Category Archives: Superior Court

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Shawn Blakley filed suit against Roosevelt Grover Parker, Patricia L. Parker, and Litchfield Vista Views III Homeowners Association. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint or identify the property-level facts, but the June 2026 fee ruling describes the claims against the association as claims that it failed to fulfill contractual enforcement duties rather than claims that it committed the underlying alleged torts.

The early minute entries are mostly procedural. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. entered trial-scheduling orders, reset scheduling conferences after stipulations to extend deadlines, and in November 2024 allowed Blakley to file and serve a First Amended Complaint. The case later moved before Judge Joseph Kreamer.

The association filed a June 17, 2025 motion for partial summary judgment. The Parkers joined that motion in July 2025, and the association later filed an October 27, 2025 motion for summary judgment on Counts V and VI of the First Amended Complaint. Several entries reset oral argument on those motions before the court heard argument on February 27, 2026.

At the February 27, 2026 oral argument, the court granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts II and IV, denied the Parkers’ joinder in that motion as to Counts II and IV, and granted Litchfield Vista Views III’s summary-judgment motion as to Counts V and VI. The minute entry states that those rulings resolved all claims against Litchfield Vista Views III.

The association then sought attorneys’ fees and costs. On June 1, 2026, Judge Kreamer rejected CC&R 5.15 as a fee basis because, on its face, it applied only when the association brings an offensive enforcement action. The court nevertheless held that A.R.S. § 12-341.01 supported a fee award because, regardless of claim labels, Blakley sued the association for allegedly failing to fulfill contractual enforcement duties. The court found the claims intertwined, applied Associated Indemnity and China Doll, made a limited fee reduction, and entered judgment awarding the association fees and costs.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al. (CV2023-014388 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA won all claims and fees under § 12-341.01 for alleged contractual enforcement-duty failures. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Shawn Blakley v. Roosevelt Grover Parker, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued 4AAR Holdings, LLC and others in Maricopa County Superior Court over a planned-community assessment lien. The early minutes show an order-to-show-cause hearing where Michael Ripson appeared as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC, followed by a December 2012 ruling striking the LLC’s answer because a corporation or LLC cannot appear in court through a nonlawyer. In March 2013, the court consolidated this action with CV2012-018064, the related case brought by Forange, LLC against the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns.

Forange’s consolidated complaint turned on a payoff-statement theory. The August 12, 2014 ruling says Forange moved for partial summary judgment on its claims, while the association and its attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. The court identified the undisputed facts this way: A.R.S. § 33-1807 creates an HOA lien for unpaid assessments; subsection I requires an association to furnish a payoff statement within ten days after a request from a unit owner, lienholder, or escrow agent; and the special penalty for failure to answer an escrow-agent request is extinguishment of the lien. Here, an escrow agent asked for a payoff statement, but the request was not made in the context of any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction.

Judge Aceto rejected Forange’s statutory theory. The ruling framed the issue as whether § 33-1807(I) gives escrow agents a special power to make liens disappear simply because they are escrow agents, or whether the penalty provision is meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions by requiring prompt payoff responses. Applying a rational-interpretation approach, the court held the penalty provision was directed at real pending transactions. It denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

The association then moved for partial summary judgment on its own foreclosure claim. On November 24, 2014, the court denied that motion. The ruling noted that A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) allows foreclosure only if the owner “has been” delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count when deciding whether the right to foreclose exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that a homeowner cannot avoid foreclosure once the complaint has been filed. The court expressly left open the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments.

A March 11, 2015 ruling accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacated the scheduled trial, and found for defendants on Count I to the extent it sought foreclosure on the property. The June 9, 2015 fee ruling divided the consolidated case into four parts: the association’s unpaid-assessment claim, the association’s lien-foreclosure claim, the association’s CC&R-violation allegations, and Forange’s groundless-document claims. The court found the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations.

The fee ruling made Forange the prevailing party overall. It awarded Forange $994.05 in taxable costs, denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and awarded Forange $18,000 in attorney fees under § 12-341.01 to mitigate the expense of establishing just defenses. The last collected entry continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC (CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Escrow payoff requests do not erase HOA liens absent a real transaction; paid assessments defeated foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Tanglewood HOA sued James E. Goode in Maricopa County Superior Court. The collected minute entries do not include the complaint, the amount sought, or the specific covenants or statutes relied on. The May 19, 2015 scheduling order set discovery, disclosure, settlement-conference, dispositive-motion, and status-conference deadlines, and removed the case from the dismissal calendar.

At a November 23, 2015 telephonic status conference, counsel James Portman Webster appeared for the HOA and Goode appeared for himself. The court set a two-hour bench trial for March 3, 2016 and ordered a joint pretrial statement by February 25, 2016. The same minute entry also corrected Goode’s address in the court system; this public guide omits the address under the project’s privacy rule.

Before trial, the HOA moved for summary judgment. On January 25, 2016, Judge Robert H. Oberbillig ruled that Goode had failed to respond to the motion in any manner and that the response deadline under Rule 7.1(a) had expired. Citing Rule 7.1(b), the court found the unexplained inaction should be deemed consent to granting the motion.

The ruling did not stop at the nonresponse. It also stated that the HOA’s motion and the record established that Tanglewood HOA was entitled as a matter of law to the relief it sought. The court granted the summary-judgment motion, ordered the HOA’s counsel to submit an appropriate form of judgment and any fee-and-cost application by February 15, 2016, and vacated the March 2016 bench trial.

The last collected minute entry is from September 1, 2017. It says the court had before it Tanglewood HOA’s application to prevent waste prior to expiration of the redemption period. Judge Joshua D. Rogers ordered Goode to respond by September 11, 2017 and warned that if no response was filed, the application would be granted. The collected records do not show the final judgment terms or the final outcome of that application.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Tanglewood HOA v. Goode (CV2014-094502 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Unopposed HOA summary judgment entered; later order addressed redemption-period waste. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Tanglewood HOA v. Goode. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

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Maricopoly alleged that it bought at a March 7, 2019 sheriff’s sale based on a judgment in favor of Tierra Santa Community Association against a Scottsdale property. The court’s February 7, 2022 ruling states that Maricopoly’s agent investigated the sale, found a prior foreclosure, and saw documents creating ambiguity about whether Tierra Santa still had a valid lien to foreclose.

For purposes of the converted summary-judgment motion, the court took Maricopoly’s facts as true. On that assumed record, Maricopoly’s agent called Maxwell & Morgan, Tierra Santa’s lawyers, the day before the sale and asked whether the lien was valid. The ruling says the agent was told the lien was valid, but Maricopoly alleged that was false because Tierra Santa had entered a stipulated judgment agreeing the HOA lien would be extinguished if another entity obtained title, and Maxwell & Morgan knew that condition had occurred.

The court also treated as true, for that motion only, Maricopoly’s allegations that a lawyer for Tierra Santa appeared at the sale and allowed it to proceed, that Maricopoly was the winning bidder for $44,000, and that Maxwell & Morgan later threatened fees when Maricopoly tried to secure return of the payment. The court emphasized it was not finding those allegations true; it was applying the summary-judgment standard.

Maxwell & Morgan relied on caveat emptor, the rule that a judicial-sale bidder must determine title and takes only the execution debtor’s interest. The court held that caveat emptor did not bar the case at summary judgment because Arizona law recognizes a fraud exception. Since Maricopoly alleged a knowingly false statement about the lien and a sale based on an extinguished lien, the court found material factual disputes and denied summary dismissal.

The court allowed amendment of factual allegations and some counts, but rejected several proposed new theories. It denied negligent misrepresentation because the case could proceed only if Maxwell & Morgan knowingly misrepresented the lien rather than merely making a mistake. It denied wrongful foreclosure because the alleged facts did not involve a trustee, mortgage, note, or creditor-declared default. It also denied slander of title as insufficiently alleged.

On May 12, 2022, the court separately addressed A.R.S. § 33-420. It quoted the statute and held that liability applies to a person claiming an interest, lien, or encumbrance against real property. Because Maricopoly alleged Maxwell & Morgan was the law firm representing the client who claimed an interest, not a claimant itself, the court denied leave to add the § 33-420 claim against Maxwell & Morgan while granting leave to amend in part.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association (CV2020-013607 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Fraud allegations over an extinguished HOA lien sale defeated summary judgment; § 33-420 did not apply to the firm. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Maricopoly LLC v. Tierra Santa Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

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Andrew Kuhn owned a condominium unit at Southern Village Estates and was a member of the condominium association. The July 2, 2014 ruling states that he failed to pay past assessments, and the association obtained a judgment against him for all past-due and accruing assessments. The association retained Pride Asset Management for collection efforts.

The association paid a utility for water delivered to each condominium unit from monthly assessments. When Kuhn did not pay, defendants either shut off or significantly restricted water flow to his unit. Kuhn said the action made his home uninhabitable and argued that the association had no express statutory or governing-document authority to use water shutoff as a collection remedy.

Defendants relied on A.R.S. § 33-1242 and a rule adopted by the association’s board. The court noted defendants conceded that the Declaration did not expressly authorize water shutoff and that no statute expressly authorized it. The rule itself stated that the association had the right to turn off water to a unit for nonpayment of monthly assessment.

The court denied both sides summary judgment. It agreed that the association had authority to adopt rules if the rules were reasonable, but it held that reasonableness was a fact question on this record. The key issue was whether the rule bore a relationship to the health, happiness, and enjoyment of life of the unit owners, or instead was arbitrary or capricious.

The case also included a separate FDCPA claim against Pride. The November 25, 2014 ruling states that Pride became the HOA’s managing agent on July 1, 2008, that Kuhn did not become delinquent until 2010, and that the challenged collection activity occurred in 2012. Because Pride was responsible for collecting assessments before the debt went into default, the court held Pride fell within the statutory exception to the FDCPA definition of debt collector and granted Pride summary judgment.

Earlier discovery rulings also mattered procedurally. The court sanctioned Pride for failing to provide a knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) witness, compelled a new deposition, and awarded Kuhn $4,500 in fees and $12 in costs. The case later settled, Pride withdrew a proposed form of judgment, and the court dismissed the action with prejudice on March 19, 2015.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association (CV2012-018443 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Water shutoff collection rule went to factfinder; Pride was not an FDCPA debt collector for pre-default HOA dues. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Marybeth Abodeely owned an Oasis condominium. The June 30, 2021 ruling states that The Oasis Association was the homeowners association for the condominium complex and that The Management Trust was hired by Oasis to manage it. The court described the governing documents as including Oasis’s CC&Rs and House Rules.

The dispute began with May 2018 notices directing Abodeely to clean up her patio and remove empty planters from common areas. The ruling quoted House Rules limiting porch areas to appropriate furniture and small potted plants, requiring unsightly items to be removed on HOA request, and restricting visible textile items. It also quoted CC&R section 15.2, which restricted what could be stored, placed, erected, hung, or permitted on patios, balconies, common elements, exterior building areas, windows, and outside doors except for customary patio furniture and potted plants.

Abodeely did not comply with the request to remove the empty planters, and Oasis began fining her on June 8, 2018. She hired counsel to dispute the fines, and counsel exchanged letters about the fines and policies. Earlier in the case, the court dismissed The Management Trust because Abodeely had not alleged that the manager owed statutory or common-law duties to her or acted outside its agency role for Oasis. The Marsh defendants also had been dismissed before the summary-judgment ruling.

Abodeely moved for partial summary judgment on a claimed breach of statutory and common-law duties, declaratory relief, and an injunction. She argued that Oasis had failed to enforce the CC&Rs against the Marsh dog, sent successive and harassing violation notices, photographed her property, and adopted arbitrary rules targeted at her. The court denied her motion, finding it rested on conclusory statements and did not show an absence of disputed facts.

Oasis also moved for summary judgment. The court granted Oasis summary judgment on the dog-related portions of the statutory-duty, injunction, and declaratory-judgment claims because Oasis showed that it had to make reasonable accommodations to its no-pet policy and could not enforce that policy against the Marsh dog. But the court denied Oasis summary judgment on the remaining violation-notice and fine issues. It found genuine disputes or an unclear record about which notices were at issue, whether Oasis violated A.R.S. § 33-1803, and whether it was reasonable to start fines 14 days after the first notice while Abodeely still had 7 days to respond.

Oasis later moved for reconsideration on damages. On July 22, 2021, the court denied reconsideration and clarified that it had not concluded Abodeely would recover emotional damages; it had only concluded that it could not rule out such damages on the record. Later entries show the parties reported an official settlement reached on September 1, 2022, with funding and Medicare consent issues still being discussed in May 2023, and a May 23, 2023 order extended the time for any motion to enforce settlement.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association (CV2020-001329 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Fine claims survived where Oasis may have fined before the A.R.S. § 33-1803 response period expired. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Marybeth Abodeely v. The Oasis Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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AAM brought a special action after the Board of Legal Document Preparers disagreed with a retired judge’s decision about HOA lien paperwork. The court framed the issue as a discrete legal question: whether a legal document preparer may sign a lien it prepared on behalf of a homeowners association.

The court explained that Rule 31 of the Arizona Supreme Court Rules defines the practice of law and prohibits unauthorized practice subject to exemptions. It also considered section 7-208 of the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration, which governs legal-document-preparer activities.

The Board’s position was that the legal document preparer could not sign the lien. The superior court disagreed. It reasoned that corporations can act only through agents and generally may appoint and retain agents as they choose. The court found no persuasive explanation for treating the mere signing of a lien as the practice of law when similar corporate-agent signatures on checks, contracts, deeds, and other binding documents would not be treated that way.

The court also noted that a UPL advisory opinion recognized that a duly authorized agent can sign a lien. In the court’s view, it made no sense to allow a homeowners association to appoint a random agent to sign liens but forbid it from appointing a legal document preparer to do the same thing.

On August 20, 2012, the court granted AAM’s claim for relief and directed AAM to lodge a form of judgment. On October 26, 2012, the court stated that it had modified and signed the judgment to direct the Board to modify its order to conform to the ruling. The court struck AAM’s requested refund language because the requested refunds were outside the pleadings and evidence presented.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of AAM, LLC v. Board of Legal Document Preparers (LC2012-000317 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). AAM won a special action allowing an authorized legal document preparer to sign an HOA lien as agent. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in AAM, LLC v. Board of Legal Document Preparers. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Robert Peshek served on the board of the Anasazi Village condominium association from 2014 until May 2016. According to the court’s summary-judgment findings, homeowners removed him from the board on or about May 25, 2016, and he sued Anasazi, Paul Jensen, and AAM alleging that the removal was improper.

The court found that a recall action began when homeowner Michael McGrane submitted a petition to AAM representative Wayne Yurk on or about May 2, 2016. Yurk assessed that the petition had more than 100 signers. The board then called a special meeting of members and sent a May 9, 2016 letter to homeowners with notice of the May 25 meeting, the location, the time, the subject matter, and an absentee ballot.

Peshek actually received the notice and ballot on or before May 18, 2016. He mailed in a ballot voting against his own removal, and the ballot was received by the board or AAM on May 24, the day before the special meeting. At the May 25 meeting, the board found a quorum, members were given an opportunity to be heard, Peshek did not appear, and more than 50% of those eligible to vote under the quorum voted to remove him. Wayne Yurk then gave Peshek notice that he had been removed.

The August 20, 2018 ruling treated the breach-of-contract and state-law claims together because both depended on the recall procedure. The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1243(H), including the petition threshold, special meeting, quorum, and majority-vote requirements, and found the Declaration allowed removal of a board member with or without cause while incorporating that statutory procedure. On that record, the court held the defendants had shown no genuine dispute that all statutory and Declaration requirements were met.

Peshek’s response did not create a triable factual issue. The court said he asserted possible irregularities in petition signatures, notice, and the opportunity to be heard, but offered no admissible or reliable evidence to support those claims or counter the defendants’ showing. It also held that even if Jensen initiated the recall or had an improper motive, that did not matter because the governing law required only proper procedure, which was followed.

The court also rejected good-faith-and-fair-dealing and tortious-interference theories. Under the Declaration, Peshek had rights such as undisturbed property use, common-area maintenance, and enforcement of behaviors affecting value, but he had no contractual right to be on the board. The court found no supported damages from removal from an uncompensated board position and no admissible evidence that defendants caused him to lose expected benefits under the Declaration. Summary judgment was granted in full.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc. (CV2017-056168 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Condo board recall upheld where the association followed A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) and the Declaration. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Robert Peshek v. Anasazi Village Condominiums Homeowners Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

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Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Lakewood Community Association filed this Maricopa County Superior Court case in 2017. The December 12, 2018 findings explain the background: in a 2014 Lakewood case, the association had brought an action to require removal of a wall that the court found violated the community’s conditions, covenants, and restrictions. A permanent injunction ordered removal and awarded the association its fees and costs. The current case was described in the same findings as an action to enforce orders entered in that earlier case.

Stephen Edwards responded with counterclaims and cross-claims against Lakewood, attorney Quinten Cupps, association members, neighbors, and others. The January 4, 2018 under-advisement ruling resolved many of those claims. The court granted Lakewood’s motion to dismiss Edwards’s counter-complaint, relying on Lakewood’s res judicata and immunity arguments and on a prior 2016 order in another Edwards v. Lakewood case. It also denied Edwards’s own motion for summary judgment, finding it unsupported by evidence and legally insufficient.

The court then turned to the litigation conduct itself. Lakewood and David Lunn were granted permission to file a vexatious-litigant motion, and the court set an evidentiary hearing. The May 24, 2018 status-conference ruling limited discovery to that issue and denied requests for Lakewood billing records, board-member depositions, and videotaped interviews. At the September 28, 2018 evidentiary hearing, the court received Lakewood and Lunn’s exhibits and evidence, noted that Edwards had not appeared despite notice, and took proposed findings under advisement.

Judge Hegyi’s December 12, 2018 minute entry applied A.R.S. § 12-3201. The court found that Edwards had been a party to forty-one civil cases in Maricopa County Superior Court, that the court’s record did not show a single successful claim among the adjudicated matters, and that the Lakewood-related filings arose from the earlier CC&R-wall dispute. The court concluded that Edwards had consistently filed or defended actions for harassment, repeatedly sought relief already denied, advanced claims without substantial justification, and expanded or delayed proceedings.

The court recommended that Edwards, plus entities he solely owned or controlled, be declared vexatious litigants and be prohibited from filing new pleadings, motions, or other documents without prior leave. Later rulings denied reconsideration and new-trial requests, granted Lakewood $12,406.00 in additional attorneys’ fees and $71.64 in costs, denied Edwards’s motion to extinguish the lien, and denied his July 2019 motion to quash after finding he had not objected to the proposed judgment form or sought a stay. On October 4, 2019, Judge Viola dismissed any remaining unadjudicated claims and parties without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of The Lakewood Community Association v. Stephen S. Edwards et al. (CV2017-003266 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Court recommended vexatious-litigant limits after repeated filings from a CC&R wall dispute. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in The Lakewood Community Association v. Stephen S. Edwards et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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Empire West Title Agency LLC filed this Maricopa County Superior Court case against Charles Hoskins. The collected minute entries are limited to competing applications for release of proceeds involving Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company.

On September 19, 2011, the court reviewed American Savings’ application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g), Wigwam Creek’s objection to that application, Wigwam Creek’s own application for release of proceeds, and Westwind’s application for release of proceeds. The court set an in-person hearing for September 22, 2011.

At the September 22 hearing, Melissa A. Lovonier appeared for Wigwam Creek and Westwind, and Gove L. Allen appeared for American Savings. No other parties appeared. The court heard argument on the competing applications and took the matter under advisement.

Later that same minute entry, the court stated that it had considered the applications, oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau. It then directed the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

The minute entries do not contain broader analysis of HOA assessment liens, CC&Rs, foreclosure priority, or association governance. This page therefore treats the case as a narrow example of homeowners associations participating as claimants in a proceeds-distribution proceeding.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins (CV2011-053961 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Two HOAs received priority distributions from trustee-sale proceeds before the remaining balance went to a lender. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings