Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Litigation | Mandatory Counterclaims | CV2025-060700

This case shows the procedural risk of filing a separate lawsuit over HOA foreclosure and assessment issues while another case about the same property and assessments is already pending: the court dismissed the separate action because the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in the earlier assessment case.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-02-10. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the December 16, 2025 litigation-privilege ruling and the February 2, 2026 dismissal ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with denial of a motion to vacate dismissal; they also note a separate pending case, CV2023-013780, involving the same property and assessments. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A homeowner who is already litigating unpaid assessments cannot safely split related foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy, or de-annexation theories into a new lawsuit. The court dismissed this separate case because the subject matter was a mandatory counterclaim in the pending assessment case involving the same property and assessments. The court also protected the association’s lawyers with the litigation privilege for acts in the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steve Pandi (Plaintiff)
    Self-represented homeowner plaintiff who filed the separate action and multiple emergency, sanctions, and post-dismissal motions.

Respondent Side

  • Crown Point Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. The dismissal ruling states that a separate case was already pending in which the association sought to recover unpaid assessments involving the same property and assessments.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Counsel)
    Attorney defendant; the court held the claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they acted in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association.
  • Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendant)
    Law firm defendant dismissed under the litigation privilege.
  • Joseph A. Brophy (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Crown Point Homeowners Association in later minute entries.
  • Wm Michael Yohler (Counsel)
    Counsel name appearing for defendants in earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the TRO, sanctions, litigation-privilege, dismissal, and post-dismissal rulings.
  • Richard Albrecht (Commissioner)
    Commissioner identified for any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after the plaintiff sought default against the association.

What happened

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. The January 22, 2026 minute entry identifies the attempted amended pleading as asserting fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court later stated that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking to recover unpaid assessments there.

The first ruling denied Pandi’s emergency request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Judge Michael J. Herrod wrote that the request was based on a damages complaint, asked the court to order the defendants to stop doing things the plaintiff said were bad, and did not seek equitable relief. The court later quashed the related order to show cause and denied another emergency TRO request.

The court dismissed Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. on December 16, 2025. It held that Pandi’s claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court also found the fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were outside the superior court’s jurisdiction. Crown Point’s joinder in that motion was denied because many defenses did not apply to the association, but the court gave Crown Point leave to file its own dismissal motion.

January 2026 brought several procedural rulings. The court denied sanctions motions against Mulcahy, the firm, Crown Point, and a nonparty; denied a motion to strike bankruptcy assertions; denied a third TRO application because Pandi could not identify an actor for the alleged vandalism; denied a motion to strike or file a sur-reply; struck a first amended complaint filed without leave; and denied discovery and deadline motions while Crown Point’s dismissal motion was pending.

On February 2, 2026, the court granted Crown Point Homeowners Association’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court found that Pandi had a pending case involving the same property and same assessments, that the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments in that case, and that the subject matter of this separate action was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised there. Because no defendants remained, the court dismissed the matter in its entirety and deemed all pending motions moot. It later denied a sanctions motion and a motion to vacate the dismissal.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (CV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Separate HOA foreclosure claims were dismissed as mandatory counterclaims in a pending assessment case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

2025-12-01

The court summarily denies Pandi's emergency TRO/preliminary-injunction motion because it does not seek equitable relief.

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2025-12-16

The court dismisses Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege and allows Crown Point to file its own dismissal motion.

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2026-01-13

The court denies sanctions against Crown Point, noting no substantive ruling yet supported sanctions and service was improper.

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2026-01-22

The court denies a third TRO request, denies a strike/sur-reply motion, and strikes the first amended complaint filed without leave.

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2026-02-02

The court grants Crown Point's motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in pending case CV2023-013780 involving the same property and assessments.

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2026-02-10

The court denies Pandi's motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

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Complete source-document index

This index contains 14 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2025-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling summarily denying Steve Pandi's emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because the motion did not seek equitable relief.

Download source file
Source 2 2025-12-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2025-12-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege while denying Crown Point Homeowners Association's joinder and allowing it to file its own motion to dismiss.

Download source file
Source 4 2026-01-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling quashing the order to show cause and denying Steve Pandi's December 10, 2025 emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Download source file
Source 5 2026-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. as procedurally improper, unsupported, and legally deficient.

Download source file
Source 6 2026-01-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's sanctions motion against Crown Point Homeowners Association because no substantive ruling supported sanctions and service was improper.

Download source file
Source 7 2026-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to strike Crown Point Homeowners Association's bankruptcy assertions for the reasons stated in the association's response.

Download source file
Source 8 2026-01-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to deem a nonparty's nonresponse consent to sanctions because the sanctions motion was not properly served and the person was not a party.

Download source file
Source 9 2026-01-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's third application for temporary restraining order, denying his motion to strike or seek leave for a sur-reply, and striking his first amended complaint filed without leave.

Download source file
Source 10 2026-01-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to compel as premature while Crown Point Homeowners Association's motion to dismiss was pending and denying his request to maintain existing deadlines.

Download source file
Source 11 2026-01-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2026-02-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Crown Point Homeowners Association's Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in the pending unpaid-assessments case involving the same property and assessments.

Download source file
Source 13 2026-02-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's post-dismissal sanctions motion against the defendants and defense counsel because the matter had been dismissed.

Download source file
Source 14 2026-02-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Download source file

FAQ

Why did the court dismiss the claims against the HOA lawyers?

The court held the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. were barred by the litigation privilege because the Mulcahy defendants were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. It also found the fraud allegations lacked specificity and bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction.

Why did the court dismiss the claims against Crown Point Homeowners Association?

The court found that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking unpaid assessments there. The subject matter of this separate lawsuit was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in that pending case.

Did the court decide whether the HOA foreclosure or assessment allegations were true?

No. The January 13, 2026 sanctions ruling expressly said no motion for summary judgment had been filed by the plaintiff or granted on any factual issue, and the February 2 dismissal rested on the mandatory-counterclaim problem rather than merits findings on foreclosure or assessment liability.

What happened to the TRO requests?

The court denied repeated emergency TRO or preliminary-injunction requests. It said the first request did not seek equitable relief, later quashed an order to show cause, and denied the third TRO request because the plaintiff could not identify an actor who committed the alleged vandalism.

What is the practical lesson for homeowners?

If an HOA has an active lawsuit over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related claims about foreclosure, fraud, or association status may need to be raised as counterclaims in that case. Filing a separate lawsuit can lead to dismissal without a merits ruling.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is useful primarily as a procedural example of litigation privilege and mandatory-counterclaim treatment in an HOA assessment dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 2, 2026
Judge / panelHon. Michael J. Herrod
PartiesSteve Pandi (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendants)
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureLiensProcedureFDCPABankruptcy
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the separate lawsuit against Crown Point Homeowners Association because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in a pending case involving the same property and assessments, and it dismissed the association's lawyers under the litigation privilege for acts within the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package14 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewSteve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. over alleged fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court denied repeated emergency TRO requests and sanctions motions. It dismissed the Mulcahy defendants because the litigation privilege protected acts taken in the course and scope of representing Crown Point, because fraud was not pleaded with specificity, and because bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction. The court then granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and assessments, so the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in that assessment case.

Key Issues & Findings

For the lawyer defendants, the court held that the litigation privilege barred claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. because they were acting in the course and scope of their representation of Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court added that fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were not within superior-court jurisdiction.

For the association, the court focused on claim splitting. It found that Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and the same assessments, CV2023-013780, where the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments. The subject matter of the new case therefore was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in the pending assessment case. The court granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed the matter in its entirety because no defendants remained, and later denied post-dismissal sanctions and relief-from-judgment motions.

Why It Matters

This case is a procedural caution for HOA assessment litigation. When an association has already sued over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related homeowner theories about foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy effects, or association status may have to be raised in that action as counterclaims. A separate lawsuit can be dismissed before the court reaches the merits.

The case also illustrates how the litigation privilege can protect HOA collection counsel for conduct within the representation, even when the homeowner names the lawyer and law firm as defendants. It is standard rather than must-read because it does not interpret Title 33 or a declaration provision on the merits; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor: HOA Court Case Guide

Bankruptcy & Assessments | 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)

In this 2011 published decision, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor stays personally liable for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them—for as long as the debtor retains title, because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title.

Federal court | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) | Decided 2011-05-26

Scope note: This educational page summarizes In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor, a Federal court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

Source note: The full opinion text is hosted below as a downloadable source file, and the page also links the official public citation.

This federal bankruptcy authority was issued by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona.

The takeaway

Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Shawn Burgueno (Debtor)
    Individual Chapter 11 debtor and record owner of the Scottsdale condominium; moved to have the associations' post-petition claims limited to their allowed pre-petition amounts under the confirmed plan; motion denied.
  • D. Lamar Hawkins (Counsel)
    Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi PC
    Counsel for the debtor, Shawn Burgueno; the only attorney named in the published opinion.

Respondent Side

  • Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association (Creditor)
    Condominium association that continued to bill the debtor for post-petition assessments; argued the plan could not discharge those assessments while the debtor held title. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.
  • Grayhawk Community Association (Creditor)
    Master community association that likewise sought post-petition assessments and collection attorneys' fees. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.

Neutral Parties

  • Randolph J. Haines (Judge)
    United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Arizona; authored the Opinion and Order denying discharge of the post-petition HOA fees and attorneys' fees.

What happened

Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer, filed an individual Chapter 11 case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona in 2009. His scheduled assets included his home, a vacant lot, and five single-family residential investment properties; according to his schedules, all of the investment properties were worth less than the debts secured by them. One investment property was a condominium in Scottsdale, subject to assessments by two associations—the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association.

In February 2010, Burgueno stipulated with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank could immediately foreclose on the condominium. The stipulation terminated the § 362 automatic stay as to the bank’s interest in the property and waived the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3). The bankruptcy court approved the stipulation on March 8, 2010.

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. The order confirming the plan expressly incorporated the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the bank’s claim regarding the Scottsdale condominium.

Despite obtaining stay relief, Wells Fargo did not conduct a foreclosure or trustee’s sale of the condominium for more than a year. In the meantime, the two associations continued to bill Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which totaled roughly $8,000 by April 2011.

In April 2011, Burgueno filed motions seeking orders determining that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and therefore limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. The associations responded that the plan neither did nor could discharge their post-petition assessments so long as Burgueno held legal title, and that neither the stipulated stay relief nor the plan confirmation terminated that title.

On May 26, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. He held the post-petition assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d) for as long as Burgueno retained a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the unit. Because the associations had not requested a money judgment and the dispute was a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing. For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

Video overview of the case record

AI-generated video overview of In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor. This is a bankruptcy assessment-liability authority. The written opinion and linked source note control.

The written case page and linked court records are the controlling source for legal posture and accuracy.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

AI-generated audio deep dive for In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor. This is a bankruptcy assessment-liability authority. The written opinion and linked source note control.

Use the linked court records and written page for the exact legal posture.

Audio overview generated from the case record; verify against the linked court records.

Litigation record

Step 1 2009

Shawn Burgueno files an individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the District of Arizona; his assets include a Scottsdale condominium subject to two associations' assessments.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2010-02-16

Burgueno stipulates with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank can foreclose on the condominium, waiving the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2010-03-08

The bankruptcy court approves the Wells Fargo stay-relief stipulation.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2010-08-31

Burgueno's Chapter 11 plan is confirmed; the confirmation order incorporates the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the condominium claim.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2011-04

Wells Fargo still has not foreclosed; post-petition assessments total roughly $8,000. Burgueno moves to have the associations' claims deemed controlled by the confirmed plan and limited to their pre-petition amounts.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2011-05-26

Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denies the motion, holding the post-petition assessments and collection attorneys' fees nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Download source

Complete source-document index

This index contains 0 PDFs, 1 other source file from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2011-05-26

Courtlistener Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

FAQ

What did In re Burgueno decide?

The bankruptcy court held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor’s personal liability for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—remains nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of the debtor’s plan ended that liability, so the court denied the debtor’s motion to limit the associations to their pre-petition claims.

What is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)?

Section 523(a)(16) is a bankruptcy discharge exception for homeowner- and condominium-association fees and assessments. Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments it applied only while the debtor occupied the property, but the amendment expanded it so that it applies regardless of possession as long as the debtor or the trustee retains a legal or equitable ownership interest in the unit. The exception covers not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” which the court read to include collection attorneys’ fees.

Why didn't stay relief or plan confirmation end the debtor's liability for HOA fees?

The court explained that nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates post-petition liability when a debtor obtains stay relief or confirms a plan, because neither event transfers legal title. Stay relief may signal that the debtor has surrendered possession, but the debtor remained the record owner of the condominium. As long as the debtor holds title, post-petition assessments continue to accrue as nondischargeable obligations.

Are an association's attorneys' fees for collecting assessments also nondischargeable?

Yes. The court held that attorneys’ fees the associations incurred collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16). The CC&Rs—which Arizona treats as a contract—expressly provided for collection fees, and even a narrow reading of the discharge exception could not exclude attorneys’ fees. The court relied on Ninth Circuit BAP and Seventh Circuit authority reaching the same conclusion.

How could the debtor have stopped the post-petition assessments from accruing?

The court explained that to end the liability the debtor would have had to transfer legal title rather than wait for the lender to foreclose. Options included conveying the unit by quit-claim deed—an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and court order under § 363(b)(1)—or transferring title through the plan under § 1123(a)(5)(B). Until title actually passed, the nondischargeable liability continued.

Is this decision binding precedent?

It is a published, precedential decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)), authored by Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines. As a trial-level bankruptcy opinion it binds the parties and is persuasive, frequently cited authority on the post-petition, nondischargeable nature of HOA and condominium assessments; it is not an appellate decision, so other courts are not strictly bound by it.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)
Court / tribunalFederal Court
Decision / key dateMay 26, 2011
Judge / panelHaines
PartiesEdge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and Grayhawk Community Association (Creditors/Respondents) v. Shawn Burgueno (Debtor/Movant)
Governing law
  • 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (incl. (a), (d)(2), (d)(5))
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)
  • 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B)
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (attorneys' fees)
  • A.R.S. § 33-401(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-402 (quit-claim deed)
  • Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3)
  • Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6)
Topics
BankruptcyLiensAssessmentsAttorney FeesCC&RsForeclosure
Outcome / holding

Post-petition homeowners' and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys' fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys' fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable "fee" within § 523(a)(16).

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 other source file
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewIn re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor – 451 B.R. 1
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In re Burgueno arose from the individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer whose properties included a Scottsdale condominium subject to assessments by two associations, the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association. In February 2010 Burgueno stipulated to relief from the automatic stay so that Wells Fargo Bank could foreclose on the condominium, and his Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. Wells Fargo, however, did not foreclose for more than a year, and during that time the two associations kept billing Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which reached roughly $8,000 by April 2011. Burgueno moved for orders declaring that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. Applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) as expanded by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, the court held that an individual debtor's personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association fees continues after the bankruptcy filing for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title, Burgueno remained personally liable until title actually passed—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer of title. The court further held that the attorneys' fees the associations incurred in collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable "fee" under § 523(a)(16), supported both by the CC&Rs (a contract under Arizona law) and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because the associations sought no money judgment and this was not an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor's motion to compel plan compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the plain language of § 523(a)(16). Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments the exception applied only when the debtor occupied the property; as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel explained in In re Foster, the amendment expanded the exception so it applies regardless of possession, so long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates that post-petition liability upon stay relief or plan confirmation.

The court acknowledged that post-petition, pre-confirmation fees are administrative expenses that § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires be paid in full on the effective date, but that plan treatment did not apply here because the associations filed neither a proof of claim nor an application for allowance of an administrative expense; and § 1141(d)(2) makes clear that individual Chapter 11 debtors are not discharged from debts excepted under § 523. Had the plan expressly discharged the post-petition fees and the associations failed to object despite adequate notice, that provision would be res judicata under the Supreme Court's decision in Espinosa—but this plan did not so provide, and the court cautioned that the "specter" of Rule 11 penalties should deter bad-faith attempts to discharge otherwise nondischargeable debts by such an ambush.

The core problem was that the bank failed to foreclose for more than a year after obtaining stay relief—an increasingly frequent occurrence. While stay relief may signal the debtor's surrender of possession, surrender does not terminate legal title; following the Massachusetts bankruptcy court in In re Ames, the court held that post-petition assessments remain nondischargeable while the debtor remains the record owner. To end the liability, the debtor would have to convey title—by quit-claim deed (an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and order under § 363(b)(1)) or by a plan transfer of title under § 1123(a)(5)(B).

On attorneys' fees, the court noted that Arizona treats the CC&Rs as a contract (Pinetop Lakes Ass'n v. Hatch), and that while A.R.S. § 12-341.01 might not apply because the contract was not the central issue in the litigation, the CC&Rs themselves expressly provided for collection fees. Moreover, § 523(a)(16) excepts not only "assessments" but also "a fee," and even a narrow construction of the exception cannot exclude attorneys' fees; the Ninth Circuit BAP (Foster) and the Seventh Circuit (In re Busson-Sokolik) reached the same conclusion. The court therefore held the fees nondischargeable but declined to enter a money judgment, because the associations had not requested one and the matter was a contested motion rather than an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6).

Why It Matters

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor's personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys' fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing.

For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about "surrendering" investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

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