Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Nuisance Claims | A.R.S. §§ 12-2101, 12-341 | 2 CA-CV 2025-0008

Division Two affirmed summary judgment for Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, holding that everyday disturbances tied to community mailboxes, benches, and a bulletin board did not rise to the level of a private nuisance and that the homeowner’s punitive-damages claim failed without an underlying tort.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation, 2 CA-CV 2025-0008.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation (2 CA-CV 2025-0008) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals held that the homeowner’s allegations — slamming mailbox doors, vehicle stereos and idling, slammed car doors, headlights, smoking, yelling, and litter from community mailboxes, benches, and a bulletin board — described the ordinary annoyances of neighborhood life and did not establish a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, so summary judgment for the homeowners’ association on the private nuisance claim was proper; and because punitive damages require proof of an underlying tort, that claim failed as a matter of law as well.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Everett Huffman (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Self-represented (In Propria Persona), Florence, Arizona
Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Arizona non-profit corporation
R. Corey Hill (Counsel)
Hill, Hall, Stark, & Ferraro PLC, Scottsdale
Christopher Robbins (Counsel)
Hill, Hall, Stark, & Ferraro PLC, Scottsdale
Presiding Judge Kelly (Appellate Judge (authored the decision))
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge Sklar (Appellate Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge Gard (Appellate Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Hon. Robert Carter Olson (Trial Judge)
Superior Court in Pinal County

What happened

The Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association placed community mailboxes, two park benches, and a bulletin board near Everett Huffman’s house — described as beneath his master bedroom window — in 2014 and 2015.

After two earlier, unsuccessful rounds of litigation, Huffman filed a 2021 action that, following an appeal, proceeded on a 2023 second amended complaint alleging private nuisance, breach of quiet enjoyment, and punitive damages.

Magic Ranch moved for summary judgment, arguing the allegations did not establish a nuisance and that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

The superior court granted summary judgment for Magic Ranch, finding no substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference and that the original placement fell outside the two-year limitations window and was not a continuing tort.

Huffman, representing himself, appealed; the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and affirmed, holding the described disturbances were ordinary neighborhood annoyances and not an actionable nuisance, and that the punitive-damages claim failed without an underlying tort.

Magic Ranch, as the prevailing party, was awarded its costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation (2 CA-CV 2025-0008). The homeowner’s allegations — slamming mailbox doors, vehicle stereos and idling, slammed car doors, headlights… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-2015 Magic Ranch placed community mailboxes, two park benches, and a bulletin board near Huffman’s master bedroom window.

Step 2015 In a separate proceeding, Magic Ranch sued Huffman for breach of contract over alleged CC&R violations; Huffman counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and his counterclaim was dismissed (affirmed on appeal Nov. 22, 2019).

Step 2016 Huffman sued Magic Ranch and others (nuisance, breach of quiet enjoyment, IIED, fraud, NIED, FDCPA, and derivative claims), then amended to remove the nuisance claim; the amended complaint was involuntarily dismissed with prejudice (affirmed Oct. 17, 2019).

Step 2021-05-07 Huffman filed a new action against Magic Ranch alleging nuisance, breach of quiet enjoyment, negligence, and wrongful initiation of civil proceedings.

Step 2023-04-19 The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the negligence and wrongful-initiation claims but vacated dismissal of the nuisance claim, holding the 2016 judgment had no preclusive effect as to it.

Step 2023 After the mandate issued, Huffman filed a second amended complaint alleging private nuisance, breach of quiet enjoyment, and punitive damages tied to the 2014-2015 placement of the mailboxes, benches, and bulletin board.

Step 2023 Magic Ranch moved for summary judgment, asserting the allegations failed to establish nuisance and that the claims were time-barred.

Step 2024 The superior court (Hon. Robert Carter Olson) granted summary judgment for Magic Ranch on all claims.

Step 2026-04-21 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in an unpublished memorandum decision.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/huffman-v-magic-ranch-estates-homeowners-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-04-21

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals held that the homeowner’s allegations — slamming mailbox doors, vehicle stereos and idling, slammed car doors, headlights, smoking, yelling, and litter from community mailboxes, benches, and a bulletin board — described the ordinary annoyances of neighborhood life and did not establish a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, so summary judgment for the homeowners’ association on the private nuisance claim was proper; and because punitive damages require proof of an underlying tort, that claim failed as a matter of law as well.

Download source file

2026-04-21_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What did Everett Huffman claim against the Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association?

Huffman, representing himself, claimed private nuisance and breach of quiet enjoyment, alleging that the association’s 2014-2015 placement of community mailboxes, two park benches, and a bulletin board near his master bedroom window caused disturbances such as slamming mailbox doors, vehicle noise and headlights, idling, smoking, yelling, and litter. He also sought punitive damages.

How did the Arizona Court of Appeals rule?

The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment for the association. It held that the disturbances Huffman described were the ordinary annoyances of neighborhood life and did not establish a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, so the nuisance claim could not proceed.

What must a homeowner prove to win a private nuisance claim in Arizona?

A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another person’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct substantially, intentionally, and unreasonably under the circumstances interfered with the use and enjoyment of the property and caused significant harm. The law does not remedy mere trifles or the petty annoyances of everyday community life.

Why did the homeowner’s punitive-damages claim also fail?

Punitive damages require proof of an underlying tort and actual damages flowing from it. Because the court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted on the only tort claim (nuisance), the derivative punitive-damages claim necessarily failed as a matter of law.

Did the court decide whether the nuisance claim was barred by the statute of limitations?

No. Because the court concluded that Huffman had not alleged facts sufficient to establish a nuisance at all, it did not need to reach whether the alleged nuisance was permanent or continuous, or whether the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Is this decision binding legal precedent in Arizona?

No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision that does not create legal precedent and may not be cited except as authorized by applicable rules. It is provided here for educational purposes only and is not legal advice.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	2 CA-CV 2025-0008
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 21, 2026
Judge / panel	Presiding Judge Kelly (authored), Judge Sklar, Judge Gard
Parties	Self-represented homeowner Everett Huffman appealed against Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona non-profit corporation.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) (Court of Appeals jurisdiction) A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (appeal from final judgment) A.R.S. § 12-341 (recovery of costs by prevailing party)
Topics	ProcedureBoard Governance
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals held that the homeowner’s allegations — slamming mailbox doors, vehicle stereos and idling, slammed car doors, headlights, smoking, yelling, and litter from community mailboxes, benches, and a bulletin board — described the ordinary annoyances of neighborhood life and did not establish a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, so summary judgment for the homeowners’ association on the private nuisance claim was proper; and because punitive damages require proof of an underlying tort, that claim failed as a matter of law as well.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Everett Huffman v. Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association, an Arizona Non-Profit Corporation
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Everett Huffman, a self-represented homeowner, sued the Magic Ranch Estates Homeowners’ Association for private nuisance and breach of quiet enjoyment, alleging that the association’s placement of community mailboxes, two park benches, and a bulletin board near his master bedroom window in 2014 and 2015 caused ongoing disturbances such as slamming mailbox doors, vehicle noise and headlights, idling, smoking, yelling, and litter. He also sought punitive damages. After earlier rounds of litigation, the superior court granted summary judgment to the association, finding Huffman had not shown a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, and that the original placement decision fell outside the limitations period and was not a continuing tort. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed, holding that the everyday neighborhood activities Huffman described did not amount to an actionable nuisance and that his derivative punitive-damages claim necessarily failed.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Huffman, the court restated the elements of a private nuisance under Arizona law. A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and while the rules of a civilized society require neighbors to keep their activities within tolerable limits, what is reasonably tolerable must be tolerated. The law does not concern itself with trifles or seek to remedy the petty annoyances of everyday life, even when those annoyances are known to result. To prevail, a plaintiff must show conduct that substantially, intentionally, and unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of property and caused significant harm.

Applying that standard, the court concluded that Huffman’s catalogued complaints — slamming mailbox doors, blaring stereos, slammed vehicle doors, idling and vehicle smells, headlights shining into his window, people yelling, talking, meeting, and smoking, and trash from unwanted mail — described the activities and consequences of daily life among people living together in a neighborhood. Although potentially annoying or inconvenient, these behaviors by fellow homeowners were not illegal and did not rise to the level of a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference or cause significant harm. The superior court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on the nuisance claim.

Because the nuisance claim failed, the court did not need to decide whether the alleged nuisance was permanent or continuous or whether it was time-barred. The court further held that punitive damages require an underlying tort and actual damages flowing from it; with the only tort claim properly dismissed, the punitive-damages claim necessarily failed as a matter of law. The judgment was affirmed, and the association was awarded its appellate costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.

Why It Matters

This unpublished decision illustrates the limits of nuisance and quiet-enjoyment claims that homeowners bring against their associations. It shows that ordinary inconveniences flowing from shared community amenities — mailbox noise, traffic, headlights, smoking, and litter generated by neighbors using a common facility — generally do not amount to a legally actionable private nuisance. A plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial, intentional, and unreasonable interference causing significant harm, not merely annoyance, and a punitive-damages claim cannot survive once the underlying tort is dismissed. The case is a useful example of the ‘failed nuisance / quiet-enjoyment claim against an HOA’ category for homeowners weighing similar litigation.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Voting & Elections | A.R.S. §§ 10-3804, 10-3206 | 1 CA-CV 19-0341

How the Arizona Court of Appeals read a condominium association’s bylaws to determine when a valid board election occurred—and why a cancelled annual meeting meant no July election took place.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee, 1 CA-CV 19-0341.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 19-0341) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Robert Wollner (Appellant)
Association member and plaintiff below; appeared pro se (In Propria Persona), Phoenix. Claimed he was validly elected to the board in July 2017.

Respondent Side

Spanish Hills Condominium Association (Appellee)
Defendant condominium association; cancelled the July meeting and held the August board election under its bylaws.
Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Spanish Hills Condominium Association.

Neutral Parties

Lawrence F. Winthrop (Judge)
Presiding Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
David B. Gass (Judge)
Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who granted summary judgment for the association below.

What happened

Spanish Hills Condominium Association’s bylaws provide that at each annual meeting the members elect three directors for one-year terms, and that nominations for the board are made either by a Nominating Committee or from the floor at the annual meeting.

In 2017, the association gave written notice that its annual meeting, including a board election, was set for July 27, 2017, and that members could vote in person or by absentee ballot. Robert Wollner expressed interest in serving, and his name was one of three placed on the absentee ballots mailed before the meeting.

On July 24, 2017, the association cancelled the July 27 meeting after realizing the candidates on the ballot had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee, as the bylaws required. It reset the annual meeting for August 29, 2017, convened a Nominating Committee that nominated candidates, and mailed a new ballot. Wollner was not among the committee’s nominees and was not on the new ballot.

Wollner attended and participated in the August 29 meeting but did not object to the cancellation, the reset, the discarding of the original ballots, or his exclusion, and he did not nominate himself from the floor as the bylaws allowed. Three candidates on the new ballot were elected.

On September 18, 2017, Wollner filed a civil complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking to nullify the August election and a declaration that he had been duly elected in July. The same day, he filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, which led to appointment of an arbitrator.

After a June 6, 2018 hearing, the arbitrator ruled he lacked jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1)(A) because Wollner sought relief other than a money judgment, and referred the matter back to the superior court. The court later denied Wollner’s motions challenging the arbitration.

On cross-motions, the superior court granted summary judgment for the association on February 5, 2019, ruling that no election was held in July and that the annual meeting and election were properly rescheduled to August 29 in accordance with the bylaws. Wollner appealed.

On March 3, 2020, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Spanish Hills and awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a provision in its CC&Rs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 19-0341). Because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Date not specified Spanish Hills bylaws (Article IV, section 2; Article V, section 1) provide that directors are elected at each annual meeting and nominated by a Nominating Committee or from the floor.

Step 2017-07-27 Date originally set for the association’s annual meeting and board election; Wollner’s name was on the mailed absentee ballots.

Step 2017-07-24 Association sends notice cancelling the July 27 meeting after realizing the ballot candidates were not nominated by a Nominating Committee.

Step 2017-08-29 Rescheduled annual meeting held; three candidates nominated by a Nominating Committee are elected to the board. Wollner attends but is not on the new ballot.

Step 2017-09-18 Wollner files a civil complaint seeking to nullify the August election, and also files a certificate of compulsory arbitration.

Step 2018-06-06 Arbitration hearing held; arbitrator rules he lacks jurisdiction under Rule 72(b)(1)(A) because the relief sought was non-monetary, and refers the case back to the superior court.

Step 2018-09-18 Wollner files a motion for summary judgment.

Step 2018-10-22 Spanish Hills files a response and cross-motion for summary judgment.

Step 2019-02-05 Superior court grants summary judgment for Spanish Hills, ruling no July election occurred and the August election complied with the bylaws.

Step 2020-03-03 Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirms summary judgment for Spanish Hills and awards the association its fees and costs on appeal.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/wollner-v-spanish-hills-condominium-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2020-03-03

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.

Download source file

2020-03-03_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What was the dispute in Wollner v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association about?

Robert Wollner, a condominium association member, claimed he had been validly elected to the Board of Directors through absentee ballots mailed before a July 2017 annual meeting. The association cancelled that meeting and held a rescheduled August meeting with a different, Nominating-Committee-approved slate. Wollner sued to nullify the August election, but the courts sided with the association.

Why did the court find there was no valid July election?

The association’s bylaws provided that directors are elected “at each annual meeting.” Because the July annual meeting was cancelled and never held, the court concluded no valid election occurred in July even though absentee ballots had already been mailed. The election properly took place at the rescheduled August annual meeting.

Why did the association cancel the July meeting?

The association realized the candidates on the initial ballot had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee, as its bylaws required. It cancelled the July 27 meeting, convened a Nominating Committee, and reset the annual meeting for August 29, 2017, with a new ballot. Wollner was not among the committee’s nominees.

What happened with the compulsory arbitration?

Wollner himself filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, which triggered appointment of an arbitrator. The arbitrator later found he lacked jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1)(A) because Wollner sought non-monetary relief, and referred the case back to the superior court. The Court of Appeals held the arbitration was proper and denied Wollner’s request for compensation.

Who won and what did the court order?

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Spanish Hills Condominium Association. It also awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a provision in its CC&Rs, upon compliance with the applicable appellate rule.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 19-0341
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	March 3, 2020
Judge / panel	Lawrence F. Winthrop (Presiding Judge, author), Maria Elena Cruz, David B. Gass
Parties	Robert Wollner (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 10-3804(A)(2) A.R.S. § 10-3206(B)
Topics	ElectionsBoard GovernanceMeetings & RecordsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the association, holding that because the bylaws provide that directors are elected at the annual meeting and no July annual meeting was held, no valid July election occurred; the rescheduled August 29 election, conducted after a Nominating Committee selected candidates as the bylaws required, was valid.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Robert Wollner, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Spanish Hills Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Robert Wollner, a Spanish Hills Condominium Association member, sought a seat on the association’s Board of Directors after his name appeared on absentee ballots mailed before a July 27, 2017 annual meeting. The association cancelled that meeting when it realized the candidates had not been nominated by a Nominating Committee as its bylaws required. It reset the annual meeting to August 29, 2017, where a Nominating Committee’s slate was elected; Wollner was not on the new ballot. Wollner sued to nullify the August election and be seated as elected in July. He also filed a certificate of compulsory arbitration, and the appointed arbitrator later found he lacked jurisdiction because Wollner sought non-monetary relief. The superior court granted summary judgment for the association. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the bylaws provide for electing directors at the annual meeting and no July meeting occurred, no valid July election took place.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first rejected Wollner’s challenge to the compulsory arbitration. It emphasized that Wollner himself filed the certificate of compulsory arbitration that triggered the referral, and that under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 72 the arbitrator was properly appointed and had no choice but to proceed. When it became clear the relief sought was non-monetary, the arbitrator correctly referred the matter back to the superior court under Rule 72(e). Wollner cited no legal authority entitling him to compensation for the time or money spent in an arbitration he himself initiated, so the court declined to award any.

Turning to the merits, the court treated the bylaws as a contract between the association and its members, to be enforced as written when clear and unambiguous. The bylaws stated that “[a]t each annual meeting the Members shall elect three (3) directors,” so the election necessarily occurs at the annual meeting. Because Wollner conceded no annual meeting was held in July, there could be no valid July election even though absentee ballots had already been mailed. This reading also conformed to A.R.S. § 10-3804(A)(2), which provides that directors are elected at each annual meeting, and the bylaws’ Nominating Committee requirement was a permissible provision under A.R.S. § 10-3206(B) that the association was obligated to follow.

The court held that Wollner waived his argument that the association should be sanctioned for its July process because he cited no supporting legal authority, and it found no basis to award him costs where the association was the successful party. Declining his invitation to apply public-election-law principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, the court affirmed summary judgment in full and awarded the association its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under a fee provision in its CC&Rs.

Why It Matters

This decision illustrates how Arizona courts treat community-association bylaws as binding contracts and read election and annual-meeting provisions according to their plain terms. For condominium and HOA governance, it underscores that mailing absentee ballots does not by itself constitute an election when the governing documents tie the vote to an annual meeting, and that a board may need to cancel and reschedule a defective process to comply with nomination requirements.

The case helps fill in the condo-governance side of association law—how elections and annual meetings interact—and shows how a member’s own procedural choices, such as filing for compulsory arbitration, can shape the course and cost of the litigation. It is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential; it may be cited only as authorized by court rule.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee.: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Board Governance & Arbitration | A.R.S. §§ 12-1512, 12-349 | 1 CA-CV 24-0594

How a self-represented condo owner’s fiduciary-duty and quorum claims were resolved through dismissal, arbitration, and a strict appellate deadline—and why the association recovered its fees.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee., 1 CA-CV 24-0594.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee. (1 CA-CV 24-0594) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, holding that Gounder failed to file a notice of appeal within the 20-day window and, even if his filings were treated as a timely appeal, he made no adequate showing of any statutory ground—such as arbitrator partiality—to vacate the award.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Paul Gounder (Appellant)
Condominium owner (Plaintiff/Appellant) who sued his HOA; appeared self-represented (in propria persona).

Respondent Side

Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Appellee)
The condominium homeowners’ association (Defendant/Appellee) sued by one of its owners; prevailing party below and on appeal.
Charles D. Onofry (Counsel)
Schneider & Onofry, P.C.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Royal Riviera Condominium Association.
ReNae A. Nachman (Counsel)
Schneider & Onofry, P.C.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Royal Riviera Condominium Association.
Dee R. Giles (Counsel)
Schneider & Onofry, P.C.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Royal Riviera Condominium Association.

Neutral Parties

Randall M. Howe (Judge)
Vice Chief Judge; authored the memorandum decision for the Court of Appeals, Division One.
Brian Y. Furuya (Judge)
Presiding Judge; joined the memorandum decision.
David B. Gass (Judge)
Chief Judge; joined the memorandum decision.
Susanna C. Pineda (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge whose judgment confirming the arbitration award was affirmed.

What happened

In early 2023, Paul Gounder sued the Royal Riviera Condominium Association, the HOA for his community, in Maricopa County Superior Court. His complaint listed a range of grievances, including allegations that the association held meetings without a quorum, that it breached its fiduciary duty by “not enforcing the rules,” and that the HOA’s president and secretary were “in cahoots” and had “hijacked” the association.

The association moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint violated basic pleading rules and made it impossible to answer. The superior court agreed that the complaint did not comply with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed it, but gave Gounder leave to amend. His amended complaint raised functionally the same claims while adding requests for the maximum compensatory and punitive damages, liens against individual units, and a permanent ban on certain individuals serving on the board. The court dismissed several of these claims and the punitive-damages request.

The association then successfully moved to compel arbitration. Both sides submitted documents and attended the arbitration hearing, after which the arbitrator ruled for the association and awarded it costs and attorney’s fees. Gounder objected to the arbitrator’s notice of decision and later moved to sanction both the arbitrator and the association, but he did not file a notice of appeal from the final award within the 20-day period set by the rules. The superior court entered judgment confirming the award.

Representing himself, Gounder appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing that the arbitrator made procedural errors and was biased and that the superior court violated his due-process rights and possibly engaged in misconduct. Division One affirmed, concluding that Gounder had not timely appealed the arbitration award and, regardless, had not made the required showing of any statutory ground to overturn it. The court awarded the association its appellate attorney’s fees and costs but declined to impose sanctions.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee. (1 CA-CV 24-0594). Gounder failed to file a notice of appeal within the 20-day window and, even if his filings were treated as a timely… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Date not specified Early 2023 — Paul Gounder, an owner, sued Royal Riviera Condominium Association, his HOA, in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023-002759), alleging meetings without a quorum, breach of fiduciary duty, and that board officers had “hijacked” the association.

Step Date not specified The superior court granted the association’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding the complaint did not comply with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and granted Gounder leave to amend.

Step Date not specified Gounder filed an amended complaint raising functionally the same claims and seeking maximum and punitive damages, liens on individual units, and a permanent ban on certain board members; the court dismissed several claims and the punitive-damages request.

Step Date not specified The superior court granted the association’s motion to compel arbitration; both parties submitted documents and attended the arbitration hearing.

Step 2024-02-22 The arbitrator issued a notice of decision.

Step 2024-03-03 Gounder filed an objection to the arbitrator’s notice of decision.

Step 2024-03-18 The arbitrator filed the final award in favor of Royal Riviera, including costs and attorney’s fees; Gounder moved to sanction the arbitrator the same day, referencing the February 22 notice.

Step 2024-03-21 Gounder moved to sanction Royal Riviera.

Step Date not specified The superior court entered judgment confirming the arbitration award for Royal Riviera; Gounder appealed.

Step 2025-03-13 Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment confirming the arbitration award and awarded the association its appellate attorney’s fees and costs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/gounder-v-royal-riviera-condominium-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2025-03-13

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, holding that Gounder failed to file a notice of appeal within the 20-day window and, even if his filings were treated as a timely appeal, he made no adequate showing of any statutory ground—such as arbitrator partiality—to vacate the award.

Download source file

2025-03-13_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Who won Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association?

The condominium association won. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s judgment confirming the arbitration award in the association’s favor and awarded the association its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

Why did the owner’s appeal fail?

Primarily because it was untimely. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 77(b), a party must file a notice of appeal from a compulsory arbitration award within 20 days after the award is filed. The award was filed March 18, 2024, and none of Gounder’s filings—an earlier objection and later sanction motions—qualified as a timely notice of appeal.

What claims did the owner make against the HOA?

Gounder alleged, among other things, that the association held meetings without a quorum, breached its fiduciary duty by not enforcing the rules, and that board officers had “hijacked” the association. The courts never reached the merits of these claims; the case was resolved on pleading, arbitration, and procedural grounds.

What happened with the arbitrator-bias argument?

The court explained that a party claiming arbitrator partiality bears the burden of producing evidence of bias. Gounder offered no adequate evidence, and his objections—such as the arbitrator accepting hard-copy documents or once using an incorrect name for the association—did not show prejudice, so there was no statutory ground to vacate the award under A.R.S. § 12-1512(A).

Did the owner have to pay the association’s attorney’s fees?

Yes. As the successful party on appeal, Royal Riviera was awarded its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, upon compliance with the appellate rules. The court declined, however, to impose additional sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision. Under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 24-0594
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	March 13, 2025
Judge / panel	Randall M. Howe, Brian Y. Furuya, David B. Gass
Parties	Paul Gounder (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1512 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics	ProcedureBoard GovernanceMeetings & RecordsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitration award, holding that Gounder failed to file a notice of appeal within the 20-day window and, even if his filings were treated as a timely appeal, he made no adequate showing of any statutory ground—such as arbitrator partiality—to vacate the award.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Paul Gounder, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Defendant/Appellee.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Paul Gounder, an owner in the Royal Riviera Condominium Association, sued his HOA in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging that the association held meetings without a quorum, breached its fiduciary duty by not enforcing the rules, and that board officers had “hijacked” the association. The superior court dismissed his original complaint for failing to comply with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure but allowed him to amend. After the amended complaint, the court dismissed several claims and compelled arbitration. The arbitrator found for the association and awarded it costs and attorney’s fees, and the superior court confirmed the award. Representing himself, Gounder appealed, arguing procedural errors, arbitrator bias, and due-process violations. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Gounder did not timely appeal the arbitration award and, in any event, made no adequate showing of any statutory ground to overturn it. The court awarded the association its appellate attorney’s fees.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed the confirmation of an arbitration award for an abuse of discretion, emphasizing that judicial review of arbitration awards is severely limited. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 77(b), a party who participates in compulsory arbitration must file a notice of appeal within 20 days after the award is filed. The arbitrator filed the award on March 18, 2024, but none of Gounder’s filings functioned as a timely appeal: his objection was filed March 3—before the final award—and his motions to sanction the arbitrator (March 18) and the association (March 21) could not be construed as a notice of appeal. Because Gounder did not timely appeal, the superior court did not err in entering judgment on the award.

The court further explained that, even if Gounder’s motions were treated as a timely appeal, an appeal from an arbitration award requires an adequate showing of one of the narrow statutory grounds in A.R.S. § 12-1512(A). Gounder disagreed with the arbitrator’s findings and asserted bias, but the party alleging partiality bears the burden of producing evidence of it, and Gounder offered none. His complaints that the arbitrator accepted hard-copy documents and once used an incorrect name for the association did not show prejudice, because he had received the documents beforehand and both the award and the judgment used the association’s correct name.

The court also rejected Gounder’s contention that the superior court disregarded due process or engaged in misconduct, noting that he failed to support those allegations with references to the record as required by ARCAP 13(7). Affirming the judgment, the court awarded Royal Riviera its reasonable appellate attorney’s fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, but in its discretion denied the association’s request for sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349.

Why It Matters

This unpublished decision is a useful cautionary example of how condominium-governance disputes can go wrong procedurally for an owner acting without a lawyer. Gounder raised the kinds of concerns owners often have about their associations—meetings allegedly held without a quorum, claims that the board breached its fiduciary duty by not enforcing the rules, and assertions that officers had improperly taken control of the association—but the merits of those grievances were never decided on appeal. Instead, the case turned on procedure: a complaint dismissed for not following the pleading rules, an order compelling arbitration, and, ultimately, the failure to file a notice of appeal from the arbitration award within the 20-day deadline.

For owners and boards alike, the opinion underscores that even legitimate-sounding governance complaints must be pleaded properly, supported with evidence, and pursued within strict deadlines—and that the losing party in HOA litigation can face liability for the association’s attorney’s fees. It is not a homeowner victory, but it illustrates the practical importance of pleading standards, arbitration procedure, appellate deadlines, and the evidentiary burden for claims like arbitrator bias.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments | A.R.S. §§ 22-201, 12-341.01 | 1 CA-CV 24-0377

A homeowner argued a prior settlement order permanently excused him from HOA assessments. Division One explained why the order was a nullity and why the association’s contract-based fee award stood while the third-party defendants’ fees did not.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant, 1 CA-CV 24-0377.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant (1 CA-CV 24-0377) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A justice court’s 2014 order purporting to void all of a homeowner’s future HOA assessments was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, so the HOA was entitled to summary judgment and contract-based attorney fees on the unpaid assessments; however, the third-party defendants’ attorney-fee award was reversed because the tort claims against them did not arise out of the contract.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Michael A. Urbano (Appellant)
Homeowner and defendant below who appealed the summary judgment and the attorney-fee awards.
Ernest Collins, Jr. (Counsel)
The Collins Law Firm, PLLC
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Michael A. Urbano.

Respondent Side

Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association (Appellee)
HOA and plaintiff below; sued Urbano for unpaid assessments and prevailed on its contract claims at trial and on appeal.
Susan Smith (Defendant)
HOA’s property manager; third-party defendant sued by Urbano on tort claims.
AAM (Defendant)
Property management company; third-party defendant sued by Urbano on tort claims (collectively, with Susan Smith, the Third-Party Defendants).
Quinten T. Cupps (Counsel)
Vial Fotheringham, LLP
Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Lakewood Estates HOA.
Christina N. Morgan (Counsel)
Vial Fotheringham, LLP
Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Lakewood Estates HOA.
Deeann M. Barnes (Counsel)
Vial Fotheringham, LLP
Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Lakewood Estates HOA.
Andrew Apodaca (Counsel)
Goering Roberts Rubin Brogna Enos & Treadwell-Ruben, PC
Co-counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Lakewood Estates HOA.

Neutral Parties

David D. Weinzweig (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge who authored the memorandum decision.
Michael S. Catlett (Judge)
Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals panel; joined the decision.
Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge; joined the decision.
Timothy J. Ryan (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge whose orders were reviewed on appeal.

What happened

Michael Urbano purchased a house in the Lakewood Estates community in 2005. In doing so, he agreed to the recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) running with the property and promised to pay assessments used to maintain the community’s common areas.

In 2014, the Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association sued Urbano in justice court, alleging he had failed to pay assessments. The parties settled, and the justice court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. That 2014 order stated that any and all future liens, encumbrances, and assessments against Urbano would be deemed void and invalid.

Six years later, the HOA again sued Urbano in justice court for unpaid assessments. Urbano contended that the 2014 order and a confidential settlement agreement relieved him of any obligation to pay, and he counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, abuse of process, and punitive damages. The matter was transferred to the superior court.

While the lawsuit was pending, Urbano had an altercation with the HOA’s property manager over tree trimmings; police were called and a report was filed, but nothing further came of it. Urbano then asserted tort claims (harassment, defamation, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress) against the HOA and two third-party defendants — property manager Susan Smith and management company AAM — and added them to his abuse-of-process and punitive-damages claims.

The HOA and the third-party defendants moved for summary judgment, which the superior court granted. The court found the 2014 order void because the justice court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to relieve Urbano of all future assessments. After an evidentiary hearing, the court awarded attorney fees of $31,830 to the HOA and $83,413 to the third-party defendants.

Urbano appealed. The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the rulings voiding the 2014 order, granting the HOA summary judgment, and awarding the HOA’s fees, and it granted the HOA’s appellate fees under the CC&Rs. It reversed the award of attorney fees to the third-party defendants because Urbano’s tort claims against them did not arise out of the contract.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant (1 CA-CV 24-0377). Justice court lacked jurisdiction to void all future HOA assessments in a small-claims collection case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Date not specified 2005: Urbano bought a house in Lakewood Estates and agreed to the CC&Rs, including the obligation to pay HOA assessments.

Step Date not specified 2014: The HOA sued Urbano in justice court for unpaid assessments; the parties settled and the justice court entered the 2014 order dismissing the case with prejudice and purporting to void all of Urbano’s future liens, encumbrances, and assessments.

Step Date not specified 2020: The HOA again sued Urbano in justice court for unpaid assessments (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-010651 after transfer); Urbano invoked the 2014 order, counterclaimed, and later added tort claims against the HOA and third-party defendants Susan Smith and AAM.

Step Date not specified The superior court granted summary judgment to the HOA and third-party defendants, finding the 2014 order void for lack of jurisdiction, and after an evidentiary hearing awarded $31,830 in fees to the HOA and $83,413 to the third-party defendants. Urbano appealed.

Step 2025-03-06 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, filed its memorandum decision affirming in part and reversing in part.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/lakewood-estates-homeowners-association-v-urbano/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2025-03-06

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that a justice court’s 2014 order purporting to void all of a homeowner’s future HOA assessments was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, so the HOA was entitled to summary judgment and contract-based attorney fees on the unpaid assessments; however, the third-party defendants’ attorney-fee award was reversed because the tort claims against them did not arise out of the contract.

Download source file

2025-03-06_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Did a prior settlement or court order excuse Urbano from paying HOA assessments?

No. The 2014 justice-court order purported to void all of Urbano’s future liens, encumbrances, and assessments, but the Court of Appeals held that order was void because the justice court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant that relief. A void order is treated as a nullity, so it could not excuse him from paying assessments.

Why did the justice court lack jurisdiction to void future assessments?

Under A.R.S. § 22-201, justice courts can hear civil matters only when the amount involved is under $10,000 or when the dispute concerns the right to possess (not title to) real property. Declaring all of an owner’s future assessments void fit neither category, so the 2014 order exceeded the justice court’s authority and was void.

How did the CC&Rs affect the outcome?

The court treated the CC&Rs as a contract between the association and the lot owners. Because it was undisputed that Urbano agreed to the CC&Rs, failed to pay assessments, and had an outstanding balance, the HOA was entitled to summary judgment. Urbano’s claimed oral agreement could not override the CC&Rs, which required any amendment to the declaration to be signed by the president or vice president and recorded — which never happened.

Why was the HOA awarded attorney fees but the third-party defendants’ fee award reversed?

Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A), a court may award fees to the successful party in an action arising out of contract, and the HOA’s assessment dispute arose from the CC&Rs. The third-party defendants (the property manager and management company) were sued on tort claims stemming from an altercation over tree trimmings, which did not arise out of the contract, so their $83,413 fee award was reversed.

What was the final outcome of the appeal?

The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings voiding the 2014 order, granting the HOA summary judgment, and awarding the HOA $31,830 in fees, and it granted the HOA’s appellate fees under the CC&Rs. It reversed only the award of attorney fees to the third-party defendants.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by the rule.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 24-0377
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	March 6, 2025
Judge / panel	David D. Weinzweig, Michael S. Catlett, Daniel J. Kiley
Parties	Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. Michael A. Urbano (Defendant/Appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 22-201 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	AssessmentsAttorney FeesCC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding	A justice court’s 2014 order purporting to void all of a homeowner’s future HOA assessments was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, so the HOA was entitled to summary judgment and contract-based attorney fees on the unpaid assessments; however, the third-party defendants’ attorney-fee award was reversed because the tort claims against them did not arise out of the contract.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appella
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Michael Urbano bought a home in Lakewood Estates in 2005 and agreed to the community’s CC&Rs, which obligated owners to pay HOA assessments. After the HOA sued him for unpaid assessments in justice court in 2014, the parties settled and the justice court entered a 2014 order stating that any and all future liens, encumbrances, and assessments against Urbano would be void. Six years later the HOA again sued for unpaid assessments; Urbano invoked the 2014 order and a confidential settlement agreement, counterclaimed, and added tort claims against the HOA’s property manager and management company. The superior court found the 2014 order void for lack of jurisdiction, granted the HOA summary judgment, and awarded attorney fees to the HOA and the third-party defendants. On appeal, Division One affirmed the void ruling, the summary judgment, and the HOA’s fee award, but reversed the fee award to the third-party defendants.

Key Issues & Findings

Justice courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the authority statutes affirmatively confer. Under A.R.S. § 22-201, they may hear civil actions when the amount involved is under $10,000 or when the dispute concerns the right to possess (but not title to) real property. The 2014 order declared all of Urbano’s future liens, encumbrances, and assessments void — relief that is neither a monetary remedy under $10,000 nor a matter of possession — so the justice court exceeded its subject-matter jurisdiction and the order was void. A void order is a nullity, and the parties may proceed as though it had never been entered. Urbano’s new promissory-estoppel theory was waived because he never raised it below.

On the merits, to prove breach of contract the HOA had to establish a contract, a breach, and resulting damages. CC&Rs constitute a contract between the association and the individual lot owners, and it was undisputed that Urbano agreed to the CC&Rs, failed to pay assessments, and carried an outstanding balance. Urbano’s affirmative defense rested on the void 2014 order (a nullity, ineffective for any purpose) and an alleged oral agreement, but the CC&Rs required any amendment to the declaration to be signed by the HOA’s president or vice president and recorded, which never occurred. The alleged oral agreement therefore could not create a material factual dispute, and summary judgment was proper.

As to fees, A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) permits a court to award reasonable fees to the successful party in a contested action arising out of contract, and fees on tort claims only when the tort is so interwoven with the contract that it could not exist but for the breach. The HOA’s $31,830 fee award was within the court’s discretion, supported by consideration of relevant factors such as Urbano’s counterclaims and discovery, and no on-the-record findings were required. The third-party defendants’ fee award, however, had to be reversed: Urbano’s tort claims arose from his altercation with the property manager over tree trimmings, which was unrelated to the assessment/contract dispute. The court also granted the HOA its appellate fees under the CC&Rs but declined the third-party defendants’ appellate fee request for lack of a contractual or other basis.

Why It Matters

This decision illustrates that a settlement or court order does not necessarily eliminate an owner’s ongoing obligation to pay HOA assessments — especially where the order was entered by a court that lacked authority to grant that relief. Homeowners sometimes assume that one settlement, dismissal, or order permanently resolves future HOA charges, but here the 2014 justice-court order was treated as a nullity, and assessments continued to accrue and remain enforceable under the CC&Rs.

The case also highlights attorney-fee exposure. Because CC&Rs operate as a contract, an owner who unsuccessfully litigates an assessment dispute can be ordered to pay the association’s fees (here $31,830 plus appellate fees), while unrelated tort claims may not support a fee award against the party who brought them. For anyone relying on a prior agreement to avoid future assessments, the decision underscores the importance of ensuring that any change to assessment obligations is made through a valid, properly recorded amendment to the governing documents.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments | A.R.S. §§ 33-1256, 33-1247, 33-1803 | 2 CA-CV 2025-0183

Division Two affirms summary judgment foreclosing a condominium assessment lien, holding that an owner cannot self-help by withholding assessments even when alleging the association failed to maintain or repair the unit.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte, 2 CA-CV 2025-0183.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte (2 CA-CV 2025-0183) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. Any affirmative defense of setoff failed because the owner submitted only unsworn descriptions, photos, fire department reports, and county permits without authentication, and thus produced no admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 and Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a); self-representation does not excuse compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence. The 20% annual assessment-increase limit in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies only to planned communities, from which condominiums are expressly excluded under A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii), and A.R.S. § 33-1242 imposes no limit on assessment increases. The owner’s argument that assessments could not be charged while the property was condemned was not considered because it was raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay where the owner posted no supersedeas bond, did not move for a stay in the appellate court, and had not yet filed his contemplated damages action. Summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure were affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. (Party)
Travis L. Nolte (Party)
John J. Halk (Counsel)
Halk, Oetinger and Brown PLLC
Andrea J. Miska (Counsel)
Halk, Oetinger and Brown PLLC
Travis Nolte (Counsel)
In Propria Persona
Judge Sklar (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Presiding Judge Kelly (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge Brearcliffe (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
The Honorable Greg Sakall (Judge)
Pima County Superior Court

What happened

Travis Nolte purchased a condominium unit in Barcelona Manor in 2017, subject to a Declaration of CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments.

Nolte stopped paying assessments; in July 2022 the association recorded a lien notice for nonpayment and later obtained a money judgment against him for breach of contract.

Nolte alleged that since 2020 three floods and a fire (linked to a shared drainage pipe serving units above his) left the unit without drywall or cabinets and filled with mold, and that the county condemned the property between 2022 and 2024.

In May 2024 the association sued to foreclose its assessment lien; Nolte answered, contending he was excused from paying because the association failed to repair the property.

The association moved for summary judgment under A.R.S. § 33-1256(A) and the CC&Rs; Nolte argued he could withhold assessments until repairs were made.

The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on whether Nolte’s negligence allegations, if true, would create a legally recognizable defense or counterclaim, then granted summary judgment for the association.

Nolte’s motion for reconsideration was denied; his motion to stay collection was denied in the final order and decree of foreclosure; Nolte appealed.

The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed on February 10, 2026, and awarded the association its appellate attorney fees and costs under the CC&Rs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte (2 CA-CV 2025-0183). Condo owners cannot withhold assessments as self-help even when alleging association nonperformance. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017 Nolte purchased a condominium unit in Barcelona Manor, subject to the Declaration of CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments.

Step 2020 Beginning in 2020, three flooding incidents and a fire allegedly damaged the unit, leaving it without drywall or cabinets and filled with mold.

Step 2022-07 Barcelona Manor filed a lien notice for nonpayment of assessments.

Step 2022 The county began a roughly 28-month period (through 2024) during which the property was condemned due to fire and flood damage.

Step 2024-05 Barcelona Manor filed this action to foreclose its assessment lien in Pima County Superior Court (No. C20242617).

Step 2026-02-10 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure and awarded the association appellate attorney fees.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/barcelona-manor-association-v-nolte/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-02-10

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that a condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none.

Download source file

2026-02-10_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Can a condominium owner stop paying assessments if the association fails to make repairs?

No. The Court of Appeals held there is no self-help remedy that lets a condominium owner withhold monthly assessments, even if the association breached its statutory duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) to maintain, repair, and replace common elements. Nolte cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. An owner who believes the association breached its duties must pursue a recognized legal claim rather than simply not paying.

Why did the owner’s claim that the property was uninhabitable not defeat the foreclosure?

The court treated his theory as a possible setoff defense but held he failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact. To oppose summary judgment, a party must cite specific, admissible evidence. Nolte offered only an unsworn description of the damage, photos, fire department reports, and county permits, none of which were authenticated under Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a), so they were inadmissible and could not be considered.

Does the 20% annual cap on assessment increases apply to condominiums?

No. The 20% one-year limit on regular assessment increases in A.R.S. § 33-1803 is part of the statutory scheme governing planned communities, and A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii) expressly excludes condominiums from that scheme. The court also noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242 authorizes a condominium association to collect common-expense assessments but does not cap increases.

Why didn’t the court address the argument about assessments accruing while the unit was condemned?

The court declined to reach that argument because Nolte raised it for the first time in his motion for reconsideration in the trial court. Under Arizona law, an appellate court generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on reconsideration unless the facts or arguments were unavailable when the challenged ruling was entered.

Does representing yourself change the rules that apply?

No. The court emphasized that although Nolte was not represented by counsel, he was still required to comply with the rules of civil procedure and evidence. Self-represented litigants must, for example, authenticate exhibits and support disputed facts with admissible evidence just as represented parties must.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION. It does not create legal precedent and may not be cited except as authorized by applicable rules (see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c) and Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28). It is useful as an educational example rather than as binding authority.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	2 CA-CV 2025-0183
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	February 10, 2026
Judge / panel	Peter J. Eckerstrom Sklar (Judge Sklar, author), Presiding Judge Kelly, Judge Brearcliffe
Parties	A condominium association (Barcelona Manor Association, Inc.) sued to foreclose its assessment lien against a unit owner (Travis L. Nolte), who argued he could withhold assessments because the association failed to repair flood and fire damage that left his unit uninhabitable.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1256(A) A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) A.R.S. § 33-1803 A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii) A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(2)
Topics	AssessmentsForeclosureProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	A condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. Any affirmative defense of setoff failed because the owner submitted only unsworn descriptions, photos, fire department reports, and county permits without authentication, and thus produced no admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 and Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a); self-representation does not excuse compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence. The 20% annual assessment-increase limit in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies only to planned communities, from which condominiums are expressly excluded under A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii), and A.R.S. § 33-1242 imposes no limit on assessment increases. The owner’s argument that assessments could not be charged while the property was condemned was not considered because it was raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay where the owner posted no supersedeas bond, did not move for a stay in the appellate court, and had not yet filed his contemplated damages action. Summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure were affirmed.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Travis Nolte bought a condominium in Barcelona Manor in 2017, subject to CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments. After he stopped paying, the association recorded an assessment lien in July 2022, obtained a money judgment for breach of contract, and in May 2024 sued to foreclose the lien. Nolte argued he was excused from paying because the association allegedly failed to repair shared-drainage flooding and fire damage that left the unit moldy, gutted, and condemned by the county from 2022 to 2024. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and denied Nolte’s request to stay collection. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed. It held that Arizona law gives a condominium owner no self-help right to withhold assessments even if the association breached its maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); that any setoff defense failed because Nolte offered no admissible, authenticated evidence; that the 20% assessment-increase cap in A.R.S. § 33-1803 governs planned communities and does not apply to condominiums; and that his condemnation argument was waived because he raised it for the first time on reconsideration. The court also upheld the denial of a stay and awarded the association its appellate attorney fees under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Nolte, and addressed his three challenges in turn. On the central question, it agreed with the trial court that nothing in Arizona law lets a condominium owner withhold assessments as self-help. Even assuming the association violated its duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) to maintain, repair, and replace common elements, that statute supplies no remedy of nonpayment, and Nolte identified no other authority creating such a right. The court next considered whether his position could be recast as the affirmative defense of setoff, citing Granmo v. Superior Court. It assumed without deciding that setoff might be theoretically available, but held Nolte failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact because a party opposing summary judgment must support each disputed fact with specific, admissible evidence under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Nolte’s unsworn narrative, photographs, fire department reports, and county work permits were not authenticated under Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a) and were therefore inadmissible, and his self-represented status did not relieve him of compliance with the rules.

The court then rejected Nolte’s statutory cap argument. The 20% one-year limit on regular assessment increases in A.R.S. § 33-1803 sits within the statutory scheme for planned communities, and A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii) expressly excludes condominiums from that scheme, so the cap did not constrain Barcelona Manor. A.R.S. § 33-1242 was also unavailing because, while it authorizes a condominium association to collect common-expense assessments, it imposes no ceiling on increases. The court declined to reach Nolte’s argument that no assessments could accrue while the unit was condemned, applying the rule from RT Automotive Center v. Westlake Services that an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration absent newly available facts or arguments.

Finally, the court upheld the denial of a stay, reviewed for abuse of discretion. A defendant seeking to halt enforcement of a judgment may post a supersedeas bond under Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 7(a) or move for a stay in the appellate court under Rule 7(c); Nolte did neither, and he cited no authority allowing a stay to persist past issuance of the appellate mandate. Even assuming a stay were available, the discretionary factors from Apache Produce Imports and Tonnemacher did not favor Nolte because he had not yet filed a separate damages action and judgment had already been entered. As the prevailing party, the association was entitled to its appellate attorney fees and costs under Section 13.2(B) of the CC&Rs upon compliance with Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21(b).

Why It Matters

This memorandum decision illustrates, in the condominium context, a principle that closely parallels Arizona HOA assessment disputes: an owner generally cannot engage in self-help by simply withholding assessments, even when alleging that the association neglected its own maintenance and repair obligations. The court explains that the statutory maintenance duty (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)) does not carry a built-in remedy of nonpayment, and that an owner who believes the association breached its duties must pursue a recognized legal avenue and support it with admissible evidence rather than treating unpaid assessments as leverage. The decision also clarifies that the 20% annual assessment-increase cap in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies to planned communities, not condominiums, a distinction owners and boards frequently confuse. For self-represented owners, it underscores that the rules of civil procedure and evidence apply equally to them, that exhibits must be authenticated to be considered on summary judgment, and that arguments must be preserved (not raised for the first time on reconsideration) to be reviewed on appeal. Because the decision is unpublished, it does not create binding precedent, but it is a useful educational example of how Arizona courts approach assessment-lien foreclosures and condition-of-property defenses.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al.: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Enforcement | A.R.S. §§ 12-1832, 12-341.01 | 1 CA-CV 23-0437

Division One reaffirms that an Arizona HOA’s enforcement of its CC&Rs is discretionary unless the governing documents expressly create a duty to enforce.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al., 1 CA-CV 23-0437.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 23-0437) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

An HOA has no duty to enforce its CC&Rs against a violating owner unless the governing documents expressly obligate it to do so; La Glorieta’s CC&Rs granted enforcement powers but imposed no such duty, so summary judgment for the HOA was affirmed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Daniel Mason (Appellant)
Homeowner in La Glorieta subdivision; plaintiff who sued the HOA over a drainage obstruction.
Toni Mason (Appellant)
Homeowner and co-plaintiff/appellant with Daniel Mason.
Keith L. Hendricks (Counsel)
Moyes Sellers & Hendricks
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants the Masons.
Natalya Ter-Grigoryan (Counsel)
Moyes Sellers & Hendricks
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants the Masons.

Respondent Side

La Glorieta Homeowners Association (Appellee)
The defendant HOA; obtained summary judgment and a fee award, affirmed on appeal.
Yinong Chen (Appellee)
Neighbor two lots from the Masons whose lot allegedly obstructed drainage; denied summary judgment below (not part of this appeal).
Hongyan Shi (Appellee)
Co-owner of the neighboring lot with Yinong Chen; defendant/appellee.
Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee La Glorieta Homeowners Association.
Patrick Whelan (Counsel)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee La Glorieta Homeowners Association.
Hyung Choi (Counsel)
Choi & Fabian, PLC
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Yinong Chen and Hongyan Shi.
Veronika Fabian (Counsel)
Choi & Fabian, PLC
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Yinong Chen and Hongyan Shi.

Neutral Parties

Anni Hill Foster (Judge)
Presiding Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; authored the memorandum decision.
Brian Y. Furuya (Judge)
Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
Randall M. Howe (Judge)
Vice Chief Judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One; joined the decision.
Joan M. Sinclair (Judge)
Honorable Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court who granted the HOA summary judgment and the fee award below.

What happened

Daniel and Toni Mason own a home in the La Glorieta residential subdivision in Chandler, two lots away from a home owned by Yinong Chen and Hongyan Shi. A drainage swale runs in front of both properties, designed to route runoff from the Masons’ lot to an outlet grate on the Chen and Shi lot. In September 2014, a severe thunderstorm flooded the Masons’ basement, causing roughly $2,000 in damage. The day after, Mr. Mason found water still pooling and concluded an obstruction on the neighbors’ lot was blocking the flow.

Over the next several years the Masons tried to resolve the issue by talking to the neighbors, raising it at two HOA meetings, and filing a written complaint with the HOA. In mid-2019 the HOA’s counsel sent the neighbors a letter noting that work on their lot may have contributed to water backups up the street. City of Chandler officials told the Masons the HOA, not the city, was responsible for subdivision drainage, and a civil engineer the Masons hired reported obstructions in the swale on the neighbors’ lot. The home has not flooded since 2014.

In September 2020 the Masons sued the HOA, Chen, and Shi for breach of contract and declaratory judgment, claiming the neighbors’ pathway blocked drainage in violation of CC&Rs § 12.17 and that the HOA was required to enforce the covenants. The HOA moved for summary judgment; the superior court granted it and dismissed all claims against the HOA (the neighbors were denied summary judgment, and that ruling was not appealed).

After a procedural detour — the Court of Appeals initially stayed the appeal because the superior court had not yet ruled on the HOA’s fee request, defeating Rule 54(b) certification — the superior court denied reconsideration, awarded the HOA its attorneys’ fees, and entered final judgment. The Masons appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the CC&Rs gave the HOA enforcement power but no duty to enforce.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 23-0437). An HOA has no duty to enforce its CC&Rs against a violating owner unless the governing documents expressly obligate… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-09 A severe thunderstorm flooded the Masons’ basement, causing about $2,000 in damage; Mr. Mason concluded an obstruction on the neighbors’ lot was blocking drainage.

Step 2019 The HOA’s counsel sent Chen and Shi a letter stating work done to their lot may have contributed to water backups on lots up the street (mid-2019).

Step 2020 The Masons hired a civil engineer whose report found obstructions in the drainage swale on Chen and Shi’s lot (late 2019 or early 2020).

Step 2020-09 The Masons sued the HOA, Chen, and Shi for breach of contract and declaratory judgment, alleging a violation of CC&Rs § 12.17.

Step 2022-03 The superior court entered judgment for the HOA and certified it under Rule 54(b); the Masons appealed.

Step 2022-12 The Court of Appeals stayed the appeal and reinstated superior court jurisdiction because the HOA’s fee request was unresolved, defeating Rule 54(b) certification.

Step 2023-05 The superior court denied the Masons’ motion for reconsideration and awarded the HOA its attorneys’ fees.

Step 2023-06 The superior court entered final judgment; the Masons timely appealed.

Step 2024-04-02 The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the judgment in favor of the HOA.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/mason-v-la-glorieta-homeowners-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2024-04-02

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that an HOA has no duty to enforce its CC&Rs against a violating owner unless the governing documents expressly obligate it to do so; La Glorieta’s CC&Rs granted enforcement powers but imposed no such duty, so summary judgment for the HOA was affirmed.

Download source file

2024-04-02_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What was Mason v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association about?

Two La Glorieta homeowners, the Masons, sued their HOA and two neighbors after a 2014 storm flooded their basement. They alleged an obstruction on the neighbors’ lot violated the CC&Rs’ drainage provision (§ 12.17) and claimed the HOA was contractually required to enforce the CC&Rs against the neighbors. They sought damages for breach of contract and a declaratory judgment.

What did the Arizona Court of Appeals decide?

The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the HOA. It held that while the CC&Rs gave the HOA the power to enforce its covenants, none of the provisions required the HOA to exercise that power. With no duty to enforce, the breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment claims both failed as a matter of law.

Does an Arizona HOA have to enforce its CC&Rs?

Not automatically. The court reaffirmed that under Arizona law — citing Tierra Ranchos v. Kitchukov and the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13 — enforcement is a discretionary power. An HOA must act reasonably in exercising that discretion, but it has no duty to enforce a particular violation unless the governing documents expressly obligate it to do so.

Why did the homeowners’ reliance on the CC&R language fail?

The court read every enforcement-related provision (the recitals and §§ 4.7, 12.21, 15.1, and 15.3) and found each one used permissive, power-granting language such as ‘may enter’ or ‘shall have the power to file an action.’ None imposed a mandatory duty. Because the language was unambiguous, there was no room to interpret an implied enforcement obligation into the CC&Rs.

The trial court misread one CC&R section — why didn’t that change the result?

The superior court had treated § 4.5 as disclaiming HOA liability for drainage, but the appellate court found § 4.5 created two separate easements and its disclaimer reached only landscaping, not drainage. The error was harmless because the Masons were not asking the HOA to maintain landscaping; they were asking it to enforce a violation, which remained discretionary either way.

Who paid attorneys’ fees in the case?

The Masons. As the prevailing party in a contract dispute, the HOA was awarded its attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. The appellate court also granted the HOA its fees on appeal and denied the Masons’ fee request as the non-prevailing party.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 23-0437
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 2, 2024
Judge / panel	Anni Hill Foster, Brian Y. Furuya, Randall M. Howe
Parties	Daniel and Toni Mason (Plaintiffs/Appellants) v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association (Defendant/Appellee)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1832 A.R.S. § 12-1842 A.R.S. § 12-341 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	An HOA has no duty to enforce its CC&Rs against a violating owner unless the governing documents expressly obligate it to do so; La Glorieta’s CC&Rs granted enforcement powers but imposed no such duty, so summary judgment for the HOA was affirmed.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Two homeowners in the La Glorieta subdivision sued their HOA (and two neighbors) after a 2014 storm flooded their basement, alleging an obstruction on the neighbors’ lot violated the CC&Rs’ drainage provision (§ 12.17). The homeowners claimed the HOA was contractually required to enforce the CC&Rs against the neighbors and sought both breach-of-contract damages and a declaratory judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the HOA and awarded it attorneys’ fees. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. Reviewing the CC&Rs de novo, the court held that although several provisions gave the HOA the power to enforce its covenants, none obligated it to do so. Under Arizona law, an HOA’s enforcement of its CC&Rs is discretionary unless the governing documents expressly create a duty to enforce. Because no such duty existed, both the contract and declaratory-judgment claims failed as a matter of law, and the fee award stood.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed the summary-judgment ruling and the interpretation of the CC&Rs de novo, treating the recorded covenants as a contract. It examined every CC&R provision addressing enforcement — the recitals, the § 4.7 easement for investigating and correcting violations, § 12.21 (the HOA “may” enter a lot and correct a violation at the owner’s expense), § 15.1, and § 15.3 (the HOA “shall have the power to file an action”). Each provision granted the association authority to act, but none required it to exercise that authority. That absence of a mandatory duty was fatal to the homeowners’ claims.

The court corrected one point in the HOA’s favor’s analysis: the superior court had read § 4.5 as disclaiming HOA liability for drainage, but the appellate court found § 4.5 created two distinct easements (landscape and drainage) and its disclaimer language reached only the landscape easement. That interpretive error was harmless, however, because the homeowners were not asking the HOA to install or maintain landscaping — they were asking it to enforce an alleged violation, which remained discretionary. The court also distinguished Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista N. Townhomes Ass’n (which involved CC&Rs with an express enforcement duty) and reaffirmed, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov and the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13, that discretionary enforcement is the default rule in Arizona.

Because the CC&Rs’ language was unambiguous and imposed no duty to enforce, the breach-of-contract claim failed for lack of any breach, and the declaratory-judgment claim failed because the homeowners had no corresponding right to compel enforcement. Finally, the court held the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the prevailing HOA its fees and costs under A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, and it granted the HOA its appellate fees while denying the homeowners’ request.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces a recurring principle in Arizona community-association law: language that gives an HOA the power to enforce its CC&Rs (“may enter,” “shall have the power to file an action”) is not the same as language requiring it to enforce. Absent an express, mandatory duty in the governing documents, enforcement is discretionary, and a homeowner generally cannot force the HOA to pursue a neighbor over an alleged violation.

It complements Johnson v. The Pointe and Tierra Ranchos v. Kitchukov, which likewise frame HOA enforcement as a discretionary power the board must exercise reasonably rather than a duty owed to any individual owner. Homeowners frequently sue on the theory that the HOA “must” act against a neighbor; Mason illustrates that such claims typically fail unless the CC&Rs create a specific enforcement obligation — and that a losing homeowner in a CC&R contract dispute can be ordered to pay the association’s attorneys’ fees.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Common-Area Costs | A.R.S. §§ 12-341, 12-341.01 | 2 CA-CV 2024-0314

An Arizona active-adult community sued homeowners to make them pay half the cost of repairing a wall between the common area and their lots. The Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the homeowners, holding the wall is part of the common area the association must maintain and that a committee-adopted guideline could not shift those costs in conflict with the recorded CC&Rs.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: SUNDANCE ADULT VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BILL ELLIOTT AND MARY ELLIOTT, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT C. LAMB AND SHARON R. LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AKA ROBERT LAMB AND SHARON LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE; HELEN J. HORNE AND EDWARD L. HORNE, WIFE AND HUSBAND AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP; JASON JOSEPH, A SINGLE MAN; MIKE MARTIN, AN UNMARRIED MAN; KATHLEEN LAMONT, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; LELAND PINNEY, AN UNMARRIED MAN; CAROLINA ALCALA, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; DAVID H. OTIS AND LEANN K. OTIS, TRUSTEES OF THE DAVE AND LEANN OTIS FAMILY TRUST, DATED MARCH 27, 2008, Defendants/Appellees., 2 CA-CV 2024-0314.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers SUNDANCE ADULT VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BILL ELLIOTT AND MARY ELLIOTT, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT C. LAMB AND SHARON R. LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AKA ROBERT LAMB AND SHARON LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE; HELEN J. HORNE AND EDWARD L. HORNE, WIFE AND HUSBAND AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP; JASON JOSEPH, A SINGLE MAN; MIKE MARTIN, AN UNMARRIED MAN; KATHLEEN LAMONT, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; LELAND PINNEY, AN UNMARRIED MAN; CAROLINA ALCALA, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; DAVID H. OTIS AND LEANN K. OTIS, TRUSTEES OF THE DAVE AND LEANN OTIS FAMILY TRUST, DATED MARCH 27, 2008, Defendants/Appellees. (2 CA-CV 2024-0314) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Court of Appeals held that the wall is a structure located on the common area under Section 1.17 of the Declaration, so Section 5.01 makes the Association responsible for repairing the entire wall absent proof that the homeowners caused the damage; the conflicting 2012 Architectural Committee guideline shifting repair costs to owners could not be enforced because it would effectively amend the Declaration without the required 75% vote, and the Architectural Committee lacked authority to impose new financial obligations not found in the original Declaration. Affirmed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Arizona homeowners association governing the active-adult residential community in Buckeye, Arizona; Plaintiff/Appellant.
Lauren Elliott Stine (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association.
Kristin N. Leaptrott (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association.

Respondent Side

Bill Elliott (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Husband of Mary Elliott.
Mary Elliott (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Wife of Bill Elliott.
Robert C. Lamb (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Also known as Robert Lamb. Husband of Sharon R. Lamb.
Sharon R. Lamb (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Also known as Sharon Lamb. Wife of Robert C. Lamb.
Helen J. Horne (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Holds title as community property with right of survivorship with Edward L. Horne.
Edward L. Horne (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. Holds title as community property with right of survivorship with Helen J. Horne.
Jason Joseph (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. A single man per the caption.
Mike Martin (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. An unmarried man per the caption.
Kathleen Lamont (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. An unmarried woman per the caption.
Leland Pinney (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. An unmarried man per the caption.
Carolina Alcala (Defendant)
Homeowner of a lot bordering the wall; Defendant/Appellee. An unmarried woman per the caption.
David H. Otis (Defendant)
Defendant/Appellee, sued as trustee of the Dave and LeAnn Otis Family Trust, dated March 27, 2008, which owns a lot bordering the wall.
LeAnn K. Otis (Defendant)
Defendant/Appellee, sued as trustee of the Dave and LeAnn Otis Family Trust, dated March 27, 2008, which owns a lot bordering the wall.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees (the homeowners).
David E. Wood (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees (the homeowners).

Neutral Parties

Hon. Kelly (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Authored the memorandum decision of the court.
Hon. Vásquez (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Presiding Judge who concurred in the decision.
Hon. Gard (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge who concurred in the decision.
Hon. Rodrick Coffey (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial judge who granted the homeowners’ motion for summary judgment in No. CV2022090753.

What happened

Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association governs an active-adult residential community in Buckeye, Arizona. In one part of the community, a wall separates the common area from eight adjoining private lots that contain single-family homes. The wall straddles the property lines, sitting partly on the common area and partly on the owners’ lots. About a year before suit, water damage to the wall was discovered, prompting repair efforts.

In 2022, the Association filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the owners of the eight bordering lots were responsible for contributing half the cost of repairing and replacing the wall. In 2023, both sides moved for summary judgment. In 2024, after a hearing, the superior court granted the homeowners’ motion and denied the Association’s, ruling that the Association was responsible for repairing the entire wall absent a showing that the homeowners caused the damage.

The Association appealed. On January 6, 2026, Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision, holding that the wall is part of the common area the Association must repair, that a conflicting 2012 architectural guideline could not be enforced because it would amend the Declaration without the required vote, and that the homeowners, as the prevailing party, were entitled to their attorney fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott (2 CA-CV 2024-0314). HOA had to repair a common-area wall; architectural guidelines could not shift the cost to owners. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2006 Sundance adopts the original Architectural Design Guidelines and Association Rules.

Step 2012 The Architectural Committee amends the Guidelines, adopting Guideline I(h)(7), which assigns lot owners responsibility for maintaining and repairing walls separating a lot from the common area.

Step 2021 Water damage to the wall separating the common area from the Residents’ lots is discovered (approximately a year before the complaint).

Step 2022 Sundance files a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2022090753) seeking a declaration that the owners of eight bordering lots must contribute half the cost of repairing and replacing the wall.

Step 2023 Both parties file competing motions for summary judgment.

Step 2024 After a hearing, the superior court grants the Residents’ motion for summary judgment and denies Sundance’s motion, holding Sundance responsible for repairing the entire wall absent proof the Residents caused the damage.

Step 2026-01-06 Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals files a memorandum decision affirming the superior court.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/sundance-adult-village-homeowners-association-v-elliott/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-01-06

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding the HOA must repair the common-area wall and cannot shift that cost through architectural guidelines.

Download source file

2026-01-06_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Is Sundance Adult Village HOA v. Elliott binding precedent in Arizona?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two. Under the applicable rules, it does not create legal precedent and generally may not be cited as binding authority, though it can still illustrate how Arizona courts approach these issues.

Who is responsible for repairing a wall between an HOA common area and a homeowner’s lot in this case?

The court held the Association was responsible for repairing the entire wall. Because the wall is a structure located on the common area under the Declaration, the Association’s duty to maintain, repair, and replace the common area applied, absent proof that the homeowners caused the damage.

Can an HOA shift common-area repair costs to homeowners through an architectural guideline?

Not here. The court held that a 2012 architectural guideline assigning repair costs to lot owners conflicted with the Declaration, which made the Association solely responsible. Enforcing the guideline would effectively amend the Declaration without the required 75% owner vote, so it could not be enforced.

Did the homeowners cause the wall damage in this case?

The opinion notes the repairs followed water damage discovered about a year before suit, and that on appeal the Association did not allege the homeowners’ actions necessitated the repairs. The Declaration would have allowed cost-shifting only for repairs necessitated by an owner.

Who pays attorney fees after this appeal?

The homeowners. Because they prevailed in an action to enforce the Declaration, which requires a fee award to the prevailing party, the Court of Appeals held they were entitled to recover their appellate attorney fees and costs upon complying with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	2 CA-CV 2024-0314
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	January 6, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Kelly, Hon. Vásquez, Hon. Gard
Parties	Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Appellant) v. Bill and Mary Elliott, Robert and Sharon Lamb, Helen and Edward Horne, Jason Joseph, Mike Martin, Kathleen Lamont, Leland Pinney, Carolina Alcala, and David and LeAnn Otis as trustees of the Dave and LeAnn Otis Family Trust (Defendants/Appellees)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) A.R.S. § 12-341 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The Court of Appeals held that the wall is a structure located on the common area under Section 1.17 of the Declaration, so Section 5.01 makes the Association responsible for repairing the entire wall absent proof that the homeowners caused the damage; the conflicting 2012 Architectural Committee guideline shifting repair costs to owners could not be enforced because it would effectively amend the Declaration without the required 75% vote, and the Architectural Committee lacked authority to impose new financial obligations not found in the original Declaration. Affirmed.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association governs an active-adult community in Buckeye, Arizona, where a wall straddling the property line separates the common area from eight adjoining lots. After water damage to the wall was discovered, the Association sued the owners of those lots, seeking a declaration that they must contribute half the cost of repairing and replacing the wall. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court ruled for the homeowners, holding the Association responsible for repairing the entire wall absent proof that the owners caused the damage. On appeal, Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the wall is a structure located on the common area under the Declaration, so the Association’s maintenance and repair duty applies, and that a later architectural guideline shifting costs to owners conflicted with the Declaration and was therefore unenforceable. This is an unpublished memorandum decision.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, the court interpreted the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions as a contract among the landowners. Section 5.01 makes the Association responsible for maintaining, repairing, and replacing the “Common Area,” which Section 1.17 defines to include structures located on the common area tracts. The court agreed with the Association that the definition distinguishes tangible structures “located on” the tracts from intangible “rights, easements, and appurtenances relating to” them. But because the parties agreed the disputed wall is a structure that sits, at least partially, on the common area tract, the wall falls within the ordinary meaning of being “on” the common area, and thus within the definition of Common Area. The Association was therefore responsible for repairing the entire wall.

The Association relied on a 2012 Architectural Committee guideline, Guideline I(h)(7), which assigned lot owners responsibility for maintaining and repairing walls separating a lot from the common area. The court held this guideline could not override the Declaration. Section 5.01 assigned sole repair responsibility to the Association absent a repair necessitated by an owner, and the Association did not allege the owners caused this damage. Enforcing the guideline would effectively amend the Declaration, which Section 11.07 permits only by a 75% affirmative vote, and Section 11.16 provides that the Declaration prevails over conflicting documents “in all instances.” The court declined to rewrite the parties’ agreement by ignoring those provisions.

Finally, the court rejected the argument that the Architectural Committee had authority to impose this new financial obligation. Reading Article Seven of the Declaration as a whole, the court found the committee’s powers concern aesthetic matters and related procedures, not the creation of new financial burdens that did not exist in the original Declaration. Because the homeowners prevailed in an action to enforce the Declaration, which requires a fee award to the prevailing party, the court held they were entitled to their appellate attorney fees and costs upon compliance with Rule 21.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and associations, this decision illustrates that an association generally cannot shift common-area repair costs onto individual owners without clear authority in the governing documents or proof that the owners caused the damage. Where a board rule or architectural guideline conflicts with the recorded CC&Rs, the CC&Rs control, and an association cannot use committee-adopted guidelines to create new financial obligations that the declaration’s formal amendment process never approved. Owners facing a demand to pay for common-area repairs should check whether the CC&Rs actually assign that cost to them and how the documents must be amended.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/Appellee: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs & Short-Term Rentals | A.R.S. §§ 33-1806.01, 33-1817 | 1 CA-CV 22-0761

An unpublished Division One decision holding that a planned community’s short-term rental amendment was a foreseeable extension of its original CC&Rs, and thus valid and enforceable.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/Appellee, 1 CA-CV 22-0761.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 22-0761) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The 1995 CC&Rs, read in their entirety, provided sufficient notice that a durational limit on leases could be imposed by amendment; the 2022 short-term rental amendment is therefore valid and enforceable, and the superior court properly denied the homeowners’ requests for injunctive relief. Affirmed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Colin Preston (Appellant)
Named homeowner-plaintiff who, with several other single-family owners (“et al.”), challenged the amendment and sought injunctive relief.
Brian Locker (Counsel)
Fowler St. Clair, PLLC (Scottsdale)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants (the homeowners).

Respondent Side

Las Sendas Community Association, Inc. (Appellee)
Planned-community HOA (Defendant below) that adopted and recorded the short-term rental amendment; prevailing party.
Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP (Tempe)
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee (the HOA).

Neutral Parties

D. Steven Williams (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge; authored the memorandum decision.
Samuel A. Thumma (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision.
Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision.
John R. Hannah (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial judge who granted summary judgment for the HOA and denied injunctive relief.

What happened

Las Sendas is a planned community in Maricopa County governed by CC&Rs, recorded in 1995, that restrict all residential units to residential use by a single family and impose broad restrictions on business and trade within residential units, while exempting an owner’s leasing of a unit from the definition of “trade or business.” Each plaintiff owns a single-family home subject to those CC&Rs.

In 2009 the HOA Board adopted a rule barring leases of fewer than six months. After the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 33-1806.01(A) in 2014 (allowing owners to use property as rental property unless prohibited in the CC&Rs, subject to CC&R rental-time-period restrictions), the Board grew concerned the statute might invalidate the six-months rule and, in July 2021, proposed an amendment prohibiting leases of 31 days or fewer and advertising units as vacation rentals.

Voting opened in November 2021, and in June 2022 the HOA declared the amendment approved with 2,604 of 3,090 votes (84.3%), exceeding the 75% threshold in CC&Rs Section 9.3.1. The HOA recorded the short-term rental amendment in June 2022.

The homeowners sued the HOA, alleging the amendment lessened the value and marketability of their properties, and sought both a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction barring enforcement. The HOA moved for summary judgment, arguing the amendment was valid; the plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment on their permanent-injunction claim.

The superior court (Judge John R. Hannah) denied the preliminary injunction, denied the plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion, and granted summary judgment for the HOA on the permanent-injunction claim. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. It held that, viewed in their entirety, the original CC&Rs gave sufficient notice under Kalway that a durational limit on leases could be imposed, so the amendment was valid and enforceable and injunctive relief was properly denied. As the prevailing party, the HOA was awarded its reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/Appellee (1 CA-CV 22-0761). The 1995 CC&Rs, read in their entirety, provided sufficient notice that a durational limit on leases could be… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/Appellee. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 1995 Original Las Sendas CC&Rs recorded, restricting residential units to single-family residential use and limiting business/trade while exempting owner leasing.

Step Date not specified CC&Rs amended in 1998, 2004, and 2005 (amendments did not alter the provisions relevant to this appeal).

Step 2009 HOA Board adopts a rule barring leases of fewer than six months (“the six-months rule”).

Step 2014 Arizona legislature enacts A.R.S. § 33-1806.01(A), allowing owners to use property as rental property unless prohibited in the CC&Rs, subject to rental time-period restrictions.

Step 2021-07 Board announces a proposed amendment prohibiting leases of 31 days or fewer and advertising units as vacation rentals (“the short-term rental amendment”).

Step 2021-11 HOA opens owner voting on the short-term rental amendment.

Step 2022-06 HOA declares the amendment approved (2,604 of 3,090 votes, 84.3%, exceeding the 75% threshold) and records the short-term rental amendment.

Step Date not specified Homeowners file suit (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-010280) seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against enforcement of the amendment.

Step Date not specified Superior court denies the preliminary injunction, denies plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment, and grants summary judgment for the HOA; plaintiffs appeal.

Step 2023-10-31 Court of Appeals, Division One, affirms and awards the HOA its appellate attorneys’ fees and costs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/preston-v-las-sendas-community-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2023-10-31

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that the 1995 CC&Rs, read in their entirety, provided sufficient notice that a durational limit on leases could be imposed by amendment; the 2022 short-term rental amendment is therefore valid and enforceable, and the superior court properly denied the homeowners’ requests for injunctive relief.

Download source file

2023-10-31_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Who won Preston v. Las Sendas?

The HOA. Division One affirmed summary judgment for Las Sendas Community Association, upheld the 2022 short-term rental amendment, and affirmed the denial of the homeowners’ injunctions. As the prevailing party, the HOA was awarded its reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees and costs.

What was the dispute about?

Homeowners challenged a 2022 amendment to the Las Sendas CC&Rs that prohibited leasing units for 31 days or fewer and advertising them as vacation rentals. They argued the original CC&Rs did not give them sufficient notice that such a durational rental restriction could be imposed.

What legal test did the court apply?

The court applied the reasonable-expectations / sufficient-notice framework from Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC. Even an amendment properly adopted under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) and the CC&Rs’ amendment procedure is unenforceable unless the original CC&Rs, objectively viewed at the time of purchase, foreshadowed the possibility of the amendment.

Why did the homeowners lose?

The court read the CC&Rs as a whole rather than the lease exemption in isolation. The original CC&Rs limited units to single-family residential use, broadly restricted business and trade subject to Board discretion, and already barred apartment units from hotel or transient use, language that tracked the amendment. Together these gave sufficient notice that a durational lease limit could be added.

Does A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 let HOAs restrict rentals?

The statute allows owners to use their property as rental property unless prohibited in the governing CC&Rs, and requires owners to abide by the CC&Rs’ rental time-period restrictions. Here, the court held the amendment validly imposed such a durational restriction under the CC&Rs.

Is this decision precedential?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c). It is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 22-0761
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	October 31, 2023
Judge / panel	D. Steven Williams, Samuel A. Thumma, Paul J. McMurdie
Parties	Colin Preston, et al. (homeowners / Plaintiffs-Appellants) v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc. (HOA / Defendant-Appellee)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1806.01(A) A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) A.R.S. § 42-5070(F) A.R.S. § 9-500.39
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceElectionsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The 1995 CC&Rs, read in their entirety, provided sufficient notice that a durational limit on leases could be imposed by amendment; the 2022 short-term rental amendment is therefore valid and enforceable, and the superior court properly denied the homeowners’ requests for injunctive relief. Affirmed.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Colin Preston, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Las Sendas Community Association, Inc., Defendant/A
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Las Sendas is a Maricopa County planned community whose CC&Rs, recorded in 1995, restrict residential units to single-family residential use and limit business or trade activity while exempting owner leasing. In 2009 the Board adopted a rule barring leases of fewer than six months. After Arizona enacted A.R.S. § 33-1806.01(A) in 2014, the Board proposed a 2021 amendment prohibiting rentals of 31 days or fewer and vacation-rental advertising; owners approved it by 84.3% (well above the 75% threshold), and the HOA recorded it in June 2022. Several homeowners sued, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to block enforcement and arguing the original CC&Rs gave insufficient notice under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch that such a restriction could be added. The superior court granted summary judgment to the HOA and denied injunctive relief. Division One affirmed, holding the original CC&Rs, read as a whole, gave sufficient notice that a durational lease limit could be imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed the denial of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion but interpreted the CC&Rs and reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. Under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, even an amendment adopted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) and the CC&Rs’ own amendment procedure will not be enforced unless the original CC&Rs “provided sufficient notice” of the possibility of the amendment; courts strike down “unforeseen” amendments that would alter the nature of the covenants homeowners originally agreed to. The test is objective and measured against a purchaser’s reasonable expectations at the time of purchase: the original CC&Rs need not state the precise details of a later amendment, but must make clear that a restriction exists and could be refined or extended, and neither a general-purpose statement nor a general-amendment provision alone suffices.

Applying that standard, the court held the lease exemption in Section 3.12 could not be read in isolation. It is only an exception to Section 3.12’s broad prohibition on commercial activity in residential units and has meaning only in the context of the CC&Rs as a whole. The CC&Rs limit units to residential use by a single family who “maintain” a common household, language the court read to imply continuing rather than transient occupancy, and impose extensive restrictions on business and trade subject to the Board’s “sole discretion,” reasonably placing purchasers on notice that their use could be substantially regulated and even curtailed by future amendment.

The court also relied on the original CC&Rs’ treatment of apartment units, which barred the Las Sendas “Rental Apartments” from being used as a hotel or on a transient basis, language that largely tracks the short-term rental amendment. A prospective purchaser could reasonably have anticipated the HOA extending a comparable durational restriction to residential units. Viewed in their entirety, the CC&Rs foreshadowed the amendment, so upholding it did not alter the covenants in a substantial or unforeseen way. The court declined the homeowners’ footnote arguments drawn from A.R.S. § 9-500.39 and later online-lodging statutes, did not reach whether the 2009 six-months rule supplied additional notice, and treated the HOA’s first-on-appeal standing argument as waived.

Why It Matters

This is a board-favorable short-term-rental outcome: the homeowners’ Kalway challenge failed because the original CC&Rs, read as a whole, foreshadowed a durational lease restriction. It illustrates that Kalway’s notice-and-foreseeability test cuts both ways, and that not every Kalway or short-term-rental challenge succeeds. Where the original governing documents already contain robust single-family use and commercial-activity restrictions and an analogous transient-use limit (here, on apartment units), a later amendment adding a rental durational cap can be deemed a foreseeable extension rather than an “entirely new and different” restriction, and thus enforceable even against owners who purchased before it was recorded.

As a counterweight to owner-favorable amendment decisions, the case shows the fact-specific nature of the analysis: the enforceability of a short-term-rental amendment turns on the text and structure of the specific CC&Rs, not on a categorical rule. Because it is an unpublished memorandum decision, it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Gene D. Watson, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Leisure World Community Association, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs & Voting | A.R.S. §§ 33-420, 33-1817 | 1 CA-CV 20-0592

How an HOA’s recorded “consolidation” and amendment of CC&Rs were struck down for lacking owner consent, and when recording an invalid document triggers A.R.S. § 33-420 damages.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Gene D. Watson, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Leisure World Community Association, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 1 CA-CV 20-0592.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers Gene D. Watson, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Leisure World Community Association, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee (1 CA-CV 20-0592) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Both the 2013 Consolidated Declaration and the 2014 Amendment were invalid amendments adopted without the owner approval the CC&Rs required; the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and (C) as to the Consolidated Declaration, which it knew or should have known was invalid, but not as to the 2014 Amendment, where the record negated the required scienter. The Trust was the successful party, and fees and costs were remanded for recalculation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Gene D. Watson (Plaintiff)
Named plaintiff/appellee/cross-appellant associated with the Watson-McKinley Residence Revocable Trust, which owns a unit in Plat 24.
Watson-McKinley Residence Revocable Trust (Plaintiff)
Owner of a Plat 24 unit; brought quiet title and A.R.S. § 33-420 claims seeking release of the recorded documents.
Eileen Dennis GilBride (Counsel)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Co-counsel for the Trust/plaintiffs on appeal.
Frederick E. Davidson (Counsel)
Davidson & Funkhouser, PLLC
Co-counsel for the Trust/plaintiffs; argued the appeal.
Josh G. Funkhouser (Counsel)
Davidson & Funkhouser, PLLC
Co-counsel for the Trust/plaintiffs.

Respondent Side

Leisure World Community Association (Defendant)
Property owners’ association for nearly two dozen platted communities, including Plat 24; recorded the challenged Consolidated Declaration and 2014 Amendment.
Chad P. Miesen (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel for the Association (Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee).
Kate J. Merolo (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Counsel for the Association (Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee).

Neutral Parties

Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
Court of Appeals judge; authored the memorandum decision.
Peter B. Swann (Judge)
Presiding Judge on the Court of Appeals panel.
David D. Weinzweig (Judge)
Judge on the Court of Appeals panel.
Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge in the underlying case.
Cynthia J. Bailey (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge (retired) in the underlying case.

What happened

Leisure World Community Association is the property owners’ association for nearly two dozen single-family platted communities, including Plat 24. Each community is governed by its own Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and Plat 24’s original CC&Rs required at least three-quarters of Plat 24’s record owners to approve any amendment. The Watson-McKinley Residence Revocable Trust owns a unit in Plat 24.

In 2013, without obtaining owner approval, the Association recorded a “Consolidated Declaration” purporting to consolidate and restate the declarations of the communities it served. In 2014, it recorded an amendment changing the voting rules so amendments could be adopted by three-quarters of record owners across the platted communities rather than within each community; it obtained consent from 47 of Plat 24’s 54 units.

In February 2017, the Trust’s attorney demanded that the Association release both documents, and the Association refused. About nine months later the Trust sued in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2017-055942), seeking release of the documents and asserting quiet title and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420. After cross-motions and depositions, the court granted summary judgment for the Trust, invalidated both documents, awarded statutory damages under § 33-420, roughly $116,000 in attorney’s fees, and $4,000 in costs.

The Association moved for a new trial. After the original judge retired, a newly assigned judge partly reversed course, ruling the Consolidated Declaration was a mere restatement and striking the order invalidating it, while leaving the 2014 Amendment’s statutory damages in place. Both sides appealed.

The Arizona Court of Appeals held both documents were invalid amendments adopted without required owner consent. It concluded the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and (C) as to the Consolidated Declaration (reinstating those damages) but not as to the 2014 Amendment (vacating those damages), found the Trust the successful party, and remanded for recalculation of attorney’s fees and costs.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013 The Association recorded the 2013 Consolidated Declaration without a vote of the record owners.

Step 2014 The Association recorded the 2014 Amendment, changing amendment voting to a three-quarters vote across the platted communities; 47 of Plat 24’s 54 units consented.

Step 2017-02 The Trust’s attorney demanded release of the Consolidated Declaration and the 2014 Amendment; the Association refused.

Step Date not specified About nine months after the demand, the Trust filed its complaint seeking release of the documents and asserting quiet title and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420 (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-055942).

Step Date not specified The parties cross-moved for summary judgment; the court found disputes of material fact and denied both motions.

Step Date not specified After depositions, the parties again cross-moved for summary judgment and the court granted summary judgment for the Trust.

Step 2020-02 The superior court entered an order awarding statutory damages under A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and (C).

Step 2020-04 The superior court entered judgment for the Trust, awarding $5,000 per document under § 33-420(A), $1,000 per document under § 33-420(C), about $116,000 in attorney’s fees, and $4,000 in costs; the Association moved for a new trial.

Step 2020-09 After the original trial judge retired, the newly assigned judge partly granted the new-trial motion, striking the ruling that invalidated the Consolidated Declaration (deeming it a mere restatement) while leaving the 2014 Amendment’s statutory damages in place; both sides appealed.

Step 2021-12-02 The Court of Appeals issued its memorandum decision, affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/watson-v-leisure-world-community-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2021-12-02

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that both the 2013 Consolidated Declaration and the 2014 Amendment were invalid amendments adopted without the owner approval the CC&Rs required; the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and (C) as to the Consolidated Declaration, which it knew or should have known was invalid, but not as to the 2014 Amendment, where the record negated the required scienter.

Download source file

2021-12-02_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

What was the dispute in Watson v. Leisure World Community Association?

A revocable trust that owned a Plat 24 unit challenged two documents the Association recorded without the owner approval its CC&Rs required: a 2013 Consolidated Declaration that restated the communities’ declarations and a 2014 Amendment that let CC&R changes pass by a three-quarters vote across all platted communities instead of within each community. The Trust sought their release and asserted quiet title and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-420.

Why did the court hold both documents were invalid?

A recorded CC&R declaration is a contract interpreted from its plain language. The court found the Consolidated Declaration was an amendment (not a mere restatement) because its operative text expanded the Association’s veto power and diluted Plat 24’s autonomous voting rights, so it needed owner approval that was never obtained. The 2014 Amendment failed because 21 of the consent forms did not describe the action taken as required by A.R.S. § 10-3704(A), leaving fewer than the three-quarters of Plat 24 owners needed.

What is A.R.S. § 33-420 and how did it apply here?

A.R.S. § 33-420 penalizes recording a document asserting an invalid interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property when the recorder knew or should have known it was invalid, and it also penalizes willful refusal to release such a document. The court held the dilution of the Trust’s voting power and the expansion of the Association’s veto power each created an “encumbrance,” and that the Association had reason to know the Consolidated Declaration was invalid but not the 2014 Amendment.

What damages and fees were involved?

The trial court had awarded $5,000 per document under § 33-420(A), $1,000 per document under § 33-420(C), about $116,000 in attorney’s fees, and $4,000 in costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the statutory damages tied to the Consolidated Declaration, vacated those tied to the 2014 Amendment, found the Trust the successful party, and remanded for recalculation of fees and costs.

What was the final disposition?

The Arizona Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision that affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It affirmed that both documents were invalid, reinstated § 33-420 damages for the Consolidated Declaration, vacated § 33-420 damages for the 2014 Amendment, and remanded for recalculation of attorney’s fees and costs.

Who represented the parties?

The Leisure World Community Association was represented by Chad P. Miesen and Kate J. Merolo of Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP, an HOA-side firm. The Trust was represented by Eileen Dennis GilBride of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., and by Frederick E. Davidson (who argued) and Josh G. Funkhouser of Davidson & Funkhouser, PLLC.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 20-0592
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	December 2, 2021
Judge / panel	Paul J. McMurdie, Peter B. Swann, David D. Weinzweig
Parties	Gene D. Watson, et al. (Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants) v. Leisure World Community Association (Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-420 A.R.S. § 33-1817 A.R.S. § 33-1812 A.R.S. § 10-3704 A.R.S. § 10-3708 A.R.S. § 47-9102 A.R.S. § 33-438 A.R.S. § 33-416
Topics	CC&RsElectionsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	Both the 2013 Consolidated Declaration and the 2014 Amendment were invalid amendments adopted without the owner approval the CC&Rs required; the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-420(A) and (C) as to the Consolidated Declaration, which it knew or should have known was invalid, but not as to the 2014 Amendment, where the record negated the required scienter. The Trust was the successful party, and fees and costs were remanded for recalculation.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowner’s revocable trust that owned a unit in Leisure World’s Plat 24 challenged two documents the Association recorded without the owner approval its CC&Rs required: a 2013 “Consolidated Declaration” that restated the various communities’ declarations and a 2014 Amendment that let CC&R changes pass by a three-quarters vote across all platted communities rather than within each one. The trial court initially found both documents invalid, groundless recordings under A.R.S. § 33-420, and awarded statutory damages and about $116,000 in fees; a newly assigned judge then partly reversed course on a new-trial motion. On cross-appeals, the Arizona Court of Appeals held both documents were invalid amendments adopted without required owner consent, that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-420 by recording and refusing to release the Consolidated Declaration, but not the 2014 Amendment because it lacked the required knowledge of that document’s invalidity. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Key Issues & Findings

A recorded declaration of CC&Rs is a contract interpreted as a matter of law from its plain language. The court held the 2013 Consolidated Declaration was an amendment, not a mere restatement, because its operative text made two substantive changes to Plat 24’s governance: it dropped the phrase “with respect to the Community Facilities,” broadening the Association’s veto over amendments, and it redefined “Project” to include additional platted communities, replacing Plat 24’s autonomous three-quarters vote with a three-quarters vote spread across communities. Because it changed the CC&Rs it required owner approval, and none was obtained, so it was invalid. The document’s recitals, board-member testimony, and a claimed clerical omission could not override the clear operative language.

The 2014 Amendment was also invalid. An amendment to the Plat 24 declaration required consent from three-quarters of Plat 24’s 54 record owners (at least 41), and the consent forms themselves had to describe the action taken under A.R.S. § 10-3704(A). Although 47 owners signed, 21 forms did not refer to amending the Plat 24 declaration or summarize the change to voting rights, and representations made only in the Leisure World News did not satisfy the statute. The valid consents therefore fell short.

On A.R.S. § 33-420, the court held that both the dilution of the Trust’s voting power and the expansion of the Association’s veto power each created an “encumbrance” (a non-ownership right in real property) because they reduced the Trust’s control over its property and could lead buyers to underestimate that control. The Association knew or had reason to know the Consolidated Declaration was invalid because its plain text plainly departed from the CC&Rs, so § 33-420(A) and (C) liability and statutory damages applied. But confusion over which statute governed the 2014 consent forms, plus undisputed evidence that owners were informed through the Association’s website, negated the required knowledge of that document’s invalidity, so no § 33-420 liability attached to the 2014 Amendment. The court reinstated the statutory damages tied to the Consolidated Declaration, vacated those tied to the 2014 Amendment, deemed the Trust the successful party, and remanded for recalculation of fees and costs.

Why It Matters

The decision illustrates how Arizona courts scrutinize HOA amendment procedures and recorded documents. An association cannot expand its own powers or dilute owners’ voting rights by “consolidating and restating” or amending CC&Rs without the owner approval the governing documents require, and the operative recorded language controls over the drafters’ stated intent. Consent forms must themselves describe the action being approved; publicizing an amendment elsewhere does not cure defective forms.

The case also shows the reach of A.R.S. § 33-420 (false or invalid recorded documents): recording an instrument that clouds title can expose an association to statutory damages ($5,000 per document under subsection (A) and $1,000 per document under subsection (C)) and substantial attorney’s-fee liability (about $116,000 here, plus appellate fees), but only where the recorder knew or had reason to know of the document’s invalidity. In this matter the Association was represented by Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP, an HOA-side firm, underscoring the accountability stakes for associations and their counsel when documents of questionable validity are recorded against owners’ property.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases

Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association v. Smith

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Amendments & STR | A.R.S. §§ 33-1806.01, 33-1817 | 2 CA-CV 2023-0071

Vista Del Corazon’s HOA amended its CC&Rs to ban rentals shorter than ninety days and re-voted to approve them with eighty-percent support. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the injunction enforcing the amendments, applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA to hold that entirely new restrictions need fair notice in the original declaration and, absent that, unanimous consent.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: VISTA DEL CORAZON HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, AN ARIZONA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee, v. DEANNA SMITH AND MYCHAL A. KINTZ, Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellants, 2 CA-CV 2023-0071.

Download memorandum decision

Scope note: This page covers VISTA DEL CORAZON HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, AN ARIZONA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee, v. DEANNA SMITH AND MYCHAL A. KINTZ, Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellants (2 CA-CV 2023-0071) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, the court held that an HOA cannot use the CC&R amendment process to impose entirely new restrictions or affirmative obligations on owners unless the original CC&Rs gave fair notice that such restrictions could be added; following the technical amendment procedure (here, an eighty-percent vote) does not cure the lack of notice, and absent unanimous consent the new short-term-rental ban and most related provisions are unenforceable. The permanent injunction compelling compliance was therefore an abuse of discretion and was vacated.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Arizona non-profit corporation and Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee; adopted the 2021 and re-voted 2022 CC&R amendments and sought to enforce them by injunction.
Alexis G. Firehawk (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association (Tempe).
Ember Van Vranken (Counsel)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Counsel for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association (Tempe).

Respondent Side

Deanna Smith (Defendant)
Co-owner of Lot 89 (since 2020) and Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellant; challenged the validity of the CC&R amendments and prevailed on appeal.
Mychal A. Kintz (Defendant)
Co-owner of Lot 89 (since 2020) and Defendant/Counter-Claimant/Appellant; challenged the validity of the CC&R amendments and prevailed on appeal.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellants Deanna Smith and Mychal A. Kintz (Phoenix).
Ashley C. Hill (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellants Deanna Smith and Mychal A. Kintz (Phoenix).

Neutral Parties

Judge Brearcliffe (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Presiding Judge who authored the memorandum decision of the Court.
Judge Kelly (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge who concurred in the decision.
Judge Eckerstrom (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
Judge who concurred in part and dissented in part; would have upheld the lease-notice, lease-default, and disclosure provisions as enforcing the original covenants.
Joseph R. Georgini (Judge)
Pinal County Superior Court
The Honorable Joseph R. Georgini, trial judge whose grant of the permanent injunction was vacated on appeal.

What happened

Vista Del Corazon is a planned community in Pinal County whose CC&Rs were first adopted in 1997. Deanna Smith and Mychal Kintz bought Lot 89 in 2020 and rented it out from time to time for periods shorter than ninety days. In February 2021 the HOA board told members it had been “surprised to discover” that the existing CC&Rs did not prohibit short-term rentals, and it set out to amend them. Without holding a formal association meeting and vote, the HOA collected written approvals, repealed the existing rental section, and adopted new §§ 4.22.1-4.22.5 (the “2021 amendments”) banning rentals shorter than ninety days, prohibiting advertising, and adding a special fine structure. The HOA began fining Smith and Kintz, then sued to enforce the amendments and collect the fines; Smith and Kintz counterclaimed that the amendments were invalid because the HOA had not obtained the vote required to amend without a meeting.

After a settlement conference the parties stayed the case so the HOA could re-vote. In April 2022 about eighty percent of members approved the amendments (the “2022 amendments”), which the HOA president certified on April 28, 2022; they were erroneously recorded in Maricopa County before being properly recorded in Pinal County on August 11, 2022. The superior court granted the HOA partial summary judgment, entered a permanent injunction compelling Smith and Kintz to stop advertising and renting short-term, and awarded the HOA its fees and costs. On appeal, Division Two vacated the injunction. Applying Kalway, it held that the short-term-rental ban and most related provisions were entirely new restrictions for which the 1997 CC&Rs gave no fair notice, so they could not be enforced absent unanimous consent. The court vacated the injunction without prejudice, vacated the HOA’s fee award, awarded Smith and Kintz their appellate fees, and remanded for further proceedings.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association v. Smith (2 CA-CV 2023-0071). Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, the court held that an HOA cannot use the CC&R amendment process to impose… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association v. Smith. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 1997 Vista Del Corazon’s original CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Grant of Easements) are adopted.

Step 2020 Deanna Smith and Mychal Kintz buy Lot 89 and begin leasing it from time to time for periods shorter than ninety days.

Step 2021-02 The HOA board sends members a letter reporting short-term-rental activity and proposing to amend the CC&Rs to require a minimum rental of ninety consecutive days.

Step 2021 The HOA adopts the 2021 amendments (repealing § 4.22 and adopting §§ 4.22.1-4.22.5) by written approval without a formal association meeting and vote, records them in Pinal County, and adopts a special fine structure; the HOA begins fining Smith and Kintz.

Step 2022 The HOA files a complaint to enforce the amended CC&Rs and collect fines; Smith and Kintz counterclaim challenging the validity of the 2021 amendments and seeking to void them.

Step 2022-04 After a settlement conference and stay, the HOA holds a re-vote and about eighty percent of members approve the amendments (the 2022 amendments).

Step 2022-04-28 The HOA president certifies the 2022 amendments.

Step 2022-05-02 The 2022 amendments are erroneously recorded in Maricopa County.

Step 2022-08-11 The 2022 amendments are properly recorded in Pinal County.

Step 2023 The superior court grants the HOA partial summary judgment, denies Smith and Kintz’s motion, enters a permanent injunction enforcing the 2022 amendments, and Smith and Kintz appeal.

Step 2023-03-29 The superior court awards the HOA its attorney fees and costs incurred through the partial summary judgment ruling.

Step 2024-03-08 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, files its memorandum decision vacating the permanent injunction and the fee award and remanding.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/vista-del-corazon-homeowners-association-v-smith/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2024-03-08

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that applying Kalway v.

Download source file

2024-03-08_001_memorandum-decision.pdf

FAQ

Is the Vista Del Corazon v. Smith decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two (No. 2 CA-CV 2023-0071, filed March 8, 2024). Under Arizona rules, memorandum decisions are generally not precedential and are not citable as binding authority, although this one illustrates how courts apply the binding precedent in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA.

Can an Arizona HOA ban short-term rentals by amending its CC&Rs?

Not automatically. The court held that a ban on rentals shorter than ninety days was an entirely new restriction that the community’s original 1997 CC&Rs gave no fair notice could be imposed. Under Kalway, such a new restriction generally requires the unanimous consent of affected owners, not just a majority or supermajority vote, so the ban was unenforceable here even after an eighty-percent re-vote.

Does following the CC&R amendment procedure make an amendment valid?

Not by itself. The court explained that technically complying with A.R.S. § 33-1817 and the CC&Rs’ amendment clause (here, a seventy-five-percent threshold) is not dispositive. If the original declaration did not give owners fair notice that a particular kind of restriction could be added, the common law still requires unanimous consent for that new restriction.

Did A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 give the HOA power to restrict short-term rentals?

No. The court held that § 33-1806.01(A) protects an owner’s right to lease subject to validly imposed rental-time-period restrictions; it does not itself give HOAs an unfettered power to create such restrictions, and it did not abrogate the common-law notice requirement recognized in Dreamland and Kalway.

Which amendment provisions survived and which were struck?

The court left in place provisions carried over from the original CC&Rs (such as the bar on leasing less than the entire lot and an owner’s responsibility for an occupant’s compliance) and a new sentence defining ‘lease’ and ‘rent,’ which was tied to existing terms. It held unenforceable by injunction the short-term-rental ban, the advertising ban, the mandatory lease terms, the new power for the HOA to evict an owner’s tenants, and the broad requirement to disclose lease information.

What happened to the attorney-fee award?

Because it vacated the injunction, the court also vacated the related attorney-fee award the trial court had given the HOA. As the prevailing parties on appeal, Smith and Kintz were awarded their appellate fees and costs under the CC&Rs’ fee provision (§ 17.1), upon compliance with the rules; the HOA, having lost, recovered nothing on appeal.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	2 CA-CV 2023-0071
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	March 8, 2024
Judge / panel	Presiding Judge Brearcliffe (authored), Judge Kelly (concurred), Judge Eckerstrom (concurred in part and dissented in part)
Parties	Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellee) v. Deanna Smith and Mychal A. Kintz (Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Appellants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 A.R.S. § 33-1817 A.R.S. § 12-2101 A.R.S. § 33-1310 A.R.S. § 1-201 A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-341 A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics	CC&RsFinesDisclosureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, the court held that an HOA cannot use the CC&R amendment process to impose entirely new restrictions or affirmative obligations on owners unless the original CC&Rs gave fair notice that such restrictions could be added; following the technical amendment procedure (here, an eighty-percent vote) does not cure the lack of notice, and absent unanimous consent the new short-term-rental ban and most related provisions are unenforceable. The permanent injunction compelling compliance was therefore an abuse of discretion and was vacated.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	12 roadmap entries
Video overview	Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association v. Smith
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Vista Del Corazon Homeowners Association sued homeowners Deanna Smith and Mychal Kintz to stop them from renting their Pinal County home for short terms and to enforce CC&R amendments the HOA adopted in 2021 and re-adopted by an eighty-percent vote in 2022. The amendments banned rentals shorter than ninety days, prohibited advertising short-term rentals, required disclosure of lease information, dictated lease terms, and let the HOA evict an owner’s tenants. The trial court found the amendments valid and entered a permanent injunction enforcing them. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated, applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA: even a properly conducted amendment vote cannot impose entirely new restrictions unless the original 1997 CC&Rs gave homeowners fair notice that such restrictions could later be added. Because the short-term-rental ban and most related provisions were new and unforeseeable, the injunction was an abuse of discretion.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first confirmed it could review the legal basis for the injunction even though it lacked jurisdiction over the underlying partial summary judgment ruling, because the injunction was “inextricably bound up” with the trial court’s conclusion that the 2022 amendments were valid. It then rejected the trial court’s view that A.R.S. § 33-1806.01(A) had abrogated the common-law limits on CC&R amendments. That statute preserves an owner’s right to lease subject to validly imposed rental-time-period restrictions; it does not give HOAs an unfettered power to create such restrictions, and it does not displace the notice requirement recognized in Dreamland and Kalway.

Under Kalway, an amendment is valid only if it is “reasonable and foreseeable” from the original CC&Rs, meaning the original declaration gave notice that a covenant existed and could be refined, corrected, or filled in. A general amendment clause (here allowing change by a seventy-five-percent vote), general-purpose recitals, and a flexible definition of “Declaration” were not enough to put owners on notice that any particular new restriction could be imposed. Technical compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the CC&Rs’ amendment procedure was not dispositive; absent fair notice, the common law requires the unanimous consent of affected owners, which the HOA did not obtain.

Reviewing each provision, the court held that the short-term-rental ban (§ 4.22.2), the advertising ban (§ 4.22.3), the mandatory lease terms (§ 4.22.4), the new power to evict an owner’s tenants (§ 4.22.5), and the broad lease-disclosure requirement (last sentence of § 4.22.1) were entirely new and untethered to the 1997 CC&Rs, and so could not be enforced by injunction; the original CC&Rs allowed rentals of any duration and even excepted leasing from the ban on trades and businesses. Only provisions carried over from the original CC&Rs and the new sentence defining “lease” and “rent” (tethered to existing terms) were enforceable. Because the injunction rested on an erroneous view of the law and the equitable balance had shifted, the court vacated it in its entirety and remanded. It also vacated the related fee award to the HOA and awarded Smith and Kintz their appellate fees under the CC&Rs’ fee clause.

Why It Matters

This case shows that following the formal CC&R amendment procedure, even with a large supermajority vote (eighty percent), is not enough to make new use restrictions enforceable in Arizona. Under Kalway, owners must have had fair notice from the original declaration that a particular kind of restriction could later be added; brand-new bans on short-term rentals, advertising, or tenant-related obligations generally require unanimous consent. For HOAs pursuing short-term-rental restrictions, the decision is a cautionary complement to Kalway and Dreamland: amendments can fail not only on procedure but on the more fundamental ground that they impose obligations no reasonable owner could have foreseen. It also illustrates that an injunction enforcing such amendments is an equitable remedy the trial court must independently justify.

← Back to Court of Appeals cases