In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Bankruptcy & Assessments | 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)

In this 2011 published decision, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor stays personally liable for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them—for as long as the debtor retains title, because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title.

Federal court | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) | Decided 2011-05-26

Read the source opinion FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor, a Federal court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

Source note: The page keeps the public source URL but does not provide a local ruling PDF because no source PDF passed the file gate.

This federal bankruptcy authority was issued by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona.

The takeaway

Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Shawn Burgueno (Debtor)
Individual Chapter 11 debtor and record owner of the Scottsdale condominium; moved to have the associations’ post-petition claims limited to their allowed pre-petition amounts under the confirmed plan; motion denied.
D. Lamar Hawkins (Counsel)
Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi PC
Counsel for the debtor, Shawn Burgueno; the only attorney named in the published opinion.

Respondent Side

Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association (Creditor)
Condominium association that continued to bill the debtor for post-petition assessments; argued the plan could not discharge those assessments while the debtor held title. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.
Grayhawk Community Association (Creditor)
Master community association that likewise sought post-petition assessments and collection attorneys’ fees. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.

Neutral Parties

Randolph J. Haines (Judge)
United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Arizona; authored the Opinion and Order denying discharge of the post-petition HOA fees and attorneys’ fees.

What happened

Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer, filed an individual Chapter 11 case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona in 2009. His scheduled assets included his home, a vacant lot, and five single-family residential investment properties; according to his schedules, all of the investment properties were worth less than the debts secured by them. One investment property was a condominium in Scottsdale, subject to assessments by two associations—the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association.

In February 2010, Burgueno stipulated with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank could immediately foreclose on the condominium. The stipulation terminated the § 362 automatic stay as to the bank’s interest in the property and waived the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3). The bankruptcy court approved the stipulation on March 8, 2010.

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. The order confirming the plan expressly incorporated the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the bank’s claim regarding the Scottsdale condominium.

Despite obtaining stay relief, Wells Fargo did not conduct a foreclosure or trustee’s sale of the condominium for more than a year. In the meantime, the two associations continued to bill Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which totaled roughly $8,000 by April 2011.

In April 2011, Burgueno filed motions seeking orders determining that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and therefore limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. The associations responded that the plan neither did nor could discharge their post-petition assessments so long as Burgueno held legal title, and that neither the stipulated stay relief nor the plan confirmation terminated that title.

On May 26, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. He held the post-petition assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d) for as long as Burgueno retained a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the unit. Because the associations had not requested a money judgment and the dispute was a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing. For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

Litigation record

Step 1 2009

Shawn Burgueno files an individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the District of Arizona; his assets include a Scottsdale condominium subject to two associations’ assessments.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2010-02-16

Burgueno stipulates with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank can foreclose on the condominium, waiving the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2010-03-08

The bankruptcy court approves the Wells Fargo stay-relief stipulation.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2010-08-31

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan is confirmed; the confirmation order incorporates the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the condominium claim.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2011-04

Wells Fargo still has not foreclosed; post-petition assessments total roughly $8,000. Burgueno moves to have the associations’ claims deemed controlled by the confirmed plan and limited to their pre-petition amounts.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2011-05-26

Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denies the motion, holding the post-petition assessments and collection attorneys’ fees nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

FAQ

What did In re Burgueno decide?

The bankruptcy court held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor’s personal liability for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—remains nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of the debtor’s plan ended that liability, so the court denied the debtor’s motion to limit the associations to their pre-petition claims.

What is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)?

Section 523(a)(16) is a bankruptcy discharge exception for homeowner- and condominium-association fees and assessments. Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments it applied only while the debtor occupied the property, but the amendment expanded it so that it applies regardless of possession as long as the debtor or the trustee retains a legal or equitable ownership interest in the unit. The exception covers not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” which the court read to include collection attorneys’ fees.

Why didn’t stay relief or plan confirmation end the debtor’s liability for HOA fees?

The court explained that nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates post-petition liability when a debtor obtains stay relief or confirms a plan, because neither event transfers legal title. Stay relief may signal that the debtor has surrendered possession, but the debtor remained the record owner of the condominium. As long as the debtor holds title, post-petition assessments continue to accrue as nondischargeable obligations.

Are an association’s attorneys’ fees for collecting assessments also nondischargeable?

Yes. The court held that attorneys’ fees the associations incurred collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16). The CC&Rs—which Arizona treats as a contract—expressly provided for collection fees, and even a narrow reading of the discharge exception could not exclude attorneys’ fees. The court relied on Ninth Circuit BAP and Seventh Circuit authority reaching the same conclusion.

How could the debtor have stopped the post-petition assessments from accruing?

The court explained that to end the liability the debtor would have had to transfer legal title rather than wait for the lender to foreclose. Options included conveying the unit by quit-claim deed—an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and court order under § 363(b)(1)—or transferring title through the plan under § 1123(a)(5)(B). Until title actually passed, the nondischargeable liability continued.

Is this decision binding precedent?

It is a published, precedential decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)), authored by Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines. As a trial-level bankruptcy opinion it binds the parties and is persuasive, frequently cited authority on the post-petition, nondischargeable nature of HOA and condominium assessments; it is not an appellate decision, so other courts are not strictly bound by it.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	May 26, 2011
Judge / panel	Haines
Parties	Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and Grayhawk Community Association (Creditors/Respondents) v. Shawn Burgueno (Debtor/Movant)
Governing law	11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (incl. (a), (d)(2), (d)(5)) 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay) 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B) A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (attorneys’ fees) A.R.S. § 33-401(B) A.R.S. § 33-402 (quit-claim deed) Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6)
Topics	bankruptcyliensassessmentsattorneys-feescc-and-rsforeclosure
Outcome / holding	Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	No raw source-folder files found for this slug
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In re Burgueno arose from the individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer whose properties included a Scottsdale condominium subject to assessments by two associations, the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association. In February 2010 Burgueno stipulated to relief from the automatic stay so that Wells Fargo Bank could foreclose on the condominium, and his Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. Wells Fargo, however, did not foreclose for more than a year, and during that time the two associations kept billing Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which reached roughly $8,000 by April 2011. Burgueno moved for orders declaring that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. Applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) as expanded by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, the court held that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association fees continues after the bankruptcy filing for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title, Burgueno remained personally liable until title actually passed—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer of title. The court further held that the attorneys’ fees the associations incurred in collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16), supported both by the CC&Rs (a contract under Arizona law) and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because the associations sought no money judgment and this was not an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the plain language of § 523(a)(16). Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments the exception applied only when the debtor occupied the property; as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel explained in In re Foster, the amendment expanded the exception so it applies regardless of possession, so long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates that post-petition liability upon stay relief or plan confirmation.

The court acknowledged that post-petition, pre-confirmation fees are administrative expenses that § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires be paid in full on the effective date, but that plan treatment did not apply here because the associations filed neither a proof of claim nor an application for allowance of an administrative expense; and § 1141(d)(2) makes clear that individual Chapter 11 debtors are not discharged from debts excepted under § 523. Had the plan expressly discharged the post-petition fees and the associations failed to object despite adequate notice, that provision would be res judicata under the Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa—but this plan did not so provide, and the court cautioned that the “specter” of Rule 11 penalties should deter bad-faith attempts to discharge otherwise nondischargeable debts by such an ambush.

The core problem was that the bank failed to foreclose for more than a year after obtaining stay relief—an increasingly frequent occurrence. While stay relief may signal the debtor’s surrender of possession, surrender does not terminate legal title; following the Massachusetts bankruptcy court in In re Ames, the court held that post-petition assessments remain nondischargeable while the debtor remains the record owner. To end the liability, the debtor would have to convey title—by quit-claim deed (an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and order under § 363(b)(1)) or by a plan transfer of title under § 1123(a)(5)(B).

On attorneys’ fees, the court noted that Arizona treats the CC&Rs as a contract (Pinetop Lakes Ass’n v. Hatch), and that while A.R.S. § 12-341.01 might not apply because the contract was not the central issue in the litigation, the CC&Rs themselves expressly provided for collection fees. Moreover, § 523(a)(16) excepts not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” and even a narrow construction of the exception cannot exclude attorneys’ fees; the Ninth Circuit BAP (Foster) and the Seventh Circuit (In re Busson-Sokolik) reached the same conclusion. The court therefore held the fees nondischargeable but declined to enter a money judgment, because the associations had not requested one and the matter was a contested motion rather than an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6).

Why It Matters

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing.

For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

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Six v. IQ Data International, Inc.: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

FDCPA / Article III Standing

A single unwanted debt-collection letter to a consumer known to be represented by counsel is a concrete injury — the Ninth Circuit reverses a District of Arizona dismissal and splits with the Seventh Circuit.

Federal court | 129 F.4th 630 (9th Cir. 2025) | Decided 2025-02-24

Download the ruling PDF FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes Six v. IQ Data International, Inc., a Federal court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

The Ninth Circuit opinion involved Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen as counsel for IQ Data, in a federal FDCPA standing dispute.

The takeaway

A consumer who receives a debt-collection communication sent in violation of FDCPA § 1692c(a)(2) — direct contact with a consumer the collector knows is represented by counsel — suffers a concrete, particularized, and actual injury (an invasion of privacy analogous to intrusion upon seclusion) that satisfies Article III standing. Receipt of even a single unwanted letter is sufficient at the pleading/jurisdiction stage. The district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is reversed and remanded.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Ryan Six (Plaintiff-Appellant)
Consumer who received the debt-collection letter after notifying IQ Data that he was represented by counsel; prevailed on standing and obtained reversal and remand.
Russell S. Thompson IV (Counsel)
Thompson Consumer Law Group PC
Argued for Plaintiff-Appellant Ryan Six (Scottsdale, Arizona).

Respondent Side

IQ Data International, Inc. (Defendant-Appellee)
Debt collector that acquired the residential-lease debt and mailed the verification letter directly to Six despite notice of representation.
Erin M. McManis (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
Argued for Defendant-Appellee IQ Data International, Inc.; Carpenter Hazlewood is a prominent Arizona HOA/community-association firm (now CHDB Law), Tempe, Arizona.
Ember A. Van Vranken (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
Argued for Defendant-Appellee IQ Data International, Inc.; Carpenter Hazlewood (now CHDB Law), Tempe, Arizona.
Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
On the briefs for Defendant-Appellee IQ Data International, Inc.; name partner at Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (now CHDB Law), Tempe, Arizona.

Neutral Parties

Roopali H. Desai (Judge)
Circuit Judge; authored the panel opinion.
Susan P. Graber (Judge)
Circuit Judge; member of the panel.
Ana de Alba (Judge)
Circuit Judge; member of the panel.
Michael T. Liburdi (Judge)
U.S. District Judge, District of Arizona; presided below and dismissed the action for lack of Article III standing (reversed on appeal).

What happened

IQ Data International, Inc. acquired a debt obligation stemming from Ryan Six’s purported breach of a residential lease. The dispute that reached the Ninth Circuit was not about whether Six owed the money, but about how IQ, as a debt collector, communicated with him after he retained a lawyer.

On August 18, 2021, Six mailed a letter to Equifax disputing the debt and requesting documentation. The same day, Six’s counsel mailed a letter directly to IQ, giving notice that Six was represented and that all correspondence should be sent to counsel rather than to Six.

On September 2, 2021, IQ received Six’s dispute letter and generated an internal request to produce and send the requested verification documentation to Six’s own mailing address. The next day, September 3, IQ updated its records to reflect that it had processed counsel’s letter and that direct communication with Six should cease — yet on that same day IQ mailed the debt-verification letter directly to Six.

After receiving the letter, Six sued IQ in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), which prohibits a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer it knows is represented by an attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The district court (Judge Michael T. Liburdi) dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that Six lacked Article III standing because he had not shown an injury in fact. The court reasoned that receiving a single unwanted letter was neither akin to a traditionally recognized harm nor the type of abusive practice the FDCPA was designed to prevent, and it denied the remaining summary-judgment arguments as moot.

On de novo review, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Desai, joined by Judges Graber and de Alba) reversed. It held that receipt of a letter sent in violation of § 1692c(a)(2) is a concrete, particularized, and actual injury — an invasion of privacy — sufficient for standing, and it rejected the Seventh Circuit’s contrary Pucillo reasoning as focused on degree rather than kind of harm.

The panel remanded for the district court to address the parties’ summary-judgment arguments in the first instance, expressly leaving open the affirmative defenses and a possible bona fide mistake defense. It noted that the short time between IQ processing counsel’s letter and mailing the disputed letter, together with Six’s own request that information be sent to him, raised serious questions about IQ’s ultimate liability. A separately filed memorandum disposition affirmed the district court’s discovery ruling and its modified attorneys’-fee award.

Six resolves an important standing question for consumer-protection litigation in the Ninth Circuit: a single unwanted written communication sent to a represented consumer can, by itself, be a concrete injury sufficient to sue in federal court. By anchoring the injury in Congress’s privacy findings and the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and by expressly declining to follow the Seventh Circuit’s mail-versus-text distinction from Pucillo, the panel makes clear that the relevant inquiry is the kind of harm, not its degree or the medium of delivery. That lowers the jurisdictional threshold for FDCPA plaintiffs and creates a circuit split that could draw further review. For Arizona community-association practitioners, the case is notable less for its subject matter — the underlying debt came from a residential lease, not an assessment lien, and no HOA is a party — than for who litigated it. The debt collector was represented on appeal by Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (now CHDB Law), a leading Arizona HOA/community-association firm. Because associations and their managing agents routinely collect delinquent assessments and often qualify as debt collectors, the decision is a practical reminder that once a homeowner is known to be represented by counsel, direct written contact — even a single verification letter — can expose a collector to FDCPA liability and confer standing to sue.

HOA relevance: the defendant was represented by Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, a community-association law firm, and the decision affects FDCPA standing in collection communications.

Litigation record

Step 1 2021-08-18

Six mails a letter to Equifax disputing the debt; the same day, Six’s counsel mails IQ Data notice that Six is represented and that all correspondence must go to counsel.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2021-09-02

IQ Data receives Six’s dispute letter and generates an internal request to send debt-verification documentation to Six’s mailing address.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2021-09-03

IQ updates its records to note that direct communication should cease — but on the same day mails the debt-verification letter directly to Six.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2022-02-04

Six files suit against IQ Data in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (No. 2:22-cv-00203-MTL) under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2024-05-17

Case argued and submitted before the Ninth Circuit panel in Phoenix, Arizona.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2025-02-24

Ninth Circuit files its published opinion reversing the dismissal and remanding; a separate memorandum disposition addresses discovery and attorneys’ fees.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Download source

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/six-v-iq-data-international/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-07-01

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What did the Ninth Circuit actually decide in Six v. IQ Data International?

The court held that a consumer who receives a letter sent in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s prohibition on contacting a represented consumer (15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2)) suffers a concrete, particularized, and actual injury — an invasion of privacy — that is sufficient for Article III standing. It reversed the District of Arizona’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and sent the case back for further proceedings.

Why did the district court dismiss the case, and why was that wrong?

The district court found that receiving one unwanted letter was not an injury in fact — not similar to a traditional legal harm and not the abusive practice the FDCPA targets. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that both Congress’s judgment in enacting the FDCPA and a close analogy to the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion show that an unwanted, unlawful communication is itself a concrete privacy harm, regardless of how few letters were sent.

Does a single letter really create standing, or do you need repeated contacts?

Under this decision, a single letter can be enough at the standing stage. The court explained that the number of communications goes to the degree of harm, not its kind, and that even one unwanted letter intrudes on the recipient’s privacy. It cautioned, however, that establishing standing to sue is different from ultimately proving liability, which remained for the district court on remand.

How is this case relevant to Arizona HOAs and community associations?

The dispute itself is not an HOA case — the debt came from a residential lease and no association is a party. Its relevance is twofold: the debt collector was represented by Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (now CHDB Law), a major Arizona community-association firm, and the ruling underscores that entities collecting debts — including associations and managers pursuing delinquent assessments — can face FDCPA exposure for contacting a homeowner directly once they know the homeowner is represented by counsel.

Does this ruling create a split with other federal courts of appeals?

Yes. The panel expressly declined to follow the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pucillo v. National Credit Systems, which had distinguished unwanted mail from unwanted texts and calls. The Ninth Circuit found that distinction improperly focused on the degree of intrusion rather than the kind of harm, creating a circuit split on whether an unwanted collection letter is a concrete injury.

What issues were left open for the district court on remand?

The Ninth Circuit resolved only standing. It left the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the affirmative defenses, and the potential ‘bona fide mistake’ defense for the district court to decide first. The panel even noted that the short time between IQ processing the attorney’s letter and mailing the disputed letter — and Six’s own request for information — raised serious questions about IQ’s ultimate liability. A separate memorandum disposition affirmed the discovery ruling and the modified attorneys’-fee award.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	129 F.4th 630 (9th Cir. 2025)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	February 24, 2025
Judge / panel	Susan P. Graber, Roopali H. Desai, Ana de Alba
Parties	Consumer Ryan Six (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. debt collector IQ Data International, Inc. (Defendant-Appellee), which was defended by the Arizona community-association law firm Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP.
Governing law	15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act — direct contact with a represented consumer) 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (FDCPA congressional findings on invasions of privacy) U.S. Const. art. III (standing / injury in fact)
Topics	fdcpaprocedureattorneys-fees
Outcome / holding	A consumer who receives a debt-collection communication sent in violation of FDCPA § 1692c(a)(2) — direct contact with a consumer the collector knows is represented by counsel — suffers a concrete, particularized, and actual injury (an invasion of privacy analogous to intrusion upon seclusion) that satisfies Article III standing. Receipt of even a single unwanted letter is sufficient at the pleading/jurisdiction stage. The district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is reversed and remanded.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Ryan Six sued debt collector IQ Data International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), which forbids a debt collector from communicating directly with a consumer it knows is represented by an attorney. IQ had acquired a debt arising from Six’s alleged breach of a residential lease. After Six’s counsel notified IQ in writing that all correspondence should be directed to the attorney, IQ nonetheless mailed a debt-verification letter directly to Six. The district court (Judge Michael T. Liburdi) dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing, reasoning that receiving one unwanted letter was not an injury in fact analogous to a traditionally recognized harm or to the abusive debt-collection practices the FDCPA targets. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Roopali H. Desai held that a consumer who receives a letter sent in violation of § 1692c(a)(2) suffers a concrete injury. Both Congress’s judgment in enacting the FDCPA — which found that abusive collection practices invade individual privacy — and a close common-law analogy to intrusion upon seclusion showed the unwanted communication was a concrete harm. The harm was also particularized and actual, not conjectural or a bare procedural violation. The panel rejected the Seventh Circuit’s contrary reasoning in Pucillo, explaining that it wrongly focused on the degree rather than the kind of harm. The court left the parties’ summary-judgment arguments, affirmative defenses, and a possible bona fide mistake defense for the district court on remand. A separately filed memorandum disposition addressed discovery and attorneys’ fees. Disposition: reversed and remanded.

Key Issues & Findings

Applying Spokeo and TransUnion, the panel asked whether Six’s alleged injury was concrete by weighing two factors: Congress’s judgment and a comparison to harms traditionally recognized at common law. On the first, Congress found in enacting the FDCPA that abusive debt-collection practices contribute to invasions of individual privacy (15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)) and specifically barred contacting a consumer known to be represented by counsel, so receipt of such a letter is exactly the privacy infringement Congress contemplated. On the second, unwanted communications bear a close relationship in kind to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion; following Ward and Van Patten, the court saw no meaningful difference between an unwanted phone call and an unwanted letter, and it rejected the Seventh Circuit’s Pucillo distinction as improperly turning on degree rather than kind. Because the letter was delivered directly to Six, the harm was particularized and actual — not conjectural or a bare procedural violation — and causation and redressability were undisputed, so Six had Article III standing.

Why It Matters

Six resolves an important standing question for consumer-protection litigation in the Ninth Circuit: a single unwanted written communication sent to a represented consumer can, by itself, be a concrete injury sufficient to sue in federal court. By anchoring the injury in Congress’s privacy findings and the common-law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and by expressly declining to follow the Seventh Circuit’s mail-versus-text distinction from Pucillo, the panel makes clear that the relevant inquiry is the kind of harm, not its degree or the medium of delivery. That lowers the jurisdictional threshold for FDCPA plaintiffs and creates a circuit split that could draw further review.

For Arizona community-association practitioners, the case is notable less for its subject matter — the underlying debt came from a residential lease, not an assessment lien, and no HOA is a party — than for who litigated it. The debt collector was represented on appeal by Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (now CHDB Law), a leading Arizona HOA/community-association firm. Because associations and their managing agents routinely collect delinquent assessments and often qualify as debt collectors, the decision is a practical reminder that once a homeowner is known to be represented by counsel, direct written contact — even a single verification letter — can expose a collector to FDCPA liability and confer standing to sue.

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Janis Wolf, Plaintiff, v. Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP, Defendant.: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

FCRA & HOA Assessments | 15 U.S.C. § 1681b | CV-20-00957-PHX-DLR

How a delinquent homeowner’s Fair Credit Reporting Act suit against her HOA’s collection law firm turned on whether the installment assessment was a voluntary credit transaction—and why the firm’s credit-report pull was permitted.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Janis Wolf, Plaintiff, v. Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP, Defendant.; No. CV-20-00957-PHX-DLR.

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

An HOA annual assessment payable in installments is a voluntary “credit transaction” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and a debt collector—here the HOA’s retained law firm—that obtains a delinquent homeowner’s credit report to locate her for a collection action has a permissible purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. Summary judgment was therefore granted for the defendant firm, and the putative class claims were denied as moot.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (Defendant)
HOA collection law firm retained by the Neely Farms HOA to collect Wolf’s unpaid assessments; prevailing party on summary judgment.
Janis Wolf (Plaintiff)
Homeowner in the Neely Farms subdivision who stopped paying HOA assessments; sued the firm under the FCRA individually and on behalf of a putative class.
Neely Farms HOA (Non-party (underlying HOA client))
The Neely Farms subdivision homeowners’ association that imposed the annual assessment under its CC&Rs and retained the defendant law firm to collect Wolf’s unpaid assessments; not a named party in this suit.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Janis Wolf. (The D. Ariz. order contains no counsel block; counsel sourced from public filings per record metadata.)
Thomas E. Raccuia (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff Janis Wolf. (Sourced from public filings; not listed in the D. Ariz. order.)
Ashley C. Hill (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff Janis Wolf. (Sourced from public filings; not listed in the D. Ariz. order.)
David M. Schultz (Counsel)
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
Counsel for Defendant Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP. (Sourced from public filings; not listed in the D. Ariz. order.)
Brett J. Larsen (Counsel)
Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
Counsel for Defendant Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP. (Sourced from public filings; not listed in the D. Ariz. order.)
Douglas L. Rayes (Judge)
United States District Judge, District of Arizona; authored the summary judgment order.

What happened and why it matters

Janis Wolf bought a home in the Neely Farms subdivision, which was subject to recorded Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) requiring homeowners to pay an annual HOA assessment in installments over the year. Before buying, Wolf read the CC&Rs “from cover to cover” and knew she would owe those assessments. In 2017 she stopped paying, and the Neely Farms HOA hired the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP to collect the unpaid assessments. In September 2019, before filing a justice-court collection action, the firm obtained Wolf’s credit report—without her consent—to confirm her current address. Wolf then sued the firm under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, individually and on behalf of a putative class, arguing the firm lacked a permissible purpose to pull her report. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (Judge Douglas L. Rayes) framed the case around two questions: whether the HOA assessment was a voluntary “credit transaction” under the FCRA, and whether there was a “direct link” between that transaction and the credit-report request. The court answered both yes. It held that the assessment involved deferred payment through installments and was voluntary—because Wolf freely chose to buy a home she knew was bound by the CC&Rs—and that the firm pulled the report to locate her for a collection suit. The court granted the firm summary judgment, denied Wolf’s class-certification and summary-judgment motions as moot, and directed entry of judgment terminating the case.

On the first question, the court noted that the definition of “credit transaction” under the FCRA was one of first impression. Because the FCRA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act share the same definition of “credit” (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(r)(5); 1691a(d)), and because the Ninth Circuit in Brothers v. First Leasing held that the hallmark of a credit transaction is deferred payment, the court applied Brothers. It found the assessment satisfied both required elements. First, deferred payment: the HOA sets the assessment on a yearly basis and homeowners pay it in installments over the year, which the court analogized to the installment lease in Brothers. The court rejected Wolf’s argument that “nothing is deferred,” reasoning that the annual imposition triggers the obligation and the installments defer payment, and that the HOA “regularly extends credit.” It distinguished Ollie v. Waypoint Homes (a residential lease with no grace period), noting the HOA arrangement was a consumer transaction that allowed a fifteen-day grace period. Second, voluntariness: debt collection is a permissible reason to pull a report only where the debt arose from a transaction in which the debtor voluntarily and directly sought credit (Pintos; Baron). Applying Arizona law that a buyer who accepts a deed with restrictions assents to them (Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser), the court found Wolf acted of her own accord: she liked the home, read the CC&Rs “from cover to cover,” knew she would owe assessments, and conceded no one forced her to buy. It distinguished involuntary debts such as police-initiated towing (Pintos) and court costs (Baron).

On the second question, the court found the direct-link requirement satisfied because it was undisputed that the firm obtained Wolf’s credit report to confirm her whereabouts before filing the justice-court collection action. Having answered both questions affirmatively, the court granted the firm’s motion for summary judgment, which mooted Wolf’s motions for class certification and summary judgment as well as the pending motions for leave to file supplemental briefing, and directed the clerk to enter judgment and terminate the case.

Because this is a federal district-court order, it is persuasive rather than binding authority. According to the case’s subsequent history reflected in the record metadata, the Ninth Circuit later affirmed (No. 22-15233, 2023) and Wolf filed a petition for certiorari (No. 23-109). The case illustrates the intersection of HOA assessment collection and federal consumer-credit law—relevant to owners weighing whether an HOA’s law firm may access their credit information during collection, and to boards and firms weighing the limits of the FCRA’s permissible-purpose provisions. Note that the specific statute at issue here is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, not the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, even though the dispute arises out of HOA debt collection.

Step-by-step litigation record

Before her purchase — Janis Wolf became interested in a home in the Neely Farms subdivision, learned it was within an HOA that imposed an annual assessment under recorded CC&Rs, and read the CC&Rs “from cover to cover” before deciding to buy.

Step 2017 Wolf stopped making payments on the Neely Farms HOA annual assessment.

The Neely Farms HOA retained the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP to collect the unpaid assessments.

Step 2019-09 The firm obtained Wolf’s credit report—without her consent—to learn her current address before filing a collection action.

Step 2019-10 The firm received a bill for a second credit inquiry on Wolf, which it said was for the same address-confirmation purpose (undisputed).

Step 2019-11 The firm filed a justice-court action against Wolf to collect the outstanding HOA debt.

Wolf sued the firm under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and moved for class certification; both parties later moved for summary judgment, and several motions for leave to file supplemental briefing were filed.

Step 2022-01-18 Judge Douglas L. Rayes granted the firm’s motion for summary judgment, denied Wolf’s motions for class certification and summary judgment as moot, and directed entry of judgment terminating the case (order filed January 19, 2022).

Step 2023-03-17 Per the case’s subsequent history in the record metadata, the Ninth Circuit affirmed (No. 22-15233); Wolf later filed a petition for certiorari (No. 23-109).

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Source 1 2022-01-18

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2022-01-18_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

Who won Wolf v. Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP?

The defendant law firm won. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted the firm’s motion for summary judgment and denied the homeowner’s motions for class certification and summary judgment as moot, directing entry of judgment terminating the case.

What was the case about?

The homeowner, Janis Wolf, sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act after the HOA’s collection law firm obtained her credit report without her consent to locate her before filing a collection action for unpaid Neely Farms HOA assessments. The core dispute was whether the firm had a permissible purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b to pull the report.

Why did the court find the HOA assessment was a “credit transaction”?

The court applied the Ninth Circuit’s Brothers v. First Leasing standard, under which the hallmark of a credit transaction is deferred payment. Because the annual assessment was payable in installments over the year, it involved deferred payment, and because Wolf voluntarily bought a home she knew was bound by the CC&Rs (Heritage Heights), the transaction was also voluntary.

Was the firm allowed to pull the credit report without consent?

Yes. The FCRA permits obtaining a report without consent for use in connection with collecting an account, provided there is a “direct link” between the credit transaction and the request. The court found that link because the firm undisputedly pulled the report to confirm Wolf’s whereabouts before filing a justice-court collection action.

Is this an FDCPA case?

No. Although the dispute arises from HOA assessment debt collection by the HOA’s law firm, the claim was brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, not the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The opinion never mentions the FDCPA.

Is this decision binding precedent?

No. It is a federal district-court summary judgment order, which is persuasive rather than binding. According to the case’s subsequent history in the record metadata, the Ninth Circuit later affirmed (No. 22-15233) and Wolf filed a petition for certiorari (No. 23-109).

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	No. CV-20-00957-PHX-DLR
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	January 18, 2022
Judge / panel	Douglas L. Rayes
Parties	Janis Wolf (Plaintiff) v. Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP (Defendant)
Governing law	15 U.S.C. § 1681b (FCRA permissible purpose) 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(r)(5) (FCRA definition of ‘credit’) 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(d) (ECOA definition of ‘credit’) Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
Topics	assessmentscc-and-rsprocedurefdcpa
Outcome / holding	An HOA annual assessment payable in installments is a voluntary “credit transaction” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and a debt collector—here the HOA’s retained law firm—that obtains a delinquent homeowner’s credit report to locate her for a collection action has a permissible purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. Summary judgment was therefore granted for the defendant firm, and the putative class claims were denied as moot.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Key Issues & Findings

The court framed the case around the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s permissible-purpose provision. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, a third party may obtain a consumer’s credit report without consent when it intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer and involving the extension of credit to, or the review or collection of an account of, the consumer. Courts have added a requirement that there be a “direct link” between the credit transaction and the collector’s request for the report (Baron v. Kirkorsky). The court therefore reduced the many pending motions to two questions: (1) whether the Neely Farms HOA assessment was a voluntary “credit transaction,” and (2) whether a direct link existed between that transaction and the firm’s request for Wolf’s report.

On the first question, the court noted that the definition of “credit transaction” under the FCRA was one of first impression. Because the FCRA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act share the same definition of “credit” (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(r)(5); 1691a(d)), and because the Ninth Circuit in Brothers v. First Leasing held that the hallmark of a credit transaction is deferred payment, the court applied Brothers. It found the assessment satisfied both required elements. First, deferred payment: the HOA sets the assessment on a yearly basis and homeowners pay it in installments over the year, which the court analogized to the installment lease in Brothers. The court rejected Wolf’s argument that “nothing is deferred,” reasoning that the annual imposition triggers the obligation and the installments defer payment, and that the HOA “regularly extends credit.” It distinguished Ollie v. Waypoint Homes (a residential lease with no grace period), noting the HOA arrangement was a consumer transaction that allowed a fifteen-day grace period. Second, voluntariness: debt collection is a permissible reason to pull a report only where the debt arose from a transaction in which the debtor voluntarily and directly sought credit (Pintos; Baron). Applying Arizona law that a buyer who accepts a deed with restrictions assents to them (Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser), the court found Wolf acted of her own accord: she liked the home, read the CC&Rs “from cover to cover,” knew she would owe assessments, and conceded no one forced her to buy. It distinguished involuntary debts such as police-initiated towing (Pintos) and court costs (Baron).

On the second question, the court found the direct-link requirement satisfied because it was undisputed that the firm obtained Wolf’s credit report to confirm her whereabouts before filing the justice-court collection action. Having answered both questions affirmatively, the court granted the firm’s motion for summary judgment, which mooted Wolf’s motions for class certification and summary judgment as well as the pending motions for leave to file supplemental briefing, and directed the clerk to enter judgment and terminate the case.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and HOAs, the decision addresses a recurring question: whether an HOA’s collection law firm may pull a delinquent owner’s credit report without consent. By treating the installment-based annual assessment as a voluntary “credit transaction,” the court gave collection firms a permissible-purpose basis under the FCRA to obtain credit reports in order to locate debtors. That conclusion rests on a first-impression reading of “credit transaction” that leans on the Ninth Circuit’s broad definition of credit in Brothers v. First Leasing and on the Arizona rule that a buyer who accepts a deed with recorded CC&Rs is bound by them (Heritage Heights).

Because this is a federal district-court order, it is persuasive rather than binding authority. According to the case’s subsequent history reflected in the record metadata, the Ninth Circuit later affirmed (No. 22-15233, 2023) and Wolf filed a petition for certiorari (No. 23-109). The case illustrates the intersection of HOA assessment collection and federal consumer-credit law—relevant to owners weighing whether an HOA’s law firm may access their credit information during collection, and to boards and firms weighing the limits of the FCRA’s permissible-purpose provisions. Note that the specific statute at issue here is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, not the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, even though the dispute arises out of HOA debt collection.

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McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

FDCPA | 15 U.S.C. § 1692e | 9th Cir. No. 15-17383 (893 F.3d 680)

The Ninth Circuit narrows Ho v. ReconTrust and confirms that collecting delinquent HOA assessments through Arizona’s judicial-foreclosure process is ‘debt collection’ subject to the FDCPA.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC; 893 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17383); D. Ariz. No. 2:14-cv-00869-PHX-DGC (David G. Campbell, District Judge).

Download the ruling PDF

Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

Collecting delinquent homeowner-association assessments through a judicial foreclosure that permits deficiency judgments constitutes “debt collection” under the FDCPA, distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co.; and a debt collector’s filing of a writ of special execution that implicitly represents unapproved “accruing” attorneys’ fees as already court-approved falsely states the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants on that claim and remanded for a determination of damages, while affirming the remaining claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Martha A. McNair (Appellant)
Homeowner in Gilbert, Arizona within the Neely Commons Community Association; plaintiff who sued the collection law firm under the FDCPA.
Maxwell & Morgan PC (Appellee)
Arizona professional corporation; the HOA collection law firm that represented the Neely Commons Community Association in collecting McNair’s assessment debt.
Charles E. Maxwell (Appellee)
Principal of Maxwell & Morgan PC; named defendant-appellee (husband).
Lisa Maxwell (Appellee)
Named defendant-appellee (wife of Charles E. Maxwell), joined for marital-community purposes.
W. William Nikolaus (Appellee)
Principal of Maxwell & Morgan PC; named defendant-appellee (husband).
Leslie Nikolaus (Appellee)
Named defendant-appellee (wife of W. William Nikolaus), joined for marital-community purposes.
Neely Commons Community Association (Party)
The homeowners association whose delinquent assessments were at issue; the firm’s client, not a named party to the appeal.
Douglas C. Wigley (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Martha McNair (argued); Phoenix, Arizona.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Martha McNair; Phoenix, Arizona.
Robert Travis Campbell (Counsel)
Simmonds & Narita LLP
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees (argued); San Francisco, California.
Jeffrey A. Topor (Counsel)
Simmonds & Narita LLP
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; San Francisco, California.
Tomio B. Narita (Counsel)
Simmonds & Narita LLP
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; San Francisco, California.
Janet Bond Arterton (Judge)
U.S. District Judge for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation; authored the opinion.
Jay S. Bybee (Judge)
U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit; randomly drawn to the panel and joined the opinion.
Michelle T. Friedland (Judge)
U.S. Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit; joined the opinion.
David G. Campbell (Judge)
U.S. District Judge for the District of Arizona who granted summary judgment to the defendants below.

What happened and why it matters

Martha McNair bought a home in Gilbert, Arizona in 2004 that was part of the Neely Commons Community Association, obligating her under a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) to pay an annual assessment in monthly installments. After she fell behind, the law firm Maxwell & Morgan P.C. — retained by the Association — pursued her through a series of collection lawsuits, a stipulated judgment, and ultimately a judicial foreclosure that sold her home. McNair then sued the firm and its principals under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging they misrepresented the amount she owed and sought attorneys’ fees to which they were not entitled. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding most claims time-barred and rejecting the timely claims — reasoning in part that pursuing a foreclosure was not “debt collection” and that the state court had implicitly approved the fees. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co. (a non-judicial foreclosure case), the panel held that collecting HOA assessments through a judicial foreclosure that allows deficiency judgments is “debt collection” subject to the FDCPA. It further held that the firm’s writ of special execution violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by falsely representing the legal status of $1,597.50 in “accruing” attorneys’ fees as court-approved when no court had yet approved them. The panel remanded for a determination of statutory and any actual damages, and a concurrently filed memorandum disposition affirmed the remaining, largely untimely claims.

The court then distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017), on which the defendants relied. Ho held that a trustee facilitating a non-judicial foreclosure was not collecting a “debt” because, under California law, such a foreclosure cannot yield a deficiency judgment and thus extinguishes the entire debt regardless of the sale price — the object being to retake and resell the security, not to collect money from the borrower. Here, by contrast, the defendants pursued a judicial foreclosure under a scheme that, in many cases, permits deficiency judgments, citing A.R.S. §§ 33-727(A) and 33-729(B)-(C). That difference placed the firm’s conduct squarely within the FDCPA’s definition of debt collection.

Second, the district court had held, in the alternative, that the writ did not violate the Act because the Maricopa County Superior Court had implicitly approved the claimed fees by issuing the writ and later rejecting McNair’s challenges. The panel found this analysis failed to ask the right question: whether the defendants were legally entitled to claim the fees at the time they applied for the writ. The FDCPA bars any false or misleading representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment attorneys’ fees must be requested by motion, and when the November 5, 2013 writ was filed, no court had yet approved the quantification of the $1,597.50 in “accruing” fees. By listing those fees as “now … due,” the writ falsely represented that they had already been judicially approved. The court cited Woliansky v. Miller and Costa v. Maxwell & Morgan PC for the point that fee amounts are set by the court’s discretion. Because the district court had not reached damages, the panel remanded for a determination of statutory and, if applicable, actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, noting McNair might have suffered no actual damages given the Superior Court’s later approval of the fees.

The decision also draws a practical line for how collectors may present attorneys’ fees in enforcement papers. Listing “accruing” fees as presently due in a writ of special execution — before any court has approved that amount under Arizona Rule 54(g) — can be an actionable misrepresentation of the debt’s legal status, even if a court later blesses the same fees. For homeowners, McNair confirms a federal remedy (including statutory damages) against overreaching collection conduct; for associations and their counsel, it is a reminder to secure judicial approval before characterizing post-judgment fees as owed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2019, leaving the ruling in force within the Ninth Circuit.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2004 Martha McNair buys a home in Gilbert, Arizona within the Neely Commons Community Association, obligating her to pay assessments in monthly installments under the CC&Rs.

Step 2009 Maxwell & Morgan P.C. first notifies McNair of a delinquent assessment debt and sues on the Association’s behalf; the parties enter a payment agreement.

Step 2010 After McNair defaults on the payment agreement, the firm revives the lawsuit and obtains a default judgment against her.

Step 2012-06-27 The parties execute a stipulated judgment recognizing the Association’s right to sell McNair’s home to collect the debt, listing $1,687.50 in attorney fees plus accruing fees.

Step 2012-07-12 The Maricopa County Superior Court adopts the stipulated judgment by order.

Step 2013-11-05 The firm files a praecipe and the Superior Court issues a writ of special execution stating $1,687.50 plus $1,597.50 in accruing attorney fees are ‘now … due’; McNair’s home is later sold for $75,000, yielding $11,600.13 to the firm and Association.

Step 2014 McNair sues Maxwell & Morgan P.C. and its principals in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (No. 2:14-cv-00869-DGC) under the FDCPA.

Step 2017-09-14 The Ninth Circuit hears oral argument in San Francisco, California.

Step 2018-06-25 The Ninth Circuit files its published opinion, affirming in part and reversing in part, and remanding for a determination of damages.

Step 2019 The U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. v. McNair, 139 S. Ct. 1375).

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/mcnair-v-maxwell-and-morgan/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-06-25

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2018-06-25_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was McNair v. Maxwell & Morgan, PC about?

Martha McNair, a Gilbert, Arizona homeowner, sued the law firm Maxwell & Morgan P.C. and its principals under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The firm had collected delinquent homeowner-association assessments she owed the Neely Commons Community Association, ultimately foreclosing on and selling her home. McNair alleged the firm misrepresented the amount of her debt and sought attorneys’ fees to which it was not entitled.

Does the FDCPA apply to collecting HOA assessments through foreclosure?

Yes, when the foreclosure is judicial and can allow a deficiency judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the firm’s effort to collect HOA fees through Arizona’s judicial-foreclosure process was “debt collection” under the FDCPA. It distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., which had exempted non-judicial foreclosures because, under the law there, such foreclosures extinguish the entire debt and cannot produce a deficiency judgment.

Why did the firm’s writ of special execution violate the FDCPA?

The November 2013 writ listed $1,597.50 in “accruing” attorneys’ fees as “now … due,” implying a court had already approved that amount. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment fees must be requested by motion, and no court had yet approved those fees when the writ was filed. That falsely represented the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).

What did the Ninth Circuit ultimately decide?

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part. In a concurrent memorandum disposition it affirmed that most of McNair’s claims were untimely and rejected one timely claim. In the published opinion it reversed summary judgment on her claim about the misrepresented fees, held the FDCPA applied, and remanded to the district court to determine statutory and any actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.

Was McNair still liable for the fees, and did she win money?

The Superior Court later approved the attorneys’ fees, so McNair may not have suffered actual damages from the misrepresentation. The Ninth Circuit did not award damages itself; it remanded so the district court could determine what statutory and, if applicable, actual damages she is entitled to. The FDCPA allows statutory damages even without proven actual loss.

Is this decision binding, and what happened after?

Yes. The opinion was published (“FOR PUBLICATION,” 893 F.3d 680), making it precedential within the Ninth Circuit. The defendants sought U.S. Supreme Court review, but certiorari was denied in 2019 (139 S. Ct. 1375), leaving the ruling intact. It is a leading authority on the FDCPA’s reach over judicial-foreclosure collection of HOA debt.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	893 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-17383)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	June 25, 2018
Judge / panel	Janet Bond Arterton (opinion author, D. Conn., sitting by designation), Jay S. Bybee, Michelle T. Friedland
Parties	Martha A. McNair (Plaintiff-Appellant, a Gilbert homeowner) v. Maxwell & Morgan PC and its principals Charles E. Maxwell and W. William Nikolaus (Defendants-Appellees, the HOA collection law firm for the Neely Commons Community Association).
Governing law	15 U.S.C. § 1692e (FDCPA — false or misleading representations) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5)-(6) (FDCPA definitions of ‘debt’ and ‘debt collector’) 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (FDCPA civil liability and damages) A.R.S. § 12-1551(A) (writ of execution to enforce a judgment) A.R.S. §§ 33-727, 33-729 (judgment liens, foreclosure, and deficiency judgments) Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(g) (post-judgment attorneys’ fees by motion)
Topics	fdcpaassessmentsforeclosureattorneys-feeslienscc-and-rs
Outcome / holding	Collecting delinquent homeowner-association assessments through a judicial foreclosure that permits deficiency judgments constitutes “debt collection” under the FDCPA, distinguishing Ho v. ReconTrust Co.; and a debt collector’s filing of a writ of special execution that implicitly represents unapproved “accruing” attorneys’ fees as already court-approved falsely states the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants on that claim and remanded for a determination of damages, while affirming the remaining claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.
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Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Key Issues & Findings

The panel addressed the two independent grounds on which the district court had granted summary judgment. First, the district court had held that the defendants were not engaged in “debt collection” because the writ was filed to foreclose on a lien. The Ninth Circuit rejected that reasoning as irreconcilable with the statutory text. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5), a “debt” is an obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, and under § 1692a(6) a “debt collector” is anyone who regularly collects debts owed to another. McNair’s obligation arose from unpaid homeowner-association assessments on her residence, so it plainly qualified as consumer debt, and the firm plainly qualified as a debt collector. The court cited Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017), and Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), for the settled rule that attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt collection are covered by the Act even when that activity consists of litigation.

The court then distinguished Ho v. ReconTrust Co., NA, 858 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2017), on which the defendants relied. Ho held that a trustee facilitating a non-judicial foreclosure was not collecting a “debt” because, under California law, such a foreclosure cannot yield a deficiency judgment and thus extinguishes the entire debt regardless of the sale price — the object being to retake and resell the security, not to collect money from the borrower. Here, by contrast, the defendants pursued a judicial foreclosure under a scheme that, in many cases, permits deficiency judgments, citing A.R.S. §§ 33-727(A) and 33-729(B)-(C). That difference placed the firm’s conduct squarely within the FDCPA’s definition of debt collection.

Second, the district court had held, in the alternative, that the writ did not violate the Act because the Maricopa County Superior Court had implicitly approved the claimed fees by issuing the writ and later rejecting McNair’s challenges. The panel found this analysis failed to ask the right question: whether the defendants were legally entitled to claim the fees at the time they applied for the writ. The FDCPA bars any false or misleading representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(g), post-judgment attorneys’ fees must be requested by motion, and when the November 5, 2013 writ was filed, no court had yet approved the quantification of the $1,597.50 in “accruing” fees. By listing those fees as “now … due,” the writ falsely represented that they had already been judicially approved. The court cited Woliansky v. Miller and Costa v. Maxwell & Morgan PC for the point that fee amounts are set by the court’s discretion. Because the district court had not reached damages, the panel remanded for a determination of statutory and, if applicable, actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, noting McNair might have suffered no actual damages given the Superior Court’s later approval of the fees.

Why It Matters

This published Ninth Circuit decision is significant for homeowners, associations, and the law firms that collect HOA debt because it confirms that the FDCPA applies to judicial-foreclosure collection of delinquent assessments. Many collectors had read Ho v. ReconTrust to mean that any foreclosure is outside the Act. McNair narrows Ho to its facts: the exemption turns on whether the foreclosure scheme can produce a deficiency judgment. Because Arizona’s judicial-foreclosure process can, a firm that collects assessments through it is a “debt collector” pursuing a “debt” and must comply with the FDCPA’s prohibitions on false or misleading representations.

The decision also draws a practical line for how collectors may present attorneys’ fees in enforcement papers. Listing “accruing” fees as presently due in a writ of special execution — before any court has approved that amount under Arizona Rule 54(g) — can be an actionable misrepresentation of the debt’s legal status, even if a court later blesses the same fees. For homeowners, McNair confirms a federal remedy (including statutory damages) against overreaching collection conduct; for associations and their counsel, it is a reminder to secure judicial approval before characterizing post-judgment fees as owed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2019, leaving the ruling in force within the Ninth Circuit.

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Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

FDCPA & HOA Assessments | 15 U.S.C. § 1692g | 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017)

A San Diego homeowner sued her HOA’s collection law firm after it demanded an overdue assessment and threatened a lien. The Ninth Circuit held she stated a plausible FDCPA claim because the letter’s payment deadline and lien threat overshadowed her federal right to dispute the debt, and that the firm was a debt collector subject to the full statute.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Zakia Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell; Debora M. Zumwalt; Does 1-25; 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-56927); 3:14-cv-00839-JLS-RBB (S.D. Cal.).

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Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

The Ninth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that Mashiri stated a plausible FDCPA claim because, judged by the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, the collection letter contained language that overshadowed and conflicted with her 15 U.S.C. § 1692g debt-validation rights. The panel further held that a debt collector who sends such a letter to collect an overdue assessment is subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, not merely the limitations of § 1692f(6), because it was collecting a debt and not merely enforcing an already-existing security interest.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Zakia Mashiri (Plaintiff)
Homeowner and member of the Westwood Club homeowners’ association in San Diego; Plaintiff-Appellant who brought the FDCPA, Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims.
Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC (Defendant)
Law firm that sent the May 1, 2013 assessment-collection letter on behalf of the Westwood Club HOA; Defendant-Appellee. Held to be a debt collector subject to the full scope of the FDCPA.
Debora M. Zumwalt (Defendant)
Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
Attorney named as a defendant; associated with the collection letter sent on behalf of the HOA. Defendant-Appellee.
Westwood Club Homeowners’ Association (Creditor (non-party))
The underlying HOA client and creditor on whose behalf Epsten sent the collection letter and recorded the lien; not a named party in the appeal.
Asil Marhiri (Counsel)
Mashiri Law Firm
Argued the appeal for Plaintiff-Appellant Zakia Mashiri; Mashiri Law Firm, San Diego, California.
Anne Lorentzen Rauch (Counsel)
Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
Argued the appeal for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
Mandy D. Hexom (Counsel)
Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
Rian W. Jones (Counsel)
Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees; Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC, San Diego, California.
Richard A. Paez (Judge)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Circuit Judge; authored the panel’s published opinion.
Dorothy W. Nelson (Judge)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Circuit Judge on the panel.
Elaine E. Bucklo (Judge)
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (sitting by designation)
U.S. District Judge sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit panel.
Janis L. Sammartino (Judge)
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California
District Judge who presided below and granted the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal that was reversed on appeal.

What happened and why it matters

Zakia Mashiri owns a home in San Diego and is a member of the Westwood Club homeowners’ association, which levies annual assessments. After she failed to timely pay a $385 assessment fee levied in July 2012, the HOA’s collection law firm, Epsten Grinnell & Howell, and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt sent her a May 1, 2013 letter (the ‘May Notice’) demanding $598 in assessments plus late, administrative, and legal fees, and warning that failure to pay within thirty-five days would result in a lien on her property. The same letter also contained federal debt-validation language telling her she had thirty days to dispute the debt. Mashiri sued under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), California’s Rosenthal Act, and California’s Unfair Competition Law, alleging the letter’s payment deadline and lien threat overshadowed and contradicted her right to dispute the debt. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reversed. Applying the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, it held Mashiri stated a plausible 15 U.S.C. § 1692g violation because the letter demanded payment within thirty-five days of its date (inconsistent with the thirty-day dispute window running from receipt) and threatened a lien regardless of any dispute. The panel also rejected Epsten’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it was subject only to § 1692f(6); it held Epsten was a debt collector subject to the full scope of the FDCPA. The court reversed and remanded.

Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, the panel accepted the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations as true and asked whether they stated a claim ‘plausible on its face’ under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. It framed the FDCPA’s purpose as eliminating abusive debt-collection practices and subjecting ‘debt collectors’ to civil liability. The court first addressed Epsten’s threshold argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that because it sought only to perfect a security interest it was governed solely by 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). Although arguments raised for the first time on appeal are ordinarily forfeited, the panel reached this one because it was purely legal, the pertinent facts were undisputed, and Mashiri had responded to it. On the merits, the court held the overdue assessment was a ‘debt’ under § 1692a(5) because it arose from Mashiri’s household membership in the HOA, and the May Notice plainly sought to collect it. Relying on Ho v. ReconTrust, the panel reasoned that entities enforcing security interests are debt collectors when their activities constitute debt collection; unlike the trustee in Ho, who merely sent a notice of default without demanding payment, Epsten demanded payment and there was as yet no recorded lien to enforce. Epsten was therefore subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, including § 1692g and § 1692e. Turning to § 1692g, the court explained that a validation notice must be conveyed effectively (Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service) and must not be overshadowed by or inconsistent with other messages that would confuse the least sophisticated debtor (Terran v. Kaplan). The panel found two plausible violations: first, demanding payment within thirty-five days of the letter’s date conflicted with the debtor’s thirty-day dispute period measured from receipt, because a debtor might receive the letter with fewer than thirty days remaining and would have to forgo her dispute rights to avoid a lien; second, the statement that a lien ‘will’ be recorded upon nonpayment overshadowed the right to dispute, because the least sophisticated debtor would wrongly believe a lien would be recorded on the thirty-fifth day even after disputing the debt. The court distinguished Shimek v. Weissman (governed by Georgia law permitting contemporaneous lien filing) and explained that under California’s Davis-Stirling Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670) an HOA must give thirty days’ notice and participate in dispute resolution before recording a lien, so the FDCPA duty to suspend collection pending verification was fully consistent with state law. Accordingly, the threat to record a lien was a debt-collection activity that had to cease upon a dispute, and the letter’s failure to convey that effectively stated a plausible § 1692g violation. Reversing the § 1692g dismissal required reversing the dependent § 1692e(5), Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims as well.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision carries direct weight even though it arose under California’s Davis-Stirling Act. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, so it binds Arizona’s federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides. Arizona HOAs collect assessments under a different state statutory scheme, but the FDCPA is federal law that applies the same way to Arizona assessment-collection letters. An Arizona homeowner who receives a demand letter from an HOA collection firm has the same right to a clear, unobstructed thirty-day validation notice, and firms operating in Arizona should ensure their letters do not let assessment deadlines or lien warnings overshadow that federal right.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2012-07 The Westwood Club HOA levies a $385 annual assessment fee; Mashiri fails to pay it in a timely manner.

Step 2013-05-01 Epsten Grinnell & Howell and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt send the ‘May Notice’ collection letter on behalf of the HOA, demanding $598 and warning of a lien if unpaid within 35 days.

Step 2013-05-20 Mashiri writes to Epsten disputing the debt, requesting validation, and stating she never received a bill for the July 2012 assessment.

Step 2013-06-05 Epsten responds by sending another copy of Mashiri’s account statement.

Step 2013-06-18 Epsten, on behalf of the HOA, records a lien on Mashiri’s property for $928 ($598 plus $330 in additional legal fees).

Step 2013-06-21 Mashiri sends the HOA a $385 check with a letter disputing the balance of the debt.

Step 2013-06-24 Epsten notifies Mashiri of the recorded lien, as required by Cal. Civ. Code § 5675(e).

Step 2014 Mashiri files her complaint (D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00839-JLS-RBB, S.D. Cal.); the district court later dismisses it under Rule 12(b)(6).

Step 2016-10-04 The Ninth Circuit hears oral argument in Pasadena, California.

Step 2017-01-13 The Ninth Circuit files its published opinion reversing the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.

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Source 1 2017-01-13

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

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2017-01-13_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

Is Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell binding precedent?

Yes. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reported at 845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Arizona is within the Ninth Circuit, the decision binds Arizona’s federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides, even though the case itself arose under California law.

What did the court decide about the HOA collection letter?

The court held that the homeowner stated a plausible violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Judged by the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, the letter’s demand for payment within thirty-five days of its date, and its warning that a lien ‘will’ be recorded, overshadowed and conflicted with her federal right to dispute the debt within thirty days of receiving the notice.

Can an HOA collection firm avoid the FDCPA by saying it was just perfecting a lien?

Not on these facts. The firm argued for the first time on appeal that it was subject only to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) because it was enforcing a security interest. The court rejected that, holding the overdue assessment was a ‘debt,’ the letter demanded payment, and no lien yet existed to enforce, so the firm was subject to the full scope of the FDCPA.

Why was the 35-day payment deadline a problem?

The FDCPA gives a consumer thirty days from receipt of the notice to dispute the debt. Because the letter demanded payment within thirty-five days of its date, a homeowner who received it late might have fewer than thirty days to act, effectively forcing her to give up her dispute rights to avoid a lien. The court found that inconsistent with § 1692g.

How does California’s Davis-Stirling Act fit with the FDCPA here?

The court held the two are consistent. Davis-Stirling (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670) already requires an HOA to give at least thirty days’ notice and to participate in dispute resolution before recording a lien, so the FDCPA’s requirement that collection pause once the debtor disputes the debt did not conflict with state law. The lien threat was thus a debt-collection activity that had to cease upon a dispute.

What happened to the homeowner’s state-law claims?

The district court had dismissed the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law claims as dependent on the FDCPA claim. Because the Ninth Circuit reversed the § 1692g dismissal, it also reversed the dismissal of the dependent § 1692e(5), Rosenthal Act, and Unfair Competition Law claims and remanded for further proceedings.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	845 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 14-56927)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	January 13, 2017
Judge / panel	Richard A. Paez (Circuit Judge, author), Dorothy W. Nelson (Circuit Judge), Elaine E. Bucklo (U.S. District Judge, N.D. Ill., sitting by designation)
Parties	Zakia Mashiri (Plaintiff-Appellant), a homeowner and member of the Westwood Club homeowners’ association, v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell APC and attorney Debora M. Zumwalt (Defendants-Appellees), the law firm and lawyer who sent an assessment-collection letter on the HOA’s behalf.
Governing law	Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (debt validation notice; overshadowing/inconsistency) 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (nonjudicial enforcement of a security interest) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e / § 1692e(5) (false or misleading representations) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (definition of ‘debt’) 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (definition of ‘debt collector’) Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et seq. California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 5660, 5670, 5675
Topics	fdcpaassessmentsliensforeclosureprocedure
Outcome / holding	The Ninth Circuit reversed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, holding that Mashiri stated a plausible FDCPA claim because, judged by the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ standard, the collection letter contained language that overshadowed and conflicted with her 15 U.S.C. § 1692g debt-validation rights. The panel further held that a debt collector who sends such a letter to collect an overdue assessment is subject to the full scope of the FDCPA, not merely the limitations of § 1692f(6), because it was collecting a debt and not merely enforcing an already-existing security interest.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Why It Matters

For homeowners’ associations and the law firms that collect their assessments, this published Ninth Circuit decision confirms that a single letter can be both a Davis-Stirling pre-lien notice and full-blown FDCPA debt collection. A collector cannot escape § 1692g simply by saying it was ‘perfecting a security interest’ when no lien yet exists and the letter demands payment. Practically, collection letters must give the consumer the full thirty-day dispute window measured from receipt, must not set a payment deadline that effectively shortens that window, and must not threaten that a lien ‘will’ be recorded in a way that suggests the threat survives a timely dispute. Because the FDCPA requires collection to cease once the debtor disputes the debt and until verification is mailed, a lien threat that ignores that pause can overshadow the validation notice and expose the firm to liability.

For Arizona homeowners and boards, the decision carries direct weight even though it arose under California’s Davis-Stirling Act. It is a published, precedential opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, so it binds Arizona’s federal district courts on the FDCPA questions it decides. Arizona HOAs collect assessments under a different state statutory scheme, but the FDCPA is federal law that applies the same way to Arizona assessment-collection letters. An Arizona homeowner who receives a demand letter from an HOA collection firm has the same right to a clear, unobstructed thirty-day validation notice, and firms operating in Arizona should ensure their letters do not let assessment deadlines or lien warnings overshadow that federal right.

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Glawe v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on June 30, 2026 by [email protected]

Ninth Circuit (Unpublished) • FDCPA & HOA Assessments

An Arizona homeowner’s FDCPA suit against his HOA’s collection law firm turned on a single question: is a rental-property assessment a consumer debt or a commercial one?

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Glawe v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC; 9th Cir. No. 19-17090 (memorandum disposition); D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01282-JAS (D. Ariz.).

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Scope note: This educational case page summarizes a court ruling for Arizona HOA homeowners, boards, and counsel. It is not legal advice.

The rule in one sentence

The relevant “transaction” under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is the purchase of the property that gave rise to the HOA assessment obligation, and whether that obligation is a consumer debt turns on the primary purpose of the purchase measured when the obligation was incurred—not on the owner’s later use of the property as a rental. Because an obligation associated with a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed about the Glawes’ purpose in acquiring the properties, the district court erred in granting summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

Curtis G. Glawe (Party)
Plaintiff-Appellant; homeowner and Sundance HOA member who brought the FDCPA claim. Appeared pro se on appeal.
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC (Party)
Defendant-Appellee; the law firm that served as collection counsel for the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association. (Spelled ‘Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado, & Boren PLC’ in the body of the memorandum.)
Javier Delgado (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant.
Mark Holmgreen (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant.
Mark K. Sahl (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant.
Gregory A. Stein (Party)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
Defendant-Appellee; individual attorney named as a defendant.
Curtis G. Glawe (Counsel)
Pro Se
Appeared pro se (self-represented) for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Donald Wilson, Jr. (Counsel)
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees.
Alicyn Marie Freeman (Counsel)
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson PC
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees.
Kim McLane Wardlaw (Judge)
Ninth Circuit Judge on the panel.
Ronald M. Gould (Judge)
Ninth Circuit Judge on the panel.
James Donato (Judge)
U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
James Alan Soto (Judge)
U.S. District Judge who presided over the case below and granted summary judgment.

What happened and why it matters

In 2009, Iowa residents Curtis and Lorri Glawe purchased a home in Buckeye, Arizona (the “Mohave Property”) and a second lot in the same subdivision (the “228th Lane Property”). Ownership made them members of the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association, Inc. and bound them to the community’s CC&Rs and assessment obligations. The Glawes never lived in the homes and consistently rented them to tenants. After they fell behind on assessments, the HOA—through its collection law firm, Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC—twice sued them in Arizona state court for unpaid assessments and late fees and was awarded court costs and attorneys’ fees. Glawe then sued the firm and several of its attorneys in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the firm, reasoning that because the property was a rental, the assessment obligation was commercial rather than consumer in nature and therefore not a “debt” covered by the FDCPA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the relevant “transaction” was the original 2009 purchase of the property, and that the purpose of that purchase—measured when the obligation was incurred—controls, not the owner’s later rental use. Because an obligation tied to a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed over the Glawes’ purpose in buying the properties, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the true purpose of the acquisition. The decision is an unpublished, non-precedential memorandum.

The dispositive question was how to identify the “transaction.” The appellees urged the court to focus on the assessments and attorneys’ fees incurred after the Glawes bought the home and while it was being used as a rental. The panel rejected that framing. It held that the “transaction” at issue is the purchase of the Mohave Property itself. The Glawes bought the property in 2009 and were, at that moment, subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs, which required them to pay assessments. Because the appellees’ efforts to collect the allegedly late assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees are what produced the FDCPA claim, the underlying obligation “ar[ose] out of” the purchase of the property under a plain reading of the statute.

Having fixed the transaction as the purchase, the court framed the real inquiry as whether that purchase was primarily consumer or commercial in nature, and it emphasized timing: courts “determine the debtor’s purpose as of the time the debt was incurred,” quoting In re Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court had erred by concluding categorically that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be primarily consumer in nature. To decide the purpose question, a court must “examine the transaction as a whole, paying particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended,” quoting Slenk v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 236 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). That determination can be made as a matter of law, but a genuine dispute of fact relevant to the inquiry can preclude summary judgment. Here, the Glawes’ affidavits and deposition testimony—that they initially intended to use the home as a future retirement residence and only later decided to rent—created such a dispute. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures it deemed appropriate. Because the reversal resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach Glawe’s challenges to the denial of his motion to amend or his motion for reconsideration.

The decision also underscores that the consumer-versus-commercial question is fact-intensive and can defeat summary judgment. Owner intent at the time of purchase—documented through affidavits, deposition testimony, and the surrounding circumstances of the acquisition—can create a genuine dispute that a court must resolve on a full record. Because the disposition is unpublished and non-precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, it does not bind future panels, but it is a useful window into how the court frames the “transaction” and “primary purpose” elements when HOA assessment debt intersects with federal debt-collection law. This page is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and anyone facing an assessment or collection dispute should consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their specific facts.

Step-by-step litigation record

Step 2009 Curtis and Lorri Glawe, Iowa residents, purchase the Mohave Property in Buckeye, Arizona, and later a second lot (the 228th Lane Property) in the same Sundance Residential development, becoming HOA members bound by the CC&Rs.

Step After 2009 The Glawes rent out the properties to tenants and fall behind on HOA assessments; the Sundance HOA, through Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC, twice sues them in Arizona state court for unpaid assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees.

Step 2018 Glawe files an FDCPA action against the collection law firm and individual attorneys in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (No. 2:18-cv-01282-JAS).

Step 2019 The district court grants summary judgment for the defendants, holding the assessment obligation is commercial (not consumer) and thus not a ‘debt’ under the FDCPA; Glawe appeals (9th Cir. No. 19-17090).

Step 2021-05-06 The Ninth Circuit panel submits the case for decision without oral argument at Pasadena, California.

Step 2021-06-08 The Ninth Circuit issues an unpublished memorandum reversing the judgment and remanding for the district court to determine the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both properties.

Complete uploaded source-document index

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Source 1 2021-06-08

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Decision document; read it to understand the controlling result before moving to later filings.

Download source file

2021-06-08_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was Glawe v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC about?

It was a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) lawsuit brought by an Arizona homeowner, Curtis Glawe, against the law firm that acted as collection counsel for his community association, the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association. After the HOA twice sued the Glawes in state court for unpaid assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees, Glawe sued the firm in federal court, claiming its collection efforts violated the FDCPA. The central legal question was whether the HOA assessment obligation qualified as a consumer ‘debt’ that the FDCPA protects.

What did the Ninth Circuit decide?

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the law firm and remanded the case. It held that the relevant ‘transaction’ for the FDCPA analysis is the original purchase of the property, and that whether the assessment obligation is a consumer or commercial debt depends on the primary purpose of that purchase—measured when the obligation was incurred—not on how the owner later used the property. The court directed the district court to make a factual finding about the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both properties.

Does renting out a home automatically make HOA dues a commercial debt?

No. The court expressly rejected the idea that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be consumer in nature. The district court had erred by treating the rental use as automatically making the debt commercial. Instead, a court must examine the transaction as a whole and focus on the purpose for which the property was acquired at the time the obligation arose. An owner who bought a home for personal or family use does not necessarily lose FDCPA protection just by later renting it out.

Why did the timing of the ‘debt’ matter?

The FDCPA defines a consumer debt by reference to a transaction whose subject is ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.’ The Ninth Circuit, quoting In re Cherrett, explained that courts determine the debtor’s purpose ‘as of the time the debt was incurred.’ Because the Glawes’ assessment obligation arose out of their 2009 purchase of the property, the relevant question was their purpose at that time—here complicated by affidavits stating they initially planned to retire in the home and only later chose to rent it out.

Is this decision binding precedent in Arizona?

No. The disposition is an unpublished memorandum marked ‘NOT FOR PUBLICATION,’ and under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 it is not precedent except in limited circumstances. It does not bind future panels or district courts as controlling authority. It can still be informative as an illustration of how the Ninth Circuit frames the consumer-versus-commercial debt question when HOA assessments intersect with the FDCPA, but it should not be treated as settled law.

What happens after a reversal and remand like this?

A reversal and remand sends the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate ruling. Here, the Ninth Circuit did not decide who wins; it instructed the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures the court finds appropriate. Depending on that finding, the FDCPA claim may proceed or be resolved. This summary is educational only and is not legal advice.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	9th Cir. No. 19-17090 (memorandum disposition)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	June 8, 2021
Judge / panel	Kim McLane Wardlaw (Circuit Judge), Ronald M. Gould (Circuit Judge), James Donato (U.S. District Judge, N.D. Cal., sitting by designation)
Parties	Curtis G. Glawe (pro se homeowner and HOA member) v. Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen PLC and individual attorneys Javier Delgado, Mark Holmgreen, Mark K. Sahl, and Gregory A. Stein (collection counsel for the Sundance Residential Homeowners Association).
Governing law	15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (FDCPA definition of ‘debt’) 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (courts of appeals jurisdiction over final decisions)
Topics	fdcpaassessmentscc-and-rsattorneys-feesprocedure
Outcome / holding	The relevant “transaction” under the FDCPA’s definition of “debt” is the purchase of the property that gave rise to the HOA assessment obligation, and whether that obligation is a consumer debt turns on the primary purpose of the purchase measured when the obligation was incurred—not on the owner’s later use of the property as a rental. Because an obligation associated with a rental property is not automatically commercial and a genuine factual dispute existed about the Glawes’ purpose in acquiring the properties, the district court erred in granting summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

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Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Key Issues & Findings

The panel began with the FDCPA’s threshold limitation: the statute reaches only consumer—as opposed to commercial—debt, citing Bloom v. I.C. Systems, Inc., 972 F.2d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 1992). The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The court read this to require two things: (1) an obligation arising out of a transaction, and (2) that the subject of the transaction be primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

The dispositive question was how to identify the “transaction.” The appellees urged the court to focus on the assessments and attorneys’ fees incurred after the Glawes bought the home and while it was being used as a rental. The panel rejected that framing. It held that the “transaction” at issue is the purchase of the Mohave Property itself. The Glawes bought the property in 2009 and were, at that moment, subject to the HOA’s CC&Rs, which required them to pay assessments. Because the appellees’ efforts to collect the allegedly late assessments, late fees, court costs, and attorneys’ fees are what produced the FDCPA claim, the underlying obligation “ar[ose] out of” the purchase of the property under a plain reading of the statute.

Having fixed the transaction as the purchase, the court framed the real inquiry as whether that purchase was primarily consumer or commercial in nature, and it emphasized timing: courts “determine the debtor’s purpose as of the time the debt was incurred,” quoting In re Cherrett, 873 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2017). The district court had erred by concluding categorically that an obligation associated with a rental property cannot be primarily consumer in nature. To decide the purpose question, a court must “examine the transaction as a whole, paying particular attention to the purpose for which the credit was extended,” quoting Slenk v. Transworld Systems, Inc., 236 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001). That determination can be made as a matter of law, but a genuine dispute of fact relevant to the inquiry can preclude summary judgment. Here, the Glawes’ affidavits and deposition testimony—that they initially intended to use the home as a future retirement residence and only later decided to rent—created such a dispute. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a factual determination of the true purpose of the Glawes’ acquisition of both the Mohave Property and the 228th Lane Property, using whatever procedures it deemed appropriate. Because the reversal resolved the appeal, the panel did not reach Glawe’s challenges to the denial of his motion to amend or his motion for reconsideration.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners and community associations, this memorandum illustrates a recurring dividing line in assessment-collection disputes: whether the FDCPA even applies to an HOA’s efforts to collect unpaid dues. The FDCPA governs only “consumer” debt, and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis makes clear that the character of an HOA assessment obligation is judged by the primary purpose of the original property purchase, measured when the obligation was incurred—not by how the owner later uses the home. An owner who buys a residence for personal or family use does not necessarily lose FDCPA protection simply by later renting it out, and a court cannot treat every rental-property assessment as categorically commercial. That has practical stakes for both sides: if the debt is consumer in nature, the collecting law firm must comply with the FDCPA’s disclosure and conduct rules; if it is commercial, those federal protections do not apply.

The decision also underscores that the consumer-versus-commercial question is fact-intensive and can defeat summary judgment. Owner intent at the time of purchase—documented through affidavits, deposition testimony, and the surrounding circumstances of the acquisition—can create a genuine dispute that a court must resolve on a full record. Because the disposition is unpublished and non-precedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, it does not bind future panels, but it is a useful window into how the court frames the “transaction” and “primary purpose” elements when HOA assessment debt intersects with federal debt-collection law. This page is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and anyone facing an assessment or collection dispute should consult a qualified Arizona attorney about their specific facts.

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