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Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association v. Bey: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

HOA Foreclosure | Excess Proceeds | CV2013-015763

The court kept the association foreclosure judgment intact and later handled applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763.

Download ruling

Scope note: This page covers Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the July 29, 2014 oral-argument entry, the October 21, 2014 emergency-motion ruling, the October 22, 2015 ruling denying a motion to vacate default judgment, and the later excess-proceeds entries. Currency caveat: the collected record ends with the July 10, 2020 minute entry stating that an order releasing excess proceeds to the United States had already been entered. Any later collection, title, bankruptcy, or appeal activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Once the association foreclosure judgment had been entered, the superior court repeatedly declined to reopen it. Later proceedings shifted away from the merits of the HOA lien and toward who could receive excess proceeds from the judicial sale and what notice had to be given.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that brought the lien-foreclosure action and obtained the foreclosure judgment.
Malik Bey (Defendant)
Defendant who filed post-judgment motions seeking to set aside, stay, or vacate the foreclosure judgment and proceedings.
M. Tariq-Bey (Defendant)
Named defendant in the foreclosure action.
United States of America (Intervenor)
Intervened in later proceedings concerning release of excess proceeds from the judicial sale.
Dolores Wallace (Claimant)
Appeared in the later excess-proceeds phase.
Beth Mulcahy (Counsel)
Counsel listed for the association in the minute entries.
Anne E. Nelson (Counsel)
Counsel listed for the United States in the later excess-proceeds proceedings.
Hon. David W. Garbarino (Judge)
Judge who handled the later excess-proceeds proceedings after remand.
Commissioner James R. Morrow (Commissioner)
Superior Court Commissioner who denied the October 22, 2015 Motion to Vacate Default Judgment (the featured ruling) and decided most of the post-judgment motions.
Hon. James T. Blomo (Judge)
Judge who ruled on the defendant's June 2015 emergency petition for a temporary restraining order.
Hon. Randall H. Warner (Judge)
Civil Presiding Judge who denied the November 6, 2015 motion for change of judge for cause, finding no showing of judicial bias.

What happened

The association filed a lien-foreclosure case and obtained a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. The collected minute entries begin around the post-judgment stage, when defendants sought to set aside or stop foreclosure-related proceedings.

On July 29, 2014, the court heard oral argument and denied Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, the court denied an emergency motion seeking to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings, stating that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

The post-judgment challenges continued. In October 2015, the court denied a motion to vacate default judgment. The ruling addressed the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court found that the record did not support the argument because the association attached the Cottonflower-Goodyear Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions as an exhibit to its complaint.

A later phase concerned excess proceeds from the judicial sale. In 2017, the court denied an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if the applicant filed and served a proper application. In 2019, after remand from federal court, the court allowed the United States to pursue an excess-proceeds application and ordered service on affected defendants.

The final collected minute entry, dated July 10, 2020, states that the court had already entered an order releasing the excess proceeds to the United States and therefore took no further action on the amended application.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey (CV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA foreclosure judgment stood after challenges, with later excess-sale proceeds handled through court process. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-05-28 Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is referenced in later minute entries as having been entered on this date.

Step 2014-07-29 The court denies Malik Bey's motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure after oral argument.

Step 2014-10-21 The court denies an emergency motion to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings.

Step 2015-10-22 The court denies a motion to vacate default judgment and rejects the argument that the association failed to attach the declaration to the foreclosure complaint.

Step 2017-02-08 The court denies an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if a proper application is filed and served.

Step 2019-04-29 After remand, the court permits the United States to file an application for release of excess proceeds and requires service on all defendants.

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry granting the United States a new service-by-publication schedule for its excess-proceeds application.

Download source file

2020-04-03_022_status-conference.pdf

Source 23 2020-07-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry stating that the court had already entered an order releasing the judicial-sale excess proceeds to the United States and took no further action.

Download source file

2020-07-10_023_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Was this a published appellate decision?

No. This is a Maricopa County Superior Court case built from minute entries. It binds only the parties and is not precedent.

What was the main HOA issue?

The collected entries concern an association lien foreclosure judgment and later efforts to set aside, stay, or vacate that foreclosure judgment.

Did the court reopen the foreclosure judgment?

No. The collected rulings denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and default judgment.

What did the October 2015 ruling say about the declaration?

The court rejected the argument that the association failed to attach necessary foreclosure documents, finding that the Cottonflower-Goodyear declaration was attached as Exhibit B to the complaint.

Why were there later entries after the foreclosure judgment?

Later entries concerned applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale, including notice and service issues and an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Why is this case classified as standard?

The record is useful procedurally, but it does not include a broad merits ruling interpreting HOA statutes or CC&R provisions for general application.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	October 22, 2015
Judge / panel	Commissioner James R. Morrow, Hon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Randall H. Warner, Hon. David W. Garbarino
Parties	Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Malik Bey, et al. (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-812
Topics	ForeclosureLiensAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The court left the HOA foreclosure judgment in place. It denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and later denied a motion to vacate default judgment after finding that the record did not support the argument that the association failed to attach the governing declaration to its foreclosure complaint.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	23 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	8 roadmap entries
Video overview	Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association obtained a foreclosure judgment and sale. The superior court later denied repeated efforts to set aside or vacate the judgment and handled competing post-sale excess-proceeds requests, including an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Key Issues & Findings

The key post-judgment rulings treated the association foreclosure case as already reduced to judgment and sale. On July 29, 2014, the court denied Malik Bey's motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, it denied an emergency request to stay or vacate the foreclosure proceedings, noting that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

In the October 22, 2015 ruling, the court addressed a renewed argument that the plaintiff failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court rejected that challenge because the record showed that the association attached a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Cottonflower-Goodyear as Exhibit B to the complaint. Later entries focused on excess sale proceeds, including service requirements and the United States' application after federal-court remand.

Why It Matters

This case is useful mainly as a procedural example of a superior-court HOA lien foreclosure that survived multiple post-judgment challenges. It also shows how excess proceeds from an association foreclosure sale can remain in court and require separate notice and application practice after the foreclosure judgment itself is no longer being revisited.

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Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessment Litigation | Mandatory Counterclaims | CV2025-060700

This case shows the procedural risk of filing a separate lawsuit over HOA foreclosure and assessment issues while another case about the same property and assessments is already pending: the court dismissed the separate action because the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in the earlier assessment case.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700.

Download ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-02-10. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the December 16, 2025 litigation-privilege ruling and the February 2, 2026 dismissal ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with denial of a motion to vacate dismissal; they also note a separate pending case, CV2023-013780, involving the same property and assessments. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A homeowner who is already litigating unpaid assessments cannot safely split related foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy, or de-annexation theories into a new lawsuit. The court dismissed this separate case because the subject matter was a mandatory counterclaim in the pending assessment case involving the same property and assessments. The court also protected the association’s lawyers with the litigation privilege for acts in the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Steve Pandi (Plaintiff)
Self-represented homeowner plaintiff who filed the separate action and multiple emergency, sanctions, and post-dismissal motions.

Respondent Side

Crown Point Homeowners Association (Defendant)
Homeowners association defendant. The dismissal ruling states that a separate case was already pending in which the association sought to recover unpaid assessments involving the same property and assessments.
Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Counsel)
Attorney defendant; the court held the claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they acted in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association.
Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendant)
Law firm defendant dismissed under the litigation privilege.
Joseph A. Brophy (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Crown Point Homeowners Association in later minute entries.
Wm Michael Yohler (Counsel)
Counsel name appearing for defendants in earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the TRO, sanctions, litigation-privilege, dismissal, and post-dismissal rulings.
Richard Albrecht (Commissioner)
Commissioner identified for any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after the plaintiff sought default against the association.

What happened

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. The January 22, 2026 minute entry identifies the attempted amended pleading as asserting fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court later stated that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking to recover unpaid assessments there.

The first ruling denied Pandi’s emergency request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Judge Michael J. Herrod wrote that the request was based on a damages complaint, asked the court to order the defendants to stop doing things the plaintiff said were bad, and did not seek equitable relief. The court later quashed the related order to show cause and denied another emergency TRO request.

The court dismissed Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. on December 16, 2025. It held that Pandi’s claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court also found the fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were outside the superior court’s jurisdiction. Crown Point’s joinder in that motion was denied because many defenses did not apply to the association, but the court gave Crown Point leave to file its own dismissal motion.

January 2026 brought several procedural rulings. The court denied sanctions motions against Mulcahy, the firm, Crown Point, and a nonparty; denied a motion to strike bankruptcy assertions; denied a third TRO application because Pandi could not identify an actor for the alleged vandalism; denied a motion to strike or file a sur-reply; struck a first amended complaint filed without leave; and denied discovery and deadline motions while Crown Point’s dismissal motion was pending.

On February 2, 2026, the court granted Crown Point Homeowners Association’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court found that Pandi had a pending case involving the same property and same assessments, that the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments in that case, and that the subject matter of this separate action was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised there. Because no defendants remained, the court dismissed the matter in its entirety and deemed all pending motions moot. It later denied a sanctions motion and a motion to vacate the dismissal.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (CV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Separate HOA foreclosure claims were dismissed as mandatory counterclaims in a pending assessment case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2025-12-01 The court summarily denies Pandi's emergency TRO/preliminary-injunction motion because it does not seek equitable relief.

Step 2025-12-16 The court dismisses Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege and allows Crown Point to file its own dismissal motion.

Step 2026-01-13 The court denies sanctions against Crown Point, noting no substantive ruling yet supported sanctions and service was improper.

Step 2026-01-22 The court denies a third TRO request, denies a strike/sur-reply motion, and strikes the first amended complaint filed without leave.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Download source file

2026-02-10_014_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Why did the court dismiss the claims against the HOA lawyers?

The court held the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. were barred by the litigation privilege because the Mulcahy defendants were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. It also found the fraud allegations lacked specificity and bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction.

Why did the court dismiss the claims against Crown Point Homeowners Association?

The court found that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking unpaid assessments there. The subject matter of this separate lawsuit was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in that pending case.

Did the court decide whether the HOA foreclosure or assessment allegations were true?

No. The January 13, 2026 sanctions ruling expressly said no motion for summary judgment had been filed by the plaintiff or granted on any factual issue, and the February 2 dismissal rested on the mandatory-counterclaim problem rather than merits findings on foreclosure or assessment liability.

What happened to the TRO requests?

The court denied repeated emergency TRO or preliminary-injunction requests. It said the first request did not seek equitable relief, later quashed an order to show cause, and denied the third TRO request because the plaintiff could not identify an actor who committed the alleged vandalism.

What is the practical lesson for homeowners?

If an HOA has an active lawsuit over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related claims about foreclosure, fraud, or association status may need to be raised as counterclaims in that case. Filing a separate lawsuit can lead to dismissal without a merits ruling.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is useful primarily as a procedural example of litigation privilege and mandatory-counterclaim treatment in an HOA assessment dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	February 2, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael J. Herrod
Parties	Steve Pandi (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendants)
Topics	AssessmentsForeclosureLiensProcedureFDCPABankruptcy
Outcome / holding	The superior court dismissed the separate lawsuit against Crown Point Homeowners Association because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in a pending case involving the same property and assessments, and it dismissed the association's lawyers under the litigation privilege for acts within the course and scope of representing the HOA.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	14 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. over alleged fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court denied repeated emergency TRO requests and sanctions motions. It dismissed the Mulcahy defendants because the litigation privilege protected acts taken in the course and scope of representing Crown Point, because fraud was not pleaded with specificity, and because bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction. The court then granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and assessments, so the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in that assessment case.

Key Issues & Findings

For the lawyer defendants, the court held that the litigation privilege barred claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. because they were acting in the course and scope of their representation of Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court added that fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were not within superior-court jurisdiction.

For the association, the court focused on claim splitting. It found that Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and the same assessments, CV2023-013780, where the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments. The subject matter of the new case therefore was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in the pending assessment case. The court granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed the matter in its entirety because no defendants remained, and later denied post-dismissal sanctions and relief-from-judgment motions.

Why It Matters

This case is a procedural caution for HOA assessment litigation. When an association has already sued over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related homeowner theories about foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy effects, or association status may have to be raised in that action as counterclaims. A separate lawsuit can be dismissed before the court reaches the merits.

The case also illustrates how the litigation privilege can protect HOA collection counsel for conduct within the representation, even when the homeowner names the lawyer and law firm as defendants. It is standard rather than must-read because it does not interpret Title 33 or a declaration provision on the merits; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Boles v. Tarrell: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

HOA Foreclosure, Sheriff’s Sale & Quiet Title | A.R.S. §§ 12-1802, 12-341.01 | CV2018-053929

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows the limits of trying to unwind an HOA-related foreclosure after a sheriff’s sale. The court refused to stop a later eviction action, then granted Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles did not prove any valid chain of title or right of possession, had notice of the sheriff’s sale, and lost any possible property interest when the sale occurred. A later fee ruling denied the association’s contract-fee request because the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, not the essential basis of Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Sky Boles v. Jason Tarrell, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-053929) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the May 12, 2020 preliminary-injunction ruling, the October 9, 2020 summary-judgment ruling, the November 30, 2020 Rule 60 ruling, and the December 1, 2020 fee-and-cost ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the January 5, 2021 order denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate; any later appellate or enforcement history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court treated Boles’s title and possession theories as defeated by the recorded title chain, an earlier foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to challenge those events in time. It refused to enjoin Maricopoly’s separate eviction case under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1), then granted Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment because Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. The court also rejected Northern Manor’s contract-fee request: the CC&Rs were at most a factual predicate to Boles’s title and wrongful-foreclosure theories, not the essential basis of claims “arising out of contract” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Sky Boles (Plaintiff)
Claimant who sought title, possession, injunctive relief against an eviction proceeding, and later relief from summary judgment.
Mark W. Horne (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Boles in the 2020 injunction proceedings.

Respondent Side

Jason Tarrell (Defendant)
Defendant from whom Boles claimed a title transfer; the court found Tarrell had testified he never transferred title to Boles and had provided an affidavit to the same effect.
Northern Manor Townhouse Association (Defendant / Intervenor)
Homeowners association that intervened, sought summary judgment, opposed the title and possession claims, requested vexatious-litigant relief, and later sought attorney fees and costs.
Maricopoly, LLC (Defendant in consolidated action)
Entity that bought the property at sheriff’s sale and pursued a separate eviction proceeding; the court found the sheriff’s sale was conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership.
Erik Wright (Defendant)
Defendant referenced in the court’s title-chain analysis; the court found no deed from Wright to Tarrell to support Boles’s claims.
Kathryn A. Battock, Emily H. Mann, Joseph M. Hoffman, and Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
Attorneys appearing for Northern Manor in the collected minute entries.
Mark Zinman (Counsel)
Counsel for Maricopoly, LLC in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key 2020 injunction, summary-judgment, fee, and post-judgment rulings.
John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
Judge who issued early 2018 service and voluntary-dismissal entries.

What happened

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others in 2018. Northern Manor Townhouse Association later appeared as an intervenor, and the case was eventually consolidated with Boles’s 2020 action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. The consolidated dispute centered on whether Boles had title, ownership, or possession rights in a Northern Manor property after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale.

The first major merits ruling came after a May 12, 2020 evidentiary hearing. Boles asked the court to preliminarily enjoin an eviction proceeding brought by Maricopoly against Tarrell and Boles. Judge Theodore Campagnolo denied the injunction. He ruled that A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) gave the court little discretion to stop an eviction case filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and that consolidating the later action with the 2018 quiet-title case did not change each action’s filing date or party rights.

The court also found Boles had not shown the injunction factors. Based on the title chain, the prior foreclosure action, the sheriff’s sale, and Boles’s failure to timely challenge those events, the evidence showed Maricopoly had a legitimate claim of possession. The court found no substantial likelihood of success, no irreparable harm because the possible damages were monetary, hardships favoring Maricopoly, and public policy favoring speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

Northern Manor’s dispositive motion was first filed as a motion to dismiss, then converted to a summary-judgment motion because the association attached exhibits outside the pleadings. After several scheduling and filing-protocol entries, the court heard argument on October 9, 2020. Boles had notice but did not appear. The court found she had wholly failed to show any ownership, title, or right of possession. It specifically found there was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even if the purported Tarrell deed were genuine, Tarrell had not been shown to hold legal title that he could transfer.

The court granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly. It found no genuine issue of material fact, held that any ownership or possession right had been lost at the sheriff’s sale, found the sheriff’s sale conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title ownership as bona fide purchaser, and held future claims by Boles about the property were barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. The court dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, barred further title or possession filings about the property, and denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation as unnecessary and procedurally confusing.

Post-judgment rulings followed. The court denied Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate because a nonlawyer could not appear for her, the medical note submitted did not establish excusable neglect, and Boles had not shown a meritorious claim. It denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because Boles’s claims did not arise out of contract: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, while the essential basis of the claims was Boles’s alleged title transfer from Tarrell. The association did recover $73.70 in taxable costs as the successful party.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Boles v. Tarrell (CV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Quiet-title claimant lost after a sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession rights. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Boles v. Tarrell. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-06-07 The court grants alternative service on Tarrell and signs an order granting Boles’s voluntary-dismissal motion as to unspecified defendants.

Step 2018-12-18 At a status conference, Northern Manor appears through counsel; the court denies Boles’s motion to serve by publication and continues the dismissal calendar.

Step 2020-04-13 The court consolidates CV2018-053929 with CV2020-051900 and sets proceedings on Boles’s injunction request.

Step 2020-04-29 The court converts Northern Manor’s motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 summary-judgment motion because exhibits outside the pleadings were attached.

Step 2020-05-12 After an evidentiary hearing, the court denies Boles’s application to preliminarily enjoin Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding.

Step 2020-10-09 The court grants Northern Manor and Maricopoly summary judgment, dismisses the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashes the lis pendens, and bars further title or possession filings about the property.

Step 2020-11-30 The court denies Boles’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate and denies her Rule 62 stay request as moot.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-12-03_038_minute-entry.pdf

Source 39 2021-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Boles’s renewed motion to vacate for the reasons stated in the court’s December 2020 minute entry.

Download source file

2021-01-05_039_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Why did the court refuse to stop the eviction case?

The eviction action was filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction action, and the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) generally precluded the requested injunction. It also found Boles had not shown likelihood of success, irreparable harm, favorable hardship balancing, or public policy supporting an injunction.

Why did Northern Manor and Maricopoly win summary judgment?

The court found Boles had not shown ownership, title, or possession rights. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell-to-Boles deed would not help if Tarrell lacked title to transfer. The sheriff’s sale then cut off any possible ownership or possession rights and made Maricopoly the bona fide purchaser.

Did the court declare Boles a vexatious litigant?

No. The court denied a broader vexatious-litigant designation. It reasoned that Boles’s repeated filings concerned this property, and the court had already barred future filings claiming title, ownership, or possession about the property, so a broader A.R.S. § 12-3201 order would add procedural confusion.

Why were Northern Manor’s attorney fees denied?

Northern Manor sought fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which applies to actions arising out of contract. The court held Boles’s claims did not arise out of a contract with the association. The CC&Rs were only a factual predicate; the essential basis was Boles’s alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. The association did receive taxable costs.

What happened to Boles’s motion to vacate?

The court denied it. A nonlawyer had filed the motions for Boles, the submitted note did not establish excusable neglect for missing the summary-judgment argument, and Boles did not show a meritorious claim as required for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.

Is this decision binding on other HOA foreclosure disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful for understanding how one court handled title-chain proof, sheriff’s-sale consequences, eviction-injunction limits, and contract-fee requests after an HOA-related foreclosure.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2018-053929 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	October 9, 2020
Judge / panel	Hon. Theodore Campagnolo, Hon. John R. Hannah Jr.
Parties	Sky Boles (Plaintiff) v. Jason Tarrell, Northern Manor Townhouse Association, Erik Wright, and Maricopoly, LLC through consolidated proceedings (Defendants or Intervenor)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1802 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	ForeclosureLiensCC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court denied Boles’s request to enjoin a related eviction proceeding, granted summary judgment to Northern Manor Townhouse Association and Maricopoly because Boles failed to prove title or possession rights after the sheriff’s sale, dismissed the consolidated cases with prejudice, quashed Boles’s lis pendens, and later denied Northern Manor attorney fees while awarding taxable costs.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	39 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Boles v. Tarrell
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sky Boles sued Jason Tarrell and others, and Northern Manor Townhouse Association intervened in litigation later consolidated with Boles’s action against Northern Manor and Maricopoly, LLC. Boles sought to stop Maricopoly’s eviction proceeding and claimed ownership, title, or possession rights after an earlier foreclosure action and sheriff’s sale. The court denied the preliminary injunction under A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) and the traditional injunction factors, then granted summary judgment to Northern Manor and Maricopoly because Boles did not prove a valid chain of title, any right of possession was lost through the sheriff’s sale, and Maricopoly was the bona fide purchaser. It later denied Boles Rule 60 relief, denied Northern Manor attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because the claims did not arise out of contract, and awarded the association $73.70 in taxable costs.

Key Issues & Findings

On the preliminary-injunction request, the court found A.R.S. § 12-1802(1) left little discretion to enjoin an eviction action filed before Boles’s 2020 injunction case. Consolidation with the older 2018 quiet-title action did not change filing dates or party rights. The court also found Boles failed the injunction factors: Maricopoly had a legitimate possession claim based on the title chain, foreclosure action, and sheriff’s sale; monetary damages would not be irreparable harm; hardships favored allowing the eviction case to proceed; and public policy favored speedy resolution of the earlier eviction proceeding.

On summary judgment, the court found Boles had wholly failed to show ownership, title, or possession. There was no deed from Wright to Tarrell, Tarrell had testified and sworn that he never transferred title to Boles, and even a genuine Tarrell deed would not establish Boles’s title if Tarrell had no legal title to convey. The court found no genuine issue of material fact, held that the sheriff’s sale cut off any ownership or possession interest, and treated the sale as conclusive evidence of Maricopoly’s title as bona fide purchaser.

The court denied broader vexatious-litigant relief but barred future filings by Boles claiming title, ownership, or possession of the property. It then denied Rule 60(b)(1) relief because Boles did not prove excusable neglect or a meritorious claim. On fees, the court held A.R.S. § 12-341.01 did not apply because Boles’s claims were not essentially contract claims: the CC&Rs were only a factual predicate, and the core dispute was her alleged title transfer and wrongful-foreclosure theory. Northern Manor recovered taxable costs as the successful party.

Why It Matters

This case is a practical example of how difficult it is to use a later quiet-title or injunction case to stop an eviction after an HOA-related foreclosure and sheriff’s sale. The court separated possession in the eviction case from title claims in the civil action, then held that Boles’s chain-of-title proof failed and that the sheriff’s sale cut off any title or possession claim.

The fee ruling is also useful. Even though CC&Rs may be contractual between an association and an owner, the court would not award contract fees where the plaintiff was not claiming under a contract with the association and the essential basis of the case was title and wrongful foreclosure. The result was summary judgment and taxable costs for the association, but no attorney-fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

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Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessment Liens & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | CV2012-094261

In this Maricopa County Superior Court assessment-lien case, the court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) does not let an escrow agent extinguish an HOA lien merely by requesting a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction. Later, the same court denied the association summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), rejecting the association’s argument that a foreclosure claim survives once filed even after the delinquent assessments themselves have been paid. The fee ruling treated the case in four parts: the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and the dismissed CC&R-violation claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2015-06-09. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 12, 2014 ruling on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory, the November 24, 2014 ruling on the association’s foreclosure motion, the March 11, 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 9, 2015 fee ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 9, 2015 fee ruling, which continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first; any later docket activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court read A.R.S. § 33-1807 in two different lien contexts. First, it rejected Forange’s argument that an HOA lien disappeared because an escrow agent requested a payoff statement and the association did not respond within ten days: the court held the escrow-agent penalty in § 33-1807(I) is meant to facilitate actual sale, transfer, lease, or other escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a freestanding power to make liens disappear. Second, when the association later sought summary judgment on foreclosure, the court denied it under § 33-1807(A) because late fees and attorney fees do not count toward the foreclosure threshold and the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case later ended through a stipulation that found for defendants on foreclosure and through a fee ruling awarding Forange costs and $18,000 in fees while denying the association’s fee applications.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff / Defendant in consolidated action)
Homeowners association that sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations; the court later found it succeeded on the unpaid-assessment claim and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, but not on lien foreclosure.
Lindsey O. Stearns (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
Attorney listed for the association in later minute entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint; the August 2014 ruling granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.
Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
Attorney listed for the association in multiple caption entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint.
Javier Delgado (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
Attorney defendant named by Forange in the consolidated action, according to the August 2014 ruling.
Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
Attorney who filed the April 2015 motion for attorney fees on behalf of the association.

Respondent Side

4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant)
Entity defendant in the association’s action; its answer was struck in December 2012 because a nonlawyer could not represent the LLC.
Forange, LLC (Defendant / Plaintiff in consolidated action)
Entity that filed the consolidated action against the association and its attorneys, arguing that an escrow-agent payoff request extinguished the association lien under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I); it lost that claim but later prevailed on the association’s foreclosure claim and received fees and costs.
Michael D. Ripson (Defendant / LLC member)
Individual listed as a defendant and as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC in the early order-to-show-cause minute entry.
Scottsdale Community Association (Defendant)
Entity listed as a defendant in the association’s action; the collected minute entries do not show a merits ruling against it.
Citibank South Dakota N.A. (Defendant)
Lienholder defendant listed in the caption; the collected minute entries do not show a substantive ruling about it.
Johnson Bank (Defendant (dismissed))
Defendant dismissed with prejudice in August 2014 after no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.
Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
Counsel of record for 4AAR Holdings, LLC and Forange, LLC in the later minute entries and fee applications.
Andrew J. Van Loon (Counsel)
Attorney listed in several caption entries for the defense side before the later fee ruling noted that the court declined to award Forange fees incurred while represented by Van Loon.

Neutral Parties

Emmet J. Ronan (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled early order-to-show-cause and LLC-representation rulings.
Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key August 2014 payoff-statement ruling, the November 2014 foreclosure ruling, the March 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 2015 fee ruling.
Ruth H. Hilliard (Judge)
Judge who signed the March 2013 consolidation order for Judge Ronan.

What happened

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued 4AAR Holdings, LLC and others in Maricopa County Superior Court over a planned-community assessment lien. The early minutes show an order-to-show-cause hearing where Michael Ripson appeared as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC, followed by a December 2012 ruling striking the LLC’s answer because a corporation or LLC cannot appear in court through a nonlawyer. In March 2013, the court consolidated this action with CV2012-018064, the related case brought by Forange, LLC against the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns.

Forange’s consolidated complaint turned on a payoff-statement theory. The August 12, 2014 ruling says Forange moved for partial summary judgment on its claims, while the association and its attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. The court identified the undisputed facts this way: A.R.S. § 33-1807 creates an HOA lien for unpaid assessments; subsection I requires an association to furnish a payoff statement within ten days after a request from a unit owner, lienholder, or escrow agent; and the special penalty for failure to answer an escrow-agent request is extinguishment of the lien. Here, an escrow agent asked for a payoff statement, but the request was not made in the context of any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction.

Judge Aceto rejected Forange’s statutory theory. The ruling framed the issue as whether § 33-1807(I) gives escrow agents a special power to make liens disappear simply because they are escrow agents, or whether the penalty provision is meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions by requiring prompt payoff responses. Applying a rational-interpretation approach, the court held the penalty provision was directed at real pending transactions. It denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

The association then moved for partial summary judgment on its own foreclosure claim. On November 24, 2014, the court denied that motion. The ruling noted that A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) allows foreclosure only if the owner “has been” delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count when deciding whether the right to foreclose exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that a homeowner cannot avoid foreclosure once the complaint has been filed. The court expressly left open the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments.

A March 11, 2015 ruling accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacated the scheduled trial, and found for defendants on Count I to the extent it sought foreclosure on the property. The June 9, 2015 fee ruling divided the consolidated case into four parts: the association’s unpaid-assessment claim, the association’s lien-foreclosure claim, the association’s CC&R-violation allegations, and Forange’s groundless-document claims. The court found the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations.

The fee ruling made Forange the prevailing party overall. It awarded Forange $994.05 in taxable costs, denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and awarded Forange $18,000 in attorney fees under § 12-341.01 to mitigate the expense of establishing just defenses. The last collected entry continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC (CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Escrow payoff requests do not erase HOA liens absent a real transaction; paid assessments defeated foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2012-09-12 At an order-to-show-cause hearing, the court gives 4AAR Holdings, LLC until October 12, 2012 to obtain counsel.

Step 2012-12-12 The court strikes 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because a nonlawyer cannot represent the LLC in court.

Step 2013-03-01 The court consolidates CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064.

Step 2013-08-26 The court denies the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions, finding there was no enforceable settlement.

Step 2014-08-12 The court denies Forange partial summary judgment and grants the association and its attorneys summary judgment on Forange’s A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory.

Step 2014-11-24 The court denies the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), while leaving monetary claims for penalties and fees unresolved.

Step 2014-11-24 The court separately denies the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-05-07_034_ruling.pdf

Source 35 2015-06-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling awarding Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denying the association’s fee requests, and continuing the case on the dismissal calendar.

Download source file

2015-06-09_035_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Did the escrow-agent payoff request extinguish the HOA lien?

No. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent penalty was intended to facilitate actual pending escrow transactions. Because the escrow agent’s request was not connected to a pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, the request did not extinguish the association’s lien.

Why did the association win the August 2014 summary-judgment ruling?

Forange’s theory depended on treating any escrow-agent payoff request as enough to erase the lien if the association did not respond within ten days. The court rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

Why did the association lose its later foreclosure motion?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) to look only at the delinquent assessment amount when deciding whether foreclosure is available. Late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be part of a lien, but they do not count toward the foreclosure threshold. Because the delinquent assessments had been paid, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure.

Did the ruling eliminate all claims by the association?

No. The November 2014 foreclosure ruling expressly said it was not suggesting the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments was not viable. The June 2015 fee ruling later found the association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange paid the previously unpaid assessments in July 2013.

Who received attorney fees at the end?

Forange did. The court treated the consolidated case as mixed, found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Is this decision binding in other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one Arizona superior-court judge interpreted the escrow-payoff and foreclosure portions of A.R.S. § 33-1807 in a planned-community assessment-lien dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	August 12, 2014
Judge / panel	Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Emmet J. Ronan, Hon. Ruth H. Hilliard
Parties	Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff; defendant in consolidated action) v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, Forange, LLC, Michael D. Ripson, Scottsdale Community Association, Citibank South Dakota N.A., and Johnson Bank (Defendants or related parties); Forange, LLC also sued the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns in the consolidated action.
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807
Topics	LiensForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) did not extinguish an HOA assessment lien when an escrow agent requested a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction, so Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion was denied and summary judgment was granted to the association and its attorneys. The court later denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because foreclosure eligibility depends on the unpaid assessment amount, excluding late fees and attorney fees, and the delinquent assessments had been paid.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	35 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations, while the consolidated Forange action attacked the association lien and its attorneys based on an escrow-agent payoff request under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). In August 2014, Judge Mark F. Aceto held that § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent payoff-statement penalty applies to actual pending escrow transactions, not to a request made outside any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s lien-extinguishment claims. In November 2014, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), holding that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count toward foreclosure eligibility and that the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case ended through a dismissal stipulation and a fee ruling that awarded Forange taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees while denying the association’s fee requests.

Key Issues & Findings

On the payoff-statement claim, the court focused on the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). The statute requires associations to furnish payoff statements within ten days after requests from specified actors and creates a lien-extinguishment penalty for an unanswered request by an escrow agent. But the court found the undisputed escrow request here was not made in connection with any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction. Reading the statute rationally and in light of the policy behind it, the court concluded the penalty provision was meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a special power to erase HOA liens whenever someone asks them to request payoff information.

On the association’s foreclosure motion, the court applied A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) differently. It noted that foreclosure is available only if the owner has been delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be included in the lien but are excluded when deciding whether the foreclosure right exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that filing a foreclosure complaint locks in the right to foreclose regardless of later payment.

The fee ruling treated the consolidated case as mixed. The association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange ultimately paid the overdue assessments, and it also defeated Forange’s groundless-document claims. Forange prevailed on the lien-foreclosure issue and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations. Weighing those results, the court found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee applications.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it cuts in both directions on HOA assessment liens. It rejects a payoff-request strategy aimed at extinguishing an HOA lien through an escrow agent when there is no real pending escrow transaction, making the statutory penalty in A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) depend on the transaction context.

At the same time, it gives homeowners and associations a concrete reading of § 33-1807(A): for foreclosure eligibility, the court counted only delinquent assessments, not late fees, collection charges, or attorney fees. Once the delinquent assessments were paid, the association still could pursue monetary penalties and fees, but it did not receive summary judgment authorizing foreclosure. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but the reasoning addresses recurring assessment-lien and payoff-statement disputes.

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Tanglewood HOA v. Goode: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Unopposed Summary Judgment | Redemption Period | CV2014-094502

This is a thin-record Maricopa County Superior Court HOA case. The collected minutes show scheduling orders, an unopposed summary-judgment ruling for Tanglewood HOA, and a later application to prevent waste before expiration of a redemption period. They do not provide the complaint, the requested judgment language, the amount at issue, or a written analysis of any HOA statute or CC&R provision, so this guide sticks to the procedural facts that appear in the minute entries.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Tanglewood HOA v. James E. Goode, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094502.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2017-09-01. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Tanglewood HOA v. James E. Goode (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094502) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 25, 2016 ruling granting the HOA’s unopposed summary-judgment motion and the September 1, 2017 order on the HOA’s redemption-period waste application; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the September 1, 2017 order requiring a response to the application to prevent waste; the collected records do not include the proposed judgment, any final signed judgment, or any later ruling on that application. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court granted Tanglewood HOA summary judgment after the homeowner filed no response. The ruling relied on Rule 7.1(b), treated the unexplained nonresponse as consent to granting the motion, and separately stated that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law. Because the collected minute entry does not identify the claim details or analyze an HOA statute or CC&R provision, the case is best read as a procedural example of unopposed summary judgment in a thin-record HOA matter, not as a substantive HOA-law ruling.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Tanglewood HOA (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that obtained the January 2016 unopposed summary-judgment ruling and later filed an application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.
James Portman Webster (Counsel)
Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the 2015 scheduling and trial-setting minute entries.
Lashawn D. Jenkins (Counsel)
Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the September 2017 order on the application to prevent waste.

Respondent Side

James E. Goode (Defendant)
Homeowner defendant who appeared on his own behalf at the November 2015 status conference and did not file a response to the HOA’s summary-judgment motion by the time the January 2016 ruling issued.

Neutral Parties

Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the May 2015 scheduling order before reassignment.
Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who set the bench trial and later granted the HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment.
Joshua D. Rogers (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the September 2017 order requiring a response to the HOA’s application to prevent waste.

What happened

Tanglewood HOA sued James E. Goode in Maricopa County Superior Court. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint, the amount sought, or the specific covenants or statutes relied on. The May 19, 2015 scheduling order set discovery, disclosure, settlement-conference, dispositive-motion, and status-conference deadlines, and removed the case from the dismissal calendar.

At a November 23, 2015 telephonic status conference, counsel James Portman Webster appeared for the HOA and Goode appeared for himself. The court set a two-hour bench trial for March 3, 2016 and ordered a joint pretrial statement by February 25, 2016. The same minute entry also corrected Goode’s address in the court system; this public guide omits the address under the project’s privacy rule.

Before trial, the HOA moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 2016, Judge Robert H. Oberbillig ruled that Goode had failed to respond to the motion in any manner and that the response deadline under Rule 7.1(a) had expired. Citing Rule 7.1(b), the court found the unexplained inaction should be deemed consent to granting the motion.

The ruling did not stop at the nonresponse. It also stated that the HOA’s motion and the record established that Tanglewood HOA was entitled as a matter of law to the relief it sought. The court granted the summary-judgment motion, ordered the HOA’s counsel to submit an appropriate form of judgment and any fee-and-cost application by February 15, 2016, and vacated the March 2016 bench trial.

The last collected minute entry is from September 1, 2017. It says the court had before it Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste prior to expiration of the redemption period. Judge Joshua D. Rogers ordered Goode to respond by September 11, 2017 and warned that if no response was filed, the application would be granted. The collected records do not show the final judgment terms or the final outcome of that application.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Tanglewood HOA v. Goode (CV2014-094502 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Unopposed HOA summary judgment entered; later order addressed redemption-period waste. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Tanglewood HOA v. Goode. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-05-19 The court enters a scheduling order, sets discovery and motion deadlines, requires settlement efforts, and removes the case from the dismissal calendar.

Step 2015-11-23 At a telephonic status conference, the HOA appears through counsel and Goode appears pro per; the court sets a two-hour bench trial for March 3, 2016.

Step 2016-01-25 The court grants Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, orders a proposed judgment and any fee application, and vacates trial.

Step 2017-09-01 The court orders Goode to respond to Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period, warning that the application will be granted if no response is filed.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 4 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2015-05-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-05-19_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2015-11-23

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2015-11-23_002_status-conference.pdf

Source 3 2016-01-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, ordering counsel to submit a proposed judgment and fee application, and vacating the scheduled bench trial.

Download source file

2016-01-25_003_ruling.pdf

Source 4 2017-09-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order requiring James E. Goode to respond to Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period or have the application granted.

Download source file

2017-09-01_004_ruling.pdf

FAQ

What did the court decide in the summary-judgment ruling?

The court granted Tanglewood HOA’s motion for summary judgment. It found that Goode had not responded by the Rule 7.1 deadline, treated that unexplained inaction as consent under Rule 7.1(b), and also stated that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law.

Does the minute entry explain the underlying HOA dispute?

No. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint, the requested judgment terms, any assessment amount, or the CC&R provisions at issue. This page therefore does not add unsourced detail about the underlying claim.

Why is this still treated as an HOA case?

The named plaintiff is Tanglewood HOA, and the last collected order refers to an application to prevent waste before expiration of a redemption period. Those facts indicate an HOA enforcement or foreclosure posture, even though the written minutes do not provide the full claim details.

Was there a trial?

No trial appears in the collected records. The court set a bench trial for March 3, 2016, then vacated that trial after granting the HOA summary judgment on January 25, 2016.

What happened after the summary-judgment ruling?

The January 2016 ruling ordered the HOA’s counsel to submit a proposed judgment and any fee-and-cost application. The collected minutes do not include that judgment, but a September 2017 order later required Goode to respond to the HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.

Is this ruling precedent for other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This thin-record case is most useful as a procedural example: an unopposed summary-judgment motion can still require the court to determine that the moving party is entitled to judgment on the record.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2014-094502 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	January 25, 2016
Judge / panel	Hon. Robert H. Oberbillig, Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Joshua D. Rogers
Parties	Tanglewood HOA (Plaintiff) v. James E. Goode (Defendant)
Topics	ProcedureForeclosureCC&RsLiens
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted Tanglewood HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment, finding that the homeowner’s failure to respond should be deemed consent under Rule 7.1(b) and that the HOA’s motion and the case record established entitlement to the relief sought as a matter of law.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	4 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	4 roadmap entries
Video overview	Tanglewood HOA v. Goode
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tanglewood HOA sued James E. Goode in Maricopa County Superior Court. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint or the requested judgment terms, but they show the court set the case for a bench trial and later granted the HOA’s unopposed motion for summary judgment after Goode filed no response. The court relied on Rule 7.1(b), found the nonresponse should be treated as consent, and also stated that the motion and record established the HOA’s entitlement to relief as a matter of law. A later order required Goode to respond to the HOA’s application to prevent waste before expiration of the redemption period.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s written reasoning was procedural and brief. It noted that Goode, who was not represented by counsel, had failed to respond in any manner to Tanglewood HOA’s summary-judgment motion and that the response deadline under Rule 7.1(a) had expired. Under Rule 7.1(b), the court treated the unexplained nonresponse as consent to granting the motion.

The court also made the required merits statement: the HOA’s motion and the case record established that the HOA was entitled as a matter of law to the relief it was seeking. On that basis, the court granted summary judgment, ordered a proposed judgment and any fee-and-cost application, and vacated the scheduled bench trial. The collected records do not provide a substantive analysis of an HOA statute or CC&R provision.

Why It Matters

The case is a thin-record example of how an HOA can obtain summary judgment when the homeowner does not respond, but it should not be read as a substantive interpretation of Arizona HOA law. The ruling states both parts of the analysis: the nonresponse could be deemed consent under Rule 7.1(b), and the court still found the motion and record established entitlement to relief as a matter of law.

The later redemption-period waste order suggests a post-judgment enforcement or foreclosure posture, but the collected minutes do not include the final judgment or the details of the underlying claim. For readers, the useful lesson is procedural and practical rather than doctrinal.

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Maricopoly v. Tierra Santa Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

HOA Liens | Sheriff Sale | CV2020-013607

A purchaser alleged an HOA lien sale went forward after the lien was extinguished. The court let fraud-based claims survive summary judgment but rejected A.R.S. § 33-420 against the association’s law firm.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-013607.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2022-06-07. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-013607) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the February 7, 2022 under-advisement ruling on Maxwell & Morgan’s converted summary-judgment motion and the May 12, 2022 ruling on A.R.S. § 33-420 amendment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 7, 2022 order referring the case to a mandatory settlement conference and setting a March 27, 2023 pretrial or trial-setting conference. The collected records do not show a final judgment, settlement, trial, appeal, or dismissal after that order. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A bidder normally takes only whatever title exists at a judicial sale, but the court held that caveat emptor does not shield alleged fraud. Taking Maricopoly’s facts as true for summary judgment, the court let claims proceed where the buyer alleged Tierra Santa’s law firm falsely confirmed the HOA lien was valid and allowed a sheriff’s sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Maricopoly LLC (Plaintiff)
Purchaser at the sheriff's sale who alleged the Tierra Santa HOA lien had already been extinguished and that the sale should not have gone forward.
Kyle A. Kinney (Counsel)
Counsel for Maricopoly in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Association whose foreclosure judgment and asserted continuing statutory lien formed the basis for the sheriff's sale.
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. (Defendant)
Law firm alleged to have represented Tierra Santa in the foreclosure matter and to have told Maricopoly's agent that the HOA lien was valid; the court denied summary judgment on fraud-based allegations but later rejected A.R.S. § 33-420 against the firm.
Rod Sauaia (Defendant)
Listed in the early minute-entry captions and represented with Maxwell & Morgan at the August 13, 2021 oral argument.
Ember Ann Van Vranken (Counsel)
Counsel for Tierra Santa in the minute entries.
Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
Counsel for Tierra Santa at the August 13, 2021 and December 9, 2021 oral arguments.
Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
Counsel for Maxwell & Morgan and Rod Sauaia at oral argument on the converted summary-judgment motion.
Sean P. Healy (Counsel)
Counsel listed for Maxwell & Morgan in the May 12, 2022 ruling.
Aaron C. Schepler (Counsel)
Counsel listed for Maxwell & Morgan in the May 12, 2022 ruling.

Neutral Parties

Hon. Pamela Gates (Judge)
Judge who issued the February 7, 2022 and May 12, 2022 rulings.

What happened

Maricopoly alleged that it bought at a March 7, 2019 sheriff’s sale based on a judgment in favor of Tierra Santa Community Association against a Scottsdale property. The court’s February 7, 2022 ruling states that Maricopoly’s agent investigated the sale, found a prior foreclosure, and saw documents creating ambiguity about whether Tierra Santa still had a valid lien to foreclose.

For purposes of the converted summary-judgment motion, the court took Maricopoly’s facts as true. On that assumed record, Maricopoly’s agent called Maxwell & Morgan, Tierra Santa’s lawyers, the day before the sale and asked whether the lien was valid. The ruling says the agent was told the lien was valid, but Maricopoly alleged that was false because Tierra Santa had entered a stipulated judgment agreeing the HOA lien would be extinguished if another entity obtained title, and Maxwell & Morgan knew that condition had occurred.

The court also treated as true, for that motion only, Maricopoly’s allegations that a lawyer for Tierra Santa appeared at the sale and allowed it to proceed, that Maricopoly was the winning bidder for $44,000, and that Maxwell & Morgan later threatened fees when Maricopoly tried to secure return of the payment. The court emphasized it was not finding those allegations true; it was applying the summary-judgment standard.

Maxwell & Morgan relied on caveat emptor, the rule that a judicial-sale bidder must determine title and takes only the execution debtor’s interest. The court held that caveat emptor did not bar the case at summary judgment because Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception. Since Maricopoly alleged a knowingly false statement about the lien and a sale based on an extinguished lien, the court found material factual disputes and denied summary dismissal.

The court allowed amendment of factual allegations and some counts, but rejected several proposed new theories. It denied negligent misrepresentation because the case could proceed only if Maxwell & Morgan knowingly misrepresented the lien rather than merely making a mistake. It denied wrongful foreclosure because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, mortgage, note, or creditor-declared default. It also denied slander of title as insufficiently alleged.

On May 12, 2022, the court separately addressed A.R.S. § 33-420. It quoted the statute and held that liability applies to a person claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property. Because Maricopoly alleged Maxwell & Morgan was the law firm representing the client who claimed an interest, not a claimant itself, the court denied leave to add the § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan while granting leave to amend in part.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association (CV2020-013607 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Fraud allegations over an extinguished HOA lien sale defeated summary judgment; § 33-420 did not apply to the firm. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-04-12 The court takes no action on Maricopoly's application for default against Maxwell & Morgan and directs default-judgment materials to the commissioner process.

Step 2021-04-21 The court takes no action on Maricopoly's application for default against Tierra Santa and gives the same default-judgment process direction.

Step 2021-08-13 The court grants Maricopoly limited Rule 56(d) discovery and allows the deposition of Austin Slade before response to the converted summary-judgment motion.

Step 2021-12-09 The court hears oral argument on Maxwell & Morgan's converted summary-judgment motion and Maricopoly's motion for leave to amend, then takes both under advisement.

Step 2022-02-07 The court denies Maxwell & Morgan's converted summary-judgment motion and grants Maricopoly leave to amend only in part.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Maricopoly leave to amend in part but denying leave to add an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan because the firm did not itself claim an interest, lien, or encumbrance against the property.

Download source file

2022-05-12_008_ruling.pdf

Source 9 2022-06-07

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Scheduling minute entry referring the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and setting a March 27, 2023 pretrial conference or trial-setting conference.

Download source file

2022-06-07_009_status-conference.pdf

FAQ

Why did the court deny summary judgment?

The court took Maricopoly’s factual allegations as true for the converted summary-judgment motion and found a genuine dispute about whether Maxwell & Morgan knowingly misrepresented that the HOA lien was valid and allowed a sheriff’s sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished.

What did caveat emptor mean in this case?

Caveat emptor meant that a bidder at a judicial sale normally must determine title and takes only whatever interest the execution debtor has. The court held that this rule did not end the case because Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception.

Did the court find that Maxwell & Morgan committed fraud?

No. The court expressly said it was taking Maricopoly’s allegations as true only for purposes of deciding the converted summary-judgment motion. The ruling decided that the allegations created material factual disputes, not that they were proven.

What happened to the proposed wrongful-foreclosure claim?

The court denied leave to add wrongful foreclosure as futile because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, recorded mortgage, note, or creditor wrongfully declaring default under a note.

Why did the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim fail against the law firm?

The court held that § 33-420 applies to a person claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property. Maricopoly alleged Maxwell & Morgan represented the client who claimed the interest, not that the firm itself claimed the lien.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of how one trial court handled an alleged HOA lien sale after the lien had been extinguished.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2020-013607 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	February 7, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Pamela Gates
Parties	Maricopoly LLC (Plaintiff) v. Tierra Santa Community Association, Inc., Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. and Rod Sauaia (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-420
Topics	ForeclosureLiensCC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The court denied Maxwell & Morgan's motion to dismiss converted to summary judgment because, taking Maricopoly's facts as true, the fraud exception to caveat emptor could apply to allegations that the firm falsely confirmed a valid HOA lien and allowed a sheriff's sale to proceed after the lien had been extinguished. The court also denied leave to add negligent-misrepresentation, wrongful-foreclosure, and slander-of-title claims, and later denied leave to add an A.R.S. § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan while allowing amendment in part.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	9 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A purchaser at a sheriff's sale sued Tierra Santa Community Association and its collection law firm after buying at a sale based on an HOA foreclosure lien that the plaintiff alleged had already been extinguished. The court denied the defense summary-judgment motion on fraud-based allegations, allowed some amendment, denied negligent-misrepresentation, wrongful-foreclosure, and slander-of-title amendments as futile, and later held that A.R.S. § 33-420 did not provide a claim against the law firm because the firm did not itself claim an interest in the property.

Key Issues & Findings

The February 7, 2022 ruling treated the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a summary-judgment motion and therefore took Maricopoly's factual allegations as true for that motion only. On that assumed record, Maricopoly's agent investigated a sheriff's sale based on a Tierra Santa foreclosure judgment, discovered a prior foreclosure and a stipulated judgment that allegedly extinguished the HOA lien if another entity obtained title, and called Maxwell & Morgan to ask whether the lien remained valid.

The court reasoned that ordinary caveat emptor principles make a judicial-sale bidder responsible for checking title, but that Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception. Because Maricopoly alleged that Maxwell & Morgan knowingly gave false information that the lien remained valid and then allowed the sale to proceed, the court found material factual disputes and denied summary dismissal.

The court separated that fraud theory from proposed new claims. It denied negligent misrepresentation because no claim existed if Maxwell & Morgan was merely mistaken, denied wrongful foreclosure because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, mortgage, note, or similar foreclosure structure, and denied slander of title as insufficiently pleaded. In the later A.R.S. § 33-420 ruling, the court held the statute did not create a claim against Maxwell & Morgan because the law firm represented a claimant but did not itself claim an interest, lien, or encumbrance against the property.

Why It Matters

The ruling is useful for HOA lien and foreclosure disputes because it shows that caveat emptor may not end the case when a purchaser alleges fraud in an HOA sheriff's sale based on an extinguished lien. It also draws a line between an association that claims a lien and a law firm representing that association for purposes of A.R.S. § 33-420.

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Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Liens & Trustee-Sale Proceeds | A.R.S. § 33-812(g) | CV2011-053961

In this Maricopa County Superior Court proceeding, two homeowners associations and American Savings Life Insurance Company competed for release of proceeds. The court ordered specific payments to Westwind Homeowners Association and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association before the remaining balance went to American Savings.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-053961.

Download proceeds ruling

Scope note: This page covers Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-053961) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, including the September 19, 2011 hearing-setting entry and the September 22, 2011 proceeds ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the September 22, 2011 order distributing proceeds. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court resolved competing applications for release of proceeds by ordering payment first to Westwind Homeowners Association, second to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and then the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company. The ruling is narrow and procedural; it does not announce a broad HOA lien rule.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Empire West Title Agency LLC (Plaintiff)
Title agency plaintiff listed in the case caption and party table.
Westwind Homeowners Association (Claimant)
Homeowners association claimant that applied for release of proceeds and received a $2,206.11 distribution.
Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association (Claimant)
Homeowners association claimant that objected to American Savings' application, filed its own application, and received a $5,208.97 distribution.
Melissa A. Lovonier (Counsel)
Counsel who appeared for Westwind Homeowners Association and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association at the September 22, 2011 hearing.

Respondent Side

Charles Hoskins (Defendant)
Defendant listed in the caption and party table; no appearance was made by him at the September 22, 2011 hearing.
American Savings Life Insurance Company (Claimant)
Claimant that applied for release of proceeds and received the remaining balance after the two homeowners-association distributions.
Gove L. Allen (Counsel)
Counsel who appeared for American Savings Life Insurance Company at the September 22, 2011 hearing.

Neutral Parties

Michael R. McVey (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the competing applications and ordered the proceeds distribution.

What happened

Empire West Title Agency LLC filed this Maricopa County Superior Court case against Charles Hoskins. The collected minute entries are limited to competing applications for release of proceeds involving Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company.

On September 19, 2011, the court reviewed American Savings’ application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g), Wigwam Creek’s objection to that application, Wigwam Creek’s own application for release of proceeds, and Westwind’s application for release of proceeds. The court set an in-person hearing for September 22, 2011.

At the September 22 hearing, Melissa A. Lovonier appeared for Wigwam Creek and Westwind, and Gove L. Allen appeared for American Savings. No other parties appeared. The court heard argument on the competing applications and took the matter under advisement.

Later that same minute entry, the court stated that it had considered the applications, oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau. It then directed the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

The minute entries do not contain broader analysis of HOA assessment liens, CC&Rs, foreclosure priority, or association governance. This page therefore treats the case as a narrow example of homeowners associations participating as claimants in a proceeds-distribution proceeding.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins (CV2011-053961 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Two HOAs received priority distributions from trustee-sale proceeds before the remaining balance went to a lender. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2011-06-03 Westwind Homeowners Association files an application for release of proceeds.

Step 2011-06-08 American Savings Life Insurance Company files an application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g).

Step 2011-07-21 Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association files its application for release of proceeds after objecting to American Savings' application.

Step 2011-09-19 The court sets a September 22 hearing on the competing applications for release of proceeds.

Step 2011-09-22 After argument, the court orders the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek, and the balance to American Savings.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 2 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2011-09-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2011-09-19_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2011-09-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling directing the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

Download source file

2011-09-22_002_ruling.pdf

FAQ

What was this case about?

The collected minute entries show competing applications for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g). Two homeowners associations and American Savings Life Insurance Company each sought money from the proceeds being held by the Maricopa County Treasurer.

Which homeowners associations received money?

Westwind Homeowners Association received $2,206.11, and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association received $5,208.97.

Who received the remaining balance?

The court ordered the remaining balance paid to American Savings Life Insurance Company after the two homeowners associations received their specified distributions.

Did the court interpret the HOA CC&Rs?

No. The minute entries do not quote or analyze CC&Rs. The ruling resolves the distribution of proceeds among claimants; it does not decide an architectural-review, records, election, governance, or CC&R-interpretation dispute.

Is this a must-read HOA case?

No. It is a standard, narrow proceeds-distribution case. It is useful because it shows homeowners associations appearing as claimants, but the ruling does not provide broad analysis of HOA law.

Is this ruling precedent?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page summarizes the public minute entries for educational use.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2011-053961 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	September 22, 2011
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael R. McVey
Parties	Empire West Title Agency LLC (Plaintiff) v. Charles Hoskins (Defendant); Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company (Claimants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-812(g)
Topics	LiensForeclosureAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court ordered trustee-sale proceeds distributed first to Westwind Homeowners Association in the amount of $2,206.11, second to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association in the amount of $5,208.97, and then the balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	2 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Empire West Title Agency LLC filed a Maricopa County Superior Court proceeding involving Charles Hoskins and competing applications for release of proceeds. Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company each sought proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g). After a September 22, 2011 hearing, the court considered the applications, oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau, then directed the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association first, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association second, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

Key Issues & Findings

The court had before it American Savings' application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g), Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association's objection to that application and its own application, and Westwind Homeowners Association's application. It set a short in-person hearing on those competing applications and required counsel or parties to appear.

At the September 22, 2011 hearing, counsel appeared for Wigwam Creek and Westwind, and counsel appeared for American Savings. The court heard argument, took the matter under advisement, and later stated that it had considered the applications, the oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau. The resulting order gave the two homeowners associations priority distributions in specific dollar amounts before directing the remaining balance to American Savings.

Why It Matters

This is a narrow, routine proceeds-distribution ruling, but it shows homeowners associations participating as claimants in an A.R.S. § 33-812(g) excess-proceeds proceeding. The court did not publish a broad rule about HOA liens or assessment enforcement; it simply resolved the competing applications and ordered specific payments from the Maricopa County Treasurer.

For HOA readers, the practical takeaway is that association claims can appear in trustee-sale surplus litigation alongside lender or insurer claims, and the actual distribution order matters. As a superior-court minute-entry ruling, this binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

Sundance won the contract claim and prevailing-party fees, but the court denied late fees, collection fees, and foreclosure.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-095178.

Download ruling

Scope note: This page covers Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-095178) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the September 14, 2016 under-advisement ruling and the November 21, 2016 final judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Sundance won summary judgment for breach of contract and was treated as the prevailing party for fees and legal costs. But the court denied late fees and collection fees because they were not timely and properly invoiced, and it denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff / counterdefendant)
Homeowners association pursuing assessment-related claims.

Respondent Side

Lorri Glawe, Curt Glawe, and Jordan Glawe (Defendants / counterclaimants)
Homeowners opposing the association's collection and foreclosure remedies.

Neutral Parties

Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the lis pendens ruling, summary-judgment ruling, and final judgment.

What happened

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association litigated assessment-related claims against the Glawe defendants after the case came up from White Tank Justice Court. The early superior-court entries addressed discovery, consolidation, and a stay request.

On March 1, 2016, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dissolve a lis pendens. The court found Sundance had shown adequate grounds for the filing but stated it was taking no position on the merits.

At the July 28, 2016 summary-judgment argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on email notice of amounts due and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a). On September 14, 2016, the court granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only. It denied late fees and collection fees because Sundance had not timely and properly invoiced them, and it denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

In the final judgment, both sides sought fees as prevailing parties. The court found that, under the totality of circumstances, Sundance was the prevailing party. It awarded Sundance $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, denied reconsideration, and entered final judgment under Rule 54(c).

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe (CV2015-095178 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Sundance won breach summary judgment, but no late fees, collection fees, or foreclosure after payment. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-11-16 The court resolves discovery, sanctions, consolidation, and stay motions.

Step 2016-03-01 The court denies the defendants' motion to dissolve lis pendens.

Step 2016-07-28 The court hears summary-judgment argument and orders supplemental briefing on email notice and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a).

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2016-10-04_006_order.pdf

Source 7 2016-11-21

Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Final judgment finding Sundance the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarding $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, and denying reconsideration.

Download source file

2016-11-21_007_judgment.pdf

FAQ

Did Sundance win summary judgment?

Yes, but only for breach of contract. The court did not award late fees, collection fees, or foreclosure relief.

Why were late fees and collection fees denied?

The September 14, 2016 ruling says Sundance did not timely and properly invoice those amounts.

Why was foreclosure denied?

The court ruled Sundance was not entitled to foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

Who was the prevailing party for fees?

The court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances and awarded $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs.

Why is this case marked standard?

The case gives practical collection outcomes, but the minute entries do not contain extended statutory or CC&R analysis.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2015-095178 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	November 21, 2016
Judge / panel	Hon. Robert H. Oberbillig
Parties	Sundance Residential Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Lorri Glawe, Curt Glawe, and Jordan Glawe (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807(a) A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	AssessmentsLiensForeclosureAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only, denied recovery of late fees and collection fees, denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid, and entered final judgment awarding Sundance fees and legal costs as the prevailing party.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	5 roadmap entries
Video overview	Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association pursued assessment-related claims against the Glawe defendants. The court denied the defendants' motion to dissolve a lis pendens, later granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only, and ruled that Sundance could not recover late fees or collection fees because it had not timely and properly invoiced them. The court also held Sundance was not entitled to foreclosure after the assessments had been paid. In the final judgment, the court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarded $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, and denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration.

Key Issues & Findings

The March 1, 2016 ruling denied the defendants' motion to dissolve the lis pendens because Sundance's response established adequate grounds for the filing, while the court expressly took no position on the merits.

At the July 28, 2016 summary-judgment argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on email notice of amounts due and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a). After reviewing the supplemental briefs, the September 14, 2016 under-advisement ruling granted Sundance's motion for summary judgment for breach of contract only. The court agreed with the defense that Sundance had not timely and properly invoiced late fees or collection fees, so Sundance could not recover those damages. It also ruled foreclosure was unavailable because the assessments had been paid.

In the November 21, 2016 final judgment, the court considered both sides' fee applications under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). Although each side prevailed on some issues, the court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarded Sundance $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, denied reconsideration, and entered the order under Rule 54(c).

Why It Matters

This case is useful for assessment disputes because it separates breach-of-contract liability from late-fee, collection-fee, and foreclosure remedies. The association won the contract claim and fees, but the court refused late/collection fees for defective invoicing and refused foreclosure after payment of assessments.

The case is marked standard because the minute entries announce those conclusions without extended statutory or CC&R analysis. It is a practical collection example, not a broad must-read rule.

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Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The court held that assessment duties arose from the CC&Rs, not an alleged parking agreement, and a jury later awarded both unpaid assessments to the association and larger implied-covenant damages to the commercial owner.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-090103.

Download ruling

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2018-05-18. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-090103) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA and condominium case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the March 2 and March 24, 2015 assessment-lien rulings, the May 6 and June 13, 2016 summary-judgment rulings, the September 1, 2017 verdict entry, the November 8, 2017 post-trial ruling, and the November 21, 2017 final judgment entry. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court treated the commercial owner’s assessment obligation as a CC&R duty governed by A.R.S. § 33-1256, not as a duty excused by an alleged parking-space agreement. The association still had to prove the lien amount, and a later jury awarded the association unpaid assessments while awarding the owner much larger damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Tapestry on Central LLC (Plaintiff and counterdefendant)
Commercial condominium owner that sued the condominium association and defended against the assessment-lien counterclaim.
Ryan J. Lorenz (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Tapestry on Central LLC in the later trial and judgment entries.

Respondent Side

Tapestry on Central Condominium Association (Defendant and counterclaimant)
Condominium association that defended the owner claims and sought unpaid assessments and foreclosure on its counterclaim.
Kenneth Cheuvront (Defendant)
Individual defendant associated with the condominium-association side of the dispute.
Jim Ehinger (Defendant)
Individual defendant associated with the condominium-association side of the dispute.
Emery Jensen (Defendant)
Individual defendant associated with the condominium-association side of the dispute.
Steve Denning (Defendant)
Individual defendant associated with the condominium-association side of the dispute.
Kevin P. Nelson (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the condominium association in many substantive entries.

Neutral Parties

David M. Talamante (Judge)
Superior Court judge who handled the later summary-judgment, trial, verdict, post-trial, judgment, and bond/garnishment entries.
Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued early assessment-lien and pleading rulings.

What happened

Tapestry on Central LLC, a commercial condominium owner, sued the condominium association and related individual defendants. The association counterclaimed for unpaid assessments and foreclosure of its assessment lien. The collected record describes disputes over CC&R assessment duties, parking-space allegations, common-area repairs and maintenance, A.R.S. § 33-420 lien allegations, discovery, expert disclosures, and trial damages.

The March 2, 2015 ruling is the clearest assessment-lien ruling. The court found it undisputed that the owner held commercial condominium interests, that the CC&Rs required condominium owners to pay assessments, that the association had levied assessments, that the owner had not paid those assessments, and that A.R.S. § 33-1256 generally gives an association the right to foreclose absent a viable defense. The court denied summary judgment on the amount of the lien because the association had not established the claimed amount as a matter of law.

The same ruling rejected the owner’s parking-space theory as a defense to the assessment obligation. The court reasoned that the association’s assessment claim was based on the CC&Rs, not the alleged parking-space agreement, so an alleged breach of that parking agreement was a red herring for the owner’s duty to pay assessments. The court asked for supplemental briefing on whether equitable defenses such as laches and unclean hands could be asserted against the CC&R/statutory foreclosure claim.

The case later narrowed through summary judgment. In May 2016, the court granted judgment to defendants on the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim after finding the disputed facts did not meet the statutory requirements. In June 2016, the court denied summary judgment on claims involving repairs made at the association’s direction and maintenance of common areas, but granted judgment on an alleged oral-contract claim.

After a multi-day jury trial, the September 1, 2017 verdict awarded the association $156,509 on its counterclaim for principal and interest. The jury also found for the owner against the association on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarded $1,190,400. A later nunc pro tunc entry clarified that the court had directed verdict on the alleged failure-to-tow CC&R theory because there was insufficient factual support for that damages claim.

The court denied the association’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial. It found adequate factual support for the implied-covenant verdict. The November 21, 2017 judgment entry awarded judgment in the owner’s proposed form, plus $581,420 in attorney fees and $15,874.54 in costs, while recognizing that the association had prevailed on unpaid assessments.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association (CV2014-090103 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). CC&R assessment duties survived a parking-agreement defense, but the owner won a larger implied-covenant verdict. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-03-02 Ruling finds A.R.S. § 33-1256 applies and the CC&Rs require assessments, but denies summary judgment on the lien amount and requests supplemental briefing on defenses.

Step 2015-03-24 The court denies the owner's summary-judgment motion on the assessment-lien foreclosure counterclaim.

Step 2016-05-06 The court grants summary judgment on the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim and part of the tortious-interference claim, and takes other claims under advisement.

Step 2016-06-13 The court denies summary judgment on common-area repair and maintenance claims, but grants judgment on the alleged oral-contract claim.

Step 2017-01-19 The court allows the owner's replacement damages expert and reopens limited discovery.

Step 2017-09-01 The jury awards the association $156,509 on its counterclaim and awards the owner $1,190,400 against the association for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Step 2017-09-20 The court clarifies that directed verdict was granted on the alleged failure-to-tow theory.

Step 2017-11-08 The court denies the association's judgment-as-a-matter-of-law and new-trial motions.

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2018-05-18_088_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What did the court say about unpaid assessments?

The March 2015 ruling said the CC&Rs mandated assessments, the owner had not paid assessments, and A.R.S. § 33-1256 generally gives an association a foreclosure remedy absent a viable defense. The association still had to prove the amount of the lien.

Did an alleged parking-space agreement excuse assessments?

No, not on the reasoning in the March 2015 ruling. The court said the assessment claim was based on the CC&Rs, not the alleged parking agreement, so the alleged parking breach was a red herring to the CC&R assessment duty.

Who won at trial?

Both sides won something. The association won $156,509 on its counterclaim for principal and interest, but the owner won $1,190,400 against the association on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Did the court overturn the jury verdict?

No. The court denied the association’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial, finding an adequate factual basis for the verdicts.

Why is this case marked must-read?

The case includes substantive superior-court analysis of CC&R assessment duties, A.R.S. § 33-1256 foreclosure, statutory lien claims under A.R.S. § 33-420, common-area duties, and the implied covenant in a condominium-association dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2014-090103 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	November 21, 2017
Judge / panel	Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. David M. Talamante
Parties	Tapestry on Central LLC (Plaintiff and counterdefendant, commercial condominium owner) v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association and individual defendants (Defendants and counterclaimants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1256 A.R.S. § 33-420 Rule 50, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 56, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 59, Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	AssessmentsLiensForeclosureCC&RsGood Faith & Fair DealingBoard GovernanceAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The court held that the CC&Rs, not an alleged parking-space agreement, supplied the owner's assessment duty and that A.R.S. § 33-1256 generally authorized condominium assessment-lien foreclosure absent a viable defense. After trial, the court entered judgment on a verdict awarding the association unpaid assessments while awarding the owner larger implied-covenant damages against the association.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	88 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Tapestry on Central LLC v. Tapestry on Central Condominium Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	5 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tapestry on Central LLC sued its condominium association and related individual defendants, and the association counterclaimed for unpaid assessments and assessment-lien foreclosure. Early rulings treated the owner's assessment obligation as arising from the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1256, not from an alleged parking-space agreement, while leaving the lien amount and defenses for later proof. The case proceeded through summary-judgment rulings and a multi-day jury trial. The jury awarded the association $156,509 on its counterclaim but awarded the owner $1,190,400 against the association for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the court later entered judgment with a large fee award for the owner.

Key Issues & Findings

The March 2, 2015 ruling began with the assessment counterclaim. The court found that the owner held commercial condominium interests, the CC&Rs mandated assessment payments, the association had levied assessments, the owner had not paid, and A.R.S. § 33-1256 generally gives an association foreclosure rights in this setting absent a viable defense. The court still denied summary judgment on the amount of the assessment lien because the association had not proved the claimed amount as a matter of law.

The court rejected the owner's attempt to use an alleged parking-space agreement as a material-breach defense to assessments. The court reasoned that the association's assessment claim was not based on that alleged agreement; it was based on the CC&Rs. It therefore described the parking-agreement theory as a red herring in the context of the owner's CC&R assessment obligation, while asking for additional briefing on equitable defenses such as laches and unclean hands.

Later summary-judgment rulings narrowed the case. The May 6, 2016 entry granted judgment to defendants on the A.R.S. § 33-420 claim because the disputed facts did not meet the statutory requirements. The June 13, 2016 under-advisement ruling denied judgment on common-area repair and maintenance claims but granted judgment on the alleged oral-contract claim.

At trial, the jury awarded the association $156,509 on its counterclaim and awarded the owner $1,190,400 on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court denied the association's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and new trial, finding the record contained an adequate factual basis for the verdicts. The final judgment entry awarded the owner attorney fees and costs while recognizing the assessment-counterclaim award.

Why It Matters

This is one of the more useful superior-court records for mixed-use or commercial condominium disputes because it separates the CC&R assessment duty from side agreements. The court treated the alleged parking-space bargain as irrelevant to the basic CC&R-based duty to pay assessments, while still requiring the association to prove the lien amount and face viable defenses.

The case also shows how a condominium dispute can produce split results. The association recovered unpaid assessments, but the owner obtained a much larger implied-covenant verdict and fee award. For readers, the lesson is that assessment foreclosure and governance conduct can travel together: winning on delinquent assessments does not necessarily defeat claims that the association handled the broader relationship in bad faith.

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North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Superior Court HOA Case

The collected superior-court record shows an assessment-collection dispute shaped by bankruptcy discharge, a prior justice-court case, appeal, and a final foreclosure judgment.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-097453.

Download ruling

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-097453) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the April 12, 2016 summary-judgment ruling, the November 28, 2016 post-trial ruling, the March 5, 2019 post-mandate entry, and the April 24, 2019 post-mandate fee/cost and foreclosure-judgment entry. The collected minute-entry text references a Court of Appeals memorandum decision and mandate but does not include the full appellate opinion. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior-court record shows a bankruptcy-sensitive HOA collection dispute. The trial court first dismissed the association’s claim, but after the Court of Appeals mandate the superior court entered a foreclosure judgment and awarded the association only post-bankruptcy attorney fees and costs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

North Canyon Ranch Owners Association (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that sought to collect assessments, fees, costs, and foreclosure relief.
Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
Counsel of record for North Canyon Ranch Owners Association.

Respondent Side

Pamela J. Allen (Defendant)
Homeowner defendant who contested collectability of the association's claimed arrearages after bankruptcy.
Bank of America National Association (Defendant)
Lienholder defendant named in the foreclosure action.
First National of Nebraska Inc. (Defendant)
Lienholder defendant named in the foreclosure action.
First International of Nebraska Inc. (Defendant)
Lienholder defendant named in the foreclosure action.
Dennis Brookshire (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Pamela Allen.

Neutral Parties

David K. Udall (Judge)
Superior Court judge who issued the 2016 summary-judgment and post-trial rulings.
Janice K. Crawford (Judge)
Superior Court judge who handled the post-mandate fee/cost ruling and foreclosure judgment entry.

What happened

North Canyon Ranch sued a homeowner and lienholders in a collection and foreclosure case. The collected record shows that the dispute centered on association assessments, fees, costs, liens, bankruptcy discharge, and whether earlier justice-court proceedings prevented the association from collecting old amounts.

In April 2016, the court denied the association’s motion for summary judgment. The ruling found genuine issues of material fact regarding the collectability of past arrearages, so the case proceeded to a bench trial.

After trial in November 2016, the court dismissed the association’s case with prejudice. The court found that the homeowner had filed bankruptcy, that earlier debts no longer existed after discharge, that a prior justice-court matter had resolved earlier claims, that res judicata barred collection of fees, costs, or fines associated with that justice-court matter, that 11 U.S.C. § 524 prohibited collection of discharged personal debt, and that the association had not met its burden of proof.

The later entries show the case changed after appeal. In March 2019, the superior court received a Court of Appeals mandate awarding the association costs and attorney fees and ordered a proposed order consistent with that mandate. The collected minute entries do not include the full appellate memorandum decision, so this page does not summarize the appellate reasoning.

On April 24, 2019, the court awarded the association $22,865 in reasonable attorney fees and $1,170.63 in costs. The court limited recovery to fees and costs incurred after the homeowner’s bankruptcy filing, rejected pre-bankruptcy amounts, and noted that a judgment of foreclosure was filed at the same time.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen (CV2014-097453 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). After appeal, the HOA received foreclosure judgment and post-bankruptcy fees; pre-bankruptcy amounts were excluded. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-04-12 The court denies the association's summary-judgment motion because factual issues remain about collectability of past arrearages.

Step 2016-11-14 The court holds a bench trial, receives evidence, hears testimony, and takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2016-11-28 Post-trial ruling dismisses the association's case with prejudice based on bankruptcy discharge, prior justice-court proceedings, res judicata, and failure of proof.

Step 2017-02-13 The court enters judgment against the association and separately denies the association's motion for new trial.

Step 2017-04-25 The court sets a supersedeas bond amount after the association seeks a stay pending appeal.

Step 2017-05-15 The court enters an amended final judgment against the association under Rule 54(c).

Type: Court order/minute entry

Post-mandate ruling requiring the association to submit a proposed order consistent with the Court of Appeals mandate awarding costs and attorney fees.

Download source file

2019-03-05_018_ruling.pdf

Source 19 2019-04-24

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Post-mandate order awarding North Canyon Ranch $22,865 in attorney fees and $1,170.63 in costs incurred after the bankruptcy filing, and noting entry of a foreclosure judgment.

Download source file

2019-04-24_019_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Did North Canyon Ranch win at trial?

No. The November 2016 superior-court ruling dismissed the association’s case with prejudice after a bench trial.

Why was the trial ruling against the association?

The court found that earlier debts no longer existed after bankruptcy discharge, that a prior justice-court matter had resolved earlier claims, that res judicata barred collection of related fees, costs, or fines, and that the association had not met its burden of proof.

What changed after appeal?

The collected superior-court entries state that the Court of Appeals mandate awarded the association costs and attorney fees. After remand, the superior court entered a foreclosure judgment and awarded post-bankruptcy fees and costs.

What fees and costs did the court award after remand?

The April 2019 order awarded $22,865 in reasonable attorney fees and $1,170.63 in costs, but limited the award to amounts incurred after the homeowner’s bankruptcy filing.

Does this page summarize the Court of Appeals reasoning?

No. The superior-court minute entries reference the appellate memorandum decision and mandate, but the collected minute-entry text does not include the appellate opinion. This page reports only the appellate result reflected in the superior-court record.

Why is the case marked standard rather than must-read?

The case is HOA-relevant and useful for bankruptcy-overlap collection issues, but the collected superior-court entries do not provide broad Title 33 or CC&R interpretation. The final result is case-specific and partly depends on an appellate decision not included in the minute-entry text.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2014-097453 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 24, 2019
Judge / panel	Hon. David K. Udall, Hon. Janice K. Crawford
Parties	North Canyon Ranch Owners Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Pamela J. Allen (Defendant, homeowner), Bank of America National Association, First National of Nebraska Inc., and First International of Nebraska Inc.
Governing law	11 U.S.C. § 524 A.R.S. § 12-332 Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Rule 56, Ariz. R. Civ. P.
Topics	AssessmentsLiensForeclosureAttorney FeesCC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding	After remand from the Court of Appeals, the superior court entered a judgment of foreclosure for North Canyon Ranch Owners Association and awarded the association $22,865 in reasonable attorney fees and $1,170.63 in costs, limited to amounts incurred after the homeowner's bankruptcy filing.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package	19 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	8 roadmap entries
Video overview	North Canyon Ranch Owners Association v. Allen
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Featured download links	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

North Canyon Ranch Owners Association sued a homeowner and lienholders over unpaid assessments and foreclosure. The superior court first denied the association's summary-judgment motion, then after a bench trial dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that pre-bankruptcy debts were discharged or resolved and that post-bankruptcy obligations were current. Later entries show a Court of Appeals mandate in favor of the association, an order for the association to submit a mandate-consistent order, and a 2019 judgment of foreclosure with post-bankruptcy attorney fees and costs awarded to the association.

Key Issues & Findings

The superior-court record has two stages. In April 2016, the court denied the association's summary-judgment motion because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding collectability of past arrearages. After a November 2016 bench trial, the same judge dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that pre-bankruptcy debts no longer existed after discharge, that a prior justice-court matter had resolved earlier claims, that res judicata barred collection of fees, costs, or fines associated with that justice-court matter, and that 11 U.S.C. § 524 prohibited collection of discharged personal debt.

The later minute entries show that the case did not end there. In March 2019, the superior court received a Court of Appeals mandate awarding the association costs and attorney fees and ordered the association to submit a proposed order consistent with the mandate. The collected minute entries do not include the appellate memorandum decision itself, so this draft describes the appellate result only at the level shown in the superior-court entries.

On April 24, 2019, the superior court reviewed the post-mandate fee and cost submissions, the earlier summary-judgment and new-trial rulings, and the Court of Appeals memorandum decision. It awarded the association reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred after the homeowner's bankruptcy filing, rejected pre-bankruptcy fees and costs, and noted that a judgment of foreclosure was filed contemporaneously with the order.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for HOA collection files that overlap with bankruptcy, but it should be read carefully. The trial court initially treated bankruptcy discharge, prior justice-court proceedings, and res judicata as defeating the association's collection case; later post-appeal entries show the association obtained foreclosure and a limited post-bankruptcy fee/cost award.

The practical point is not a broad new HOA rule. The minute-entry record shows the importance of segregating pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy fees and costs, and of being precise about which debts remain collectible after a homeowner bankruptcy. Because the appellate memorandum decision is not included in the collected minute-entry text, this draft does not infer appellate reasoning beyond the superior-court entries showing the mandate and final foreclosure judgment.

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