Tag Archives: Open Meeting Law

Wanda Swartling v. Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H057-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-08-01
Administrative Law Judge Brian Del Vecchio
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition because the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1804 by failing to hold a properly noticed open board meeting prior to the March 2, 2023, special assessment vote. Evidence suggested issues were discussed in prior committee and board meetings, and Petitioner did not prove informal discussions constituted a violation requiring a finding against the Respondent.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wanda Swartling Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa Counsel Chad Gallacher

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition because the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1804 by failing to hold a properly noticed open board meeting prior to the March 2, 2023, special assessment vote. Evidence suggested issues were discussed in prior committee and board meetings, and Petitioner did not prove informal discussions constituted a violation requiring a finding against the Respondent.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent's conduct violated ARS § 33-1804.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold open board meeting prior to special assessment meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting law (ARS § 33-1804) by failing to hold an open board meeting prior to the March 2, 2023, special meeting where members voted on a special assessment, arguing that preliminary discussions and decisions were made unilaterally in supposed closed-door meetings or through email/informal discussions.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Petitioner's request to levy a civil penalty against Respondent is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, Special Assessment, Board Meetings, HOA Governance, Committee Meeting
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

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Decision Documents

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071114.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:10:30 (5884.7 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071115.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071120.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071121.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071122.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071126.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071127.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071503.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1079574.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071114.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:11 (5884.7 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:14 (7935.6 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071120.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:19 (1989.0 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071121.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:23 (4055.1 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071122.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071126.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071127.pdf

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23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071503.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:39 (49.2 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1079574.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:42 (114.8 KB)

This summary concerns the legal case *Wanda Swartling v. Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa*, Docket No. 23F-H057-REL. The evidentiary hearing took place on July 10, 2023, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Brian Del Vecchio.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The Petitioner, Wanda Swartling (a property owner and Association member), filed a single-issue petition on or about April 10, 2023. The core allegation was that the Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa (Respondent) violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (the open meeting law for planned communities).

The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors:

  1. Sent a February 7, 2023, email to homeowners informing them of the intent to hold a special meeting and proposing funding options without first holding an open board meeting.
  2. Held a March 2, 2023, special meeting to vote on a special assessment without having held an open board meeting prior to determining the items to be voted upon.

Petitioner argued that the board unilaterally determined which special assessments would be voted on through "closed door board meetings," thereby denying members the opportunity to be present for the decision-making processes. The March 2, 2023, special assessment vote ultimately failed to pass.

Hearing Proceedings and Key Arguments

Respondent (represented by Chad Gallacher, with community manager Steve Cheff testifying) denied the claims. Respondent argued that the claims were factually incorrect and legally insufficient.

Respondent's Legal Defense:

  • There is no legal requirement in ARS § 33-1804 stipulating that an open board meeting must be held before an email is sent to the community or prior to calling a special meeting of the members.
  • The authority to call a special meeting rests with the Board President, as per the association's bylaws (Section 2.2).
  • The issues had been previously discussed: Evidence submitted included meeting minutes showing discussions of capital projects, including painting, roofs, and special assessments, dating back to an Architectural Committee meeting on August 18, 2022, and a subsequent Board meeting on October 11, 2022.

Petitioner’s Burden and ALJ Rulings:

The ALJ emphasized that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent violated ARS § 33-1804. The ALJ strictly limited the scope of the hearing to the specific violations alleged in the complaint (the process surrounding the February 7th email and March 2nd meeting). Attempts by the Petitioner to introduce evidence demonstrating a *pattern* of closed meetings or to challenge procedural changes related to a prior annual meeting were repeatedly objected to and sustained as irrelevant or beyond the scope of jurisdiction.

Final Decision and Outcome

The ALJ issued a decision on August 1, 2023. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof.

  • The ALJ found that the special assessment voted on March 2, 2023, resulted from maintenance recommendations developed during the August 18, 2022, architectural committee meeting.
  • Regarding claims of informal discussions or emails constituting a violation, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the number of board members involved constituted a quorum necessary to trigger the notice requirement under ARS § 33-1804.

The ALJ ordered that Petitioner’s petition be dismissed and denied the request to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent.

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner alleging a violation against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the burden is on the homeowner to prove their case. The standard used is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Do informal discussions or emails between board members automatically violate open meeting laws?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. To constitute a violation, there must be proof that a quorum was present and that board business was actually conducted.

Detailed Answer

While informal discussions or emails might technically constitute a meeting, the homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum of board members was involved and that they were conducting actual board business to prove a violation of the open meeting statute.

Alj Quote

The informal discussions and emails between board members may have constituted board meetings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, however, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • emails
  • board communication

Question

What evidence is required to prove the board held a 'secret' meeting?

Short Answer

The homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum met and that specific board business was conducted.

Detailed Answer

Allegations of closed-door meetings fail if the homeowner cannot prove that enough board members were present to form a quorum and that they engaged in board business during that time.

Alj Quote

Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence board business was conducted during these putative board meetings.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • secret meetings
  • quorum

Question

Can a special assessment vote be based on recommendations from a committee meeting held months earlier?

Short Answer

Yes, if the committee meeting was valid, its recommendations can serve as the basis for a later vote.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ found that a special assessment vote in March 2023 was validly based on maintenance recommendations generated during an architectural committee meeting held the previous August.

Alj Quote

The special assessment which was voted on during the March 2, 2023, special meeting were maintenance recommendations from the architectural committee meeting on August 18, 2022.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • special assessments
  • committees
  • voting

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't remove all reasonable doubt.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Question

Which HOA meetings are required by law to be open to all members?

Short Answer

Meetings of the members, the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings must be open.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute explicitly requires that meetings of the members' association, the board of directors, and regularly scheduled committee meetings be open to all association members, notwithstanding contrary bylaws.

Alj Quote

Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • statutes

Case

Docket No
23F-H057-REL
Case Title
Wanda Swartling v Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa
Decision Date
2023-08-01
Alj Name
Brian Del Vecchio
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner alleging a violation against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the burden is on the homeowner to prove their case. The standard used is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Do informal discussions or emails between board members automatically violate open meeting laws?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. To constitute a violation, there must be proof that a quorum was present and that board business was actually conducted.

Detailed Answer

While informal discussions or emails might technically constitute a meeting, the homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum of board members was involved and that they were conducting actual board business to prove a violation of the open meeting statute.

Alj Quote

The informal discussions and emails between board members may have constituted board meetings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, however, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • emails
  • board communication

Question

What evidence is required to prove the board held a 'secret' meeting?

Short Answer

The homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum met and that specific board business was conducted.

Detailed Answer

Allegations of closed-door meetings fail if the homeowner cannot prove that enough board members were present to form a quorum and that they engaged in board business during that time.

Alj Quote

Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence board business was conducted during these putative board meetings.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • secret meetings
  • quorum

Question

Can a special assessment vote be based on recommendations from a committee meeting held months earlier?

Short Answer

Yes, if the committee meeting was valid, its recommendations can serve as the basis for a later vote.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ found that a special assessment vote in March 2023 was validly based on maintenance recommendations generated during an architectural committee meeting held the previous August.

Alj Quote

The special assessment which was voted on during the March 2, 2023, special meeting were maintenance recommendations from the architectural committee meeting on August 18, 2022.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • special assessments
  • committees
  • voting

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't remove all reasonable doubt.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Question

Which HOA meetings are required by law to be open to all members?

Short Answer

Meetings of the members, the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings must be open.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute explicitly requires that meetings of the members' association, the board of directors, and regularly scheduled committee meetings be open to all association members, notwithstanding contrary bylaws.

Alj Quote

Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • statutes

Case

Docket No
23F-H057-REL
Case Title
Wanda Swartling v Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa
Decision Date
2023-08-01
Alj Name
Brian Del Vecchio
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wanda Swartling (petitioner)
    Val Vista Park Townhome Association
    Homeowner, VVP Unit 82

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Steve Cheff (property manager / witness)
    Heywood Community Management
    Also community manager
  • Patti Locks (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Also listed as candidate/incumbent
  • Stephanie Hamrock (board member / witness)
    Val Vista Park HOA
  • Troy Goudeau (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Elected director
  • Paul Wilcox (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Elected director
  • Bettie Smiley (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
  • Carlee Collins (administrative assistant)
    Heywood Community Management
  • Alli (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Associate attorney

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Del Vecchio (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • Shelley Dusek (candidate)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Candidate for Board of Directors
  • Lori Solomon (candidate)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Candidate for Board of Directors
  • Tanya (committee attendee)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Attended Building Architectural Committee meeting
  • David Clem Sr (homeowner)
    Val Vista Park Townhomes
    Email recipient

Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H015-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-18
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The petition was granted because the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) by holding an informal quorum discussion prior to a meeting, and violated CC&R 4.32 by improperly charging the homeowner $1750.00 for septic maintenance and repair costs that should have been covered by annual common assessments.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jill P. Eden-Burns Counsel —
Respondent Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel S. Francom

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), (E); CC&R 4.32

Outcome Summary

The petition was granted because the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) by holding an informal quorum discussion prior to a meeting, and violated CC&R 4.32 by improperly charging the homeowner $1750.00 for septic maintenance and repair costs that should have been covered by annual common assessments.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Open Meeting Laws and unequal application of CC&R 4.32 regarding septic system costs.

The Board violated open meeting laws by holding an informal quorum discussion about septic policy prior to a formal meeting. Additionally, the Association improperly charged Petitioner $1750.00 for septic maintenance and repair, violating CC&R 4.32, which mandates such costs be included as part of Assessments allocated equally among all Lots.

Orders: Petition granted. Respondent must reimburse the $1,000.00 filing fee and henceforth comply with A.R.S. § 33-33-1804 and CC&R 4.32.

Filing fee: $1,000.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)
  • CC&R 4.32

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, HOA Governing Documents, Assessment Dispute, Septic System Maintenance, Informal Meeting
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)
  • CC&R 4.32
  • CC&R 8.1
  • CC&R 8.2
  • CC&R 11.2
  • CC&R 15.1

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

Preview HOABallot election workflows

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1015027.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:28 (52.0 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1017891.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:32 (53.2 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1024720.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:35 (59.5 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1033722.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:38 (47.5 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1057466.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:42 (168.6 KB)

This summary details the administrative hearing proceedings (No. 23F-H015-REL) initiated by Petitioner Jill P. Eden-Burns against the Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (Association/Respondent). The hearing took place across two dates: February 13, 2023, and April 4, 2023.

Key Facts

The Petitioner filed a complaint alleging the Association violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) and improperly applied Section 4.32 of the Community Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The substantive dispute centered on a $1,750.00 charge for a repair and pumpout performed on the Petitioner’s required sewage treatment system in November 2021. Although the Association initially paid for the work, it subsequently back assessed the Petitioner for the full amount.

Main Legal Issues and Arguments

  1. Violation of Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804):
  • The Petitioner alleged that a quorum of the Board members held an informal, closed meeting via Zoom on January 31, 2022, immediately prior to the officially scheduled open meeting. The Petitioner, who inadvertently joined the call, was subsequently removed.
  • Testimony and a recorded transcript revealed that Board members, including the President, discussed the pending septic issue and procedural methods for presenting a new "policy" regarding pumpouts without holding a formal vote.
  • The Respondent argued this was merely procedural discussion, not substantive Association business.
  • Legal Point: A.R.S. § 33-1804(E) requires that a quorum of the board meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, even if no vote is taken.
  1. Improper Application of CC&R Section 4.32 (Septic Costs):
  • CC&R Section 4.32 states that the Association assumes "responsibility for the monitoring, maintenance and repair" of the required sewage treatment system, "with the costs thereof to be included as part of the Assessments payable by such Owner".
  • The Petitioner argued that "Assessments" is a defined term in the CC&Rs (Article I), referring to annual charges levied pursuant to Article 8. Article 8 requires assessments to be allocated equally among all Lots for Common Expenses. Therefore, maintenance costs should be covered by general funds, not back assessed to individual owners.
  • The Respondent countered that 4.32 explicitly allows costs to be assessed back to the specific owner because the system is on private property and usage varies, making individual assessment equitable.
  • Legal Point: The Administrative Law Judge determined that because the definition of "Assessments" (Article I, referencing Article 8) mandates equal allocation among all lots, the CC&Rs do not provide a mechanism in Article 8 to charge a single owner for lot-specific fees. Thus, the Association was required to pay for system maintenance from annual assessments.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner’s petition, finding that the Petitioner successfully sustained the burden of proof for both claims.

  • Decision on Open Meeting: The informal discussion among a quorum of the Board regarding septic policy constituted a discussion of Association business in violation of A.R.S. § 33-33-1804.
  • Decision on Assessments: The Association improperly charged the Petitioner $1,750.00 for the septic repair and pumpout.
  • Orders: The Association was ordered to henceforth comply with A.R.S. § 33-33-1804 and CC&R Section 4.32, and to reimburse the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,000.00.

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H015-REL”, “case_title”: “Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-18”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can the HOA board meet informally (e.g., on Zoom) before an open meeting to discuss business without notifying homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “No. Any gathering of a quorum of the board to discuss association business, even informally, must be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law requires that whenever a quorum of the board meets to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to members. This applies even if the meeting is informal and no official votes or actions are taken during that time. Discussions about how to handle agenda items or agreeing on policies effectively constitute a meeting.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), and (E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “board procedures”, “informal meetings” ] }, { “question”: “Does the board have to take a formal vote for a private discussion to be considered a violation of open meeting laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Merely discussing business is sufficient to trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “It is a violation of open meeting laws for a quorum of the board to discuss association business in private, even if they do not take a formal vote or action. If the board members discuss a policy and agree on how to proceed (e.g., agreeing to ‘just nod our heads’ later), they are conducting business that must be done in the open.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “voting”, “quorum” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me individually for maintenance on my lot if the CC&Rs say costs are part of ‘Assessments’?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. It depends on how ‘Assessments’ is defined in your CC&Rs.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the CC&Rs define ‘Assessments’ as charges levied against each membership equally (like annual dues), the HOA cannot interpret a provision saying costs are ‘part of the Assessments’ as authorization to bill a single owner individually. Unless there is a specific provision allowing individual charges (like for owner negligence), maintenance costs defined as ‘Assessments’ must generally be paid from the common funds.”, “alj_quote”: “Nothing in Article 8 provides a mechanism by which a single owner may be charged for fees associated with their lot. Rather, that type of charge is located in Section 11 of the CC&Rs, which is not referenced in the definition of ‘Assessments.'”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “assessments”, “maintenance costs”, “CC&R interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) filing the complaint has the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means they must show that their claims are more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Law Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the ALJ has the authority to order the Respondent (the HOA) to reimburse the filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00 in certified funds.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “remedies”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “How are ambiguous terms in CC&Rs interpreted?”, “short_answer”: “Words are given their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning, and definitions within the document are prioritized.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting CC&Rs, the tribunal looks at the defined terms within the document. If a term like ‘Assessment’ is specifically defined as a general charge allocated equally, that definition controls over an interpretation that would allow individual billing, unless another section specifically authorizes it.”, “alj_quote”: “Unless defined by the legislature, words in statutes are given their ordinary meanings… Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute or rule must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”, “legal_basis”: “Principles of Statutory/Contract Construction”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to maintain systems on my lot if the CC&Rs state they ‘shall assume responsibility’?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. If the CC&Rs state the HOA assumes responsibility for monitoring, maintenance, and repair, they must perform and pay for it.”, “detailed_answer”: “When the governing documents explicitly state the Association ‘shall assume responsibility’ for maintenance, and the costs are to be included in the general Assessments, the HOA cannot shift that financial burden back to the individual owner improperly.”, “alj_quote”: “Accordingly, the terms of the CC&Rs requires that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the septic systems in the Association and that the maintenance is to be paid for from the annual assessments collected by Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law / CC&R Enforcement”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA obligations”, “maintenance”, “repairs” ] } ] }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H015-REL”, “case_title”: “Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-18”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can the HOA board meet informally (e.g., on Zoom) before an open meeting to discuss business without notifying homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “No. Any gathering of a quorum of the board to discuss association business, even informally, must be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law requires that whenever a quorum of the board meets to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to members. This applies even if the meeting is informal and no official votes or actions are taken during that time. Discussions about how to handle agenda items or agreeing on policies effectively constitute a meeting.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), and (E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “board procedures”, “informal meetings” ] }, { “question”: “Does the board have to take a formal vote for a private discussion to be considered a violation of open meeting laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Merely discussing business is sufficient to trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “It is a violation of open meeting laws for a quorum of the board to discuss association business in private, even if they do not take a formal vote or action. If the board members discuss a policy and agree on how to proceed (e.g., agreeing to ‘just nod our heads’ later), they are conducting business that must be done in the open.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “voting”, “quorum” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me individually for maintenance on my lot if the CC&Rs say costs are part of ‘Assessments’?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. It depends on how ‘Assessments’ is defined in your CC&Rs.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the CC&Rs define ‘Assessments’ as charges levied against each membership equally (like annual dues), the HOA cannot interpret a provision saying costs are ‘part of the Assessments’ as authorization to bill a single owner individually. Unless there is a specific provision allowing individual charges (like for owner negligence), maintenance costs defined as ‘Assessments’ must generally be paid from the common funds.”, “alj_quote”: “Nothing in Article 8 provides a mechanism by which a single owner may be charged for fees associated with their lot. Rather, that type of charge is located in Section 11 of the CC&Rs, which is not referenced in the definition of ‘Assessments.'”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “assessments”, “maintenance costs”, “CC&R interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) filing the complaint has the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means they must show that their claims are more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Law Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the ALJ has the authority to order the Respondent (the HOA) to reimburse the filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00 in certified funds.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “remedies”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “How are ambiguous terms in CC&Rs interpreted?”, “short_answer”: “Words are given their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning, and definitions within the document are prioritized.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting CC&Rs, the tribunal looks at the defined terms within the document. If a term like ‘Assessment’ is specifically defined as a general charge allocated equally, that definition controls over an interpretation that would allow individual billing, unless another section specifically authorizes it.”, “alj_quote”: “Unless defined by the legislature, words in statutes are given their ordinary meanings… Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute or rule must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”, “legal_basis”: “Principles of Statutory/Contract Construction”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to maintain systems on my lot if the CC&Rs state they ‘shall assume responsibility’?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. If the CC&Rs state the HOA assumes responsibility for monitoring, maintenance, and repair, they must perform and pay for it.”, “detailed_answer”: “When the governing documents explicitly state the Association ‘shall assume responsibility’ for maintenance, and the costs are to be included in the general Assessments, the HOA cannot shift that financial burden back to the individual owner improperly.”, “alj_quote”: “Accordingly, the terms of the CC&Rs requires that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the septic systems in the Association and that the maintenance is to be paid for from the annual assessments collected by Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law / CC&R Enforcement”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA obligations”, “maintenance”, “repairs” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jill P. Eden-Burns (petitioner)
  • Kathryn Kendall (witness)
    Former Board Member; also referred to as Catherine Temple
  • John Krahn (witness)
    Former Board Member/Secretary; also referred to as John Cran
  • Michael Holland (witness)
    Former Board President

Respondent Side

  • Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (respondent)
  • Daniel S. Francom (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Also referred to as Dan Frank
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Kurt Meister (board president)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Jeanne Ackerley (board member)
    Witness for Respondent; also referred to as Jean Aly
  • Kerry Chou (board member)
    Witness for Respondent; also referred to as Carrie Shu
  • Jeremy Sykes (board member)
    Secretary; also referred to as Jeremy Sikes
  • Steve Gauer (board member)
  • Charles Kiehl (witness)
    Lot owner; testified for Respondent
  • Melissa Jordan (property manager/witness)
    Aud
  • Len Meyer (former board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Also referred to as Tammy Igener
  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • James Knupp (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Acting Commissioner
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • c. serrano (OAH staff)
    OAH
    Transmitting Staff
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • Rich Orcutt (property manager)
    Focus/Ogden
    Community Manager
  • Rebecca (property manager)
    Former HOA Manager (Focus)
  • Jason Buck (former board president)

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel —
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:04 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:09 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:15 (101.7 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:49 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:52 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:56 (101.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

• Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

• Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

• Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

• May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

• July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

• September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

• September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

• December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

• January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

• Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
    Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board president, witness)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as a witness for Respondent
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as Mr. Madill

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during original decision transmittal
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (staff)
    Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmittal staff

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (staff)
    Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel —
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

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Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

• Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

• Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

• On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

• On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

• Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

• Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

Jay A. Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista NO. 8 Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-25
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay A. Janicek Counsel Jake Kubert
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association Counsel Evan Thompson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B); Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4; Association Bylaws Article VIII, Section 1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, concluding that the HOA Board’s unilateral amendment of the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, was an invalid action taken without the required vote of the Association members and without statutory notice, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association’s governing documents. The amendment was invalidated, and the Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.

The Board of Directors attempted a third amendment to the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, specifically changing the requirements for the Association's financial review (audit, review, or compilation). The ALJ concluded that this action was invalid because it was taken in the absence of a quorum of Association members voting in favor of the amendment, violating both the Bylaws and statutory notice requirements.

Orders: The petition was granted. The third amendment to the Association Bylaws taken on November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • Association Bylaws Article III

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Bylaws Amendment, Open Meeting Law, ARS 33-1804, Membership Vote, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:21 (169.8 KB)

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:27 (143.2 KB)

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:00 (169.8 KB)

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:08 (143.2 KB)

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:37 (143.2 KB)

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:40 (169.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Jay A. Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG). The central issue was the validity of a bylaw amendment enacted by the Association’s Board of Directors on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general homeowner membership.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, finding that the Board’s action was invalid. The decision hinged on a critical interpretation of the Association’s governing documents, concluding that the term “members” in the context of bylaw amendments unambiguously refers to the homeowner membership, not the Board of Directors. The ruling established that the Board does not have the authority to amend bylaws where that power is reserved for the membership.

Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by failing to provide the required notice to homeowners for a meeting concerning a proposed bylaw amendment. As a result, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties and Jurisdiction

• Petitioner: Jay A. Janicek, a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision and a member of the Respondent Association.

• Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and overseen by a Board of Directors.

• Adjudicating Body: The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), an independent state agency, which received the case on referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The Central Dispute

The core of the dispute was an action taken by the Association’s Board of Directors during a regular meeting on November 20, 2017. At this meeting, the Board, with three of five directors present, voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), changing the requirement for an annual financial check from:

“cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year”

“cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”

The Petitioner contended this action was invalid because it was undertaken without a vote of the general Association membership, as he believed the governing documents required.

Timeline of Adjudication

1. July 25, 2018: Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. September 05, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing is held before the OAH.

3. September 25, 2018: The OAH issues an ALJ Decision in the Petitioner’s favor.

4. October 23, 2018: The Respondent submits a Request for Rehearing.

5. November 07, 2018: The Department grants the rehearing request and refers the matter back to the OAH.

6. March 05, 2019: A rehearing is conducted, based on legal briefs and closing arguments without new evidence.

7. March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision is issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state statutes.

Key Bylaw Provisions

Article

Section

Description

Article IV

Section 1

States that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) directors.”

Article VI

Section 1

Establishes that regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held monthly without notice.

Article VI

Section 2

Governs special meetings of the Board, requiring not less than three days’ notice to each Director.

Article VI

Section 3

Defines a quorum for Board meetings as “a majority of the number of Directors.”

Article VII

Section 1

Outlines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. This section does not explicitly grant the Board the power to amend the Bylaws.

Article XIII

Section 1

(The central provision in the dispute) States: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.”

Relevant Arizona Statutes

• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): This statute was central to the Petitioner’s argument and the ALJ’s final decision.

◦ Subsection (A): Requires that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors be open to all members of the association.

◦ Subsection (B): Mandates specific notice requirements for any meeting of the members, stating that notice “shall also state the purpose for which the meeting is called, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”

◦ Subsection (F): The ALJ noted that this section codifies the legislative intent of the statute, which, as cited from a Governor’s message, is to “promote transparency and participation for all residents in homeowners’ association governance.”

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a textual interpretation of the Bylaws and adherence to state law.

• Interpretation of “Members”: The Petitioner argued that the word “members” in Article XIII, Section 1 refers to the general homeowner membership of the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors.

• Textual Differentiation: The drafters of the Bylaws intentionally used the words “members” and “directors” distinctly throughout the document. Where the intent was to refer to the Board, the word “Director” was specifically used (e.g., Article VI).

• Proxy Voting: The inclusion of the term “proxy” in Article XIII supports the argument that the vote is for the general membership, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy.

• Lack of Explicit Power: Article VII, which details the Board’s powers, does not grant the authority to amend the Bylaws, implying such power is reserved for the membership.

• Statutory Violation: The Board’s action violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the required notice for a meeting concerning a bylaw amendment was not provided to the general membership.

• Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, an Arizona Supreme Court case holding that restrictive covenants (which he argued include the Bylaws) should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the entire document.

Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)

The Association argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.

• Broad Authority: The Respondent cited Article IV, which states the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board,” to assert its general authority.

• Valid Board Meeting: The amendment occurred at a regular monthly Board meeting as allowed by Article VI. The meeting had three directors present, which constituted a valid quorum for transacting business.

• Interpretation of Article XIII: The Respondent argued that the phrase “at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors” in Article XIII indicates that the Board is the body empowered to make the amendment, and the word “members” in that context refers to the members of the Board.

• No Open Meeting Law Violation: The Respondent contended its conduct was not a violation because the action occurred during a regular Board meeting with a proper quorum of directors.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions were unequivocal, fully adopting the Petitioner’s interpretation of the governing documents and state law.

Conclusions of Law

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ found that the Petitioner successfully sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• Interpretation of “Members” vs. “Directors”: The decision states that the governing documents are clear: “‘members’ refers to the body of owners who make up the membership of the Association, and ‘directors’ refers to the few who are elected to the membership’s Board.” The ALJ found the differentiation to be intentional by the drafters.

• Avoiding Absurdity: The decision holds that construing the Bylaws to allow the Board to amend them would create an absurdity. The ALJ wrote, “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”

• Violation of Statute and Bylaws: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, violated both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) due to a lack of notice and Article III of the Association Bylaws.

• Rejection of Respondent’s Argument: The decision explicitly states, “The Tribunal is not swayed by Respondent’s closing arguments.”

Final Order

Based on the findings and conclusions, the ALJ issued the following binding order:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was officially granted.

2. Amendment Invalidated: The third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as enacted on November 20, 2017, was invalidated.

3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

1. Who were the primary parties in the case No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by the Respondent on November 20, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint?

3. According to the Petitioner, what was the crucial difference in meaning between the terms “members” and “directors” as used in the Association’s Bylaws?

4. What was the Respondent’s central argument for why the Board of Directors had the authority to amend the Bylaws at its regular meeting?

5. What is Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, and how did the Petitioner argue that the Respondent violated it?

6. What was the financial concern that the Petitioner argued could potentially impact him as a homeowner due to the Board’s amendment?

7. Describe the procedural history of this case after the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision on September 25, 2018.

8. What case did the Petitioner cite regarding the interpretation of restrictive covenants, and what principle did it establish?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this proceeding, and how is it defined in the document?

10. What was the final outcome of the case, including the specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jay A. Janicek, the Petitioner, and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner is a property owner and member of the Association who brought the legal action, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association governed by a Board of Directors.

2. On November 20, 2017, the Respondent’s Board of Directors held a regular meeting where they voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. This amendment changed the requirement for an “annual audit…by a public accountant” to an “annual audit, review, or compilation” of financial records.

3. The Petitioner argued that the term “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws refers to the entire body of property owners in the Association, not the Board of Directors. He contended that if the drafter had intended to give amendment power to the Board, the specific word “directors” would have been used, as it was in other sections of the Bylaws.

4. The Respondent argued that its actions were proper because the Bylaws empower the Board to manage the Association’s affairs at regular monthly meetings. They contended that since a quorum of three directors was present at the November 20, 2017 meeting, the Board was empowered to transact business, which they interpreted to include amending the bylaws as described in Article XIII.

5. Arizona’s Open Meeting Law is ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, which requires meetings of a homeowners’ association’s board and members to be open to all members. The Petitioner argued the Respondent violated this by amending a bylaw without proper notice to the full membership, which is required for any proposed bylaw amendment, thus undermining the law’s legislative intent of transparency.

6. The Petitioner was concerned that the amendment weakened the financial oversight of the Association. It modified a requirement for a third-party audit to a less stringent “review, or compilation,” creating a risk that the Association could perform its own financial checks, and as a homeowner, he had an interest in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct.

7. After the initial decision in the Petitioner’s favor on September 25, 2018, the Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing on October 23, 2018. The Department of Real Estate granted this request on November 7, 2018, and the matter was referred back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing, which ultimately took place on March 5, 2019.

8. The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn. This case established the principle that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties, as determined from the language of the entire document and the purpose for which the covenants were created.

9. The legal standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The document defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the most “convincing force” that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

10. The final outcome was a ruling in favor of the Petitioner. The ALJ granted the petition, invalidated the third amendment to the Bylaws that was passed on November 20, 2017, and ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning in differentiating between the terms “members” and “directors.” How did the principle of avoiding absurdity and considering the drafter’s intent, as seen throughout the Bylaws, contribute to the final decision?

2. Discuss the interplay between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804). Explain which authority took precedence in this case and why the Board’s actions were found to violate both.

3. Evaluate the legal strategy employed by the Petitioner, Jay A. Janicek. Consider his use of specific Bylaw articles, the citation of Powell v. Washburn, and his argument regarding the legislative intent of the Open Meeting Law.

4. Examine the arguments presented by the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association. Why did the Judge find their interpretation of the Bylaws unconvincing, despite their claims that the Board was empowered to transact business with a quorum present?

5. Based on the text, discuss the broader implications of this ruling for homeowners’ associations in Arizona. How does this decision reinforce the principles of transparency and the limitations of a Board’s power relative to the association’s general membership?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

A section of the Arizona Revised Statutes, also known as Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, which mandates that meetings of an HOA’s members and board of directors must be open to all members and requires specific notice for meetings where bylaw amendments will be considered.

Bylaws

A set of rules that govern the internal operations of the homeowners’ association. In this case, key articles discussed include Article VI (Meeting of Directors), Article VII (Powers of the Board), and Article XIII (Amendments).

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Member

As defined in the Association’s documents, a person entitled to membership by virtue of being a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision. The Judge concluded this term refers to the body of owners, not the Board of Directors.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona, unaffiliated with the parties, responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings and making legal decisions in disputes like this one.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Jay A. Janicek, a homeowner in the Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof in this case. It is defined as evidence that is more likely true than not and has the most convincing force, sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue.

The authority to represent someone else, especially in voting. The document notes that the term “proxy” applies to votes of the members, as members of the Board are not permitted to vote by proxy.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly necessary to conduct the business of that group. For the Respondent’s Board of Directors, a quorum is defined as a majority of the number of Directors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenants

Legal obligations imposed in a deed to real property to do or not do something. The Petitioner argued this term included the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and rules of the Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this document, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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19F-H1918001-REL-RHG

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Jay A. Janicek (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core issue of the case, designated No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, revolves around whether the Homeowners Association violated its Bylaws and Arizona state statute (§ 33-1804) when its Board of Directors unilaterally amended the Bylaws on November 20, 2017. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board’s action was invalid because the power to amend the Bylaws was delegated to the Association’s general membership, not the Board of Directors, and the Board failed to provide the required notice for such an amendment. Consequently, the Petitioner’s request was granted, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty.

1 source

What central conflict drove the administrative hearing and subsequent rehearing process?
How did governing documents and Arizona statutes shape the final legal decision?
What ultimate implications does this ruling have for homeowners association governance and member rights?

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay A. Janicek (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at initial hearing; Observed rehearing
  • Jake Kubert (petitioner attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared at rehearing

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thompson (HOA attorney)
    Thompson Krone, P.L.C.
  • Maxwell T. Riddiough (HOA attorney)
    Thompson Krone, P.L.C.
  • Andrew F. Vizcarra (property manager)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Co. Management
    Recipient of correspondence for Respondent HOA

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dennis Legere (observer)
    Present at initial hearing
  • Becky Nutt (observer)
    Present at initial hearing
  • Caleb Rhodes (observer)
    Present at initial hearing