other interests. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to Robert Draper for $5,599 (compared to its $190,000 appraisal value), who later sold it to Scott Jacoby for $110,000. Meanwhile, the assignee bank foreclosed its senior first deed of trust and sold the property to James Orlandini for $80,550. When Jacoby filed a quiet title action against the bank, Orlandini intervened and sought to vacate the default foreclosure judgment. Although Judge Burke initially vacated the judgment for fraud on the court, Commissioner Kongable later consolidated the cases and reinstated the judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed Commissioner Kongable, vacating the default judgment due to the HOA attorneys’ fraud on the court.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini (1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235 (Consolidated)). Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association’s assessment… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2003-01-15 Cypress on Sunland HOA CC&Rs are recorded in Maricopa County.

Step 2006-06-02 Derrick Spearman obtains loans of $190,400 (first deed of trust) and $23,900 (second deed of trust) from American Lending Corporation (ALC).

Step 2006-06-06 ALC assigns the first deed of trust to Alliance Bancorp via an unrecorded assignment.

Step 2006-06-08 First and second deeds of trust are recorded in Maricopa County.

Step 2006-06-12 First deed of trust is assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, as trustee (the Bank).

Step 2007-02-09 The HOA records a money judgment against Spearman in the amount of $748.21.

Step 2007-04-09 The HOA files a lien foreclosure complaint against Spearman and ALC.

Step 2007-06-04 Commissioner M. Scott McCoy enters an ex parte default judgment of foreclosure in favor of the HOA.

Step 2007-07-26 Robert Draper purchases the property at a sheriff’s sale for $5,599.

Step 2007-10-09 The successor trustee of the Bank notices a trustee’s sale to foreclose on the first deed of trust.

Step 2008-01-02 Attorney for the Bank/Wells Fargo writes to Maxwell & Morgan requesting confirmation of the first deed of trust’s priority.

Step 2008-03-15 Robert Draper sells the property by warranty deed to Scott Jacoby for $110,000.

Step 2008-05-22 The Bank obtains a trustee’s deed upon sale following the trustee’s sale foreclosure.

Step 2008-09-22 Scott Jacoby files a complaint to quiet title against the Bank.

Step 2008-09-26 James V. Orlandini purchases the property from the Bank for $80,550.

Step 2008-11-10 The assignment of the first deed of trust to HSBC Bank, USA is recorded.

Step 2009-03-15 James V. Orlandini and First American Title Insurance Company file a motion to intervene in the quiet title action.

Step 2009-07-22 Judge Edward O. Burke issues a minute entry granting the Intervenors’ cross-motion for summary judgment, finding fraud on the court, and vacating the default judgment and sheriff’s sale.

Step 2009-11-17 The court grants the HOA’s motion to consolidate the lien foreclosure and quiet title actions.

Step 2009-11-25 The Intervenors file a notice of change of judge and a motion to stay proceedings.

Step 2009-12-10 Commissioner Kirby Kongable denies the Intervenors’ notice of change of judge.

Step 2009-12-15 Commissioner Kongable enters a final order reinstating the default foreclosure judgment nunc pro tunc.

Step 2010-02-02 Commissioner Kongable enters an order awarding attorneys’ fees of $8,710 to the HOA as sanctions under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 12-350.

Step 2010-03-02 The Arizona Court of Appeals issues a Civil Notice to Counsel in 1 CA-CV 10-0142.

Step 2010-03-09 The Appellants’ filing fee in 1 CA-CV 10-0142 is paid.

Step 2010-03-15 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice to Counsel regarding Appellees’ fees due in 1 CA-CV 10-0142.

Step 2010-04-09 The Court of Appeals issues a Civil Notice to Counsel in 1 CA-CV 10-0235.

Step 2010-04-14 The Appellants’ filing fee in 1 CA-CV 10-0235 is paid.

Step 2010-04-15 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice to Counsel regarding Appellee’s fee due in 1 CA-CV 10-0235.

Step 2010-04-28 Clerk of the Court Philip G. Urry issues a letter notifying Jacoby’s counsel that his filing fee is past due.

Step 2010-06-02 The Court of Appeals issues an order directing the Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal.

Step 2010-12-03 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice of Oral Argument setting the consolidated cases for hearing on January 4, 2011.

Step 2011-01-04 The Court of Appeals hears oral arguments and takes both consolidated cases under advisement.

Step 2011-05-19 The Arizona Court of Appeals Division One files its Opinion reversing the reinstatement of the default judgment and the award of attorneys’ fees.

Step 2011-07-06 Division One transmits the record and Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2011-09-22 Counsel for the HOA files a Notice of Change of Address.

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2011-11-14_016_0000-civil-mandate-package.pdf

FAQ

Does an Arizona HOA assessment lien have priority over a first mortgage or deed of trust?

No. Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first mortgage or first deed of trust always maintains priority over an HOA assessment lien, regardless of when the mortgages or CC&Rs were recorded. An HOA cannot foreclose its lien to extinguish a senior first mortgage.

Is the Cypress HOA v. Orlandini decision binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. The decision was issued as a published opinion by Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. It serves as binding legal precedent across the state of Arizona.

What is ‘fraud on the court’ in the context of an HOA foreclosure?

In this case, the HOA’s attorneys committed fraud on the court by failing to disclose to the judge in an ex parte default hearing that the bank held a senior first deed of trust, claiming instead that the HOA’s assessment lien had absolute priority and requesting a judgment that purported to extinguish the bank’s interest.

What happens to a buyer who purchases a property at an HOA foreclosure sale?

A purchaser at an HOA lien foreclosure sale takes the property subject to any existing senior liens, such as a first mortgage or deed of trust. The buyer must satisfy the senior debt to avoid losing the property if the senior lender later forecloses.

Can an HOA recover attorneys’ fees from a non-owner who challenges a foreclosure?

No. The Court of Appeals ruled that statutory fee-shifting under A.R.S. § 33-1807(H) did not apply because neither party obtained a foreclosure judgment against each other. Furthermore, CC&R provisions allowing attorneys’ fees for collections do not apply to third-party purchasers who are not defaulting lot owners.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235 (Consolidated)
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	May 19, 2011
Judge / panel	Hon. Sheldon H. Weisberg, Hon. Donn Kessler, Hon. Diane M. Johnsen
Parties	Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association (HOA) and Scott Jacoby (subsequent purchaser) v. James V. Orlandini, II (purchaser under trustee sale) and First American Title Insurance Company (intervenors)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2) A.R.S. § 33-1807(E) A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) A.R.S. § 33-805 A.R.S. § 12-349 A.R.S. § 12-350
Topics	AssessmentsForeclosureProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association’s assessment lien regardless of when the two instruments were recorded. Obtaining an ex parte default foreclosure judgment by concealing the existence of a senior first deed of trust and misrepresenting the priority of the HOA assessment lien constitutes a fraud upon the court, justifying setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(c).

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	16 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	38 roadmap entries
Video overview	Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	2 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute over residential property in Phoenix, Arizona. A homeowner fell delinquent on HOA assessments, leading the Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association to file a foreclosure action. Although the property was encumbered by a senior first deed of trust, the HOA’s attorneys obtained an ex parte default judgment of foreclosure by asserting that the assessment lien was a superior ‘first lien’ that extinguished all other interests. A third party purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale and sold it to Scott Jacoby. Meanwhile, the bank foreclosed its first deed of trust and sold the property to James Orlandini. Jacoby filed a quiet title action, and Orlandini intervened to set aside the default judgment. The trial court initially set aside the default judgment for fraud on the court, but later reinstated it. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a first deed of trust has priority over an assessment lien regardless of recording dates, and that the HOA attorneys’ failure to disclose this priority in the ex parte proceeding constituted a fraud on the court.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals analyzed the plain language and legislative history of A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), rejecting the HOA’s ‘first-in-time’ argument. The court determined that ‘first’ in ‘first deed of trust’ designates the relative priority between mortgages or deeds of trust, not the timing of their recording relative to an HOA’s covenants. The 1997 statutory amendment explicitly removed the requirement that a first mortgage or deed of trust be recorded prior to the assessment delinquency to maintain priority, proving the legislature’s intent to keep first mortgages senior. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results where no lender would provide condominium or HOA home loans if they could not secure a first-priority position over assessment liens. Furthermore, the court held that deeds of trust are legally equivalent to mortgages under A.R.S. § 33-805, thereby subordinating the HOA’s assessment lien under both statutory law and Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs.

Regarding the fraud claim, the court emphasized that attorneys owe a strict duty of candor to the tribunal, particularly in ex parte proceedings under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 42, ER 3.3. The HOA’s attorneys failed to disclose that one of the encumbrances was a senior first deed of trust, failed to cite the statutory priority exception under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), and drafted a default judgment declaring the assessment lien a ‘valid first lien’ that extinguished the first deed of trust. The court concluded this was not an innocent mistake or excusable zealousness, as evidenced by a post-judgment letter in which the attorneys admitted they knew the first deed of trust had priority. Suppressing these material facts to obtain the default judgment compromised the court’s impartial functioning and constituted a fraud on the court, requiring the judgment to be set aside.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOA boards, this decision cements the absolute priority of first mortgages and deeds of trust over HOA assessment liens, providing clarity for real estate transactions, foreclosures, and mortgage lending. HOAs cannot extinguish a senior mortgage through an assessment foreclosure, and any attempts to claim absolute priority in court filings without legal basis are invalid and subject to severe scrutiny.

For legal counsel, the case is a stark warning regarding the duty of candor under ER 3.3, especially during ex parte hearings. Attorneys must disclose all material facts and adverse legal authority to the court. Misleading a judge or commissioner—even by omission or by presenting overly broad drafted orders—undermines the integrity of the judicial process, constitutes fraud on the court, and exposes counsel to disciplinary action and the loss of judgments.

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Hawk v. PC Village Association: HOA Sign Bans Preempted by Arizona Law

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Enforceability | A.R.S. §§ 33-441, 33-1808 | 1 CA-CV 12-0362

This landmark case illustrates the limits of HOA authority when community covenants conflict with state-mandated property rights. It establishes that legislative protections for homeowners override pre-existing CC&R provisions, even if those covenants were recorded before the statutes were passed.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Hawk, Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 12-0362; opinion affirming.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page details the factual background, key legal disputes, and the complete procedural timeline for the landmark Arizona case of Hawk v. PC Village Association. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A.R.S. § 33-441 applies prospectively to prohibit the enforcement of pre-existing covenants, conditions, and restrictions that restrict the display of ‘for sale’ signs, and such application does not violate the Contract Clause of the United States or Arizona Constitutions.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Robert R. Hawk (Plaintiff)
Co-owner of Pine Canyon Lot 197 who displayed a standard ‘For Sale’ sign on his property, initiating the dispute.
Cecilia J. Hawk (Plaintiff)
Co-owner of Pine Canyon Lot 197 and co-plaintiff/appellee alongside her husband Robert R. Hawk.
Tevis Reich (Counsel)
Law Office of Tevis Reich
Represented plaintiffs and appellees Robert and Cecilia Hawk throughout the trial court and appeal.
Richard V. Mack (Counsel)
Mack, Watson & Stratman, P.L.C.
Counsel who represented the Arizona Association of REALTORS® as amicus curiae in support of the Hawks.
Scott M. Drucker (Counsel)
Mack, Watson & Stratman, P.L.C.
Counsel who represented the Arizona Association of REALTORS® as amicus curiae in support of the Hawks.
K. Michelle Lind (Counsel)
Arizona Association of REALTORS®
General Counsel who represented the Arizona Association of REALTORS® as amicus curiae.

Respondent Side

PC Village Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Arizona non-profit homeowners association responsible for managing the Pine Canyon Subdivision.
Edward G. Hochuli (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Represented defendant and appellant PC Village Association, Inc. in both the trial court and on appeal.
J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Represented defendant and appellant PC Village Association, Inc.
Jonathan Confer (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Represented defendant and appellant PC Village Association, Inc.
Lori L. Voepel (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Appellate counsel who represented PC Village Association, Inc. throughout the appeals process.
Jonathan P. Barnes, Jr. (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Represented appellant PC Village Association, Inc. on appeal.
Warren Smith (Association President)
PC Village Association, Inc.
President of the PC Village Association who issued courtesy notices and signed the supersedeas bond on appeal.
T. Randall Bailey (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Sherri Slayton (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Randall Lee Hutchison (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Arlene McDonald (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Howard Sadkin (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Deborah S. Schweikert (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
James R. Schweikert (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Pamela S. Slayton (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
James D. Siragusa (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.
Patrick H. Stewart (Witness)
Pine Canyon resident who submitted an affidavit supporting the validity of the CC&R sign ban.

Neutral Parties

Hon. Mark R. Moran (Judge)
Coconino County Superior Court
Trial judge (Division 3) who granted summary judgment and awarded attorney’s fees to the Hawks.
Hon. Peter B. Swann (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who sat on the panel that heard oral arguments and decided the appeal.
Hon. Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge on the panel that heard oral arguments and decided the appeal.
Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge on the panel that heard oral arguments and decided the appeal.
Deborah Young (Other)
Coconino County Superior Court
Clerk of Coconino County Superior Court.
Ruth A. Willingham (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Division One.
Jonna E. Baker (Other)
Coconino County Superior Court
Certified Court Reporter who transcribed the oral arguments in the trial court.

What happened

In 2009, Robert and Cecilia Hawk purchased Lot 197 in Pine Canyon, a master-planned subdivision in Flagstaff managed by the PC Village Association. The community was subject to CC&Rs recorded in 2002 and amended in 2004, which contained a strict ban in Section 12.3 prohibiting any ‘For Sale’ or ‘For Rent’ signs on residential lots. In August 2011, the Hawks displayed a standard ‘For Sale’ sign on their lot to market their home. Citing the CC&R restriction, PC Village personnel entered the lot on two consecutive days and removed the sign.

In response, the Hawks filed a complaint in Coconino County Superior Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the sign prohibition was invalid under A.R.S. § 33-441 and § 33-1808(F). The Association counterclaimed and asserted that retroactive application of the statutes would violate the Contract Clauses of the Arizona and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Hawks, enjoining the Association from removing compliant signs and awarding the Hawks $21,820 in fees and costs. The Association appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on all grounds.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Hawk v. PC Village Association (1 CA-CV 12-0362). A.R.S. § 33-441 bars enforcement of certain old covenants only prospectively. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Hawk v. PC Village Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2009-08-25 Robert and Cecilia Hawk purchase Lot 197 in the Pine Canyon Subdivision.

Step 2011-08-16 Robert Hawk places a standard ‘For Sale’ sign on Lot 197.

Step 2011-08-17 PC Village Association personnel remove the sign and send a courtesy violation notice citing CC&R Section 12.3.

Step 2011-09-15 Plaintiffs Robert and Cecilia Hawk file their Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Coconino County Superior Court (Case No. CV2011-00775) and file a Certificate Regarding Arbitration.

Step 2011-09-27 Summons and Complaint are formally served on defendant PC Village Association, Inc.

Step 2011-11-01 Defendant PC Village Association, Inc. files its Answer, Counterclaim, Demand for Jury Trial, and Certificate of Compulsory Arbitration.

Step 2011-11-04 Plaintiffs file their Answer to Defendant’s Counterclaim.

Step 2011-11-10 Superior Court issues initial and amended orders setting a Case Management Conference.

Step 2011-11-15 Plaintiffs file their Motion for Summary Judgment.

Step 2011-12-16 Parties file a Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Respond to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Step 2011-12-19 Parties file an Amended Stipulation to Extend Deadline to Respond.

Step 2011-12-20 Parties file a Stipulated Motion to Continue Case Management Conference.

Step 2011-12-28 Superior Court issues an Order granting stipulation to continue the Case Management Conference.

Step 2012-01-03 Defendant files Response to summary judgment, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment challenging constitutionality of sign statutes, Notice of Claim of Unconstitutionality, and Statement of Facts.

Step 2012-01-17 Superior Court holds Case Management Conference and schedules oral argument.

Step 2012-01-25 Plaintiffs file Reply to Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Cross-Motion.

Step 2012-02-03 Defendant files Reply in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and service affidavits.

Step 2012-02-28 Superior Court holds Oral Argument on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2012-03-26 Superior Court issues Under-Advisement Ruling granting summary judgment in favor of the Hawks.

Step 2012-03-30 Hawks file Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Statement of Costs.

Step 2012-04-18 Defendant files Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

Step 2012-04-20 Hawks file Reply to Opposition, Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees and Costs, and Notice of Lodging Proposed Judgment.

Step 2012-04-23 Defendant PC Village Association, Inc. files Notice of Appeal in Coconino County Superior Court.

Step 2012-04-24 Superior Court Clerk issues Notice of Bond Posted for Costs ($500 cash bond) and Notice Re: Notice of Appeal Filed.

Step 2012-04-30 Superior Court holds Status Conference regarding attorney’s fees hearing.

Step 2012-05-11 Process server files Declaration of Service of subpoena duces tecum on defense counsel.

Step 2012-05-24 Hawks file Second Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees and Costs.

Step 2012-05-24 Superior Court enters Judgment in favor of the Hawks for $21,820 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Step 2012-05-24 Superior Court holds hearing, hears oral argument on attorney’s fees and Defendant’s Rule 62(C) Motion to Stay/Suspend Enforcement, and takes Rule 62(C) under advisement.

Step 2012-05-24 Superior Court issues Under-Advisement Ruling denying Defendant’s request to stay the injunction.

Step 2012-06-04 Court of Appeals Division One issues Civil Notice to Counsel regarding appeal filing fees and appellant opening brief deadlines.

Step 2012-06-13 PC Village Association, Inc. files Amended Notice of Appeal.

Step 2012-06-14 Appellant files Civil Appeals Docketing Statement and certificates of service for reporter’s transcripts.

Step 2012-06-28 Court of Appeals issues Notice to Counsel confirming appellant filing fee payment and reminding of brief deadlines.

Step 2012-07-10 PC Village Association, Inc. files Notice of Posting Supersedeas Bond ($23,211.04) in Coconino County Superior Court.

Step 2012-07-11 PC Village Association, Inc. files Unopposed First Motion for Extension of Time to File Opening Brief.

Step 2012-08-15 PC Village Association, Inc. files Appellant’s Opening Brief and Certificate of Compliance.

Step 2012-09-28 Hawks file Appellees’ Answering Brief and Motion for Oral Argument.

Step 2012-10-01 Court of Appeals Division One enters Order for transmission of Coconino County Superior Court record.

Step 2012-10-02 Arizona Association of REALTORS® (AAR) files Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2012-10-22 Appellant PC Village Association, Inc. files Response in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2012-11-05 AAR files Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2012-11-06 Appellant PC Village Association, Inc. files Appellant’s Reply Brief and Certificate of Compliance.

Step 2012-11-15 AAR files its Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2012-11-28 Appellant PC Village Association, Inc. files Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2012-12-17 PC Village Association, Inc. files Appellant’s Response to Amicus Curiae Brief.

Step 2013-01-07 Amicus counsel files Notice of Firm Name Change to Mack, Watson & Stratman, P.L.C.

Step 2013-02-07 Court of Appeals issues Notice of Oral Argument setting arguments for March 19, 2013.

Step 2013-02-25 Parties file Joint Request to Reschedule Oral Argument.

Step 2013-02-27 Court of Appeals issues Order resetting oral argument to April 16, 2013 at 9:30 a.m.

Step 2013-03-01 Parties file Joint Request to Reschedule Oral Argument (Second Request).

Step 2013-03-06 Court of Appeals issues Order resetting oral argument to April 16, 2013 at 2:00 p.m.

Step 2013-03-13 Court of Appeals Division One issues Notice and Amended Notice of Oral Argument.

Step 2013-04-16 Oral Argument held before Panel of Presiding Judge Orozco, Judge Swann, and Judge Cattani; case taken under advisement.

Step 2013-09-03 Court of Appeals Division One files its Opinion affirming the trial court’s summary judgment and attorney’s fee award.

Step 2013-09-13 Appellees Robert and Cecilia Hawk file Application and Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal.

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Download source file

2013-10-29_112_0001-certificate-of-service.pdf

Source 113 2013-12-13

0000 Civil Mandate Package

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2013-12-13_113_0000-civil-mandate-package.pdf

FAQ

Can an Arizona HOA enforce a complete ban on ‘For Sale’ signs if the CC&Rs were recorded before the state laws were passed?

No. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that A.R.S. § 33-441 applies prospectively to prohibit the enforcement of pre-existing CC&R bans on ‘For Sale’ signs. HOA boards cannot rely on the recording date of their covenants to bypass state laws protecting a homeowner’s right to market their property.

Does the state law preventing HOAs from banning ‘For Sale’ signs violate the constitutional protection against impairing contracts?

No. The court ruled that the sign statutes do not unconstitutionally impair CC&R agreements. Because HOAs are highly regulated and CC&Rs typically contain clauses acknowledging that community rules must comply with changing laws, homeowners have no reasonable expectation that a sign ban will remain enforceable indefinitely.

What are the size limits for ‘For Sale’ signs that an Arizona homeowner can display?

Under A.R.S. § 33-441, homeowners are permitted to display industry-standard signs and sign riders. The sign itself must not exceed 18 by 24 inches, and any sign rider must not exceed 6 by 24 inches.

Can an HOA still regulate how and where ‘For Sale’ signs are displayed?

Yes. While an HOA cannot ban ‘For Sale’ signs entirely or require the use of a specific, proprietary sign, it retains the authority to establish reasonable regulations regarding the placement and number of signs displayed, provided those rules conform to state statutory guidelines.

Is the ruling in Hawk v. PC Village Association binding precedent for all Arizona HOAs?

Yes. Because this decision was issued as a published, precedential opinion by the Arizona Court of Appeals, it establishes binding legal precedent that applies to all planned communities and condominiums throughout the state of Arizona.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 12-0362
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	September 3, 2013
Judge / panel	Hon. Peter B. Swann, Hon. Patricia A. Orozco, Hon. Kent E. Cattani, Hon. Mark R. Moran
Parties	Robert R. Hawk and Cecilia J. Hawk (homeowners/plaintiffs) vs. PC Village Association, Inc. (homeowners association/defendant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-441 A.R.S. § 33-1808 A.R.S. § 1-244 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-1831
Topics	CC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	A.R.S. § 33-441 applies prospectively to prohibit the enforcement of pre-existing covenants, conditions, and restrictions that restrict the display of ‘for sale’ signs, and such application does not violate the Contract Clause of the United States or Arizona Constitutions.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	113 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	58 roadmap entries
Video overview	Hawk v. PC Village Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Robert and Cecilia Hawk, owners of a lot in the Pine Canyon master-planned community in Flagstaff, Arizona, filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against their homeowners association, PC Village Association, Inc. The dispute arose in August 2011 when the Hawks displayed a “For Sale” sign on their property to market their home, and the Association removed it twice, citing Section 12.3 of the community’s CC&Rs, which prohibited such signage. The Hawks argued that A.R.S. § 33-441, enacted in 2009, and A.R.S. § 33-1808(F), enacted in 2007, superseded and invalidated the CC&R restriction. The Association contended that the statutes were inapplicable because the CC&Rs were recorded prior to their enactment and that retroactive application would unconstitutionally impair their contractual rights. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hawks and awarded them $21,820 in attorney’s fees and costs. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that A.R.S. § 33-441 prospectively applied to render the pre-existing CC&R restriction unenforceable, and that this did not violate the Contract Clauses of the federal or state constitutions.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals held that A.R.S. § 33-441 operates prospectively because it regulates future acts-specifically, the enforcement of a restriction after the statute’s effective date-rather than past transactions. Although the CC&Rs were recorded in 2002, the Association’s right to enforce the sign ban was contingent upon a resident actually displaying a sign. Since the Hawks posted their sign in 2011, several years after A.R.S. § 33-441 became effective in 2009, applying the statute to this future conduct did not constitute retroactive legislation.

Under the Contract Clause analysis, the court determined that the Association failed to show that A.R.S. § 33-441 substantially impaired any contractual relationship. The CC&Rs themselves expressly contemplated that the community rules might change or be affected by future laws, meaning the residents had no reasonable expectation that the sign ban would remain in effect indefinitely. Because the threshold of substantial impairment was not met, the court concluded there was no constitutional violation and declined to evaluate if the impairment was justified under the state’s police power.

Additionally, the court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the Hawks under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). It rejected the Association’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion, finding a reasonable basis for the fees as the Hawks were the prevailing party in an action arising out of contract (the CC&Rs), and the complexity and novelty of the constitutional and statutory issues justified the billing records.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOA boards, this decision establishes that state laws overriding community covenants apply to pre-existing CC&Rs, preventing HOAs from enforcing outdated restrictions on property owners’ rights. Specifically, associations cannot rely on the date of their CC&R recordation to bypass statutory protections regarding the display of ‘for sale’ signs or other legislative carve-outs.

For legal counsel, the case reinforces the principle that CC&Rs constitute contract-based rights where enforcement expectations are subject to statutory changes, meaning they do not easily qualify for Contract Clause protection. It also emphasizes that under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), prevailing parties in CC&R disputes are highly likely to recover substantial attorney’s fees, raising the financial risks for HOAs that engage in litigation to enforce invalidated rules.

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Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association: Procedural Milestones in an HOA Appeal

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

Procedure | A.R.S. § 12-322A | 1 CA-CV 04-0816

This case illustrates the complex procedural path of an Arizona homeowners association dispute on appeal. It highlights key milestones including docketing, record transmission, and the final mandate. Homeowners and boards can observe how appellate courts govern procedural compliance and cost recovery.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Vales, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 04-0816; mandate issued.

Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page covers the procedural history, timeline, and cost awards of the Arizona HOA appeal in Janet Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association, including its precedential posture. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and memorandum decision on December 22, 2005, and subsequently issued a mandate on March 29, 2006, commanding the Maricopa County Superior Court to comply with its decision and awarding appellate costs of $297.80.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Janet Vales (Plaintiff)
A married woman dealing with her sole and separate property; Plaintiff/Appellant.
Melody K. Seal (Counsel)
Jackson White PC
Represented Plaintiff/Appellant Janet Vales.
James L. Tanner (Counsel)
Jackson White PC
Represented Plaintiff/Appellant Janet Vales.

Respondent Side

Kings Hill Condominium Association (Defendant)
An unincorporated condominium association; Defendant/Appellee.
Michael A. Ludwig (Counsel)
Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC
Represented Defendant/Appellee Kings Hill Condominium Association.
Randall H. Warner (Counsel)
Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC
Represented Defendant/Appellee Kings Hill Condominium Association.

Neutral Parties

Hon. J. Richard Gama (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial Court Judge on Appeal.
Hon. Philip Hall (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge, Department D.
Hon. G. Murray Snow (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge, Department D.
Hon. Patricia K. Norris (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge, Department D.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of Court of Appeals, Division One.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor, Appeals Section, Maricopa County Superior Court.

What happened

Janet Vales filed an appeal (No. 1 CA-CV 04-0816) in the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, from a judgment of the Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2003-009786) presided over by Judge J. Richard Gama. The case was docketed in December 2004, with Vales paying the $140.00 filing fee on January 3, 2005.

Following the docketing, the Court of Appeals ordered the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal. The Superior Court compiled and transmitted a record consisting of one volume of instruments and minute entries, with no transcripts or exhibits, in April 2005. The appeal was submitted without oral argument to Department D, consisting of Presiding Judge Philip Hall and Judges G. Murray Snow and Patricia K. Norris, who took the matter under advisement in October 2005. The court issued an opinion and memorandum decision on December 22, 2005, and, after denying a motion for reconsideration, issued its mandate on March 29, 2006, awarding $297.80 in costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association (1 CA-CV 04-0816). The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and memorandum decision on December 22, 2005, and subsequently issued a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2004-11-30 A docketing statement was received from Appellant Janet Vales.

Step 2004-12-21 The index of record from the Superior Court was filed, and the case was assigned docket number 1 CA-CV 04-0816 in the Court of Appeals, Division One.

Step 2004-12-21 Clerk Philip G. Urry issued a Civil Notice to Counsel regarding the $140.00 filing fee deadline and the opening brief due date.

Step 2005-01-03 Appellant paid the filing fee of $140.00.

Step 2005-01-12 Clerk Philip G. Urry issued a Notice to Counsel setting the appellee’s $70.00 filing fee deadline and reminding appellant of the January 31, 2005 opening brief due date.

Step 2005-04-19 Court of Appeals issued an order directing the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal within 15 days.

Step 2005-04-27 Maricopa County Superior Court filed the inventory of the record on appeal, consisting of one volume of instruments and minute entries, and no transcripts or exhibits.

Step 2005-10-05 The Court of Appeals Department D ordered the appeal taken under advisement without oral argument.

Step 2005-12-22 The Court of Appeals filed its Opinion and Memorandum Decision.

Step 2005-12-22 Clerk Philip G. Urry transmitted the court’s slip opinion to West Publishing and LEXIS for immediate online availability.

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2005-12-21_006_0000-div-1-westmead-package-letters.pdf

Source 7 2006-03-29

0000 Div 1 Civil Mandate Package

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2006-03-29_007_0000-div-1-civil-mandate-package.pdf

FAQ

What is the precedential value of the decision in Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association?

The Court of Appeals issued both an ‘Opinion’ and a ‘Memorandum Decision’ on December 22, 2005. Under Arizona court rules, memorandum decisions are non-precedential, while opinions are published and binding. Because the mandate references both, parties must check which parts of the decision were officially published as precedential.

What is the penalty if an appellant fails to pay the filing fee on time?

If the appellant fails to pay the required filing fee ($140.00 in this case) within the timeframe specified by the court, the appeal will be deemed abandoned in accordance with A.R.S. § 12-322A.

How does the Arizona Court of Appeals obtain the trial court record?

Under Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (ARCAP) Rule 11(a)(3), the Court of Appeals issues an order directing the Clerk of the Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal (including instruments, minute entries, transcripts, and exhibits) within 15 days.

Can an HOA appeal be decided without oral argument?

Yes. If the appeal is deemed ‘at issue,’ the court may submit the case without oral argument. In this case, Department D took the matter under advisement after conference on October 5, 2005.

Are attorneys’ fees or costs awarded at the end of an HOA appeal?

Yes, the prevailing party on appeal can recover taxable costs. Upon issuing the final mandate on March 29, 2006, the Court of Appeals awarded costs of $297.80 to be complied with by the Maricopa County Superior Court.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 04-0816
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	December 22, 2005
Judge / panel	Hon. Philip Hall, Hon. G. Murray Snow, Hon. Patricia K. Norris, Hon. J. Richard Gama
Parties	Janet Vales (Plaintiff/Appellant, homeowner) vs. Kings Hill Condominium Association (Defendant/Appellee, unincorporated condominium association)
Topics	ProcedureCondominiums
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and memorandum decision on December 22, 2005, and subsequently issued a mandate on March 29, 2006, commanding the Maricopa County Superior Court to comply with its decision and awarding appellate costs of $297.80.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	12 roadmap entries
Video overview	Vales v. Kings Hill Condominium Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	2 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This appeal arises from a dispute between homeowner Janet Vales and the Kings Hill Condominium Association. Following a trial court decision in Maricopa County Superior Court under Judge J. Richard Gama, Vales appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. The appellate court docketed the case in December 2004, received briefing throughout early 2005, and ordered the transmission of the record on appeal. The matter was submitted to Department D (consisting of Judges Philip Hall, G. Murray Snow, and Patricia K. Norris) without oral argument and taken under advisement. On December 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals filed its opinion and memorandum decision. After denying a motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2006, and with no petition for review filed with the Arizona Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals issued its mandate on March 29, 2006, commanding the Superior Court to comply with its decision and awarding $297.80 in costs.

Key Issues & Findings

The available record for this matter is procedural rather than substantive: it documents the docketing, filing-fee deadlines, transmission of the record on appeal, submission of the appeal to Department D under advisement without oral argument, and the issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, and final mandate, but it does not reproduce the court’s merits analysis. Accordingly, this page summarizes the procedural posture and disposition rather than the substantive legal reasoning. The Court of Appeals resolved the appeal through a combination of a published opinion and a non-precedential memorandum decision, denied a motion for reconsideration, and then issued its mandate commanding the Superior Court to comply and awarding appellate costs.

Why It Matters

Because the substantive merits of the decision are not detailed in the procedural record, the primary takeaway is procedural. It highlights the structured, multi-step nature of the Arizona appellate process for homeowners and HOA boards, including strict deadlines for filing fees, the compilation of the record on appeal, the submission under advisement without oral argument, and the finality of the mandate. Additionally, it underscores that prevailing parties on appeal in Arizona HOA disputes can recover taxable costs (here, $297.80) upon issuance of the mandate.

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College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA: Enforceability of CC&R Non-Waiver Clauses and Property Access Rights

Posted on June 29, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs & Private Condemnation | A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) | 1 CA-CV 08-0450

This case illustrates the high legal threshold required to prove that an Arizona homeowners’ association has waived its CC&Rs. It also highlights how a landlocked property owner may still use statutory private condemnation to bypass restrictive covenants, provided they pay just compensation to affected owners.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: College Book Centers, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 08-0450; reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

Download the appellate opinion Download the appellate mandate Download the record index Source-file index FAQ

Scope note: This page details the Arizona Court of Appeals’ published, precedential decision regarding the enforceability of CC&R non-waiver clauses, the requirements for establishing common law implied easements of necessity, and the framework for statutory private condemnation of restrictive covenants. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the homeowners’ association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a seventy-six-lot subdivision did not constitute frequent violations, and the CC&Rs contained an enforceable non-waiver clause. It also held that Vanyo failed to establish a common law implied way of necessity because there was no historical evidence that the property was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

David B. Vanyo (Plaintiff)
College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trustee
Trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan and purchaser of Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim.
College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trust (Plaintiff)
The 401 profit sharing plan and trust entity holding title to Lot 24 and the landlocked Mamie Maude Mining Claim.
Jeffrey D. Gross (Counsel)
Gallagher & Kennedy, P.A.
Attorney representing the plaintiff/appellee David B. Vanyo and the College Book Centers Profit Sharing Plan.
Timothy Berg (Counsel)
Co-counsel representing the plaintiff/appellee David B. Vanyo on appeal and in the petition for review.
Valerie Biederbeck (Other)
Vanyo’s predecessor-in-interest who sold Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Vanyo’s pension plan.
Richard Biederbeck (Other)
Vanyo’s predecessor-in-interest who sold Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Vanyo’s pension plan.
James Farris Murphy (Witness)
Vanyo’s former real estate transaction attorney who testified at trial regarding pre-closing meetings and notice from the HOA.
Donald Duncan (Witness)
Licensed real estate appraiser called by Vanyo who testified on valuation and lack of financial impact of the road on subdivision lots.
Greg Gentsch (Witness)
Licensed professional engineer called by Vanyo who testified on the road design and infeasibility of constructing a road across the steep slope.

Respondent Side

Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association (Defendant)
The homeowners’ association for the subdivision, serving as the certified class representative of the subdivision lot owners.
John P. Dwyer, Jr. (Defendant)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Homeowner who initially opted out of the defendant class, participated individually at trial, and rejoined the class post-trial.
Janet G. Dwyer (Defendant)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Homeowner who initially opted out of the defendant class, participated individually at trial, and rejoined the class post-trial.
Thomas H. Crouch (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association.
Kevin T. Minchey (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association.
Kurt M. Zitzer (Counsel)
Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P.
Attorney representing the defendant/appellant Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association.
Ralph W. Applegate, Jr. (Association President)
Carefree Foothills Corporation
Original subdivision developer who drafted the CC&Rs and acted as the HOA board prior to its official formation; granted historical easements.
Denton L. Ingle (Other)
Carefree Foothills Corporation
Partner of developer Ralph Applegate, subdivision manager, original owner of Lot 43, and draftsman of the Thiele easement.
Barbara L. Ingle (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and co-owner of Lot 43 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Fo O. Buck (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and owner of Lot 42 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Deborah R. Buck (Other)
Subdivision homeowner and co-owner of Lot 42 who signed the reciprocal 1987 Applegate roadway agreement.
Jack Anderson (Board Member)
Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association
Subdivision homeowner, principal of Calver Capital, and Architectural Control Committee chair responsible for denying Vanyo’s road proposal.
Whitney Smelser (Witness)
Licensed Land Surveyor and expert witness called by the HOA who testified on historical physical access to the mining claims.

Neutral Parties

John A. Buttrick (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
The trial court judge who presided over the jury trial and entered final judgment in favor of Vanyo.
Michael J. Brown (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge who authored the court’s opinion reversing the waiver and implied easement claims.
Patricia A. Orozco (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding appellate judge on Department B who concurred with the court’s opinion.
Patricia K. Norris (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Appellate judge on Department B who concurred with the court’s opinion.
Philip G. Urry (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued docketing notices and orders to transmit the superior court record.
Ruth Willingham (Other)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued electronic notifications of the opinion and the final civil mandate.
Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
Arizona Supreme Court
Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who processed the petition for review and issued letters on the denial of review.
Heinrich J. Thiele (Other)
The Heinrich J. Thiele and Gertrude A. Thiele Trust
Co-grantee of the perpetual 1984 access and utility easement across Lot 7 to access an adjacent unsubdivided parcel.
Gertrude A. Thiele (Other)
The Heinrich J. Thiele and Gertrude A. Thiele Trust
Co-grantee of the perpetual 1984 access and utility easement across Lot 7 to access an adjacent unsubdivided parcel.
Jefferrey Rybarszyk (Witness)
Professional engineer whose deposition testimony was entered into the court record.
John Ratliff (Witness)
Developer of the adjacent Carefree Vistas subdivision who offered Vanyo a limited roadway easement for $50,000.
Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court.
Patricia Sanderman (Other)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Supervisor of the Appeals Section of Maricopa County Superior Court.

What happened

In March 2005, David B. Vanyo, acting as trustee of the College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchased Lot 24 in the seventy-six-lot Carefree Foothills residential subdivision in Maricopa County, Arizona, alongside an adjacent nine-acre rectangular parcel called the Mamie Maude Mining Claim. Lot 24 is subject to the subdivision’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which restrict lot use exclusively to single-family residential purposes and prohibit non-residential structures. Mamie Maude, which is not part of the subdivision, is bisected by a steep, impassable slope that prevents building a safe roadway connecting its elevated northern portion to its lower southern portion. Seeking to develop the lower portion into four residential lots, Vanyo’s predecessors-in-interest and later Vanyo himself proposed building a fifty-foot roadway across Lot 24 to connect the cul-de-sac of Languid Lane to Mamie Maude. The HOA rejected both proposals, advising that a roadway is a non-residential structure that violates the CC&Rs.

In August 2006, Vanyo filed a class action lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court against all subdivision property owners, naming the HOA as the class representative. Vanyo sought a declaratory judgment that the HOA had waived its right to enforce the CC&R restriction because it had previously permitted two roadway easements (the Thiele roadway in 1984 and the Applegate roadway in 1987) to cross subdivision lots. Vanyo also claimed he possessed a common law implied way of necessity over Lot 24, or alternatively, that he was entitled to privately condemn the CC&R restriction under Arizona’s private way of necessity statute (A.R.S. § 12-1202(A)). Following a trial in November 2007, the jury returned a verdict in Vanyo’s favor on the waiver claim without reaching the other two claims. The trial court entered judgment for Vanyo, awarded him $100,000 in attorneys’ fees, and denied the HOA’s motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and a new trial.

The HOA appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for JMOL. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of JMOL on Vanyo’s waiver and implied way of necessity claims. It held that the two prior roadway easements did not constitute frequent violations to establish a waiver, and that the clear non-waiver provision in the CC&Rs barred Vanyo’s waiver claim because the subdivision covenants had not been completely abandoned. The court also held that Vanyo failed to prove an implied way of necessity because he provided no evidence that Mamie Maude was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912. However, the court affirmed the denial of JMOL on the statutory private condemnation claim, remanding it for a new trial because the jury had never reached a verdict on whether removing the CC&R restriction was reasonably necessary and what just compensation was due. Vanyo filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on May 24, 2011, and the Court of Appeals issued its civil mandate package to the Superior Court on June 15, 2011.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA (1 CA-CV 08-0450). The homeowners’ association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 1912-04-01 The United States Government issues a land patent for the Mamie Maude Mining Claim to Charles W. Cheney and F.H. Summeril, severing it from federal land.

Step 1956-06-15 The United States Government issues land patents for adjacent property including what is now the Carefree Foothills subdivision.

Step 1983-11-23 CC&Rs containing a single-family residential use restriction and a non-waiver clause are executed and recorded for the Carefree Foothills subdivision.

Step 1984-09-12 Developer Ralph Applegate causes Carefree Foothills Corporation to grant a perpetual access and utility easement across Lot 7 to the Thiele Trust.

Step 1987-01-21 Lot owners (including Ralph Applegate) execute the Mutual Ingress and Egress Agreement and Easement over Lots 42, 43, and 44, which is recorded on April 2, 1987.

Step 2005-03-22 David B. Vanyo, as trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchases Lot 24 and the Mamie Maude Mining Claim.

Step 2005-11-14 Carefree Foothills HOA formally rejects David Vanyo’s written proposal to build a roadway across Lot 24 to access Mamie Maude.

Step 2006-08-08 David B. Vanyo files a putative class action complaint against Carefree Foothills HOA in Maricopa County Superior Court (Cause No. CV2006-011927).

Step 2006-11-02 Maricopa County Superior Court certifies the case as a defendant class action, appointing the HOA as the class representative.

Step 2007-11-13 A three-day jury trial begins in Maricopa County Superior Court.

Step 2007-11-20 The jury returns a unanimous verdict in Vanyo’s favor, finding the HOA waived enforcement of the CC&R single-family use restriction.

Step 2008-04-17 Maricopa County Superior Court enters final judgment in favor of Vanyo, declaring the CC&R restriction waived and awarding $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Step 2008-04-25 Carefree Foothills HOA files a post-trial Motion for New Trial or Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL).

Step 2008-06-24 Maricopa County Superior Court Judge John A. Buttrick enters an order denying the HOA’s motion for JMOL and new trial.

Step 2008-07-03 Carefree Foothills HOA files a Notice of Appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals and posts a supersedeas bond.

Step 2008-08-13 The Arizona Court of Appeals denies the HOA’s motion to challenge the supersedeas bond amount.

Step 2008-08-20 The Court of Appeals Division One issues a Notice to Counsel docketing the appeal as Case No. 1 CA-CV 08-0450.

Step 2008-11-10 College Book Centers / David Vanyo files Appellee’s Answering Brief.

Step 2008-11-18 Court of Appeals Clerk Philip G. Urry enters an order directing the Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal.

Step 2008-12-03 Clerk of the Court of Appeals files the Inventory of Record on Appeal.

Step 2008-12-05 Carefree Foothills HOA files Appellant’s Reply Brief.

Step 2009-04-01 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice of Oral Argument setting the hearing for May 5, 2009.

Step 2009-05-05 Court of Appeals Department B hears oral argument and enters an order taking the appeal under advisement.

Step 2010-10-26 The Arizona Court of Appeals Division One Department B files its Opinion, reversing the waiver and implied easement rulings but remanding the statutory condemnation claim for a new trial.

Step 2010-10-27 Court of Appeals Clerk sends electronic notification of the opinion filing.

Step 2010-12-30 David Vanyo files an untimely Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-11-0003-PR).

Step 2011-01-03 Court of Appeals Clerk transmits the Petition for Review and record to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Step 2011-05-24 The Arizona Supreme Court enters an order denying Vanyo’s Petition for Review, the HOA’s Amended Cross-Petition for Review, and both parties’ attorney fee requests.

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2011-06-15_012_0000-civil-mandate-package.pdf

FAQ

Is this Arizona Court of Appeals ruling binding precedent?

Yes, this is a published, precedential opinion by the Arizona Court of Appeals. It establishes binding legal rules across Arizona regarding the strict enforceability of CC&R non-waiver clauses, the high evidentiary hurdles for common law implied easements of necessity, and the framework for statutory private condemnation of restrictive covenants.

Can an HOA waive its right to enforce CC&Rs if it allowed past violations?

Generally, no, if the CC&Rs contain a clear non-waiver clause. The Court of Appeals held that an unambiguous non-waiver clause remains enforceable despite past violations unless the restrictions have been so thoroughly disregarded as to constitute a ‘complete abandonment’ that destroys the fundamental character of the neighborhood.

How many past violations are needed to prove that an HOA has waived a covenant restriction?

The court ruled as a matter of law that two historical roadway violations over a twenty-year period in a seventy-six-lot subdivision do not constitute ‘frequent’ violations. To establish waiver in the absence of a non-waiver clause, violations must be frequent, habitual, or regular, occurring often or at close intervals.

What must a property owner prove to establish a common law implied way of necessity?

The claimant must prove that the dominant and servient properties were under common ownership, followed by a severance, and that the landlocked property had no outlet at the exact time of that original severance. Silence regarding access in a 1912 federal land patent is legally insufficient to prove that the property lacked an outlet.

Can a landlocked owner condemn an HOA’s CC&R restriction to build an access road?

Yes. Arizona law allows a landlocked property owner to utilize statutory private condemnation under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) to condemn a restrictive covenant on an adjacent lot. Because this statutory right only arises if no common law implied easement exists, the court remanded this claim for a new trial to let a jury determine if the road is reasonably necessary and to decide the ‘just compensation’ owed to the subdivision lot owners.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 08-0450
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 26, 2010
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael J. Brown, Hon. Patricia A. Orozco, Hon. Patricia K. Norris
Parties	College Book Centers, Inc. 401 Profit Sharing Plan and Trustee David B. Vanyo (Plaintiffs/Appellees) v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ Association (Defendants/Appellants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1202(A) A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 33-416
Topics	CC&RsSelective EnforcementAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the homeowners’ association did not waive its CC&R restrictions because two prior roadway easements in a seventy-six-lot subdivision did not constitute frequent violations, and the CC&Rs contained an enforceable non-waiver clause. It also held that Vanyo failed to establish a common law implied way of necessity because there was no historical evidence that the property was landlocked when it was patented and severed from federal land in 1912.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	30 roadmap entries
Video overview	College Book Centers v. Carefree Foothills HOA
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This case arose when David B. Vanyo, as trustee of the College Book Centers 401 Profit Sharing Plan, purchased undeveloped Lot 24 within the Carefree Foothills subdivision and an adjacent landlocked nine-acre parcel known as the Mamie Maude Mining Claim. To develop the lower portion of Mamie Maude into residential lots, Vanyo requested the homeowners’ association’s (HOA) permission to build a short roadway across Lot 24. The HOA denied the request because the subdivision’s CC&Rs prohibited non-residential structures. Vanyo sued the HOA, claiming that the HOA waived this restriction by previously allowing two other roadways (the Thiele and Applegate easements), and that he was entitled to a common law implied easement or statutory private way of necessity. A jury found in Vanyo’s favor on waiver, and the trial court entered judgment with attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the waiver and implied easement rulings, remanding the statutory private condemnation claim for a new trial.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s reasoning on the waiver claim turned on the frequency of violations and the effect of the CC&R non-waiver clause. It concluded that two prior roadway easements granted in the 1980s did not constitute frequent violations in a seventy-six-lot subdivision to establish waiver of the non-residential structure restriction. Furthermore, the court held that the CC&Rs contained an unambiguous non-waiver clause that remained fully enforceable since the subdivision covenants had not been completely abandoned. Complete abandonment occurs only when restrictions have been so thoroughly disregarded that the fundamental character of the neighborhood has been destroyed, which Vanyo did not argue. The court also rejected Vanyo’s action versus inaction distinction, holding that both act as a failure to enforce that is covered by the non-waiver clause.

On Vanyo’s common law implied way of necessity claim, the court held that Vanyo failed to establish a prima facie case. Under Arizona law, a claimant must prove that the dominant and servient properties were under common ownership, followed by severance, that the dominant property had no outlet at the time of severance, and that access was reasonably necessary when severance occurred. The court found no evidence in the record establishing that Mamie Maude was landlocked in 1912 when the land patent was issued. Silence regarding access in the 1912 land patent was insufficient to prove the lack of an outlet, particularly since a historical 1909 survey depicted roads crossing the mining claims.

Finally, the court addressed the statutory private condemnation claim under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A). Because private condemnation only comes into existence if no other access exists by common law implication, Vanyo’s failure to establish an implied way of necessity cleared the path for statutory condemnation. Since the jury, having found for Vanyo on the waiver claim, did not decide whether removing the CC&R restriction was reasonably necessary for Vanyo’s proper use and enjoyment of Mamie Maude, or what just compensation was due, the court remanded the statutory private condemnation claim for a new trial.

Why It Matters

This decision is highly significant for Arizona homeowners’ associations, boards, and their legal counsel because it strongly reinforces the enforceability of clear and unambiguous non-waiver clauses within CC&Rs. The ruling establishes that an HOA’s prior failure to enforce a covenant, or even its affirmative granting of historical variances, does not constitute a wholesale waiver of those covenants unless the violations are so rampant as to completely destroy the neighborhood’s character. At the same time, it reminds associations that their discretionary design-control and enforcement powers are always constrained by duties of fairness and reasonableness, which protects members against arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

For property litigation counsel, the case highlights the high evidentiary hurdles required to establish a common law implied way of necessity in Arizona. Specifically, it confirms that silence in a century-old federal land patent is legally insufficient to prove that a parcel was historically landlocked at severance. Lastly, the case confirms that restrictive covenants represent valid property rights that can be privately condemned under A.R.S. § 12-1202(A), opening a potential, though costly, pathway for landlocked owners to acquire access by paying just compensation to all affected lot owners in the subdivision.

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