Hallcraft Villas East v. Lamb: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Property Judgment | Stipulated Order | CV2002-092314

The court entered a stipulated order allowing the HOA to obtain judgment on the property while taking no money judgment against an insurer.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Hallcraft Villas East I II & III Homeowners Association Inc. v. Kenneth Ray Lamb, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2002-092314.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2002-11-25. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Hallcraft Villas East I II & III Homeowners Association Inc. v. Kenneth Ray Lamb, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2002-092314) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from one filed minute entry: the November 25, 2002 stipulated order. Currency caveat: no later judgment, sale, satisfaction, appeal, or collection record is included in the collected minute entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The only sourced ruling is a stipulated priority/order-to-judgment entry. It allowed the HOA to obtain judgment on the property while preserving that no money judgment would be entered against the insurer and that the insurer’s interest was subordinate to the association’s interest.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Hallcraft Villas East I II & III Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association authorized by the stipulated order to obtain judgment on the subject real property.
  • Kenneth Ray Lamb (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the association case.
  • Automobile Club Insurance Company (Defendant)
    Insurer party to the stipulation; no money judgment was to be taken against it, and its interest was subordinate to the association’s interest.
  • Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association in the minute entry.
  • Hon. Bethany G. Hicks (Judge)
    Judge who entered the stipulated order.

What happened

The association sued Kenneth Ray Lamb and other defendants in a case involving the subject real property. The only collected minute entry is a stipulated order between the association and Automobile Club Insurance Company.

The order allowed the association to obtain judgment on the real property consistent with the complaint. It expressly stated that no money judgment would be taken against Automobile Club Insurance Company.

The order also provided that Automobile Club Insurance Company’s interest was subordinate to the association’s interest and that each party would bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in the action.

Because the collected record is limited to this stipulation, the page does not infer the amount owed, the basis for the association’s claim, whether a foreclosure sale occurred, or how the case ended as to other defendants.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Hallcraft Villas East v. Lamb (CV2002-092314 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA could take judgment on the property while an insurer’s interest was treated as subordinate by stipulation. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Hallcraft Villas East v. Lamb. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2002-11-25 The court enters a stipulated order allowing the HOA to obtain judgment on the property, preserving no money judgment against Automobile Club Insurance Company, and treating the insurer’s interest as subordinate.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 1 PDF from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2002-11-25

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Stipulated order allowing the association to obtain judgment on the real property, treating the insurer’s interest as subordinate, and requiring each side to bear its own fees and costs.

FAQ

What does this case show?

It shows a stipulated order allowing an HOA to obtain judgment on real property while preserving priority terms with an insurer.

Did the court decide the amount owed?

The collected minute entry does not state an amount owed or analyze the association’s underlying claim.

Was there a money judgment against the insurer?

No. The order says no money judgment would be taken against Automobile Club Insurance Company.

Did the insurer’s interest remain ahead of the HOA?

No. The stipulated order states that the insurer’s interest was subordinate to the association’s interest.

Is this a substantive HOA lien precedent?

No. It is a superior-court stipulated order with no legal analysis and no precedential value.

Why is this case classified as standard?

It is a routine, thin, stipulated real-property judgment entry and does not interpret HOA statutes or governing documents.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2002-092314 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 25, 2002
Judge / panelHon. Bethany G. Hicks
PartiesHallcraft Villas East I II & III Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Kenneth Ray Lamb, et al. (Defendants)
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court entered the parties’ stipulated order allowing the homeowners association to obtain judgment on the subject real property consistent with the complaint, with no money judgment against Automobile Club Insurance Company and with that insurer’s interest subordinate to the association’s interest.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap1 roadmap entry
Video overviewHallcraft Villas East v. Lamb
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Hallcraft Villas East I II & III Homeowners Association obtained a stipulated order with an insurer allowing the association to obtain judgment on the subject real property, while taking no money judgment against that insurer and recognizing the insurer’s interest as subordinate to the association’s interest.

Key Issues & Findings

The only collected minute entry is a signed stipulated order between the association and Automobile Club Insurance Company. The order did not analyze the underlying assessment or lien claim. It provided that the association could obtain judgment on the property, that no money judgment would be taken against the insurer, that the insurer’s interest was subordinate to the association’s interest, and that each party would bear its own costs and fees.

Why It Matters

This case is useful only as a narrow example of an older HOA real-property judgment resolving priority with an insurer by stipulation. It does not provide substantive analysis of Arizona HOA lien law, assessment validity, or foreclosure procedure.

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Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Lien Foreclosure | Default Packet | CV2014-094190

The court rejected the association’s lien-foreclosure default packet because the case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Tanglewood HOA v. Molly Fagen, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094190.

Scope note: This page covers Tanglewood HOA v. Molly Fagen, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094190) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from five filed minute entries, especially the August 11, 2015 dismissal, the January 7, 2016 ruling denying reinstatement, and the February 4, 2016 order rejecting the default packet. Currency caveat: the collected record ends with the February 4, 2016 order. Any later refiling, payment, settlement, or title activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

An HOA lien-foreclosure default packet is not enough if the case has already been dismissed. The association first needed a successful reinstatement order; without that, the commissioner rejected the default package because there was no pending case in which to enter judgment.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Tanglewood HOA (Plaintiff)
    Association that filed the lien-foreclosure and money-judgment action.
  • Molly Fagen (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the association’s foreclosure case.
  • Jason Fagen (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the association’s foreclosure case.
  • James Portman Webster (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Tanglewood HOA in the minute entries.
  • Hon. Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
    Judge who dismissed the case and denied the motion to reinstate.
  • Comm. Margaret Benny (Commissioner)
    Commissioner who rejected the default packet after dismissal.

What happened

Tanglewood HOA filed a lien-foreclosure and money-judgment case against the defendants. Early minute entries show the court directing the association to pursue default judgment through the commissioner’s default-judgment process.

In April 2015, the assigned judge noted that the defendants had not answered or otherwise appeared. Because no default judgment had been entered, the court continued the case on the dismissal calendar and warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered before the deadline.

No default judgment was entered before the deadline. On August 11, 2015, the court dismissed all unadjudicated claims without prejudice and signed the minute entry as a final Rule 54(c) order.

The association later moved to reinstate the case. On January 7, 2016, the court denied reinstatement because the motion contained no grounds for reinstatement. The next month, Commissioner Benny received the association’s default packet for a lien foreclosure and money judgment, but rejected it because the case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen (CV2014-094190 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA default packet for lien foreclosure was rejected after the case had already been dismissed. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Tanglewood HOA v. Fagen. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-09-16 The court explains the default-judgment packet process for the association’s application for entry of default.
Step 2015-04-22 The court continues the case on the dismissal calendar unless default judgment is entered by the deadline.
Step 2015-08-11 The court dismisses all unadjudicated claims without prejudice after no default judgment is entered.
Step 2016-01-07 The court denies Tanglewood HOA’s motion to reinstate because the motion states no grounds.
Step 2016-02-04 The commissioner rejects the association’s lien-foreclosure and money-judgment default packet because the case has been dismissed.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2014-09-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2015-04-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2015-08-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Final dismissal minute entry dismissing all unadjudicated claims without prejudice after no default judgment was entered by the dismissal-calendar deadline.

Download source file
Source 4 2016-01-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Tanglewood HOA’s motion to reinstate because the motion contained no grounds for reinstatement.

Download source file
Source 5 2016-02-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Order rejecting Tanglewood HOA’s default packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Download source file

FAQ

Did the HOA obtain a foreclosure judgment in the collected record?

No. The final collected order rejected the association’s default packet because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Why was the case dismissed?

The court had placed the matter on the dismissal calendar and warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered by the deadline. No default judgment was entered before that deadline.

Why did the court deny reinstatement?

The January 2016 ruling states that the motion to reinstate contained no grounds for reinstatement.

What did the default-packet order decide?

The commissioner rejected the packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Is this a broad HOA-law ruling?

No. It is a narrow procedural superior-court order about dismissal, reinstatement, and default-judgment procedure in an HOA lien-foreclosure case.

Why is this case classified as standard?

It involved an HOA lien foreclosure, but the collected record does not include a substantive merits ruling interpreting HOA statutes or governing documents.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2014-094190 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 4, 2016
Judge / panelHon. Robert H. Oberbillig, Hon. Mark F. Aceto, Comm. Margaret Benny
PartiesTanglewood HOA (Plaintiff) v. Molly Fagen and Jason Fagen (Defendants)
Topics
ForeclosureLiensAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court denied the association’s motion to reinstate because it stated no grounds for reinstatement. It then rejected the association’s default packet for a lien foreclosure and money judgment because the case had already been dismissed without prejudice.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewTanglewood HOA v. Fagen
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Tanglewood HOA filed a lien-foreclosure and money-judgment case. After the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to obtain default judgment by the dismissal-calendar deadline, the court denied the association’s motion to reinstate and later rejected its default packet because no case remained pending.

Key Issues & Findings

The April 2015 minute entry put the case on the dismissal calendar because defendants had not answered or otherwise appeared and default judgment had not been entered. The court warned that unadjudicated claims would be dismissed unless default judgment was entered by the new deadline.

No qualifying action was taken before the deadline, so on August 11, 2015 the court dismissed all claims without prejudice under Rule 54(c). When the association later moved to reinstate, the court denied the motion because it contained no grounds for reinstatement. Commissioner Benny then rejected the default packet for lien foreclosure and money judgment because the underlying case had already been dismissed and reinstatement had been denied.

Why It Matters

This case is a narrow procedural reminder for HOA assessment and lien-foreclosure practice: a default packet cannot revive a dismissed case. If an association misses a dismissal-calendar deadline, it needs an adequate basis for reinstatement before default judgment can be considered.

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Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association v. Bey: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA Foreclosure | Excess Proceeds | CV2013-015763

The court kept the association foreclosure judgment intact and later handled applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763.

Scope note: This page covers Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Malik Bey, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-015763) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the July 29, 2014 oral-argument entry, the October 21, 2014 emergency-motion ruling, the October 22, 2015 ruling denying a motion to vacate default judgment, and the later excess-proceeds entries. Currency caveat: the collected record ends with the July 10, 2020 minute entry stating that an order releasing excess proceeds to the United States had already been entered. Any later collection, title, bankruptcy, or appeal activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Once the association foreclosure judgment had been entered, the superior court repeatedly declined to reopen it. Later proceedings shifted away from the merits of the HOA lien and toward who could receive excess proceeds from the judicial sale and what notice had to be given.

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that brought the lien-foreclosure action and obtained the foreclosure judgment.
  • Malik Bey (Defendant)
    Defendant who filed post-judgment motions seeking to set aside, stay, or vacate the foreclosure judgment and proceedings.
  • M. Tariq-Bey (Defendant)
    Named defendant in the foreclosure action.
  • United States of America (Intervenor)
    Intervened in later proceedings concerning release of excess proceeds from the judicial sale.
  • Dolores Wallace (Claimant)
    Appeared in the later excess-proceeds phase.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association in the minute entries.
  • Anne E. Nelson (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the United States in the later excess-proceeds proceedings.
  • Hon. David W. Garbarino (Judge)
    Judge who handled the later excess-proceeds proceedings after remand.
  • Commissioner James R. Morrow (Commissioner)
    Superior Court Commissioner who denied the October 22, 2015 Motion to Vacate Default Judgment (the featured ruling) and decided most of the post-judgment motions.
  • Hon. James T. Blomo (Judge)
    Judge who ruled on the defendant's June 2015 emergency petition for a temporary restraining order.
  • Hon. Randall H. Warner (Judge)
    Civil Presiding Judge who denied the November 6, 2015 motion for change of judge for cause, finding no showing of judicial bias.

What happened

The association filed a lien-foreclosure case and obtained a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. The collected minute entries begin around the post-judgment stage, when defendants sought to set aside or stop foreclosure-related proceedings.

On July 29, 2014, the court heard oral argument and denied Malik Bey’s motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, the court denied an emergency motion seeking to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings, stating that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

The post-judgment challenges continued. In October 2015, the court denied a motion to vacate default judgment. The ruling addressed the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court found that the record did not support the argument because the association attached the Cottonflower-Goodyear Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions as an exhibit to its complaint.

A later phase concerned excess proceeds from the judicial sale. In 2017, the court denied an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if the applicant filed and served a proper application. In 2019, after remand from federal court, the court allowed the United States to pursue an excess-proceeds application and ordered service on affected defendants.

The final collected minute entry, dated July 10, 2020, states that the court had already entered an order releasing the excess proceeds to the United States and therefore took no further action on the amended application.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey (CV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA foreclosure judgment stood after challenges, with later excess-sale proceeds handled through court process. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-05-28 Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is referenced in later minute entries as having been entered on this date.
Step 2014-07-29 The court denies Malik Bey's motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure after oral argument.
Step 2014-10-21 The court denies an emergency motion to stay or vacate foreclosure proceedings.
Step 2015-10-22 The court denies a motion to vacate default judgment and rejects the argument that the association failed to attach the declaration to the foreclosure complaint.
Step 2017-02-08 The court denies an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice if a proper application is filed and served.
Step 2019-04-29 After remand, the court permits the United States to file an application for release of excess proceeds and requires service on all defendants.
Step 2020-04-03 The court grants the United States a new service-by-publication schedule for the excess-proceeds application.
Step 2020-07-10 The court states it has already entered an order releasing the excess proceeds to the United States and takes no further action.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 23 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2014-05-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2014-05-14

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 3 2014-06-26

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2014-07-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2014-07-29

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry denying Malik Bey's motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure after argument.

Download source file
Source 6 2014-09-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2014-10-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying an emergency request to stay or vacate the foreclosure proceedings because judgment had already been entered and the set-aside motion had been denied.

Download source file
Source 8 2014-11-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 9 2015-01-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2015-06-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying multiple post-judgment requests, including renewed efforts to enjoin, vacate, or otherwise disrupt the foreclosure judgment and related proceedings.

Download source file
Source 11 2015-10-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the motion to vacate default judgment and rejecting the argument that the association failed to attach the Cottonflower-Goodyear declaration to the foreclosure complaint.

Download source file
Source 12 2015-11-06

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the request for change of judge for cause after finding no showing of judicial bias or prejudice under A.R.S. § 12-409(B)(5).

Download source file
Source 13 2016-04-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 14 2017-01-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 15 2017-02-08

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry denying an application for release of excess proceeds without prejudice to filing a procedurally proper application.

Source 16 2019-04-10

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 17 2019-04-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2019-04-29

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 19 2019-08-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 20 2019-09-16

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 21 2020-03-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 22 2020-04-03

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry granting the United States a new service-by-publication schedule for its excess-proceeds application.

Source 23 2020-07-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry stating that the court had already entered an order releasing the judicial-sale excess proceeds to the United States and took no further action.

Download source file

FAQ

Was this a published appellate decision?

No. This is a Maricopa County Superior Court case built from minute entries. It binds only the parties and is not precedent.

What was the main HOA issue?

The collected entries concern an association lien foreclosure judgment and later efforts to set aside, stay, or vacate that foreclosure judgment.

Did the court reopen the foreclosure judgment?

No. The collected rulings denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and default judgment.

What did the October 2015 ruling say about the declaration?

The court rejected the argument that the association failed to attach necessary foreclosure documents, finding that the Cottonflower-Goodyear declaration was attached as Exhibit B to the complaint.

Why were there later entries after the foreclosure judgment?

Later entries concerned applications for excess proceeds from the judicial sale, including notice and service issues and an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Why is this case classified as standard?

The record is useful procedurally, but it does not include a broad merits ruling interpreting HOA statutes or CC&R provisions for general application.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2013-015763 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 22, 2015
Judge / panelCommissioner James R. Morrow, Hon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Randall H. Warner, Hon. David W. Garbarino
PartiesCottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Malik Bey, et al. (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-812
Topics
ForeclosureLiensAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court left the HOA foreclosure judgment in place. It denied motions to set aside, stay, or vacate the judgment and later denied a motion to vacate default judgment after finding that the record did not support the argument that the association failed to attach the governing declaration to its foreclosure complaint.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package23 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap8 roadmap entries
Video overviewCottonflower Goodyear Community Association, Inc. v. Bey
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Cottonflower Goodyear Community Association obtained a foreclosure judgment and sale. The superior court later denied repeated efforts to set aside or vacate the judgment and handled competing post-sale excess-proceeds requests, including an application by the United States after remand from federal court.

Key Issues & Findings

The key post-judgment rulings treated the association foreclosure case as already reduced to judgment and sale. On July 29, 2014, the court denied Malik Bey's motion to set aside the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. On October 21, 2014, it denied an emergency request to stay or vacate the foreclosure proceedings, noting that judgment had been entered on May 28, 2014 and that the motion to set aside had already been denied.

In the October 22, 2015 ruling, the court addressed a renewed argument that the plaintiff failed to attach necessary documents to the complaint to foreclose a lien. The court rejected that challenge because the record showed that the association attached a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Cottonflower-Goodyear as Exhibit B to the complaint. Later entries focused on excess sale proceeds, including service requirements and the United States' application after federal-court remand.

Why It Matters

This case is useful mainly as a procedural example of a superior-court HOA lien foreclosure that survived multiple post-judgment challenges. It also shows how excess proceeds from an association foreclosure sale can remain in court and require separate notice and application practice after the foreclosure judgment itself is no longer being revisited.

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Val Vista Lakes Community Association v. Rodriguez: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessments | Rule 56 Response | CV2024-090662

A routine assessment-collection case became a useful procedural example: the court gave homeowners additional time to retain counsel and file a proper summary-judgment response, then granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment when no compliant response followed.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-090662.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2025-04-14. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Scope note: This page covers Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-090662) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 21, 2025 extension order and the April 14, 2025 summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the court granting summary judgment and inviting a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement; this draft does not include a later signed judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

In an assessment-collection case, disputing a statement of facts in general terms is not enough to defeat summary judgment. After the court gave the homeowners extra time to retain counsel and file a Rule 56-compliant response, no additional response was filed. The court held the association met its initial burden and the homeowners did not meet their responsive burden, so it granted summary judgment.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association seeking judgment for past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees.
  • Charles B. Sellers (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Respondent Side

  • Ben J. Rodriguez (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant listed as self-represented in the minute entries.
  • Stephanie L. Cox (Defendant)
    Homeowner defendant listed as self-represented in the minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Driggs (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the extension order and the summary-judgment ruling.
  • Meggan Elizabeth Medina (Arbitrator)
    Arbitrator listed in later minute entries after an earlier appointed arbitrator was excused.

What happened

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox. The available minute entries do not include the complaint, but the summary-judgment ruling says the association sought judgment for past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees.

The early entries were procedural. In April 2024, the court granted the homeowners additional time to answer. In August 2024, the court excused an appointed arbitrator for good cause and sent the case back to Civil Court Administration for appointment of a new arbitrator.

The association filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2024. The homeowners filed a response titled as a motion to deny summary judgment or, alternatively, to extend time. The court found in January 2025 that the homeowners raised questions about whether the association’s counsel adequately communicated during efforts to resolve the dispute and whether sufficient information had been provided, but that their response did not conform to Rule 56.

Rather than immediately grant the motion, Judge Driggs allowed the homeowners 30 more days to retain counsel, file a proper Rule 56 response, and/or attempt to resolve the dispute without further increasing attorneys’ fees. The court specifically told them that, if they remained self-represented, they still needed to identify the numbered paragraphs in the association’s statement of facts they disputed and the facts creating a genuine dispute or otherwise precluding summary judgment.

No additional response was filed by the February 21, 2025 deadline. In the April 14, 2025 ruling, the court recited Arizona summary-judgment standards and found that the association met its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and explain why summary judgment was warranted. Because the homeowners did not meet their burden under Rule 56 despite the extra time, the court granted the association’s motion and allowed it to submit a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al. (CV2024-090662 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA won assessment-collection summary judgment after homeowners missed Rule 56 response requirements. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Val Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2024-04-15 The court grants the homeowners' motion to extend time to answer.
Step 2024-08-22 The court excuses the appointed arbitrator for good cause and sends the case for appointment of a new arbitrator.
Step 2024-10-02 Val Vista Lakes Community Association files the summary-judgment motion later addressed in the rulings.
Step 2025-01-21 The court gives the homeowners additional time, until February 21, 2025, to retain counsel and file a Rule 56-compliant response.
Step 2025-04-14 After no additional response is filed, the court grants the association summary judgment and permits a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 4 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2024-04-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2024-08-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2025-01-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2025-04-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment for claimed past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees after the homeowners did not file a Rule 56-compliant response despite extra time.

Download source file

FAQ

What was the association seeking?

The summary-judgment ruling says Val Vista Lakes Community Association sought judgment for $1,003.64, representing past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and/or other fees.

Why did the court give the homeowners more time?

The court found it reasonable to allow 30 additional days for the homeowners to retain counsel, file a proper Rule 56 response, and/or try to resolve the dispute without further increasing attorneys’ fees.

What was wrong with the homeowners' first response?

The court said the response did not conform to Rule 56. It reminded the homeowners that a proper response must specify which numbered facts are disputed and identify facts showing a genuine dispute or otherwise precluding summary judgment.

Why did the association win summary judgment?

After the court granted extra time, the homeowners did not file an additional response. The court found that the association met its burden to show no genuine issue of material fact and that the homeowners did not meet their responsive burden under Rule 56.

Did the court enter a final money judgment in the collected entries?

Not in the collected entries for this draft. The April 14, 2025 ruling granted summary judgment and allowed the association to submit a proposed judgment with a fee application and statement of costs.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA assessment cases?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is mainly useful as a procedural example of how Rule 56 applies in a routine assessment-collection dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2024-090662 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateApril 14, 2025
Judge / panelHon. Adam D. Driggs
PartiesVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox (Defendants)
Topics
AssessmentsProcedureAttorney FeesCC&Rs
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Val Vista Lakes Community Association summary judgment in an assessment-related collection case after finding the association met its Rule 56 burden and the homeowners did not file a compliant response showing a genuine dispute of material fact despite being given extra time.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package4 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewVal Vista Lakes Community Association, The v. Ben J. Rodriguez, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Val Vista Lakes Community Association sued Ben J. Rodriguez and Stephanie L. Cox for a claimed $1,003.64 balance made up of past-due assessments, service fees, late charges, and other fees. The homeowners disputed breach and factual issues, including questions about communications and information provided during settlement efforts, but their response did not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Judge Adam D. Driggs gave them additional time to retain counsel and file a proper response. When no additional response was filed, the court granted the association summary judgment and permitted the association to submit a proposed judgment, fee application, and cost statement.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first gave the homeowners a procedural opportunity to fix their response. Their filing disputed breach of contract and raised questions about communication and information provided during settlement efforts, but the court found it did not conform to Rule 56. Judge Driggs extended the response deadline and explained that any response needed to identify the specific numbered facts disputed and the facts creating a genuine issue or otherwise defeating summary judgment.

When no additional response was filed, the court applied the ordinary summary-judgment burden framework. The moving party must produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and explain why judgment is warranted; if that burden is met, the nonmoving party must point to competent evidence justifying trial. The court found the association met its burden and the homeowners did not meet theirs. On that basis, it granted summary judgment and allowed the association to pursue a form of judgment, fees, and costs.

Why It Matters

For homeowners, the case is a practical Rule 56 warning: even in a small assessment dispute, a response must do more than generally dispute the association's claim. The homeowner must identify evidence and specific factual disputes in the form required by the rule.

For associations, the ruling shows a routine path to judgment where the ledger claim is supported and the owner does not make a competent evidentiary response after a fair opportunity to do so. It is not must-read authority because it does not interpret Title 33 or any CC&R provision; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Litigation | Mandatory Counterclaims | CV2025-060700

This case shows the procedural risk of filing a separate lawsuit over HOA foreclosure and assessment issues while another case about the same property and assessments is already pending: the court dismissed the separate action because the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in the earlier assessment case.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2026-02-10. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2025-060700) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the December 16, 2025 litigation-privilege ruling and the February 2, 2026 dismissal ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with denial of a motion to vacate dismissal; they also note a separate pending case, CV2023-013780, involving the same property and assessments. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A homeowner who is already litigating unpaid assessments cannot safely split related foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy, or de-annexation theories into a new lawsuit. The court dismissed this separate case because the subject matter was a mandatory counterclaim in the pending assessment case involving the same property and assessments. The court also protected the association’s lawyers with the litigation privilege for acts in the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steve Pandi (Plaintiff)
    Self-represented homeowner plaintiff who filed the separate action and multiple emergency, sanctions, and post-dismissal motions.

Respondent Side

  • Crown Point Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. The dismissal ruling states that a separate case was already pending in which the association sought to recover unpaid assessments involving the same property and assessments.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Counsel)
    Attorney defendant; the court held the claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they acted in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association.
  • Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendant)
    Law firm defendant dismissed under the litigation privilege.
  • Joseph A. Brophy (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Crown Point Homeowners Association in later minute entries.
  • Wm Michael Yohler (Counsel)
    Counsel name appearing for defendants in earlier minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the TRO, sanctions, litigation-privilege, dismissal, and post-dismissal rulings.
  • Richard Albrecht (Commissioner)
    Commissioner identified for any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after the plaintiff sought default against the association.

What happened

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. The January 22, 2026 minute entry identifies the attempted amended pleading as asserting fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court later stated that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking to recover unpaid assessments there.

The first ruling denied Pandi’s emergency request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Judge Michael J. Herrod wrote that the request was based on a damages complaint, asked the court to order the defendants to stop doing things the plaintiff said were bad, and did not seek equitable relief. The court later quashed the related order to show cause and denied another emergency TRO request.

The court dismissed Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. on December 16, 2025. It held that Pandi’s claims against the Mulcahy defendants were barred by the litigation privilege because they were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court also found the fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were outside the superior court’s jurisdiction. Crown Point’s joinder in that motion was denied because many defenses did not apply to the association, but the court gave Crown Point leave to file its own dismissal motion.

January 2026 brought several procedural rulings. The court denied sanctions motions against Mulcahy, the firm, Crown Point, and a nonparty; denied a motion to strike bankruptcy assertions; denied a third TRO application because Pandi could not identify an actor for the alleged vandalism; denied a motion to strike or file a sur-reply; struck a first amended complaint filed without leave; and denied discovery and deadline motions while Crown Point’s dismissal motion was pending.

On February 2, 2026, the court granted Crown Point Homeowners Association’s Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court found that Pandi had a pending case involving the same property and same assessments, that the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments in that case, and that the subject matter of this separate action was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised there. Because no defendants remained, the court dismissed the matter in its entirety and deemed all pending motions moot. It later denied a sanctions motion and a motion to vacate the dismissal.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al. (CV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Separate HOA foreclosure claims were dismissed as mandatory counterclaims in a pending assessment case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Steve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2025-12-01 The court summarily denies Pandi's emergency TRO/preliminary-injunction motion because it does not seek equitable relief.
Step 2025-12-16 The court dismisses Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege and allows Crown Point to file its own dismissal motion.
Step 2026-01-13 The court denies sanctions against Crown Point, noting no substantive ruling yet supported sanctions and service was improper.
Step 2026-01-22 The court denies a third TRO request, denies a strike/sur-reply motion, and strikes the first amended complaint filed without leave.
Step 2026-02-02 The court grants Crown Point's motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in pending case CV2023-013780 involving the same property and assessments.
Step 2026-02-10 The court denies Pandi's motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 14 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2025-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling summarily denying Steve Pandi's emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because the motion did not seek equitable relief.

Download source file
Source 2 2025-12-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2025-12-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. under the litigation privilege while denying Crown Point Homeowners Association's joinder and allowing it to file its own motion to dismiss.

Download source file
Source 4 2026-01-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling quashing the order to show cause and denying Steve Pandi's December 10, 2025 emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.

Download source file
Source 5 2026-01-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. as procedurally improper, unsupported, and legally deficient.

Download source file
Source 6 2026-01-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's sanctions motion against Crown Point Homeowners Association because no substantive ruling supported sanctions and service was improper.

Download source file
Source 7 2026-01-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to strike Crown Point Homeowners Association's bankruptcy assertions for the reasons stated in the association's response.

Download source file
Source 8 2026-01-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to deem a nonparty's nonresponse consent to sanctions because the sanctions motion was not properly served and the person was not a party.

Download source file
Source 9 2026-01-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's third application for temporary restraining order, denying his motion to strike or seek leave for a sur-reply, and striking his first amended complaint filed without leave.

Download source file
Source 10 2026-01-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to compel as premature while Crown Point Homeowners Association's motion to dismiss was pending and denying his request to maintain existing deadlines.

Download source file
Source 11 2026-01-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2026-02-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Crown Point Homeowners Association's Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in the pending unpaid-assessments case involving the same property and assessments.

Download source file
Source 13 2026-02-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's post-dismissal sanctions motion against the defendants and defense counsel because the matter had been dismissed.

Download source file
Source 14 2026-02-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Steve Pandi's motion to vacate the dismissal order and for relief from judgment.

Download source file

FAQ

Why did the court dismiss the claims against the HOA lawyers?

The court held the claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. were barred by the litigation privilege because the Mulcahy defendants were acting in the course and scope of representing Crown Point Homeowners Association. It also found the fraud allegations lacked specificity and bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction.

Why did the court dismiss the claims against Crown Point Homeowners Association?

The court found that another case, CV2023-013780, already involved the same property and the same assessments, with the association seeking unpaid assessments there. The subject matter of this separate lawsuit was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in that pending case.

Did the court decide whether the HOA foreclosure or assessment allegations were true?

No. The January 13, 2026 sanctions ruling expressly said no motion for summary judgment had been filed by the plaintiff or granted on any factual issue, and the February 2 dismissal rested on the mandatory-counterclaim problem rather than merits findings on foreclosure or assessment liability.

What happened to the TRO requests?

The court denied repeated emergency TRO or preliminary-injunction requests. It said the first request did not seek equitable relief, later quashed an order to show cause, and denied the third TRO request because the plaintiff could not identify an actor who committed the alleged vandalism.

What is the practical lesson for homeowners?

If an HOA has an active lawsuit over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related claims about foreclosure, fraud, or association status may need to be raised as counterclaims in that case. Filing a separate lawsuit can lead to dismissal without a merits ruling.

Is this ruling precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This case is useful primarily as a procedural example of litigation privilege and mandatory-counterclaim treatment in an HOA assessment dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2025-060700 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateFebruary 2, 2026
Judge / panelHon. Michael J. Herrod
PartiesSteve Pandi (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. (Defendants)
Topics
AssessmentsForeclosureLiensProcedureFDCPABankruptcy
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the separate lawsuit against Crown Point Homeowners Association because the claims were mandatory counterclaims in a pending case involving the same property and assessments, and it dismissed the association's lawyers under the litigation privilege for acts within the course and scope of representing the HOA.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package14 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap6 roadmap entries
Video overviewSteve Pandi v. Crown Point Homeowners Association, et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steve Pandi sued Crown Point Homeowners Association, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law P.C. over alleged fraud, fraudulent foreclosure, bankruptcy violations, and permanent de-annexation from the association. The court denied repeated emergency TRO requests and sanctions motions. It dismissed the Mulcahy defendants because the litigation privilege protected acts taken in the course and scope of representing Crown Point, because fraud was not pleaded with specificity, and because bankruptcy-violation claims were outside superior-court jurisdiction. The court then granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and assessments, so the subject matter belonged as a mandatory counterclaim in that assessment case.

Key Issues & Findings

For the lawyer defendants, the court held that the litigation privilege barred claims against Beth Mulcahy and Mulcahy Law P.C. because they were acting in the course and scope of their representation of Crown Point Homeowners Association. The court added that fraud claims were not pleaded with specificity and that bankruptcy-violation claims were not within superior-court jurisdiction.

For the association, the court focused on claim splitting. It found that Pandi already had a pending case involving the same property and the same assessments, CV2023-013780, where the association was seeking to recover unpaid assessments. The subject matter of the new case therefore was a mandatory counterclaim that should have been raised in the pending assessment case. The court granted Crown Point's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion, dismissed the matter in its entirety because no defendants remained, and later denied post-dismissal sanctions and relief-from-judgment motions.

Why It Matters

This case is a procedural caution for HOA assessment litigation. When an association has already sued over unpaid assessments involving the same property, related homeowner theories about foreclosure, fraud, bankruptcy effects, or association status may have to be raised in that action as counterclaims. A separate lawsuit can be dismissed before the court reaches the merits.

The case also illustrates how the litigation privilege can protect HOA collection counsel for conduct within the representation, even when the homeowner names the lawyer and law firm as defendants. It is standard rather than must-read because it does not interpret Title 33 or a declaration provision on the merits; as a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties and is not precedent.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Dispute & Derivative Standing | A.R.S. §§ 10-3631, 10-3632 | CV2015-053962

This Maricopa County Superior Court case shows three recurring limits on owner litigation against an association, its board, and its counsel. Individual board-member claims failed because board duties were owed to the association, not directly to the owner, and any claim on the association’s behalf had to satisfy Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes. Claims against association counsel failed because the lawyer owed duties to the association, not individual members. The remaining claims then failed on summary judgment because the court accepted the defendants’ reading of the CC&R annual-assessment provision.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Wayne L. Mullins v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-053962) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 19, 2016 partial dismissal ruling, the March 31, 2016 fiduciary-duty dismissal ruling, the September 19, 2016 summary-judgment ruling, and the November 10, 2016 judgment entry; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the November 10, 2016 entry approving formal written judgment against Mullins; any later appellate or collection history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court drew a line between claims an HOA member may bring directly and claims that belong to the association. Duties of board members were owed to Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, so an owner could pursue those claims only derivatively and only by satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The association’s lawyer likewise owed duties to the association, not to individual members. After those claims were dismissed, the remaining contract-related claims failed because the court accepted the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs regarding the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff)
    Homeowner plaintiff who represented himself and brought claims against the association, board-member defendants, neighboring individuals, Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Respondent Side

  • The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc. (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. Some contract-related claims initially survived dismissal, but the association and other defendants later won summary judgment on the remaining claims.
  • Bill Stevens, Ira Rose, Steven Scholfield, Kay Lynne Jacobson, Tina Stevens, and Kathleen Baughman (Board-member defendants)
    Defendants described in the January 2016 ruling as board members; the court dismissed personal claims against them because their duties were owed to the association and any association claim had to be derivative.
  • Andrea Stevens (Defendant)
    Individual defendant listed in the caption and later included in the defendants entitled to seek fees or costs after summary judgment.
  • Beth Mulcahy (Defendant / Association counsel)
    Attorney defendant. The court dismissed claims against her with prejudice, holding that an association lawyer has no duty to individual association members and generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct.
  • Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendant)
    Law-firm defendant whose claims were dismissed with prejudice along with Beth Mulcahy’s claims; the March 2016 ruling also denied Mullins’s sanctions request against the firm and Mulcahy.
  • Mark E. Lines (Counsel)
    Counsel listed for the association and several defendants in the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the dismissal, summary-judgment, reconsideration, and judgment-related entries.

What happened

Wayne L. Mullins sued The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., several board-member defendants, other individuals, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The collected minute entries do not reproduce the full complaint, but the January 19, 2016 ruling identifies claims against board members, claims against association counsel, breach-of-contract claims against the association, statutory-violation counts, tort claims, unjust enrichment, and an extortion theory.

The first ruling substantially narrowed the case. Judge John R. Hannah Jr. held Mullins lacked standing to bring claims personally against the board-member defendants because their duties were owed to the association. A member could bring causes of action on behalf of the association only as derivative claims under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, and Mullins had not pleaded derivative claims or satisfied the statutory prerequisites. The court dismissed the claims against the board-member defendants on that basis.

The court also dismissed claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice. It held that the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual members of the association. It also stated that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct, and that no narrow exception was alleged. Several other counts were dismissed as well: statutory-violation counts seeking damages because the sole remedy was injunctive relief, an extortion count because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, emotional-distress and punitive-damages counts because the alleged facts were not outrageous enough, and aiding-and-abetting because no tort claim remained.

Some claims against the association initially survived. The January ruling allowed factually distinct breach-of-contract claims, an unjust-enrichment claim, and at first a fiduciary-duty count against the association because the association had not developed its argument. On March 31, 2016, however, the court granted a renewed motion to dismiss Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty and denied Mullins’s sanctions and reconsideration-related requests.

The dispositive ruling came on September 19, 2016. The court considered the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. That interpretation controlled both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation of the CC&Rs, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to the defendants.

Mullins moved for reconsideration and asked the court to rule on leave to amend his complaint. The court denied that motion on October 5, 2016. On November 10, 2016, the court approved and settled a formal written judgment against Mullins.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association (CV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Owner claims failed because board duties were derivative and the CC&Rs allowed the assessment increases. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Mullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-01-19 The court grants dismissal in part: board-member personal claims, Mulcahy claims, statutory damages counts, extortion, emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories are dismissed; selected contract-related claims against the association survive.
Step 2016-03-31 The court dismisses the fiduciary-duty count, denies sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denies reconsideration or extension relief from the January ruling.
Step 2016-09-19 The court grants defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supports defendants’ interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.
Step 2016-10-05 The court denies Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment ruling and to rule on leave to amend.
Step 2016-11-10 The court approves and enters formal written judgment against Mullins.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 5 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2016-01-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing claims against board-member defendants, dismissing claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm with prejudice, dismissing several statutory and tort counts, and allowing specified contract-related claims against the association to proceed.

Download source file
Source 2 2016-03-31

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing Count 6 for breach of fiduciary duty, denying sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm, and denying reconsideration or extension relief from the January 19, 2016 order.

Download source file
Source 3 2016-09-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting defendants summary judgment because the court agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Download source file
Source 4 2016-10-05

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Wayne Mullins’s motion to reconsider the summary-judgment order and to rule on his motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Download source file
Source 5 2016-11-10

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling formal written judgment against plaintiff Wayne L. Mullins.

FAQ

Why were the claims against individual board members dismissed?

The court held Mullins lacked standing to bring those claims directly because the board members’ duties were owed to the association. If Mullins wanted to assert claims on the association’s behalf, he had to plead derivative claims and satisfy A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632, which the court found he had not done.

Can an association member sue the association’s lawyer for duties owed to the HOA?

Not on the theory pleaded here. The court held that the association’s lawyer has no duty to individual members of the association, and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct absent a narrow exception not alleged in the complaint.

Which claims survived the first dismissal ruling?

The January 2016 ruling allowed selected breach-of-contract claims against the association, an unjust-enrichment claim, and initially a fiduciary-duty count because the association had not developed that argument. The fiduciary-duty count was later dismissed on March 31, 2016.

What did the summary-judgment ruling decide?

The court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because all remaining claims depended on Mullins’s contrary interpretation, the court held they failed as a matter of law.

Did the court award sanctions against Beth Mulcahy or the Mulcahy Law Firm?

No. The March 31, 2016 ruling denied Mullins’s request for sanctions against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one court handled direct-versus-derivative owner claims, claims against association counsel, and CC&R annual-assessment interpretation at summary judgment.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-053962 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 19, 2016
Judge / panelHon. John R. Hannah Jr.
PartiesWayne L. Mullins (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. The Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, Inc., board-member defendants, Andrea Stevens, Beth Mulcahy, and Mulcahy Law Firm, P.C. (Defendants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 10-3631
  • A.R.S. § 10-3632
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court dismissed the direct board-member and association-counsel claims, held that claims belonging to the association had to satisfy Arizona’s derivative-action statutes, and granted defendants summary judgment because Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs supported their interpretation of annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewMullins v. Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Wayne L. Mullins sued Nisbet Greens Homeowners Association, board-member defendants, attorney Beth Mulcahy, and the Mulcahy Law Firm over claims that included breach of contract, statutory violations, fiduciary duty, tort theories, unjust enrichment, and alleged attorney misconduct. The superior court dismissed direct personal claims against board members because their duties were owed to the association and any claim on the association’s behalf had to be derivative under A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. It dismissed claims against association counsel with prejudice because an HOA lawyer owes duties to the association, not individual members. After narrowing the case, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants because it agreed with their interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the CC&Rs on maximum annual assessments and annual-increase effective dates, making all remaining claims fail as a matter of law.

Key Issues & Findings

The court first separated direct owner claims from claims belonging to the association. Board members owed their duties to the association, not directly to Mullins, so Mullins could sue on the association’s behalf only through derivative claims satisfying A.R.S. §§ 10-3631 and 10-3632. The court found he had not pleaded derivative claims and, even if he had tried, the statutory prerequisites were not satisfied. It dismissed the board-member claims on that basis.

The same dismissal ruling rejected claims against Beth Mulcahy and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The court held the association’s lawyer had no duty to individual association members and that an attorney generally cannot be held to have aided and abetted a client’s alleged tortious conduct. The ruling also dismissed statutory damages counts because the sole remedy for those alleged statutory violations was injunctive relief, dismissed extortion because Arizona does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion as such, and dismissed emotional-distress, punitive-damages, and aiding-and-abetting theories.

After the fiduciary-duty count was dismissed in March 2016, the remaining claims turned on the CC&Rs. At summary judgment, the court agreed with the defendants’ interpretation of Article IV, section 3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions on both the maximum annual assessment and the effective date of annual increases. Because every remaining claim depended on Mullins’s contrary reading, the court held the claims failed as a matter of law, granted summary judgment, denied reconsideration, and entered judgment against Mullins.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact roadmap for several limits on owner suits against an HOA ecosystem. Members generally cannot convert alleged wrongs to the association into direct claims against board members; if the claim belongs to the association, Arizona’s nonprofit derivative-action statutes matter. Likewise, association counsel represents the association, not each individual member, so claims against HOA lawyers require more than dissatisfaction with counsel’s work for the association.

The merits ruling also matters for assessment disputes. The court treated the CC&R text, not the owner’s contrary assessment theory, as dispositive. Once it accepted the defendants’ interpretation of the annual-assessment provision, all remaining claims failed together. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is useful reading for assessment, board-governance, and association-counsel disputes.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Liens & Foreclosure | A.R.S. § 33-1807 | CV2012-094261

In this Maricopa County Superior Court assessment-lien case, the court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) does not let an escrow agent extinguish an HOA lien merely by requesting a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction. Later, the same court denied the association summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), rejecting the association’s argument that a foreclosure claim survives once filed even after the delinquent assessments themselves have been paid. The fee ruling treated the case in four parts: the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and the dismissed CC&R-violation claims.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261.

Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2015-06-09. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.

Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.

Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-094261) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 12, 2014 ruling on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory, the November 24, 2014 ruling on the association’s foreclosure motion, the March 11, 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 9, 2015 fee ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 9, 2015 fee ruling, which continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first; any later docket activity is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court read A.R.S. § 33-1807 in two different lien contexts. First, it rejected Forange’s argument that an HOA lien disappeared because an escrow agent requested a payoff statement and the association did not respond within ten days: the court held the escrow-agent penalty in § 33-1807(I) is meant to facilitate actual sale, transfer, lease, or other escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a freestanding power to make liens disappear. Second, when the association later sought summary judgment on foreclosure, the court denied it under § 33-1807(A) because late fees and attorney fees do not count toward the foreclosure threshold and the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case later ended through a stipulation that found for defendants on foreclosure and through a fee ruling awarding Forange costs and $18,000 in fees while denying the association’s fee applications.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Homeowners association that sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations; the court later found it succeeded on the unpaid-assessment claim and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, but not on lien foreclosure.
  • Lindsey O. Stearns (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in later minute entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint; the August 2014 ruling granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.
  • Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney listed for the association in multiple caption entries and one of the attorney defendants in Forange’s consolidated complaint.
  • Javier Delgado (Counsel / Defendant in consolidated action)
    Attorney defendant named by Forange in the consolidated action, according to the August 2014 ruling.
  • Bradley R. Jardine (Counsel)
    Attorney who filed the April 2015 motion for attorney fees on behalf of the association.

Respondent Side

  • 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant)
    Entity defendant in the association’s action; its answer was struck in December 2012 because a nonlawyer could not represent the LLC.
  • Forange, LLC (Defendant / Plaintiff in consolidated action)
    Entity that filed the consolidated action against the association and its attorneys, arguing that an escrow-agent payoff request extinguished the association lien under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I); it lost that claim but later prevailed on the association’s foreclosure claim and received fees and costs.
  • Michael D. Ripson (Defendant / LLC member)
    Individual listed as a defendant and as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC in the early order-to-show-cause minute entry.
  • Scottsdale Community Association (Defendant)
    Entity listed as a defendant in the association’s action; the collected minute entries do not show a merits ruling against it.
  • Citibank South Dakota N.A. (Defendant)
    Lienholder defendant listed in the caption; the collected minute entries do not show a substantive ruling about it.
  • Johnson Bank (Defendant (dismissed))
    Defendant dismissed with prejudice in August 2014 after no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.
  • Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for 4AAR Holdings, LLC and Forange, LLC in the later minute entries and fee applications.
  • Andrew J. Van Loon (Counsel)
    Attorney listed in several caption entries for the defense side before the later fee ruling noted that the court declined to award Forange fees incurred while represented by Van Loon.

Neutral Parties

  • Emmet J. Ronan (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled early order-to-show-cause and LLC-representation rulings.
  • Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the key August 2014 payoff-statement ruling, the November 2014 foreclosure ruling, the March 2015 dismissal-stipulation ruling, and the June 2015 fee ruling.
  • Ruth H. Hilliard (Judge)
    Judge who signed the March 2013 consolidation order for Judge Ronan.

What happened

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued 4AAR Holdings, LLC and others in Maricopa County Superior Court over a planned-community assessment lien. The early minutes show an order-to-show-cause hearing where Michael Ripson appeared as a member of 4AAR Holdings, LLC, followed by a December 2012 ruling striking the LLC’s answer because a corporation or LLC cannot appear in court through a nonlawyer. In March 2013, the court consolidated this action with CV2012-018064, the related case brought by Forange, LLC against the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns.

Forange’s consolidated complaint turned on a payoff-statement theory. The August 12, 2014 ruling says Forange moved for partial summary judgment on its claims, while the association and its attorneys cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. The court identified the undisputed facts this way: A.R.S. § 33-1807 creates an HOA lien for unpaid assessments; subsection I requires an association to furnish a payoff statement within ten days after a request from a unit owner, lienholder, or escrow agent; and the special penalty for failure to answer an escrow-agent request is extinguishment of the lien. Here, an escrow agent asked for a payoff statement, but the request was not made in the context of any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction.

Judge Aceto rejected Forange’s statutory theory. The ruling framed the issue as whether § 33-1807(I) gives escrow agents a special power to make liens disappear simply because they are escrow agents, or whether the penalty provision is meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions by requiring prompt payoff responses. Applying a rational-interpretation approach, the court held the penalty provision was directed at real pending transactions. It denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

The association then moved for partial summary judgment on its own foreclosure claim. On November 24, 2014, the court denied that motion. The ruling noted that A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) allows foreclosure only if the owner “has been” delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count when deciding whether the right to foreclose exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that a homeowner cannot avoid foreclosure once the complaint has been filed. The court expressly left open the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments.

A March 11, 2015 ruling accepted the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacated the scheduled trial, and found for defendants on Count I to the extent it sought foreclosure on the property. The June 9, 2015 fee ruling divided the consolidated case into four parts: the association’s unpaid-assessment claim, the association’s lien-foreclosure claim, the association’s CC&R-violation allegations, and Forange’s groundless-document claims. The court found the association succeeded on unpaid assessments and on Forange’s groundless-document claims, while Forange prevailed on foreclosure and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations.

The fee ruling made Forange the prevailing party overall. It awarded Forange $994.05 in taxable costs, denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and awarded Forange $18,000 in attorney fees under § 12-341.01 to mitigate the expense of establishing just defenses. The last collected entry continued the case on the dismissal calendar to July 7, 2015 unless a proposed form of judgment was submitted first.

Video overview of the case record

An AI-generated video overview of Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC (CV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Escrow payoff requests do not erase HOA liens absent a real transaction; paid assessments defeated foreclosure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the case record

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2012-09-12 At an order-to-show-cause hearing, the court gives 4AAR Holdings, LLC until October 12, 2012 to obtain counsel.
Step 2012-12-12 The court strikes 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because a nonlawyer cannot represent the LLC in court.
Step 2013-03-01 The court consolidates CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064.
Step 2013-08-26 The court denies the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions, finding there was no enforceable settlement.
Step 2014-08-12 The court denies Forange partial summary judgment and grants the association and its attorneys summary judgment on Forange’s A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) payoff-statement lien-extinguishment theory.
Step 2014-11-24 The court denies the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), while leaving monetary claims for penalties and fees unresolved.
Step 2014-11-24 The court separately denies the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Step 2015-03-11 The court accepts the parties’ dismissal stipulation, vacates trial, and finds for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim.
Step 2015-06-09 The court awards Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denies the association’s fee requests, and continues the case on the dismissal calendar.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 35 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2012-09-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2012-12-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling striking 4AAR Holdings, LLC’s answer because Michael Ripson could not represent the LLC and no attorney had appeared for it.

Download source file
Source 3 2013-01-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2013-03-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling consolidating CV2012-094261 with CV2012-018064 on the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate.

Download source file
Source 5 2013-03-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2013-07-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2013-08-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ July 2013 stipulation and ordering the association’s application for default judgment due by August 23, 2013.

Download source file
Source 8 2013-08-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association’s motion to enforce settlement and request for Rule 11 sanctions because there was no enforceable settlement.

Download source file
Source 9 2013-08-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2013-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2013-12-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2014-05-09

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 14 2014-08-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing with prejudice any remaining unadjudicated claims against Johnson Bank because no party responded to the court’s notice of possible dismissal.

Download source file
Source 15 2014-08-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion and granting summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s payoff-statement lien-extinguishment claims under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I).

Download source file
Source 16 2014-08-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling clarifying that attorney-fee requests from the summary-judgment motions would be decided after all claims in the consolidated case were resolved.

Download source file
Source 17 2014-08-22

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2014-09-18

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 19 2014-10-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange’s request for an evidentiary hearing and sanctions and allowing the association to respond to its motion to quash.

Download source file
Source 20 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Forange leave to submit a late cross-motion for partial summary judgment on Count 1 lien foreclosure after the dispositive-motion deadline.

Download source file
Source 21 2014-11-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado and Bolen’s motion to quash for the reasons argued by the movant.

Download source file
Source 22 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 23 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association partial summary judgment on lien foreclosure because A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) did not allow foreclosure after the delinquent assessment amount had been paid.

Download source file
Source 24 2014-11-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion after finding they had not established entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Download source file
Source 25 2014-12-16

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 26 2015-01-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 27 2015-02-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 28 2015-03-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 29 2015-03-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 30 2015-03-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling accepting the parties’ stipulation regarding dismissal, vacating trial, finding for defendants on the association’s foreclosure claim, and setting a fee-application deadline.

Download source file
Source 31 2015-03-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 32 2015-03-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 33 2015-04-27

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 34 2015-05-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 35 2015-06-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling awarding Forange $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, denying the association’s fee requests, and continuing the case on the dismissal calendar.

Download source file

FAQ

Did the escrow-agent payoff request extinguish the HOA lien?

No. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent penalty was intended to facilitate actual pending escrow transactions. Because the escrow agent’s request was not connected to a pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, the request did not extinguish the association’s lien.

Why did the association win the August 2014 summary-judgment ruling?

Forange’s theory depended on treating any escrow-agent payoff request as enough to erase the lien if the association did not respond within ten days. The court rejected that interpretation as inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, denied Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s claims.

Why did the association lose its later foreclosure motion?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) to look only at the delinquent assessment amount when deciding whether foreclosure is available. Late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be part of a lien, but they do not count toward the foreclosure threshold. Because the delinquent assessments had been paid, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure.

Did the ruling eliminate all claims by the association?

No. The November 2014 foreclosure ruling expressly said it was not suggesting the association’s monetary claim for penalties and fees related to assessments was not viable. The June 2015 fee ruling later found the association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange paid the previously unpaid assessments in July 2013.

Who received attorney fees at the end?

Forange did. The court treated the consolidated case as mixed, found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it $994.05 in taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee requests under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Is this decision binding in other HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful because it shows how one Arizona superior-court judge interpreted the escrow-payoff and foreclosure portions of A.R.S. § 33-1807 in a planned-community assessment-lien dispute.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-094261 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateAugust 12, 2014
Judge / panelHon. Mark F. Aceto, Hon. Emmet J. Ronan, Hon. Ruth H. Hilliard
PartiesTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association (Plaintiff; defendant in consolidated action) v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC, Forange, LLC, Michael D. Ripson, Scottsdale Community Association, Citibank South Dakota N.A., and Johnson Bank (Defendants or related parties); Forange, LLC also sued the association and attorneys Javier Delgado, Joshua Bolen, and Lindsey Stearns in the consolidated action.
Governing law
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court held that A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) did not extinguish an HOA assessment lien when an escrow agent requested a payoff statement outside any pending escrow transaction, so Forange’s partial summary-judgment motion was denied and summary judgment was granted to the association and its attorneys. The court later denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because foreclosure eligibility depends on the unpaid assessment amount, excluding late fees and attorney fees, and the delinquent assessments had been paid.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package35 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewTroon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association v. 4AAR Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon Ridge Estates III & IV Homeowners Association sued over unpaid assessments, lien foreclosure, and alleged CC&R violations, while the consolidated Forange action attacked the association lien and its attorneys based on an escrow-agent payoff request under A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). In August 2014, Judge Mark F. Aceto held that § 33-1807(I)’s escrow-agent payoff-statement penalty applies to actual pending escrow transactions, not to a request made outside any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction, and granted summary judgment to the association and its attorneys on Forange’s lien-extinguishment claims. In November 2014, the court denied the association partial summary judgment on foreclosure under § 33-1807(A), holding that late fees, attorney fees, and costs do not count toward foreclosure eligibility and that the delinquent assessment amount had been paid. The case ended through a dismissal stipulation and a fee ruling that awarded Forange taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees while denying the association’s fee requests.

Key Issues & Findings

On the payoff-statement claim, the court focused on the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1807(I). The statute requires associations to furnish payoff statements within ten days after requests from specified actors and creates a lien-extinguishment penalty for an unanswered request by an escrow agent. But the court found the undisputed escrow request here was not made in connection with any pending sale, transfer, lease, or other transaction. Reading the statute rationally and in light of the policy behind it, the court concluded the penalty provision was meant to facilitate actual escrow transactions, not to give escrow agents a special power to erase HOA liens whenever someone asks them to request payoff information.

On the association’s foreclosure motion, the court applied A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) differently. It noted that foreclosure is available only if the owner has been delinquent on the assessment for one year or in the amount of $1,200 or more, and that late fees, attorney fees, and costs may be included in the lien but are excluded when deciding whether the foreclosure right exists. Because the delinquent assessment amount had been paid after the lawsuit began, the court rejected the association’s argument that filing a foreclosure complaint locks in the right to foreclose regardless of later payment.

The fee ruling treated the consolidated case as mixed. The association succeeded on its unpaid-assessment claim because Forange ultimately paid the overdue assessments, and it also defeated Forange’s groundless-document claims. Forange prevailed on the lien-foreclosure issue and on the dismissed CC&R-violation allegations. Weighing those results, the court found Forange the prevailing party overall, awarded it taxable costs and $18,000 in attorney fees, and denied the association’s fee applications.

Why It Matters

This case is useful because it cuts in both directions on HOA assessment liens. It rejects a payoff-request strategy aimed at extinguishing an HOA lien through an escrow agent when there is no real pending escrow transaction, making the statutory penalty in A.R.S. § 33-1807(I) depend on the transaction context.

At the same time, it gives homeowners and associations a concrete reading of § 33-1807(A): for foreclosure eligibility, the court counted only delinquent assessments, not late fees, collection charges, or attorney fees. Once the delinquent assessments were paid, the association still could pursue monetary penalties and fees, but it did not receive summary judgment authorizing foreclosure. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but the reasoning addresses recurring assessment-lien and payoff-statement disputes.

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Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessment Collection | Water Shutoff | CV2012-018443

The court refused to decide on summary judgment whether water shutoff was a reasonable collection rule, but dismissed the FDCPA claim against the management company.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-018443.

Current-status note: Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.

Scope note: This page covers Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-018443) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the July 2, 2014 ruling on water shutoff and the November 25, 2014 summary-judgment ruling on the FDCPA claim; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the March 19, 2015 order dismissing the entire action with prejudice after the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss. The water-shutoff issue was not finally decided on summary judgment; it was left for the factfinder before the later settlement and stipulated dismissal. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A condominium association may have authority under A.R.S. § 33-1242 to adopt reasonable rules, but this court would not decide as a matter of law that a water-shutoff assessment-collection rule was valid or invalid when the Declaration and Bylaws were silent. Separately, the manager was not an FDCPA debt collector where it had responsibility for regular assessment collection before the owner’s account became delinquent.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Andrew Kuhn (Plaintiff)
    Southern Village Estates condominium owner who challenged water shutoff or restriction and brought an FDCPA claim against Pride.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Counsel for Kuhn in the minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Southern Village Estates Condominium Association (Defendant)
    Condominium association that obtained a judgment for unpaid and accruing assessments and used water shutoff or restriction as part of collection efforts.
  • Pride Asset Management, Inc. (Defendant)
    Property-management company retained by the association to manage the development and collect maintenance assessments and related charges from members.
  • Nikita V. Patel (Counsel)
    Counsel for Southern Village Estates Condominium Association and Pride in many of the minute entries.
  • Diana J. Elston (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Pride at the November 13, 2014 pretrial/status conference.

Neutral Parties

  • Hon. J. Richard Gama (Judge)
    Judge who issued the water-shutoff, discovery-sanctions, fee, and FDCPA rulings.

What happened

Andrew Kuhn owned a condominium unit at Southern Village Estates and was a member of the condominium association. The July 2, 2014 ruling states that he failed to pay past assessments, and the association obtained a judgment against him for all past-due and accruing assessments. The association retained Pride Asset Management for collection efforts.

The association paid a utility for water delivered to each condominium unit from monthly assessments. When Kuhn did not pay, defendants either shut off or significantly restricted water flow to his unit. Kuhn said the action made his home uninhabitable and argued that the association had no express statutory or governing-document authority to use water shutoff as a collection remedy.

Defendants relied on A.R.S. § 33-1242 and a rule adopted by the association’s board. The court noted defendants conceded that the Declaration did not expressly authorize water shutoff and that no statute expressly authorized it. The rule itself stated that the association had the right to turn off water to a unit for nonpayment of monthly assessment.

The court denied both sides summary judgment. It agreed that the association had authority to adopt rules if the rules were reasonable, but it held that reasonableness was a fact question on this record. The key issue was whether the rule bore a relationship to the health, happiness, and enjoyment of life of the unit owners, or instead was arbitrary or capricious.

The case also included a separate FDCPA claim against Pride. The November 25, 2014 ruling states that Pride became the HOA’s managing agent on July 1, 2008, that Kuhn did not become delinquent until 2010, and that the challenged collection activity occurred in 2012. Because Pride was responsible for collecting assessments before the debt went into default, the court held Pride fell within the statutory exception to the FDCPA definition of debt collector and granted Pride summary judgment.

Earlier discovery rulings also mattered procedurally. The court sanctioned Pride for failing to provide a knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) witness, compelled a new deposition, and awarded Kuhn $4,500 in fees and $12 in costs. The case later settled, Pride withdrew a proposed form of judgment, and the court dismissed the action with prejudice on March 19, 2015.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association (CV2012-018443 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Water shutoff collection rule went to factfinder; Pride was not an FDCPA debt collector for pre-default HOA dues. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Andrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-01-11 The court restrains Southern Village Estates from turning off Kuhn's water and orders the water turned back on pending an evidentiary hearing after counsel avowed that fees had been paid.
Step 2013-07-29 The court grants Rule 37 sanctions in part, compels Pride to provide an adequate Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and awards costs and reasonable attorney fees for the motion.
Step 2013-08-22 The court denies defendants' motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2013 discovery-sanctions ruling.
Step 2014-06-17 The court awards Kuhn $4,500 in fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions, reducing the requested amount as duplicative and excessive.
Step 2014-07-02 The court denies both sides summary judgment on whether the association's water-shutoff rule was lawful and reasonable.
Step 2014-11-25 The court grants Pride summary judgment and dismisses the FDCPA claim because Pride handled assessment collection before the debt went into default.
Step 2015-03-19 After settlement, the court dismisses the entire action with prejudice, with each party bearing its own fees and costs.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 21 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2013-01-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Preliminary-restraint minute entry ordering Southern Village Estates not to turn off Kuhn's water and ordering the water turned back on pending the evidentiary hearing after counsel avowed that fees had been paid.

Download source file
Source 2 2013-02-04

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2013-03-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2013-04-10

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2013-07-12

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2013-07-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Discovery-sanctions ruling granting Kuhn relief in part, compelling Pride to provide an adequate Rule 30(b)(6) witness, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees for the motion.

Download source file
Source 7 2013-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2013-08-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying defendants' motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2013 Rule 30(b)(6) discovery-sanctions order.

Download source file
Source 9 2013-09-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2013-10-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2013-11-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2014-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2014-06-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Fee ruling awarding Kuhn $4,500 in attorney fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions while reducing the requested fees as duplicative and excessive.

Download source file
Source 14 2014-07-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying both Kuhn's and defendants' summary-judgment motions on whether the association's water-shutoff rule was lawful and reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the governing documents.

Download source file
Source 15 2014-09-08

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 16 2014-09-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 17 2014-11-13

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2014-11-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Pride Asset Management summary judgment and dismissing Kuhn's FDCPA claim because Pride collected assessments before Kuhn's assessments became overdue.

Download source file
Source 19 2015-02-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 20 2015-03-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 21 2015-03-19

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Dismissal order dismissing the entire action with prejudice after the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss following settlement.

FAQ

Did the court decide the association could shut off water for unpaid assessments?

No. The court denied both sides summary judgment. It held that whether the water-shutoff rule was reasonable under the circumstances was a factual issue for the factfinder.

What role did A.R.S. § 33-1242 play?

Defendants relied on A.R.S. § 33-1242 as authority for the association to adopt rules. The court agreed an association may adopt reasonable rules, but said the reasonableness of this water-shutoff rule could not be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment.

Why did Pride win summary judgment on the FDCPA claim?

The court found that Pride was responsible for collecting monthly assessments before Kuhn’s assessments became overdue. Under the FDCPA exception discussed in the ruling, Pride was not a debt collector for that debt because the debt was not in default when Pride obtained collection responsibility.

Did the governing documents expressly authorize water shutoff?

The court stated that the parties agreed the Declaration and Bylaws did not expressly provide a right to shut off water as a way to collect unpaid assessments.

What discovery sanction did the court impose?

The court found Pride failed to provide a knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) corporate witness, ordered a new deposition, and later awarded Kuhn $4,500 in attorney fees and $12 in costs as Rule 37 sanctions.

Is this ruling precedential?

No. It is a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still useful as an example of one trial court’s analysis of condominium water shutoff, assessment collection, and FDCPA manager liability.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-018443 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 25, 2014
Judge / panelHon. J. Richard Gama
PartiesAndrew Kuhn (Plaintiff) v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association and Pride Asset Management, Inc. (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsFDCPACC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The court held that neither side was entitled to summary judgment on the water-shutoff issue because the association could adopt reasonable rules under A.R.S. § 33-1242, but whether this rule reasonably related to the health, happiness, and enjoyment of the unit owners presented a fact question. The court later held that Pride was not an FDCPA debt collector because it obtained responsibility for collecting the assessments before Kuhn's assessments became overdue.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap7 roadmap entries
Video overviewAndrew Kuhn v. Southern Village Estates Condominium Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A condominium owner challenged Southern Village Estates' use of water shutoff or restriction to collect unpaid assessments and asserted an FDCPA claim against Pride Asset Management. The court denied both sides summary judgment on whether the association's water-restriction rule was reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the governing documents, but later granted Pride summary judgment on the FDCPA claim because Pride was responsible for collecting assessments before the owner's account went into default.

Key Issues & Findings

On the water-shutoff motions, the court began with undisputed facts: Kuhn owned a condominium unit, was a member of the association, failed to pay past assessments, and the association obtained a judgment for unpaid and accruing assessments. The association and Pride then used water shutoff or water restriction as a collection method, and Kuhn argued that neither Arizona statute nor the governing documents expressly authorized that remedy.

The court agreed with the association that A.R.S. § 33-1242 gave the association authority to promulgate reasonable rules, but it did not treat that authority as unlimited. Because the Declaration and Bylaws did not expressly provide a water-shutoff remedy, and because the rule's reasonableness depended on whether it related to the general welfare of condominium residents, the court found a factual dispute and denied summary judgment to both sides.

On the FDCPA claim, the court focused on Pride's timing and role. Pride was the association's property manager and was responsible for collecting monthly assessments beginning July 1, 2008; Kuhn did not become delinquent until 2010; and the challenged collection activity occurred in 2012. Because the FDCPA excludes collectors whose collection activity concerns debt that was not in default when obtained, the court granted Pride summary judgment and dismissed the FDCPA claim.

Why It Matters

The case is useful for Arizona condominium readers because it shows one trial court refusing to decide on summary judgment whether an association may restrict water service as an assessment-collection rule when the declaration and bylaws are silent. It also shows how a management company may defeat an FDCPA claim when it was already responsible for assessment collection before the owner's account went into default.

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Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Liens & Trustee-Sale Proceeds | A.R.S. § 33-812(g) | CV2011-053961

In this Maricopa County Superior Court proceeding, two homeowners associations and American Savings Life Insurance Company competed for release of proceeds. The court ordered specific payments to Westwind Homeowners Association and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association before the remaining balance went to American Savings.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-053961.

Scope note: This page covers Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-053961) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, including the September 19, 2011 hearing-setting entry and the September 22, 2011 proceeds ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the September 22, 2011 order distributing proceeds. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The court resolved competing applications for release of proceeds by ordering payment first to Westwind Homeowners Association, second to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and then the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company. The ruling is narrow and procedural; it does not announce a broad HOA lien rule.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Empire West Title Agency LLC (Plaintiff)
    Title agency plaintiff listed in the case caption and party table.
  • Westwind Homeowners Association (Claimant)
    Homeowners association claimant that applied for release of proceeds and received a $2,206.11 distribution.
  • Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association (Claimant)
    Homeowners association claimant that objected to American Savings' application, filed its own application, and received a $5,208.97 distribution.
  • Melissa A. Lovonier (Counsel)
    Counsel who appeared for Westwind Homeowners Association and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association at the September 22, 2011 hearing.

Respondent Side

  • Charles Hoskins (Defendant)
    Defendant listed in the caption and party table; no appearance was made by him at the September 22, 2011 hearing.
  • American Savings Life Insurance Company (Claimant)
    Claimant that applied for release of proceeds and received the remaining balance after the two homeowners-association distributions.
  • Gove L. Allen (Counsel)
    Counsel who appeared for American Savings Life Insurance Company at the September 22, 2011 hearing.

Neutral Parties

  • Michael R. McVey (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the competing applications and ordered the proceeds distribution.

What happened

Empire West Title Agency LLC filed this Maricopa County Superior Court case against Charles Hoskins. The collected minute entries are limited to competing applications for release of proceeds involving Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company.

On September 19, 2011, the court reviewed American Savings’ application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g), Wigwam Creek’s objection to that application, Wigwam Creek’s own application for release of proceeds, and Westwind’s application for release of proceeds. The court set an in-person hearing for September 22, 2011.

At the September 22 hearing, Melissa A. Lovonier appeared for Wigwam Creek and Westwind, and Gove L. Allen appeared for American Savings. No other parties appeared. The court heard argument on the competing applications and took the matter under advisement.

Later that same minute entry, the court stated that it had considered the applications, oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau. It then directed the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

The minute entries do not contain broader analysis of HOA assessment liens, CC&Rs, foreclosure priority, or association governance. This page therefore treats the case as a narrow example of homeowners associations participating as claimants in a proceeds-distribution proceeding.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins (CV2011-053961 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Two HOAs received priority distributions from trustee-sale proceeds before the remaining balance went to a lender. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Empire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2011-06-03 Westwind Homeowners Association files an application for release of proceeds.
Step 2011-06-08 American Savings Life Insurance Company files an application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g).
Step 2011-07-21 Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association files its application for release of proceeds after objecting to American Savings' application.
Step 2011-09-19 The court sets a September 22 hearing on the competing applications for release of proceeds.
Step 2011-09-22 After argument, the court orders the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek, and the balance to American Savings.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 2 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2011-09-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2011-09-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling directing the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

Download source file

FAQ

What was this case about?

The collected minute entries show competing applications for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g). Two homeowners associations and American Savings Life Insurance Company each sought money from the proceeds being held by the Maricopa County Treasurer.

Which homeowners associations received money?

Westwind Homeowners Association received $2,206.11, and Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association received $5,208.97.

Who received the remaining balance?

The court ordered the remaining balance paid to American Savings Life Insurance Company after the two homeowners associations received their specified distributions.

Did the court interpret the HOA CC&Rs?

No. The minute entries do not quote or analyze CC&Rs. The ruling resolves the distribution of proceeds among claimants; it does not decide an architectural-review, records, election, governance, or CC&R-interpretation dispute.

Is this a must-read HOA case?

No. It is a standard, narrow proceeds-distribution case. It is useful because it shows homeowners associations appearing as claimants, but the ruling does not provide broad analysis of HOA law.

Is this ruling precedent?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page summarizes the public minute entries for educational use.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2011-053961 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateSeptember 22, 2011
Judge / panelHon. Michael R. McVey
PartiesEmpire West Title Agency LLC (Plaintiff) v. Charles Hoskins (Defendant); Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company (Claimants)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 33-812(g)
Topics
LiensForeclosureAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court ordered trustee-sale proceeds distributed first to Westwind Homeowners Association in the amount of $2,206.11, second to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association in the amount of $5,208.97, and then the balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package2 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewEmpire West Title Agency LLC v. Charles Hoskins
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Empire West Title Agency LLC filed a Maricopa County Superior Court proceeding involving Charles Hoskins and competing applications for release of proceeds. Westwind Homeowners Association, Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association, and American Savings Life Insurance Company each sought proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g). After a September 22, 2011 hearing, the court considered the applications, oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau, then directed the Maricopa County Treasurer to release $2,206.11 to Westwind Homeowners Association first, $5,208.97 to Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association second, and the remaining balance to American Savings Life Insurance Company.

Key Issues & Findings

The court had before it American Savings' application for release of proceeds under A.R.S. § 33-812(g), Wigwam Creek North Phase 2B Homeowners Association's objection to that application and its own application, and Westwind Homeowners Association's application. It set a short in-person hearing on those competing applications and required counsel or parties to appear.

At the September 22, 2011 hearing, counsel appeared for Wigwam Creek and Westwind, and counsel appeared for American Savings. The court heard argument, took the matter under advisement, and later stated that it had considered the applications, the oral argument, and Weaver v. Tri City Credit Bureau. The resulting order gave the two homeowners associations priority distributions in specific dollar amounts before directing the remaining balance to American Savings.

Why It Matters

This is a narrow, routine proceeds-distribution ruling, but it shows homeowners associations participating as claimants in an A.R.S. § 33-812(g) excess-proceeds proceeding. The court did not publish a broad rule about HOA liens or assessment enforcement; it simply resolved the competing applications and ordered specific payments from the Maricopa County Treasurer.

For HOA readers, the practical takeaway is that association claims can appear in trustee-sale surplus litigation alongside lender or insurer claims, and the actual distribution order matters. As a superior-court minute-entry ruling, this binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe

Superior Court HOA Case

Sundance won the contract claim and prevailing-party fees, but the court denied late fees, collection fees, and foreclosure.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-095178.

Scope note: This page covers Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-095178) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the September 14, 2016 under-advisement ruling and the November 21, 2016 final judgment. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Sundance won summary judgment for breach of contract and was treated as the prevailing party for fees and legal costs. But the court denied late fees and collection fees because they were not timely and properly invoiced, and it denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sundance Residential Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff / counterdefendant)
    Homeowners association pursuing assessment-related claims.

Respondent Side

  • Lorri Glawe, Curt Glawe, and Jordan Glawe (Defendants / counterclaimants)
    Homeowners opposing the association's collection and foreclosure remedies.

Neutral Parties

  • Robert H. Oberbillig (Judge)
    Superior Court judge who issued the lis pendens ruling, summary-judgment ruling, and final judgment.

What happened

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association litigated assessment-related claims against the Glawe defendants after the case came up from White Tank Justice Court. The early superior-court entries addressed discovery, consolidation, and a stay request.

On March 1, 2016, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dissolve a lis pendens. The court found Sundance had shown adequate grounds for the filing but stated it was taking no position on the merits.

At the July 28, 2016 summary-judgment argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on email notice of amounts due and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a). On September 14, 2016, the court granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only. It denied late fees and collection fees because Sundance had not timely and properly invoiced them, and it denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

In the final judgment, both sides sought fees as prevailing parties. The court found that, under the totality of circumstances, Sundance was the prevailing party. It awarded Sundance $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, denied reconsideration, and entered final judgment under Rule 54(c).

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe (CV2015-095178 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Sundance won breach summary judgment, but no late fees, collection fees, or foreclosure after payment. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-11-16 The court resolves discovery, sanctions, consolidation, and stay motions.
Step 2016-03-01 The court denies the defendants' motion to dissolve lis pendens.
Step 2016-07-28 The court hears summary-judgment argument and orders supplemental briefing on email notice and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a).
Step 2016-09-14 The court grants Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only and denies late fees, collection fees, and foreclosure.
Step 2016-11-21 The court enters final judgment, awards Sundance fees and legal costs, and denies reconsideration.

Complete source-document index

This index contains 7 PDFs from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.

Source 1 2015-11-16

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling setting remote depositions, denying Sundance's deposition-sanctions motion, denying consolidation, and denying a stay of discovery.

Download source file
Source 2 2016-03-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the defendants' motion to dissolve lis pendens because Sundance established adequate grounds for the filing, without deciding the merits.

Download source file
Source 3 2016-06-30

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2016-07-28

Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Summary-judgment argument entry taking Sundance's motion under advisement and ordering supplemental briefing on email notice and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a).

Download source file
Source 5 2016-09-14

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only, denying late fees and collection fees for improper invoicing, and denying foreclosure because assessments had been paid.

Source 6 2016-10-04

Order

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2016-11-21

Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Final judgment finding Sundance the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarding $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, and denying reconsideration.

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FAQ

Did Sundance win summary judgment?

Yes, but only for breach of contract. The court did not award late fees, collection fees, or foreclosure relief.

Why were late fees and collection fees denied?

The September 14, 2016 ruling says Sundance did not timely and properly invoice those amounts.

Why was foreclosure denied?

The court ruled Sundance was not entitled to foreclosure because the assessments had been paid.

Who was the prevailing party for fees?

The court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances and awarded $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs.

Why is this case marked standard?

The case gives practical collection outcomes, but the minute entries do not contain extended statutory or CC&R analysis.

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-095178 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 21, 2016
Judge / panelHon. Robert H. Oberbillig
PartiesSundance Residential Homeowners Association Inc. (Plaintiff) v. Lorri Glawe, Curt Glawe, and Jordan Glawe (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
AssessmentsLiensForeclosureAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only, denied recovery of late fees and collection fees, denied foreclosure because the assessments had been paid, and entered final judgment awarding Sundance fees and legal costs as the prevailing party.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Reviewed source package7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewSundance Residential Homeowners Association v. Glawe
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions5 questions
Featured download links1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sundance Residential Homeowners Association pursued assessment-related claims against the Glawe defendants. The court denied the defendants' motion to dissolve a lis pendens, later granted Sundance summary judgment for breach of contract only, and ruled that Sundance could not recover late fees or collection fees because it had not timely and properly invoiced them. The court also held Sundance was not entitled to foreclosure after the assessments had been paid. In the final judgment, the court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarded $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, and denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration.

Key Issues & Findings

The March 1, 2016 ruling denied the defendants' motion to dissolve the lis pendens because Sundance's response established adequate grounds for the filing, while the court expressly took no position on the merits.

At the July 28, 2016 summary-judgment argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on email notice of amounts due and A.R.S. § 33-1807(a). After reviewing the supplemental briefs, the September 14, 2016 under-advisement ruling granted Sundance's motion for summary judgment for breach of contract only. The court agreed with the defense that Sundance had not timely and properly invoiced late fees or collection fees, so Sundance could not recover those damages. It also ruled foreclosure was unavailable because the assessments had been paid.

In the November 21, 2016 final judgment, the court considered both sides' fee applications under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). Although each side prevailed on some issues, the court found Sundance was the prevailing party under the totality of circumstances, awarded Sundance $7,500 in fees and $2,364.25 in legal costs, denied reconsideration, and entered the order under Rule 54(c).

Why It Matters

This case is useful for assessment disputes because it separates breach-of-contract liability from late-fee, collection-fee, and foreclosure remedies. The association won the contract claim and fees, but the court refused late/collection fees for defective invoicing and refused foreclosure after payment of assessments.

The case is marked standard because the minute entries announce those conclusions without extended statutory or CC&R analysis. It is a practical collection example, not a broad must-read rule.

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