Keith A. Shadden v. Las Brisas Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith A. Shadden Counsel
Respondent Las Brisas Community Association Counsel Emily Cooper, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article 5.10 & Article 5.12 of CC&Rs (Las Brisas Community Association)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing the HOA used incorrect CC&R sections for the violation concerning reflective material on garage door glass cutouts. The ALJ concluded that the plain meaning of "window" in CC&R Section 5.10 applies to any transparent opening and does not exclude garages.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by using incorrect sections for the violation regarding reflective tint on garage door glass cutouts.

Key Issues & Findings

Allegation that Respondent is using incorrect CC&R section (5.10) to create violation for garage door glass cutouts which fall under section 5.12.

Petitioner alleged the HOA misapplied CC&R Section 5.10 (Windows) to enforce a violation regarding reflective tint on garage door glass cutouts, asserting that Section 5.10 was not intended to cover garage doors as they are addressed under Section 5.12.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Powell, 211 Ariz. at 557 ¶ 16, 125 P.3d at 377

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Window Restriction, Garage Door, Reflective Material, Planned Communities Act, Burden of Proof, Violation Notice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Powell, 211 Ariz. at 557 ¶ 16, 125 P.3d at 377

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H043-REL Decision – 10_TAB H – Denial of Architectural Design hearing request.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:34 (284.5 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 11_TAB I – Email concerning unable to attend hearing on Architectural Design with HOA Board.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:19:39 (517.3 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 1298924.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 12_TAB J – HOA Board denial Letter of Architectural Design appeal.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1303564.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1312135.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1312136.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1314210.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1315443.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1315444.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1316546.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1316554.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1317444.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1317445.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1317647.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1317648.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1325514.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1325661.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1325928.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 13_TAB K – Email for HOA Board consideration before rendering Architectural Design Appeal Decision.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:20:56 (1963.4 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 14_TAB L – Email to Community Manager with Owner Building Option List for window blinds.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:00 (162.2 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 15_Table of Content.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 1_Homeowner Association HOA Dispute Process Petition.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 2_Statement of Facts and Argument.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – 3_TAB A – Home Build option sheet.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:19 (391.9 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 4_TAB B – Violation notification from HOA.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:24 (446.9 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 5_TAB C – Hearing Request and communication with Community Manager.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:29 (472.4 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 6_TAB D – Las Brisas.3.Declaration of Covenants Conditions Restrictions.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:33 (175.1 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 7_TAB E – HOA Board Response Letter.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:36 (5.3 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 8_TAB F – Architectural Design Request.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:40 (13.8 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – 9_TAB G – Architectural Design Request Response Letter.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:45 (60.7 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – Answer – Las Brisas (1).pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – Arizona Corporation Commission.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:21:54 (149.1 KB)

25F-H043-REL Decision – Filing Fee Receipt.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – Notice of Hearing.pdf

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25F-H043-REL Decision – Notice of Petition.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:22:06 (496.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H043-REL


Briefing Document: Shadden v. Las Brisas Community Association, Case No. 25F-H043-REL

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowner Keith A. Shadden (Petitioner) and the Las Brisas Community Association (Respondent) concerning a violation for reflective material on garage door windows. The case, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, centered on whether the Association correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

On July 7, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision dismissing Mr. Shadden’s petition. The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the Association had violated its governing documents.

The core of the dispute was Mr. Shadden’s allegation that the Association improperly used CC&R Section 5.10 (“Windows”) to cite him for reflective tint on his garage door’s glass cutouts. He argued that the garage door should be governed by Section 5.12 (“Garages and Driveways”). His primary evidence was that the original builder, Taylor Morrison, did not install window treatments on the garage door (a requirement of 5.10), implying the builder did not consider the cutouts to be “windows.”

The Association maintained that the plain language of the CC&Rs prohibits reflective materials on windows, that the glass cutouts are functionally windows, and that this rule is consistently enforced throughout the community. The Judge ultimately agreed with the Association’s interpretation, defining a “window” in its plain meaning as “any transparent opening through which light passes” and noting that Section 5.10 does not explicitly exclude garages.

Case Overview

Case Name

In the Matter of: Keith A. Shadden v. Las Brisas Community Association

Case Number

25F-H043-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

June 16, 2025

Decision Date

July 7, 2025

Petitioner

Keith A. Shadden (representing himself)

Respondent

Las Brisas Community Association, represented by Emily Cooper, Esq.

Core Dispute and Allegations

The central issue of the hearing, as defined in a June 5, 2025 order, was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent was “using incorrect CC&R section (5.10) to create violation for garage door glass cutouts which fall under section 5.12”.

The dispute originated from a violation notice issued to Mr. Shadden on August 19, 2024, for having reflective material on his garage door windows. Subsequent notices with escalating fines were issued on February 13, 2025 (25fine),March21,2025(50 fine), and April 23, 2025 ($100 fine).

Relevant Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of two specific sections of the Las Brisas Community Association CC&Rs.

Section

Full Text

Article 5.10

Windows

“Within ninety (90) days of occupancy of a Residential Unit each Owner shall install permanent suitable window treatments that are Visible from Neighboring Property. No reflective materials, including, but without limitation, aluminum foil, reflective screens or glass, mirrors or similar type items, shall be installed or placed upon the outside or inside of any windows.”

Article 5.12

Garages and Driveways

“The interior of all garages situated on any lot shall be maintained in a neat and clean condition. Garages shall be used only for the parking of Vehicles and the storage of normal household supplies and materials and shall not be used for or converted to living quarters or recreational activities after the initial construction thereof without the prior written approval of the Architectural Committee. Garage doors shall be left open only as needed for ingress and egress.”

Arguments and Evidence Presented at Hearing

The evidentiary hearing was conducted virtually via Google Meet on June 16, 2025. Both parties presented arguments, testimony, and exhibits.

Petitioner’s Case (Keith A. Shadden)

Mr. Shadden argued that the Association’s application of Section 5.10 to his garage door was incorrect and unreasonable.

Argument from Declarant’s Intent: Mr. Shadden testified that as the original homeowner, he paid the declarant, Taylor Morrison, nearly $1,600 for window treatments on all windows in the home. Because Taylor Morrison did not install any treatments on the garage door’s glass cutouts, he contended this showed the declarant’s intent that these cutouts were not to be considered “windows” under Section 5.10.

Unreasonable Application: He argued that applying the entirety of Section 5.10, including the requirement for window treatments like blinds, to a garage door is an “unrealistic expectation for a homeowner.”

Conflicting Communication: Mr. Shadden presented an email (Exhibit M) from the assistant community manager, K. White, which stated, “you do not have to install window treatment you can leave the windows without the treatments or you may install window treatments.” He argued this showed the Association itself did not apply the full scope of Section 5.10 to the garage.

Testimony on “Window” Definition: Under cross-examination, Mr. Shadden offered several definitions of a window, including “something you look through.” He eventually conceded that the glass cutouts meet a common-sense understanding of a window but maintained his position based on the specific context of the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Case (Las Brisas Community Association)

The Association, represented by Emily Cooper, Esq., with testimony from Community Manager Jamie Cryblskey, argued its actions were proper and consistent.

Plain Language Interpretation: The Association asserted that the governing documents, including the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines, have “clear and plain language” that expressly prohibits reflective materials on windows.

Consistent Enforcement: Ms. Cryblskey testified that the rule against reflective tint is enforced consistently across all 1,321 lots in the community. She noted that at the time of the hearing, one or two other homeowners had active violations for the same issue and were being treated in the same manner.

Definition of “Window”: The Association argued that a “garage window is a window.” Ms. Cryblskey testified that she personally considers the glass inserts in a garage door to be windows.

Adherence to Due Process: The Association outlined the procedural history, noting Mr. Shadden was provided a hearing before the Board of Directors on October 15, 2024. After his dispute was denied, he was required to submit an architectural application, which was also denied. His subsequent appeal of that denial was heard and denied by the board on December 17, 2024.

Compliance Status: During opening statements, Ms. Cooper noted that Mr. Shadden had since installed a charcoal tint, which is permissible, rendering the petition moot. During testimony, Mr. Shadden stated he had applied black masking tape. Ms. Cryblskey confirmed that as of her last inspection on June 12, 2025, the reflective material was removed and the lot was in compliance.

Final Decision and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge issued a final decision on July 7, 2025, dismissing Mr. Shadden’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Shadden, bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its CC&Rs.

Legal Interpretation: The judge’s central conclusion addressed the definition of “window.”

Final Ruling: The judge found that Mr. Shadden failed to meet his evidentiary burden.

Order: The recommended order stated, “IT IS ORDERED that Keith A. Shadden’s petition against Respondent Las Brisas Community Association is dismissed.” The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing within 30 days of the order.






Study Guide – 25F-H043-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H043-REL”, “case_title”: “Keith A. Shadden v. Las Brisas Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-07-07”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If I file a petition against my HOA, who is responsible for proving the violation occurred?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner filing the dispute must prove that the HOA violated the governing documents. It is not automatically the HOA’s job to prove they were right; the petitioner must first establish the violation.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “How much evidence do I need to win a hearing against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “You need a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning your claim is more likely true than not.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is not ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (like in criminal cases). It is a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show that the homeowner’s argument is more probably true than the HOA’s.”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “evidence”, “legal standards”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA apply ‘Window’ restrictions (like tint bans) to glass cutouts in my garage door?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the cutouts function as windows (allow visibility) and the homeowner fails to prove the specific garage section overrides the window section.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ dismissed the homeowner’s claim that the HOA used the ‘incorrect’ CC&R section by applying window rules to garage door glass. The ALJ noted it was undisputed that one could see through the cutouts.”, “alj_quote”: “It was undisputed that there are glass door cut outs on Petitioner’s garage door. Petitioner admitted during hearing that a person can see through the glass door cut outs… Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to establish that Respondent used incorrect sections of the CC&Rs when it issued its VIOLATION NOTICE.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 5.10 vs 5.12”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural control”, “garage doors”, “windows”, “interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to prove anything during the hearing?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the HOA asserts any ‘affirmative defenses,’ they must prove them.”, “detailed_answer”: “While the homeowner has the initial burden to prove the violation, if the HOA claims a specific legal defense justifies their actions, they carry the burden of proof for that specific defense.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent bears the burden to establish affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary standard.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)”, “topic_tags”: [ “affirmative defense”, “burden of proof”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Can I argue that a restriction doesn’t apply because the builder didn’t install the item (like blinds) originally?”, “short_answer”: “That argument may fail if the text of the CC&Rs explicitly restricts the item in question.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner argued that because the builder didn’t put blinds on the garage door, the ‘Window’ section (requiring treatments and banning reflective tint) shouldn’t apply. The ALJ rejected this argument and dismissed the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner contended that because Taylor Morrison did not place window treatment on the garage door cut outs, Taylor Morrison did intend for Section 5.10 of the CC&Rs to apply to garage doors… Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to establish that Respondent used incorrect sections of the CC&Rs”, “legal_basis”: “Preponderance of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “builder intent”, “interpretation”, “architectural restrictions” ] }, { “question”: “What agency handles hearings regarding HOA disputes in Arizona?”, “short_answer”: “The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) receives petitions, which are heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).”, “detailed_answer”: “State law authorizes the Department of Real Estate to receive petitions from association members regarding violations of planned community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “The Arizona Department of Real Estate (hereinafter “the Department”) is authorized by statute to receive and to decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations… concerning violations of planned community documents”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “ADRE”, “OAH” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 25F-H043-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H043-REL”, “case_title”: “Keith A. Shadden v. Las Brisas Community Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-07-07”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If I file a petition against my HOA, who is responsible for proving the violation occurred?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner filing the dispute must prove that the HOA violated the governing documents. It is not automatically the HOA’s job to prove they were right; the petitioner must first establish the violation.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “How much evidence do I need to win a hearing against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “You need a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning your claim is more likely true than not.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is not ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (like in criminal cases). It is a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show that the homeowner’s argument is more probably true than the HOA’s.”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5”, “topic_tags”: [ “evidence”, “legal standards”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA apply ‘Window’ restrictions (like tint bans) to glass cutouts in my garage door?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the cutouts function as windows (allow visibility) and the homeowner fails to prove the specific garage section overrides the window section.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ dismissed the homeowner’s claim that the HOA used the ‘incorrect’ CC&R section by applying window rules to garage door glass. The ALJ noted it was undisputed that one could see through the cutouts.”, “alj_quote”: “It was undisputed that there are glass door cut outs on Petitioner’s garage door. Petitioner admitted during hearing that a person can see through the glass door cut outs… Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to establish that Respondent used incorrect sections of the CC&Rs when it issued its VIOLATION NOTICE.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Section 5.10 vs 5.12”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural control”, “garage doors”, “windows”, “interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to prove anything during the hearing?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the HOA asserts any ‘affirmative defenses,’ they must prove them.”, “detailed_answer”: “While the homeowner has the initial burden to prove the violation, if the HOA claims a specific legal defense justifies their actions, they carry the burden of proof for that specific defense.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent bears the burden to establish affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary standard.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)”, “topic_tags”: [ “affirmative defense”, “burden of proof”, “procedure” ] }, { “question”: “Can I argue that a restriction doesn’t apply because the builder didn’t install the item (like blinds) originally?”, “short_answer”: “That argument may fail if the text of the CC&Rs explicitly restricts the item in question.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner argued that because the builder didn’t put blinds on the garage door, the ‘Window’ section (requiring treatments and banning reflective tint) shouldn’t apply. The ALJ rejected this argument and dismissed the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner contended that because Taylor Morrison did not place window treatment on the garage door cut outs, Taylor Morrison did intend for Section 5.10 of the CC&Rs to apply to garage doors… Petitioner has failed to meet its burden to establish that Respondent used incorrect sections of the CC&Rs”, “legal_basis”: “Preponderance of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “builder intent”, “interpretation”, “architectural restrictions” ] }, { “question”: “What agency handles hearings regarding HOA disputes in Arizona?”, “short_answer”: “The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) receives petitions, which are heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).”, “detailed_answer”: “State law authorizes the Department of Real Estate to receive petitions from association members regarding violations of planned community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “The Arizona Department of Real Estate (hereinafter “the Department”) is authorized by statute to receive and to decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations… concerning violations of planned community documents”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “ADRE”, “OAH” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith A. Shadden (petitioner)
    Homeowner of Lot #1-175; appeared pro se
  • Donna M. Shadden (petitioner)
    Co-owner of the property

Respondent Side

  • Emily E. Cooper (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Appeared at hearing
  • Kyle Banfield (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Attended hearing
  • Suzanne Hilborn (legal assistant)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Signed proofs of service
  • Jaime Cryblskey (property manager)
    City Property Management Company
    Community Manager; testified at hearing
  • Makayla White (property manager)
    City Property Management Company
    Community Assistant
  • Erica Golditch (property manager)
    City Property Management Company
    Observer at hearing
  • Lauren Nabulsi (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    President
  • Dakota Ball (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Treasurer; asked question during October hearing
  • Terrance Thomas (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Vice-President
  • Frank Grigsby (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Secretary
  • Timothy J. Hansell (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Director

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding Administrative Law Judge
  • Susan Nicolson (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Gabe Osborn (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Filed Notice of Hearing
  • Vivian Nunez (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Dispute Process
  • Chandni Bhakta (mediator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    ADRE Ombudsman

Other Participants

  • Barry Merklin (witness)
    Taylor Morrison
    Sales Associate listed on purchase agreement
  • Karla Paulsen (unknown)
    Taylor Morrison
    Authorized Officer listed on purchase agreement
  • G. Thomas Hennessy (board member)
    Taylor Morrison/Arizona, Inc.
    Declarant Vice President (2010)
  • Lynne M. Dugan (board member)
    Taylor Morrison/Arizona, Inc.
    Director (2010)
  • Leah Grogan (board member)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Secretary/Treasurer (2010)
  • Amanda Shaw (unknown)
    Las Brisas Community Association
    Resigned Statutory Agent

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H030-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-06-02
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sharon Maiden Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Josh Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws
Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) or selectively enforced Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws regarding term limits.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both issues. The closed board meeting was authorized for discussing legal advice, and the HOA's interpretation of the term limit provision aligned with the amendment's purpose to prevent Board members from serving long terms.

Key Issues & Findings

Selective enforcement of Bylaws regarding term limits.

Petitioner alleged Respondent selectively enforced the 2021 Bylaws amendment concerning term limits by retroactively applying the two-term limit to disqualify her 2024 candidacy.

Orders: Petition denied. Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Failure to hold an open meeting to decide candidacy disqualification.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated open meeting laws by holding a closed executive session vote on October 11, 2024, to disqualify her candidacy.

Orders: Petition denied. Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Term Limits, Open Meeting Law, Selective Enforcement, ADR
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272425.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272426.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282372.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:17:12 (60.5 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:17:15 (9.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1284492.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288176.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288177.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1293820.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1313134.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing:Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing case Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 25F-H030-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Sharon Maiden, a former board member, alleged that the association selectively enforced its bylaws to disqualify her from running for the board and violated Arizona’s open meeting laws by making this decision in a closed executive session.

The central conflict revolved around the interpretation of a 2021 bylaw amendment that shortened board member term limits. The petitioner argued for a prospective application, which would reset the term-limit clock for sitting board members, while the respondent association argued for an interpretation that counted prior service.

On June 2, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety. The judge concluded that the association’s board acted within the bounds of Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)) by holding a closed session to consider legal advice. Furthermore, the judge found that the petitioner failed to prove a bylaw violation, reasoning that the association’s interpretation was consistent with the membership’s clear intent to shorten, not lengthen, the potential tenure of board members.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Number

25F-H030-REL

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Petitioner

Sharon M. Maiden

Respondent

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Josh Bolen, Esq. (CHDB Law LLP)

Presiding Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petition Allegations

The petition, filed by Sharon Maiden on December 15, 2024, asserted two primary violations by the Val Vista Lakes Community Association:

1. Selective Enforcement of Bylaws: An alleged violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws, stemming from the board’s decision to disqualify the petitioner from running for a board position in 2024 based on its interpretation of term limits.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: An alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A), contending that the board failed to hold an open meeting when it made the binding decision to disqualify her candidacy.

Initially filed as a single-issue petition for which a $500 fee was paid, the OAH ordered on March 12, 2025, that the petitioner must either pay an additional $500 to pursue both issues or select one to proceed with at the hearing.

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Procedural History

January 27, 2025: The Arizona Department of Real Estate refers the petition to the OAH for an administrative hearing.

February 4, 2025: Respondent files a Motion to Strike the Petition, arguing the petitioner improperly disclosed attorney-client privileged communications.

February 11, 2025: Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn denies the Motion to Strike. The hearing is continued to March 26, 2025.

March 26, 2025: The first day of the evidentiary hearing is conducted.

April 11, 2025: A further hearing is conducted. At its conclusion, the record is held open to allow for post-hearing briefing.

May 13, 2025: The post-hearing briefing period concludes, and the record is closed.

June 2, 2025: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues the final decision, denying the petition.

Central Dispute: Interpretation of Bylaw Term Limits

The core of the dispute was the interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the association’s bylaws, which was amended in 2021. The amendment’s purpose, as testified by multiple witnesses, was to shorten the length of time directors could serve on the board.

Evolution of the Bylaw

2012 Bylaws: Introduced term limits for the first time, establishing a maximum of three consecutive two-year terms (six years total), followed by a required one-year break.

2021 Bylaws: The membership approved a rewrite that reduced term limits to two consecutive elected two-year terms (four years total), followed by a required two-year break.

Both versions of the bylaw contained the following critical sentence: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.” The meaning of this sentence became the primary point of contention.

Competing Interpretations

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Position (Prospective Application)

The “Commencing with…” language resets the clock. Terms served before the 2021 amendment should not count toward the new, shorter limits. The association’s sudden shift to a retroactive interpretation was selective and targeted.

William Sutell (Former President): Testified the intent was to “reset the clock for everybody.” His 2022 newsletter stating his “term limit of four years is up” was “ineloquent” and meant to express he was tired of serving.
Douglas Keats (Former Board Member): Stated the intent of the rewrite was to “Go forward.”
Historical Precedent: The association, based on a 2016 legal opinion from Goodman Law Group, had allowed Director Cheryl McCoy to serve nine consecutive years despite the 2012 bylaw’s six-year limit.
Legal Opinions: An opinion from Krupnik & Speas in November 2023 stated the 2021 bylaws were prospective, not retroactive.

Respondent’s Position (Prior Service Counts)

The clear intent of the membership and the bylaw committee was to shorten terms. The petitioner’s interpretation creates a loophole allowing sitting board members to serve for 8 or more years, directly contradicting the amendment’s purpose.

Jill Brown (Bylaw Committee Chair): Testified the committee’s intent was to apply the new limits to sitting directors and there was no discussion of “grandfathering” anyone.
Bryan Patterson (Current President): Testified that the membership voted for two two-year terms “and that’s it.”
Sutell’s 2022 Newsletter: Presented as a direct admission from the former president that the four-year limit applied to him based on his service from 2018-2022.
Drafting Logic: The “Commencing with…” clause is a standard legal provision to prevent a new rule from invalidating a board member’s current term, not to erase their entire service history.

Central Dispute: Alleged Open Meeting Law Violation

The second major issue concerned the board’s decision-making process. On October 11, 2024, the board held a closed executive session where it voted 5-4 to accept the legal opinion of its counsel (CHDB Law) and disqualify Ms. Maiden from the ballot.

Competing Arguments

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Argument (Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))

The vote to disqualify a candidate was a final, binding decision that must be made in an open meeting. The closed session was not justified under the narrow exceptions of the statute.

Improper Notice: The meeting notice cited the incorrect statute (for condominiums, not planned communities) and was not properly distributed to all board members.
Lack of Statutory Justification: No attorney was present at the meeting, and there was no pending litigation at that specific moment. The agenda item was to “accept opinion,” not simply “receive advice.”

Respondent’s Argument (Compliance with Law)

The executive session was permissible under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows closed meetings for the “consideration of… Legal advice from an attorney for the board or the association” and matters concerning “pending or contemplated litigation.”

Contemplated Litigation: Testimony indicated that Ms. Maiden had threatened to file an ADR complaint or lawsuit.
Consideration of Legal Advice: The board was reviewing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility.
Petitioner’s Participation: Ms. Maiden was present at the meeting, participated in the vote, and did not object to the session being held in private at that time.

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Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ denied Ms. Maiden’s petition on both counts, finding that she failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ruling on the Open Meeting Law

The ALJ concluded that the board did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Key Rationale: The evidence demonstrated that the board met in executive session “to consider a legal opinion regarding the 2021 Amendment.” This action falls squarely within the statutory exception outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).

On Disclosure: The statute permits, but does not require, the board to disclose information from such a session after a “final resolution.” As the matter was still being litigated, no final resolution had been reached.

Ruling on the Bylaw Violation

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Article IV of its bylaws.

Key Rationale: The judge focused on the underlying purpose of the 2021 amendment, which testimony from both sides confirmed was to “prevent Board members from serving for long periods of time.”

Rejection of Petitioner’s Interpretation: The decision noted that the petitioner, along with her witnesses, admitted that their interpretation “would have allowed the then-sitting Board Members the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” The ALJ found this outcome would be contrary to the amendment’s purpose.

Jurisdictional Note: The decision explicitly stated that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” The ruling was based on the interpretation of the bylaw’s text and intent, not on whether it was applied unevenly.

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that Respondent’s Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 or Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.”






Study Guide – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Study Guide: Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. What were the two primary legal issues Sharon Maiden raised in her petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association?

2. What was the key phrase in the 2021 bylaws that became the central point of interpretive conflict regarding term limits?

3. According to the hearing testimony, what were the main purposes of the 2021 bylaw committee’s rewrite of the association’s bylaws?

4. Explain the Respondent’s justification for holding a closed executive session on October 11, 2024, to decide on Sharon Maiden’s eligibility.

5. How did the legal opinions from the Goodman Law Group (Ashley Turner) and Krupnik & Spees (Adrien Speed) support the Petitioner’s case?

6. Describe the key piece of evidence the Respondent used involving former board president William (Bill) Sutell to argue against a prospective interpretation of the term limits.

7. What decision did the Board of Directors make during the October 11, 2024, executive session, and what was the final vote count?

8. What procedural issue did Petitioner Douglas Keats identify with the notice for the October 11, 2024, executive session?

9. According to witness Jill Brown, what was the general intent of the bylaw committee and community members regarding the length of board service?

10. What were the final conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the June 2, 2025, decision?

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Answer Key

1. Petitioner Sharon Maiden alleged that the Respondent (1) selectively enforced the Bylaws in violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3, and (2) failed to hold an open meeting when it decided to disqualify her from running for the Board, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A).

2. The central point of conflict was the phrase in Article IV, Section 2: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits…” The Petitioner argued this indicated a prospective “reset,” while the Respondent argued it did not erase prior service.

3. Testimony from witnesses like Douglas Keats and William Sutell indicated the rewrite was intended to address multiple issues, not just term limits. Key purposes included establishing secret ballots, eliminating the nominating committee which was seen as counter to the CCNRs, and creating a formal procedure for replacing board members based on vote counts rather than board appointments.

4. The Respondent justified the closed session under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows for closed meetings to consider legal advice from an attorney. The board was discussing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility and also noted that Ms. Maiden had contemplated legal action against the association.

5. The Petitioner argued that these opinions demonstrated a consistent historical interpretation by the association’s own general counsels. Both opinions stated that the term limit language in the 2012 and 2021 bylaws should be interpreted prospectively, meaning terms served prior to the adoption of the new bylaws did not count toward the new limits.

6. The Respondent heavily relied on a November 2022 newsletter message from then-president Bill Sutell. In it, Mr. Sutell stated, “This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up,” which the Respondent argued was an admission that the term limits were not reset by the 2021 bylaw amendment.

7. The Board of Directors voted to accept the opinion of CHDB Law LLP regarding term limits, which effectively disqualified Sharon Maiden from running in the 2024 election. The motion passed with a vote of 5 to 4.

8. Douglas Keats testified that the email notice for the executive session was not sent to him or two other board members (Christine Rucker and Curtis Weile) at their correct addresses, while it was sent to a former board member. He also noted the notice cited an incorrect statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248 for condominiums) instead of the one for planned communities.

9. Jill Brown, who chaired the bylaw committee, testified that the general consensus of the committee and community members was that they did not want directors serving for long periods. The intent was to shorten the available terms to encourage turnover and prevent directors from serving for “excessive amounts of time.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied Sharon Maiden’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the closed meeting to consider legal advice was permissible. Furthermore, the Judge found Maiden failed to prove a violation of the bylaws, stating the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent long service periods, and deemed the issue of selective enforcement to be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

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Essay Questions

Construct detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from across the source documents. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent regarding the proper interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law). Discuss the specific actions taken by the board and how each party framed those actions in the context of the statute’s exceptions for closed sessions.

2. Compare and contrast the testimonies of William Sutell and Douglas Keats with that of Jill Brown. How did their recollections and interpretations of the bylaw committee’s intent differ, particularly concerning whether the new term limits should apply prospectively or retroactively to sitting board members?

3. Trace the evolution of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s bylaws regarding term limits from 2012 to 2021. Evaluate the arguments concerning “long-standing practice” and “selective enforcement,” referencing the specific cases of board members Cheryl McCoy, William Sutell, and Sharon Maiden.

4. Examine the role of conflicting legal advice in this dispute. Discuss the different opinions offered by the Goodman Law Group, Krupnik & Spees, and CHDB Law LLP, and analyze how the Board of Directors chose to navigate these contradictory recommendations.

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s final decision states that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Based on the testimony and arguments presented, construct an argument that Sharon Maiden might have made regarding selective enforcement, and explain why the Respondent would have refuted it.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Kay A. Abramsohn and Velva Moses-Thompson served as ALJs.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from members of homeowners’ associations. It referred this case to the OAH.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes in this case include § 33-1804(A) and § 32-2199.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

The Arizona statute concerning open meeting laws for planned community associations. It mandates that meetings be open to members but provides specific, limited exceptions for closed (executive) sessions, such as to discuss legal advice.

Bolen, Josh

An attorney with CHDB Law LLP who served as counsel for the Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Brown, Jill

A witness for the Respondent. She served as the chair of the 2021 bylaw committee and was a current board member at the time of the hearing.

Bylaw Committee

A committee established by the board in 2021 to review and recommend changes to the association’s bylaws. Its members included Jill Brown, William Sutell, and Douglas Keats.

Carpenter Hazelwood (CHDB LAW LLP)

The law firm that represented the Respondent. The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the firm.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing documents for the community. The 2021 bylaw committee sought to address bylaw provisions that were counter to the CCNRs, such as the nominating committee.

Commencing with…

The key phrase in Article IV, Section 2 of the bylaws that was central to the dispute. The Petitioner argued it signaled a prospective application of term limits, while the Respondent disagreed.

Executive Session

A closed meeting of the Board of Directors, permitted under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) for specific purposes, such as discussing legal advice or pending litigation.

Keats, Douglas

A witness for the Petitioner. He was a former board member who served as secretary of the 2021 bylaw committee.

Maiden, Sharon M.

The Petitioner in the case, a homeowner in Val Vista Lakes and a former member of its Board of Directors who was disqualified from running for a third consecutive term.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH / Tribunal)

The independent state agency that conducted the administrative hearing for this case after referral from the Department of Real Estate.

Patterson, Bryan

A witness for the Respondent. He was the HOA President at the time of the hearing and was Vice President when the vote to disqualify the Petitioner occurred.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Sharon M. Maiden.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing, defined as evidence that is more likely true than not. The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.

Prospective Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies only “going forward” from its effective date and does not consider service or actions that occurred prior to that date. This was the Petitioner’s central argument.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Retroactive Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies to past events, meaning prior service on the board would count against the newly established term limits. This was the Respondent’s position.

Sutell, William (Bill)

A witness for the Petitioner. He is an attorney, a former board president, and served on the 2021 bylaw committee.

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association (HOA) in Gilbert, Arizona.






Blog Post – 25F-H030-REL


5 Surprising Lessons from an HOA War Over a Single Sentence

Introduction: The Butterfly Effect of Bylaws

For many homeowners, the rules set by their homeowners’ association (HOA) can feel arbitrary, buried in dense legal documents. But the precise wording of those governing documents has massive, unforeseen consequences—a legal butterfly effect where a minor change creates a major storm. This dynamic was on full display in the case of Sharon Maiden vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, where one seemingly simple sentence sparked a complex, year-long legal dispute.

The case offers a masterclass in the tension between the technical reading of a text versus its clear, underlying intent. It provides surprising insights into law, community governance, and human nature. Here are five key lessons from this HOA war over a single sentence.

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1. One Sentence, Two Meanings, and a Mountain of Legal Bills

A 2021 bylaw amendment, designed to reduce board member term limits, lit the fuse for the central conflict. The entire dispute hinged on the interpretation of one introductory phrase, demonstrating just how much can ride on a few words.

The critical sentence from Article IV, Section 2 of the 2021 Bylaws reads:

“Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.”

This single sentence gave rise to two completely opposite interpretations:

The “Reset” Theory (Petitioner’s view): Proponents argued this language meant the term limit clock reset for all sitting board members. Under this view, their prior years of service didn’t count toward the new, shorter limit. This interpretation seemed solid, even supported by a formal legal opinion from the association’s previous general counsel, attorney Adrien Spees.

The “Look-Back” Theory (Respondent’s view): The association argued the phrase was merely a legal formality to prevent sitting members from being disqualified mid-term. They contended that a board member’s prior service absolutely still counted toward the new limit.

The fact that this ambiguity was enough to fuel a formal administrative hearing shows the high stakes of precise legal drafting. What’s truly surprising is how a standard legal phrase like “Commencing with…” could be interpreted so diametrically as to potentially erase years of board service from the term-limit calculation.

2. The Architect of the Rule Became Its Most Complicated Case

One of the most fascinating aspects of the case involved the testimony of Bill Sutell, the former Board President. Mr. Sutell was in charge when the 2021 bylaw changes were drafted and approved, and he testified in support of the “reset” theory, which would have allowed him and other members to serve longer.

However, the strongest piece of evidence used against his position came from his own hand. In a 2022 newsletter to the community, Mr. Sutell had written:

“This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up.”

When questioned, he explained the statement was “ineloquent.” He testified he was tired and had a “self-imposed term limit” because he “didn’t want to be a career board member.” This created a paradox where the rule’s architect argued for one interpretation in court while his own public statement seemed to support the opposing view. As community governance analysts, we see a crucial lesson here: for HOA volunteers, informal communications like a newsletter can be scrutinized with the same intensity as a legal document—a trap many well-meaning leaders are unprepared for.

3. Why a “Correct” Interpretation Can Still Be Wrong

The petitioner’s side came to the hearing with what seemed like very strong evidence. They had testimony about the bylaw committee’s intent and presented a formal legal opinion from attorney Adrien Spees that appeared to settle the matter:

“This amendment is prospective not retroactive. The Term limits only apply to directors elected beginning the first annual meeting following November 9th, 2021. Thus, a director who has served for several years before November 9th, 2021 will still be eligible to serve two consecutive terms after November 9th, 2021.”

This seems clear-cut. However, the argument that ultimately won focused not on what the words said, but on what they would do. The fatal blow to the “reset” theory came not from the respondent’s lawyers, but from the petitioner’s own key witnesses. During testimony, both Sutell and another witness, Douglas Keats, admitted that their interpretation would create a massive loophole, allowing sitting board members “the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” This admission was critical. The Administrative Law Judge rejected an interpretation—even one supported by a legal opinion—because it led to an “absurd result” that directly contradicted the stated purpose of the rule, which was to shorten term limits, not accidentally lengthen them for a select few.

4. The Peril of a Closed-Door Meeting

The second major issue was the claim that the board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws. The vote to disqualify Sharon Maiden from the 2024 ballot was not taken in public. Instead, it happened during a closed executive session while she, a sitting board member, was present.

The board justified the closed-door meeting by stating they were discussing legal advice and contemplated litigation, a valid exception under A.R.S. § 33-1804. However, the ALJ’s final decision highlighted a crucial detail:

“Petitioner was a member of the Board at the time of the meeting and did not object to the Board voting on whether Article IV, Section 2 of Respondent’s Bylaws permitted Petitioner to run for the board…”

This offers a stark lesson. A person’s failure to object to a process in the moment can significantly weaken their ability to challenge it later. It’s easy to see why someone might stay silent: they may be intimidated, unsure of the rules, or simply not realize the procedural gravity of their silence. This surprising takeaway underscores that understanding the rules of order as they are happening is critical, because silence can be interpreted as consent.

5. The “Why” Trumped the “What”

The story concluded when the Administrative Law Judge denied the petitioner’s case on both counts. In the face of ambiguous text and competing legal opinions, the judge focused on the fundamental purpose of the 2021 bylaw amendment. The final decision stated:

“…the preponderance of the evidence presented at hearing shows that the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent Board members for serving on the Board for long periods of time.”

In this legal gray area, the underlying intent—the “why” behind the rule—proved more powerful than the technical arguments about the “what.” The judge determined that an interpretation creating 10-year term limits could not possibly align with the members’ vote to prevent people from serving for long periods. The surprising lesson is that even when the text is debatable, the spirit of a rule can become the most decisive factor in its application.

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Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Rules Mean?

The Val Vista Lakes case is a powerful reminder that the words in bylaws are not just suggestions; they have real-world power to shape communities, define rights, and launch costly legal battles. Bylaws are “living documents” in the sense that they have a daily impact, but they are dangerously “dead documents” if members don’t understand them. The consequences are not just financial. At the hearing, former president Bill Sutell gave a poignant final statement explaining his departure from the community he had worked so hard to serve: “I sold my home that this was more than I needed in my retirement.”

This case is a cautionary tale about the human cost of ambiguity. It leaves every HOA member with a final, thought-provoking challenge: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and are you willing to actively question ambiguity and push for clarity before a conflict arises?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sharon M. Maiden (petitioner)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board member/candidate
  • William Sutel (witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board president; bylaw committee member
  • Douglas Keats (witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Board member; bylaw committee member; requested subpoena for him
  • Jeremy Whitaker (petitioner)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Filed ADR complaint

Respondent Side

  • Josh Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Counsel for Val Vista Lakes Community Association; requested subpoena for him
  • Jill Brown (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Bylaw committee chair; respondent witness
  • Bryan Patterson (board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Respondent witness; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
  • Chuck Oldham (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
  • Mel McDonald (board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena; board member
  • Vicki Goslin (attorney staff)
    CHDB Law LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Ashley Turner (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Wrote 2016 legal opinion; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
  • Jessica Misto (attorney)
    Provided legal review/opinion
  • Adrienne Speed (attorney)
    Cartik and Speed
    General counsel who wrote 2023 opinion

Other Participants

  • Diana Ebertshauser (witness)
    Requested subpoena; candidate
  • Brodie Hurtado (witness)
    Requested subpoena; candidate
  • Timothy Hedrick (witness)
    Requested subpoena
  • Christine Rucker (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena
  • Curtis Weile (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena
  • Cheryl McCoy (former board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Brian Solomon (former board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Dustin Snow (former director)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Wendy Rhodess (bylaw committee member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Jonathan Everhouser (attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Bylaw committee member
  • Laura Henry (property manager)
    First Service Residential
    General Manager
  • Leslie Johnson (former director)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • John Walls (former board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Community member

Allan, Joseph P v. The Springs Condominiums Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-03-31
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joseph P. Allan Counsel
Respondent The Springs Condominiums Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A). Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee and comply with the statute in the future.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide access to financial and other records within ten business days.

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to allow Petitioner to examine original invoices for May 2024 (requested July 9, 2024) and bank statements from four accounts (requested September 23, 2024) within the required ten business days, despite receiving the requests through board members.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days and is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) going forward. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, records request, A.R.S. 33-1258, prevailing party, condominium association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H018-REL Decision – 1263777.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:14:18 (48.3 KB)

25F-H018-REL Decision – 1288586.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:14:22 (105.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H018-REL


Briefing Document: Case No. 25F-H018-REL, Allan v. The Springs Condominiums Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative hearing and subsequent decision in the matter of Joseph P. Allan (Petitioner) versus The Springs Condominiums Association (Respondent). The central issue was the Respondent’s failure to provide financial records to the Petitioner within the timeframe mandated by Arizona law.

The Petitioner, a homeowner and former board member, formally requested to examine bank statements and original invoices by sending emails directly to the association’s board members. The Respondent, represented by the owner of its property management company, did not fulfill these requests within the statutory ten-business-day period. The primary defense offered was that the requests were not sent to the management company, which is the customary channel for processing such items, and the board failed to forward the requests.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Petitioner. The decision established that the legal obligation to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1258 rests with the association itself, and internal procedural preferences or communication failures between the board and its management agent do not absolve the association of this statutory duty. The documents were ultimately provided on the eve of the hearing, well past the legal deadline. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, mandated the refund of his $500 filing fee, and directed the association to ensure future compliance with state law.

Case Overview

Case Number

25F-H018-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Petitioner

Joseph P. Allan

Respondent

The Springs Condominiums Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

March 11, 2025

Decision Date

March 31, 2025

Core Allegation and Legal Framework

The dispute centered on the Petitioner’s allegation that The Springs Condominiums Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1258, which governs a member’s right to access association records.

Statutory Requirement (A.R.S. § 33-1258 A): The statute mandates that “all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member.” It explicitly states, “The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.”

Specific Violations Alleged: The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate after the association failed to respond to two separate requests for documents:

1. A request for original invoices for May 2024.

2. A request for bank statements from four association accounts.

Chronology of Events

July 9, 2024: Mr. Allan emails several board members, including the President and Vice President, requesting to examine original invoices for May 2024.

September 23, 2024: Mr. Allan emails several board members requesting to examine bank statements from four association accounts.

October 2024 (approx.): After receiving no response, Mr. Allan files a petition with the Department of Real Estate, alleging the violations. The petition incorrectly listed the request dates as July 29 and September 24, a discrepancy clarified and acknowledged by both parties at the hearing.

January 16, 2025: An “Order Granting Continuance” is issued at the Petitioner’s request, moving the hearing date.

March 10, 2025: At 6:45 PM, the evening before the scheduled hearing, the Respondent provides the requested documents to Mr. Allan.

March 11, 2025: The evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Velva Moses-Thompson.

March 31, 2025: The ALJ issues the final decision and order.

Analysis of Testimony and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joseph P. Allan)

Mr. Allan, representing himself, argued that he followed the law by submitting his requests directly to the association. His key points were:

Direct Communication with the Association: He intentionally sent his requests to the board members (President, Vice President, Treasurer, and Director) because he considers them to be the “association” as defined by the statute.

Investigation of Management Company: He deliberately bypassed the management company because he was actively investigating its conduct.

Lack of Timely Response: It was undisputed that the association failed to provide the documents within the 10-day period. He confirmed receipt only on March 10, 2025, months after the requests were made.

Past Experience: As a former board member for three years, he was familiar with the association’s financial documents and was requesting them to ensure everything was correct due to perceived problems.

Respondent’s Position (The Springs Condominiums Association)

The association was represented by Belen Guzman, the owner of its management company, SSC Property Management. Her defense centered on a procedural failure, not a denial of the Petitioner’s right to the documents.

Improper Channel of Request: The primary defense was that Mr. Allan failed to follow standard practice by not including the management company in his email requests.

Board’s Failure to Act: Ms. Guzman testified that the board members who received the emails did not forward them or follow up. She stated she was unaware of the requests until after the official complaint was filed and one of the board members, Petri (the president at the time), forwarded an email to her.

Lack of Written Policy: Ms. Guzman acknowledged that the association has no written policy requiring requests to be sent to the management company, but stated the board had verbally instructed Mr. Allan in a meeting to include management on such communications.

Knowledge of Procedure: She argued that as a former board member, Mr. Allan was aware that record requests are typically handled by the management company.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision provided a clear legal interpretation of the events and the responsibilities of the parties.

Key Findings of Fact

• It was undisputed that the Petitioner is a member of the Respondent association.

• The Petitioner made formal requests for records via email to board members on July 9, 2024, and September 23, 2024.

• These requests were not sent to the Respondent’s property management company.

• The Respondent did not respond to the requests within the ten-business-day timeframe required by law.

• The Respondent provided the requested documents on March 10, 2025.

• The Respondent’s representative, Ms. Guzman, did not dispute that the board members had received the requests.

Key Conclusions of Law

• The Petitioner successfully met his burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).

• The Respondent failed to provide any legal authority supporting its defense that a request must be sent to its property management company to be valid.

• The statutory obligation to provide records lies with the “association.” The failure of the board to forward the requests to its management agent does not excuse the association’s non-compliance.

• The ALJ concluded: “Respondent violated A.R.S. section 33-1258(A) when it failed to allow Petitioner to examine the May 2024 original invoices and bank statements from four of Respondent’s accounts, within ten business days of the date of Petitioner’s requests.”

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the ALJ issued a binding order with the following components:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Joseph P. Allan, was deemed the prevailing party.

2. Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days of the order.

3. Future Compliance: The Respondent was formally directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) going forward.

4. No Civil Penalty: The judge determined that a civil penalty was not appropriate in this matter.

The primary implication of this decision is that a condominium or homeowner association is directly and legally responsible for fulfilling its statutory obligations. It cannot use internal protocols, informal procedures, or communication breakdowns between its board and third-party vendors (like a management company) as a legal defense for failing to comply with state law.






Study Guide – 25F-H018-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H018-REL”, “case_title”: “Allan, Joseph P v. The Springs Condominiums Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-03-31”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If I send a records request to the Board but not the management company, can the HOA ignore it?”, “short_answer”: “No. Sending the request to Board members is sufficient to trigger the HOA’s legal obligation to respond.”, “detailed_answer”: “Even if the management company prefers requests to go directly to them, the Association is still obligated to comply with the law if the Board receives the request. In this case, the management company argued they didn’t know about the request because it went to the Board, but the judge ruled the violation still occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent did present any legal authority to establish that it was not obligated to comply with A.R.S. section 33-1258(A), for the reason that the requests were not sent to Respondent’s property management company.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “HOA obligations”, “property management” ] }, { “question”: “How many days does the HOA have to let me examine the records I requested?”, “short_answer”: “The HOA must make records available for examination within 10 business days.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law grants the Association ten business days to fulfill a request for examination after receiving it.”, “alj_quote”: “The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “timelines”, “records request”, “statutory requirements” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at the records?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA cannot charge a member for making material available for review.”, “detailed_answer”: “While the HOA can charge for copies (up to 15 cents per page), they are explicitly prohibited from charging a fee for the act of making materials available for review.”, “alj_quote”: “The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “fees”, “records request”, “homeowner rights” ] }, { “question”: “What happens if I win my hearing against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “You may be deemed the prevailing party and the HOA can be ordered to reimburse your filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the judge rules in your favor, they can order the HOA to pay back the filing fee you paid to bring the case. In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the homeowner $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.”, “legal_basis”: “Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “ruling” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to provide original invoices if I request them?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. Financial records, including original invoices, must be made reasonably available.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision confirms that failure to allow examination of original invoices constitutes a violation of the statute governing association records.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent violated A.R.S. section 33-1258(A) when it failed to allow Petitioner to examine the May 2024 original invoices and bank statements”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “invoices”, “financial records”, “transparency” ] }, { “question”: “What is the standard of proof for proving the HOA violated the law?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by showing it is ‘more probably true than not.’ This is the standard evidentiary weight required in these administrative hearings.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 (A) by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “burden of proof”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Will the HOA always be fined a civil penalty if they break the law?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. The judge has discretion on whether to apply a civil penalty.”, “detailed_answer”: “Even if a violation is found (as it was in this case regarding the records), the judge may decide that a civil penalty is not appropriate based on the circumstances.”, “alj_quote”: “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”, “legal_basis”: “Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “civil penalty”, “fines”, “enforcement” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 25F-H018-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H018-REL”, “case_title”: “Allan, Joseph P v. The Springs Condominiums Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-03-31”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “If I send a records request to the Board but not the management company, can the HOA ignore it?”, “short_answer”: “No. Sending the request to Board members is sufficient to trigger the HOA’s legal obligation to respond.”, “detailed_answer”: “Even if the management company prefers requests to go directly to them, the Association is still obligated to comply with the law if the Board receives the request. In this case, the management company argued they didn’t know about the request because it went to the Board, but the judge ruled the violation still occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent did present any legal authority to establish that it was not obligated to comply with A.R.S. section 33-1258(A), for the reason that the requests were not sent to Respondent’s property management company.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “HOA obligations”, “property management” ] }, { “question”: “How many days does the HOA have to let me examine the records I requested?”, “short_answer”: “The HOA must make records available for examination within 10 business days.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law grants the Association ten business days to fulfill a request for examination after receiving it.”, “alj_quote”: “The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “timelines”, “records request”, “statutory requirements” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at the records?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA cannot charge a member for making material available for review.”, “detailed_answer”: “While the HOA can charge for copies (up to 15 cents per page), they are explicitly prohibited from charging a fee for the act of making materials available for review.”, “alj_quote”: “The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “fees”, “records request”, “homeowner rights” ] }, { “question”: “What happens if I win my hearing against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “You may be deemed the prevailing party and the HOA can be ordered to reimburse your filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the judge rules in your favor, they can order the HOA to pay back the filing fee you paid to bring the case. In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the homeowner $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.”, “legal_basis”: “Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “ruling” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to provide original invoices if I request them?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. Financial records, including original invoices, must be made reasonably available.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision confirms that failure to allow examination of original invoices constitutes a violation of the statute governing association records.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent violated A.R.S. section 33-1258(A) when it failed to allow Petitioner to examine the May 2024 original invoices and bank statements”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “invoices”, “financial records”, “transparency” ] }, { “question”: “What is the standard of proof for proving the HOA violated the law?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by showing it is ‘more probably true than not.’ This is the standard evidentiary weight required in these administrative hearings.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 (A) by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “burden of proof”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Will the HOA always be fined a civil penalty if they break the law?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. The judge has discretion on whether to apply a civil penalty.”, “detailed_answer”: “Even if a violation is found (as it was in this case regarding the records), the judge may decide that a civil penalty is not appropriate based on the circumstances.”, “alj_quote”: “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”, “legal_basis”: “Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “civil penalty”, “fines”, “enforcement” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joseph P. Allan (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself. Name also appears as Joseph P. Allen.

Respondent Side

  • Belen Guzman (property manager)
    SSC Property Management
    Owner of the property management company for the Respondent. Appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
  • Peetri Ahon (board member)
    The Springs Condominiums Association
    Was the President of the board at the time of requests, later identified as a member at large.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge. Name also appears as Fala Moses Thompson.
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Carmen (homeowner)
    The Springs Condominiums Association
    A homeowner who was CC'd on an email.

Keystone Owners Association V. Bernadette M. Bennett

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-12-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keystone Owners Association Counsel Erica L. Mortenson
Respondent Bernadette M. Bennett Counsel Thomas A. Walcott

Alleged Violations

Mountain Park Association CC&Rs Art. IV, Sec. 2; Keystone CC&Rs Art. V, Sec. 5.19; Rules (35% Frontage Limit)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed. The Respondent (Homeowner) was found in violation of Governing Documents for installing an unapproved driveway extension that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the $1,500.00 filing fee and comply with all Governing Documents henceforth. No civil penalty was levied.

Why this result: Respondent failed to obtain prior written approval for the driveway alteration and failed to prove the affirmative defense of laches.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized Driveway Extension Exceeding 35% of Total Yard Frontage Area

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by installing a driveway extension exceeding 35% of the total yard frontage area without prior written approval. The ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation occurred and the Respondent failed to establish the affirmative defense of laches.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $1,500.00 for the filing fee and comply henceforth with the Governing Documents.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, ARC, Driveway, Frontage Area, CC&Rs, Laches
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1159036.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180542.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180545.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198622.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:05:09 (7.6 KB)

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1225107.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:05:13 (52.6 KB)

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227639.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:05:18 (48.7 KB)

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227642.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:05:23 (5.9 KB)

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1230660.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1241815.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1250037.pdf

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Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erica L. Mortenson (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    HOA attorney
  • Harry Whitel (board member/witness)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Secretary of the Board
  • Tim Seyfarth (board member/president)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board President
  • Glenn Steinman (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Vice President
  • Debbie Burch (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Cherry Collins (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Member at large; Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Joe Getti (ARC member/former board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Mary Hamilton (ARC member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Dan (attorney/staff)
    Goodman Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bernadette M. Bennett (respondent)
    Lot Owner
  • Thomas A. Walcott (attorney)
    Provident Lawyers
    Respondent attorney
  • Noah Alvarado (staff)
    Staff/assistant for Respondent's Counsel
  • Christopher J. Charles (attorney/staff)
    Provident Lawyers

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Amy Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge (prior to VMT)
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Isabella (property manager)
    Vision Management
    Keystone Property Manager who was asked for documents
  • Annette Wthbon (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent
  • Carla Garvin (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent

John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H058-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-10-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R. Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC Counsel James Brewer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner John R. Ashley's petition against Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The ALJ found that the HOA did not violate the Bylaws regarding the minimum number of directors because compliance was impossible due to lack of member interest, and the issue was subsequently moot as the board currently met the minimum requirement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut Respondent’s claim that it actively sought a third board member. The Respondent was exonerated under the legal doctrine of impossibility of performance, and the current compliance with the three-member minimum rendered the dispute moot.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding the minimum number of Board Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws by having only two Board Directors dismiss and order a redo of the 1/9/2023 Annual Membership Meeting for 3/7/2023, arguing that three directors were required to properly handle the Association’s affairs.

Orders: The petition is dismissed. Respondent was unable to comply with the Bylaws requiring three directors due to impossibility (lack of member interest) while actively seeking compliance, and the dispute is currently moot as the board now has three or more members.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: impossibility of performance, board structure, election dispute, bylaw violation, Planned Communities Act, mootness
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1075520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:49 (45.8 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078604.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:52 (47.9 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078608.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:56 (5.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1099484.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:59:01 (104.5 KB)

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R. Ashley (petitioner)
    Represented himself
  • Rmulo Gonzalez (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; contested re-election procedures
  • James Canella (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election; member of the community who desired to serve
  • Daniel Walker (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election
  • Richard Springer (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board
  • Charles Seers (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board; name variations include Charles Zippers

Respondent Side

  • James Brewer (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
    Represented Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association
  • Leah M. McKeever (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Lynn M. Allen (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Sherry Ortega (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Vice President since March 2023; President previously; testified for Respondent
  • Maria Ruelas (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Director in 2022 until March 2023
  • Kimberly Schone (COO/witness)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Chief Operating Officer, testified for Respondent
  • Ronda Raal (CEO/property manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    CEO of the management company
  • Sammy (assistant)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Assistant who helped count ballots for January 2023 election; name variations include Tammy, Cammy, Samantha
  • Joy (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Manager during January 2023 election period
  • Jennifer (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Current manager of the account
  • Vince (management staff)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Saw ballot video footage

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Also referred to as Fala Moses Thompson
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • VNunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • DJones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • Labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents

Other Participants

  • Cordova Sapola (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; unresponsive and did not attend meetings
  • Eugenia Francisco (elected candidate)
    Elected in January 2023 election but refuted candidacy; name variations include Eugene Silva
  • Yolanda Molina (former board member)
    Former Treasurer; resigned December 2021
  • Mario Martinez (witness reference)
    Adam LMC
  • Diane (former property manager)
    First manager for the HOA around 2017-2018

Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony Payson Counsel
Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1 Counsel Sean K. Mohnihan

Alleged Violations

CC&R Section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed after the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 5.4, finding that this section applies to use restrictions on individual Lots and Members, not the Association itself.

Why this result: The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Section 5.4 because the HOA does not own or operate the nuisance-causing television, and the CC&R section governs restrictions on lot Owners/Members, not the Association. OAH jurisdiction is limited to finding the governing document or statute violated by the respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's alleged failure to enforce nuisance provision (CC&R Section 5.4) regarding neighbor's outdoor television.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA failed to perform its duty to enforce CC&R Section 5.4 by refusing to seek removal of a neighbor's large, outdoor television that created noise disturbances and was deemed a nuisance.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • CC&R Section 5.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Homeowners Association, CC&R, Nuisance, Enforcement, Jurisdiction, Outdoor TV
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/74bT2mijNKJ5SUal3ovDor

Decision Documents

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1047496.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:58 (57.5 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1053240.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:01 (98.4 KB)





Study Guide – 23F-H041-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H041-REL”, “case_title”: “In the Matter of Anthony Payson vs The Foothills Homeowners Association #1”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-01”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can I use the ADRE administrative hearing process to force my HOA to enforce CC&R rules against a neighbor?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, if the specific rule applies to member conduct rather than Association conduct.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) clarified that the dispute process is for determining if the Respondent (the HOA) violated a statute or governing document. If a CC&R provision restricts how a ‘lot’ may be used, a violation of that rule is a breach by the member (the neighbor), not the Association. Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 23F-H041-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H041-REL”, “case_title”: “In the Matter of Anthony Payson vs The Foothills Homeowners Association #1”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-01”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can I use the ADRE administrative hearing process to force my HOA to enforce CC&R rules against a neighbor?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, if the specific rule applies to member conduct rather than Association conduct.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) clarified that the dispute process is for determining if the Respondent (the HOA) violated a statute or governing document. If a CC&R provision restricts how a ‘lot’ may be used, a violation of that rule is a breach by the member (the neighbor), not the Association. Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Payson (petitioner)
    Homeowner

Respondent Side

  • Sean K. Mohnihan (HOA attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Appeared for Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
  • Jason E Smith (attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Listed with counsel
  • Gabron (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Linda Armo (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Philip Brown (former HOA attorney)
    Previously represented the HOA; wrote a letter to Petitioner

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barry Callahan (neighbor)
    Alleged violator of CC&Rs, neighbor to Petitioner

Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), v. Montelena Master

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) Counsel
Respondent Montelena Master Community Association Counsel Troy Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-442, A.R.S. § 33-1806

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA

Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Aaron Ricks (petitioner)
    Somerstone Properties, LLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (HOA attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (119.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

Decision Date: February 10, 2021

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL


Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL


Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:29 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:31 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:32 (119.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

Decision Date: February 10, 2021

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL


Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL


Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission