Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos

Superior Court HOA Case

The court found no genuine fact dispute over delinquent association charges, recognized the association’s lien, and authorized foreclosure.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-090909.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-090909) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the March 20, 2015 under-advisement ruling, the June 2, 2015 final judgment minute entry, and the September 8, 2017 ruling denying dismissal under A.R.S. § 33-722. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Lake Park Village I obtained summary judgment and foreclosure authority after the court found the homeowner owed delinquent association charges, the association held an automatic lien for the arrearages and costs, and there was no genuine issue of material fact. A later A.R.S. § 33-722 challenge failed because the association had already elected foreclosure.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that sought judgment for delinquent charges and foreclosure of its lien.
  • Jason N. Miller (Counsel)
    Counsel for Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association.

Respondent Side

  • Cia Spyropoulos (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant who opposed summary judgment and later sought dismissal under A.R.S. § 33-722.
  • Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (Defendant)
    Lienholder defendant included in the foreclosure proceedings.
  • Pentagon Federal Credit Union (Defendant)
    Lienholder defendant included in the foreclosure proceedings.

Neutral Parties

  • David K. Udall (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the March 2015 summary-judgment ruling and June 2015 final judgment entry.
  • Margaret Benny (Commissioner)
    Judicial officer who handled default-judgment and post-judgment procedural entries.

What happened

Lake Park Village I sued a homeowner and lienholders to collect delinquent association charges and foreclose the association’s lien. The collected minute entries show the association moved for summary judgment against the homeowner while also pursuing default-judgment steps against lienholder defendants.

On March 13, 2015, Judge David K. Udall heard oral argument on the association’s summary-judgment motion and took the matter under advisement. One week later, the court granted the motion. The ruling found that the homeowner owned property within Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association and was obligated to pay fees, costs, assessments, late fees, and attorney fees if delinquent.

The court also found the association already had an automatic lien for the arrearages and costs, and that the association was authorized to foreclose on that lien. Because the court found no genuine issues of material fact, it entered judgment against the homeowner and directed the association to submit a form of judgment and fee request.

The next several entries handled the mechanics of judgment. The court denied reconsideration, required cleaner separate foreclosure/default judgment orders for the homeowner and lienholders, and on June 2, 2015 entered judgment for the association under the formal written judgment. That entry stated no further matters remained and made the judgment final under Rule 54(c).

In 2017, the homeowner asked to dismiss the action and argued the association had to elect between an action on the debt and foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-722. The court denied dismissal, explaining that the association had elected foreclosure through the June 2015 judgment and foreclosure orders.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos (CV2014-090909 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA won summary judgment to foreclose its assessment lien after the court found no factual dispute over delinquency. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-07-17 The court directs the association to use the commissioner default-judgment process for MERS.
Step 2014-08-27 The court treats the homeowner's filing as a timely answer, preventing default from becoming effective.
Step 2014-11-07 The court sets oral argument on the association's summary-judgment motion.
Step 2015-03-13 The court hears argument on the association's summary-judgment motion and takes it under advisement.
Step 2015-03-20 Under-advisement ruling grants summary judgment for the association and authorizes lien foreclosure.
Step 2015-04-14 The court denies the homeowner's reconsideration request.
Step 2015-05-14 The court requires separate amended judgment orders for the homeowner and lienholder defendants.
Step 2015-06-02 Final judgment is entered for the association under the formal foreclosure judgment.
Step 2015-07-08 The court denies the homeowner's motion to amend the judgment.
Step 2017-09-08 The court denies the homeowner's A.R.S. § 33-722 dismissal motion because the association elected foreclosure.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 17 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2014-07-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2014-08-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2014-08-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling treating the homeowner's filing as a timely pro per answer, so the requested default did not become effective.

Download source file
Source 4 2014-11-07

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2014-12-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2015-02-02

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2015-03-13

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 8 2015-03-20

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment, finding delinquent HOA charges and an automatic lien, and authorizing foreclosure.

Source 9 2015-04-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling taking no action on a homeowner filing because the court could not determine any specific request for relief.

Download source file
Source 10 2015-04-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling extending the association's deadline to submit its application for attorney fees.

Download source file
Source 11 2015-04-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying reconsideration of the March 20, 2015 under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment.

Download source file
Source 12 2015-04-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2015-05-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the association's request to set aside a default-judgment order as to Pentagon Federal Credit Union.

Download source file
Source 14 2015-05-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling requiring separate amended foreclosure/default judgment orders for the homeowner, MERS, and Pentagon Federal Credit Union because the prior proposed orders were confusing.

Download source file
Source 15 2015-06-02

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Final judgment minute entry entering judgment for the association under the signed foreclosure judgment and stating no further matters remained.

Source 16 2015-07-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the homeowner's motion to amend the judgment to correct her name and taking no action on a moot request for findings.

Download source file
Source 17 2017-09-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the homeowner's A.R.S. § 33-722 dismissal motion because the association had elected foreclosure through the judgment and foreclosure orders.

Download source file

FAQ

What did the March 2015 ruling decide?

The court granted Lake Park Village I summary judgment, found no genuine issue of material fact, recognized the association’s automatic lien for delinquent charges and costs, and authorized foreclosure.

Was this a broad HOA-law ruling?

No. The ruling is short and fact-specific. It is useful as a trial-court example of routine assessment and lien foreclosure, but it does not provide extended statutory or CC&R analysis.

Did the court enter a final judgment?

Yes. The June 2, 2015 minute entry entered judgment for the association under the formal written judgment and stated that no further matters remained.

What happened with the homeowner's A.R.S. § 33-722 argument?

In September 2017, the court denied the homeowner’s motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the association had elected foreclosure through the June 2015 judgment and foreclosure orders.

Why is the case marked standard rather than must-read?

The case is HOA-relevant, but the record is a routine assessment-collection and foreclosure result with limited analysis. The rubric reserves must-read status for superior-court rulings with substantive analysis of generally important HOA statutes or governing-document issues.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2014-090909 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMarch 20, 2015
Judge / panelHon. David K. Udall, Commissioner Margaret Benny
PartiesLake Park Village I Homeowners Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Cia Spyropoulos (Defendant, homeowner), Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., and Pentagon Federal Credit Union
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-722
  • Rule 56, Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics
AssessmentsLiensForeclosureAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association summary judgment against the homeowner and authorized foreclosure of the association's lien for delinquent fees, costs, assessments, late fees, and attorney fees. A later order denied the homeowner's election-of-remedies dismissal motion because the association had elected to foreclose.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package17 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewLake Park Village I Homeowners Association v. Spyropoulos
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions5 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association sued a homeowner and lienholders to collect delinquent association charges and foreclose its assessment lien. After oral argument on the association's summary-judgment motion, the superior court found that the homeowner owed association fees, costs, assessments, late fees, and attorney fees, that the association already had an automatic lien for the arrearages and costs, and that the association was authorized to foreclose. The court granted summary judgment for the association, later entered final judgment and foreclosure orders, and in 2017 denied the homeowner's A.R.S. § 33-722 dismissal motion because the association had elected foreclosure.

Key Issues & Findings

The March 20, 2015 under-advisement ruling was brief but direct. The court found that the defendant was the recorded homeowner of property within Lake Park Village I Homeowners Association and that she had an obligation under the association to pay fees, costs, assessments, late fees, and attorney fees if delinquent. The court also found that the association already had an automatic lien for the arrearages and costs, was authorized to foreclose that lien, and had shown there were no genuine issues of material fact.

Those findings resolved the merits of the assessment-collection dispute in the association's favor. The court granted the association's motion for summary judgment and directed it to submit a form of judgment and fee request. On June 2, 2015, the court entered judgment for the association under a formal written judgment, stated that no further matters remained, and made the judgment final under Rule 54(c).

The later 2017 entry addressed the homeowner's request to dismiss under A.R.S. § 33-722 by forcing the association to elect between an action on the debt and foreclosure. The court denied dismissal because the association had already elected foreclosure through the June 2015 judgment and foreclosure orders against the homeowner and other lienholders.

Why It Matters

This is a routine superior-court assessment-foreclosure case, not a broad HOA precedent. Its value is practical: the minute entries show how a trial court handled a straightforward HOA lien claim at summary judgment when the owner did not create a genuine factual dispute over delinquent charges and foreclosure authority.

The 2017 order is also a narrow procedural note. When the homeowner later invoked A.R.S. § 33-722, the court treated the association's judgment and foreclosure orders as the election that defeated dismissal. The collected record does not include extended statutory analysis, so the case should be read as a case-specific foreclosure result rather than a general rule expanding association lien remedies.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Val Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge granted Val Vista Classic Community Association summary judgment in an unpaid-assessment foreclosure case.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-003271.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-05-15. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-003271) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the May 11, 2026 under-advisement summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated May 15, 2026, denies reconsideration, a motion to quash, and a stay request after summary judgment; the collected entries do not show a signed final judgment amount. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court granted the association summary judgment in a routine unpaid-assessment foreclosure case. It held the CC&Rs were a contract, the record showed nonpayment and collection charges, Rosenbaum did not produce evidence that the association misapplied a payment or fraudulently placed the lien, and foreclosure on the HOA lien was permissible.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Classic Community Association (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association seeking breach-of-contract relief and foreclosure based on unpaid assessments and related charges.
  • Nikita Verma Patel (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the association in the case-party records and minute entries.
  • Ember Ann Van Vranken (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the association in later status, discovery, and summary-judgment proceedings.

Respondent Side

  • Levi Rosenbaum (Defendant)
    Self-represented homeowner who disputed the association’s collection position and raised payment, discovery, and joinder arguments.

Neutral Parties

  • Susanna C. Pineda (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled the case and issued the May 11, 2026 summary-judgment ruling.

What happened

Val Vista Classic Community Association filed suit in February 2024 alleging breach of contract and foreclosure based on unpaid HOA assessments. The association claimed it had placed a lien on the homeowner’s residence and sought foreclosure on that lien. Early in the case, the court denied default because Rosenbaum had filed a motion to dismiss, then treated his response as an answer and denied dismissal.

The litigation moved through scheduling, ADR, arbitration, and discovery disputes. At one point the case was sent to compulsory arbitration, but the court later vacated that order because the association sought foreclosure on unpaid HOA fees and fines. The court also denied several discovery, joinder, and reconsideration motions, and denied an interim fee application without prejudice as untimely.

The central merits dispute concerned whether Rosenbaum owed assessments and related charges. The May 11, 2026 ruling states that monthly HOA fees were normally $195.00, that earlier payments had been returned for insufficient funds, that Rosenbaum’s last actual payment was in March 2022, and that a third-party assistance payment had been credited to a separate account rather than the account at issue in this case.

Judge Susanna Pineda granted the association summary judgment. Viewing the record under Rule 56, the court found evidence of a contract, breach, contractual assessment and collection obligations, and a lien remedy. The court found Rosenbaum did not produce evidence showing the association misapplied the assistance payment, was required to accept his later settlement proposal, or engaged in fraudulent lien activity.

The court denied Rosenbaum’s request for summary judgment, ordered the association to lodge a proposed form of judgment, vacated the future trial-management conference and jury trial, and deemed remaining motions moot. On May 15, 2026, the court denied Rosenbaum’s motion for reconsideration of the summary-judgment ruling, motion to quash, and request for stay.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Val Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum (CV2024-003271 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Routine HOA assessment foreclosure: unpaid assessments supported summary judgment for the association. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Val Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-02-20 The association files its complaint for breach of contract and foreclosure based on unpaid HOA fees.
Step 2024-10-17 The court denies default because Rosenbaum filed a motion to dismiss.
Step 2024-12-06 The court treats Rosenbaum’s response as an answer and denies his motion to dismiss.
Step 2025-02-28 The case is initially transferred to compulsory arbitration.
Step 2025-03-28 The court vacates the arbitration transfer because the association seeks foreclosure on unpaid HOA fees and fines.
Step 2025-06-02 The court gives Rosenbaum additional time to respond to discovery and discusses payments, the payment portal, ADR, and scheduling.
Step 2026-01-07 The court denies without prejudice the association’s interim fee application as untimely.
Step 2026-04-14 The court denies Rosenbaum’s discovery and joinder motions and denies the association’s related fee request.
Step 2026-05-11 Under-advisement ruling grants the association summary judgment, denies Rosenbaum summary judgment, vacates trial settings, and deems remaining motions moot.
Step 2026-05-15 The court denies Rosenbaum’s reconsideration, quash, and stay request.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 28 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2024-09-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry extending the dismissal-calendar deadline after service and before completion of the default process.

Download source file
Source 2 2024-09-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry again extending the dismissal-calendar deadline unless the association completed the default process.

Download source file
Source 3 2024-10-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association’s application for default because Rosenbaum had filed a motion to dismiss as a responsive pleading.

Download source file
Source 4 2024-12-06

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling treating Rosenbaum’s response as an answer and denying his motion to dismiss based on payment-portal access and service arguments.

Download source file
Source 6 2025-01-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry referring the parties to a mandatory settlement conference process.

Download source file
Source 7 2025-02-28

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Rule 16 status-conference minute entry finding the case subject to compulsory arbitration and transferring it to the arbitration desk.

Source 8 2025-02-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry vacating the trial-setting conference after the arbitration transfer.

Download source file
Source 9 2025-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry ordering Rosenbaum to respond to the association’s reconsideration motion on compulsory arbitration.

Download source file
Source 10 2025-03-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry vacating the ADR referral after the parties did not submit the required readiness certification.

Download source file
Source 11 2025-03-28

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting reconsideration of the arbitration transfer and holding the case was not subject to compulsory arbitration because the association sought foreclosure on unpaid HOA fees and fines.

Download source file
Source 12 2025-04-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry again referring the parties to a mandatory settlement conference process.

Download source file
Source 13 2025-05-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling rejecting a unilateral settlement-conference readiness certificate and vacating the ADR referral.

Download source file
Source 14 2025-05-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting an order-to-show-cause hearing on the association’s discovery-dispute filing seeking to compel discovery and obtain sanctions.

Source 15 2025-06-02

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry giving Rosenbaum thirty additional days to respond to written discovery and discussing payments, the payment portal, ADR, and scheduling.

Source 17 2025-12-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Trial-setting conference minute entry giving Rosenbaum until January 22, 2026 to respond to the association’s summary-judgment motion and setting future trial dates while the motion remained pending.

Source 18 2026-01-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying without prejudice the association’s fee application for defending dismissed counterclaims as untimely, subject to the outcome of the association’s claim.

Download source file
Source 19 2026-01-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Rosenbaum’s discovery motion, Rule 60 motion, and additional fee-response filing.

Download source file
Source 20 2026-01-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Nunc pro tunc ruling correcting the January 20 order to refer to Rosenbaum’s motion rather than the association’s motion.

Download source file
Source 21 2026-02-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting oral argument on the association’s summary-judgment motion.

Source 22 2026-03-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling giving the association time to respond to Rosenbaum’s motion to compel discovery and motion to join an indispensable party, and denying his request to submit those motions for decision as premature.

Download source file
Source 23 2026-04-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Rosenbaum’s motion to compel discovery, denying his motion to join an indispensable party, and denying the association’s related fee request.

Download source file
Source 24 2026-04-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying as moot Rosenbaum’s renewed request to submit pending motions for decision after the court had ruled on the discovery and joinder motions.

Download source file
Source 25 2026-04-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Rosenbaum’s motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2026 minute entry.

Download source file
Source 26 2026-05-08

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking the association’s summary-judgment motion under advisement.

Download source file
Source 27 2026-05-11

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on its unpaid-assessment contract and foreclosure claims, denying Rosenbaum summary judgment, vacating trial settings, and requiring the association to lodge a proposed judgment.

Source 28 2026-05-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Rosenbaum’s motion for reconsideration, motion to quash, and request for stay after the summary-judgment ruling.

Download source file

FAQ

Was this a must-read HOA ruling?

No. The case is HOA-relevant, but it is a routine assessment-collection and foreclosure ruling. The court did not identify or analyze a novel HOA statute or CC&R interpretation issue.

Why did the court grant summary judgment for the association?

The court found evidence of the CC&Rs as a contract, unpaid assessments and returned payments, collection charges, attorneys’ fees tied to nonpayment, and an HOA lien remedy. Rosenbaum did not produce evidence creating a genuine dispute on those points.

What happened to the payment-portal argument?

The court treated lack of payment-portal access as a defense that could be addressed in the case, but at summary judgment found Rosenbaum had not shown the association was required to accept his proposed settlement or reopen ordinary payment handling after the account entered collections.

Did the court say a third-party payment was misapplied?

No. The May 11, 2026 ruling states that the third-party payment was credited to a separate account and that Rosenbaum did not provide evidence showing the association misapplied that payment to the wrong account.

Was final judgment already entered in the collected entries?

The collected entries show summary judgment and denial of reconsideration, but they do not show the signed final judgment amount. The May 11 ruling ordered the association to submit a proposed form of judgment.

What privacy information was omitted from this page?

The minute entries include the homeowner’s residential address and other contact details. Those details are intentionally omitted here because this page is an educational case summary, not a republication of private contact information.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2024-003271 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMay 11, 2026
Judge / panelHon. Susanna C. Pineda
PartiesVal Vista Classic Community Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Levi Rosenbaum (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureLiensAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Classic Community Association summary judgment on unpaid-assessment breach-of-contract and lien-foreclosure claims, denied Rosenbaum summary judgment, and rejected his reconsideration, quash, and stay request.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package28 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewVal Vista Classic Community Association v. Levi Rosenbaum
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Classic Community Association sued homeowner Levi Rosenbaum for breach of contract and foreclosure based on unpaid HOA assessments, collection charges, and related fees. The case included early default, dismissal, arbitration, discovery, ADR, and counterclaim-fee disputes. The court ultimately granted the association summary judgment on May 11, 2026, finding that the CC&Rs formed a contract between homeowner and association, that Rosenbaum had not disputed returned payments and nonpayment, that he had not produced evidence showing the association misapplied a third-party assistance payment or fraudulently placed a lien, and that foreclosure on the HOA lien was statutorily permissible. The court denied Rosenbaum’s summary-judgment request, vacated the future trial settings, deemed remaining motions moot, and denied reconsideration on May 15, 2026.

Key Issues & Findings

The court framed the CC&Rs as a contractual agreement between homeowner and association. The association’s evidence showed unpaid monthly assessments, returned payments, collection charges, and attorneys’ fees tied to nonpayment. Rosenbaum acknowledged that payments had been returned for insufficient funds, that a third-party assistance payment was credited to a different account, and that he had been unable to make the assessment payments.

The court found Rosenbaum had not produced evidence that the association misapplied the assistance payment, was required to accept his later settlement offer for past-due assessments only, or acted fraudulently in placing a lien on the property. Because the evidence showed a contract, breach, contractual assessment and collection obligations, and a lien remedy, the court held summary judgment was warranted for the association and that foreclosure on the HOA lien was permissible by statute.

The ruling is routine rather than precedentially notable: it does not identify or construe a specific HOA statute, and it applies ordinary summary-judgment standards to an assessment-collection record. The court separately denied an untimely interim fee application without prejudice, denied discovery and joinder motions, and required the association to submit a proposed form of judgment after summary judgment.

Why It Matters

This is a standard superior-court HOA assessment-collection example. It shows that payment-portal disputes, disagreement with collection handling, and assertions about a misapplied assistance payment did not defeat summary judgment where the homeowner did not produce evidence creating a genuine dispute over unpaid assessments or the lien.

For homeowners and boards, the practical lesson is procedural as much as substantive: once an account is in collections and litigation, the court will require evidence, proper motion practice, and compliance with discovery rules. As a superior-court ruling it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Susan Wellman

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge held that court-authorized self-help cleanup costs could be charged to the owner’s ledger, secured by an assessment lien, and foreclosed under A.R.S. § 33-1807.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Susan Wellman, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001865.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2025-04-02. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Video/audio is held from this page until a fresh media package is generated from the approved source record.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Susan Wellman (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-001865) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the June 2021 default-judgment minute entry, the November 2021 injunction-enforcement minute entries, the November 3, 2023 under-advisement ruling on lien foreclosure, and the March 28, 2025 Rule 50 ruling. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated April 2, 2025, continues a contempt/enforcement evidentiary hearing to July 24, 2025; the collected record does not show the result of that continued hearing. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court allowed Val Vista Lakes to use A.R.S. § 33-1807 lien foreclosure to collect unpaid nuisance-abatement costs. Because a prior judgment authorized association self-help, the association charged cleanup costs to the owner’s ledger under the judgment and governing documents; the court held those costs were secured by the assessment lien and were foreclosable once the unpaid balance exceeded the statutory threshold.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that obtained the default judgment, pursued nuisance abatement, charged cleanup costs to the owner's account, and sought lien foreclosure.
  • Gregory A. Stein (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the association in many of the early and summary-judgment entries.
  • Tessa Knueppel (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the association in later enforcement and contempt proceedings.
  • Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing with Tessa Knueppel for the association in later enforcement proceedings.

Respondent Side

  • Susan M. Wellman (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant who opposed the association's lien-foreclosure and later contempt/enforcement requests.
  • Arizona Federal Credit Union (Defendant)
    Financial institution defendant named in later proceedings related to the supplemental foreclosure claim.
  • Olen V. Lenets (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Susan Wellman in the summary-judgment and later enforcement entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Scott A. Blaney (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the November 2023 summary-judgment ruling and later enforcement rulings.
  • Richard Albrecht (Judge)
    Judicial officer who handled 2021 injunction-enforcement and early supplemental-complaint proceedings.
  • David W. Garbarino (Judge)
    Judicial officer who handled the June 2021 default-hearing minute entry.

What happened

Val Vista Lakes sued Susan Wellman over alleged violations of the association’s declaration and governing documents. The November 2023 ruling describes the alleged conditions as a large quantity of trash, unauthorized backyard structures where transient individuals were living, inoperable vehicles, and other nuisance conditions.

A June 2021 default hearing produced a formal judgment against Wellman. In November 2021, after an order-to-show-cause hearing, the court reaffirmed the injunction, ordered notice before the association removed unapproved structures and debris, and stated that trash and debris were not to accumulate in the yard in the future. A correction a week later made clear that Wellman and others were not to interfere with association removal efforts.

The association later used the injunction’s self-help remedy. The November 3, 2023 ruling states that its contractors removed more than 220,000 pounds of trash and other unauthorized items at a cost of $38,960.99, not including attorneys’ fees and costs. The association charged that cleanup amount to Wellman’s ledger under the default judgment and governing documents. After partial payments, it filed a supplemental complaint to foreclose on the remaining balance.

Judge Scott A. Blaney granted partial summary judgment for Val Vista Lakes on lien foreclosure. The court held that the cleanup costs were properly charged to the ledger and secured by the association’s assessment lien. It also held the association was entitled to foreclose because, when the supplemental complaint was filed, Wellman was delinquent in payment of lien-secured amounts of at least $1,200 under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A).

Wellman argued that the association failed to satisfy the A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) notice requirement before filing foreclosure. The court rejected that argument on the facts before it, reasoning that the parties were already litigating the issue and the court had already entered the default judgment, so Wellman had sufficient notice that collection activity was underway.

The collected record continued after the foreclosure ruling. Later entries ordered settlement-conference steps and addressed a separate contempt/enforcement track. On March 28, 2025, the court denied Wellman’s Rule 50 motion, holding that the self-help provision was permissive rather than a prerequisite to court enforcement. The last collected minute entry continued the remaining contempt/enforcement hearing to July 24, 2025.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-06-02 Default-hearing minute entry grants judgment against Susan Wellman under a formal written judgment.
Step 2021-11-08 Order-to-show-cause hearing enforces the default judgment, requires notice before association removal, and reaffirms the injunction against future trash and debris accumulation.
Step 2021-11-15 Correcting entry clarifies that the homeowner and others shall not interfere with association removal of unapproved structures.
Step 2022-05-04 The court grants Val Vista Lakes leave to file a first supplemental complaint.
Step 2022-12-14 The court grants the homeowner Rule 56(d) discovery before further summary-judgment briefing.
Step 2023-05-19 The court denies the association's request to limit the issues the homeowner may raise in her amended summary-judgment response.
Step 2023-11-01 The court hears argument on the association's lien-foreclosure summary-judgment motion and takes it under advisement.
Step 2023-11-03 Under-advisement ruling grants partial summary judgment to Val Vista Lakes on lien foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807.
Step 2024-11-12 The court begins the combined evidentiary hearing and trial on contempt sanctions, receives association evidence, and orders Rule 50 briefing.
Step 2025-03-28 The court denies the homeowner's Rule 50 motion, finding the self-help language permissive and not a bar to court enforcement.
Step 2025-04-02 The court continues the remaining evidentiary hearing and trial on contempt sanctions to July 24, 2025.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 36 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2021-03-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2021-04-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2021-05-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2021-06-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the homeowner additional time to answer because she had sought counsel, making a May 31, 2021 response timely if filed by that date.

Download source file
Source 5 2021-06-02

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-hearing minute entry granting judgment against the homeowner under a formal written judgment signed and entered in June 2021.

Source 6 2021-06-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2021-07-06

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2021-11-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order-to-show-cause minute entry enforcing the default judgment, requiring notice before association removal of unapproved structures and debris, and reaffirming the injunction against future trash and debris accumulation.

Download source file
Source 9 2021-11-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Correcting minute entry adding the missing word 'not' so the injunction barred the homeowner and others from interfering with association removal efforts.

Download source file
Source 10 2021-12-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2022-05-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Val Vista Lakes leave to file a first supplemental complaint after the initial judgment and injunction proceedings.

Download source file
Source 12 2022-06-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2022-10-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 14 2022-12-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 15 2022-12-14

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 16 2023-03-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 17 2023-05-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association's request to limit the homeowner's amended summary-judgment response after Rule 56(d) discovery.

Download source file
Source 18 2023-05-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying reconsideration of the order that allowed the homeowner to raise any properly supported issue in her amended summary-judgment response.

Download source file
Source 19 2023-08-21

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 20 2023-09-15

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 21 2023-09-25

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 22 2023-10-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 23 2023-11-01

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 24 2023-11-03

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting partial summary judgment for Val Vista Lakes on lien foreclosure for unpaid self-help cleanup costs secured by the assessment lien under A.R.S. § 33-1807.

Source 25 2023-12-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 26 2024-04-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 27 2024-06-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 28 2024-06-27

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 29 2024-08-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 30 2024-09-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order-to-show-cause return-hearing entry requiring the homeowner and counsel to explain their nonappearance and setting a combined evidentiary hearing and trial on contempt sanctions.

Download source file
Source 31 2024-10-01

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 32 2024-10-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting counsel's calendaring-error explanation for the September 20 nonappearance and taking no further action on that failure to appear.

Download source file
Source 33 2024-11-12

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Evidentiary-hearing minute entry denying the homeowner's oral summary-adjudication request, receiving association evidence, and staying the hearing for Rule 50 briefing.

Download source file
Source 34 2025-02-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 35 2025-03-28

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the homeowner's Rule 50 motion and holding that the injunction's self-help provision was permissive, not a requirement that the association repeatedly clean the property before seeking court enforcement.

Download source file
Source 36 2025-04-02

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

FAQ

What costs did the association foreclose on?

The foreclosure ruling involved unpaid cleanup costs charged after the association exercised a self-help remedy under the default judgment and governing documents. The ruling states the cleanup cost was $38,960.99, excluding attorneys’ fees and costs.

Why did the court treat the cleanup costs as lien-secured?

The court found the self-help costs were properly charged to the homeowner’s account ledger under the default judgment and governing documents, and that those ledgered amounts were secured by the association’s assessment lien.

How did A.R.S. § 33-1807 matter?

The court relied on A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) to hold that the association was entitled to foreclose because the homeowner was delinquent in payment of monies secured by the lien in the amount of $1,200 or more when the foreclosure action was filed.

Did the homeowner's notice argument succeed?

No. The court rejected the A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) notice argument because the parties were already litigating the issue, a default judgment had already been entered, and the homeowner had sufficient notice that collection activity was underway.

Was the association required to keep using self-help before asking the court for enforcement?

In the March 2025 Rule 50 ruling, the court said no. It read the self-help language as permissive and said the order did not require the association to act as the homeowner’s provider of bulk-trash collection before seeking court enforcement.

Was the case finished in the collected record?

Not completely. The November 2023 lien-foreclosure ruling resolved the summary-judgment issue, but later contempt/enforcement proceedings continued. The last collected entry continued the remaining evidentiary hearing to July 24, 2025.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2021-001865 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 3, 2023
Judge / panelHon. Margaret R. Mahoney, Hon. David W. Garbarino, Hon. Richard Albrecht, Hon. Scott A. Blaney
PartiesVal Vista Lakes Community Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Susan M. Wellman (Defendant, homeowner) and Arizona Federal Credit Union
Governing law
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsFinesCC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Lakes partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure. It held that self-help nuisance-abatement costs charged after a default judgment were properly placed on the owner's account ledger, secured by the association's assessment lien, and foreclosable because the unpaid amount exceeded the A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) threshold when the supplemental foreclosure action was filed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package36 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap11 roadmap entries
Video overviewTemporarily unavailable while the expanded case record is reviewed
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Lakes Community Association obtained a default judgment and permanent injunction requiring Susan Wellman to abate alleged nuisance conditions and allowing association self-help if she did not comply. After the association used that self-help remedy and charged $38,960.99 in cleanup costs to the owner's ledger, it filed a supplemental lien-foreclosure claim for the unpaid balance. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the association on lien foreclosure, holding that the self-help costs were properly charged to the account ledger, secured by the association's assessment lien, and subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807. Later entries show continuing contempt/enforcement proceedings over the injunction, with the collected record ending before the continued July 2025 evidentiary hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

The November 3, 2023 under-advisement ruling started from the default judgment and injunction already entered in the association's favor. That injunction ordered permanent nuisance abatement and included a self-help provision allowing the association, after notice, to enter the property and abate the nuisance if the owner failed to comply. The court stated that the association then removed more than 220,000 pounds of trash and unauthorized items, charged $38,960.99 in cleanup costs to the owner's ledger under the default judgment and governing documents, and sued to foreclose after only part of that charge had been paid.

Applying A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) and Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association v. Mejia, the court found the association was entitled to foreclose because the owner was delinquent in payment of monies secured by the lien in an amount of $1,200 or more when the supplemental complaint was filed. The court also rejected the owner's A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) notice argument, reasoning that the parties were already litigating the issue and that the default judgment had already been issued, so the owner had sufficient notice that collection activity was underway.

The collected minute entries do not show a clean final stop to all enforcement activity. After the foreclosure ruling, later entries show mandatory settlement-conference orders and a separate contempt/enforcement track over continued alleged injunction violations. In March 2025, the court denied the owner's oral Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, explaining that the injunction's self-help language was permissive and did not require the association to keep providing bulk-trash cleanup before asking the court to enforce its order.

Why It Matters

This case is important for HOA enforcement disputes because it treats court-authorized nuisance-abatement costs as more than an ordinary fine. The ruling says those self-help costs, once charged under the judgment and governing documents, can be secured by an assessment lien and foreclosed under A.R.S. § 33-1807 if the statutory delinquency threshold is met.

The ruling also gives a trial-court example of how notice arguments may fare when lien foreclosure follows earlier litigation and a default judgment. The court did not require a fresh A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) notice cycle on these facts because the owner already had notice through the litigation and judgment. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is a useful source for the intersection of injunction enforcement, association self-help, account ledgers, and lien foreclosure.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Foreclosure & Lien Priority | A.R.S. §§ 33-1807, 33-727 | CV2012-012813

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowners association that had won a judgment of foreclosure and forced a sheriff’s sale squared off against Bank of America over who was entitled to the $4,716.06 left over after the sale. The association argued the foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, entitling it to the surplus; the Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages. The court was persuaded by the Bank: distribution is governed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and the Bank — as the next lienholder in priority — takes the excess proceeds.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-012813.

Scope note: This page covers Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-012813) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling on the competing excess-proceeds applications; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entries, from May 2014, are orders directing the Clerk’s Office to release the excess proceeds to Bank of America; the collected minutes show no appeal or further activity, so the dispute over the sale proceeds appears concluded as of those entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court held that Bank of America, not the foreclosing homeowners association, was entitled to the $4,716.06 in excess proceeds left over from the sheriff’s sale that followed the Association’s judgment of foreclosure. The Association argued the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would have sent the surplus to it as judgment creditor. The court was instead persuaded by the Bank’s position — grounded in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), under which association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages — that distribution of the excess is governed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A). Because the Bank was the next lienholder in priority, the court denied the Association’s application, granted the Bank’s, and directed the Clerk to distribute the excess proceeds to the Bank.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
    Scottsdale homeowners association that obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien and, as judgment creditor, applied for the excess proceeds from the September 2013 sheriff's sale. Its application was denied.
  • Janet E. Jackim (Counsel)
    Counsel for Plaintiff Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, appearing at the February 28, 2014 oral argument on the competing excess-proceeds applications.
  • Roger Owers (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Plaintiff Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Windy Walk Properties, LLC (Defendant)
    First-named defendant in the Association's foreclosure suit. The Association applied for a default judgment against it in early 2013, and it appeared at the February 2014 oral argument through a company representative rather than counsel.
  • Bank of America, N.A. (Defendant)
    Defendant lienholder that opposed the Association's application and filed its own competing application for release of the excess proceeds. The court found the Bank was the next lienholder in priority and awarded it the $4,716.06.
  • David E. Funkhouser III (Counsel)
    Counsel for Defendant Bank of America, N.A., appearing at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.
  • Lyzzette M. Bullock (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Defendant Bank of America, N.A. at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.
  • Doug Metz (Representative)
    Representative of Defendant Windy Walk Properties, LLC, present at the February 28, 2014 oral argument. The minute entries identify him as a company representative, not counsel.

Neutral Parties

  • Maria del Mar Verdin (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the excess-proceeds dispute, heard the February 2014 oral argument, and issued the April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling.
  • Colleen L. French (Judge)
    Judge pro tem who signed the May 2014 orders directing release of the excess proceeds to Bank of America and correcting a clerical error in the release order.
  • Benjamin E. Vatz (Commissioner)
    Court commissioner designated in the February 2013 minute entry to hear the Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings against Windy Walk Properties, LLC.

What happened

Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association sued Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2012-012813) and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien. The collected minute entries pick up the case in early 2013, when the Association filed an application and affidavit for default judgment against Windy Walk Properties; the court directed that those Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Benjamin E. Vatz and that the default packet be hand-delivered to that division.

In February 2013 the Association also moved for summary judgment on lien priority. That motion never had to be decided: after the parties filed a stipulation in April 2013, the court deemed the summary-judgment motion moot in a May 3, 2013 minute entry.

On September 12, 2013, a sheriff’s sale was conducted on the property as a result of the judgment of foreclosure in the Association’s favor. The sale generated $4,716.06 in excess proceeds, which were deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court. In October 2013 the Association applied for distribution of the excess proceeds to itself as judgment creditor. Bank of America opposed that application in November 2013 and filed its own competing application for release of the same funds, and the two applications were fully briefed through December 2013.

Judge Maria del Mar Verdin set the competing applications for oral argument and heard them on February 28, 2014. Janet E. Jackim and Roger Owers argued for the Association; David E. Funkhouser and Lyzzette M. Bullock argued for Bank of America; Windy Walk Properties appeared through its representative, Doug Metz. The court took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling issued April 9, 2014, the court resolved the statutory tug-of-war in the Bank’s favor. The Association had argued that its lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, entitling it to the excess proceeds; the Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages, so any excess should be disbursed to the Bank. The court was persuaded by the Bank’s position that priority, under the circumstances presented, is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and held that the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds as the next lienholder in priority. It denied the Association’s application, granted the Bank’s, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America.

The endgame was administrative. The Bank filed a proposed form of order in late April 2014, and Judge Pro Tem Colleen L. French signed an order in May 2014 granting the Bank’s application and directing release of the $4,716.06 — less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a fully executed U.S. Treasury Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g). A May 20, 2014 minute entry corrected a clerical error so that the Clerk’s Office, rather than the Maricopa County Treasurer, would release the funds. The collected minutes end there, with the excess proceeds ordered released to the Bank.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC (CV2012-012813 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The excess proceeds from the sheriff’s sale following the association’s lien foreclosure must be distributed by lien… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-02-04 The court takes no action on the Association's e-filed application for default judgment against Windy Walk Properties, LLC and directs that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Benjamin E. Vatz.
Step 2013-02-27 The Association files a motion for summary judgment on lien priority with a separate statement of facts.
Step 2013-05-03 Pursuant to an April 26, 2013 stipulation, the court deems the summary-judgment motion on lien priority moot.
Step 2013-09-12 A sheriff's sale is conducted on the property under the judgment of foreclosure in the Association's favor; $4,716.06 in excess proceeds is deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court.
Step 2013-10-17 The Association files its Application for Distribution of Excess Proceeds from Sale of Real Estate Under Execution and Order of Sale on Special Execution.
Step 2013-11-05 Bank of America files its response opposing the Association's application and its own competing Application for Release of Excess Proceeds; briefing continues through December 2013.
Step 2014-01-09 The court sets the competing excess-proceeds applications for oral argument.
Step 2014-02-28 Oral argument before Judge Maria del Mar Verdin; counsel for the Association and the Bank argue, a Windy Walk Properties representative is present, and the matter is taken under advisement.
Step 2014-04-09 Under-advisement ruling: priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A); the Association's application is denied, the Bank's application is granted, and the Clerk is directed to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America.
Step 2014-05-15 Order granting Bank of America's application and directing release of the $4,716.06, less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g).
Step 2014-05-20 Clerical correction: the Clerk's Office, rather than the Maricopa County Treasurer, is to release the excess proceeds to Bank of America.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 7 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2013-02-04

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-judgment entry ordering that no action would be taken by the assigned division because Rule 55(b) default-judgment papers had to proceed through commissioner procedure.

Source 2 2013-05-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2014-01-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2014-02-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2014-04-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the association’s application for excess foreclosure-sale proceeds and directing distribution by lien priority.

Source 6 2014-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2014-05-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What are "excess proceeds" in a foreclosure case like this one?

They are the money left over from a foreclosure sale after the amounts the sale was conducted to satisfy are paid. Here, the sheriff’s sale held on September 12, 2013 under the judgment of foreclosure in the Association’s favor produced $4,716.06 more than was needed, and that surplus was deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court until the judge decided who was entitled to it.

Why did Bank of America get the money instead of the association that foreclosed?

Because of lien priority. The court was persuaded by the Bank’s position that priority in these circumstances is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and it held the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds “as the next lien holder in priority.” The Association’s foreclosure judgment gave it the right to force the sale, but it did not give the Association a superior claim to the surplus over the next lienholder in line.

What was the Association's legal theory, and why did it fail?

The Association argued that its lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would have routed the excess sale proceeds to it as the judgment creditor. The court rejected that framing in favor of the Bank’s argument that, under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages — so the surplus is distributed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A) rather than handed to the foreclosing judgment creditor.

What happened to the earlier summary-judgment motion on lien priority?

The Association moved for summary judgment on lien priority in February 2013, but the parties filed a stipulation in April 2013, and the court then deemed the motion moot in a May 3, 2013 minute entry. The priority question ultimately reached the court a different way — through the competing applications for the excess sale proceeds filed in the fall of 2013.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. In this case, Judge Maria del Mar Verdin took the competing excess-proceeds applications under advisement at the February 28, 2014 oral argument and issued the written ruling on April 9, 2014. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA foreclosure disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading for anyone tracking association lien foreclosures: it shows a court treating an HOA lien foreclosure like a mortgage foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) and distributing surplus sale proceeds strictly by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A), rather than awarding them to the foreclosing association.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-012813 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateApril 9, 2014
Judge / panelHon. Maria del Mar Verdin, Judge Pro Tem Colleen L. French
PartiesBallantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff, judgment creditor) v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court held that the excess proceeds from the sheriff's sale following the association's lien foreclosure must be distributed by lien priority — being persuaded by the Bank's position, grounded in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)'s treatment of association lien foreclosures as mortgages, that priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A) — and that Bank of America was entitled to the $4,716.06 as the next lienholder in priority, rejecting the association's argument that the foreclosure was a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562 entitling it to the surplus as judgment creditor.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap11 roadmap entries
Video overviewBallantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Scottsdale homeowners association sued Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien. A September 12, 2013 sheriff's sale conducted under that judgment produced $4,716.06 in excess proceeds, which were deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court. The association applied for the surplus as judgment creditor, arguing the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562; Bank of America filed a competing application, arguing that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages so the excess should be disbursed to the Bank. After a February 28, 2014 oral argument, the court issued an April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling adopting the Bank's position: priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds as the next lienholder in priority. The court denied the association's application, granted the Bank's, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America; May 2014 orders implemented the release and corrected a clerical error.

Key Issues & Findings

The dispute reached the court through competing applications for the same pot of money. After the association won a judgment of foreclosure and a sheriff's sale was conducted on the property on September 12, 2013, $4,716.06 in excess proceeds was deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court. In October 2013 the association applied for distribution of the surplus to itself, characterizing the sale as one conducted under execution and an order of sale on special execution; in November 2013 Bank of America both opposed that application and filed its own application for release of the same funds. The applications were fully briefed through December 2013 and argued on February 28, 2014.

The April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling framed the parties' positions as a statutory choice. The association argued that the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would entitle it, as judgment creditor, to the excess proceeds. The Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages, so any excess monies should be disbursed to the Bank. The court stated it was persuaded by the Bank's position that priority in the case, under the circumstances presented, is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and concluded the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds "as the next lien holder in priority."

On that basis the court denied the association's application for distribution, granted the Bank's application for release, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America, with counsel to lodge a form of order. Implementation followed in May 2014: a judge pro tem signed an order releasing the funds to the Bank less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g), and a follow-up minute entry corrected a clerical error so the Clerk's Office, rather than the county treasurer, would release the money. The collected minute entries show no appeal or further activity after the May 2014 release orders.

Why It Matters

This case answers a question that recurs whenever an Arizona homeowners association forecloses its lien and the property sells for more than the sale needed to raise: who keeps the surplus? The association here assumed that, as the foreclosing judgment creditor, it would — and framed the sheriff's sale as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562 to get there. The court instead treated the association's lien foreclosure like a mortgage foreclosure, following the Bank's argument under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), and distributed the excess strictly by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A). The next lienholder in line — a bank — took the money.

For associations, the lesson is that winning a foreclosure judgment and forcing a sale does not create a right to surplus sale proceeds; other lienholders' priority positions survive the sale and control the distribution of any excess. For homeowners and lenders, the case shows the mechanics of how these fights actually unfold — competing applications to the court for funds deposited with the Clerk, briefing, oral argument, and an under-advisement ruling. The dollar amount here was modest ($4,716.06), but the priority principle applies regardless of size. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties and is not precedent; the collected minute entries show the matter concluded with the May 2014 release orders and no appeal.

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Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment-Lien Foreclosure | CC&R Enforcement | CV2018-090922

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowners association filed a foreclosure complaint against a homeowner who had become significantly delinquent on her monthly assessments, asserting contractual lien rights under the community’s recorded CC&Rs and statutory lien rights under Arizona law. The self-represented homeowner’s response rested on a large partial payment she made after the complaint was filed. The court held that the recorded CC&Rs created a binding obligation to pay assessments on time, that the association had convincingly shown she failed to stay current, and that her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense — so the association was entitled to summary judgment, with the post-complaint payment credited against the amount awarded.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-090922.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2018-09-26. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-090922) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries end with the September 26, 2018 ruling, which directed the association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 and permitted an attorneys’-fee application upon entry of judgment. The entry of final judgment, any fee award, and anything that happened afterward are not reflected in the collected record or on this page. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint. It found the Association had firmly established that, as a property owner in the Palm Valley Community subject to the recorded CC&Rs, the homeowner had an ongoing, binding, and absolute legal obligation to make timely assessment payments — with failure carrying strict penalties up to and including foreclosure — and had convincingly shown she failed to remain current. Her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense. The court awarded the Association the $4,622.64 principal balance sought in the complaint, less her post-complaint payment of $4,095.50, plus assessments, late charges, or fees incurred after the complaint was filed, and held the Association entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in collection.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Palm Valley Community Association (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association for the Palm Valley Community that filed the May 2018 foreclosure complaint to collect delinquent assessments and prevailed on summary judgment.
  • Mark W. Waldron (Counsel)
    Counsel of record listed for the Association in the minute-entry captions and the court's party records.
  • Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
    Counsel who appeared for the Association at the September 19, 2018 oral argument and is named in the under-advisement ruling.

Respondent Side

  • Stella Benton (Defendant)
    Homeowner in the Palm Valley Community who became delinquent on monthly assessments; she represented herself throughout the collected minute entries, including at the September 19, 2018 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

  • David J. Palmer (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who set and heard the summary-judgment oral argument and issued the September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling.

What happened

Stella Benton owned a home in the Palm Valley Community, a development governed by duly recorded Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Under the CC&Rs, she was obligated to pay monthly fees assessed by the Palm Valley Community Association. According to the court’s later ruling, she became delinquent in those obligations “to a significant degree.”

On May 3, 2018, the Association filed a complaint seeking foreclosure on its contractual lien rights under the CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under applicable Arizona statutory provisions. The principal balance at the time of filing was $4,622.64, which included unpaid assessments plus interest, late charges, and other fees imposed because of the missed payments.

On June 14, 2018, the Association moved for summary judgment with an accompanying statement of facts. Benton, representing herself, filed a “Request to Deny Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the court treated as her response; the Association filed a reply on June 21, 2018. Benton’s response pointed to a significant payment of $4,095.50 she made on May 31, 2018 — a few weeks after the complaint was filed — which the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed.

Judge David J. Palmer set oral argument for September 19, 2018. At the hearing, attorney Samuel C. Richardson appeared for the Association and Benton appeared on her own behalf; after roughly sixteen minutes of argument, the court took the motion under advisement.

In a September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling, the court recited Arizona’s summary-judgment standard — judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — and found that the Association had firmly established Benton’s ongoing, binding, and absolute obligation to make timely assessment payments, with failure carrying strict penalties up to and including foreclosure. It further found the Association had convincingly shown she failed to remain current, and that her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense to the complaint or the motion.

The court therefore granted summary judgment in the amount of $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment made since the case began, plus any assessments, late charges, or fees incurred between the filing of the complaint and the date of judgment. It directed the Association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 — with Benton free to object — and held the Association entitled to collect the attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts, to be sought by application upon entry of judgment. The collected minute entries end with this ruling.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton (CV2018-090922 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint, finding no… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-05-03 The Association files its complaint seeking foreclosure on its contractual (CC&R) and statutory lien rights; the principal balance is $4,622.64, including unpaid assessments, interest, late charges, and other fees.
Step 2018-05-31 Benton makes a $4,095.50 payment, which the Association characterizes as four months late and less than the full amount owed.
Step 2018-06-14 The Association files its motion for summary judgment with a statement of facts; Benton files a "Request to Deny Motion for Summary Judgment," which the court treats as her response.
Step 2018-06-21 The Association files its reply in support of summary judgment.
Step 2018-09-05 The court sets oral argument on the summary-judgment motion for September 19, 2018 (30 minutes, split between the parties).
Step 2018-09-19 Oral argument is held; Samuel C. Richardson appears for the Association and Benton appears on her own behalf. The court takes the motion under advisement.
Step 2018-09-26 Under-advisement ruling grants the Association summary judgment for $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment, plus post-complaint assessments, late charges, or fees; a proposed form of judgment is due October 12, 2018, and the Association may apply for its attorneys' fees upon entry of judgment.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 3 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2018-09-05

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2018-09-19

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 3 2018-09-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure claim and entitlement to collection fees.

FAQ

What was this case about?

Delinquent HOA assessments. Stella Benton owned a home in the Palm Valley Community subject to recorded CC&Rs that required her to pay monthly assessments to the Association. After she became significantly delinquent, the Association filed a complaint in May 2018 seeking to foreclose on its contractual lien rights under the CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under Arizona law, with a principal balance of $4,622.64 at filing.

Didn't the homeowner pay most of what she owed?

She made a significant payment — $4,095.50 on May 31, 2018 — but only after the complaint had been filed on May 3, and the Association characterized the payment as four months late and less than the full amount owed. The court credited the payment against the judgment amount, but it did not defeat the case: summary judgment was still granted for the remaining balance plus assessments, late charges, or fees incurred after the complaint was filed.

Why did the homeowner lose at summary judgment?

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court found the Association had firmly established Benton’s binding obligation to pay assessments on time and had convincingly shown she failed to remain current — and, in the court’s words, her “own written Response, as well as her oral argument, fails to state any factual or legal defense” to the complaint or the motion. With no disputed material facts, the Association was entitled to judgment.

What exactly did the court order?

The September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment in the amount of $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment made since the case began, plus any subsequently incurred assessments, late charges, or fees through the date of judgment. The Association was ordered to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018, with Benton able to file timely objections, and was held entitled to collect the attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts, to be sought by application upon entry of judgment.

Was the home actually foreclosed?

The collected minute entries do not say. The complaint sought foreclosure on the Association’s lien rights, and the ruling granted summary judgment on the amounts owed and set up the judgment and fee-application process — but the collected record ends with the September 26, 2018 ruling, before entry of a final judgment. Whether a foreclosure sale, payoff, or other resolution followed is not reflected in the minute entries this page is built from.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how an Arizona assessment-lien foreclosure case proceeds from complaint to summary judgment, how a court treats a large partial payment made after suit is filed (credited against the judgment, but not a defense), and that a losing homeowner can also be ordered to pay the association’s collection attorneys’ fees.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2018-090922 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 26, 2018
Judge / panelHon. David J. Palmer
PartiesPalm Valley Community Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Stella Benton (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney FeesLiens
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint, finding no genuine issue of material fact: the recorded CC&Rs imposed an ongoing, binding, and absolute obligation to pay assessments on time, the Association convincingly showed the homeowner failed to remain current, and her response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense. Judgment was awarded for the $4,622.64 principal balance less her $4,095.50 post-complaint payment, plus subsequently incurred assessments, late charges, or fees, with the Association entitled to its reasonable collection attorneys' fees.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package3 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewPalm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Palm Valley Community Association sued homeowner Stella Benton in May 2018 to foreclose on its contractual lien rights under the community's recorded CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under Arizona law, after she became significantly delinquent on her monthly assessments; the principal balance at filing was $4,622.64, including unpaid assessments, interest, late charges, and other fees. The Association moved for summary judgment in June 2018. Benton, representing herself, responded by pointing to a $4,095.50 payment she made on May 31, 2018 — after the complaint was filed — which the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed. After a September 19, 2018 oral argument, the court issued a September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granting the Association summary judgment for $4,622.64 less the $4,095.50 payment, plus post-complaint assessments, late charges, or fees, and held the Association entitled to apply for its reasonable collection attorneys' fees upon entry of judgment. The collected minute entries end with that ruling.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began from Arizona's summary-judgment standard, quoting Johnson v. Earnhardt's Gilbert Dodge, Inc. and Orme School v. Reeves: judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the motion denied if the opposing evidence would let reasonable people reach a different conclusion.

Applying that standard, the court found the Association had "firmly established" that Benton, as a property owner in the Palm Valley Community subject to the duly recorded CC&Rs, had an ongoing, binding, and absolute legal obligation to make timely assessment payments — an obligation whose breach carries strict penalties including late fees, fines, and other financial sanctions, up to and including foreclosure by the Association to collect the unpaid amounts. The Association had further established convincingly that Benton failed to remain current on her assessments.

Benton's defense reduced to the $4,095.50 payment she made on May 31, 2018, roughly four weeks after the complaint was filed — a payment the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed. The court found that her written response and her oral argument failed to state any factual or legal defense to the complaint or the summary-judgment motion. With no genuine issue of material fact, the court granted judgment for the $4,622.64 principal balance less the $4,095.50 payment, plus any assessments, late charges, or fees incurred between the complaint and the date of judgment, directed the Association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 (with Benton able to object), and held the Association entitled to collect the attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts by application upon entry of judgment.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact, real-world example of the most common kind of Arizona HOA litigation: an assessment-lien collection and foreclosure action against a delinquent homeowner. It shows how quickly such a case can move — complaint in May, summary-judgment motion six weeks later, judgment granted within five months — and how little a homeowner's position matters at summary judgment unless it raises an actual factual or legal defense to the delinquency itself.

The treatment of the homeowner's $4,095.50 payment is the practical lesson. Paying most of the arrears after the association has already sued reduces the judgment (the court credited every dollar) but does not undo the case: the association still recovered the remaining balance, everything that accrued after filing, and its reasonable collection attorneys' fees. For homeowners, the economics favor resolving delinquencies before a complaint is filed; for associations, the ruling illustrates that recorded CC&Rs plus a documented payment history is ordinarily enough to carry a summary-judgment motion. As a superior-court decision it binds only these parties, and the collected minute entries end at the ruling stage, before entry of final judgment.

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Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Foreclosure & Assessment Liens | A.R.S. §§ 33-1807, 33-420 | CV2014-094169

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a delinquent Troon North owner argued that paying the assessments off in full after years of delinquency defeated the association’s foreclosure count under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The court read the statute’s “has been delinquent” language as a trigger: once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not end the association’s lien or its right to foreclose — a right the court found the association also holds independently under Article 7 of its CC&Rs. The A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the lis pendens took effect.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for partial summary judgment and the June 26, 2015 final judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 26, 2015 judgment, which states that no further matters remained and that it was a final judgment entered under Rule 54(c) — any later appellate history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court held that Troon North Association could foreclose its assessment lien even though the owner paid off the delinquent assessments after years of nonpayment. It read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and a later payoff of the regular assessments does not let the owner avoid the statute’s foreclosure provisions or extinguish the association’s lien. The court also found the association holds a separate contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs — specifically Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 — which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The owner’s A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the owner admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Troon North Association (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
    Homeowners association that sued to foreclose its lien for delinquent assessments on a Scottsdale property and prevailed on every claim, ending the case with a judgment that included its attorneys' fees and costs.
  • Mark W. Waldron (Counsel / Counterdefendant)
    Attorney listed for the association in the early minute entries and present on its behalf at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; also named as a counterdefendant because the A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim sought to hold him and the association responsible for failing to release the lis pendens.
  • Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
    Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument and listed as its counsel of record in the spring 2015 minute entries.
  • Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
    Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; replaced as counsel of record by substitution within the firm in June 2015.
  • Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Substituted in on June 22, 2015 as attorney of record for the association and counterdefendant Mark W. Waldron, in place of Paul R. Neil.

Respondent Side

  • Ripson Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
    Defendant that moved for partial summary judgment against the foreclosure count and brought the A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron; the counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.
  • 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
    Co-defendant; the association applied for default judgment against it in December 2014, and its June 2015 request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A) was denied in the final judgment.
  • City of Scottsdale (Defendant (dismissed))
    Municipal defendant dismissed on the association's notice of dismissal by order entered August 12, 2014.
  • Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for defendants Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC; present on behalf of the defendants at the April 3, 2015 oral argument.
  • Eric C. Anderson (Counsel)
    Attorney listed in the 2014 minute entries for Defendant City of Scottsdale, which was dismissed in August 2014.

Neutral Parties

  • David K. Udall (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions, issued the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, and signed the June 2015 final judgment.
  • Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge initially assigned to the case; ordered the dismissal of the City of Scottsdale in August 2014 before the case was reassigned on the association's notice of change of judge.
  • John Rea (Judge)
    Civil Presiding Judge who reassigned the case to Judge Udall in September 2014 after a notice of change of judge was filed.

What happened

Troon North Association is a homeowners association in Scottsdale. In 2014 it sued Ripson Holdings, LLC, 4AAR Holdings, LLC, and the City of Scottsdale in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2014-094169), including a count to foreclose its assessment lien on a Scottsdale property. The court later found that the owner — referred to in the ruling as “Defendant Ripson,” with Michael Ripson personally present at the 2015 oral argument — became delinquent on assessment fees in 2009 and remained delinquent every year through 2014, when the delinquent assessments were finally paid off on August 4, 2014. The City of Scottsdale was dismissed early, on the association’s own notice, by an August 12, 2014 order, and after the association filed a notice of change of judge the case moved from Judge Mark F. Aceto to Judge David K. Udall in September 2014.

The defense answered with a counterattack. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420 — Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute — seeking to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a lis pendens that had been recorded against the property. Meanwhile, in December 2014 the association applied for default judgment against 4AAR Holdings; the assigned judge took no action on the e-filed application and directed that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be handled by Commissioner Margaret Benny, with the default packet hand-delivered as required by administrative order.

The case came to a head on cross-motions. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment against the association’s foreclosure count and on their counterclaim; the association and Waldron cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Judge Udall heard oral argument on April 3, 2015 — Charles Maxwell, Mark Waldron, and Paul Neil appearing for the association, Elijah Rosov for the defendants — ordered the defendants to respond to the association’s motion to strike, and took the matter under advisement.

The April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling resolved everything in the association’s favor. The court first granted the motion to strike, finding the defendants had improperly cited a ruling by Judge Aceto, and refused to consider those references. It then dismissed the § 33-420 special action and counterclaim with prejudice: at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing it, so as a matter of law § 33-420 did not apply. On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid. The court disagreed, interpreting the statute’s “has been delinquent” phrase as a triggering mechanism — once an owner has been delinquent for over a year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and the owner cannot later pay the full assessment fees to avoid its foreclosure provisions. The association’s lien, the court found, did not end with the payment of the regular-assessment portion of the debt.

The ruling also gave the association a second, independent path. Under Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — the association has the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, along with the right to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual lien and foreclosure rights: while A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature’s intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights, no such language limits an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion — finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories — and allowed the association to seek its attorneys’ fees and costs.

The endgame ran through June 2015. The court denied the association’s request for a hearing on the remaining issues in May and warned that the case would be dismissed if the parties did not submit the required joint report or a form of final judgment; in early June it granted short extensions for the defendants to respond to the fee application and proposed judgment, and on June 22 Samuel C. Richardson of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. substituted in as the association’s counsel of record. On June 26, 2015 the court entered judgment: it denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, entered judgment for the association and against the defendants, and dismissed Ripson Holdings’ special action and counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice. The court noted that no further matters remained and that the judgment was final under Rule 54(c).

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC (CV2014-094169 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA foreclosure judgment quieted lien priority and rejected homeowner recording-penalty theories. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-08-12 On the association's notice of dismissal, the court dismisses all claims against Defendant City of Scottsdale.
Step 2014-09-05 After a notice of change of judge, the Civil Presiding Judge reassigns the case from Judge Aceto to Judge David K. Udall; a September 11 correction clarifies the notice was filed by the association.
Step 2014-12-10 The court takes no action on the association's e-filed application for default judgment against 4AAR Holdings, LLC, directing that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Margaret Benny.
Step 2015-03-03 Oral argument is set on the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the foreclosure count and counterclaim, and on the association's cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
Step 2015-04-03 Oral argument is held; the defendants are ordered to respond to the association's motion to strike by April 8, and the matter is taken under advisement.
Step 2015-04-08 Rule 16(b) order: the parties must file a joint report and proposed scheduling order by May 8, 2015 or the case will be placed on the dismissal calendar.
Step 2015-04-15 Under-advisement ruling: motion to strike granted; the A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice; the association may foreclose under both A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) and its CC&Rs; attorneys' fees and costs are allowed.
Step 2015-05-27 The court denies the association's request for a hearing on remaining issues and places the case on the dismissal calendar for June 15, 2015 absent the required filings.
Step 2015-06-05 The court signs orders extending to June 15 the deadline to respond to the association's attorneys'-fee application and Ripson Holdings' deadline to respond to the proposed form of judgment.
Step 2015-06-22 Samuel C. Richardson of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. substitutes for Paul R. Neil as counsel of record for the association and counterdefendant Mark W. Waldron.
Step 2015-06-26 Judgment signed: the fee application is granted, 4AAR Holdings' request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure is denied, judgment is entered for the association against the defendants, Ripson Holdings' counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, and the judgment is final under Rule 54(c).

Complete source-document index

This index contains 13 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2014-08-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2014-09-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2014-09-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2014-12-10

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 5 2015-03-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2015-04-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2015-04-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2015-04-15

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association partial summary judgment on its foreclosure count, dismissing the counterclaim with prejudice, and allowing fees and costs.

Source 9 2015-05-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2015-06-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2015-06-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2015-06-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2015-06-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying 4AAR’s foreclosure-amount request, awarding the association fees and costs, entering judgment for the association, and dismissing Ripson’s special-action complaint.

FAQ

Can a homeowner stop an HOA foreclosure by paying off the delinquent assessments?

Not according to this ruling. The court interpreted A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies to that owner. The court expressly declined to read the statute as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any point and thereby avoid its foreclosure provisions, and it found the association’s lien did not end when the owner paid the regular-assessment portion of the debt.

What does A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) require before an HOA can foreclose?

As quoted in the ruling, the association’s lien for assessments, late charges, reasonable collection fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs may be foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage on real estate — but only if the owner has been delinquent in the payment of money secured by the lien, excluding those fees and charges, for a period of one year or for an amount of $1,200.00 or more, whichever occurs first. Here the court found the owner became delinquent in 2009 and remained delinquent each year through 2014, satisfying the trigger.

What happened to the counterclaim against the association and its attorney?

It was dismissed with prejudice. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420, Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute, seeking to hold the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. The court found that at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00, admitted owing that money, and that as a matter of law § 33-420 does not apply in those circumstances. The final judgment repeated the dismissal with prejudice.

Can an HOA foreclose under its CC&Rs even apart from the statute?

In this case, yes. The court found that Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, and that Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. It held the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) shows the legislature included preemption language where it intended preemption, and no such language restricts an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The association therefore had a separate right to foreclose under its CC&Rs as well as under the statute.

Who ultimately won, and what did the judgment include?

The association won on every dispositive issue. The April 15, 2015 ruling denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted the association’s cross-motion, dismissed the § 33-420 counterclaim with prejudice, and allowed the association to seek fees. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure, entered judgment for the association against the defendants, and again dismissed Ripson Holdings’ counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how one Arizona trial court read the “has been delinquent” trigger in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), how CC&R lien provisions can supply an independent contractual foreclosure right, and why a § 33-420 wrongful-recording claim fails when the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the document was recorded. The collected minute entries end with the June 26, 2015 final judgment, so any appellate history is outside these records.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2014-094169 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateApril 15, 2015
Judge / panelHon. David K. Udall, Hon. Mark F. Aceto
PartiesTroon North Association (Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, homeowners association) v. Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendants/Counterclaimants); Mark W. Waldron (Counterdefendant); City of Scottsdale (Defendant, dismissed August 2014)
Governing law
Topics
ForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the association partial summary judgment on its foreclosure count and dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) an owner who has been delinquent for over a year or $1,200 or more cannot avoid foreclosure by later paying the full assessment fees, that the association's lien did not end with payment of the regular-assessment portion, that the association has a separate, non-preempted right to foreclose under Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 of its CC&Rs, and that A.R.S. § 33-420 did not apply to the unreleased lis pendens because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when it took effect.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap11 roadmap entries
Video overviewTroon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon North Association, a Scottsdale homeowners association, sued in 2014 to foreclose its assessment lien on a Scottsdale property whose owner had been delinquent on assessments from 2009 through 2014, paying them off only on August 4, 2014. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the payoff defeated the association's right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), and Ripson Holdings counterclaimed under A.R.S. § 33-420 to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. In an April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, Judge David K. Udall held the statute's "has been delinquent" language is a trigger — once the one-year or $1,200 threshold is met, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not avoid foreclosure or end the lien — and that the association also holds an independent contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs, which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The § 33-420 counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice because the defendant admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys' fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.

Key Issues & Findings

On the counterclaim, the court found that Ripson Holdings' special action under A.R.S. § 33-420 — which attempted to hold attorney Waldron and the association responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens — failed as a matter of law. At the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing that money, so the wrongful-recording statute simply did not apply in those circumstances. The court dismissed the special action and counterclaim with prejudice, a dismissal the final judgment later repeated as to both the association and Waldron.

On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid in full on August 4, 2014. The court quoted the statute — the lien may be foreclosed only if the owner "has been" delinquent for a period of one year or in an amount of $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first — and interpreted "has been" as a triggering mechanism, analogous to a jurisdictional question: once the delinquent party has been in arrears past either threshold, the statute applies to that owner from that point. The court refused to read the language as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any time and thereby avoid the statute's foreclosure provisions, and it found the association's lien did not end with the defendant's payment of the regular-assessment portion, since the lien also secures late charges, collection costs, and attorneys' fees.

The court then held the association has a second, independent foreclosure path under its own CC&Rs. Article 7 — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them and to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its right to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs. The Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature's intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights where it so chose, and no such language appears with respect to an association's right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). Finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories, the court denied the defendants' motion, granted the association's cross-motion, and allowed the association its attorneys' fees and costs. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the fee application, denied 4AAR Holdings' request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), and entered judgment for the association against the defendants under Rule 54(c).

Why It Matters

This case answers a question delinquent owners often raise: can you cut off an HOA foreclosure by writing a check for the past-due assessments once the lawsuit is underway? Under this court's reading of A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), no — the "has been delinquent" language is a one-way trigger. Once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, the association's statutory foreclosure right attaches, and paying off the regular assessments later does not erase the lien, which continues to secure late charges, collection costs, and attorneys' fees.

The ruling also illustrates two other recurring points. First, a planned community's CC&Rs can supply an independent contractual lien-and-foreclosure right that survives alongside the statute — the court found no preemption language in § 33-1807(A), contrasting it with subsection (K), where the legislature spoke expressly. Second, A.R.S. § 33-420 wrongful-recording claims over a lis pendens fail when the underlying debt was admittedly owed at the time of recording. The financial coda is familiar: the owner entities ended the case with a judgment against them that included the association's attorneys' fees and costs. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties; the collected minute entries end with the June 2015 final judgment.

← Back to Superior Court cases

In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor: HOA Court Case Guide

Bankruptcy & Assessments | 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)

In this 2011 published decision, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor stays personally liable for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them—for as long as the debtor retains title, because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title.

Federal court | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) | Decided 2011-05-26

Scope note: This educational page summarizes In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor, a Federal court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

Source note: The page keeps the public source URL but does not provide a local ruling PDF because no source PDF passed the file gate.

This federal bankruptcy authority was issued by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona.

The takeaway

Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Shawn Burgueno (Debtor)
    Individual Chapter 11 debtor and record owner of the Scottsdale condominium; moved to have the associations' post-petition claims limited to their allowed pre-petition amounts under the confirmed plan; motion denied.
  • D. Lamar Hawkins (Counsel)
    Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi PC
    Counsel for the debtor, Shawn Burgueno; the only attorney named in the published opinion.

Respondent Side

  • Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association (Creditor)
    Condominium association that continued to bill the debtor for post-petition assessments; argued the plan could not discharge those assessments while the debtor held title. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.
  • Grayhawk Community Association (Creditor)
    Master community association that likewise sought post-petition assessments and collection attorneys' fees. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.

Neutral Parties

  • Randolph J. Haines (Judge)
    United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Arizona; authored the Opinion and Order denying discharge of the post-petition HOA fees and attorneys' fees.

What happened

Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer, filed an individual Chapter 11 case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona in 2009. His scheduled assets included his home, a vacant lot, and five single-family residential investment properties; according to his schedules, all of the investment properties were worth less than the debts secured by them. One investment property was a condominium in Scottsdale, subject to assessments by two associations—the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association.

In February 2010, Burgueno stipulated with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank could immediately foreclose on the condominium. The stipulation terminated the § 362 automatic stay as to the bank’s interest in the property and waived the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3). The bankruptcy court approved the stipulation on March 8, 2010.

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. The order confirming the plan expressly incorporated the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the bank’s claim regarding the Scottsdale condominium.

Despite obtaining stay relief, Wells Fargo did not conduct a foreclosure or trustee’s sale of the condominium for more than a year. In the meantime, the two associations continued to bill Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which totaled roughly $8,000 by April 2011.

In April 2011, Burgueno filed motions seeking orders determining that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and therefore limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. The associations responded that the plan neither did nor could discharge their post-petition assessments so long as Burgueno held legal title, and that neither the stipulated stay relief nor the plan confirmation terminated that title.

On May 26, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. He held the post-petition assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d) for as long as Burgueno retained a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the unit. Because the associations had not requested a money judgment and the dispute was a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing. For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

Video overview of the case record

AI-generated video overview of In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor. This is a bankruptcy assessment-liability authority. The written opinion and linked source note control.

The written case page and linked court records are the controlling source for legal posture and accuracy.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

AI-generated audio deep dive for In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor. This is a bankruptcy assessment-liability authority. The written opinion and linked source note control.

Use the linked court records and written page for the exact legal posture.

Audio overview generated from the case record; verify against the linked court records.

Litigation record

Step 1 2009

Shawn Burgueno files an individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the District of Arizona; his assets include a Scottsdale condominium subject to two associations' assessments.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2010-02-16

Burgueno stipulates with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank can foreclose on the condominium, waiving the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2010-03-08

The bankruptcy court approves the Wells Fargo stay-relief stipulation.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2010-08-31

Burgueno's Chapter 11 plan is confirmed; the confirmation order incorporates the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the condominium claim.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2011-04

Wells Fargo still has not foreclosed; post-petition assessments total roughly $8,000. Burgueno moves to have the associations' claims deemed controlled by the confirmed plan and limited to their pre-petition amounts.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2011-05-26

Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denies the motion, holding the post-petition assessments and collection attorneys' fees nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

FAQ

What did In re Burgueno decide?

The bankruptcy court held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor’s personal liability for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—remains nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of the debtor’s plan ended that liability, so the court denied the debtor’s motion to limit the associations to their pre-petition claims.

What is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)?

Section 523(a)(16) is a bankruptcy discharge exception for homeowner- and condominium-association fees and assessments. Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments it applied only while the debtor occupied the property, but the amendment expanded it so that it applies regardless of possession as long as the debtor or the trustee retains a legal or equitable ownership interest in the unit. The exception covers not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” which the court read to include collection attorneys’ fees.

Why didn't stay relief or plan confirmation end the debtor's liability for HOA fees?

The court explained that nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates post-petition liability when a debtor obtains stay relief or confirms a plan, because neither event transfers legal title. Stay relief may signal that the debtor has surrendered possession, but the debtor remained the record owner of the condominium. As long as the debtor holds title, post-petition assessments continue to accrue as nondischargeable obligations.

Are an association's attorneys' fees for collecting assessments also nondischargeable?

Yes. The court held that attorneys’ fees the associations incurred collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16). The CC&Rs—which Arizona treats as a contract—expressly provided for collection fees, and even a narrow reading of the discharge exception could not exclude attorneys’ fees. The court relied on Ninth Circuit BAP and Seventh Circuit authority reaching the same conclusion.

How could the debtor have stopped the post-petition assessments from accruing?

The court explained that to end the liability the debtor would have had to transfer legal title rather than wait for the lender to foreclose. Options included conveying the unit by quit-claim deed—an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and court order under § 363(b)(1)—or transferring title through the plan under § 1123(a)(5)(B). Until title actually passed, the nondischargeable liability continued.

Is this decision binding precedent?

It is a published, precedential decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)), authored by Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines. As a trial-level bankruptcy opinion it binds the parties and is persuasive, frequently cited authority on the post-petition, nondischargeable nature of HOA and condominium assessments; it is not an appellate decision, so other courts are not strictly bound by it.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)
Court / tribunalFederal Court
Decision / key dateMay 26, 2011
Judge / panelHaines
PartiesEdge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and Grayhawk Community Association (Creditors/Respondents) v. Shawn Burgueno (Debtor/Movant)
Governing law
  • 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (incl. (a), (d)(2), (d)(5))
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B)
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (attorneys' fees)
  • A.R.S. § 33-401(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-402 (quit-claim deed)
  • Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3)
  • Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6)
Topics
BankruptcyLiensAssessmentsAttorney FeesCC&RsForeclosure
Outcome / holding

Post-petition homeowners' and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys' fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys' fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable "fee" within § 523(a)(16).

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewIn re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor – 451 B.R. 1
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In re Burgueno arose from the individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer whose properties included a Scottsdale condominium subject to assessments by two associations, the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association. In February 2010 Burgueno stipulated to relief from the automatic stay so that Wells Fargo Bank could foreclose on the condominium, and his Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. Wells Fargo, however, did not foreclose for more than a year, and during that time the two associations kept billing Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which reached roughly $8,000 by April 2011. Burgueno moved for orders declaring that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. Applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) as expanded by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, the court held that an individual debtor's personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association fees continues after the bankruptcy filing for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title, Burgueno remained personally liable until title actually passed—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer of title. The court further held that the attorneys' fees the associations incurred in collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable "fee" under § 523(a)(16), supported both by the CC&Rs (a contract under Arizona law) and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because the associations sought no money judgment and this was not an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor's motion to compel plan compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the plain language of § 523(a)(16). Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments the exception applied only when the debtor occupied the property; as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel explained in In re Foster, the amendment expanded the exception so it applies regardless of possession, so long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates that post-petition liability upon stay relief or plan confirmation.

The court acknowledged that post-petition, pre-confirmation fees are administrative expenses that § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires be paid in full on the effective date, but that plan treatment did not apply here because the associations filed neither a proof of claim nor an application for allowance of an administrative expense; and § 1141(d)(2) makes clear that individual Chapter 11 debtors are not discharged from debts excepted under § 523. Had the plan expressly discharged the post-petition fees and the associations failed to object despite adequate notice, that provision would be res judicata under the Supreme Court's decision in Espinosa—but this plan did not so provide, and the court cautioned that the "specter" of Rule 11 penalties should deter bad-faith attempts to discharge otherwise nondischargeable debts by such an ambush.

The core problem was that the bank failed to foreclose for more than a year after obtaining stay relief—an increasingly frequent occurrence. While stay relief may signal the debtor's surrender of possession, surrender does not terminate legal title; following the Massachusetts bankruptcy court in In re Ames, the court held that post-petition assessments remain nondischargeable while the debtor remains the record owner. To end the liability, the debtor would have to convey title—by quit-claim deed (an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and order under § 363(b)(1)) or by a plan transfer of title under § 1123(a)(5)(B).

On attorneys' fees, the court noted that Arizona treats the CC&Rs as a contract (Pinetop Lakes Ass'n v. Hatch), and that while A.R.S. § 12-341.01 might not apply because the contract was not the central issue in the litigation, the CC&Rs themselves expressly provided for collection fees. Moreover, § 523(a)(16) excepts not only "assessments" but also "a fee," and even a narrow construction of the exception cannot exclude attorneys' fees; the Ninth Circuit BAP (Foster) and the Seventh Circuit (In re Busson-Sokolik) reached the same conclusion. The court therefore held the fees nondischargeable but declined to enter a money judgment, because the associations had not requested one and the matter was a contested motion rather than an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6).

Why It Matters

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor's personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys' fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing.

For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about "surrendering" investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

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The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co.: HOA Court Case Guide

Arizona Court of Appeals — Assessments & Late Fees

A condominium association’s suit to collect assessments and retroactive late fees from its developer fails on appeal, illustrating the reasonableness limit on association powers and the evidence needed to win summary judgment.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co.; No. 1 CA-CV 90-263; 174 Ariz. 72, 847 P.2d 117 (App. 1992).

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 1992-11-10. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Reversing summary judgment and remanding, the court held that the Developer had authority under the declaration to amend it and lawfully withdraw twenty-three units into a separate phase, so those units were not subject to monthly assessments or late charges while withdrawn; that although the Association had contractual and statutory authority under A.R.S. section 33-1242(11) to impose late fees, applying them retroactively to assessments already delinquent before the late-fee schedule was adopted was unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion; and that the Association’s supporting affidavit was conclusory and relied on inadmissible hearsay, so it failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association (Party)
    Arizona nonprofit condominium association; plaintiff, counter-defendant, and appellee. Lost summary judgment and its fee award on appeal.
  • Geupel Construction Company, Inc. (Party)
    Co-venturer in Paradise Isle Associates, the developer; defendant, counter-claimant, and appellant. Prevailed on appeal.
  • R.G.W. Investment Co., Inc. (Party)
    Co-venturer in Paradise Isle Associates, the developer; defendant, counter-claimant, and appellant.
  • Wallace Neal (Party)
    The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association
    Association president and affiant on the summary-judgment motion; named defendant in the Developer's A.R.S. § 33-420 groundless-lien claim.
  • Barry A. Reiss (Counsel)
    Barry Allen Reiss, P.C. (Phoenix)
    Counsel for plaintiff/appellee, the Association.
  • Chad L. Schexnayder (Counsel)
    Jennings, Kepner & Haug (Phoenix)
    Counsel for defendants/appellants, the Developer.
  • Judge Toci (Judge)
    Authored the opinion of the court.
  • Presiding Judge Taylor (Judge)
    Concurred.
  • Judge Grant (Judge)
    Concurred.

What happened and why it matters

The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association, a group of condominium owners organized under a recorded declaration of horizontal property regime, sued its developer, Geupel Construction Company, Inc. and R.G.W. Investment Co., Inc. (together the joint venture Paradise Isle Associates, referred to as the “Developer”), to collect delinquent monthly assessments, retroactive late-payment penalties, and interest, and to foreclose an assessment lien on a lot the Developer still owned. The Developer answered that it owed no assessments on twenty-three of the original fifty-three units because it had recorded an amendment temporarily withdrawing those units into a separate phase, and that the late fees, which had grown to more than $47,000, were unenforceable because they were imposed retroactively and exceeded the twelve percent interest set by the bylaws. The trial court granted the Association summary judgment on both counts and awarded attorney’s fees. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the Developer had the votes and authority under the declaration to amend it and withdraw the Phase Two units, that the Association had contractual and statutory authority under the Uniform Condominium Act to impose late fees but exercised that power unreasonably by making them retroactive, and that the Association’s supporting affidavit was conclusory and relied on inadmissible hearsay, so it failed to establish a prima facie case. The court also found disputed fact issues on the Lot Six lien and the Developer’s tender of payment, reversed the fee award, and remanded.

The court analyzed each issue against the text of the recorded declaration (“Declaration Two”) and the Uniform Condominium Act. On the withdrawal question, it explained that the dispute was not whether the Developer had a “unilateral” right to amend, but whether it satisfied the declaration’s amendment procedure. Article Fourteen allowed amendment at any time by owners holding at least sixty-seven percent of the votes, and Article Six gave the Developer three votes per owned unit, yielding 144 votes against the five votes of the other owners, far more than enough. Mortgage-holder consent was unnecessary because those owners held under four percent of the votes, and the declaration’s own language (‘until or unless changed’) permitted altering the fractional common-element interests. The court rejected the argument that the recording mistake (a reference to the revoked Declaration One) invalidated the amendment, because the document clearly identified the property and its phasing purpose, gave constructive notice under A.R.S. section 33-416, and was re-recorded to fix the error. Distinguishing Camelback Del Este, Riley, and La Esperanza, the court held that the uniform-treatment rule applies only where the declaration so limits amendments; here the amendment merely provided for phased development and did not alter any covenant. Withdrawal of property (67 percent) was also distinct from termination of the regime (100 percent). On estoppel, the Association showed neither justifiable reliance nor injury, so no prima facie case existed. Turning to late fees, the court held the Association had power to impose them under Article Five and A.R.S. section 33-1242(11), and that the fees were a personal obligation, but that condominium associations must exercise such powers reasonably. Because no penalty schedule existed when the assessments became delinquent, owners never had the chance to choose timely payment over a known penalty; imposing the charge retroactively was therefore unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion. Finally, applying Rule 56(e) and the rules of evidence, the court found the Neal affidavit conclusory and built on computer-generated exhibits that were unauthenticated inadmissible hearsay, defeating the prima facie showing, and it found disputed facts on the Lot Six lien and the Developer’s $600 tender.

For Arizona homeowners and condominium associations, the decision is a leading illustration of two limits on association power. First, the powers a board holds under its declaration and under the Uniform Condominium Act, including the express statutory authority in A.R.S. section 33-1242(11) to impose late-payment charges, must still be exercised reasonably. An association cannot adopt a penalty and then reach backward to punish assessments that were already delinquent before any penalty schedule existed, because owners never had a chance to avoid a charge they could not have known about. Retroactive late fees, the court held, are unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

Second, the case underscores that assessment-collection and lien-foreclosure claims are ordinary civil actions in which the association carries the burden of proof. To win summary judgment an association must offer admissible evidence, not a conclusory affidavit attaching computer printouts with no foundation. A ledger or account summary must qualify under the business-records exception and be authenticated by someone with personal knowledge. The opinion also confirms that a developer or owner may validly amend a declaration to phase a project if the voting and recording requirements are met, and it flags the penalties in A.R.S. section 33-420 for recording a groundless lien, reminding associations to verify the amount actually owed before recording.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co. (No. 1 CA-CV 90-263; 174 Ariz. 72, 847 P.2d 117 (App. 1992)). Developer authority over assessments survived if supported by the declaration and admissible records. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 1985-08-30 Developer records Declaration One (declaration of horizontal property regime) for The Villas at Hidden Lakes.
Step 1985-10-11 Developer records amended Declaration Two, which governs the project.
Step 1985-10-31 The Villas at Hidden Lakes homeowners' association is formed under Declaration Two (October 1985).
Step 1986-04-22 Developer conveys the first condominium unit.
Step 1986-05-01 Monthly assessments on Developer-owned units begin under Declaration Two.
Step 1986-07-24 Developer records an amendment withdrawing 23 of the 53 units into a separate Phase Two.
Step 1986-09-05 Developer re-records the amendment to correct a reference to the revoked Declaration One.
Step 1986-12-31 The 23 withdrawn Phase Two units are rededicated to the project about five months after withdrawal (December 1986).
Step 1987-10-12 Association adopts a $10 per-unit monthly late-payment penalty and demands payment (Lot Six letter seeks $26,208.87).
Step 1987-11-03 Developer tenders a $600 check for Lot Six assessments from April 1987 and asks that interest and penalties be waived.
Step 1987-11-05 Association rejects the check and records a $1,439.25 lien against Lot Six.
Step 1988-07-31 Association begins charging a flat $3,180 monthly late charge; claimed late fees ultimately total $47,160 (July 1988).
Step 1992-11-10 Court of Appeals reverses summary judgment on all counts and remands.
Step 1993-01-13 Reconsideration denied.
Step 1993-03-16 Petition for review dismissed.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 0 PDFs, 1 other source file from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 1992-11-10

Cap Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

FAQ

What was The Villas at Hidden Lakes v. Geupel about?

It was a condominium association’s collection suit against its own developer. The Association sought delinquent monthly assessments, retroactive late fees, and interest, and tried to foreclose a lien on a lot the developer still owned. The developer argued it owed nothing on 23 units it had temporarily withdrawn from the project and that the late fees, which exceeded $47,000, were unenforceable.

Can an Arizona HOA or condominium association charge late fees retroactively?

No. The court held that, even though the association had the power to impose late fees under its declaration and under A.R.S. section 33-1242(11), applying a newly adopted penalty to assessments that were already delinquent before the penalty existed was unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion. Owners must have had a chance to choose timely payment over a known penalty.

Does a condominium association have authority to impose late fees at all?

Yes. The court confirmed that both Article Five of the declaration and A.R.S. section 33-1242(11) of the Uniform Condominium Act give an association authority to impose charges for late payment of assessments, and that the Uniform Condominium Act applied even though the declaration predated its effective date. The problem here was only the retroactive, and therefore unreasonable, way the power was used.

Why did the association lose its summary judgment?

Because its only supporting affidavit, from the association president, was conclusory and relied on computer-generated exhibits with no foundation. The affidavit did not show the affiant’s personal knowledge of how the records were prepared and did not establish the business-records exception, so the exhibits were inadmissible hearsay under Rule 56(e) and the rules of evidence, defeating the prima facie case.

Could the developer amend the declaration to withdraw units into a separate phase?

Yes. The declaration allowed amendment by owners holding at least 67 percent of the votes, and the developer’s three-votes-per-owned-unit gave it 144 of 149 votes. A recording error was cured by re-recording and did not invalidate the amendment, and withdrawing property (as opposed to terminating the regime, which needs 100 percent approval) was permissible, so no assessments were due on the withdrawn units while they were out of the project.

What should associations take away about recording liens?

The court found disputed facts about whether the Lot Six lien overstated the amount due and whether the developer’s $600 tender was unconditional, and it noted A.R.S. section 33-420, which penalizes recording a groundless lien. The practical lesson is to verify the actual amount owed, account for any valid tender, and support the claim with admissible evidence before recording or foreclosing a lien.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationNo. 1 CA-CV 90-263; 174 Ariz. 72, 847 P.2d 117 (App. 1992)
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateNovember 10, 1992
Judge / panelToci, J. (author), Taylor, P.J., Grant, J.
PartiesA condominium association sued its developer to collect delinquent assessments, retroactive late fees, and interest and to foreclose an assessment lien; the developer countered that it had validly amended the declaration to withdraw 23 units into a separate phase and that the retroactive late fees were unenforceable.
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsForeclosureLiensAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

Reversing summary judgment and remanding, the court held that the Developer had authority under the declaration to amend it and lawfully withdraw twenty-three units into a separate phase, so those units were not subject to monthly assessments or late charges while withdrawn; that although the Association had contractual and statutory authority under A.R.S. section 33-1242(11) to impose late fees, applying them retroactively to assessments already delinquent before the late-fee schedule was adopted was unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion; and that the Association's supporting affidavit was conclusory and relied on inadmissible hearsay, so it failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap15 roadmap entries
Video overviewThe Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association v. Geupel Construction Co.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The Villas at Hidden Lakes Condominiums Association, a group of condominium owners organized under a recorded declaration of horizontal property regime, sued its developer, Geupel Construction Company, Inc. and R.G.W. Investment Co., Inc. (together the joint venture Paradise Isle Associates, referred to as the "Developer"), to collect delinquent monthly assessments, retroactive late-payment penalties, and interest, and to foreclose an assessment lien on a lot the Developer still owned. The Developer answered that it owed no assessments on twenty-three of the original fifty-three units because it had recorded an amendment temporarily withdrawing those units into a separate phase, and that the late fees, which had grown to more than $47,000, were unenforceable because they were imposed retroactively and exceeded the twelve percent interest set by the bylaws. The trial court granted the Association summary judgment on both counts and awarded attorney's fees. Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the Developer had the votes and authority under the declaration to amend it and withdraw the Phase Two units, that the Association had contractual and statutory authority under the Uniform Condominium Act to impose late fees but exercised that power unreasonably by making them retroactive, and that the Association's supporting affidavit was conclusory and relied on inadmissible hearsay, so it failed to establish a prima facie case. The court also found disputed fact issues on the Lot Six lien and the Developer's tender of payment, reversed the fee award, and remanded.

Key Issues & Findings

The court analyzed each issue against the text of the recorded declaration ("Declaration Two") and the Uniform Condominium Act. On the withdrawal question, it explained that the dispute was not whether the Developer had a "unilateral" right to amend, but whether it satisfied the declaration's amendment procedure. Article Fourteen allowed amendment at any time by owners holding at least sixty-seven percent of the votes, and Article Six gave the Developer three votes per owned unit, yielding 144 votes against the five votes of the other owners, far more than enough. Mortgage-holder consent was unnecessary because those owners held under four percent of the votes, and the declaration's own language ('until or unless changed') permitted altering the fractional common-element interests. The court rejected the argument that the recording mistake (a reference to the revoked Declaration One) invalidated the amendment, because the document clearly identified the property and its phasing purpose, gave constructive notice under A.R.S. section 33-416, and was re-recorded to fix the error. Distinguishing Camelback Del Este, Riley, and La Esperanza, the court held that the uniform-treatment rule applies only where the declaration so limits amendments; here the amendment merely provided for phased development and did not alter any covenant. Withdrawal of property (67 percent) was also distinct from termination of the regime (100 percent). On estoppel, the Association showed neither justifiable reliance nor injury, so no prima facie case existed. Turning to late fees, the court held the Association had power to impose them under Article Five and A.R.S. section 33-1242(11), and that the fees were a personal obligation, but that condominium associations must exercise such powers reasonably. Because no penalty schedule existed when the assessments became delinquent, owners never had the chance to choose timely payment over a known penalty; imposing the charge retroactively was therefore unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion. Finally, applying Rule 56(e) and the rules of evidence, the court found the Neal affidavit conclusory and built on computer-generated exhibits that were unauthenticated inadmissible hearsay, defeating the prima facie showing, and it found disputed facts on the Lot Six lien and the Developer's $600 tender.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and condominium associations, the decision is a leading illustration of two limits on association power. First, the powers a board holds under its declaration and under the Uniform Condominium Act, including the express statutory authority in A.R.S. section 33-1242(11) to impose late-payment charges, must still be exercised reasonably. An association cannot adopt a penalty and then reach backward to punish assessments that were already delinquent before any penalty schedule existed, because owners never had a chance to avoid a charge they could not have known about. Retroactive late fees, the court held, are unreasonable, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

Second, the case underscores that assessment-collection and lien-foreclosure claims are ordinary civil actions in which the association carries the burden of proof. To win summary judgment an association must offer admissible evidence, not a conclusory affidavit attaching computer printouts with no foundation. A ledger or account summary must qualify under the business-records exception and be authenticated by someone with personal knowledge. The opinion also confirms that a developer or owner may validly amend a declaration to phase a project if the voting and recording requirements are met, and it flags the penalties in A.R.S. section 33-420 for recording a groundless lien, reminding associations to verify the amount actually owed before recording.

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Villa De Jardines Association v. Flagstar Bank, FSB: HOA Court Case Guide

Assessments / Lien Priority | A.R.S. section 33-1807 | 2 CA-CV 2010-0177

An HOA argued its assessment liens outranked the lenders’ first deeds of trust. Division Two explained why the plain text of A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) protects a recorded first deed of trust regardless of recording order, and why the association’s position drew Rule 11 sanctions and a frivolous-appeal award.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Villa De Jardines Association v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; 227 Ariz. 91, 253 P.3d 288 (App. 2011); CV200902335.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

A recorded first deed of trust has priority over a planned community association’s assessment lien under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) regardless of recording order, because the association’s contrary first-in-time reading would render the statutory exception superfluous. The trial court’s summary judgment for the Banks, its Rule 11 sanctions against the association, and its fee award to the Banks as prevailing parties under section 33-1807(H) were all affirmed, and, because the association presented no colorable legal argument, the appeal was deemed frivolous and the Banks were awarded their appellate fees and costs under section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Villa De Jardines Association (Plaintiff/Appellant)
    Arizona nonprofit planned community association; plaintiff below that sued to judicially foreclose its assessment liens against nineteen parcels, contending its liens had priority over the lenders' deeds of trust.
  • Flagstar Bank, FSB (Defendant/Appellee)
    Lender/deed-of-trust holder; one of the Banks that moved for and obtained summary judgment on the ground that its recorded first deed of trust had priority over VJA's assessment lien.
  • Federal National Mortgage Association (also known as Freddie Mac) (Defendant/Appellee)
    The other of the Banks; the opinion notes the entity was named inconsistently in VJA's pleadings (originally 'Federal Home Loan Corporation') and used the entity's self-designation. Prevailed on summary judgment on lien priority.
  • Charles Mannino and his wife (Defendant)
    Unit owners named as defendants below; filed a separate answer. Not parties to the Banks' summary judgment or to this appeal's core lien-priority ruling.
  • Desert Hills Bank (Defendant)
    Named defendant that failed to plead or otherwise defend; default was entered against it under Rule 55(a), but VJA obtained no default judgment.
  • Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Defendant)
    Named defendant that failed to plead or otherwise defend; default was entered against it under Rule 55(a), but VJA obtained no default judgment.
  • Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Villa de Jardines Association, of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa.
  • Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Villa de Jardines Association, of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa.
  • Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Villa de Jardines Association, of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa.
  • Brian Morgan (Counsel)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Villa de Jardines Association, of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mesa.
  • David N. Ramras (Counsel)
    Ramras Law Offices, P.C.
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Flagstar Bank, FSB and Federal National Mortgage Association, of Ramras Law Offices, P.C., Phoenix.
  • Virginia C. Kelly (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Authored the opinion of the court.
  • Garye L. Vasquez (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Presiding Judge; concurred in the opinion.
  • Peter J. Eckerstrom (Judge)
    Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two
    Judge; concurred in the opinion.
  • Honorable William J. O'Neil (Judge)
    Pinal County Superior Court
    Trial judge who granted summary judgment for the Banks, imposed Rule 11 sanctions, and denied VJA's new-trial motion and fee request (Cause No. CV200902335).

What happened and why it matters

Villa de Jardines Association (VJA), an Arizona nonprofit planned community association, filed a judicial foreclosure action in Pinal County Superior Court seeking to enforce its assessment liens against nineteen parcels, contending those liens had priority over the lenders’ deeds of trust. Flagstar Bank, FSB and Federal National Mortgage Association (referred to in the opinion as also known as Freddie Mac), together the Banks, moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, imposed Rule 11 sanctions on VJA, denied VJA’s own request for attorney fees, and denied VJA’s motion for a new trial. VJA appealed. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) unambiguously grants a recorded first deed of trust priority over an association assessment lien regardless of which was recorded first, because VJA’s contrary first-in-time reading would render the statutory exception superfluous. It upheld the Rule 11 sanctions because VJA had no objectively reasonable basis for its lien-priority position and could not rely on a title company litigation guarantee to avoid Rule 11’s reasonable-inquiry duty. It affirmed the fee award to the Banks as prevailing parties under section 33-1807(H) and rejected VJA’s procedural challenges to the judgment and to the denial of its new-trial motion. Concluding the appeal was frivolous, the court awarded the Banks their attorney fees and costs on appeal under section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., against both VJA and its counsel.

Reviewing summary judgment de novo, the court accepted that the material facts were undisputed, so the outcome turned on statutory interpretation. Under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B), an association’s assessment lien is prior to all other liens and encumbrances except three categories, including ‘[a] recorded first mortgage’ and ‘a recorded first deed of trust on the unit.’ Applying settled canons, the court gave the statute its plain meaning and presumed the legislature does not enact redundant, superfluous, or contradictory provisions. VJA argued that a deed of trust qualifies as a ‘first deed of trust’ only if it is recorded first in time, ahead of the assessment lien. The court rejected that reading because subsection (B)(1) already grants priority to any encumbrance recorded before the assessment lien; if first deeds of trust also had to be recorded first to gain priority, subsection (B)(2) would serve no purpose. The statute therefore unambiguously protects a recorded first deed of trust regardless of recording order.

The court also rejected VJA’s contention that the judgment was ‘overly broad’ by referring to all nineteen parcels and all defendants. The summary judgment ran only in favor of the Banks and gave them no interest in parcels held by other defendants, so it was not a windfall; the Banks never sought relief on behalf of others, making VJA’s standing argument (citing Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts) inapposite. Nor did the court err by referencing parcels for which default had been entered against Desert Hills Bank and Countrywide, because VJA had obtained no default judgment and was not entitled to one as a matter of law.

On the Rule 11 sanctions, reviewed for abuse of discretion (with the propriety of the legal basis reviewed de novo), the court applied the objective standard of what a competent attorney would do. Because section 33-1807 is clear, no reasonable attorney could argue an assessment lien outranks a first deed of trust, and VJA never argued for an extension or modification of the law. A title company litigation guarantee did not change this: it insures only against loss from incorrect assurances and may guide which parties to name, but it does not trump state law or excuse the duty of reasonable inquiry, and counsel must re-evaluate the client’s position as the case develops. The court further held the trial court properly denied a new trial: Rule 59(c)(1) requires the motion to be in writing, so oral amendment was impermissible and would invite gamesmanship, and no harm arose because the trial court reviewed the entire file sua sponte and found no error. Finally, under section 33-1807(H) the Banks were the prevailing parties, making a fee award mandatory, and because VJA presented no colorable argument the appeal was frivolous, warranting appellate fees and Rule 25 sanctions.

This published, precedential decision resolves a recurring Arizona HOA-collections question: where an association’s assessment lien stands relative to a lender’s first deed of trust. It confirms that A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) protects a recorded first deed of trust regardless of recording order, so an association ordinarily cannot use judicial foreclosure of an assessment lien to eliminate or leapfrog a first mortgage. Boards, community managers, and collection counsel should understand that pursuing foreclosure on the theory that the assessment lien is senior to a first deed of trust is not supported by the statute and can expose both the association and its attorneys to sanctions and fee-shifting.

The opinion also carries broader lessons about litigation conduct and cost exposure. It illustrates that Rule 11 is measured by an objective standard — what a competent attorney would do — and that relying on a title company’s litigation guarantee is no substitute for a reasonable legal inquiry. It underscores that section 33-1807(H) makes a fee award to the prevailing party mandatory in lien-priority actions, and that a party who presses a position contrary to unambiguous statutory text risks not only losing but paying the other side’s attorney fees at trial and on appeal, plus sanctions for a frivolous appeal. For homeowners, lenders, and associations alike, it is a cautionary example of the financial consequences of over-reading assessment-lien priority.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Villa De Jardines Association v. Flagstar Bank, FSB (227 Ariz. 91, 253 P.3d 288 (App. 2011)). Recorded first deeds of trust have priority over planned-community assessment liens. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Villa De Jardines Association v. Flagstar Bank, FSB. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2009 VJA filed its judicial foreclosure complaint in Pinal County Superior Court (Cause No. CV200902335), claiming assessment liens against nineteen parcels (year inferred from the cause number).
Step 2009 Default was entered against Desert Hills Bank and Countrywide Home Loans; the Manninos answered separately, and Flagstar and Federal National Mortgage Association filed a joint answer.
Step 2010 The trial court granted the Banks' motion for summary judgment, entered Rule 54(b) judgment declaring the deeds of trust superior, imposed Rule 11 sanctions on VJA, and denied VJA's fee request (year inferred from the appellate docket).
Step 2010 The trial court denied VJA's motion for a new trial and its attempt to orally amend it; VJA filed its notice of appeal (docket 2 CA-CV 2010-0177).
Step 2011-04-22 Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed and awarded the Banks their appellate attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2011-04-22

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that a recorded first deed of trust has priority over a planned community association's assessment lien under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) regardless of recording order, because the association's contrary first-in-time reading would render the statutory exception superfluous.

Download source file

FAQ

Does an HOA's assessment lien have priority over a bank's first mortgage or deed of trust in Arizona?

Generally no. Under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B), a planned community association’s assessment lien is prior to most other liens and encumbrances, but the statute lists exceptions, including a recorded first mortgage and a recorded first deed of trust on the unit. In this case the Court of Appeals held that a recorded first deed of trust takes priority over the association’s assessment lien regardless of which was recorded first.

Why did the court reject the association's 'first-in-time' argument?

VJA argued a deed of trust could be a ‘first deed of trust’ only if it was recorded first in time, ahead of the assessment lien. The court rejected this because section 33-1807(B)(1) already gives priority to any encumbrance recorded before the assessment lien. Reading subsection (B)(2) to also require the deed of trust to be recorded first would make it superfluous, and courts presume the legislature does not enact redundant provisions.

What are Rule 11 sanctions and why were they imposed here?

Rule 11 requires attorneys to certify that filings are well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument to change it. Sanctions are required when there was no reasonable inquiry, no chance of success under existing precedent, and no reasonable argument to extend, modify, or reverse the law, judged by an objective standard. The court upheld sanctions because no competent attorney could reasonably argue the association’s lien outranked a first deed of trust under the plain statutory text.

Could the association rely on a title company's litigation guarantee to justify its position?

No. The court explained that a litigation guarantee does not trump state law. It insures the association only against loss from incorrect assurances and can help identify the parties to name in a foreclosure, but the association could not rely on it exclusively to avoid Rule 11’s duty of reasonable inquiry or to argue the guarantee superseded the statute.

Why did the court refuse to let the association orally amend its motion for a new trial?

Rule 59(c)(1) requires a motion for a new trial to be in writing. The court held that allowing oral amendments would undermine that requirement and invite gamesmanship by letting a party surprise opposing counsel with new arguments at the hearing. It also found no harm, because the trial judge reviewed the entire file on its own initiative and found no error.

What does it mean that the appeal was 'frivolous,' and who had to pay the fees?

Under Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., an appellate court may impose penalties for a frivolous appeal, though only with great reservation and not where a colorable argument exists. Because VJA presented no colorable legal argument, the court awarded the Banks their attorney fees and taxable costs on appeal under A.R.S. section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25, against both the association and its counsel.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation227 Ariz. 91, 253 P.3d 288 (App. 2011)
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateApril 22, 2011
Judge / panelVirginia C. Kelly (author), Garye L. Vasquez (Presiding Judge, concurring), Peter J. Eckerstrom (Judge, concurring)
PartiesA planned community homeowners association (Villa de Jardines Association) sued to judicially foreclose its assessment liens against nineteen Pinal County parcels, contending its liens had priority over the lenders' recorded first deeds of trust; Flagstar Bank, FSB and Federal National Mortgage Association (referred to in the opinion as also known as Freddie Mac) defended on the ground that A.R.S. section 33-1807 gives a recorded first deed of trust priority over an association's assessment lien.
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureLiensAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

A recorded first deed of trust has priority over a planned community association's assessment lien under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) regardless of recording order, because the association's contrary first-in-time reading would render the statutory exception superfluous. The trial court's summary judgment for the Banks, its Rule 11 sanctions against the association, and its fee award to the Banks as prevailing parties under section 33-1807(H) were all affirmed, and, because the association presented no colorable legal argument, the appeal was deemed frivolous and the Banks were awarded their appellate fees and costs under section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewVilla De Jardines Association v. Flagstar Bank, FSB
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Villa de Jardines Association (VJA), an Arizona nonprofit planned community association, filed a judicial foreclosure action in Pinal County Superior Court seeking to enforce its assessment liens against nineteen parcels, contending those liens had priority over the lenders' deeds of trust. Flagstar Bank, FSB and Federal National Mortgage Association (referred to in the opinion as also known as Freddie Mac), together the Banks, moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, imposed Rule 11 sanctions on VJA, denied VJA's own request for attorney fees, and denied VJA's motion for a new trial. VJA appealed. Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) unambiguously grants a recorded first deed of trust priority over an association assessment lien regardless of which was recorded first, because VJA's contrary first-in-time reading would render the statutory exception superfluous. It upheld the Rule 11 sanctions because VJA had no objectively reasonable basis for its lien-priority position and could not rely on a title company litigation guarantee to avoid Rule 11's reasonable-inquiry duty. It affirmed the fee award to the Banks as prevailing parties under section 33-1807(H) and rejected VJA's procedural challenges to the judgment and to the denial of its new-trial motion. Concluding the appeal was frivolous, the court awarded the Banks their attorney fees and costs on appeal under section 33-1807(H) and, as sanctions, under Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., against both VJA and its counsel.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing summary judgment de novo, the court accepted that the material facts were undisputed, so the outcome turned on statutory interpretation. Under A.R.S. section 33-1807(B), an association's assessment lien is prior to all other liens and encumbrances except three categories, including '[a] recorded first mortgage' and 'a recorded first deed of trust on the unit.' Applying settled canons, the court gave the statute its plain meaning and presumed the legislature does not enact redundant, superfluous, or contradictory provisions. VJA argued that a deed of trust qualifies as a 'first deed of trust' only if it is recorded first in time, ahead of the assessment lien. The court rejected that reading because subsection (B)(1) already grants priority to any encumbrance recorded before the assessment lien; if first deeds of trust also had to be recorded first to gain priority, subsection (B)(2) would serve no purpose. The statute therefore unambiguously protects a recorded first deed of trust regardless of recording order.

The court also rejected VJA's contention that the judgment was 'overly broad' by referring to all nineteen parcels and all defendants. The summary judgment ran only in favor of the Banks and gave them no interest in parcels held by other defendants, so it was not a windfall; the Banks never sought relief on behalf of others, making VJA's standing argument (citing Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts) inapposite. Nor did the court err by referencing parcels for which default had been entered against Desert Hills Bank and Countrywide, because VJA had obtained no default judgment and was not entitled to one as a matter of law.

On the Rule 11 sanctions, reviewed for abuse of discretion (with the propriety of the legal basis reviewed de novo), the court applied the objective standard of what a competent attorney would do. Because section 33-1807 is clear, no reasonable attorney could argue an assessment lien outranks a first deed of trust, and VJA never argued for an extension or modification of the law. A title company litigation guarantee did not change this: it insures only against loss from incorrect assurances and may guide which parties to name, but it does not trump state law or excuse the duty of reasonable inquiry, and counsel must re-evaluate the client's position as the case develops. The court further held the trial court properly denied a new trial: Rule 59(c)(1) requires the motion to be in writing, so oral amendment was impermissible and would invite gamesmanship, and no harm arose because the trial court reviewed the entire file sua sponte and found no error. Finally, under section 33-1807(H) the Banks were the prevailing parties, making a fee award mandatory, and because VJA presented no colorable argument the appeal was frivolous, warranting appellate fees and Rule 25 sanctions.

Why It Matters

This published, precedential decision resolves a recurring Arizona HOA-collections question: where an association's assessment lien stands relative to a lender's first deed of trust. It confirms that A.R.S. section 33-1807(B)(2) protects a recorded first deed of trust regardless of recording order, so an association ordinarily cannot use judicial foreclosure of an assessment lien to eliminate or leapfrog a first mortgage. Boards, community managers, and collection counsel should understand that pursuing foreclosure on the theory that the assessment lien is senior to a first deed of trust is not supported by the statute and can expose both the association and its attorneys to sanctions and fee-shifting.

The opinion also carries broader lessons about litigation conduct and cost exposure. It illustrates that Rule 11 is measured by an objective standard — what a competent attorney would do — and that relying on a title company's litigation guarantee is no substitute for a reasonable legal inquiry. It underscores that section 33-1807(H) makes a fee award to the prevailing party mandatory in lien-priority actions, and that a party who presses a position contrary to unambiguous statutory text risks not only losing but paying the other side's attorney fees at trial and on appeal, plus sanctions for a frivolous appeal. For homeowners, lenders, and associations alike, it is a cautionary example of the financial consequences of over-reading assessment-lien priority.

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TRAILS AT AMBER RIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, v. GERARDO MACIAS, a married man, as his sole and separate property; COMMUNITY HOUSING RESOURCES OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA HOME FORECLOSURE PREVENTION FUNDING CORPORATION, Defendants/Appellees, MARICOPOLY, LLC, a limited liability company, Intervenor/Appellant.: HOA Court Case Guide

Foreclosure Surplus | Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1 | 2 CA-CV 2022-0096

After an HOA foreclosure, the sheriff’s-sale purchaser fought a junior lienholder over $59,819.17 in surplus proceeds; the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding a premature ruling harmless under the law-of-the-case doctrine.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: TRAILS AT AMBER RIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, v. GERARDO MACIAS, a married man, as his sole and separate property; COMMUNITY HOUSING RESOURCES OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA HOME FORECLOSURE PREVENTION FUNDING CORPORATION, Defendants/Appellees, MARICOPOLY, LLC, a limited liability company, Intervenor/Appellant.; 2 CA-CV 2022-0096; CV2017092698 (Maricopa County Superior Court; Hon. Brian D. Kaiser, Judge Pro Tempore).

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Although the trial court erred by granting the junior lienholder’s motion to release excess foreclosure proceeds before the opposing party’s Rule 7.1 response deadline, the error was harmless and did not violate procedural due process. Because the prior appellate mandate and the law-of-the-case doctrine limited the intervenor to re-asserting its already-rejected equitable-assignment claim — and barred new priority theories such as equitable subrogation — the intervenor suffered no prejudice, and the orders were affirmed.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Trails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
    Arizona nonprofit corporation; obtained the 2018 default judgment and judicially foreclosed on Macias's home. Its judgment was already paid from the sale, so it was not an active participant in the excess-proceeds dispute on appeal.
  • Gerardo Macias (Appellee)
    Defendant/Appellee; the foreclosed homeowner, who applied to receive any excess proceeds remaining after AZ Home's junior lien was satisfied.
  • Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation (Appellee)
    Defendant/Appellee ("AZ Home"); junior lienholder that moved for release of the excess proceeds and prevailed on appeal.
  • Community Housing Resources of Arizona (Appellee)
    Named defendant/appellee in the caption; not a focus of the appellate analysis.
  • Maricopoly, LLC (Appellant)
    Intervenor/Appellant; the limited liability company that purchased the property at the sheriff's sale and claimed the surplus on an equitable-assignment theory.
  • Valerie L. Marciano (Counsel)
    Arizona Attorney General's Office (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General)
    Assistant Attorney General; counsel for Defendant/Appellee Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation.
  • Kyle A. Kinney (Counsel)
    Law Offices of Kyle A. Kinney PLLC
    Counsel for Intervenor/Appellant Maricopoly, LLC.
  • Chief Judge Garye L. Vásquez (Judge)
    Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Division Two; authored the memorandum decision.
  • Presiding Judge Peter J. Eckerstrom (Judge)
    Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals panel; concurred in the decision.
  • Judge Christopher Cattani (Judge)
    Court of Appeals judge; concurred in the decision.
  • Hon. Brian D. Kaiser (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Pro Tempore who entered the orders under review (Superior Court No. CV2017092698).

What happened and why it matters

This memorandum decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, arose from a homeowners association’s judicial foreclosure. In 2018, Trails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association obtained a default judgment against homeowner Gerardo Macias and foreclosed on his home. Maricopoly, LLC purchased the property at the sheriff’s sale, and after the Association’s judgment was satisfied, $59,819.17 in excess proceeds was deposited with the clerk of court. Maricopoly intervened and claimed the surplus on the theory that it had acquired an “equitable assignment” of the senior lien, but in an earlier appeal Division Two rejected that theory, vacated the order paying Maricopoly, and remanded with directions to have Maricopoly return the funds. On remand, Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation (“AZ Home”), a junior lienholder, moved for release of $21,902.81 of the proceeds. The trial court granted that motion on September 1, 2021 — before Maricopoly’s response deadline under Rule 7.1. Maricopoly appealed, arguing the premature ruling denied it procedural due process and that the court wrongly refused to set the order aside under Rule 60. The Court of Appeals agreed the ruling was premature but held the error was harmless: under the appellate mandate and the law-of-the-case doctrine, Maricopoly could only re-assert its already-rejected equitable-assignment claim and could not raise new priority theories. Finding no prejudice, the court affirmed.

The court first agreed with Maricopoly that the trial court had acted prematurely. Under Rule 7.1(a)(3), Ariz. R. Civ. P., an opposing party must file any responsive memorandum within 10 days after service; because AZ Home served its August 19, 2021 motion by U.S. mail under Rule 5(c)(2)(C), five calendar days were added under Rule 6(c), and the weekend/holiday exclusion of Rule 6(a)(2) applied, making Maricopoly’s response due September 7, 2021. The court had signed and filed AZ Home’s order on September 1 — before that deadline. The panel explained that although Rule 7.1(b) permits a court to summarily grant a motion in three situations (noncompliance with Rule 7.1(a), the opposing party’s failure to file a response, or counsel’s failure to appear for oral argument), none applied here, so summary treatment was inappropriate and the trial court erred.

Nevertheless, the court held Maricopoly was not prejudiced and its due process rights were not violated. Procedural due process requires only the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (citing Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Zablotny). Maricopoly had already fully presented its sole basis for the surplus — equitable assignment — and the first appeal had rejected it. Under the mandate rule (Raimey v. Ditsworth) and the law-of-the-case doctrine (State v. Bocharski), that prior decision bound the trial court and the parties throughout the remaining proceedings, so Maricopoly could not re-assert equitable assignment or introduce new evidence to support it (United Dairymen of Ariz. v. Schugg; Crouch v. Truman).

The court further held that Maricopoly could not raise “other grounds for priority,” such as equitable subrogation, for the first time on remand, and that its attempt to advance that theory for the first time in its appellate reply brief was untimely and waived (United Bank v. Mesa N. O. Nelson Co.; BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau). The proper time to raise such theories had been the initial trial-court proceedings before the first appeal. The record also belied Maricopoly’s claim that it would have argued differently if given a chance to respond, because on remand it had told the trial court the case was remanded only to address equitable assignment. And even assuming an argument that surplus proceeds automatically flow up to an unextinguished senior lien, the court noted it would have been unavailing under Tortosa Homeowners Ass’n v. Garcia. Finding no prejudice and thus no reversible error (Volk v. Brame; Creach v. Angulo), the court affirmed and denied Maricopoly’s request for costs because it was not the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.

For homeowners, purchasers, and lienholders navigating Arizona HOA assessment-lien foreclosures, this decision illustrates how “excess” or surplus sale proceeds are contested after the association is paid, and how an appellate mandate constrains what can be argued later. When an HOA forecloses and the property sells for more than the association’s judgment, the surplus does not automatically belong to the sheriff’s-sale purchaser; competing junior lienholders (here a state-affiliated foreclosure-prevention corporation) and the former owner may also claim it, and entitlement turns on lien-priority principles rather than on who bought the home.

The case is also a practical lesson in civil procedure. A trial court’s ruling on a motion before the response deadline is error, but Arizona appellate courts will not reverse unless the error actually prejudiced the complaining party. Because the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate from the first appeal had already foreclosed Maricopoly’s only viable theory, the premature ruling changed nothing and the panel affirmed. The decision underscores that a party must raise all of its legal theories — such as equitable subrogation — in the trial court before the first appeal, not for the first time on remand or in a reply brief, or it risks waiver. As an unpublished memorandum decision it creates no binding precedent, but it offers a concrete window into surplus-proceeds and remand practice in Arizona HOA foreclosures.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of TRAILS AT AMBER RIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, v. GERARDO MACIAS, a married man, as his sole and separate property; COMMUNITY HOUSING RESOURCES OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA HOME FORECLOSURE PREVENTION FUNDING CORPORATION, Defendants/Appellees, MARICOPOLY, LLC, a limited liability company, Intervenor/Appellant. (2 CA-CV 2022-0096). Although the trial court erred by granting the junior lienholder’s motion to release excess foreclosure proceeds… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in TRAILS AT AMBER RIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, v. GERARDO MACIAS, a married man, as his sole and separate property; COMMUNITY HOUSING RESOURCES OF ARIZONA; ARIZONA HOME FORECLOSURE PREVENTION FUNDING CORPORATION, Defendants/Appellees, MARICOPOLY, LLC, a limited liability company, Intervenor/Appellant.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2018 Trails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association obtained a default judgment against Gerardo Macias and judicially foreclosed on his home.
Maricopoly, LLC purchased the property at the sheriff's sale; after the Association's judgment was paid, $59,819.17 in excess proceeds was deposited with the clerk of court.
The trial court granted Maricopoly's intervention and ordered the surplus released to Maricopoly on an equitable-assignment theory; AZ Home and Macias appealed.
Step 2021-03-23 In the first appeal (1 CA-CV 20-0254), Division Two rejected Maricopoly's equitable-assignment theory, vacated the payment to Maricopoly, and remanded with directions to return the proceeds.
Step 2021-08-19 AZ Home moved for release of $21,902.81 of the excess proceeds, with the balance to Macias.
Step 2021-09-01 The trial court signed and filed the order releasing proceeds to AZ Home (before Maricopoly's response deadline); Maricopoly moved to set the order aside the same day.
Step 2021-09-07 Maricopoly's response to AZ Home's motion was actually due under Rule 7.1, as computed by the Court of Appeals.
The trial court denied Maricopoly's set-aside motion; after a stay to obtain a signed order, Maricopoly filed a supplemental notice of appeal.
Step 2022-10-17 The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, issued its memorandum decision affirming the trial court's orders.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2022-10-17

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that although the trial court erred by granting the junior lienholder's motion to release excess foreclosure proceeds before the opposing party's Rule 7.1 response deadline, the error was harmless and did not violate procedural due process.

Download source file

FAQ

What was this case about?

It was a dispute over surplus (“excess”) proceeds from an HOA’s judicial foreclosure. Trails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association foreclosed on Gerardo Macias’s home; Maricopoly, LLC bought it at the sheriff’s sale, and after the Association was paid, $59,819.17 remained with the clerk of court. Maricopoly and a junior lienholder (AZ Home) each claimed the surplus.

Why did the Court of Appeals say the trial court erred?

The trial court granted AZ Home’s motion to release the proceeds on September 1, 2021, before Maricopoly’s response was due. Under Rule 7.1, Ariz. R. Civ. P. (with mailing and weekend/holiday adjustments), Maricopoly’s response was not due until September 7, 2021, and none of the conditions allowing a summary grant under Rule 7.1(b) applied. Ruling early was therefore error.

If the trial court erred, why did the purchaser still lose?

Because the error was harmless. Procedural due process requires only a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and Maricopoly had already fully presented its only theory — equitable assignment — which Division Two rejected in an earlier appeal. Under the mandate rule and the law-of-the-case doctrine, Maricopoly could not re-litigate that theory or add new ones on remand, so the premature ruling caused no prejudice.

What is the "law-of-the-case" or "mandate" rule referenced here?

It means that an appellate court’s decision, and the mandate implementing it, bind the trial court and the parties in later proceedings in the same case. Because the first appeal had already decided that Maricopoly had no equitable assignment of the senior lien, the trial court on remand could only carry out that ruling — it could not revisit the question or let Maricopoly raise new priority theories.

Why couldn't Maricopoly argue equitable subrogation?

Maricopoly raised equitable subrogation (and the idea that surplus automatically flows up to an unextinguished senior lien) for the first time in its appellate reply brief. Arizona courts will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, and the theory should have been presented in the trial court before the first appeal, so the court deemed it waived and noted it would have failed under Tortosa Homeowners Ass’n v. Garcia anyway.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is an unpublished memorandum decision under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1) and Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f), so it does not create legal precedent and may be cited only as those rules allow. It is presented here for educational context about HOA foreclosure surplus disputes and Arizona remand procedure, not as controlling law.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation2 CA-CV 2022-0096
Court / tribunalCourt of Appeals
Decision / key dateOctober 17, 2022
Judge / panelChief Judge Garye L. Vásquez (authored), Presiding Judge Peter J. Eckerstrom (concurred), Judge Christopher Cattani (concurred)
PartiesTrails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff) / Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation (Defendant/Appellee) v. Maricopoly, LLC (Intervenor/Appellant)
Governing law
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(3)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(b)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 5(c)(2)(C)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(2)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(c)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60
  • A.R.S. § 12-341
  • A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1)
  • Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 21
Topics
ForeclosureLiensProcedureAssessments
Outcome / holding

Although the trial court erred by granting the junior lienholder's motion to release excess foreclosure proceeds before the opposing party's Rule 7.1 response deadline, the error was harmless and did not violate procedural due process. Because the prior appellate mandate and the law-of-the-case doctrine limited the intervenor to re-asserting its already-rejected equitable-assignment claim — and barred new priority theories such as equitable subrogation — the intervenor suffered no prejudice, and the orders were affirmed.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewTRAILS AT AMBER RIDGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona nonprofit corporation, Plaintiff, v. GERARD
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

This memorandum decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, arose from a homeowners association's judicial foreclosure. In 2018, Trails at Amber Ridge Homeowners Association obtained a default judgment against homeowner Gerardo Macias and foreclosed on his home. Maricopoly, LLC purchased the property at the sheriff's sale, and after the Association's judgment was satisfied, $59,819.17 in excess proceeds was deposited with the clerk of court. Maricopoly intervened and claimed the surplus on the theory that it had acquired an "equitable assignment" of the senior lien, but in an earlier appeal Division Two rejected that theory, vacated the order paying Maricopoly, and remanded with directions to have Maricopoly return the funds. On remand, Arizona Home Foreclosure Prevention Funding Corporation ("AZ Home"), a junior lienholder, moved for release of $21,902.81 of the proceeds. The trial court granted that motion on September 1, 2021 — before Maricopoly's response deadline under Rule 7.1. Maricopoly appealed, arguing the premature ruling denied it procedural due process and that the court wrongly refused to set the order aside under Rule 60. The Court of Appeals agreed the ruling was premature but held the error was harmless: under the appellate mandate and the law-of-the-case doctrine, Maricopoly could only re-assert its already-rejected equitable-assignment claim and could not raise new priority theories. Finding no prejudice, the court affirmed.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first agreed with Maricopoly that the trial court had acted prematurely. Under Rule 7.1(a)(3), Ariz. R. Civ. P., an opposing party must file any responsive memorandum within 10 days after service; because AZ Home served its August 19, 2021 motion by U.S. mail under Rule 5(c)(2)(C), five calendar days were added under Rule 6(c), and the weekend/holiday exclusion of Rule 6(a)(2) applied, making Maricopoly's response due September 7, 2021. The court had signed and filed AZ Home's order on September 1 — before that deadline. The panel explained that although Rule 7.1(b) permits a court to summarily grant a motion in three situations (noncompliance with Rule 7.1(a), the opposing party's failure to file a response, or counsel's failure to appear for oral argument), none applied here, so summary treatment was inappropriate and the trial court erred.

Nevertheless, the court held Maricopoly was not prejudiced and its due process rights were not violated. Procedural due process requires only the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (citing Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Zablotny). Maricopoly had already fully presented its sole basis for the surplus — equitable assignment — and the first appeal had rejected it. Under the mandate rule (Raimey v. Ditsworth) and the law-of-the-case doctrine (State v. Bocharski), that prior decision bound the trial court and the parties throughout the remaining proceedings, so Maricopoly could not re-assert equitable assignment or introduce new evidence to support it (United Dairymen of Ariz. v. Schugg; Crouch v. Truman).

The court further held that Maricopoly could not raise "other grounds for priority," such as equitable subrogation, for the first time on remand, and that its attempt to advance that theory for the first time in its appellate reply brief was untimely and waived (United Bank v. Mesa N. O. Nelson Co.; BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau). The proper time to raise such theories had been the initial trial-court proceedings before the first appeal. The record also belied Maricopoly's claim that it would have argued differently if given a chance to respond, because on remand it had told the trial court the case was remanded only to address equitable assignment. And even assuming an argument that surplus proceeds automatically flow up to an unextinguished senior lien, the court noted it would have been unavailing under Tortosa Homeowners Ass'n v. Garcia. Finding no prejudice and thus no reversible error (Volk v. Brame; Creach v. Angulo), the court affirmed and denied Maricopoly's request for costs because it was not the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.

Why It Matters

For homeowners, purchasers, and lienholders navigating Arizona HOA assessment-lien foreclosures, this decision illustrates how "excess" or surplus sale proceeds are contested after the association is paid, and how an appellate mandate constrains what can be argued later. When an HOA forecloses and the property sells for more than the association's judgment, the surplus does not automatically belong to the sheriff's-sale purchaser; competing junior lienholders (here a state-affiliated foreclosure-prevention corporation) and the former owner may also claim it, and entitlement turns on lien-priority principles rather than on who bought the home.

The case is also a practical lesson in civil procedure. A trial court's ruling on a motion before the response deadline is error, but Arizona appellate courts will not reverse unless the error actually prejudiced the complaining party. Because the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate from the first appeal had already foreclosed Maricopoly's only viable theory, the premature ruling changed nothing and the panel affirmed. The decision underscores that a party must raise all of its legal theories — such as equitable subrogation — in the trial court before the first appeal, not for the first time on remand or in a reply brief, or it risks waiver. As an unpublished memorandum decision it creates no binding precedent, but it offers a concrete window into surplus-proceeds and remand practice in Arizona HOA foreclosures.

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