CC&Rs | A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1260.01 | 1 CA-CV 25-0476
Why a board-adopted short-term-rental rule survived a Kalway challenge where the Declaration already prohibited leasing units for hotel or transient purposes.
Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al., 1 CA-CV 25-0476.
Scope note: This page covers Baoan Andy Gia Le, et al. v. North Shore Condominium Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 25-0476) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The source decision came from Division One. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
A board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Baoan Andy Gia Le (Appellee)
Plaintiff below; co-owner of two North Shore units purchased as investment/short-term rental properties. - Linda Sinat Som (Appellee)
Plaintiff below; co-owner of the two North Shore units (with Le, collectively the “Owners”). - Melanie C. McKeddie (Counsel)
McKeddie Cooley, G.P. (Scottsdale)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Owners). - Justin R. Cooley (Counsel)
McKeddie Cooley, G.P. (Scottsdale)
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees (the Owners).
Respondent Side
- North Shore Condominium Association (Appellant)
Defendant below; condominium association whose board adopted the challenged 30-day minimum-lease rule. - Associated Property Management, Inc. (Appellant)
Defendant below; the association’s property manager (collectively with the association, the “Association”). - Lauren Elliott Stine (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP (Phoenix)
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants (the Association). - Kristin N. Leaptrott (Counsel)
Quarles & Brady LLP (Phoenix)
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants (the Association).
Neutral Parties
- Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge; authored the memorandum decision of the court. - D. Steven Williams (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision. - Cynthia J. Bailey (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Panel member who joined the decision. - Timothy J. Ryan (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court (Judge, Ret.)
Trial judge who granted summary judgment and fees to the Owners; decision reversed on appeal.
What happened
North Shore is a planned condominium community in Tempe subject to Arizona’s Condominium Act and to a recorded Declaration. The Declaration limits units to residential use, generally bars trade or business uses (while allowing leasing), and prohibits leasing units “for hotel or transient purposes” without defining “transient.” An earlier version of the Declaration had also barred leases for an initial term of less than one year, but that language was removed by a 2008 amendment.
In 2020 and 2021, Baoan Andy Gia Le and Linda Sinat Som purchased two North Shore units as investment properties, intending to use them as short-term rentals. In February 2022, the association’s board voted to replace an existing one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule prohibiting leases of less than 30 days.
The owners sued the association and its property manager, Associated Property Management, Inc., seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued the 30-day rule was invalid because the Declaration contained no durational rental limits and short-term leases were neither hotel nor transient uses. On cross-motions for summary judgment supported by stipulated facts, the superior court agreed with the owners, held the rule invalid under Kalway, awarded the owners attorney fees and costs, and entered final judgment.
The association appealed. Division One reversed, holding the 30-day rule valid under Kalway as a reasonable and foreseeable clarification of the Declaration’s transient-use prohibition and consistent with the board’s rulemaking authority. It remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association and held the association, as prevailing party, may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Procedural timeline
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/le-v-north-shore-condominium-association/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Memorandum Decision
Type: Decision or judgment
Memorandum decision holding that a board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association.
FAQ
What did the Court of Appeals decide in Le v. North Shore Condominium Association?
Division One reversed the superior court and held the association’s 30-day minimum-lease rule valid. It remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association, ruling the rule was a reasonable and foreseeable clarification of the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and did not conflict with the Declaration.
What was the 30-day rule and who challenged it?
In February 2022, the association’s board replaced an earlier one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule barring leases of less than 30 days. Two owners, Baoan Andy Gia Le and Linda Sinat Som, who had bought units to operate short-term rentals, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the rule was invalid because the Declaration set no durational rental limits.
How did Kalway v. Calabria Ranch apply to a board-adopted rule?
The court held that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations standard applies to board-adopted rules, not just majority-vote amendments to CC&Rs. It reasoned that if unforeseeable use restrictions are unenforceable even when approved by a majority, the same limit should apply to a rule adopted by a board, which represents only a minority of owners.
Why was a rule defining “transient” as under 30 days considered foreseeable?
The Declaration prohibited leasing for “transient” purposes but did not define the term. The court found that clarifying an undefined term already in the governing document “fills a gap” and is tethered to existing restrictions. A 30-day threshold matched the ordinary meaning of “transient” and Arizona and Tempe definitions treating stays of less than 30 days as transient.
How does this case compare to Gross and Preston?
The court distinguished Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake, where a similar 30-day rule was invalidated because those CC&Rs contained no transient-purpose prohibition. It aligned instead with Preston v. Las Sendas, which upheld a comparable short-term-rental restriction where the original CC&Rs limited units to residential, non-transient use.
Who pays attorney fees after the decision?
The trial court had awarded fees and costs to the owners. On reversal, the association became the prevailing party and may recover reasonable attorney fees and costs under Section 13.1 of the Declaration and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, upon compliance with the appellate rules.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 1 CA-CV 25-0476 |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | June 9, 2026 |
| Judge / panel | Daniel J. Kiley, D. Steven Williams, Cynthia J. Bailey |
| Parties | Baoan Andy Gia Le & Linda Sinat Som (unit owners/appellees) v. North Shore Condominium Association (condominium association/appellant) |
| Governing law | |
| Topics | cc-and-rsboard-governanceattorneys-fees |
| Outcome / holding | A board-adopted rule setting a 30-day minimum lease term is valid under Kalway because it reasonably and foreseeably clarifies the Declaration’s existing prohibition on leasing units for “hotel or transient purposes” and does not conflict with the Declaration; the grant of summary judgment to the owners is reversed and judgment is directed for the association. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 1 PDF |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 9 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
Two owners bought units in the North Shore condominium community in Tempe intending to operate short-term rentals. In February 2022 the association’s board replaced an existing one-year minimum-lease rule with a rule barring leases of less than 30 days. The owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the 30-day rule was invalid under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA because the Declaration set no durational rental limits. The superior court agreed and granted the owners summary judgment plus attorney fees. On appeal, Division One reversed. It held the board had statutory and declaratory authority to adopt rules that do not conflict with the Declaration, that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations test applies to board rules, and that a rule defining the Declaration’s undefined term “transient” as under 30 days was a reasonable, foreseeable clarification tethered to existing restrictions. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association.
Reviewing the cross-motions for summary judgment de novo on stipulated facts, the court first rejected the owners’ argument that the board could impose durational lease limits only by amending the Declaration through unanimous owner consent. The Condominium Act permits an association to adopt and amend rules subject to the declaration (A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(1)), and the Declaration expressly authorized the board to adopt rules governing unit use. Because the 30-day rule was consistent with, rather than in conflict with, the Declaration’s provisions limiting units to residential, non-transient use, the board did not violate the Act or the Declaration. The court also found nothing in the 2008 amendment (which removed earlier “less than one (1) year” language) evinced an intent to eliminate restrictions on short-term rentals.
The court then held that Kalway’s reasonable-expectations standard governs board-adopted rules, not just majority-vote CC&R amendments. It reasoned it would be illogical to exempt a rule adopted by a board (a minority of owners) from a standard that invalidates even majority-approved restrictions that were not reasonable and foreseeable. Applying that test, the court concluded that a rule defining the Declaration’s undefined term “transient” as leases under 30 days was a permissible clarification that “fills a gap” and is tethered to the original restrictions. That reading tracked the ordinary dictionary meaning of “transient” and Arizona and Tempe definitions treating stays of less than 30 days as transient (A.R.S. § 42-5070(F); City of Tempe Zoning & Development Code).
The court distinguished Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake, where a similar 30-day rule was struck down because those CC&Rs contained no transient-purpose prohibition, and aligned its result with Preston v. Las Sendas, which upheld a comparable short-term-rental restriction. It rejected the owners’ contention that requiring written leases made their use non-transient. Because only a legal question remained on stipulated facts, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the association, which as the prevailing party may recover fees under the Declaration and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01.
This decision marks where an Arizona short-term-rental restriction survives a Kalway-style challenge. Unlike disputes in which durational rental caps were invalidated as unforeseeable, the court found that the North Shore Declaration’s existing ban on “hotel or transient purposes” put purchasers on notice that short-term rentals could be restricted, so a board rule defining “transient” as under 30 days merely clarified an existing term rather than imposing an entirely new limitation.
Read alongside decisions such as Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake (and, in the broader body of Arizona short-term-rental cases, Bonham) that struck down comparable rental caps, it serves as a counterweight illustrating that the outcome under Kalway turns on the specific language of the governing documents. Where a declaration already limits units to residential, non-transient use, associations may have room to adopt clarifying rules; where it does not, similar restrictions have failed. The opinion is a non-precedential memorandum decision and may be cited only as authorized by rule.