Arizona Supreme Court · CC&R Amendments
How a five-lot Tucson subdivision’s fight over majority-vote amendments produced Arizona’s leading rule on the limits of an HOA’s power to change its CC&Rs.
Arizona Supreme Court | 252 Ariz. 532; 506 P.3d 18 (2022) | Decided 2022-03-22
Scope note: This educational page summarizes Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, a Arizona Supreme Court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.
The takeaway
A general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs may be used to amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration provided sufficient notice. Because restrictive covenants are construed narrowly to reflect homeowners’ reasonable expectations, non-consensual amendments adopted by majority vote must be reasonable and foreseeable, and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)—which permits majority-vote amendment when the declaration so provides—does not displace this common-law notice limitation. New restrictions that are entirely different in character from the original covenants and adopted without notice are invalid; the Court blue-penciled the CC&Rs to strike the severable unforeseeable provisions.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Maarten Kalway (Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner)
Owner of Lot 2, the largest lot (nearly 23 acres); sued to invalidate the 2018 CC&R amendments and prevailed on review, obtaining an award of attorney fees.
- Gerard R. O’Meara (Counsel)
Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C.
Counsel for petitioner Maarten Kalway.
- Charles W. Wirken (Counsel)
Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C.
Counsel for petitioner Maarten Kalway; argued the case.
Respondent Side
- Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
Arizona limited liability company; the homeowners’ association whose members adopted the challenged CC&R amendments.
- Mark A. Reid (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
One of the other Calabria Ranch lot owners who voted for the amendments; sued with his wife Florence J. Clark.
- Florence J. Clark (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
Other Calabria Ranch lot owner; wife of Mark A. Reid.
- Edward A. Phlaum (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
Other Calabria Ranch lot owner, individually and as co-trustee of the Edward A. and Diane Lyn Phlaum Revocable Trust dated April 10, 2017.
- Diane Lyn Phlaum (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
Other Calabria Ranch lot owner, individually and as co-trustee of the Edward A. and Diane Lyn Phlaum Revocable Trust dated April 10, 2017.
- Stuart J. Scibetta (Defendant/Appellee/Respondent)
Other Calabria Ranch lot owner, individually and as trustee of the Stuart J. Scibetta Living Trust dated April 1, 2015.
- Craig L. Cline (Counsel)
Thompson Krone P.L.C.
Counsel for respondents Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC and the other lot owners; argued the case.
Neutral Parties
- Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel (Judge)
Authored the unanimous opinion of the Court.
- Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Timmer (Judge)
Joined the opinion.
- Justice Clint Bolick (Judge)
Joined the opinion.
- Justice John R. Lopez IV (Judge)
Joined the opinion.
- Justice James P. Beene (Judge)
Joined the opinion.
- Justice Bill Montgomery (Judge)
Joined the opinion.
- Justice Andrew W. Gould (Ret.) (Judge)
Participated in oral argument but retired before issuance and did not take part in drafting the opinion.
What happened
Calabria Ranch Estates is a residential subdivision of five lots located east of Tucson in Pima County. Maarten Kalway owned Lot 2, which at nearly twenty-three acres was the largest lot; the remaining lots ranged from about 3.3 to 6.6 acres, with two of them jointly owned and together comprising 11.65 acres. All of the lots were subject to CC&Rs first recorded in an original declaration in 2015.
The 2015 original declaration stated that its purpose was to “protect[] the value, desirability, attractiveness and natural character of the Property,” and it allowed the CC&Rs to be amended “at any time by an instrument executed and acknowledged by the [m]ajority [v]ote of the owners.” A majority vote consisted of at least four of the six possible votes; each lot had one vote except Kalway’s lot, which had two.
In January 2018, the other property owners amended the CC&Rs by majority vote without Kalway’s consent or knowledge. The amendments changed some definitions and added others, created new restrictions—including limits on owners’ ability to convey or subdivide their lots, restrictions on the size and number of buildings on each lot, and reductions in the permitted livestock—and enacted new enforcement measures against owners who violated the covenants.
Kalway sued Calabria Ranch and the other owners in Pima County Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate the amendments. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted them in part and denied them in part, invalidating two sections in their entirety and partially invalidating two more, and found the invalid provisions severable from the rest of the CC&Rs. No party challenged the trial court’s ruling striking those particular provisions.
Kalway appealed, arguing that all of the amendments were invalid without unanimous consent. In a memorandum decision filed March 13, 2020, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed in a 2-1 decision, relying on Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey. The majority concluded that the general-purpose statement in the original declaration was enough to give notice of the amendments. Judge Brearcliffe, concurring in part and dissenting in part, warned that letting a “gauzy statement of purpose” justify any new amendment would render Dreamland’s notice requirement a nullity.
The Arizona Supreme Court granted review because the case raised issues of statewide importance regarding the scope of an HOA’s authority to amend CC&Rs. Reviewing questions of law de novo, the Court held that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) allows majority-vote amendments but does not displace the common law: the original declaration must give sufficient notice of a future amendment, meaning amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable. It reasoned that CC&Rs are a special type of contract not enforced as to terms beyond the range of reasonable expectation, and that a broad amendment clause and subjective purpose statement could not supply the required notice.
Applying these principles and the “blue pencil” rule, the Court examined each challenged amendment separately. It upheld provisions that merely refined restrictions already foreshadowed (for example, defining “Garage,” which the original declaration had referenced) and struck those that imposed wholly new obligations—dwelling-size limits, an expanded “Improvement” definition affecting setbacks, non-dwelling-structure caps, a mandatory improvement-plan approval process, subdivision and building-sequencing restrictions, a drastic redefinition of “livestock,” and new fire-hazard maintenance duties. The Court reversed in part and remanded, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, and awarded Kalway his attorney fees in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Kalway is a landmark decision on the outer limits of an HOA’s power to amend its CC&Rs by majority vote. It establishes a statewide common-law rule: a general grant of amendment authority, no matter how broadly worded, lets a majority amend only those restrictions of which the original declaration gave the affected owners fair notice, and any amendment must be reasonable and foreseeable. A vague statement of purpose cannot bootstrap brand-new, non-consensual burdens onto a dissenting minority. The decision cements the notice principle first articulated by the Court of Appeals in Dreamland Villa v. Raimey and confirms that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)’s authorization of majority-vote amendments does not override that common-law protection.
For homeowners, boards, and drafters, the practical takeaway is that amendments introducing categories of restriction the original declaration never mentioned—new architectural-review approval processes, building-size or building-count caps, subdivision prohibitions, or entirely redefined use limits—are vulnerable to challenge if adopted without unanimous consent. Associations that want flexibility to add such restrictions later should say so clearly in the original declaration, and boards should assess whether a proposed amendment merely refines an existing covenant or creates a new one. The Court’s use of the “blue pencil” rule also signals that courts may surgically strike the offending, severable portions of an amendment rather than voiding an entire amendment package, and the fee award to the prevailing owner underscores the litigation exposure of overreaching amendments.
Video overview of the ruling
An AI-generated video overview of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC (252 Ariz. 532; 506 P.3d 18 (2022)). HOA amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable from the original CC&Rs, not entirely new obligations. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.
Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling
An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.
Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.
Litigation record
Step 1
2015
Original declaration of CC&Rs recorded for Calabria Ranch Estates, a five-lot subdivision east of Tucson; it includes a general-purpose statement and a general-amendment-power provision permitting amendment by majority vote.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Step 2
2018-01
The other lot owners amend the CC&Rs by majority vote, without Kalway’s consent or knowledge, adding new use restrictions, definitions, and enforcement measures.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Step 3
2018
Kalway files a declaratory-judgment action in Pima County Superior Court (No. C20181284) seeking to invalidate the amendments.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Step 4
2019
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court invalidates two sections entirely and partially invalidates two more, finding the invalid provisions severable; Kalway appeals to the Court of Appeals, Division Two (No. 2 CA-CV 2019-0106).
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Step 5
2020-03-13
The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirms in a 2-1 memorandum decision, with Judge Brearcliffe concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Step 6
2022-03-22
The Arizona Supreme Court issues its opinion, adopting the notice/foreseeability requirement, blue-penciling the CC&Rs, reversing in part and remanding, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision, and awarding Kalway his attorney fees.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/kalway-v-calabria-ranch-hoa/raw/: 28 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Source 1
2019-07-09
Civil Fees Order
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 2
2019-07-10
Appellant Fee Receipt
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 3
2019-07-16
Notice Of Appearance
Type: Procedural/service filing
Procedural filing that documents service, appearance, compliance, or a required notice step.
Source 4
2019-08-29
Opening Brief
Type: Briefing paper
Opening merits brief; this is where the appellant or moving party frames the legal argument.
Source 5
2019-09-04
Cross Appellant Fee Receipt
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 6
2019-09-18
Motion To Extend Answering Brief
Type: Responsive pleading
Responding party’s first substantive response to the complaint or petition.
Source 7
2019-09-19
Order Extending Answering Brief
Type: Court order/minute entry
Responding party’s first substantive response to the complaint or petition.
Source 8
2019-11-08
Answering Brief
Type: Responsive pleading
Responding party’s first substantive response to the complaint or petition.
Source 9
2019-12-02
Reply Brief
Type: Briefing paper
Reply paper; usually the final written response before the court takes the issue under advisement.
Source 10
2019-12-02
Request For Oral Argument
Type: Motion/application
A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.
Source 11
2020-01-09
Order Setting Oral Argument
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 12
2020-01-09
Order Oral Argument Granted
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 13
2020-01-10
Oral Argument Acknowledgment
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 14
2020-02-05
Oral Argument Sign In Sheet
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 15
2020-03-13
Court Of Appeals Memorandum Decision
Type: Decision or judgment
Memorandum decision holding that a general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs may be used to amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration provided sufficient notice.
Source 16
2020-03-23
Statement Of Costs
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 17
2020-03-23
Cline Affidavit Supporting Costs
Type: Procedural/service filing
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 18
2020-03-27
Motion For Publication
Type: Motion/application
A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.
Source 19
2020-03-27
Objection To Statement Of Costs
Type: Briefing paper
Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.
Source 20
2020-03-30
Order Taking Publication Under Advisement
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 21
2020-04-03
Reply Supporting Costs
Type: Briefing paper
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Source 22
2020-04-14
Motion To Extend Publication Response
Type: Motion/application
A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.
Source 23
2020-04-14
Order Extending Publication Response
Type: Court order/minute entry
Opposing or responsive paper; compare it to the motion or request filed immediately before it.
Source 24
2020-05-05
Response To Motion For Publication
Type: Motion/application
A request for a specific ruling or procedural action; the next document is often a response or order.
Source 25
2020-05-06
Order Denying Publication
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 26
2020-05-12
Order Awarding Fees And Costs
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Source 27
2022-03-22
Arizona Supreme Court Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Opinion holding that a general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs may be used to amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration provided sufficient notice.
Source 28
2026-07-01
Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Opinion holding that a general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs may be used to amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration provided sufficient notice.
FAQ
What did the Arizona Supreme Court decide in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA?
The Court held that a general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs lets a majority amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration gave owners sufficient notice. Amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable, so wholly new restrictions adopted by majority vote without notice are invalid. The Court struck the offending amendments and awarded the challenging owner his attorney fees.
Can an HOA add any new restriction it wants by majority vote?
No. Even a broad “amend at any time by majority vote” clause does not let a majority impose brand-new burdens on a dissenting minority. Under Kalway, an amendment must refine, correct, fill a gap in, or change a covenant the original declaration already put owners on notice of; it cannot be “entirely new and different in character” and untethered to an existing covenant.
What is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), and did it decide the case?
A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) permits amending CC&Rs by majority vote when the original declaration provides for that voting scheme. The Court held the statute does not displace the common law, which still bars some amendments even if the required majority approves. So the statute authorizes majority-vote amendments but does not eliminate the notice-and-foreseeability requirement.
What is the “blue pencil” rule the Court used?
Blue-penciling means a court strikes the grammatically severable, unreasonable portions of a restrictive covenant while leaving the valid language intact, rather than voiding an entire amendment. The Court used it to delete the unforeseeable words and whole sections from several Calabria Ranch amendments while preserving the parts that were valid.
Which amendments survived and which were struck?
The Court upheld amendments that merely refined restrictions already foreshadowed—for example, defining “Garage,” a term the original declaration had referenced. It struck new, unforeseeable provisions, including dwelling-size limits, an expanded “Improvement” definition affecting setbacks, non-dwelling-structure caps, mandatory improvement-plan approval, subdivision restrictions, a drastic redefinition of “livestock,” and new fire-hazard maintenance duties.
What does Kalway mean for Arizona homeowners and HOA boards?
Homeowners gained a strong defense against non-consensual amendments that introduce restrictions the original CC&Rs never mentioned. Boards and drafters should state clearly in the original declaration if they want the ability to add particular restrictions later, and should assess whether a proposed amendment refines an existing covenant or creates a new one. Because the prevailing owner was awarded attorney fees, overreaching amendments also carry litigation risk. This is general information, not legal advice.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 252 Ariz. 532; 506 P.3d 18 (2022) |
|---|
| Court / tribunal | Arizona Supreme Court |
|---|
| Decision / key date | March 22, 2022 |
|---|
| Judge / panel | Chief Justice Robert M. Brutinel (author), Vice Chief Justice Ann A. Timmer, Justice Clint Bolick, Justice John R. Lopez IV, Justice James P. Beene, Justice Bill Montgomery, Justice Andrew W. Gould (Ret.) (participated at oral argument only; retired before issuance and did not join the opinion) |
|---|
| Parties | Individual lot owner Maarten Kalway challenged Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC and the other lot owners over whether they could impose new CC&R restrictions on him by majority vote without his consent. |
|---|
| Governing law | |
|---|
| Topics | CC&RsAmendmentsCovenantsAttorney FeesProcedure |
|---|
| Outcome / holding | A general-amendment-power provision in an HOA’s CC&Rs may be used to amend only those restrictions for which the original declaration provided sufficient notice. Because restrictive covenants are construed narrowly to reflect homeowners’ reasonable expectations, non-consensual amendments adopted by majority vote must be reasonable and foreseeable, and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)—which permits majority-vote amendment when the declaration so provides—does not displace this common-law notice limitation. New restrictions that are entirely different in character from the original covenants and adopted without notice are invalid; the Court blue-penciled the CC&Rs to strike the severable unforeseeable provisions. |
|---|
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
|---|
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 28 PDFs |
|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 6 roadmap entries |
|---|
| Video overview | Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC |
|---|
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
|---|
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
|---|
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
|---|
Key Issues & Findings
Case SummaryKalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC arose from Calabria Ranch Estates, a five-lot residential subdivision east of Tucson governed by covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) first recorded in a 2015 original declaration. That declaration allowed the CC&Rs to be amended “at any time” by a majority vote of the owners. In January 2018, the other lot owners amended the CC&Rs by majority vote, without the consent or knowledge of Maarten Kalway, who owned Lot 2, the largest lot at nearly twenty-three acres. The amendments changed and added definitions, created new use restrictions—limiting owners’ ability to subdivide or convey lots, restricting the size and number of buildings, and reducing permitted livestock—and added new enforcement measures. Kalway sued for a declaratory judgment to invalidate the amendments, arguing they required unanimous consent. On cross-motions for summary judgment the superior court struck some provisions and upheld others, and a divided Court of Appeals largely affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to resolve the statewide question of an HOA’s authority to amend CC&Rs. Construing restrictive covenants narrowly to reflect homeowners’ reasonable expectations, the Court held that a general-amendment-power provision permits amendment only of restrictions for which the original declaration gave sufficient notice; amendments must be reasonable and foreseeable, and a broad general-purpose statement does not supply notice of wholly new restrictions. The Court reaffirmed the notice principle of Dreamland Villa v. Raimey and confirmed that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) does not displace this common-law limitation. Applying the “blue pencil” rule, it struck the severable unforeseeable restrictions, reversed in part, remanded, vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, and awarded Kalway his attorney fees.
Key Issues & FindingsThe Court reasoned that CC&Rs form a contract among all landowners bound by the restrictions, but they are a special type of contract that will not be enforced as to “unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.” Although A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) permits majority-vote amendment when the original declaration provides for it, that statute does not displace the common law, which bars some amendments even when passed by the required majority. Notice turns on the original declaration in effect when the owner purchased: an amendment must give notice that a covenant exists and can be refined, corrected, or changed in a particular way, but it cannot be “entirely new and different in character” and untethered to an original covenant. Because a broad general-amendment-power provision and a subjective general-purpose statement (to “protect the value, desirability, attractiveness and natural character of the Property”) would supply limitless justification for new restrictions, they cannot alone provide the required notice. Applying an objective test, the Court analyzed each challenged amendment individually, striking those that imposed wholly new obligations—expanded setback and “Improvement” definitions, non-dwelling-structure caps, a mandatory improvement-plan approval process, subdivision restrictions, a drastic redefinition of “livestock,” and new fire-hazard duties—while upholding amendments, such as the definition of “Garage,” that merely refined restrictions already foreshadowed by the original declaration.
Why It MattersKalway is a landmark decision on the outer limits of an HOA’s power to amend its CC&Rs by majority vote. It establishes a statewide common-law rule: a general grant of amendment authority, no matter how broadly worded, lets a majority amend only those restrictions of which the original declaration gave the affected owners fair notice, and any amendment must be reasonable and foreseeable. A vague statement of purpose cannot bootstrap brand-new, non-consensual burdens onto a dissenting minority. The decision cements the notice principle first articulated by the Court of Appeals in Dreamland Villa v. Raimey and confirms that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)’s authorization of majority-vote amendments does not override that common-law protection.
For homeowners, boards, and drafters, the practical takeaway is that amendments introducing categories of restriction the original declaration never mentioned—new architectural-review approval processes, building-size or building-count caps, subdivision prohibitions, or entirely redefined use limits—are vulnerable to challenge if adopted without unanimous consent. Associations that want flexibility to add such restrictions later should say so clearly in the original declaration, and boards should assess whether a proposed amendment merely refines an existing covenant or creates a new one. The Court’s use of the “blue pencil” rule also signals that courts may surgically strike the offending, severable portions of an amendment rather than voiding an entire amendment package, and the fee award to the prevailing owner underscores the litigation exposure of overreaching amendments.