Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott B. McLaren, Defendant/Appellant: HOA Court Case Guide

Assessments | A.R.S. §§ 33-1256, 33-1807 | 1 CA-CV 25-0384

A Sierra Verde Ranch owner argued the POA’s failure to maintain roads and a well excused his assessments. Division One explained why the payment obligation is independent and affirmed foreclosure of the lien.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott B. McLaren, Defendant/Appellant; 1 CA-CV 25-0384; S1300CV202400347.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

An owner who accepts a deed subject to recorded CC&Rs is contractually bound to pay HOA assessments, and that payment obligation is independent of the association’s duty to maintain common areas. An owner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain roads or a well therefore neither excuses nonpayment nor creates a genuine fact dispute precluding summary judgment and lien foreclosure. Affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association (Appellee)
    Plaintiff below and appellee; the property owners association that sued McLaren for unpaid assessments and to foreclose its lien, and prevailed at trial and on appeal.
  • Scott B. McLaren (Appellant)
    Defendant below and appellant; self-represented (of Seligman) owner of Tract 174 who refused to pay assessments and appealed the summary judgment and foreclosure.
  • Danny M. Ford (Counsel)
    Goodman Law Group, LLP
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association (Goodman Law Group, LLP, Mesa).
  • Samuel A. Thumma (Judge)
    Court of Appeals judge who authored the memorandum decision.
  • Paul J. McMurdie (Judge)
    Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals panel; joined the decision.
  • Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
    Court of Appeals judge; joined the decision.
  • Kristyne Marie Schaaf-Olson (Judge)
    Judge Pro Tempore (Retired) of the Yavapai County Superior Court whose judgment was reviewed on appeal.

What happened and why it matters

Scott McLaren bought Tract 174 in the Sierra Verde Ranch subdivision in Seligman (Yavapai County) in April 2020, taking title by a warranty deed that expressly made the parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. Those CC&Rs created the Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, made every parcel owner an automatic member, and obligated each owner to pay annual assessments secured by a lien enforceable through foreclosure. After McLaren paid the 2021 and 2022 assessments late and then refused to pay the 2023 and 2024 assessments, the POA sued for breach of contract and to foreclose its assessment lien. The superior court granted the POA summary judgment on the contract claim and, on reconsideration, on the foreclosure claim, entering a judgment awarding roughly $848 in unpaid assessments and fees, $1,022 in collection costs, and $12,545 in attorneys’ fees. McLaren appealed, arguing lack of mutual assent to the CC&Rs, the POA’s prior material breach for failing to maintain access roads and a water well, denial of his right to a jury trial, and various procedural and evidentiary errors. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. It held that a deed taken subject to recorded CC&Rs binds the owner as a contract, and that the obligation to pay assessments is independent of the association’s maintenance duties, so alleged non-maintenance neither excused payment nor raised a triable issue. The court also rejected McLaren’s jury-trial, affirmative-defense, and additional-evidence arguments and awarded the POA its reasonable appellate fees and costs.

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McLaren, the court asked whether the POA showed there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a), noting it would affirm if the ruling was correct for any reason.

On contract formation, the court rejected McLaren’s claim that he never assented because he misunderstood whether the POA was an “association” or a “corporation.” His warranty deed expressly stated that he took the parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs, and those CC&Rs, recorded before he bought, provide that every owner “in accepting a deed . . . automatically becomes a member of the Association” and agrees to be bound. Citing ACEMA v. Turner and Powell v. Washburn, the court reiterated that a covenant running with the land is a contract between the association and the owners, and that the CC&R obligations, including annual assessments, are enforceable as a contract against owners like McLaren; the POA’s precise legal status did not affect the validity or applicability of the CC&Rs.

The core of the decision addressed McLaren’s prior-material-breach theory — that the POA’s alleged failure to maintain roads and its closure of a well excused his duty to pay. The court observed that McLaren had neither sued nor counterclaimed to enforce the CC&Rs, and had not shown a material breach that would suspend his own performance under Zancanaro v. Cross. More fundamentally, the court applied the independent-covenant doctrine: the obligation to pay assessments arises from ownership of property subject to the CC&Rs and does not depend on the association’s performance of maintenance. Quoting Mountain View Condos. Homeowners Ass’n v. Scott (“the obligation to pay assessments arises from unit ownership and is not dependent upon completion of improvements”) and Casita de Castilian, Inc. v. Kamrath, the court explained that the duty to pay and the association’s maintenance duties are distinct. It distinguished the out-of-state Rivers Edge decision as non-binding, and held that even though these CC&Rs were silent on the point, the payment obligation was independent of the POA’s responsibility to maintain common areas. McLaren’s failure to allege he could not use his parcel, or to identify any CC&R duty to maintain a specific road or well, left no triable issue.

The court then dispatched McLaren’s remaining arguments. Under National Bank of Arizona v. Thruston, the POA as movant was not required to negate McLaren’s affirmative defenses; the proponent of an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving it. Summary judgment did not deprive McLaren of a jury trial because there were no genuine fact issues to try (Cagle v. Carlson). The denial of his motion to submit additional evidence was reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and McLaren showed none; a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the allegations of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Finally, arguments not asserted below — including his point that he declined to seek damages that would fall on his neighbors — were not a valid defense to summary judgment. The court affirmed and awarded the POA its reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees and costs under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, contingent on ARCAP 21 compliance.

This decision restates a durable principle of Arizona community-association law: when a deed takes property subject to recorded CC&Rs, those covenants operate as a contract, and an owner’s duty to pay assessments is generally treated as independent of whatever the association does or fails to do with common areas. Owners who are dissatisfied with maintenance — here, roads and a well — cannot ordinarily self-help by withholding assessments; the court pointed out that the proper route is to enforce the CC&Rs affirmatively (by suit or counterclaim), not to raise non-maintenance as a defense to a collection action. The opinion also shows how the planned-community statutes, A.R.S. §§ 33-1256(A) and 33-1807(A), gate lien foreclosure: the trial court initially denied foreclosure until the POA demonstrated the owner owed at least $1,200 or was delinquent for more than a year.

The case is also a cautionary illustration of fee exposure. Because the CC&Rs and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01 authorize a fee award to the prevailing party, a relatively small assessment dispute — a few hundred dollars in unpaid dues — grew into a judgment that included more than $12,500 in trial attorneys’ fees plus collection costs, with additional fees awarded on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as the rule allows, but it usefully synthesizes the settled authorities (Scott and Casita de Castilian) that owners and boards alike rely on when disputes over assessments and maintenance arise.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott B. McLaren, Defendant/Appellant (1 CA-CV 25-0384). An owner who accepts a deed subject to recorded CC&Rs is contractually bound to pay HOA assessments, and that… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott B. McLaren, Defendant/Appellant. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Step-by-step litigation record

March 1996: The CC&Rs for Sierra Verde Ranch Units I and II are recorded with the Yavapai County Recorder, establishing the POA; Unit III (including McLaren's parcel) is annexed in August 1996.
April 2020: McLaren purchases Tract 174, Sierra Verde Ranch Unit III, by a warranty deed that takes the property subject to the recorded CC&Rs.
2021-2022: McLaren pays the annual assessments, but late, incurring late fees and collection costs ($205.40 in 2021 and $140.40 in 2022).
2023-2024: McLaren refuses to pay the annual assessments ($150.48 for 2023 and $180.50 for 2024).
April 2024: The POA sues McLaren for breach of contract and to foreclose its assessment lien (Yavapai County Superior Court No. S1300CV202400347).
January 2025: After oral argument, the superior court grants the POA summary judgment on the contract claim but denies it on foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-1256(A) and 33-1807(A).
April 2025: On reconsideration, the superior court grants the POA's foreclosure claim (finding delinquency for more than a year) and denies McLaren's motion.
July 2025: The superior court enters judgment foreclosing the lien and awarding the POA $848.48 in unpaid assessments and fees, $1,022.14 in collection costs, and $12,545 in attorneys' fees.
Step 2025-12-18 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, files its memorandum decision affirming the judgment.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2025-12-18

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that an owner who accepts a deed subject to recorded CC&Rs is contractually bound to pay HOA assessments, and that payment obligation is independent of the association's duty to maintain common areas.

Download source file

FAQ

What was this case about?

Scott McLaren bought a parcel in the Sierra Verde Ranch subdivision near Seligman subject to recorded CC&Rs that obligated owners to pay annual assessments to the property owners association (POA). After he paid late in 2021-2022 and refused to pay in 2023 and 2024, the POA sued for breach of contract and to foreclose its assessment lien. The superior court granted summary judgment and foreclosure, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Why did McLaren argue he did not have to pay assessments?

McLaren argued he never truly assented to the CC&Rs (claiming the POA did not disclose its corporate status) and that the POA had first materially breached the CC&Rs by failing to maintain access roads and by closing a water well, which he said excused his duty to pay. He also raised jury-trial and various procedural and evidentiary objections.

Why did the court hold that McLaren was bound by the CC&Rs?

His warranty deed expressly stated that he took the property subject to recorded CC&Rs, and those CC&Rs — recorded before he bought — provide that every owner automatically becomes a member and agrees to be bound. Citing ACEMA v. Turner and Powell v. Washburn, the court reiterated that CC&Rs are a contract between the association and owners, enforceable against owners like McLaren regardless of the POA’s precise legal form.

Does an association's failure to maintain common areas excuse paying assessments?

Generally no. Applying the independent-covenant doctrine, the court held that the duty to pay assessments arises from ownership of property subject to the CC&Rs and is independent of the association’s maintenance duties. Quoting Mountain View Condominiums v. Scott and Casita de Castilian v. Kamrath, the court explained that alleged non-maintenance is not a defense to a collection action; the proper remedy is to enforce the CC&Rs, which McLaren never did by suit or counterclaim.

How much did the owner ultimately owe, and were attorneys' fees awarded?

The July 2025 judgment awarded the POA $848.48 in unpaid assessments and related fees, $1,022.14 in collection costs, and $12,545 in attorneys’ fees, and foreclosed the assessment lien. On appeal, the court awarded the POA additional reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. Under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by the rule.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 25-0384
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateDecember 18, 2025
Judge / panelSamuel A. Thumma, Paul J. McMurdie, Kent E. Cattani
PartiesSierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. Scott B. McLaren (Defendant/Appellant, self-represented)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsForeclosureAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

An owner who accepts a deed subject to recorded CC&Rs is contractually bound to pay HOA assessments, and that payment obligation is independent of the association's duty to maintain common areas. An owner's allegation that the association failed to maintain roads or a well therefore neither excuses nonpayment nor creates a genuine fact dispute precluding summary judgment and lien foreclosure. Affirmed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewSierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Scott B. McLaren, Defendant/A
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Scott McLaren bought Tract 174 in the Sierra Verde Ranch subdivision in Seligman (Yavapai County) in April 2020, taking title by a warranty deed that expressly made the parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs. Those CC&Rs created the Sierra Verde Ranch Property Owners Association, made every parcel owner an automatic member, and obligated each owner to pay annual assessments secured by a lien enforceable through foreclosure. After McLaren paid the 2021 and 2022 assessments late and then refused to pay the 2023 and 2024 assessments, the POA sued for breach of contract and to foreclose its assessment lien. The superior court granted the POA summary judgment on the contract claim and, on reconsideration, on the foreclosure claim, entering a judgment awarding roughly $848 in unpaid assessments and fees, $1,022 in collection costs, and $12,545 in attorneys' fees. McLaren appealed, arguing lack of mutual assent to the CC&Rs, the POA's prior material breach for failing to maintain access roads and a water well, denial of his right to a jury trial, and various procedural and evidentiary errors. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed. It held that a deed taken subject to recorded CC&Rs binds the owner as a contract, and that the obligation to pay assessments is independent of the association's maintenance duties, so alleged non-maintenance neither excused payment nor raised a triable issue. The court also rejected McLaren's jury-trial, affirmative-defense, and additional-evidence arguments and awarded the POA its reasonable appellate fees and costs.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McLaren, the court asked whether the POA showed there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a), noting it would affirm if the ruling was correct for any reason.

On contract formation, the court rejected McLaren's claim that he never assented because he misunderstood whether the POA was an "association" or a "corporation." His warranty deed expressly stated that he took the parcel subject to recorded CC&Rs, and those CC&Rs, recorded before he bought, provide that every owner "in accepting a deed . . . automatically becomes a member of the Association" and agrees to be bound. Citing ACEMA v. Turner and Powell v. Washburn, the court reiterated that a covenant running with the land is a contract between the association and the owners, and that the CC&R obligations, including annual assessments, are enforceable as a contract against owners like McLaren; the POA's precise legal status did not affect the validity or applicability of the CC&Rs.

The core of the decision addressed McLaren's prior-material-breach theory — that the POA's alleged failure to maintain roads and its closure of a well excused his duty to pay. The court observed that McLaren had neither sued nor counterclaimed to enforce the CC&Rs, and had not shown a material breach that would suspend his own performance under Zancanaro v. Cross. More fundamentally, the court applied the independent-covenant doctrine: the obligation to pay assessments arises from ownership of property subject to the CC&Rs and does not depend on the association's performance of maintenance. Quoting Mountain View Condos. Homeowners Ass'n v. Scott ("the obligation to pay assessments arises from unit ownership and is not dependent upon completion of improvements") and Casita de Castilian, Inc. v. Kamrath, the court explained that the duty to pay and the association's maintenance duties are distinct. It distinguished the out-of-state Rivers Edge decision as non-binding, and held that even though these CC&Rs were silent on the point, the payment obligation was independent of the POA's responsibility to maintain common areas. McLaren's failure to allege he could not use his parcel, or to identify any CC&R duty to maintain a specific road or well, left no triable issue.

The court then dispatched McLaren's remaining arguments. Under National Bank of Arizona v. Thruston, the POA as movant was not required to negate McLaren's affirmative defenses; the proponent of an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving it. Summary judgment did not deprive McLaren of a jury trial because there were no genuine fact issues to try (Cagle v. Carlson). The denial of his motion to submit additional evidence was reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and McLaren showed none; a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the allegations of its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Finally, arguments not asserted below — including his point that he declined to seek damages that would fall on his neighbors — were not a valid defense to summary judgment. The court affirmed and awarded the POA its reasonable appellate attorneys' fees and costs under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, contingent on ARCAP 21 compliance.

Why It Matters

This decision restates a durable principle of Arizona community-association law: when a deed takes property subject to recorded CC&Rs, those covenants operate as a contract, and an owner's duty to pay assessments is generally treated as independent of whatever the association does or fails to do with common areas. Owners who are dissatisfied with maintenance — here, roads and a well — cannot ordinarily self-help by withholding assessments; the court pointed out that the proper route is to enforce the CC&Rs affirmatively (by suit or counterclaim), not to raise non-maintenance as a defense to a collection action. The opinion also shows how the planned-community statutes, A.R.S. §§ 33-1256(A) and 33-1807(A), gate lien foreclosure: the trial court initially denied foreclosure until the POA demonstrated the owner owed at least $1,200 or was delinquent for more than a year.

The case is also a cautionary illustration of fee exposure. Because the CC&Rs and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01 authorize a fee award to the prevailing party, a relatively small assessment dispute — a few hundred dollars in unpaid dues — grew into a judgment that included more than $12,500 in trial attorneys' fees plus collection costs, with additional fees awarded on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as the rule allows, but it usefully synthesizes the settled authorities (Scott and Casita de Castilian) that owners and boards alike rely on when disputes over assessments and maintenance arise.

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McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC: HOA Court Case Guide

FDCPA | 15 U.S.C. § 1692e | 9th Cir. No. 15-17383 (893 F.3d 680)

A published Ninth Circuit opinion held Maxwell & Morgan’s HOA judicial-foreclosure collection activity was covered by the FDCPA and that the firm falsely represented unapproved attorneys’ fees as legally owed.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC; 893 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17383); D. Ariz. No. 2:14-cv-00869-PHX-DGC (David G. Campbell, District Judge).

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Collecting delinquent homeowner-association assessments through a judicial foreclosure that permits deficiency judgments constitutes “debt collection” under the FDCPA, distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co.; and a debt collector’s filing of a writ of special execution that implicitly represents unapproved “accruing” attorneys’ fees as already court-approved falsely states the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants on that claim and remanded for a determination of damages, while affirming the remaining claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

Public-interest record: appellate finding against Maxwell & Morgan

False fee-status representation

The Ninth Circuit held Maxwell & Morgan falsely represented the legal status of $1,597.50 in accruing attorneys’ fees by presenting them as owed before court approval.

FDCPA applies to the foreclosure tactic

The panel held HOA judicial foreclosure activity that can produce a deficiency judgment is debt collection under the FDCPA, rejecting the defense framing that it was outside the statute.

Settlement limits the conclusion

The case settled after remand. The source-backed statement is the appellate holding; do not claim a later trial verdict or damages award unless a later source proves it.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Martha A. McNair (Appellant)
    Homeowner in Gilbert, Arizona within the Neely Commons Community Association; plaintiff who sued the collection law firm under the FDCPA.
  • Maxwell & Morgan PC (Appellee)
    Arizona professional corporation; the HOA collection law firm that represented the Neely Commons Community Association in collecting McNair's assessment debt.
  • Charles E. Maxwell (Appellee)
    Principal of Maxwell & Morgan PC; named defendant-appellee (husband).
  • Lisa Maxwell (Appellee)
    Named defendant-appellee (wife of Charles E. Maxwell), joined for marital-community purposes.
  • W. William Nikolaus (Appellee)
    Principal of Maxwell & Morgan PC; named defendant-appellee (husband).
  • Leslie Nikolaus (Appellee)
    Named defendant-appellee (wife of W. William Nikolaus), joined for marital-community purposes.
  • Neely Commons Community Association (Party)
    The homeowners association whose delinquent assessments were at issue; the firm's client, not a named party to the appeal.
  • Douglas C. Wigley (Counsel)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Martha McNair (argued); Phoenix, Arizona.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Martha McNair; Phoenix, Arizona.
  • Robert Travis Campbell (Counsel)
    Simmonds & Narita LLP
    Counsel for Defendants-Appellees (argued); San Francisco, California.
  • Jeffrey A. Topor (Counsel)
    Simmonds & Narita LLP
    Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; San Francisco, California.
  • Tomio B. Narita (Counsel)
    Simmonds & Narita LLP
    Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; San Francisco, California.
  • Janet Bond Arterton (Judge)
    U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation; authored the opinion.
  • Jay S. Bybee (Judge)
    U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit; randomly drawn to the panel and joined the opinion.
  • Michelle T. Friedland (Judge)
    U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit; joined the opinion.
  • David G. Campbell (Judge)
    U.S. District Judge for the District of Arizona who granted summary judgment to the defendants below.

What happened and why it matters

Martha McNair bought a home in Gilbert, Arizona in 2004 that was part of the Neely Commons Community Association, obligating her under a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) to pay an annual assessment in monthly installments. After she fell behind, the law firm Maxwell & Morgan P.C. — retained by the Association — pursued her through a series of collection lawsuits, a stipulated judgment, and ultimately a judicial foreclosure that sold her home. McNair then sued the firm and its principals under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging they misrepresented the amount she owed and sought attorneys’ fees to which they were not entitled. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding most claims time-barred and rejecting the timely claims — reasoning in part that pursuing a foreclosure was not “debt collection” and that the state court had implicitly approved the fees. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co. (a non-judicial foreclosure case), the panel held that collecting HOA assessments through a judicial foreclosure that allows deficiency judgments is “debt collection” subject to the FDCPA. It further held that the firm’s writ of special execution violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by falsely representing the legal status of $1,597.50 in “accruing” attorneys’ fees as court-approved when no court had yet approved them. The panel remanded for a determination of statutory and any actual damages, and a concurrently filed memorandum disposition affirmed the remaining, largely untimely claims.

The panel addressed the two independent grounds on which the district court had granted summary judgment. First, the district court had held that the defendants were not engaged in “debt collection” because the writ was filed to foreclose on a lien. The Ninth Circuit rejected that reasoning as irreconcilable with the statutory text. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), a “debt” is an obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and under § 1692a(6) a “debt collector” is anyone who regularly collects debts owed to another. McNair’s obligation arose from unpaid homeowner-association assessments on her residence, so it plainly qualified as consumer debt, and the firm plainly qualified as a debt collector. The court cited Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017), and Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), for the settled rule that attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt collection are covered by the Act even when that activity consists of litigation.

The court then distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017), on which the defendants relied. Ho held that a trustee facilitating a non-judicial foreclosure was not collecting a “debt” because, under California law, such a foreclosure cannot yield a deficiency judgment and thus extinguishes the entire debt regardless of the sale price — the object being to retake and resell the security, not to collect money from the borrower. Here, by contrast, the defendants pursued a judicial foreclosure under a scheme that, in many cases, permits deficiency judgments, citing A.R.S. §§ 33-727(A) and 33-729(B)-(C). That difference placed the firm’s conduct squarely within the FDCPA’s definition of debt collection.

Second, the district court had held, in the alternative, that the writ did not violate the Act because the Maricopa County Superior Court had implicitly approved the claimed fees by issuing the writ and later rejecting McNair’s challenges. The panel found this analysis failed to ask the right question: whether the defendants were legally entitled to claim the fees at the time they applied for the writ. The FDCPA bars any false or misleading representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment attorneys’ fees must be requested by motion, and when the November 5, 2013 writ was filed, no court had yet approved the quantification of the $1,597.50 in “accruing” fees. By listing those fees as “now … due,” the writ falsely represented that they had already been judicially approved. The court cited Woliansky v. Miller and Costa v. Maxwell & Morgan PC for the point that fee amounts are set by the court’s discretion. Because the district court had not reached damages, the panel remanded for a determination of statutory and, if applicable, actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, noting McNair might have suffered no actual damages given the Superior Court’s later approval of the fees.

This published Ninth Circuit decision is significant for homeowners, associations, and the law firms that collect HOA debt because it confirms that the FDCPA applies to judicial-foreclosure collection of delinquent assessments. Many collectors had read Ho v. ReconTrust to mean that any foreclosure is outside the Act. McNair narrows Ho to its facts: the exemption turns on whether the foreclosure scheme can produce a deficiency judgment. Because Arizona’s judicial-foreclosure process can, a firm that collects assessments through it is a “debt collector” pursuing a “debt” and must comply with the FDCPA’s prohibitions on false or misleading representations.

The decision also draws a practical line for how collectors may present attorneys’ fees in enforcement papers. Listing “accruing” fees as presently due in a writ of special execution — before any court has approved that amount under Arizona Rule 54(g) — can be an actionable misrepresentation of the debt’s legal status, even if a court later blesses the same fees. For homeowners, McNair confirms a federal remedy (including statutory damages) against overreaching collection conduct; for associations and their counsel, it is a reminder to secure judicial approval before characterizing post-judgment fees as owed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2019, leaving the ruling in force within the Ninth Circuit.

Video overview of the case record

AI-generated video overview of McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC. The Ninth Circuit appellate holding is the adverse source-backed point; the case settled after remand and no damages judgment should be implied.

The written case page and linked court records are the controlling source for legal posture and accuracy.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

AI-generated audio deep dive for McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC. The Ninth Circuit appellate holding is the adverse source-backed point; the case settled after remand and no damages judgment should be implied.

Use the linked court records and written page for the exact legal posture.

Audio overview generated from the case record; verify against the linked court records.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 1 2004

Martha McNair buys a Gilbert home subject to Neely Commons HOA assessments.

Filed by: McNair

Creates the assessment obligation later collected through litigation and foreclosure.

Step 2 Before 2014

The firm pursues collection litigation, a stipulated judgment, and judicial foreclosure that sells McNair's home.

Filed by: Maxwell & Morgan

This is the conduct later challenged under the FDCPA.

Step 5 2018-06-25

Panel reverses in part and holds the foreclosure enforcement was FDCPA debt collection and the unapproved-fee representation was false.

Filed by: Ninth Circuit

This is the core adverse finding against Maxwell & Morgan.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 8 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 4 2015-11-04

Clerks Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file
Source 5 2018-06-25

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that collecting delinquent homeowner-association assessments through a judicial foreclosure that permits deficiency judgments constitutes "debt collection" under the FDCPA, distinguishing Ho v.

Download source file
Source 6 2018-06-25

Ninth Circuit Published Opinion Reversal

Type: Decision or judgment

Published Ninth Circuit opinion holding judicial foreclosure was FDCPA debt collection and that unapproved accruing fees were falsely represented as legally owed.

Source 7 2018-08-07

Ninth Circuit Rehearing Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

FAQ

What was McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC about?

Martha McNair, a Gilbert, Arizona homeowner, sued the law firm Maxwell & Morgan P.C. and its principals under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The firm had collected delinquent homeowner-association assessments she owed the Neely Commons Community Association, ultimately foreclosing on and selling her home. McNair alleged the firm misrepresented the amount of her debt and sought attorneys’ fees to which it was not entitled.

Does the FDCPA apply to collecting HOA assessments through foreclosure?

Yes, when the foreclosure is judicial and can allow a deficiency judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the firm’s effort to collect HOA fees through Arizona’s judicial-foreclosure process was “debt collection” under the FDCPA. It distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., which had exempted non-judicial foreclosures because, under the law there, such foreclosures extinguish the entire debt and cannot produce a deficiency judgment.

Why did the firm's writ of special execution violate the FDCPA?

The November 2013 writ listed $1,597.50 in “accruing” attorneys’ fees as “now … due,” implying a court had already approved that amount. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment fees must be requested by motion, and no court had yet approved those fees when the writ was filed. That falsely represented the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).

What did the Ninth Circuit ultimately decide?

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. In a concurrent memorandum disposition it affirmed that most of McNair’s claims were untimely and rejected one timely claim. In the published opinion it reversed summary judgment on her claim about the misrepresented fees, held the FDCPA applied, and remanded to the district court to determine statutory and any actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

Was McNair still liable for the fees, and did she win money?

The Superior Court later approved the attorneys’ fees, so McNair may not have suffered actual damages from the misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit did not award damages itself; it remanded so the district court could determine what statutory and, if applicable, actual damages she is entitled to. The FDCPA allows statutory damages even without proven actual loss.

Is this decision binding, and what happened after?

Yes. The opinion was published (“FOR PUBLICATION,” 893 F.3d 680), making it precedential within the Ninth Circuit. The defendants sought U.S. Supreme Court review, but certiorari was denied in 2019 (139 S. Ct. 1375), leaving the ruling intact. It is a leading authority on the FDCPA’s reach over judicial-foreclosure collection of HOA debt.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation893 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17383)
Court / tribunalFederal Court
Decision / key dateJune 25, 2018
Judge / panelJanet Bond Arterton (opinion author, D. Conn., sitting by designation), Jay S. Bybee, Michelle T. Friedland
PartiesMartha A. McNair (Plaintiff-Appellant, a Gilbert homeowner) v. Maxwell & Morgan PC and its principals Charles E. Maxwell and W. William Nikolaus (Defendants-Appellees, the HOA collection law firm for the Neely Commons Community Association).
Governing law
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (FDCPA — false or misleading representations)
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt)
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)-(6) (FDCPA definitions of 'debt' and 'debt collector')
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (FDCPA civil liability and damages)
  • A.R.S. § 12-1551(A) (writ of execution to enforce a judgment)
  • A.R.S. §§ 33-727, 33-729 (judgment liens, foreclosure, and deficiency judgments)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g) (post-judgment attorneys' fees by motion)
Topics
FDCPAAssessmentsForeclosureAttorney FeesLiensCC&Rs
Outcome / holding

Collecting delinquent homeowner-association assessments through a judicial foreclosure that permits deficiency judgments constitutes "debt collection" under the FDCPA, distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co.; and a debt collector's filing of a writ of special execution that implicitly represents unapproved "accruing" attorneys' fees as already court-approved falsely states the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants on that claim and remanded for a determination of damages, while affirming the remaining claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package8 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewMcNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC – 893 F.3d 680
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links6 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Martha McNair sued Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. and its principals after the firm used Arizona judicial-foreclosure proceedings to collect delinquent HOA assessments and related fees for Neely Commons Community Association. The district court largely sided with the firm, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The panel held that judicial foreclosure of HOA assessments that can lead to a deficiency judgment is debt collection under the FDCPA. More importantly for public accountability, the court held that defendants falsely represented the legal status of $1,597.50 in accruing attorneys' fees by treating those fees as presently owed in a writ of special execution before a court had approved them. The case was remanded for statutory and possible actual damages and later settled.

Key Issues & Findings

The panel addressed the two independent grounds on which the district court had granted summary judgment. First, the district court had held that the defendants were not engaged in "debt collection" because the writ was filed to foreclose on a lien. The Ninth Circuit rejected that reasoning as irreconcilable with the statutory text. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), a "debt" is an obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and under § 1692a(6) a "debt collector" is anyone who regularly collects debts owed to another. McNair's obligation arose from unpaid homeowner-association assessments on her residence, so it plainly qualified as consumer debt, and the firm plainly qualified as a debt collector. The court cited Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017), and Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), for the settled rule that attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt collection are covered by the Act even when that activity consists of litigation.

The court then distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017), on which the defendants relied. Ho held that a trustee facilitating a non-judicial foreclosure was not collecting a "debt" because, under California law, such a foreclosure cannot yield a deficiency judgment and thus extinguishes the entire debt regardless of the sale price — the object being to retake and resell the security, not to collect money from the borrower. Here, by contrast, the defendants pursued a judicial foreclosure under a scheme that, in many cases, permits deficiency judgments, citing A.R.S. §§ 33-727(A) and 33-729(B)-(C). That difference placed the firm's conduct squarely within the FDCPA's definition of debt collection.

Second, the district court had held, in the alternative, that the writ did not violate the Act because the Maricopa County Superior Court had implicitly approved the claimed fees by issuing the writ and later rejecting McNair's challenges. The panel found this analysis failed to ask the right question: whether the defendants were legally entitled to claim the fees at the time they applied for the writ. The FDCPA bars any false or misleading representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment attorneys' fees must be requested by motion, and when the November 5, 2013 writ was filed, no court had yet approved the quantification of the $1,597.50 in "accruing" fees. By listing those fees as "now … due," the writ falsely represented that they had already been judicially approved. The court cited Woliansky v. Miller and Costa v. Maxwell & Morgan PC for the point that fee amounts are set by the court's discretion. Because the district court had not reached damages, the panel remanded for a determination of statutory and, if applicable, actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, noting McNair might have suffered no actual damages given the Superior Court's later approval of the fees.

Why It Matters

McNair is the strongest federal record against Maxwell & Morgan in this batch because the adverse point is an appellate holding, not just a homeowner allegation. The Ninth Circuit did not merely revive a procedural claim; it held that the firm's foreclosure enforcement activity was FDCPA debt collection and that the challenged writ misrepresented the legal status of unapproved fees. Because the case settled after remand, the page should not claim a final damages judgment beyond the appellate holding and settlement record.

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Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25: HOA Court Case Guide

FDCPA & HOA Assessments | 15 U.S.C. § 1692g | 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017)

A San Diego homeowner sued her HOA’s collection law firm after it demanded an overdue assessment and threatened a lien. The Ninth Circuit held she stated a plausible FDCPA claim because the letter’s payment deadline and lien threat overshadowed her federal right to dispute the debt, and that the firm was a debt collector subject to the full statute.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25; 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-56927); 3:14-cv-00839-JLS-RBB (S.D. Cal.).

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2017-01-13. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

Post-remand note: The source set contains the 2017 published Ninth Circuit opinion, not a final post-remand disposition. This page summarizes the precedential appellate ruling only.

The rule in one sentence

The Ninth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that Mashiri stated a plausible FDCPA claim because, judged by the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, the collection letter contained language that overshadowed and conflicted with her 15 U.S.C. § 1692g debt-validation rights. The panel further held that a debt collector who sends such a letter to collect an overdue assessment is subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, not merely the limitations of § 1692f(6), because it was collecting a debt and not merely enforcing an already-existing security interest.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Zakia Mashiri (Plaintiff)
    Homeowner and member of the Westwood Club homeowners' association in San Diego; Plaintiff-Appellant who brought the FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims.
  • Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC (Defendant)
    Law firm that sent the May 1, 2013 assessment-collection letter on behalf of the Westwood Club HOA; Defendant-Appellee. Held to be a debt collector subject to the full scope of the FDCPA.
  • Debora M. Zumwalt (Defendant)
    Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
    Attorney named as a defendant; associated with the collection letter sent on behalf of the HOA. Defendant-Appellee.
  • Westwood Club Homeowners' Association (Creditor (non-party))
    The underlying HOA client and creditor on whose behalf Epsten sent the collection letter and recorded the lien; not a named party in the appeal.
  • Asil Marhiri (Counsel)
    Mashiri Law Firm
    Argued the appeal for Plaintiff-Appellant Zakia Mashiri; Mashiri Law Firm, San Diego, California.
  • Anne Lorentzen Rauch (Counsel)
    Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
    Argued the appeal for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
  • Mandy D. Hexom (Counsel)
    Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
    Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
  • Rian W. Jones (Counsel)
    Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
    Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
  • Richard A. Paez (Judge)
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    Circuit Judge; authored the panel's published opinion.
  • Dorothy W. Nelson (Judge)
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
    Circuit Judge on the panel.
  • Elaine E. Bucklo (Judge)
    U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (sitting by designation)
    U.S. District Judge sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit panel.
  • Janis L. Sammartino (Judge)
    U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
    District Judge who presided below and granted the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal that was reversed on appeal.

What happened and why it matters

Zakia Mashiri owns a home in San Diego and is a member of the Westwood Club homeowners’ association, which levies annual assessments. After she failed to timely pay a $385 assessment fee levied in July 2012, the HOA’s collection law firm, Epsten Grinnell & Howell, and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt sent her a May 1, 2013 letter (the ‘May Notice’) demanding $598 in assessments plus late, administrative, and legal fees, and warning that failure to pay within thirty-five days would result in a lien on her property. The same letter also contained federal debt-validation language telling her she had thirty days to dispute the debt. Mashiri sued under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), California’s Rosenthal Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law, alleging the letter’s payment deadline and lien threat overshadowed and contradicted her right to dispute the debt. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reversed. Applying the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, it held Mashiri stated a plausible 15 U.S.C. § 1692g violation because the letter demanded payment within thirty-five days of its date (inconsistent with the thirty-day dispute window running from receipt) and threatened a lien regardless of any dispute. The panel also rejected Epsten’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it was subject only to § 1692f(6); it held Epsten was a debt collector subject to the full scope of the FDCPA. The court reversed and remanded.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the panel accepted the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true and asked whether they stated a claim ‘plausible on its face’ under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. It framed the FDCPA’s purpose as eliminating abusive debt-collection practices and subjecting ‘debt collectors’ to civil liability. The court first addressed Epsten’s threshold argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that because it sought only to perfect a security interest it was governed solely by 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). Although arguments raised for the first time on appeal are ordinarily forfeited, the panel reached this one because it was purely legal, the pertinent facts were undisputed, and Mashiri had responded to it. On the merits, the court held the overdue assessment was a ‘debt’ under § 1692a(5) because it arose from Mashiri’s household membership in the HOA, and the May Notice plainly sought to collect it. Relying on Ho v. ReconTrust, the panel reasoned that entities enforcing security interests are debt collectors when their activities constitute debt collection; unlike the trustee in Ho, who merely sent a notice of default without demanding payment, Epsten demanded payment and there was as yet no recorded lien to enforce. Epsten was therefore subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, including § 1692g and § 1692e. Turning to § 1692g, the court explained that a validation notice must be conveyed effectively (Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service) and must not be overshadowed by or inconsistent with other messages that would confuse the least sophisticated debtor (Terran v. Kaplan). The panel found two plausible violations: first, demanding payment within thirty-five days of the letter’s date conflicted with the debtor’s thirty-day dispute period measured from receipt, because a debtor might receive the letter with fewer than thirty days remaining and would have to forgo her dispute rights to avoid a lien; second, the statement that a lien ‘will’ be recorded upon nonpayment overshadowed the right to dispute, because the least sophisticated debtor would wrongly believe a lien would be recorded on the thirty-fifth day even after disputing the debt. The court distinguished Shimek v. Weissman (governed by Georgia law permitting contemporaneous lien filing) and explained that under California’s Davis-Stirling Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670) an HOA must give thirty days’ notice and participate in dispute resolution before recording a lien, so the FDCPA duty to suspend collection pending verification was fully consistent with state law. Accordingly, the threat to record a lien was a debt-collection activity that had to cease upon a dispute, and the letter’s failure to convey that effectively stated a plausible § 1692g violation. Reversing the § 1692g dismissal required reversing the dependent § 1692e(5), Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims as well.

For homeowners’ associations and the law firms that collect their assessments, this published Ninth Circuit decision confirms that a single letter can be both a Davis-Stirling pre-lien notice and full-blown FDCPA debt collection. A collector cannot escape § 1692g simply by saying it was ‘perfecting a security interest’ when no lien yet exists and the letter demands payment. Practically, collection letters must give the consumer the full thirty-day dispute window measured from receipt, must not set a payment deadline that effectively shortens that window, and must not threaten that a lien ‘will’ be recorded in a way that suggests the threat survives a timely dispute. Because the FDCPA requires collection to cease once the debtor disputes the debt and until verification is mailed, a lien threat that ignores that pause can overshadow the validation notice and expose the firm to liability.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision carries direct weight even though it arose under California’s Davis-Stirling Act. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, so it binds Arizona’s federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides. Arizona HOAs collect assessments under a different state statutory scheme, but the FDCPA is federal law that applies the same way to Arizona assessment-collection letters. An Arizona homeowner who receives a demand letter from an HOA collection firm has the same right to a clear, unobstructed thirty-day validation notice, and firms operating in Arizona should ensure their letters do not let assessment deadlines or lien warnings overshadow that federal right.

The source set for this page is the 2017 published Ninth Circuit opinion. It does not include a post-remand final disposition, damages award, or settlement record, so the page summarizes the precedential appellate ruling and does not claim a final liability judgment after remand.

Video overview of the case record

AI-generated video overview of Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25. This is a published appellate precedent guide based on the Ninth Circuit reversal/remand, not a complete post-remand final-disposition record.

The written case page and linked court records are the controlling source for legal posture and accuracy.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

AI-generated audio deep dive for Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25. This is a published appellate precedent guide based on the Ninth Circuit reversal/remand, not a complete post-remand final-disposition record.

Use the linked court records and written page for the exact legal posture.

Audio overview generated from the case record; verify against the linked court records.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2012-07 The Westwood Club HOA levies a $385 annual assessment fee; Mashiri fails to pay it in a timely manner.
Step 2013-05-01 Epsten Grinnell & Howell and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt send the 'May Notice' collection letter on behalf of the HOA, demanding $598 and warning of a lien if unpaid within 35 days.
Step 2013-05-20 Mashiri writes to Epsten disputing the debt, requesting validation, and stating she never received a bill for the July 2012 assessment.
Step 2013-06-05 Epsten responds by sending another copy of Mashiri's account statement.
Step 2013-06-18 Epsten, on behalf of the HOA, records a lien on Mashiri's property for $928 ($598 plus $330 in additional legal fees).
Step 2013-06-21 Mashiri sends the HOA a $385 check with a letter disputing the balance of the debt.
Step 2013-06-24 Epsten notifies Mashiri of the recorded lien, as required by Cal. Civ. Code § 5675(e).
Step 2014 Mashiri files her complaint (D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00839-JLS-RBB, S.D. Cal.); the district court later dismisses it under Rule 12(b)(6).
Step 2016-10-04 The Ninth Circuit hears oral argument in Pasadena, California.
Step 2017-01-13 The Ninth Circuit files its published opinion reversing the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2017-01-13

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that Mashiri stated a plausible FDCPA claim because the collection letter overshadowed and conflicted with her 15 U.S.C. § 1692g debt-validation rights.

Download source file

FAQ

Is Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell binding precedent?

Yes. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reported at 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Arizona is within the Ninth Circuit, the decision binds Arizona’s federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides, even though the case itself arose under California law.

What did the court decide about the HOA collection letter?

The court held that the homeowner stated a plausible violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Judged by the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, the letter’s demand for payment within thirty-five days of its date, and its warning that a lien ‘will’ be recorded, overshadowed and conflicted with her federal right to dispute the debt within thirty days of receiving the notice.

Can an HOA collection firm avoid the FDCPA by saying it was just perfecting a lien?

Not on these facts. The firm argued for the first time on appeal that it was subject only to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because it was enforcing a security interest. The court rejected that, holding the overdue assessment was a ‘debt,’ the letter demanded payment, and no lien yet existed to enforce, so the firm was subject to the full scope of the FDCPA.

Why was the 35-day payment deadline a problem?

The FDCPA gives a consumer thirty days from receipt of the notice to dispute the debt. Because the letter demanded payment within thirty-five days of its date, a homeowner who received it late might have fewer than thirty days to act, effectively forcing her to give up her dispute rights to avoid a lien. The court found that inconsistent with § 1692g.

How does California's Davis-Stirling Act fit with the FDCPA here?

The court held the two are consistent. Davis-Stirling (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670) already requires an HOA to give at least thirty days’ notice and to participate in dispute resolution before recording a lien, so the FDCPA’s requirement that collection pause once the debtor disputes the debt did not conflict with state law. The lien threat was thus a debt-collection activity that had to cease upon a dispute.

What happened to the homeowner's state-law claims?

The district court had dismissed the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law claims as dependent on the FDCPA claim. Because the Ninth Circuit reversed the § 1692g dismissal, it also reversed the dismissal of the dependent § 1692e(5), Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims and remanded for further proceedings.

Did the downloaded source set show a final result after remand?

No. The source set used for this page contains the published Ninth Circuit reversal and remand. It does not include a post-remand settlement, damages award, or final liability judgment, so the public page should describe the appellate holding rather than claim a final post-remand outcome.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-56927)
Court / tribunalFederal Court
Decision / key dateJanuary 13, 2017
Judge / panelRichard A. Paez (Circuit Judge, author), Dorothy W. Nelson (Circuit Judge), Elaine E. Bucklo (U.S. District Judge, N.D. Ill., sitting by designation)
PartiesZakia Mashiri (Plaintiff-Appellant), a homeowner and member of the Westwood Club homeowners' association, v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt (Defendants-Appellees), the law firm and lawyer who sent an assessment-collection letter on the HOA's behalf.
Governing law
  • Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (debt validation notice; overshadowing/inconsistency)
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (nonjudicial enforcement of a security interest)
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692e / § 1692e(5) (false or misleading representations)
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (definition of 'debt')
  • 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (definition of 'debt collector')
  • Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et seq.
  • California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.
  • Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670, 5675
Topics
FDCPAAssessmentsLiensForeclosureProcedure
Outcome / holding

The Ninth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that Mashiri stated a plausible FDCPA claim because, judged by the 'least sophisticated debtor' standard, the collection letter contained language that overshadowed and conflicted with her 15 U.S.C. § 1692g debt-validation rights. The panel further held that a debt collector who sends such a letter to collect an overdue assessment is subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, not merely the limitations of § 1692f(6), because it was collecting a debt and not merely enforcing an already-existing security interest. The ruling was a pleading-stage appellate reversal and remand, not a post-remand damages or liability judgment in the downloaded source set.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewMashiri v. Epsten Grinnell – FDCPA HOA Collection Letter
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions7 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Zakia Mashiri owns a home in San Diego and is a member of the Westwood Club homeowners' association, which levies annual assessments. After she failed to timely pay a $385 assessment fee levied in July 2012, the HOA's collection law firm, Epsten Grinnell & Howell, and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt sent her a May 1, 2013 letter (the 'May Notice') demanding $598 in assessments plus late, administrative, and legal fees, and warning that failure to pay within thirty-five days would result in a lien on her property. The same letter also contained federal debt-validation language telling her she had thirty days to dispute the debt. Mashiri sued under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), California's Rosenthal Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law, alleging the letter's payment deadline and lien threat overshadowed and contradicted her right to dispute the debt. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reversed. Applying the 'least sophisticated debtor' standard, it held Mashiri stated a plausible 15 U.S.C. § 1692g violation because the letter demanded payment within thirty-five days of its date (inconsistent with the thirty-day dispute window running from receipt) and threatened a lien regardless of any dispute. The panel also rejected Epsten's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it was subject only to § 1692f(6); it held Epsten was a debt collector subject to the full scope of the FDCPA. The court reversed and remanded. The source set for this page is the 2017 published Ninth Circuit opinion. It does not include a post-remand final disposition, damages award, or settlement record, so the page summarizes the precedential appellate ruling and does not claim a final liability judgment after remand.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the panel accepted the complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true and asked whether they stated a claim 'plausible on its face' under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. It framed the FDCPA's purpose as eliminating abusive debt-collection practices and subjecting 'debt collectors' to civil liability. The court first addressed Epsten's threshold argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that because it sought only to perfect a security interest it was governed solely by 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). Although arguments raised for the first time on appeal are ordinarily forfeited, the panel reached this one because it was purely legal, the pertinent facts were undisputed, and Mashiri had responded to it. On the merits, the court held the overdue assessment was a 'debt' under § 1692a(5) because it arose from Mashiri's household membership in the HOA, and the May Notice plainly sought to collect it. Relying on Ho v. ReconTrust, the panel reasoned that entities enforcing security interests are debt collectors when their activities constitute debt collection; unlike the trustee in Ho, who merely sent a notice of default without demanding payment, Epsten demanded payment and there was as yet no recorded lien to enforce. Epsten was therefore subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, including § 1692g and § 1692e. Turning to § 1692g, the court explained that a validation notice must be conveyed effectively (Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service) and must not be overshadowed by or inconsistent with other messages that would confuse the least sophisticated debtor (Terran v. Kaplan). The panel found two plausible violations: first, demanding payment within thirty-five days of the letter's date conflicted with the debtor's thirty-day dispute period measured from receipt, because a debtor might receive the letter with fewer than thirty days remaining and would have to forgo her dispute rights to avoid a lien; second, the statement that a lien 'will' be recorded upon nonpayment overshadowed the right to dispute, because the least sophisticated debtor would wrongly believe a lien would be recorded on the thirty-fifth day even after disputing the debt. The court distinguished Shimek v. Weissman (governed by Georgia law permitting contemporaneous lien filing) and explained that under California's Davis-Stirling Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670) an HOA must give thirty days' notice and participate in dispute resolution before recording a lien, so the FDCPA duty to suspend collection pending verification was fully consistent with state law. Accordingly, the threat to record a lien was a debt-collection activity that had to cease upon a dispute, and the letter's failure to convey that effectively stated a plausible § 1692g violation. Reversing the § 1692g dismissal required reversing the dependent § 1692e(5), Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims as well.

Why It Matters

For homeowners' associations and the law firms that collect their assessments, this published Ninth Circuit decision confirms that a single letter can be both a Davis-Stirling pre-lien notice and full-blown FDCPA debt collection. A collector cannot escape § 1692g simply by saying it was 'perfecting a security interest' when no lien yet exists and the letter demands payment. Practically, collection letters must give the consumer the full thirty-day dispute window measured from receipt, must not set a payment deadline that effectively shortens that window, and must not threaten that a lien 'will' be recorded in a way that suggests the threat survives a timely dispute. Because the FDCPA requires collection to cease once the debtor disputes the debt and until verification is mailed, a lien threat that ignores that pause can overshadow the validation notice and expose the firm to liability.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision carries direct weight even though it arose under California's Davis-Stirling Act. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, so it binds Arizona's federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides. Arizona HOAs collect assessments under a different state statutory scheme, but the FDCPA is federal law that applies the same way to Arizona assessment-collection letters. An Arizona homeowner who receives a demand letter from an HOA collection firm has the same right to a clear, unobstructed thirty-day validation notice, and firms operating in Arizona should ensure their letters do not let assessment deadlines or lien warnings overshadow that federal right.

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Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unmarried man: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Lien Foreclosure | A.R.S. §§ 12-341, 12-341.01 | 2 CA-CV 2025-0138

An unpublished Division Two memorandum decision affirming an HOA assessment-lien foreclosure — and a cautionary example of how a self-represented appeal can be waived for lack of legal authority and argument.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unmarried man, 2 CA-CV 2025-0138.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-03-19. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unmarried man (2 CA-CV 2025-0138) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Affirmed. A self-represented (in propria persona) appellant is held to the same procedural standards as a licensed attorney; an appellant whose briefs cite no supporting legal authority and develop no legal argument waives appellate review, and the appellate court will not reweigh evidence already considered by the trial court.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debabrata Gupta (Defendant/Appellant)
    Homeowner; self-represented (in propria persona / pro se); listed as an unmarried man of Scottsdale.

Respondent Side

  • Desert Crown III Homeowners Association (Plaintiff/Appellee)
    Arizona nonprofit corporation
    The homeowners association that filed the lien-foreclosure suit; prevailing party on appeal.
  • Garren R. Laymon (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan P.C., Mesa
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Desert Crown III Homeowners Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Judge Eckerstrom (Judge (author of the decision))
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Authored the memorandum decision of the court.
  • Presiding Judge Gard (Presiding Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Concurred in the decision.
  • Judge O'Neil (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Concurred in the decision.
  • Hon. Adam D. Driggs (Superior Court Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Trial judge whose judgment was affirmed on appeal.

What happened

Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, initiated a lien-foreclosure suit against homeowner Debabrata Gupta in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023096287).

The superior court granted the association’s motion to dismiss Gupta’s counterclaim.

The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the association.

The superior court denied Gupta’s motion for reconsideration and entered judgment against him as to the lien foreclosure.

Gupta, representing himself (in propria persona), appealed, arguing the superior court erred in finding a factual basis for the monetary claims underlying the judgment.

The Court of Appeals held Gupta to the same procedural standards as a represented appellant.

The court found Gupta’s opening brief cited no legal authority and that his reply brief cited Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., without developing any legal argument, warranting waiver of appellate review.

The court noted that, even reaching the merits, it would not reweigh the evidence as Gupta requested.

On March 19, 2026, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed the superior court’s judgment in an unpublished memorandum decision, denied the association’s request for attorney fees, and awarded it costs on appeal as the prevailing party.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unmarried man (2 CA-CV 2025-0138). Affirmed. A self-represented (in propria persona) appellant is held to the same procedural standards as a licensed… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Desert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unmarried man. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Date not specified Desert Crown III Homeowners Association initiates a lien-foreclosure suit against Debabrata Gupta in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023096287).
Step Date not specified Superior court grants the association's motion to dismiss Gupta's counterclaim.
Step Date not specified Superior court grants summary judgment in favor of the association.
Step Date not specified Superior court denies Gupta's motion for reconsideration and enters a lien-foreclosure judgment against him.
Step Date not specified Gupta, self-represented, appeals to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two (No. 2 CA-CV 2025-0138).
Step 2026-03-19 Court of Appeals, Division Two, files an unpublished memorandum decision affirming the superior court's judgment.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

FAQ

What was Desert Crown III Homeowners Association v. Gupta about?

Desert Crown III Homeowners Association sued homeowner Debabrata Gupta in Maricopa County Superior Court to foreclose an assessment lien. The superior court dismissed Gupta’s counterclaim, granted summary judgment for the association, and entered a lien-foreclosure judgment. Gupta appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed.

Why did Gupta lose the appeal?

The Court of Appeals held that Gupta’s appeal was procedurally deficient: his opening brief cited no legal authority as required by Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A), and although his reply brief cited Rule 403 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, he developed no legal argument. These deficiencies warranted waiver of appellate review. The court also noted that, even reaching the merits, it would not reweigh the evidence.

Does it matter that Gupta represented himself?

The court afforded Gupta, who appeared in propria persona (pro se), the same consideration as a represented appellant and held him to the same familiarity with court procedures and rules expected of a lawyer. Representing himself did not lower the procedural standards he had to meet.

Did the association get its attorney fees and costs?

The association requested attorney fees and costs under Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01. The court exercised its discretion to deny attorney fees, but awarded the association its costs on appeal as the prevailing party under A.R.S. § 12-341.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and does not create legal precedent. It may not be cited except as authorized by applicable rules (see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f)). It is offered here only as an educational illustration of how assessment-foreclosure appeals are handled.

What is the practical takeaway for homeowners and associations?

An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence a trial court considered, and a brief that cites no legal authority and develops no legal argument can result in the issues being waived. Disagreeing with a trial court’s factual findings, without identifying a specific legal error supported by authority, is unlikely to succeed on appeal.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2025-0138
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMarch 19, 2026
Judge / panelJudge Eckerstrom (author), Presiding Judge Gard, Judge O'Neil, Hon. Adam D. Driggs (Maricopa County Superior Court)
PartiesDesert Crown III Homeowners Association v. Debabrata Gupta
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-120.21
  • A.R.S. § 12-2101
  • A.R.S. § 12-341
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

Affirmed. A self-represented (in propria persona) appellant is held to the same procedural standards as a licensed attorney; an appellant whose briefs cite no supporting legal authority and develop no legal argument waives appellate review, and the appellate court will not reweigh evidence already considered by the trial court.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewDesert Crown III Homeowners Association, an Arizona nonprofit corporation v. Debabrata Gupta, an unm
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Desert Crown III Homeowners Association sued homeowner Debabrata Gupta in Maricopa County Superior Court to foreclose an assessment lien on his property. The superior court granted the association's motion to dismiss Gupta's counterclaim, granted summary judgment for the association, denied Gupta's motion for reconsideration, and entered a lien-foreclosure judgment against him. Representing himself, Gupta appealed, arguing the superior court lacked a factual basis for the monetary claims underlying the judgment. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision. The court held that a self-represented appellant is held to the same procedural standards as a licensed attorney, and that Gupta's briefs cited no supporting legal authority and developed no legal argument, which waived appellate review. The court added that, even reaching the merits, it would not reweigh the evidence as Gupta requested. It denied the association's request for attorney fees but awarded it costs on appeal as the prevailing party.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court's decision (Tucson Estates Property Owners Ass'n v. Jenkins, 247 Ariz. 475, ¶ 2 (App. 2019)), the court confirmed it had jurisdiction over the appeal under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1). Although Gupta represented himself, the court explained that a self-represented litigant is afforded the same consideration as a represented appellant and is held to the same familiarity with court procedures and rules expected of a lawyer (Higgins v. Higgins, 194 Ariz. 266, ¶ 12 (App. 1999)).

The court found Gupta's appeal procedurally deficient. His opening brief cited no legal authority to support his claim of error, contrary to Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A), which requires citations of legal authority and references to the record for each issue. While his reply brief cited Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., he developed no supporting legal argument. Citing Ritchie v. Krasner, Boswell v. Fintelmann, and Sholes v. Fernando, the court held these deficiencies warranted waiver of appellate review.

Even if it reached the argument, the court noted Gupta was effectively asking it to reweigh the evidence, which is not part of an appellate court's duty on review (Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, ¶ 16 (App. 2009)). On fees, the court exercised its discretion to deny the association's request for attorney fees under Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01, but awarded the association its costs on appeal as the prevailing party under A.R.S. § 12-341.

Why It Matters

This is a current, real-world example of how Arizona courts handle an appeal from an HOA assessment-lien foreclosure judgment, and of the practical risk of appealing without counsel. The decision illustrates two recurring points for homeowners and associations: self-represented litigants are held to the same procedural rules as attorneys, and an appellate brief that cites no legal authority and develops no legal argument can be deemed to waive the issues entirely. It also shows that appellate courts will not reweigh the evidence a trial court considered, so disagreement with the trial court's factual findings is unlikely to succeed on appeal without identifying a legal error. Because the decision is unpublished, it does not create binding precedent, but it is instructive about how assessment-foreclosure appeals proceed and the consequences of procedural missteps.

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Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte: Arizona HOA Appellate Case Guide

Assessments | A.R.S. §§ 33-1256, 33-1247, 33-1803 | 2 CA-CV 2025-0183

Division Two affirms summary judgment foreclosing a condominium assessment lien, holding that an owner cannot self-help by withholding assessments even when alleging the association failed to maintain or repair the unit.

Last updated June 30, 2026. Case: Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte, 2 CA-CV 2025-0183.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-02-10. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte (2 CA-CV 2025-0183) as a public Arizona Court of Appeals HOA case guide. The downloadable source-document index below is generated from local raw source files when a PDF opinion is available. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. Any affirmative defense of setoff failed because the owner submitted only unsworn descriptions, photos, fire department reports, and county permits without authentication, and thus produced no admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 and Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a); self-representation does not excuse compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence. The 20% annual assessment-increase limit in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies only to planned communities, from which condominiums are expressly excluded under A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii), and A.R.S. § 33-1242 imposes no limit on assessment increases. The owner’s argument that assessments could not be charged while the property was condemned was not considered because it was raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay where the owner posted no supersedeas bond, did not move for a stay in the appellate court, and had not yet filed his contemplated damages action. Summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure were affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. (Party)
  • Travis L. Nolte (Party)
  • John J. Halk (Counsel)
    Halk, Oetinger and Brown PLLC
  • Andrea J. Miska (Counsel)
    Halk, Oetinger and Brown PLLC
  • Travis Nolte (Counsel)
    In Propria Persona
  • Judge Sklar (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
  • Presiding Judge Kelly (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
  • Judge Brearcliffe (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
  • The Honorable Greg Sakall (Judge)
    Pima County Superior Court

What happened

Travis Nolte purchased a condominium unit in Barcelona Manor in 2017, subject to a Declaration of CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments.

Nolte stopped paying assessments; in July 2022 the association recorded a lien notice for nonpayment and later obtained a money judgment against him for breach of contract.

Nolte alleged that since 2020 three floods and a fire (linked to a shared drainage pipe serving units above his) left the unit without drywall or cabinets and filled with mold, and that the county condemned the property between 2022 and 2024.

In May 2024 the association sued to foreclose its assessment lien; Nolte answered, contending he was excused from paying because the association failed to repair the property.

The association moved for summary judgment under A.R.S. § 33-1256(A) and the CC&Rs Nolte argued he could withhold assessments until repairs were made.

The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on whether Nolte’s negligence allegations, if true, would create a legally recognizable defense or counterclaim, then granted summary judgment for the association.

Nolte’s motion for reconsideration was denied; his motion to stay collection was denied in the final order and decree of foreclosure; Nolte appealed.

The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed on February 10, 2026, and awarded the association its appellate attorney fees and costs under the CC&Rs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte (2 CA-CV 2025-0183). Condo owners cannot withhold assessments as self-help even when alleging association nonperformance. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Barcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017 Nolte purchased a condominium unit in Barcelona Manor, subject to the Declaration of CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments.
Step 2020 Beginning in 2020, three flooding incidents and a fire allegedly damaged the unit, leaving it without drywall or cabinets and filled with mold.
Step 2022-07 Barcelona Manor filed a lien notice for nonpayment of assessments.
Step 2022 The county began a roughly 28-month period (through 2024) during which the property was condemned due to fire and flood damage.
Step 2024-05 Barcelona Manor filed this action to foreclose its assessment lien in Pima County Superior Court (No. C20242617).
Step 2026-02-10 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure and awarded the association appellate attorney fees.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2026-02-10

Memorandum Decision

Type: Decision or judgment

Memorandum decision holding that a condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none.

FAQ

Can a condominium owner stop paying assessments if the association fails to make repairs?

No. The Court of Appeals held there is no self-help remedy that lets a condominium owner withhold monthly assessments, even if the association breached its statutory duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) to maintain, repair, and replace common elements. Nolte cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. An owner who believes the association breached its duties must pursue a recognized legal claim rather than simply not paying.

Why did the owner's claim that the property was uninhabitable not defeat the foreclosure?

The court treated his theory as a possible setoff defense but held he failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact. To oppose summary judgment, a party must cite specific, admissible evidence. Nolte offered only an unsworn description of the damage, photos, fire department reports, and county permits, none of which were authenticated under Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a), so they were inadmissible and could not be considered.

Does the 20% annual cap on assessment increases apply to condominiums?

No. The 20% one-year limit on regular assessment increases in A.R.S. § 33-1803 is part of the statutory scheme governing planned communities, and A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii) expressly excludes condominiums from that scheme. The court also noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242 authorizes a condominium association to collect common-expense assessments but does not cap increases.

Why didn't the court address the argument about assessments accruing while the unit was condemned?

The court declined to reach that argument because Nolte raised it for the first time in his motion for reconsideration in the trial court. Under Arizona law, an appellate court generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on reconsideration unless the facts or arguments were unavailable when the challenged ruling was entered.

Does representing yourself change the rules that apply?

No. The court emphasized that although Nolte was not represented by counsel, he was still required to comply with the rules of civil procedure and evidence. Self-represented litigants must, for example, authenticate exhibits and support disputed facts with admissible evidence just as represented parties must.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision marked NOT FOR PUBLICATION. It does not create legal precedent and may not be cited except as authorized by applicable rules (see Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c) and Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28). It is useful as an educational example rather than as binding authority.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2025-0183
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateFebruary 10, 2026
Judge / panelPeter J. Eckerstrom Sklar (Judge Sklar, author), Presiding Judge Kelly, Judge Brearcliffe
PartiesA condominium association (Barcelona Manor Association, Inc.) sued to foreclose its assessment lien against a unit owner (Travis L. Nolte), who argued he could withhold assessments because the association failed to repair flood and fire damage that left his unit uninhabitable.
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

A condominium unit owner has no self-help remedy to withhold monthly assessments, even when alleging that the association breached its statutory maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); the owner cited no authority granting such a right, and the court found none. Any affirmative defense of setoff failed because the owner submitted only unsworn descriptions, photos, fire department reports, and county permits without authentication, and thus produced no admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56 and Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a); self-representation does not excuse compliance with the rules of procedure and evidence. The 20% annual assessment-increase limit in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies only to planned communities, from which condominiums are expressly excluded under A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii), and A.R.S. § 33-1242 imposes no limit on assessment increases. The owner's argument that assessments could not be charged while the property was condemned was not considered because it was raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay where the owner posted no supersedeas bond, did not move for a stay in the appellate court, and had not yet filed his contemplated damages action. Summary judgment and the decree of foreclosure were affirmed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewBarcelona Manor Association, Inc. v. Travis L. Nolte
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Travis Nolte bought a condominium in Barcelona Manor in 2017, subject to CC&Rs requiring monthly assessments. After he stopped paying, the association recorded an assessment lien in July 2022, obtained a money judgment for breach of contract, and in May 2024 sued to foreclose the lien. Nolte argued he was excused from paying because the association allegedly failed to repair shared-drainage flooding and fire damage that left the unit moldy, gutted, and condemned by the county from 2022 to 2024. The trial court granted summary judgment for the association and denied Nolte's request to stay collection. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed. It held that Arizona law gives a condominium owner no self-help right to withhold assessments even if the association breached its maintenance duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A); that any setoff defense failed because Nolte offered no admissible, authenticated evidence; that the 20% assessment-increase cap in A.R.S. § 33-1803 governs planned communities and does not apply to condominiums; and that his condemnation argument was waived because he raised it for the first time on reconsideration. The court also upheld the denial of a stay and awarded the association its appellate attorney fees under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

The court reviewed summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Nolte, and addressed his three challenges in turn. On the central question, it agreed with the trial court that nothing in Arizona law lets a condominium owner withhold assessments as self-help. Even assuming the association violated its duty under A.R.S. § 33-1247(A) to maintain, repair, and replace common elements, that statute supplies no remedy of nonpayment, and Nolte identified no other authority creating such a right. The court next considered whether his position could be recast as the affirmative defense of setoff, citing Granmo v. Superior Court. It assumed without deciding that setoff might be theoretically available, but held Nolte failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact because a party opposing summary judgment must support each disputed fact with specific, admissible evidence under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Nolte's unsworn narrative, photographs, fire department reports, and county work permits were not authenticated under Ariz. R. Evid. 901(a) and were therefore inadmissible, and his self-represented status did not relieve him of compliance with the rules.

The court then rejected Nolte's statutory cap argument. The 20% one-year limit on regular assessment increases in A.R.S. § 33-1803 sits within the statutory scheme for planned communities, and A.R.S. § 33-1802(6)(b)(ii) expressly excludes condominiums from that scheme, so the cap did not constrain Barcelona Manor. A.R.S. § 33-1242 was also unavailing because, while it authorizes a condominium association to collect common-expense assessments, it imposes no ceiling on increases. The court declined to reach Nolte's argument that no assessments could accrue while the unit was condemned, applying the rule from RT Automotive Center v. Westlake Services that an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration absent newly available facts or arguments.

Finally, the court upheld the denial of a stay, reviewed for abuse of discretion. A defendant seeking to halt enforcement of a judgment may post a supersedeas bond under Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 7(a) or move for a stay in the appellate court under Rule 7(c); Nolte did neither, and he cited no authority allowing a stay to persist past issuance of the appellate mandate. Even assuming a stay were available, the discretionary factors from Apache Produce Imports and Tonnemacher did not favor Nolte because he had not yet filed a separate damages action and judgment had already been entered. As the prevailing party, the association was entitled to its appellate attorney fees and costs under Section 13.2(B) of the CC&Rs upon compliance with Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21(b).

Why It Matters

This memorandum decision illustrates, in the condominium context, a principle that closely parallels Arizona HOA assessment disputes: an owner generally cannot engage in self-help by simply withholding assessments, even when alleging that the association neglected its own maintenance and repair obligations. The court explains that the statutory maintenance duty (A.R.S. § 33-1247(A)) does not carry a built-in remedy of nonpayment, and that an owner who believes the association breached its duties must pursue a recognized legal avenue and support it with admissible evidence rather than treating unpaid assessments as leverage. The decision also clarifies that the 20% annual assessment-increase cap in A.R.S. § 33-1803 applies to planned communities, not condominiums, a distinction owners and boards frequently confuse. For self-represented owners, it underscores that the rules of civil procedure and evidence apply equally to them, that exhibits must be authenticated to be considered on summary judgment, and that arguments must be preserved (not raised for the first time on reconsideration) to be reviewed on appeal. Because the decision is unpublished, it does not create binding precedent, but it is a useful educational example of how Arizona courts approach assessment-lien foreclosures and condition-of-property defenses.

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Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia: HOA Foreclosure Right Fixed at Filing

HOA Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | 1 CA-CV 18-0276

This landmark Arizona case establishes that a homeowner cannot defeat an HOA foreclosure action by bringing delinquent assessments current after the lawsuit is filed. The court ruled that the right to foreclose is fixed at filing, allowing the HOA to proceed to collect outstanding legal fees.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Laveen Meadows, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 18-0276; opinion affirming.

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Scope note: This page covers the trial and appellate litigation history of Laveen Meadows v. Mejia, a precedential Arizona decision holding that a homeowner’s post-filing payment of delinquent assessments does not eliminate an association’s statutory right to foreclose for unawarded attorneys’ fees. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an association’s statutory right to foreclose its assessment lien is determined as of the date the foreclosure action is filed, and a homeowner’s subsequent partial payment of delinquent assessments does not divest the court of jurisdiction or eliminate the association’s right to pursue foreclosure for remaining fees and costs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Arizona nonprofit corporation that initiated the foreclosure action for delinquent assessments.
  • Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Lead counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. throughout the case and appeal.
  • W. William Nikolaus (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. in trial and appellate proceedings.
  • Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc., participated in default and evidentiary hearings.
  • Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel representing Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. in drafting default-related and appellate briefs.
  • Heather Yearack (Witness)
    Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Witness/representative for Laveen Meadows who testified regarding Mejia's assessment ledger and late fees at the evidentiary hearing.
  • Mohammed al Sayed (Board Member)
    Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Laveen Meadows board member who attended the June 2, 2017 superior court hearing.
  • Lisa Riesland (Other)
    Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association / Management Company
    Community manager for Laveen Meadows, mentioned by witness Yearack in testimony.

Respondent Side

  • Carlos Mejia (Defendant)
    Homeowner of Lot 63, Laveen Meadows Parcel 2
    Homeowner who appealed the denial of his motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Lead counsel representing Defendant Carlos Mejia on appeal.
  • Jacob A. Kubert (Counsel)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Co-counsel representing Carlos Mejia in both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
  • David E. Wood (Counsel)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Additional in-firm counsel representing Carlos Mejia during the appellate proceedings.
  • Paul Monaghan (Witness)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Witness for Carlos Mejia who testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding Mejia's assessment payment of $5,000.
  • Davina Bressler (Counsel)
    Maricopa County Attorney's Office
    Deputy County Attorney representing Defendant State of Arizona, which disclaimed interest and was dismissed.
  • State of Arizona (Defendant)
    State of Arizona, Maricopa County Finance Department Collections Unit
    Named as defendant due to a criminal restitution lien; filed a Disclaimer of Interest and was dismissed.
  • Lexington National Insurance Corporation (Defendant)
    Lexington National Insurance Corporation
    Named as defendant due to a recorded Deed of Trust; failed to appear and defaulted.
  • US Immigration Bonds and Insurance Services, Inc. (Defendant)
    US Immigration Bonds and Insurance Services, Inc.
    Named as defendant due to a recorded Deed of Trust; failed to appear and defaulted.
  • United States of America (Defendant)
    Department of the Treasury – Internal Revenue Service
    Named as defendant due to a federal tax lien; filed a Disclaimer of Interest and was dismissed with prejudice.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. Margaret E. Benny (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Judge Pro Tempore/Commissioner who presided over the trial court proceedings, entered default judgment, and denied Rule 60(b) motion.
  • Hon. Maria Elena Cruz (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Presiding Judge who delivered the decision of the appellate court affirming the foreclosure judgment.
  • Hon. Kenton D. Jones (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Appellate judge on the panel who joined the majority opinion affirming the foreclosure judgment.
  • Hon. Kent E. Cattani (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Appellate judge who dissented, arguing that Mejia's payment of assessments precluded foreclosure.
  • Hon. Michael J. Brown (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Appellate judge who was substituted for Judge Jones on the panel for the subsequent attorneys' fees order.
  • Hon. Peter B. Swann (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals who signed the administrative memorandum substituting Judge Brown on the panel.
  • Hon. James P. Beene (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals / Arizona Supreme Court
    Signed appellate procedural orders as Presiding Judge of Department M and Supreme Court orders as Duty Justice.
  • Hon. Melina Brill (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Judge Pro Tempore who signed initial procedural and dismissal orders on appeal.

What happened

In May 2016, Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association filed a judicial foreclosure complaint against homeowner Carlos Mejia, alleging that he was delinquent on assessments for over a year and in an amount exceeding $1,200. Mejia failed to file a timely answer, and the Association obtained an entry of default in December 2016.

Before the court entered default judgment, Mejia retained counsel and paid $5,000 – an amount that exceeded his delinquent assessments and late fees but did not cover the substantial attorneys’ fees the Association had incurred. Mejia moved to set aside the default, arguing that his payment eliminated the statutory basis for foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The trial court denied the motion and entered a judgment of foreclosure, recording a negative principal balance of -$2,152.08 (reflecting Mejia’s overpayment of assessments) but ordering foreclosure of the lien to satisfy $11,190.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,012.25 in costs. Mejia appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia (1 CA-CV 18-0276). HOA lien foreclosure judgment properly included assessments, fees, and statutory lien priorities. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-05-11 Complaint filed in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking foreclosure of assessment lien.
Step 2016-05-12 Carlos Mejia served with the Summons and Complaint by a private process server.
Step 2016-07-13 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Dismissal of Defendant State of Arizona.
Step 2016-08-22 IRS files Disclaimer of Interest; Laveen Meadows files Notice of Dismissal of Defendant United States of America.
Step 2016-10-12 Superior Court enters 150-Day Order Minute Entry.
Step 2016-12-08 Laveen Meadows files Application and Affidavit for Entry of Default against Carlos Mejia.
Step 2017-04-03 Laveen Meadows files Motion and Affidavit for Entry of Default Judgment, China Doll fee affidavit, and Statement of Costs.
Step 2017-04-14 Dessaules Law Group files Notice of Appearance for Carlos Mejia; Mejia files Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default, Answer, and Notice of Payment of $5,000 assessments.
Step 2017-04-17 Default hearing held; Superior Court resets hearing to June 2, 2017 to allow briefing on Mejia's Motion to Set Aside Default.
Step 2017-04-28 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default.
Step 2017-05-10 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default.
Step 2017-05-19 Laveen Meadows files Motion to Strike Mejia's Reply for improperly citing unpublished trial court rulings.
Step 2017-05-24 Mejia files Response to Motion to Strike and attaches copies of the cited trial court rulings.
Step 2017-05-26 Laveen Meadows files Reply to Motion to Strike and Notice of Exhibits for the damages hearing.
Step 2017-06-02 Hearing held; Superior Court grants Laveen Meadows' Motion to Strike and denies Mejia's Motion to Set Aside Default; schedules evidentiary hearing on damages.
Step 2017-06-06 Superior Court signs Order formally denying Mejia's Motion to Set Aside Default.
Step 2017-06-09 Mejia files Defendant's Hearing Memorandum regarding damages and right of foreclosure.
Step 2017-06-19 Laveen Meadows files Pre-Hearing Memorandum, Supplemental China Doll Fee Affidavit, and Supplemental Application for Attorney Fees.
Step 2017-06-20 Default Evidentiary Hearing on damages held; Heather Yearack and Paul Monaghan testify; Court takes matter under advisement.
Step 2017-07-03 Mejia files Objection to Proposed Judgment, Objection to Statement of Costs, and Response to Fee Application.
Step 2017-07-14 Laveen Meadows files Replies in support of its Proposed Judgment, Fee Application, and Statement of Costs.
Step 2017-08-04 Superior Court signs and files Judgment of Foreclosure, awarding -$2,152.08 principal, $11,190.00 in attorney's fees, and $1,012.25 in costs.
Step 2017-08-16 Mejia files Notice of Appeal, initiating case 1 CA-CV 17-0539.
Step 2017-08-17 Mejia files Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond and Stay Enforcement of Judgment in Superior Court.
Step 2017-08-31 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Cross-Appeal.
Step 2017-09-28 Superior Court sets Mejia's supersedeas bond at $0.00 and stays enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.
Step 2017-12-07 Court of Appeals issues Order terminating stay and dismissing appeal 1 CA-CV 17-0539 for lack of jurisdiction because a direct appeal cannot be taken from a default judgment without first seeking Rule 60(b) relief.
Step 2017-12-20 Mejia files Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment under Rule 60(b) in Superior Court; Court of Appeals dismisses the Association's cross-appeal.
Step 2018-01-10 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Mejia's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
Step 2018-01-30 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
Step 2018-03-28 Superior Court enters signed Minute Entry denying Mejia's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and permitting Association to apply for post-judgment fees.
Step 2018-04-05 Laveen Meadows files Post-Judgment Application for Attorney Fees ($7,680.00) and Statement of Costs ($98.51).
Step 2018-04-20 Superior Court signs Order granting Laveen Meadows' post-judgment attorney's fees and costs.
Step 2018-04-25 Mejia files Notice of Appeal, initiating case 1 CA-CV 18-0276.
Step 2018-05-16 Mejia files Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond and Stay Enforcement of Judgment in Superior Court.
Step 2018-05-31 Appellate clerk files Index of Record from Superior Court for case 1 CA-CV 18-0276.
Step 2018-06-12 Court of Appeals dismisses appeal 1 CA-CV 18-0276 for lack of jurisdiction, believing the Superior Court's April 20, 2018 fees order had not been resolved or signed.
Step 2018-06-14 Mejia files Motion for Reconsideration and to Reinstate Appeal in Court of Appeals, attaching the signed April 20 order; also files duplicate Motion to Set Supersedeas Bond in Superior Court.
Step 2018-07-10 Mejia files Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.
Step 2018-07-13 Court of Appeals enters Order vacating its dismissal and reinstating appeal 1 CA-CV 18-0276; Mejia files Notice of No Response to his bond motion in Superior Court.
Step 2018-07-23 Mejia files Case Management Statement and Notice of Transcript Order in the Court of Appeals.
Step 2018-09-12 Mejia files Appellant's Opening Brief.
Step 2018-11-21 Laveen Meadows files Appellee's Answering Brief.
Step 2018-11-26 Laveen Meadows files Motion for Leave to Have Clerical Error Corrected by the Trial Court.
Step 2019-01-07 Mejia files Response opposing Laveen Meadows' Motion to Correct Clerical Error.
Step 2019-01-14 Laveen Meadows files Reply in Support of Motion to Correct Clerical Error.
Step 2019-01-28 Court of Appeals enters Order denying Laveen Meadows' Motion to Correct Clerical Error.
Step 2019-03-26 Mejia files Appellant's Reply Brief.
Step 2019-04-23 Mejia files Request for Oral Argument.
Step 2019-05-01 Court of Appeals enters Order granting the request for oral argument.
Step 2019-07-24 Laveen Meadows files Notice of New Binding Authority regarding the 2019 legislative amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1807.
Step 2019-07-29 Mejia files Motion to Strike Notice of New Authority or, alternatively, to order supplemental briefing.
Step 2019-08-07 Laveen Meadows files Response in Opposition to Mejia's Motion to Strike Notice of New Authority.
Step 2019-08-13 Court of Appeals enters Order granting request for supplemental briefs on the meaning and application of newly-amended A.R.S. § 33-1807.
Step 2019-08-27 Both parties file simultaneous Supplemental Briefs in the Court of Appeals.
Step 2019-09-03 Oral argument held before Court of Appeals Department A.
Step 2020-05-01 Court of Appeals enters Order amending the short caption to 'Laveen Meadows v. Mejia.'
Step 2020-05-05 Court of Appeals files its published Opinion affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure.
Step 2020-05-20 Mejia files Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.
Step 2020-05-26 Court of Appeals enters Order denying Mejia's Motion for Reconsideration.
Step 2020-06-04 Mejia files Petition for Review in the Arizona Supreme Court, assigned No. CV-20-0167-PR.
Step 2020-06-18 Court of Appeals enters Order granting Laveen Meadows' appellate attorney's fees ($33,005.00) and costs ($512.00).
Step 2020-09-22 Arizona Supreme Court enters Order denying Mejia's Petition for Review and granting Laveen Meadows' request for Supreme Court attorney's fees.
Step 2020-11-25 Laveen Meadows files Notice of Settlement in the Arizona Supreme Court.
Step 2020-11-30 Arizona Supreme Court enters Order dismissing the pending fee applications following settlement of the matter.
Step 2020-12-03 Court of Appeals issues its Civil Mandate to the trial court, concluding the appellate proceedings.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 234 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2018-05-24

0000 Index Of Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2018-05-24

0001 Complaint

Type: Opening pleading

Starts or reframes the case and identifies the claims or relief requested.

Download source file
Source 4 2018-05-24

0003 Civil Cover Sheet

Type: Court/source PDF

Court intake document classifying the case for filing and assignment purposes.

Source 5 2018-05-24

0004 Notice Of Lis Pendens

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 7 2018-05-24

0006 Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 10 2018-05-24

0009 Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 11 2018-05-24

0010 Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 13 2018-05-24

0012 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 14 2018-05-24

0013 Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 17 2018-05-24

0016 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 18 2018-05-24

0017 Summons

Type: Procedural/service filing

Service document used to notify a defendant or respondent that the case has been filed.

Download source file
Source 29 2018-05-24

0028 Motion And Affidavit For Entry Of Ju

Type: Declaration or affidavit

Witness statement submitted under oath or declaration; its assertions are evidence offered by a party, not court findings.

Source 33 2018-05-24

0032 Notice Of Appearance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 39 2018-05-24

0038 Credit Memo

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 40 2018-05-24

0039 Minute Entry Hearing Set 04172017

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 57 2018-05-24

0056 Reply To Motion To Strike

Type: Motion/application

Reply paper; usually the final written response before the court takes the issue under advisement.

Source 59 2018-05-24

0058 Minute Entry Hearing Set 06022017

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 60 2018-05-24

0059 Defendants Hearing Memorandum

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 69 2018-05-24

0068 Minute Entry Hearing 06202017

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 77 2018-05-24

0076 Judgment Of Foreclosure

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 78 2018-05-24

0077 Minute Entry Judgment Signed 08042017

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 79 2018-05-24

0078 Exhibit Worksheet Hd 06202017

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 80 2018-05-24

0079 Notice Of Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 85 2018-05-24

0084 Court Of Appeals Receipt

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 86 2018-05-24

0085 Electronic Index Of Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 88 2018-05-24

0087 Court Of Appeals Receipt

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 106 2018-05-24

0105 Notice Of Appeal

Type: Procedural/service filing

Moves the dispute into appellate or judicial-review procedure; use it to track the next forum.

Source 111 2018-06-12

0000 Order Dismissing Appeal

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 113 2018-06-14

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 114 2018-06-14

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 115 2018-06-14

0003 Exhibit 1

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 118 2018-06-27

0000 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 119 2018-06-27

0000 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 121 2018-06-28

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 123 2018-07-10

0001 Permission By Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 124 2018-07-10

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 126 2018-07-17

0108 Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 127 2018-07-17

0109 Court Of Appeals Receipt

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 128 2018-07-17

0110 Electronic Index Of Record

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 131 2018-07-17

0113 Court Of Appeals Receipt

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 137 2018-07-23

0000 Case Management Statement

Type: Court/source PDF

Case-management filing; it tells the court how the parties propose to schedule and manage the case.

Source 139 2018-07-23

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 140 2018-07-23

0001 Certificate Of Service 2

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 143 2018-08-09

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 146 2018-09-12

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 147 2018-09-12

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 149 2018-10-16

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 152 2018-11-21

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 153 2018-11-21

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 155 2018-11-26

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 156 2018-11-26

0002 Exhibit A And B

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 159 2018-12-13

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 162 2019-01-07

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 163 2019-01-07

0002 Exhibit A

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 165 2019-01-14

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 166 2019-01-28

0000 Order Denying Motion

Type: Court order/minute entry

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 168 2019-02-14

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 172 2019-03-18

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 173 2019-03-18

0001 Certificate Of Service 2

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 176 2019-03-26

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 177 2019-03-26

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 180 2019-04-23

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 181 2019-04-24

0119 Court Of Appeals Receipt

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 185 2019-07-25

0000 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 187 2019-07-25

0001 Exhibit 1

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 189 2019-07-29

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 192 2019-08-07

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 195 2019-08-12

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 198 2019-08-27

0000 Appellees Supplemental Brief

Type: Briefing paper

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 202 2019-08-27

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 205 2019-08-27

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 206 2019-08-27

0002 Certificate Of Service 2

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 209 2020-05-05

0000 Enotification Of Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 210 2020-05-05

0000 Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an association's statutory right to foreclose its assessment lien is determined as of the date the foreclosure action is filed, and a homeowner's subsequent partial payment of delinquent assessments does not divest the court of jurisdiction or eliminate the association's right to pursue foreclosure for remaining fees and costs.

Download source file
Source 211 2020-05-05

0000 Opinion Distribution List

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 212 2020-05-14

0000 Affidavit In Support Of Applicatio

Type: Declaration or affidavit

Witness statement submitted under oath or declaration; its assertions are evidence offered by a party, not court findings.

Source 214 2020-05-14

0000 Statement Of Costs

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 215 2020-05-14

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 216 2020-05-14

0001 Certificate Of Service 2

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 217 2020-05-14

0001 Exhibit A

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 218 2020-05-20

0000 Motion For Reconsideration

Type: Motion/application

A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.

Source 219 2020-05-20

0001 Certificate Of Compliance

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 220 2020-05-20

0002 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 223 2020-06-02

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 227 2020-06-15

0001 Certificate Of Service

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 234 2020-12-03

0000 Civil Mandate

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

FAQ

Does paying off delinquent assessments after an HOA foreclosure lawsuit is filed stop the foreclosure under Arizona law?

No. In the binding precedent of Laveen Meadows v. Mejia, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that an association’s statutory right to foreclose is determined as of the date the lawsuit is filed. Bringing the assessment balance current after filing does not eliminate the HOA’s right to proceed with foreclosure to recover outstanding attorneys’ fees and costs.

What is the statutory threshold for an HOA to file a foreclosure lawsuit in Arizona?

Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an HOA can only foreclose its assessment lien if the owner has been delinquent in the payment of assessments (excluding collection fees, late charges, and attorneys’ fees) for a period of one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first.

Can an HOA foreclose on a home solely to collect unpaid attorneys' fees and costs?

Yes, if the statutory foreclosure threshold for assessments was met on the date the lawsuit was filed. While attorneys’ fees alone are not foreclosable assessments, if a foreclosure action is properly initiated based on delinquent assessments, the HOA can continue the foreclosure process to recover its reasonable collection fees, attorneys’ fees, and late charges.

Is the Laveen Meadows v. Mejia ruling binding precedent for all Arizona HOAs and homeowners?

Yes. This decision is a published, precedential opinion from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One. It was subsequently clarified and codified by the Arizona Legislature in amendments to A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), confirming that eligibility for foreclosure is determined on the date the action is filed.

How can a homeowner stop an HOA foreclosure once a lawsuit has been filed?

Once a foreclosure action is filed, a homeowner cannot unilaterally stop the process merely by paying the delinquent assessments. To completely stop the foreclosure and redeem the property, the homeowner must satisfy the entire secured debt, which includes all delinquent assessments, late fees, costs, and the HOA’s reasonable attorneys’ fees.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 18-0276
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMay 5, 2020
Judge / panelHon. Margaret E. Benny, Hon. Maria Elena Cruz, Hon. Kenton D. Jones, Hon. Kent E. Cattani
PartiesLaveen Meadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff/Appellee) v. Carlos Mejia (Defendant/Appellant)
Governing law
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The Arizona Court of Appeals held that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), an association's statutory right to foreclose its assessment lien is determined as of the date the foreclosure action is filed, and a homeowner's subsequent partial payment of delinquent assessments does not divest the court of jurisdiction or eliminate the association's right to pursue foreclosure for remaining fees and costs.

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package234 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap66 roadmap entries
Video overviewLaveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions5 questions
Featured download links3 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association filed a judicial foreclosure action against homeowner Carlos Mejia for delinquent assessments exceeding $1,200. Mejia subsequently paid $5,000, which covered the delinquent assessments and late fees but did not cover the HOA's unawarded attorney's fees. Mejia argued that bringing the assessments current eliminated the statutory basis for foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The trial court denied Mejia's motion to set aside the default judgment of foreclosure, holding that the statutory threshold delinquency must exist when the action is filed, and subsequent partial payments do not divest the court of jurisdiction or extinguish the foreclosure right. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a 2-1 opinion, holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), the right to foreclose is determined at the inception of the lawsuit, and subsequent payments towards delinquent assessments do not eliminate the association's right to proceed with foreclosure to recover its outstanding collection fees and attorney's fees.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), concluding that the statutory conditions permitting foreclosure—such as delinquency for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more—act as a triggering event or ripeness element required to initiate the foreclosure action. Once this threshold is met at the time of filing, jurisdiction is established, and subsequent actions or partial payments by the homeowner do not divest the court of jurisdiction or extinguish the association's lien foreclosure right.

The court distinguished the Arizona statute from California's negative phrasing, which explicitly limits the ongoing right to foreclose. It also noted that the Arizona Legislature's post-dispute amendment to § 33-1807(A), adding the phrase 'as determined on the date the action is filed,' serves as a clarifying declaration of the original statute's intent.

The dissenting opinion argued that the majority's decision leads to an absurd result where a homeowner who has paid all delinquent assessments can still have their home foreclosed upon solely to satisfy unawarded and unadjudicated attorney's fees, which are otherwise non-foreclosable under the statute.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners, this case emphasizes the critical risk of allowing HOA assessment delinquencies to reach the statutory thresholds of $1,200 or one year. Once a foreclosure lawsuit is filed, homeowners cannot unilaterally stop the foreclosure process merely by paying the outstanding assessments; they must pay the entire debt, including the HOA's substantial and often unadjudicated attorney's fees, to protect their homes from a sheriff's sale.

For HOA boards and managers, the ruling confirms their leverage in collection actions but also reinforces the necessity of strict compliance with statutory thresholds on the exact date of filing. For legal counsel, it highlights the importance of maintaining an accurate accounting of assessments versus attorney's fees and demonstrates that contractual attorney's fees provisions in CC&Rs do not merge with a default judgment, allowing the recovery of post-judgment collection costs.

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Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini: First Mortgage Priority Over HOA Assessment Liens

Assessments & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | 1 CA-CV 10-0142 & 10-0235

This landmark Arizona case demonstrates that HOA assessment liens cannot extinguish senior first mortgages or deeds of trust, regardless of when they are recorded. It also serves as a critical warning to HOA attorneys regarding their duty of candor to the court, particularly during ex parte hearings where all material facts must be disclosed.

Last updated June 29, 2026. Case: Cypress on Sunland, appellate No. 1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235; reversing reinstatement of default foreclosure judgment.

Scope note: This page covers the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision regarding the absolute priority of first mortgages over homeowners association assessment liens and the standards for finding fraud on the court. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association’s assessment lien regardless of when the two instruments were recorded. Obtaining an ex parte default foreclosure judgment by concealing the existence of a senior first deed of trust and misrepresenting the priority of the HOA assessment lien constitutes a fraud upon the court, justifying setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(c).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James V. Orlandini, II (Defendant)
    Intervenor who purchased the property from the bank following the senior trustee's sale.
  • First American Title Insurance Company (Defendant)
    Intervenor and title insurer that issued the lender's title policy on the senior first deed of trust.
  • HSBC Bank, USA (Defendant)
    Assignee bank holding the senior first deed of trust on the property.
  • Scott A. Malm (Counsel)
    Gust Rosenfeld, P.L.C.
    Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.
  • Ari Ramras (Counsel)
    Ramras Law Offices, P.C.
    Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.
  • David N. Ramras (Counsel)
    Ramras Law Offices, P.C.
    Attorney representing Intervenors/Appellants James V. Orlandini, II and First American Title Insurance Company.

Respondent Side

  • Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that initiated the original lien foreclosure action.
  • Scott Jacoby (Plaintiff)
    Subsequent buyer of the property who filed the quiet title action.
  • Derrick Spearman (Defendant)
    Original homeowner who defaulted on homeowners association assessments.
  • American Lending Corporation (Defendant)
    Original lender of Spearman's first and second deeds of trust.
  • Robert Draper (Other)
    Purchaser of the property at the HOA sheriff's sale who later sold it to Scott Jacoby.
  • Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
  • Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
  • Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association.
  • Warren Nikolaus (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney with Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. who wrote the January 2, 2008 letter.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
    Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Scott Jacoby.
  • Michael C. Lamb (Counsel)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
    Attorney representing Plaintiff/Appellee Scott Jacoby.

Neutral Parties

  • Alliance Bancorp (Other)
    Intermediate assignee of the senior first deed of trust.
  • Sheldon H. Weisberg (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Appellate judge who authored the court's opinion.
  • Donn Kessler (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Presiding appellate judge on Department B.
  • Diane M. Johnsen (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Appellate judge on Department B.
  • Edward O. Burke (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Trial judge who vacated the default judgment and sheriff's sale for fraud on the court.
  • Kirby D. Kongable (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Superior Court Commissioner / Judge Pro Tempore who consolidated the actions and reinstated the default judgment.
  • M. Scott McCoy (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Superior Court Commissioner who signed the original ex parte default foreclosure judgment.
  • Philip G. Urry (Other)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued several civil notices and records orders.
  • Ruth Willingham (Other)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
    Clerk / Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals who issued notices, opinions, and mandates.
  • Rachelle M. Resnick (Other)
    Arizona Supreme Court
    Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court who sent notifications regarding the denial of petition for review.
  • Michael K. Jeanes (Other)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
  • Patricia Sanderman (Other)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Supervisor of the Appeals Section of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
  • Marcus Reinkensmeyer (Other)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Court Administrator listed on various court notifications.

What happened

Derrick Spearman owned a home in Phoenix subject to the CC&Rs of the Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association, which were recorded in 2003. In 2006, Spearman obtained two loans from American Lending Corporation secured by first and second deeds of trust. Spearman subsequently failed to pay his HOA assessments. In April 2007, the HOA, represented by Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., filed a foreclosure lawsuit against Spearman and American Lending Corporation. The complaint failed to disclose that one of the loans was a senior first deed of trust and falsely asserted that the HOA’s assessment lien had priority over all other interests.

American Lending Corporation did not answer the complaint, having already assigned the first deed of trust. At an ex parte default hearing in June 2007, the HOA’s attorney obtained a default judgment declaring the assessment lien a ‘valid first lien’ and purporting to foreclose all other interests. The property was sold at a sheriff’s sale to Robert Draper for $5,599 (compared to its $190,000 appraisal value), who later sold it to Scott Jacoby for $110,000. Meanwhile, the assignee bank foreclosed its senior first deed of trust and sold the property to James Orlandini for $80,550. When Jacoby filed a quiet title action against the bank, Orlandini intervened and sought to vacate the default foreclosure judgment. Although Judge Burke initially vacated the judgment for fraud on the court, Commissioner Kongable later consolidated the cases and reinstated the judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed Commissioner Kongable, vacating the default judgment due to the HOA attorneys’ fraud on the court.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini (1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235 (Consolidated)). Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association’s assessment… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2003-01-15 Cypress on Sunland HOA CC&Rs are recorded in Maricopa County.
Step 2006-06-02 Derrick Spearman obtains loans of $190,400 (first deed of trust) and $23,900 (second deed of trust) from American Lending Corporation (ALC).
Step 2006-06-06 ALC assigns the first deed of trust to Alliance Bancorp via an unrecorded assignment.
Step 2006-06-08 First and second deeds of trust are recorded in Maricopa County.
Step 2006-06-12 First deed of trust is assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, as trustee (the Bank).
Step 2007-02-09 The HOA records a money judgment against Spearman in the amount of $748.21.
Step 2007-04-09 The HOA files a lien foreclosure complaint against Spearman and ALC.
Step 2007-06-04 Commissioner M. Scott McCoy enters an ex parte default judgment of foreclosure in favor of the HOA.
Step 2007-07-26 Robert Draper purchases the property at a sheriff's sale for $5,599.
Step 2007-10-09 The successor trustee of the Bank notices a trustee's sale to foreclose on the first deed of trust.
Step 2008-01-02 Attorney for the Bank/Wells Fargo writes to Maxwell & Morgan requesting confirmation of the first deed of trust's priority.
Step 2008-03-15 Robert Draper sells the property by warranty deed to Scott Jacoby for $110,000.
Step 2008-05-22 The Bank obtains a trustee's deed upon sale following the trustee's sale foreclosure.
Step 2008-09-22 Scott Jacoby files a complaint to quiet title against the Bank.
Step 2008-09-26 James V. Orlandini purchases the property from the Bank for $80,550.
Step 2008-11-10 The assignment of the first deed of trust to HSBC Bank, USA is recorded.
Step 2009-03-15 James V. Orlandini and First American Title Insurance Company file a motion to intervene in the quiet title action.
Step 2009-07-22 Judge Edward O. Burke issues a minute entry granting the Intervenors' cross-motion for summary judgment, finding fraud on the court, and vacating the default judgment and sheriff's sale.
Step 2009-11-17 The court grants the HOA's motion to consolidate the lien foreclosure and quiet title actions.
Step 2009-11-25 The Intervenors file a notice of change of judge and a motion to stay proceedings.
Step 2009-12-10 Commissioner Kirby Kongable denies the Intervenors' notice of change of judge.
Step 2009-12-15 Commissioner Kongable enters a final order reinstating the default foreclosure judgment nunc pro tunc.
Step 2010-02-02 Commissioner Kongable enters an order awarding attorneys' fees of $8,710 to the HOA as sanctions under A.R.S. §§ 12-349 and 12-350.
Step 2010-03-02 The Arizona Court of Appeals issues a Civil Notice to Counsel in 1 CA-CV 10-0142.
Step 2010-03-09 The Appellants' filing fee in 1 CA-CV 10-0142 is paid.
Step 2010-03-15 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice to Counsel regarding Appellees' fees due in 1 CA-CV 10-0142.
Step 2010-04-09 The Court of Appeals issues a Civil Notice to Counsel in 1 CA-CV 10-0235.
Step 2010-04-14 The Appellants' filing fee in 1 CA-CV 10-0235 is paid.
Step 2010-04-15 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice to Counsel regarding Appellee's fee due in 1 CA-CV 10-0235.
Step 2010-04-28 Clerk of the Court Philip G. Urry issues a letter notifying Jacoby's counsel that his filing fee is past due.
Step 2010-06-02 The Court of Appeals issues an order directing the Clerk of Maricopa County Superior Court to transmit the record on appeal.
Step 2010-12-03 The Court of Appeals issues a Notice of Oral Argument setting the consolidated cases for hearing on January 4, 2011.
Step 2011-01-04 The Court of Appeals hears oral arguments and takes both consolidated cases under advisement.
Step 2011-05-19 The Arizona Court of Appeals Division One files its Opinion reversing the reinstatement of the default judgment and the award of attorneys' fees.
Step 2011-07-06 Division One transmits the record and Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme Court.
Step 2011-09-22 Counsel for the HOA files a Notice of Change of Address.
Step 2011-10-26 The Arizona Supreme Court clerk notifies the parties that the Petition for Review was denied on October 25, 2011.
Step 2011-11-14 The Court of Appeals issues the Civil Mandate Package to the Maricopa County Superior Court.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 16 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 7 2010-12-03

0000 Notice Of Oa Or Conference

Type: Procedural/service filing

Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.

Source 8 2010-12-16

0000 Under Advisement Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 9 2010-12-16

0000 Under Advisement Order 2

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 10 2011-05-19

0000 Enotification Of Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Source 11 2011-05-19

0000 Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association's assessment lien regardless of when the two instruments were recorded.

Download source file
Source 15 2011-10-26

0000 Pr Denied Letter

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 16 2011-11-14

0000 Civil Mandate Package

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

FAQ

Does an Arizona HOA assessment lien have priority over a first mortgage or deed of trust?

No. Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first mortgage or first deed of trust always maintains priority over an HOA assessment lien, regardless of when the mortgages or CC&Rs were recorded. An HOA cannot foreclose its lien to extinguish a senior first mortgage.

Is the Cypress HOA v. Orlandini decision binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. The decision was issued as a published opinion by Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. It serves as binding legal precedent across the state of Arizona.

What is 'fraud on the court' in the context of an HOA foreclosure?

In this case, the HOA’s attorneys committed fraud on the court by failing to disclose to the judge in an ex parte default hearing that the bank held a senior first deed of trust, claiming instead that the HOA’s assessment lien had absolute priority and requesting a judgment that purported to extinguish the bank’s interest.

What happens to a buyer who purchases a property at an HOA foreclosure sale?

A purchaser at an HOA lien foreclosure sale takes the property subject to any existing senior liens, such as a first mortgage or deed of trust. The buyer must satisfy the senior debt to avoid losing the property if the senior lender later forecloses.

Can an HOA recover attorneys' fees from a non-owner who challenges a foreclosure?

No. The Court of Appeals ruled that statutory fee-shifting under A.R.S. § 33-1807(H) did not apply because neither party obtained a foreclosure judgment against each other. Furthermore, CC&R provisions allowing attorneys’ fees for collections do not apply to third-party purchasers who are not defaulting lot owners.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation1 CA-CV 10-0142 and 1 CA-CV 10-0235 (Consolidated)
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateMay 19, 2011
Judge / panelHon. Sheldon H. Weisberg, Hon. Donn Kessler, Hon. Diane M. Johnsen
PartiesCypress on Sunland Homeowners Association (HOA) and Scott Jacoby (subsequent purchaser) v. James V. Orlandini, II (purchaser under trustee sale) and First American Title Insurance Company (intervenors)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

Under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a homeowners association's assessment lien regardless of when the two instruments were recorded. Obtaining an ex parte default foreclosure judgment by concealing the existence of a senior first deed of trust and misrepresenting the priority of the HOA assessment lien constitutes a fraud upon the court, justifying setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(c).

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package16 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap38 roadmap entries
Video overviewCypress on Sunland HOA v. Orlandini
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions5 questions
Featured download links2 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This consolidated appeal arose from a dispute over residential property in Phoenix, Arizona. A homeowner fell delinquent on HOA assessments, leading the Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Association to file a foreclosure action. Although the property was encumbered by a senior first deed of trust, the HOA's attorneys obtained an ex parte default judgment of foreclosure by asserting that the assessment lien was a superior 'first lien' that extinguished all other interests. A third party purchased the property at a sheriff's sale and sold it to Scott Jacoby. Meanwhile, the bank foreclosed its first deed of trust and sold the property to James Orlandini. Jacoby filed a quiet title action, and Orlandini intervened to set aside the default judgment. The trial court initially set aside the default judgment for fraud on the court, but later reinstated it. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a first deed of trust has priority over an assessment lien regardless of recording dates, and that the HOA attorneys' failure to disclose this priority in the ex parte proceeding constituted a fraud on the court.

Key Issues & Findings

The Court of Appeals analyzed the plain language and legislative history of A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), rejecting the HOA's 'first-in-time' argument. The court determined that 'first' in 'first deed of trust' designates the relative priority between mortgages or deeds of trust, not the timing of their recording relative to an HOA's covenants. The 1997 statutory amendment explicitly removed the requirement that a first mortgage or deed of trust be recorded prior to the assessment delinquency to maintain priority, proving the legislature's intent to keep first mortgages senior. To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results where no lender would provide condominium or HOA home loans if they could not secure a first-priority position over assessment liens. Furthermore, the court held that deeds of trust are legally equivalent to mortgages under A.R.S. § 33-805, thereby subordinating the HOA's assessment lien under both statutory law and Section 7.9 of the CC&Rs.

Regarding the fraud claim, the court emphasized that attorneys owe a strict duty of candor to the tribunal, particularly in ex parte proceedings under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 42, ER 3.3. The HOA's attorneys failed to disclose that one of the encumbrances was a senior first deed of trust, failed to cite the statutory priority exception under A.R.S. § 33-1807(B)(2), and drafted a default judgment declaring the assessment lien a 'valid first lien' that extinguished the first deed of trust. The court concluded this was not an innocent mistake or excusable zealousness, as evidenced by a post-judgment letter in which the attorneys admitted they knew the first deed of trust had priority. Suppressing these material facts to obtain the default judgment compromised the court's impartial functioning and constituted a fraud on the court, requiring the judgment to be set aside.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOA boards, this decision cements the absolute priority of first mortgages and deeds of trust over HOA assessment liens, providing clarity for real estate transactions, foreclosures, and mortgage lending. HOAs cannot extinguish a senior mortgage through an assessment foreclosure, and any attempts to claim absolute priority in court filings without legal basis are invalid and subject to severe scrutiny.

For legal counsel, the case is a stark warning regarding the duty of candor under ER 3.3, especially during ex parte hearings. Attorneys must disclose all material facts and adverse legal authority to the court. Misleading a judge or commissioner—even by omission or by presenting overly broad drafted orders—undermines the integrity of the judicial process, constitutes fraud on the court, and exposes counsel to disciplinary action and the loss of judgments.

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Tortosa Homeowners Association v. Davis Garcia; Maricopoly, LLC; Durable Investments, LLC

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Tortosa Homeowners Association v. Davis Garcia; Maricopoly, LLC, Intervenor/Appellant/Cross-Appellee; Durable Investments, LLC, Assignee/Appellee/Cross-Appellant (2 CA-CV 2021-0114). Senior lienholder was not automatically entitled to excess proceeds from a junior HOA foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Tortosa Homeowners Association v. Davis Garcia; Maricopoly, LLC, Intervenor/Appellant/Cross-Appellee; Durable Investments, LLC, Assignee/Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2022-08-01

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Court of Appeals opinion affirming the excess-proceeds order while holding that A.R.S. § 33-727(B) does not entitle an unaffected senior lienholder to surplus generated by a junior HOA lien foreclosure.

Download source file

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2021-0114
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateAugust 1, 2022
Judge / panelJudge Espinosa, Presiding Judge Eckerstrom, Chief Judge Vásquez
PartiesAfter an HOA judicial foreclosure sale produced surplus funds, competing claimants disputed who should receive the excess proceeds.
Governing law
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsProcedureLiens
Outcome / holding

The court held that excess proceeds from a junior HOA foreclosure are not automatically payable to a senior lienholder under A.R.S. § 33-727(B), even though it affirmed the superior court's result on the claims before it.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmapNo separate litigation roadmap table on this page
Video overviewTortosa Homeowners Association v. Davis Garcia; Maricopoly, LLC, Intervenor/Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Study / briefing material0 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions0 questions
Featured download links0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tortosa foreclosed its HOA lien, the property sold, and the sale generated a large pot of excess proceeds after the HOA judgment was satisfied. The fight then shifted from foreclosure to distribution: did a senior deed-of-trust holder get those proceeds, or did they go elsewhere? The Court of Appeals held that A.R.S. § 33-727(B) does not give a senior lienholder the excess proceeds created by a junior lien foreclosure. That is a significant clarification because HOA foreclosures are often junior to first deeds of trust. The court still affirmed the superior court's order, but it did so while rejecting the broader legal theory that all lienholders ahead of the owner automatically take the surplus whenever a junior lien is foreclosed.

Key Issues & Findings

The court analyzed the statutory foreclosure-distribution scheme in the context of lien priority. A senior deed of trust is not extinguished by a junior HOA foreclosure sale, so its holder generally keeps its separate lien position. Because the senior lien survives, it is not entitled to dip into the junior sale's surplus on the theory that the foreclosure somehow paid it off.

That functional point drove the statute's interpretation. The court resisted converting a junior sale into a windfall for a senior lienholder whose security interest remained intact after the sale. The opinion therefore clarifies a recurring mistake in post-HOA-sale surplus disputes.

Why It Matters

This is a useful Arizona appellate decision for anyone litigating HOA foreclosure surplus funds. It narrows arguments by senior lenders and helps define where the surplus does and does not go.

For investors and owners, Tortosa is important because surplus disputes often decide whether an HOA sale leaves any real equity value behind.

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Windrose Estates Homeowners Association v. Justin T. Wright; Justin T. Wright v. Sunstate Acquisitions, LLC and SV 1, LLC

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2025-12-15. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Video/audio is held or de-promoted until its title and description clearly carry the same non-final/current-status posture as this page.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2025-12-15

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Court of Appeals opinion affirming denial of Rule 60(b) relief, reversing the order setting aside the HOA foreclosure sale, and remanding to reinstate the sale because A.R.S. § 33-1807 abrogates the gross-inadequacy set-aside remedy for HOA lien foreclosures.

Download source file

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2024-0074 and 2 CA-CV 2025-0058
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateDecember 15, 2025
Judge / panelJudge Sklar, Vice Chief Judge Eppich, Judge O'Neil
PartiesAn HOA foreclosure purchaser and the homeowner fought over whether a completed HOA foreclosure sale could be set aside because the price was grossly inadequate and the owner was allegedly misled.
Governing law
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsProcedureLiens
Outcome / holding

The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807 implicitly abrogates the usual common-law authority to undo an HOA foreclosure sale for grossly inadequate price and that the sale should be reinstated.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmapNo separate litigation roadmap table on this page
Video overviewTemporarily unavailable while the expanded case record is reviewed
Study / briefing material0 sections
FAQ / homeowner questions0 questions
Featured download links0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

CURRENT STATUS (June 2026): NOT FINAL — a petition for review is pending at the Arizona Supreme Court (CV-26-0021-PR). Windrose is a major 2025 Arizona HOA foreclosure case. After an HOA foreclosed and the home sold, the trial court set the sale aside and quieted title back to the owner partly because the sale price was grossly inadequate. The Court of Appeals reversed that core ruling. It held that although Arizona courts ordinarily have common-law power to set aside foreclosure sales for gross inadequacy, that power is implicitly displaced in the HOA-lien setting by A.R.S. § 33-1807's more specific statutory scheme. The court also rejected setting aside the sale based on the owner's claim of surprise or misleading circumstances and reinstated the sale. The decision sharply narrows post-sale equitable rescue arguments in Arizona HOA foreclosure litigation.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the general equitable principle that foreclosure sales can sometimes be set aside when the price is shockingly low. But it treated HOA lien foreclosures as a distinct statutory regime. In the panel's view, the legislature's detailed rules in § 33-1807 left no room for importing that general common-law remedy in a way that would destabilize completed HOA sales.

The court also rejected the alternative theory that the homeowner was sufficiently misled or surprised to justify undoing the sale. And in the related consolidated action, it upheld the refusal to set aside the default judgment authorizing foreclosure, including the service-related rulings. The combined effect was to restore finality to the completed sale.

Why It Matters

Windrose is likely to become a central Arizona authority on post-sale challenges to HOA foreclosures. It gives purchasers and associations a strong finality argument once a sale has been completed.

For homeowners, the case means defenses and cure efforts need to happen earlier. After the sale, equitable arguments that might work in other foreclosure contexts may not work in the HOA statutory framework.

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