Arleen D Jouxson v. The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222030-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-08-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition. Petitioner withdrew the issue regarding the lack of quorum. Regarding the remaining issue, the ALJ found that the Association did not violate governing documents or statutes by seating board members pursuant to a settlement agreement that certified the results of the 2021 election.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Arleen D. Jouxson Counsel Ellen B. Davis
Respondent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1243(B); Bylaws Article 3 §3.1; Declaration Article 6 §6.2
Bylaws Article 3 §3.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition. Petitioner withdrew the issue regarding the lack of quorum. Regarding the remaining issue, the ALJ found that the Association did not violate governing documents or statutes by seating board members pursuant to a settlement agreement that certified the results of the 2021 election.

Why this result: Petitioner withdrew one issue and failed to meet the burden of proof on the other, as the ALJ found the settlement agreement valid and the evidence of election irregularities insufficient.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Appointment via Settlement Agreement

Petitioner alleged the Association violated state statutes and governing documents by seating two board members pursuant to a settlement agreement from a prior lawsuit, rather than through a membership election.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(B)
  • Bylaws Article 3 §3.1
  • Declaration Article 6 §6.2

Quorum at Special Board Meeting

Petitioner alleged it was impermissible for the Board to conduct and transact business at a Special Board Meeting on June 25, 2021, without the required quorum.

Orders: Issue withdrawn by Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Bylaws Article 3 §3.9

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 959436.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964645.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964646.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964678.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 973808.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 975982.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 978159.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 989914.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:45:49 (118.3 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_HearingScheduled.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Motion_Dismiss.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Notice_Appearance_Resp..pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Notice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Payment.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_PetRequest_RespondToRespondent’s Response.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Petition&Narrative.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Response&CompletedForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Response_NoForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22033_ Expedited Request for Waiver of Conflict to Represent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:46:52 (197.0 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 959436.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:35 (48.9 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964645.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:37 (40.9 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964646.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964678.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 973808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:42 (46.0 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 975982.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:43 (40.9 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 978159.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 989914.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:46 (118.3 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_HearingScheduled.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Motion_Dismiss.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Appearance_Resp..pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Payment.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_PetRequest_RespondToRespondent’s Response.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:58 (103.9 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Petition&Narrative.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:22:00 (2495.0 KB)

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Response&CompletedForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Response_NoForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22033_ Expedited Request for Waiver of Conflict to Represent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:22:04 (197.0 KB)

The legal case, *Arleen D Jouxson vs. The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association* (No. 22F-H2222030-REL), centered on whether the Association violated its governing documents and state statutes when seating two new board members following a disputed election and a subsequent settlement agreement.

Key Facts and Procedural History

The dispute stemmed from the Association's Annual Member Meeting and election for two board seats, scheduled for April 13, 2021. The Association, a non-profit corporation comprising 392 units, distributed absentee ballots to its members. Forty ballots were required for a quorum, but 191 completed ballots were received by the time the Zoom meeting convened at 6:01 p.m., at which point quorum was announced.

Shortly after convening, the Board President, Tony Basuini, moved to postpone the election, a motion that passed 2-0 by the two sitting Board members (Basuini and Joe Orr). The ballots were not counted, and the meeting was terminated.

Candidate Eloise Figueroa, represented by attorney Jonathan Dessaules, filed a lawsuit in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to validate the election and seat herself and Linda Bahr (the other candidate). This led to a Settlement Agreement in which the Association counted the received ballots and certified that Figueroa and Bahr had received the highest number of votes, thus electing them to the Board. The lawsuit was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. Figueroa and Bahr were then seated as Board members.

Main Issues and Arguments

Petitioner Jouxson filed a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) raising two issues, ultimately pursuing only Issue 1: Whether the agreement to seat Figueroa and Bahr violated the Association’s Bylaws, Declaration, and state statutes (specifically ARS § 33-1243.B, which prohibits the Board from electing its own members) and should therefore be nullified. Jouxson argued the election was canceled and that the Board, through the contract, usurped the members’ authority to elect directors.

The Association argued that the election was valid, as a quorum was met and members acted by submitting their votes. They contended the Settlement Agreement merely enforced the members' act by counting and certifying the votes.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden initially granted the Association's motion to dismiss Issue 1, but later granted Jouxson's motion for reconsideration, allowing the issue of the election’s validity to proceed to the full hearing on June 21, 2022. At the hearing, Jouxson relied primarily on calling Figueroa to testify and submitted her case, agreeing to submit written closing arguments.

Final Decision and Outcome

The ALJ issued an Order dismissing Arleen D. Jouxson’s petition.

The decision emphasized that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a violation occurred.

The ALJ concluded that Jouxson did not meet this burden of proof because she failed to show that Figueroa and Bahr were seated without an election by the members. While the Board acted inappropriately by postponing the member meeting on April 13, 2021, the Association subsequently counted all valid ballots that had been cast by the members, which confirmed that Figueroa and Bahr had won the election. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Jouxson failed to prove that the Board, rather than the membership, had elected the new directors.

Study Guide: Case No. 22F-H2222030-REL — Jouxson vs. The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the legal proceedings, core arguments, and regulatory frameworks involved in the dispute between Petitioner Arleen D. Jouxson and Respondent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association.


Key Concepts and Case Overview

Central Dispute

The case centers on the governance of The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association ("the Association") following a disputed 2021 annual election. The primary conflict involves the seating of board members through a Superior Court settlement agreement rather than a standard membership election, and whether the Board of Directors exceeded its authority by bypasssing Association bylaws and state statutes.

The Parties
  • Petitioner: Arleen D. Jouxson, a homeowner and member of the Association.
  • Respondent: The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association, represented by the Board of Directors and legal counsel.
  • Key Figures:
  • Eloise Figueroa & Linda Bahr: Individuals seated on the Board via a settlement agreement.
  • Tony Basuni: Former President of the Association who signed the settlement agreement.
  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden: Presiding judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Primary Legal Issues
  1. Validity of Board Seating: Whether the agreement to seat Figueroa and Bahr violated the Association's Bylaws, Declaration, and A.R.S. § 33-1243.B, which prohibits a board from electing its own members.
  2. Quorum Violations: Whether business conducted at a Special Board Meeting on June 25, 2021, was invalid due to the lack of a quorum as required by Bylaws Section 3.9. (Note: This issue was eventually withdrawn by the Petitioner).
Jurisdictional Boundaries

A critical theme in this case is the limit of the Department of Real Estate’s (ADRE) authority. The Respondent argued that because the seating of directors was the result of a Superior Court settlement, the OAH lacked jurisdiction to "void" or "nullify" a contract entered into in a higher court. Conversely, the Petitioner argued that the Board cannot use a contract to circumvent the fundamental rights of owners to elect their representatives.


Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. What specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Petitioner cite to argue that the Board cannot elect its own members?

  • Answer: A.R.S. § 33-1243.B, which states that the board of directors shall not act on behalf of the association to elect members of the board.

2. Why did the Respondent move to dismiss the first issue regarding the seating of Figueroa and Bahr?

  • Answer: The Respondent argued that the seating was mandated by a Superior Court Settlement Agreement to resolve a separate lawsuit (Figueroa vs. Villages at Aviano), and that such an agreement is not a "community document" within the tribunal's scope of authority under A.R.S. § 32-2199.

3. What was the Association’s justification for claiming Figueroa and Bahr were legitimately seated?

  • Answer: The Association certified in the settlement agreement that Figueroa and Bahr had received the highest number of votes in the April 2021 election, even though that election was allegedly canceled or continued by the previous board.

4. According to the "pay-as-you-go" system of the ADRE, how are petitions for hearing funded?

  • Answer: Petitioners must pay a fee (e.g., $500 per issue) to have the ADRE adjudicate complaints. If a petitioner prevails, the Association is required by statute to refund this filing fee.

5. What happened to the second issue regarding the June 25, 2021, Special Board Meeting?

  • Answer: During the June 21, 2022 hearing, the Petitioner’s counsel confirmed they were no longer pursuing the second issue regarding the lack of a quorum at that meeting.

6. What evidence did the Petitioner provide to suggest the 2021 "election" results were untrustworthy?

  • Answer: The Petitioner pointed to batches of absentee ballots delivered to the management company (BCMI) from a single OfficeMax location, miles from the condominium, including 19 ballots faxed within a 22-minute span.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. The Intersection of Contract Law and Community Governance

Evaluate the argument that a board-signed settlement agreement can supersede community bylaws and state statutes. If a board enters into a contract that violates the Association's Declaration (e.g., Article 6, Section 6.2 regarding the election of directors), does the "contract" status of that agreement protect it from administrative oversight by the OAH? Discuss the potential for a "slippery slope" if boards are permitted to contract away membership rights.

2. Statutory Interpretation and Tribal Authority

Analyze the limitations placed on an Administrative Law Judge under A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. To what extent can an ALJ order a party to "abide by the statutes" if those statutes conflict with a court-ordered settlement? Contrast the Respondent's view (that the ALJ cannot provide injunctive relief or void contracts) with the Petitioner’s view (that the ALJ has the duty to ensure compliance with Title 33, Chapter 9).

3. The Rights of Disenfranchised Homeowners

In the context of the Aviano dispute, discuss the "most fundamental right" of homeowners as described by the Petitioner’s counsel. How does the cancellation of an annual meeting and the subsequent seating of directors via litigation impact the transparency and democratic process within a Condominium Association? Use the facts regarding the April 13, 2021 meeting to support your analysis.


Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) An official who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, decides facts, and applies law to make a decision in HOA/Condo disputes.
Bylaws The governing rules of the Association that dictate operating procedures, such as how meetings are called and how many directors constitute a quorum.
Community Documents Collective term for the Declaration (CC&Rs), Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Association Rules.
Declaration (CC&Rs) The "Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions" that govern the use of the property and the rights of the owners; recorded with the county.
Notice of Hearing The official document issued by the Department of Real Estate setting the time, date, and specific legal issues to be adjudicated.
Quorum The minimum number of members or directors required to be present at a meeting to make the proceedings of that meeting valid (e.g., a majority of the prescribed number of directors per Bylaws 3.9).
Res Judicata A legal principle preventing a matter from being litigated again if it has already been judged on its merits by a competent court.
Settlement Agreement A legally binding contract between parties to resolve a dispute, often resulting in the dismissal of a lawsuit "with prejudice."
Title 33, Chapter 9 The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes specifically governing Condominiums.
Void/Nullify To declare a document or action legally invalid and of no binding force.

Procedural Timeline Summary
Date Event
April 13, 2021 Original date for the Annual Member Meeting; canceled/continued by the Board.
April 27, 2021 Eloise Figueroa files a lawsuit in Maricopa Superior Court against the Association.
June 22, 2021 Superior Court lawsuit dismissed with prejudice following a Settlement Agreement.
June 25, 2021 Special Board Meeting held where Figueroa and Bahr were seated.
January 26, 2022 ADRE notifies the Association of Arleen Jouxson's Petition.
April 1, 2022 ALJ Shedden grants partial dismissal of Issue #1, pending reconsideration.
April 12, 2022 Oral argument held regarding the Motion for Reconsideration.
June 21, 2022 Evidentiary hearing conducted on the remaining issues.

HOA Governance vs. Court Settlements: Lessons from The Villages at Aviano

1. The "Election That Never Was": A Community in Conflict

What happens when the most fundamental right of a homeowner—the right to elect the leadership that governs their community—is traded away in a private legal settlement? This central question fueled a protracted legal battle between homeowner Arleen D. Jouxson and The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association.

The dispute stems from an annual election scheduled for April 13, 2021. Despite the fact that 81 absentee ballots had been returned by the deadline—more than enough to satisfy the 10% quorum requirement—the Board abruptly canceled or "continued" the meeting, citing unspecified "unfairness" in the process. The voting was never completed. Instead, the Board eventually seated two directors through a private settlement agreement following a Superior Court lawsuit. This move bypassed the ballot box entirely, sparking a procedural tug-of-war at the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. The Legal Flashpoint: Seating Directors via Settlement

The core of the OAH proceedings, designated as "Issue #1," was whether the Association violated its governing documents and state law by seating Eloise Figueroa and Linda Bahr via a court settlement rather than a traditional member election.

The Petitioner’s Argument

  • Prohibited Seating Method: Directors cannot be "elected" by a board contract or settlement agreement.
  • Breach of Governance Rights: The Association allegedly violated Bylaw 3.1 and Declaration 6.2, which reserve the right to elect the board exclusively to the unit owners.
  • Statutory Violation: The action ran afoul of ARS § 33-1243.B, which expressly prohibits a board from acting on behalf of the association to elect its own members.
  • The Quorum Reality: Petitioner noted that 81 absentee ballots were returned by the deadline, proving a quorum was met and the cancellation of the election was unnecessary and improper.

The Respondent’s Defense

  • Superior Court Resolution: The seating was the result of a settlement in a Superior Court lawsuit (CV 2021-006916) filed by Ms. Figueroa specifically to enforce her being seated on the board despite the election’s cancellation.
  • Vote Certification: The Association claimed it certified that Figueroa and Bahr had received the highest number of votes from the pre-election ballots that were submitted.
  • Jurisdictional Shield: The Association argued that a settlement agreement is a private contract, not a "community document" subject to the OAH tribunal’s authority under ARS § 32-2199.

3. Jurisdiction and the "Community Document" Dilemma

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden initially struggled with the jurisdictional boundaries of this case. He first granted a Motion to Dismiss regarding the election issue, reasoning that a "Settlement Agreement" entered in Superior Court is a private contract, distinct from "Community Documents" like Bylaws or Declarations.

However, the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration brought a "meteor" of a legal argument to the forefront: ARS § 33-1203. This statute explicitly states that provisions of the condominium chapter cannot be varied by agreement. Petitioner’s counsel, Ellen Davis, argued that if a board could use a private contract to bypass statutory election requirements, it would create a "slippery slope" or a "parade of horribles." Under such a theory, a board could theoretically use a contract to sell off common elements or even dissolve the association without member consent. This "silver bullet" argument forced the tribunal to take supplemental arguments on whether the Board had the power to contract away member rights.

4. The Quorum Question: A Secondary Dispute

A secondary issue ("Issue #2") concerned a Special Board Meeting held on June 25, 2021. The Petitioner alleged that Figueroa and Bahr, newly seated via the settlement, conducted business without a quorum in violation of Bylaw 3.9.

While this issue initially survived the Association's efforts to dismiss it, the narrative focus of the case eventually shifted. By the June 21, 2022, session, Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that this second issue was no longer being pursued as the community’s focus narrowed to the fundamental right of members to hold an actual election.

5. Behind the Scenes: Evidence and "Cumulative" Testimony

Modern HOA litigation carries significant logistical weight. The hearings were managed via Google Meet, which the ALJ used not just for remote participation but to record the official proceedings.

The ALJ was notably firm regarding judicial efficiency, issuing warnings against "unnecessary cumulative evidence" and limiting the number of witnesses who could testify to the same facts.

Call-Out: Judicial Efficiency & Record Integrity ALJ Shedden requested that any audio recordings intended for evidence be accompanied by written transcripts. He noted that playing raw audio during a hearing is time-consuming and makes it nearly impossible to clearly identify speakers for the official record. Reflecting on his approach to the complex jurisdictional questions, the Judge remarked, "I’d rather promise that I’ll do something thoroughly, which is more my style anyway."

6. Final Takeaways: What Every Homeowner Should Know

The conflict at The Villages at Aviano serves as a stark warning about the high stakes of community litigation and the limits of board power:

  1. The Power of the Ballot: Member voting is not a suggestion; it is a fundamental right. When boards cancel meetings where a quorum (like the 81 ballots here) is present, they invite severe legal scrutiny.
  2. The "Slippery Slope" of Settlements: Boards must be wary of using private court settlements to bypass bylaws. If a board can seat directors by contract, the integrity of the entire governing structure is at risk.
  3. The $500 Prevailing Insight: For homeowners, a vital practical takeaway is the filing fee. Under the pay-as-you-go system, if a petitioner prevails on an issue, the association must refund their $500 fee. As ALJ Shedden noted, even if a violation is "cured" before the hearing, a petitioner can still "prevail" simply to recover that cost.
  4. Administrative Limits: The OAH has specific, limited jurisdiction. While it can order compliance with community documents, it cannot always provide the same injunctive relief found in Superior Court.
  5. Document Integrity: Clear minutes are essential. The Board’s failure to maintain records for the "canceled" meeting on April 13 created a vacuum of transparency that fueled the ensuing litigation.

In the end, transparency in leadership is the only effective defense against the high costs of community division. When board seats are filled in a "private room" rather than at the ballot box, the entire community pays the price in both legal fees and lost trust.


Source Reference Note

The information in this article is derived from the official records of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, Case No. 22F-H2222030-REL.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Arleen D. Jouxson (petitioner)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association (Member)
    Unit owner of Unit 1369
  • Ellen B. Davis (petitioner attorney)
    Henze Cook Murphy, PLLC
  • Conrad Kampp (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Diane Potter (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Carol Lehan (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Barbara Kampp (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Dave Barren (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; appeared remotely
  • Lisa Le (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner
  • Carrie Y (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing

Respondent Side

  • The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association (respondent)
    Entity
  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Eloise Figueroa (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Board President; called as witness by Petitioner; Plaintiff in underlying Superior Court case
  • Linda Bahr (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Seated on board via settlement agreement
  • Tony Basuini (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former Board President; signed settlement agreement
  • Joseph Orr (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former board member
  • Tony Cancilla (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former board member
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (witness)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Attorney for Eloise Figueroa in Superior Court case; testified at OAH hearing
  • Natasha DeCoto (property manager)
    PMG Services
    Current community manager
  • Michael Sgro (property manager)
    Brown Community Management
    Former community manager
  • Marshall Chess (property manager)
    Brown Community Management
    Former community manager
  • Tim Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood
    Represented HOA in settlement negotiations
  • Curtis Ekmark (HOA attorney)
    Ekmark & Ekmark
    General Counsel for HOA at time of 2021 election

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Pamela Gates (judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Presided over CV2021-006916
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Coordinator

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3)

Outcome Summary

The Association unreasonably withheld approval for Marc Archer's two-story garage addition, thereby violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3). The Association was ordered to grant preliminary approval for the design and refund the $500 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

The Association unreasonably withheld preliminary approval for the Petitioner's January 2020 two-story garage addition request. The ALJ determined that none of the three reasons provided by the Association for the denial were reasonable.

Orders: The Association must grant preliminary approval for the proposed design and must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA architectural approval, unreasonable denial, two-story garage addition, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 980535.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:24 (46.7 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 983516.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:27 (38.4 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 928659.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:30 (39.6 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 943581.pdf

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21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 943581.pdf

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This summary focuses on the administrative hearing concerning the reasonableness of the Respondent's denial of the Petitioner's architectural request.

Key Facts and Procedural History

The Petitioner, Marc Archer, sought approval from the Respondent, PMPE Community Association, Inc., for a two-story garage addition to his home. This was the third hearing alleging that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3), which mandates that the approval of construction plans shall not unreasonably be withheld.

In December 2020, following a previous Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found the Association violated its rules by not providing a written basis for denial, the Association issued a written response outlining its reasons. A key issue during the hearing was the confusion and vagueness of this response, as two of the three reasons for denial were also listed in a subsequent section that the Association testified was merely advisory.

Main Issues and Arguments

The core issue before ALJ Thomas Shedden was whether the Association’s denial of preliminary approval for Archer’s two-story design was unreasonable. The burden of proof lay with the Petitioner.

The Association’s three reasons for denial (based on the December 30, 2020, letter) were:

  1. Lack of Harmony/Incorporation: The addition was deemed a "large two-story 'box'" that did not harmonize with the existing structure or enhance the community (AR § 1.1). The Association argued the proposed roof did not blend into the existing roof.
  • *Legal Point:* The ALJ noted that evidence showed the proposed roof matched the existing pitch, and other houses had multiple roof lines. Therefore, there was no substantial evidence that the addition would "dominate and/or sharply contrast" with the community.
  1. Painted Roof Tiles: The Association deemed painted roof tiles unacceptable (AR § 4.4).
  • *Legal Point:* The ALJ found that the Association acted outside its scope of authority, as the Architectural Rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, though they specified required tile types and approved colors. Archer also presented evidence that he had since located sufficient matching tile.
  1. Insufficient Architectural Expression: A need to add more architectural elements (pop-outs, windows, etc.) to break up expanses (AR § 4.2).
  • *Legal Point:* Archer provided credible evidence that his plans already included stucco pop-outs, inset windows, and soffit details that matched the existing structure, thus satisfying the requirement for architectural expression.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Decision on March 30, 2022, concluding that the Petitioner prevailed.

The ALJ concluded that the Association’s reasons for denial were arguably unclear due to the mixed advisory/required language but found that Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons was reasonable.

The Order required that:

  1. The Association should approve Marc Archer's preliminary design.
  2. The Association must pay Archer his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marc Archer (petitioner)
  • Greg Hancock (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, works in building industry
  • Dr. Victor Zach (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, lives across the street from Petitioner
  • Dan Earlie (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, experienced in homebuilding and HOA boards
  • Thomas Bragg (architect/witness)
    Registered architect hired by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C. S. Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Keith Kauffman (board member/witness)
    PMPE Community Association, Inc.
    President and long-time board member of the Association
  • Gail Zigler (property manager/witness)
    Community manager for the Association
  • Mr. Sasser (committee member/neighbor)
    Mentioned as an opponent to the addition
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Ikenberg (ALJ/Hearing Officer)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    ALJ in prior related proceedings (19F-H1919063-REL, 20F-H2020063-REL)
  • Claire Miller (Preserve Park Supervisor)
    City Parks and Recreation

Other Participants

  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • vnunez (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • tandert (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records (also Miranda A)
  • c. serrano (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records
  • Dr. Smith (unknown)
    House used for a meeting location

James Iannuzo v. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Petitioner prevailed by showing the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243. The Association was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. Petitioner's requests for voiding election results, assessing a civil penalty, and appointing an administrator were denied.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James Iannuzo Counsel
Respondent Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243(H)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed by showing the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243. The Association was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. Petitioner's requests for voiding election results, assessing a civil penalty, and appointing an administrator were denied.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of statutory procedure for board member removal concerning ballot tabulation after deadline.

The Association violated the statute by tabulating ballots for a recall election at the August 19, 2021 meeting, as those ballots were only valid for the canceled June 30, 2021 special meeting.

Orders: Respondent must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order. Other requested remedies (voiding results, assessing civil penalty, appointing administrator) were denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA board recall, Ballot tabulation, Quorum dispute, Statutory violation, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Ass'n
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall

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Decision Documents

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 935534.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:19 (128.9 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 945764.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:24 (48.2 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 949683.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:26 (49.4 KB)

This is a summary of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision regarding the Petitioner, James Iannuzo, versus the Respondent, Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association. The hearing took place on December 13, 2021.

Key Facts and Procedural History

The case centered on the Association's handling of a petition to recall and remove two board members, specifically addressing violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243.

The Association received the recall petitions and scheduled a Special Meeting for June 30, 2021. This meeting was required to be "called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition" pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c). A quorum required 20% of eligible voters (45 ballots).

The Association required ballots to be received by June 29, 2021. On the morning of June 30, 2021, the Association canceled the meeting, announcing that it had failed to achieve a quorum. Subsequently, on or about July 14, 2021, the Association announced that late-received ballots provided a quorum and scheduled a new meeting for August 19, 2021, solely to count the ballots originally issued for the June 30th meeting.

The single issue pursued by Petitioner Iannuzo was that the tabulation of Special Meeting ballots received after the statutory deadline violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243(H)(4).

Key Arguments

Petitioner's Argument: Iannuzo argued that the August 19, 2021, recount results should be voided because the ballots, notice, and voting instructions specifically stated the ballots were valid only for the June 30, 2021, Special Meeting.

Respondent's Argument: The Association argued that it could not hold the June 30th meeting due to lack of a quorum. They contended that merely setting the meeting was sufficient to satisfy the 30-day requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c), and the statute does not specify when votes must be tallied.

Legal Findings and Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243.

  1. Statutory Violation: The Association acknowledged it did not conduct the June 30th special meeting, meaning no meeting was conducted within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c).
  2. Invalid Ballot Counting: The decision to count the votes at the August 19th meeting was a violation because, under statute (A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(3)) and by the Association’s own documentation, the ballot was valid only for the specified June 30th election or meeting. The use of these ballots at the August 19th meeting was non-compliant.

Final Decision and Order:

  • James Iannuzo was declared the prevailing party.
  • The Association was ordered to pay Mr. Iannuzo his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
  • The ALJ declined Iannuzo’s requests to void the election results, assess a civil penalty, or appoint an oversight administrator, concluding these remedies were outside the scope of the tribunal’s authority under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).

Subsequent Advisement: Following the Order, the Office of Administrative Hearings later advised the parties that OAH's enabling statutes do not provide authority for it to compel the Respondent to comply with the Order (the fee refund).

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Iannuzo (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted Decision
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted Advisements
  • AHansen (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • djones (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • DGardner (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • vnunez (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)

Susan L Jarzabek v. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-19
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L Jarzabek Counsel
Respondent Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 Counsel Haidyn DiLorenzo, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 1, Section 10; Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy")

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof; the ALJ found the Policy does not require the two notices prior to attorney escalation, as Petitioner had alleged.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Policy concerning attorney's fees assessment and required pre-litigation notices.

Petitioner alleged the Association wrongfully assessed attorney's fees, arguing the Policy required providing the owner two warning notices and a certified letter before escalating a matter to attorney involvement.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: attorney fees, HOA policy enforcement, notice requirements, CC&Rs, due process
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:50 (93.9 KB)

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:13 (93.9 KB)

This summary pertains to the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Susan L Jarzabek (Petitioner) vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 (Respondent), heard on November 5, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The Petitioner, Susan L. Jarzabek, filed a petition alleging that the Respondent Association violated CC&R Article 1, Section 10 and its Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy") by wrongfully charging her attorney’s fees. The underlying dispute involved a neighbor's complaint regarding a tree on Ms. Jarzabek's property.

Ms. Jarzabek, the sole record owner, argued that the Association’s Policy requires the owner of record to be provided two warning notices and a certified letter before a matter can be escalated to attorney involvement, thus making the assessment of fees improper. She also contended she was denied due process because she did not receive proper notice of the allegations. Although the Association assessed fines and interest related to the violation, these charges were rescinded prior to the hearing.

The Association’s documents grant it the ability to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees (CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1). Crucially, the Association’s Policy provides that if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the standard notice-procedure will no longer apply, and the owner is responsible for the associated fees and costs.

The facts showed that the Association sent a certified letter (January 15, 2019) regarding the tree violation, but it was addressed to Ms. Jarzabek’s husband, John Jarzabek, and was not claimed by either party. Furthermore, this January 15, 2019 letter did not meet all the required elements for a Notice of Violation under the Association’s policy. The Association engaged counsel (The Mulcahy Law Firm) on October 15, 2019, which subsequently sent Notices of Violation to Ms. Jarzabek.

Legal Analysis and Outcome

The matter was governed by the Department of Real Estate's authority concerning alleged violations of community documents. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violation occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered the Policy a contract with which both parties must comply.

The ALJ concluded that Ms. Jarzabek did not meet her burden to prove the Association violated the Policy. The central legal finding was that the Policy, as written, does not require that an owner receive two notices before a matter is escalated to attorney involvement.

Final Decision

Based on this finding, the ALJ ordered that Susan L. Jarzabek’s petition be dismissed. The ALJ noted that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek constituted a valid debt, offering no opinion on that specific debt issue.

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“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
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{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
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},
{
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{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }

{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”,
“case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek, Petitioner, vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2, Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “November 19, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Susan L Jarzabek”,
“role”: “petitioner, witness”,
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},
{
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},
{
“name”: “Thomas Shedden”,
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},
{
“name”: “Robert Cody”,
“role”: “board president, witness”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “John Jarzabek”,
“role”: “spouse”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Petitioner’s husband, named on certified letter sent by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Louis Dettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
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“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
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{
“name”: “djones”,
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“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
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{
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“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “vnunez”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
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},
{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
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},
{
“name”: “Miranda Alvarez”,
“role”: “OAH staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitter of Decision”
}
]
}

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L Jarzabek (petitioner, witness)

Respondent Side

  • Haidyn DiLorenzo (HOA attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Robert Cody (board president, witness)
    Hillcrest Improvement Association #2
  • Beth Mulcahy (HOA attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • Miranda Alvarez (OAH staff)
    Transmitter of Decision

Other Participants

  • John Jarzabek (spouse)
    Petitioner's husband, named on certified letter sent by Association

Richard J. Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-15
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Richard J. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof to show the Association violated its Design Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Richard J Jones Counsel
Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association Counsel Troy Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines; CC&Rs Section 4.1.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Richard J. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof to show the Association violated its Design Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement. Evidence indicated that the Petitioner was in violation of the existing Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for his driveway extension and failing to meet the required setback.

Key Issues & Findings

Petitioner alleged the Association violated Design Guidelines regarding setback requirements for driveway extensions and engaged in selective enforcement.

Petitioner filed a single issue petition asserting that Design Guidelines did not require a twelve-inch setback for driveway extensions from the property line and that the Association was selectively enforcing its rules. The Petitioner had installed a concrete driveway extension without obtaining prior ARC approval, and approval was denied due to the lack of the twelve-inch setback.

Orders: Richard J. Jones’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Driveway Extension, Architectural Review Committee, Setback Requirements, Design Guidelines, Selective Enforcement, HOA Violation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924982.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:04 (100.9 KB)

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924983.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:07 (94.9 KB)

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924982.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:52 (100.9 KB)

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924983.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:57 (94.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the case of Richard J. Jones versus the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association (Case No. 21F-H2121038-REL). The dispute centered on a concrete driveway extension installed by Mr. Jones without the prior approval of the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Mr. Jones contested the Association’s denial of his post-installation application, alleging that the Design Guidelines were misinterpreted and selectively enforced.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed Mr. Jones’s petition. The decision rested on three key determinations:

1. Clear Violation: Mr. Jones was in direct violation of the Design Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for the modification and by not adhering to a mandatory 12-inch setback from the common block wall, a fact he acknowledged.

2. Reasonable Interpretation: The Association’s interpretation that the 12-inch setback requirement applied to the entire property line—not just the block wall—was deemed “not unreasonable,” particularly since the common wall is part of the property line.

3. Failure to Prove Selective Enforcement: Mr. Jones did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove his claim of selective enforcement. The Association provided credible evidence demonstrating consistent application of the setback rule to other homeowners.

The final order upholds the Association’s enforcement actions and dismisses the petitioner’s claims.

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdictional Details

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Richard J. Jones

On his own behalf

Respondent

Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Troy Stratman, Esq.

Adjudicator

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge

Case No.

21F-H2121038-REL

Hearing Date

November 2, 2021

Decision Date

November 15, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict arose from a concrete driveway extension installed by Richard J. Jones on his property on May 11, 2020. The installation was performed without submitting a request for prior approval to the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC), a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. Following the installation, the ARC denied Mr. Jones’s retroactive application, citing its failure to meet a required 12-inch setback from the property line. This led to a notice of non-compliance and a fine, prompting Mr. Jones to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Chronology of Events

April 2020: Mr. Jones contacted AAM, LLC, the Association’s property management company, to inquire about adding concrete strips. He was informed this was not allowed but that an employee could assist with an approval process for a paver driveway extension.

May 11, 2020: Having not received further guidance from the management company, Mr. Jones proceeded to have the concrete driveway extension installed.

Post-May 11, 2020: Mr. Jones submitted an application to the ARC for retroactive approval of the already-installed extension.

December 2, 2020: The ARC formally denied Mr. Jones’s application. The denial letter stated the extension did not meet the 12-inch setback requirement and advised him to reapply after cutting the driveway back from the property line.

January 12, 2021: The Association issued a Second Notice of Non-compliance/Fine.

February 12, 2021: Mr. Jones filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association was misinterpreting and selectively enforcing its Design Guidelines.

November 2, 2021: The administrative hearing was conducted.

November 15, 2021: The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision dismissing Mr. Jones’s petition.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Richard J. Jones)

Mr. Jones’s case was built on two primary arguments:

Interpretation of Design Guidelines: He contended that the Guidelines in effect at the time of installation required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent regarding the “property line.” He argued that since the Guidelines explicitly mandated a property line setback for sidewalks, the absence of such language for driveway extensions meant the requirement did not apply.

Allegation of Selective Enforcement: He asserted that the Association was applying its Guidelines and Rules inconsistently among homeowners.

During testimony, Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway extension did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall and expressed a willingness to correct that specific deficiency. He also testified that his neighbors did not object to the extension as installed.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association)

The Association, represented by counsel, presented a multi-faceted defense:

Procedural Failure: A core issue was Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval from the ARC before installation, as mandated by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Setback Rule: The Association maintained that the extension violated the required 12-inch setback. The property manager, Paul Favale, testified that this rule is intended to ensure water does not drain onto a neighbor’s property.

Evidence of Consistent Enforcement: To counter the claim of selective enforcement, the Association submitted an “Architectural Status Report” for the period of August 27, 2020, through April 21, 2021. This report demonstrated that other homeowners’ requests for driveway extensions had also been denied for failing to meet the 12-inch property line setback.

It was also noted that the Design Guidelines have since been modified to explicitly require a 12-inch setback from both the common wall and the property line.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Judge’s decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards.

Key Findings of Fact

• Mr. Jones installed the driveway extension on May 11, 2020, without prior approval from the ARC.

• The extension does not have a 12-inch setback from the common block wall, which is part of the property line.

• The Design Guidelines at the time explicitly required a 12-inch setback from the block wall.

• Mr. Jones acknowledged his non-compliance with the block wall setback requirement.

Conclusions of Law

The Judge concluded that Mr. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof, which required demonstrating a violation by the Association by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

1. Petitioner’s Violation: Mr. Jones was found to be in violation of the Guidelines. His acknowledgment that the driveway did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall was a critical factor.

2. Reasonableness of Association’s Interpretation: The Judge determined that the Association’s interpretation of the Guidelines—requiring a 12-inch setback along the entire property line—was “not unreasonable.” This conclusion was supported by two points: the common wall is physically part of the property line, and Mr. Jones had failed to follow the required prior approval process, where such ambiguities would have been clarified.

3. No Evidence of Selective Enforcement: The Association presented “credible evidence” via its Architectural Status Report showing that other members were subject to the same rule. Consequently, Mr. Jones “did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was selectively enforcing the Guidelines.”

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Judge ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed.

Legal Standing: The decision is binding on both parties.

Appeal Process: The order can only be challenged through a request for rehearing, which must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (November 15, 2021).

Study Guide: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 21F-H2121038-REL, involving Petitioner Richard J. Jones and Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their roles?

2. What specific modification did Richard J. Jones make to his property, and on what date did he complete it?

3. What critical step did Mr. Jones fail to take before installing the modification, as required by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs?

4. According to the Design Guidelines in effect at the time of installation, what was the specific rule regarding the placement of driveway extensions that Mr. Jones’s project violated?

5. What was Mr. Jones’s main argument regarding the ambiguity of the Design Guidelines concerning the twelve-inch setback requirement?

6. What justification did the Association’s property manager, Paul Favale, provide for the setback requirement?

7. What were the two primary claims Mr. Jones made against the Association in his petition filed on February 12, 2021?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party carried the burden of meeting that standard?

9. How did the Association counter Mr. Jones’s claim that it was selectively enforcing its rules?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Richard J. Jones, a homeowner who appeared on his own behalf, and the Respondent, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, which was represented by its counsel, Troy Stratman, Esq.

2. On May 11, 2020, Mr. Jones added a concrete driveway running from the street to a side gate on his property. This modification is referred to in the documents as a “driveway extension.”

3. Mr. Jones did not submit a request for prior approval to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) before installing his driveway extension. This pre-approval is required for such modifications under the Association’s CC&Rs.

4. The driveway extension violated the rule requiring a twelve-inch setback from the common block wall. Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway did not comply with this specific requirement of the Design Guidelines.

5. Mr. Jones argued that since the Design Guidelines explicitly required a twelve-inch setback from the property line for sidewalks but did not explicitly state the same for driveway extensions, the requirement did not apply to his project along the full property line.

6. Mr. Favale testified that the purpose of the setback requirement is functional. It is designed to help ensure that water does not drain from one property onto a neighboring property.

7. Mr. Jones’s petition asserted that the Design Guidelines for driveway extensions did not require a setback from the property line (only the common wall). He also claimed that the Association was selectively enforcing its Guidelines and Rules against him.

8. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner, Mr. Jones, bore the burden of proof to show that the Association had violated its own guidelines.

9. The Association submitted an Architectural Status Report covering August 27, 2020, to April 21, 2021. This report provided credible evidence that other Association members had also been denied requests for driveway extensions due to a failure to meet the twelve-inch setback requirement.

10. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that Mr. Jones had not met his burden of proof to show the Association had violated its guidelines or enforced them selectively.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as they were applied in this case. Explain specifically how Mr. Jones failed to meet this burden for both of his primary claims.

2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to determine that the Association’s interpretation of its Design Guidelines was “not unreasonable.” Consider the judge’s reference to the common wall being part of the property line and Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval.

3. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Jones’s initial inquiry to AAM, LLC in April 2020 to the final order in November 2021. Discuss how Mr. Jones’s decision to proceed with construction without explicit approval ultimately weakened his legal position.

4. Evaluate the claim of “selective enforcement.” What kind of evidence would Mr. Jones have needed to present to successfully prove this claim, and why was the Association’s Architectural Status Report considered more compelling evidence by the court?

5. The “Conclusions of Law” section states that the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the parties. Using the facts of this case, explain the legal and practical implications of this principle for a homeowner living within a master association.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company for the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings and renders decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and granting prior approval for modifications to properties, such as driveway extensions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Mr. Jones.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules that are part of the contract between homeowners and the association, detailing requirements for property modifications.

Driveway Extension

As defined by the parties, a concrete driveway running from the street to a gate at the side of a house.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Richard J. Jones.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as evidence that has “the most convincing force” and is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Selective Enforcement

The legal claim that an association is not applying its rules and guidelines uniformly, instead penalizing some members while allowing others to violate the same rules.

Setback

A required distance that a structure must be located away from a property line or other feature, such as a common wall. In this case, the requirement was for a twelve-inch setback.

He Fought the HOA Over 12 Inches of Concrete—and Lost. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons from His Case.

Navigating the rules of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like walking through a minefield of regulations, where a small misstep can lead to notices, fines, and protracted disputes. For one homeowner, Richard J. Jones, a conflict with his HOA, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, over a new driveway extension escalated all the way to a formal hearing. The official legal decision in his case reveals several counter-intuitive truths about how these disputes are won and lost, offering valuable lessons for any homeowner living under HOA governance.

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1. “Asking for Forgiveness” is a Losing Strategy.

The first major takeaway is that violating rules first and hoping for retroactive approval is an approach doomed to fail, even when the situation feels complex. The story here is more nuanced than simple defiance. In April 2020, before any work began, Mr. Jones contacted the HOA’s management company about his plans. After being told his initial idea for “two concrete strips” was not allowed, he was directed to another employee for help with an application for a different design. According to the case file, Mr. Jones “did not hear back from her and he had the driveway extension installed” on May 11, 2020.

While his frustration is relatable, this impatient miscalculation was his crucial error. Section 4.1.1 of the community’s CC&Rs requires prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). By proceeding without securing this written approval, Mr. Jones was in immediate violation. His subsequent application, submitted only after the work was done, was predictably denied on December 2, 2020. The lesson is stark: a breakdown in communication does not absolve a homeowner of their responsibility to follow procedure. The moment unapproved work begins, you are in breach of the community’s governing documents, and the merits of the project become secondary to the procedural failure.

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2. You Have to Prove the HOA is Wrong—Not the Other Way Around.

Many homeowners assume that in a dispute, the burden is on the HOA to prove the homeowner is wrong. The legal reality is the exact opposite. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision formally stated in Conclusion of Law #2 that Mr. Jones, as the petitioner who brought the case, bore the “burden of proof.”

To win, he had to demonstrate that the Association committed a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision cites the formal definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, which essentially means the evidence presented must be convincing enough to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The reality for homeowners is surprising and crucial: in a formal dispute, the legal scales are not neutral. You must actively build a case and convincingly prove the HOA has violated its own rules. Mr. Jones failed to meet this standard.

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3. A Small Loophole Isn’t Enough to Win.

Mr. Jones’s central argument rested on a perceived loophole in the governing documents. He claimed the Design Guidelines required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent about the “property line” as a whole, and therefore the rule didn’t apply to the entirety of his project. This highlights a key aspect of HOA governance: the purpose behind a rule matters. The property manager testified that the setback requirement exists to “ensure that water does not drain to the neighbor’s property,” transforming the rule from an arbitrary measurement into a practical and defensible standard.

Ultimately, the judge was unpersuaded by the loophole argument, and the reason is a masterclass in how these cases are decided. The judge’s decision, articulated in Conclusion of Law #7, pointed out that the common wall is fundamentally part of the property line. More importantly, the decision explicitly connected this conclusion to Mr. Jones’s prior actions: “…considering that Mr. Jones did not obtain prior approval from ARC before constructing his driveway extension, the Association’s interpretation…is not unreasonable.” This is the crucial insight: his procedural failure (Lesson #1) directly weakened his ability to argue about ambiguous wording. An HOA’s reasonable interpretation of its own rules is far more likely to be upheld when the homeowner has already disregarded clear procedural mandates. Tellingly, the Association later modified the guidelines to explicitly close this perceived loophole.

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4. Proving “Selective Enforcement” is Harder Than You Think.

A common defense from homeowners is that the HOA is engaging in “selective enforcement”—singling them out while letting others get away with similar violations. Mr. Jones made this exact claim, but the Association came prepared with meticulous documentation to defeat it.

As detailed in Finding of Fact #21, the HOA presented an “Architectural Status Report” covering August 27, 2020 through April 21, 2021. This document provided time-stamped evidence that other homeowners’ requests for similar driveway extensions had also been consistently denied for failing to meet the same 12-inch setback requirement. This report systematically dismantled the selective enforcement argument. For homeowners, this underscores a critical point: the feeling of being singled out is not evidence. To win a selective enforcement claim, you must provide clear proof that other members in the exact same situation were treated differently, a high bar that an HOA with good records can easily overcome.

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Conclusion: A Contract is a Contract

The overarching theme from this case is that HOA governing documents are not merely suggestions; they are legally binding. As stated in Conclusion of Law #5, the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the homeowner and the association. While HOA rules can often feel arbitrary or frustrating, they carry the weight of a contract. The path to successfully challenging them is narrow and requires a clear, well-documented case that proves the HOA, not the homeowner, has breached its duties.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all community members. How well do you really know the contract you’re living under?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard J Jones (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Paul Favale (property manager)
    Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Angela Pate (property manager employee)
    AAM, LLC
    Contacted by Petitioner regarding installation inquiry

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • Miranda Alvarez (Staff)
    Transmitted decision

Ronald Borruso v. Sunland Village East Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronald Borruso Counsel
Respondent Sunland Village East Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq. and Nikolas Eicher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 occurred.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding member speaking rights at May 27, 2021 meeting and unauthorized board meetings concerning Operations Manager job qualifications

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by restricting member speaking rights during deliberations at a special meeting on May 27, 2021, and by holding improperly noticed meetings to approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager.

Orders: Ronald Borruso’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Statute Violation, Burden of Proof, Dismissal, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121062-REL Decision – 912276.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:53 (114.4 KB)

This summary details the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Ronald Borruso, Petitioner, vs. Sunland Village East Association, Respondent (No. 21F-H2121062-REL), heard on September 3, 2021. The Petitioner, Ronald Borruso, alleged that the Association violated its Bylaws and specific provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.

Key Facts and Legal Standard

The Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction over the matter. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the alleged violations occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Borruso refined his allegations to two main issues, both centering on the violation of association meeting requirements under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) and (C).

Main Issues and Arguments

Issue 1: Member Participation at the May 27, 2021 Special Meeting

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged that during a special meeting concerning a recall petition, the Board denied members the right to speak at an appropriate time during proceedings, violating § 33-1804(A). He argued the meeting was improperly divided into a "closed" session where members could not offer substantive comments, followed by an "Open Session Q & A" after adjournment.
  • Association's Argument: The Association maintained there was only one meeting, and it was not a violation to restrict members’ comments until after the Board provided its statements. They argued they used the term "closed" inartfully, noting that members were allowed to attend the entire 3-hour meeting, and ample opportunity was provided for comments during the Q & A session (lasting about 90 minutes).
  • Legal Point: ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(A) permits members to attend and speak at an appropriate time during deliberations, and mandates they speak once after the Board discusses an agenda item but before formal action. The ALJ noted that legally, a "closed" meeting refers to an executive session, which the Board did not conduct.

Issue 2: Unnoticed Meeting to Approve Operations Manager Qualifications

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged the Board held un-noticed meetings to write and approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager, violating sections 33-1804(A) and (C). His primary evidence was a former Board President, Ms. Haynie, confirming in a May 6, 2021 meeting that the Board had written and approved the job description.
  • Association's Argument: Current Board members testified credibly that Ms. Haynie was wrong and that the Board had never met or voted on the job description. The description posted was similar to a previous one, and Ms. Haynie had allegedly prepared and posted it without Board approval.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Borruso failed to meet the required standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on both issues.

  1. Regarding the May 27th Meeting: The Petitioner did not prove a violation of § 33-1804(A). Although the Board was not precise in its terminology, members were allowed to attend the entire meeting, and the evidence showed it was a single meeting where members spoke after the Board's presentation.
  2. Regarding the Job Qualifications: The Petitioner failed to prove that an un-noticed meeting occurred, as the credible testimony indicated that the former President had been mistaken about the Board’s approval. Therefore, there was no violation of sections 33-1804(A) and (C).

The petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronald Borruso (petitioner)
  • Thomas Huston (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nikolas Eicher (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Mark Thurn (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Current Board President, testified for Respondent
  • Marvin Fretwell (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Joyce Haynie (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Former President, subject of recall petition
  • Kim Shallue (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Presided over May 27th meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:04 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:09 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:15 (101.7 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:49 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:52 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:56 (101.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
    Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board president, witness)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as a witness for Respondent
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as Mr. Madill

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during original decision transmittal
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (staff)
    Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmittal staff

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (staff)
    Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record

Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges vs.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges Counsel Lance Leslie
Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. Counsel Michael S. Shupe

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article VI(D)

Outcome Summary

Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.

Key Issues & Findings

View Obstruction by Pergola Approval

Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.

Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R Violation, View Obstruction, Architectural Review Committee, Filing Fee Refund, Civil Penalty Denial
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:42 (90.6 KB)

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:50 (90.6 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.

The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.

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Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.

Case Number

21F-H2120005-REL

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

November 3, 2020

Decision Date

November 20, 2020

Core Allegation

Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

Petitioners’ Property

Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”

Disputed Structure

A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.

The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.

Chronology of Key Events

The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.

February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.

On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.

December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.

January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.

July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.

August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.

October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.

November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)

Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).

Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.

Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)

Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:

1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.

2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.

Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.

1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.

2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.

Findings on the Violation

• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.

• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.

Prevailing Party Status

• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.

• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.

Financial Orders and Penalties

Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.

Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.

Legal Framework

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.

Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.

Final Order

The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.

The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?

4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?

5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?

6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?

7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?

8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?

10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.

2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.

4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.

5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.

6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.

8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.

9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”

10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?

2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.

3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?

5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.

Filing Fee

The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

View Lot

A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.

View Obstructions

The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.

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21F-H2120005-REL

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This administrative law judge decision details a dispute between Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges and Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. regarding a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioners alleged that a pergola approved by the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee was a view obstruction in violation of Article VI(D) of the CC&Rs. Although the Respondent acknowledged its error and rescinded the approval for the pergola before the hearing, the matter was not dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party and ordered the Respondent to pay the petitioners’ $500 filing fee, though no additional civil penalty was assessed.

1 source

What are the core legal and procedural issues decided in this administrative hearing?
How did the Respondent’s actions impact the Petitioners’ prevailing party status and remedy?
What is the significance of the CC&Rs and view obstruction clause in this dispute?

Audio Overview

Video Overview

Video Overview

Mind Map Mind Map

Reports Reports

Flashcards

Flashcards

Quiz

Quiz

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donald S Fern (petitioner)
  • Judith A. Hedges (petitioner)
  • Lance Leslie (petitioner attorney)
    Law Office of Susan A Siwek

Respondent Side

  • Michael S. Shupe (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

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Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

Don France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020056-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Don France Counsel
Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association Counsel B. Austin Bailio

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 2.7

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)

Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.

Orders: Don France's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R, RV storage, Estoppel, Fines
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 924655.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:03 (39.2 KB)

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:11 (96.1 KB)

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:50 (96.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020056-REL, involving petitioner Don France and respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association (the “Association”). The core of the dispute was the Association’s enforcement of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically section 2.7, which requires a six-foot-high gate for Recreational Vehicles (RVs) stored on a property.

The petitioner, Mr. France, was fined by the Association in 2019 for not having the required gate on an RV structure that the Association itself had approved in 2014. Mr. France initially filed a petition alleging the Association was in violation of its own CC&Rs. However, at the September 1, 2020 hearing, he conceded this was not the case and instead argued the Association was “estopped”—or legally prevented—from enforcing the rule due to its prior approval.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. France’s petition on procedural grounds. The judge determined that since Mr. France acknowledged his petition’s central claim was incorrect, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. The new arguments concerning estoppel and the legality of the fines were deemed not properly before the tribunal because they were not included in the original petition. The decision underscores the critical importance of aligning claims made in a formal petition with the arguments presented at a hearing.

Case Overview

Case Number

No. 20F-H2020056-REL

In the Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Don France

Respondent

Mesa East Property Owners Association

Respondent’s Counsel

B. Austin Bailio, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

September 1, 2020

Decision Date

September 21, 2020

The central issue of the case revolves around the enforcement of CC&R section 2.7, which mandates that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a six-foot-high gate. This requirement is mirrored by a City of Mesa municipal code.

Chronology of Key Events

2014: Mr. France applies for and receives approval from the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to build an RV port. In his application, he acknowledges he will abide by deed restrictions and City of Mesa codes.

October 21, 2014: The Association issues its final approval for the structure, which is built without a gate.

Circa 2018: Following threats of litigation from other residents over non-enforcement of the CC&Rs, the Association begins a new enforcement campaign for the six-foot gate rule. The City of Mesa denies the Association’s request to “grandfather in” non-compliant homes.

2019: The deadline for residents to come into compliance passes.

March 11, 2019: The Association issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. France for lacking the required gate.

April 5, 2019: Through an attorney, Mr. France asserts that the Association is estopped from enforcing the rule due to its 2014 approval.

May 15, 2019: The Association’s attorney rejects the estoppel claim and informs Mr. France’s attorney that fines of $500 per week will be assessed.

May 31, 2019: The Association assesses a $500 fine against Mr. France, with additional fines assessed later.

July 24, 2019: The City of Mesa issues its own NOV to Mr. France, citing a violation of city code 11-34-5(B), which also requires a six-foot screening fence for RVs.

April 16, 2020: Mr. France files a petition alleging the Association is in violation of CC&R section 2.7.

Prior to Hearing: To comply with the City of Mesa’s NOV, Mr. France installs a temporary gate at a cost of approximately $800.

September 1, 2020: The administrative hearing is conducted.

Analysis of Arguments and Testimonies

Petitioner’s Position (Don France)

Initial Petition: The formal petition, filed on April 16, 2020, was based on the single issue that the Mesa East Property Owners Association had violated its own CC&R section 2.7.

Revised Argument at Hearing: During the hearing, Mr. France acknowledged that the Association was not, in fact, violating section 2.7. His argument shifted to a claim of estoppel, asserting that the Association could not enforce the rule against him because its own ARC had approved his gateless structure in 2014.

Requested Relief: Mr. France asked the judge to rule that the Association could not require him to install a gate and to invalidate any outstanding fines levied against him.

Supporting Testimony: Joann Van Kirk, the chairperson of the ARC in 2014, testified on Mr. France’s behalf. She stated that she had been informed by a past chair that no gate was required for structures like Mr. France’s, citing other properties that had RV shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa at the time and was told a gate was not required if the structure was attached to the house.

Respondent’s Position (Mesa East POA)

Basis for Enforcement: The Association began strictly enforcing the gate requirement around 2018 after being threatened with lawsuits by other members for failing to enforce the CC&Rs.

Enforcement Actions: After an unsuccessful attempt to have the City of Mesa grandfather in non-compliant properties, the Association notified members of the requirement via its newsletter and online, setting a compliance deadline of 2019. When Mr. France did not comply, the Association issued an NOV and subsequently began assessing fines.

Legal Stance: The Association’s counsel formally rejected Mr. France’s estoppel argument in May 2019.

Supporting Testimony: Donald Smith testified that at the time the NOV was issued to Mr. France, eleven other residents were also non-compliant. By the hearing date, six remained in violation, five of whom had agreed to comply. This testimony was intended to show that the enforcement was not targeted solely at Mr. France.

Independent Municipal Action

The City of Mesa’s regulations played a significant and independent role in the matter.

City Code: The City of Mesa has its own ordinance, Code section 11-34-5(B), which requires RVs taller than six feet to be screened by a six-foot-tall fence.

Notice of Violation: On July 24, 2019, the City issued its own NOV to Mr. France for violating this code.

Consequence: This municipal enforcement action compelled Mr. France to install a temporary gate to avoid penalties from the City, regardless of the outcome of his dispute with the Property Owners Association.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

Final Order: IT IS ORDERED that Don France’s petition is dismissed.

The judge’s decision to dismiss the case was based on a precise legal and procedural rationale, rather than the merits of the estoppel argument.

Failure of the Core Claim: The judge noted that Mr. France’s petition was limited to the single claim that the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Mr. France himself admitted this was not the case. As the petitioner, Mr. France bore the burden of proof, and his own testimony demonstrated that the “preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation.”

Jurisdictional Limitation: The new issues raised by Mr. France at the hearing—namely the estoppel argument and the legality of the fines—were declared “not properly before the tribunal.” The judge reasoned that these claims were not included in the original petition, a separate filing fee was not paid for a second issue, and the claims were not listed in the official Notice of Hearing. This procedural failure prevented the judge from ruling on the substance of these arguments.

Conclusion and Post-Decision Protocol

The dismissal of Mr. France’s petition represents a conclusive finding in favor of the respondent based on the specific claims filed. The decision illustrates that the scope of an administrative hearing is strictly defined by the issues raised in the initial petition.

According to the decision document, the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association (No. 20F-H2020056-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision in the case between Don France (Petitioner) and the Mesa East Property Owners Association (Respondent), as decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

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Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what was the single issue alleged in the Petitioner’s original petition filed on April 16, 2020?

2. According to CC&R section 2.7 and the City of Mesa’s code, what is the specific requirement for storing a recreational vehicle (RV) on a property?

3. What enforcement actions did the Mesa East Property Owners Association take against Don France in the spring of 2019?

4. What was Don France’s primary legal argument against the Association’s enforcement, which he revealed at the September 1, 2020 hearing?

5. What was the state of compliance on Mr. France’s property regarding the RV gate as of the hearing date, and what prompted this action?

6. According to the testimony of Donald Smith, what prompted the Association to begin enforcing the six-foot gate requirement around 2018?

7. What key information did Joann Van Kirk, the 2014 chairperson of the Architectural Review Committee, provide in her testimony?

8. How did the Petitioner’s argument at the hearing differ from the allegation in his initial petition, and why was this difference critical to the case’s outcome?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decline to rule on the legality of the fines the Association had levied against Mr. France?

10. What was the ultimate order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal reasoning behind this decision?

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Answer Key for Short-Answer Questions

1. The primary parties are Don France, the Petitioner, and the Mesa East Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The single issue alleged in Mr. France’s petition was that the Association was in violation of its own CC&R section 2.7.

2. Both CC&R section 2.7 (the 1994 version) and the City of Mesa’s code (section 11-34-5(B)) require that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a gate that is at least six feet high. The CC&Rs also specified the fence and gate must be tall enough to prevent a person from seeing the RV.

3. On March 11, 2019, the Association issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. France because his RV structure lacked a six-foot gate. Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, the Association fined him $500 for the same violation.

4. At the hearing, Mr. France’s primary argument was that the Association was “estopped” from finding him in violation of section 2.7. He argued this because the Association’s Architectural Review Committee had approved his RV structure in 2014 without the gate.

5. As of the hearing date, Mr. France had installed a temporary six-foot gate at a cost of about $800. This action was taken to comply with a Notice of Violation issued to him by the City of Mesa on July 24, 2019.

6. Donald Smith testified that around 2018, people were threatening to sue the Association if it did not enforce the CC&Rs. After meeting with the City of Mesa, which would not allow non-compliant homes to be grandfathered in, the Association began enforcing the gate requirement.

7. Joann Van Kirk testified that in 2014, she had learned from the past ARC chair that no gate was required because other owners had shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa and was told no gate was required if the structure was attached to the house.

8. While his petition alleged the Association had violated section 2.7, at the hearing Mr. France acknowledged this was not the case and argued instead that the Association was estopped from enforcing that section against him. This was critical because the judge could only rule on the single issue raised in the petition, which Mr. France conceded had no merit.

9. The judge declined to rule on the legality of the fines because the issue was not raised in Mr. France’s original petition. Therefore, it was not properly before the tribunal as a filing fee had not been paid for a second issue and it was not included in the Notice of Hearing.

10. The judge ordered that Don France’s petition be dismissed. The reasoning was that the petition was limited to the single issue of whether the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7, and Mr. France himself acknowledged at the hearing that no such violation by the Association had occurred.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-format response for each, citing specific facts from the case decision to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of estoppel as it applies to this case. Explain why Don France believed the Association was estopped from enforcing the gate requirement, referencing the 2014 approvals, and discuss why the Association disagreed and proceeded with enforcement actions.

2. Discuss the procedural limitations that shaped the outcome of this hearing. How did the specific wording of Mr. France’s initial petition and the rules governing administrative hearings ultimately prevent the judge from considering the central issues of estoppel and the validity of the fines?

3. Examine the conflict between a property owner’s reliance on past approvals and a Property Owners Association’s duty to enforce its CC&Rs. Use the testimony of Joann Van Kirk and Donald Smith to illustrate the differing perspectives and pressures that led to this dispute.

4. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. France’s 2014 application to the 2020 hearing. Detail the key actions taken by Mr. France, the Association’s Architectural Review Committee, the Association’s Board, and the City of Mesa, and explain how their interactions created the legal conflict.

5. Evaluate the standard of proof required in this case, the “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the case was dismissed on a procedural issue, discuss which party presented a more convincing case regarding the underlying dispute over the RV gate, and why.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee within the Property Owners Association responsible for reviewing and approving applications for property improvements, such as Mr. France’s RV port in 2014.

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. France bore the burden of proof to show the Association violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing community documents that set rules for property use, such as section 2.7 which requires a six-foot gate for RV storage.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final ruling.

Estoppel

A legal principle asserted by Mr. France arguing that the Association should be prevented from enforcing a rule (the gate requirement) against him because of its prior action (approving his structure without a gate in 2014).

Findings of Fact

A formal, numbered list of facts in the judge’s decision that are established by the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Notice of Violation (NOV)

A formal notice issued by the Association or the City of Mesa to a property owner informing them that they are in violation of a specific rule or code.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Don France is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient to incline an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Mesa East Property Owners Association is the Respondent.

Select all sources
823714.pdf

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20F-H2020056-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning the case of Don France versus the Mesa East Property Owners Association. The document details a dispute where Petitioner Don France alleged that the Respondent Association violated a community covenant regarding the storage of recreational vehicles (RVs), specifically CC&R section 2.7, which requires RVs to be stored behind a six-foot gate. Although Mr. France initially brought the petition alleging the Association violated the rule, he ultimately argued that the Association was estopped from enforcing the rule against him due to past approval of his RV structure without a gate. The decision includes a summary of the Findings of Fact related to Mr. France’s structure, the Association’s attempts to enforce the gate requirement against him and other residents, and the resulting fines he incurred before installing a gate to comply with a separate City of Mesa Notice of Violation. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. France failed to meet the burden of proof to show the Association violated the CC&Rs, and his petition was dismissed because he acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7.

1 source

What were the legal and factual grounds for the case’s dismissal?
How did the Association’s past actions relate to the estoppel claim?
What was the core conflict between the homeowner, HOA, and city codes?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Don France (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified
  • Joann Van Kirk (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; was chairperson of Architectural Review Committee ('ARC') in 2014

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Bailio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association
  • Michael Estey (witness)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Donald Smith (witness)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate