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Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel —
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3)

Outcome Summary

The Association unreasonably withheld approval for Marc Archer's two-story garage addition, thereby violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3). The Association was ordered to grant preliminary approval for the design and refund the $500 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

The Association unreasonably withheld preliminary approval for the Petitioner's January 2020 two-story garage addition request. The ALJ determined that none of the three reasons provided by the Association for the denial were reasonable.

Orders: The Association must grant preliminary approval for the proposed design and must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA architectural approval, unreasonable denial, two-story garage addition, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 980535.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:24 (46.7 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 983516.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:27 (38.4 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 928659.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:30 (39.6 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 943581.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:33 (37.9 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 953334.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:37 (45.2 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 958716.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:34:40 (124.7 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 928659.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:06 (39.6 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 943581.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:10 (37.9 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 953334.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:13 (45.2 KB)

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 958716.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:16 (124.7 KB)

This summary focuses on the administrative hearing concerning the reasonableness of the Respondent's denial of the Petitioner's architectural request.

Key Facts and Procedural History

The Petitioner, Marc Archer, sought approval from the Respondent, PMPE Community Association, Inc., for a two-story garage addition to his home. This was the third hearing alleging that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3), which mandates that the approval of construction plans shall not unreasonably be withheld.

In December 2020, following a previous Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found the Association violated its rules by not providing a written basis for denial, the Association issued a written response outlining its reasons. A key issue during the hearing was the confusion and vagueness of this response, as two of the three reasons for denial were also listed in a subsequent section that the Association testified was merely advisory.

Main Issues and Arguments

The core issue before ALJ Thomas Shedden was whether the Association’s denial of preliminary approval for Archer’s two-story design was unreasonable. The burden of proof lay with the Petitioner.

The Association’s three reasons for denial (based on the December 30, 2020, letter) were:

  1. Lack of Harmony/Incorporation: The addition was deemed a "large two-story 'box'" that did not harmonize with the existing structure or enhance the community (AR § 1.1). The Association argued the proposed roof did not blend into the existing roof.
  • *Legal Point:* The ALJ noted that evidence showed the proposed roof matched the existing pitch, and other houses had multiple roof lines. Therefore, there was no substantial evidence that the addition would "dominate and/or sharply contrast" with the community.
  1. Painted Roof Tiles: The Association deemed painted roof tiles unacceptable (AR § 4.4).
  • *Legal Point:* The ALJ found that the Association acted outside its scope of authority, as the Architectural Rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, though they specified required tile types and approved colors. Archer also presented evidence that he had since located sufficient matching tile.
  1. Insufficient Architectural Expression: A need to add more architectural elements (pop-outs, windows, etc.) to break up expanses (AR § 4.2).
  • *Legal Point:* Archer provided credible evidence that his plans already included stucco pop-outs, inset windows, and soffit details that matched the existing structure, thus satisfying the requirement for architectural expression.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Decision on March 30, 2022, concluding that the Petitioner prevailed.

The ALJ concluded that the Association’s reasons for denial were arguably unclear due to the mixed advisory/required language but found that Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons was reasonable.

The Order required that:

  1. The Association should approve Marc Archer's preliminary design.
  2. The Association must pay Archer his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marc Archer (petitioner)
  • Greg Hancock (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, works in building industry
  • Dr. Victor Zach (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, lives across the street from Petitioner
  • Dan Earlie (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, experienced in homebuilding and HOA boards
  • Thomas Bragg (architect/witness)
    Registered architect hired by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C. S. Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Keith Kauffman (board member/witness)
    PMPE Community Association, Inc.
    President and long-time board member of the Association
  • Gail Zigler (property manager/witness)
    Community manager for the Association
  • Mr. Sasser (committee member/neighbor)
    Mentioned as an opponent to the addition
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Ikenberg (ALJ/Hearing Officer)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    ALJ in prior related proceedings (19F-H1919063-REL, 20F-H2020063-REL)
  • Claire Miller (Preserve Park Supervisor)
    City Parks and Recreation

Other Participants

  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • vnunez (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • tandert (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records (also Miranda A)
  • c. serrano (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records
  • Dr. Smith (unknown)
    House used for a meeting location

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel —
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:04 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:09 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T10:08:15 (101.7 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:49 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:52 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:56 (101.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

• Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

• Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

• Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

• May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

• July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

• September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

• September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

• December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

• January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

• Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
    Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board president, witness)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as a witness for Respondent
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as Mr. Madill

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during original decision transmittal
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (staff)
    Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmittal staff

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (staff)
    Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel —
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

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Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

• Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

• Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

• On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

• On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

• Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

• Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

Don France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020056-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Don France Counsel —
Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association Counsel B. Austin Bailio

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 2.7

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)

Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.

Orders: Don France's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R, RV storage, Estoppel, Fines
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 924655.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:03 (39.2 KB)

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:11 (96.1 KB)

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:50 (96.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020056-REL, involving petitioner Don France and respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association (the “Association”). The core of the dispute was the Association’s enforcement of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically section 2.7, which requires a six-foot-high gate for Recreational Vehicles (RVs) stored on a property.

The petitioner, Mr. France, was fined by the Association in 2019 for not having the required gate on an RV structure that the Association itself had approved in 2014. Mr. France initially filed a petition alleging the Association was in violation of its own CC&Rs. However, at the September 1, 2020 hearing, he conceded this was not the case and instead argued the Association was “estopped”—or legally prevented—from enforcing the rule due to its prior approval.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. France’s petition on procedural grounds. The judge determined that since Mr. France acknowledged his petition’s central claim was incorrect, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. The new arguments concerning estoppel and the legality of the fines were deemed not properly before the tribunal because they were not included in the original petition. The decision underscores the critical importance of aligning claims made in a formal petition with the arguments presented at a hearing.

Case Overview

Case Number

No. 20F-H2020056-REL

In the Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Don France

Respondent

Mesa East Property Owners Association

Respondent’s Counsel

B. Austin Bailio, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

September 1, 2020

Decision Date

September 21, 2020

The central issue of the case revolves around the enforcement of CC&R section 2.7, which mandates that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a six-foot-high gate. This requirement is mirrored by a City of Mesa municipal code.

Chronology of Key Events

• 2014: Mr. France applies for and receives approval from the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to build an RV port. In his application, he acknowledges he will abide by deed restrictions and City of Mesa codes.

• October 21, 2014: The Association issues its final approval for the structure, which is built without a gate.

• Circa 2018: Following threats of litigation from other residents over non-enforcement of the CC&Rs, the Association begins a new enforcement campaign for the six-foot gate rule. The City of Mesa denies the Association’s request to “grandfather in” non-compliant homes.

• 2019: The deadline for residents to come into compliance passes.

• March 11, 2019: The Association issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. France for lacking the required gate.

• April 5, 2019: Through an attorney, Mr. France asserts that the Association is estopped from enforcing the rule due to its 2014 approval.

• May 15, 2019: The Association’s attorney rejects the estoppel claim and informs Mr. France’s attorney that fines of $500 per week will be assessed.

• May 31, 2019: The Association assesses a $500 fine against Mr. France, with additional fines assessed later.

• July 24, 2019: The City of Mesa issues its own NOV to Mr. France, citing a violation of city code 11-34-5(B), which also requires a six-foot screening fence for RVs.

• April 16, 2020: Mr. France files a petition alleging the Association is in violation of CC&R section 2.7.

• Prior to Hearing: To comply with the City of Mesa’s NOV, Mr. France installs a temporary gate at a cost of approximately $800.

• September 1, 2020: The administrative hearing is conducted.

Analysis of Arguments and Testimonies

Petitioner’s Position (Don France)

• Initial Petition: The formal petition, filed on April 16, 2020, was based on the single issue that the Mesa East Property Owners Association had violated its own CC&R section 2.7.

• Revised Argument at Hearing: During the hearing, Mr. France acknowledged that the Association was not, in fact, violating section 2.7. His argument shifted to a claim of estoppel, asserting that the Association could not enforce the rule against him because its own ARC had approved his gateless structure in 2014.

• Requested Relief: Mr. France asked the judge to rule that the Association could not require him to install a gate and to invalidate any outstanding fines levied against him.

• Supporting Testimony: Joann Van Kirk, the chairperson of the ARC in 2014, testified on Mr. France’s behalf. She stated that she had been informed by a past chair that no gate was required for structures like Mr. France’s, citing other properties that had RV shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa at the time and was told a gate was not required if the structure was attached to the house.

Respondent’s Position (Mesa East POA)

• Basis for Enforcement: The Association began strictly enforcing the gate requirement around 2018 after being threatened with lawsuits by other members for failing to enforce the CC&Rs.

• Enforcement Actions: After an unsuccessful attempt to have the City of Mesa grandfather in non-compliant properties, the Association notified members of the requirement via its newsletter and online, setting a compliance deadline of 2019. When Mr. France did not comply, the Association issued an NOV and subsequently began assessing fines.

• Legal Stance: The Association’s counsel formally rejected Mr. France’s estoppel argument in May 2019.

• Supporting Testimony: Donald Smith testified that at the time the NOV was issued to Mr. France, eleven other residents were also non-compliant. By the hearing date, six remained in violation, five of whom had agreed to comply. This testimony was intended to show that the enforcement was not targeted solely at Mr. France.

Independent Municipal Action

The City of Mesa’s regulations played a significant and independent role in the matter.

• City Code: The City of Mesa has its own ordinance, Code section 11-34-5(B), which requires RVs taller than six feet to be screened by a six-foot-tall fence.

• Notice of Violation: On July 24, 2019, the City issued its own NOV to Mr. France for violating this code.

• Consequence: This municipal enforcement action compelled Mr. France to install a temporary gate to avoid penalties from the City, regardless of the outcome of his dispute with the Property Owners Association.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

Final Order: IT IS ORDERED that Don France’s petition is dismissed.

The judge’s decision to dismiss the case was based on a precise legal and procedural rationale, rather than the merits of the estoppel argument.

• Failure of the Core Claim: The judge noted that Mr. France’s petition was limited to the single claim that the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Mr. France himself admitted this was not the case. As the petitioner, Mr. France bore the burden of proof, and his own testimony demonstrated that the “preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation.”

• Jurisdictional Limitation: The new issues raised by Mr. France at the hearing—namely the estoppel argument and the legality of the fines—were declared “not properly before the tribunal.” The judge reasoned that these claims were not included in the original petition, a separate filing fee was not paid for a second issue, and the claims were not listed in the official Notice of Hearing. This procedural failure prevented the judge from ruling on the substance of these arguments.

Conclusion and Post-Decision Protocol

The dismissal of Mr. France’s petition represents a conclusive finding in favor of the respondent based on the specific claims filed. The decision illustrates that the scope of an administrative hearing is strictly defined by the issues raised in the initial petition.

According to the decision document, the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association (No. 20F-H2020056-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision in the case between Don France (Petitioner) and the Mesa East Property Owners Association (Respondent), as decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

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Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what was the single issue alleged in the Petitioner’s original petition filed on April 16, 2020?

2. According to CC&R section 2.7 and the City of Mesa’s code, what is the specific requirement for storing a recreational vehicle (RV) on a property?

3. What enforcement actions did the Mesa East Property Owners Association take against Don France in the spring of 2019?

4. What was Don France’s primary legal argument against the Association’s enforcement, which he revealed at the September 1, 2020 hearing?

5. What was the state of compliance on Mr. France’s property regarding the RV gate as of the hearing date, and what prompted this action?

6. According to the testimony of Donald Smith, what prompted the Association to begin enforcing the six-foot gate requirement around 2018?

7. What key information did Joann Van Kirk, the 2014 chairperson of the Architectural Review Committee, provide in her testimony?

8. How did the Petitioner’s argument at the hearing differ from the allegation in his initial petition, and why was this difference critical to the case’s outcome?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decline to rule on the legality of the fines the Association had levied against Mr. France?

10. What was the ultimate order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal reasoning behind this decision?

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Answer Key for Short-Answer Questions

1. The primary parties are Don France, the Petitioner, and the Mesa East Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The single issue alleged in Mr. France’s petition was that the Association was in violation of its own CC&R section 2.7.

2. Both CC&R section 2.7 (the 1994 version) and the City of Mesa’s code (section 11-34-5(B)) require that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a gate that is at least six feet high. The CC&Rs also specified the fence and gate must be tall enough to prevent a person from seeing the RV.

3. On March 11, 2019, the Association issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. France because his RV structure lacked a six-foot gate. Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, the Association fined him $500 for the same violation.

4. At the hearing, Mr. France’s primary argument was that the Association was “estopped” from finding him in violation of section 2.7. He argued this because the Association’s Architectural Review Committee had approved his RV structure in 2014 without the gate.

5. As of the hearing date, Mr. France had installed a temporary six-foot gate at a cost of about $800. This action was taken to comply with a Notice of Violation issued to him by the City of Mesa on July 24, 2019.

6. Donald Smith testified that around 2018, people were threatening to sue the Association if it did not enforce the CC&Rs. After meeting with the City of Mesa, which would not allow non-compliant homes to be grandfathered in, the Association began enforcing the gate requirement.

7. Joann Van Kirk testified that in 2014, she had learned from the past ARC chair that no gate was required because other owners had shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa and was told no gate was required if the structure was attached to the house.

8. While his petition alleged the Association had violated section 2.7, at the hearing Mr. France acknowledged this was not the case and argued instead that the Association was estopped from enforcing that section against him. This was critical because the judge could only rule on the single issue raised in the petition, which Mr. France conceded had no merit.

9. The judge declined to rule on the legality of the fines because the issue was not raised in Mr. France’s original petition. Therefore, it was not properly before the tribunal as a filing fee had not been paid for a second issue and it was not included in the Notice of Hearing.

10. The judge ordered that Don France’s petition be dismissed. The reasoning was that the petition was limited to the single issue of whether the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7, and Mr. France himself acknowledged at the hearing that no such violation by the Association had occurred.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-format response for each, citing specific facts from the case decision to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of estoppel as it applies to this case. Explain why Don France believed the Association was estopped from enforcing the gate requirement, referencing the 2014 approvals, and discuss why the Association disagreed and proceeded with enforcement actions.

2. Discuss the procedural limitations that shaped the outcome of this hearing. How did the specific wording of Mr. France’s initial petition and the rules governing administrative hearings ultimately prevent the judge from considering the central issues of estoppel and the validity of the fines?

3. Examine the conflict between a property owner’s reliance on past approvals and a Property Owners Association’s duty to enforce its CC&Rs. Use the testimony of Joann Van Kirk and Donald Smith to illustrate the differing perspectives and pressures that led to this dispute.

4. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. France’s 2014 application to the 2020 hearing. Detail the key actions taken by Mr. France, the Association’s Architectural Review Committee, the Association’s Board, and the City of Mesa, and explain how their interactions created the legal conflict.

5. Evaluate the standard of proof required in this case, the “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the case was dismissed on a procedural issue, discuss which party presented a more convincing case regarding the underlying dispute over the RV gate, and why.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee within the Property Owners Association responsible for reviewing and approving applications for property improvements, such as Mr. France’s RV port in 2014.

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. France bore the burden of proof to show the Association violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing community documents that set rules for property use, such as section 2.7 which requires a six-foot gate for RV storage.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final ruling.

Estoppel

A legal principle asserted by Mr. France arguing that the Association should be prevented from enforcing a rule (the gate requirement) against him because of its prior action (approving his structure without a gate in 2014).

Findings of Fact

A formal, numbered list of facts in the judge’s decision that are established by the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Notice of Violation (NOV)

A formal notice issued by the Association or the City of Mesa to a property owner informing them that they are in violation of a specific rule or code.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Don France is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient to incline an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Mesa East Property Owners Association is the Respondent.

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20F-H2020056-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning the case of Don France versus the Mesa East Property Owners Association. The document details a dispute where Petitioner Don France alleged that the Respondent Association violated a community covenant regarding the storage of recreational vehicles (RVs), specifically CC&R section 2.7, which requires RVs to be stored behind a six-foot gate. Although Mr. France initially brought the petition alleging the Association violated the rule, he ultimately argued that the Association was estopped from enforcing the rule against him due to past approval of his RV structure without a gate. The decision includes a summary of the Findings of Fact related to Mr. France’s structure, the Association’s attempts to enforce the gate requirement against him and other residents, and the resulting fines he incurred before installing a gate to comply with a separate City of Mesa Notice of Violation. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. France failed to meet the burden of proof to show the Association violated the CC&Rs, and his petition was dismissed because he acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7.

1 source

What were the legal and factual grounds for the case’s dismissal?
How did the Association’s past actions relate to the estoppel claim?
What was the core conflict between the homeowner, HOA, and city codes?

Based on 1 source

00:00
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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Don France (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified
  • Joann Van Kirk (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; was chairperson of Architectural Review Committee ('ARC') in 2014

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Bailio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association
  • Michael Estey (witness)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Donald Smith (witness)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

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Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Mary J Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mary J Bartle Counsel —
Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions

The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.

Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.

The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.

Case Overview

Case Name

Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Petitioner

Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)

Respondent

Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)

Rehearing Date

January 14, 2020

Final Decision Date

January 30, 2020

Procedural History and Core Allegation

The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:

• April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.

• The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.

• September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.

• October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

• January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.

• January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.

At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”

Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings

Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties

The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:

The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.

Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.

• Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:

• Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:

Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.

Legal Framework and Final Order

Applicable Legal Standards

The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:

• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

• Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.

• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

• Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”

Final Order and Implications

Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:

1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.

2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.

Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?

3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?

4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?

5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?

7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?

8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?

9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?

10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.

2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.

3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.

4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.

5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.

6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.

7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.

8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”

2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?

3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?

4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?

5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.

Bylaws

A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.

Conclusion of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.

Finding of Fact

The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.

A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.

Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?

After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.

However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.

Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win

Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.

The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.

Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:

The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.

This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.

Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken

Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.

Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.

Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”

The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser

It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.

In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:

“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.

One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.

Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners

The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.

While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mary J Bartle (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
  • Edith Rudder (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL-RHG/733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:04 (38.6 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:08 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:11 (108.8 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

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19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

• Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

• Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

• History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

• Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

• Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

• Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

• Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

• Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

• Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

• Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

• Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

• Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

• CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

• Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

• Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

• Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

• Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

• Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

• August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

• January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

• April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

• The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

• The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

• The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

• Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

• Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

• Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

• Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.

4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.

4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

——————————————————————————–

4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL
Agency Arizona Department of Real Estate
Tribunal —
Decision Date 9/14/2018
Administrative Law Judge TS
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded —
Civil Penalties —

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq., Nicolas C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 683622.pdf

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18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 694095.pdf

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18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf

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18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf

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Administrative Decision Briefing: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This briefing document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal proceedings and final administrative decisions regarding the dispute between Lawrence M. Stewart and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818052-REL and 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG).

Executive Summary

The matter originated from a petition filed by Lawrence M. Stewart on May 21, 2018, alleging that the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. violated Association Bylaws, specifically Section 5.4, regarding the denial of a variance for unauthorized changes made to common or limited common areas.

Mr. Stewart, while serving as a Board member, modified areas around his unit without prior authorization. Upon being notified of a violation of Section 5.1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), he sought a formal variance. The Board, consisting of two other members, denied this request on February 18, 2018, leading to Mr. Stewart's resignation and subsequent legal action.

Across two hearings—an initial hearing on September 6, 2018, and a rehearing on January 2, 2019—Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden consistently ruled in favor of the Association. The central legal finding was that Bylaw Section 5.4 serves as a "shield" against liability for Board members rather than a "sword" for petitioners to challenge Board decisions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of Bylaw Section 5.4 (Indemnification and Liability)

The crux of the Petitioner's argument rested on Section 5.4 of the Association Bylaws. Mr. Stewart used this section to assert a "good faith" requirement for Board decisions.

  • The Provision: Section 5.4 states that as long as a Board member acts in "good faith on the basis of information actually possessed," they shall not be liable for damages or loss related to the approval or disapproval of plans or any act/failure to act by the Association.
  • The Legal Conflict: The Association argued that Section 5.4 was inapplicable because no Board member had been charged with an act requiring indemnity.
  • The Ruling: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Section 5.4 does not impose a duty on the Board to act in a specific way toward owners; rather, it is a liability shield. Mr. Stewart eventually acknowledged that Section 5.4 acts as a "shield" and not a "sword," admitting he cited it only because he could find no other "good faith" reference in the governing documents.
2. Allegations of Bias and Lack of Good Faith

Mr. Stewart contended that the Board's decision was not made in good faith and that Board member David Larson was specifically biased against him.

  • Evidence of Bias: Stewart cited Mr. Larson’s biography, meeting notes from November 2017 regarding "Fair Notice" of enforcement (towing, violation notices), and a letter Larson wrote in October 2018 urging members not to vote for Stewart in an election.
  • Evidence of Bad Faith: Stewart testified that the Board members were unwilling to physically inspect his changes and only took a "cursory look" at his photographs.
  • The Ruling: The ALJ found the evidence insufficient to prove bias or bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence. Regarding the meeting notes, Larson’s refusal to discuss Board business in driveways or his intent to enforce CC&Rs did not constitute legal bias against Mr. Stewart’s specific variance request.
3. "Pandora's Box" and Reasonable Enforcement

A significant theme was the Board's rationale for denying the variance.

  • The Association's Defense: The Board denied the request on the basis that granting it would "open a Pandora’s Box," encouraging other owners to request similar variances for common areas.
  • Selective Enforcement Claims: Mr. Stewart argued he was treated unfairly, presenting photos of other units allegedly not in conformity with the CC&Rs.
  • The Ruling: The ALJ determined that the Board's fear of a "Pandora's Box" was a reasonable position for a condominium association. Furthermore, the specifics of Stewart’s changes were deemed not germane to the decision if the Board's policy was to prevent a precedent of common area modifications. The evidence of other non-conforming units was dismissed because there was no proof those owners had requested or been denied variances, nor was it known if they had received prior approval.

Important Quotes with Context

Quote Context
"Mr. Stewart appeared to acknowledge that section 5.4 acts as a 'shield' and not a 'sword,' but he testified to the effect that that was the only section that included a 'good faith' requirement." Findings of Fact, Para 21 (Initial Decision). This highlights the Petitioner's struggle to find a legal basis for his claim within the governing documents.
"The Board disapproved his changes because they were fearful of opening a Pandora’s Box of people requesting changes to the common area. This was not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association." Conclusions of Law, Para 7. The Judge validates the Association’s right to deny variances based on the risk of setting a precedent.
"A preponderance of the evidence is… evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue." Conclusions of Law, Para 3. This defines the standard of proof Mr. Stewart failed to meet in his allegations of bias.
"Bylaws Section 5.4 does not impose any duty on the Board members, but rather shields them from liability if they have acted in good faith." Conclusions of Law, Para 5 (Rehearing). This is the definitive legal interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners and Board Members
  • Prior Authorization is Mandatory: Modifications to common or limited common areas must receive written approval before work begins. Attempting to secure a "variance" after the fact (as Mr. Stewart did) places the owner in a precarious legal position where the Board has broad discretion to deny the request to prevent setting a precedent.
  • Understanding Bylaw Limitations: General "good faith" clauses found in indemnification sections are typically intended to protect the Association and its officers from lawsuits; they do not necessarily provide a cause of action for an owner to overturn a Board's discretionary decision.
  • Evidence Standards in Administrative Hearings: To prove bias or "bad faith," a petitioner must provide specific, probative evidence that links the bias directly to the decision in question. General disagreements or a Board member’s rigorous enforcement of rules do not legally equate to bias.
  • Burden of Proof: In these administrative matters, the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." If the evidence is equally balanced or insufficient to "incline a fair and impartial mind" to the petitioner's side, the case will be dismissed.
For Association Governance
  • Consistency in Rationale: The Board's use of a consistent rationale (preventing a "Pandora's Box") was viewed as reasonable by the court. Boards should document the policy-based reasons for denying variances to withstand legal scrutiny.
  • Recusal Protocols: While Mr. Stewart disputed whether he had agreed to recuse himself, the case underscores the importance of clear, documented recusal when a Board member has a personal interest in a matter before the Board.

Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law cases between Lawrence M. Stewart (Petitioner) and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It explores the legal disputes regarding condominium governance, homeowners' association (HOA) board conduct, and the interpretation of association bylaws.

Case Overview and Entities

The conflict arose when Lawrence M. Stewart, a condominium owner and former board member, made unauthorized changes to the common or limited common areas surrounding his unit. The resulting legal proceedings focused on whether the Association Board acted in good faith and within its authority when it denied Mr. Stewart's request for a variance to keep those changes.

Key Entities and Figures
Entity/Figure Role
Lawrence M. Stewart Petitioner; unit owner and former Board member of Canyon Gate Condominium Association.
Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Respondent; the homeowners' association governing the condominium complex.
Thomas Shedden Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presided over the hearings and issued the decisions.
David Larson Board member of the Association; accused of bias by Mr. Stewart.
Sandra Fernandez Board member of the Association during the dispute.
Arizona Department of Real Estate The state agency with authority over the matter under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Title 32.

Core Themes and Legal Principles

1. The Nature of Association Bylaws

Bylaws are legally viewed as a contract between the Association and the owners. Both parties are required to comply with the terms of this contract. When exercising authority under these bylaws, the Association must act reasonably.

2. The "Shield vs. Sword" Interpretation of Section 5.4

A central point of contention was Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability).

  • The Provision: It states that Board members are not liable for damages or prejudice resulting from their acts (including approval or disapproval of plans) as long as they act in good faith based on information they possess.
  • The Interpretation: The court determined that Section 5.4 acts as a "shield" (protecting board members from liability) rather than a "sword" (a provision that owners can use to sue the board for lack of good faith in administrative decisions).
3. Standards of Evidence
  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner (Mr. Stewart) carries the burden of proving his claims.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required. This is defined as evidence with the most "convincing force" or "superior evidentiary weight," sufficient to incline an impartial mind toward one side of the issue.
4. Board Reasonableness: The "Pandora’s Box" Defense

The Board denied Mr. Stewart’s variance request because they believed granting it would open a "Pandora’s Box," leading other owners to demand similar changes to common areas. The ALJ ruled this was a reasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

Procedural History

Date Event
November 15, 2017 Association counsel informs Mr. Stewart he is in violation of CC&Rs Section 5.1.
December 27, 2017 Association attorney erroneously writes that Mr. Stewart recused himself from the matter.
February 18, 2018 Board meeting held. Mr. Stewart resigns. The Board votes to deny the variance and orders restoration of the area.
May 21, 2018 Mr. Stewart files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
September 6, 2018 Initial hearing conducted at the Office of Administrative Hearings.
September 14, 2018 ALJ issues decision dismissing the petition.
January 2, 2019 Rehearing conducted.
January 17, 2019 Final ALJ decision issued, again dismissing the petition and affirming the Association as the prevailing party.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. What specific section of the CC&Rs did the Association claim Mr. Stewart violated?

Answer: Section 5.1, by making changes to common or limited common areas without prior written permission.

2. Why did the ALJ conclude that the specific details of Mr. Stewart’s changes were not "germane" to the Board's decision?

Answer: Because the Board's denial was based on the policy of not wanting to set a precedent ("opening a Pandora’s Box") for common area modifications, the physical specifics of the changes were irrelevant to that policy-based refusal.

3. What evidence did Mr. Stewart provide to suggest David Larson was biased against him?

Answer: Mr. Stewart cited a biography of Larson, meeting notes where Larson gave "Fair Notice" of enforcement actions, Larson's refusal to discuss board business in driveways, and an October 2018 letter Larson wrote urging members not to vote for Stewart in an election.

4. Why was Mr. Stewart’s evidence regarding other non-conforming units deemed not probative?

Answer: Mr. Stewart could not prove those units had requested and been granted variances (as opposed to having pre-approval or being older than two years), meaning their status did not prove the Board treated him unfairly regarding his specific variance request.

5. How did the ALJ define "Preponderance of the Evidence"?

Answer: It is the greater weight of evidence that has the most convincing force; it is superior evidentiary weight that inclines a fair mind to one side even if it doesn't free the mind of all reasonable doubt.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

Prompt 1: The Scope of Good Faith and Liability

Analyze the Association’s Bylaw Section 5.4. Discuss the legal distinction between a provision that shields a director from personal liability and a provision that creates an actionable duty of "good faith" toward individual homeowners. Why did the ALJ determine that Mr. Stewart could not use Section 5.4 as a "sword"?

Prompt 2: Fairness in HOA Enforcement

Mr. Stewart argued that he was treated unfairly because other units were not in conformity with the CC&Rs. Evaluate the evidentiary requirements for a "selective enforcement" claim based on the case text. What must a petitioner prove to demonstrate that the board is acting inconsistently or in bad faith when denying a variance?

Prompt 3: Judicial Deference to Board Decisions

The ALJ found the Board’s "Pandora’s Box" argument to be a "reasonable position." Explore the balance of power between individual property rights and the collective authority of a homeowners' association. Under what circumstances should an Administrative Law Judge overrule the discretionary decision of a community board?

Glossary of Important Terms

  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings and makes decisions regarding disputes involving government agencies (in this case, the Department of Real Estate).
  • CC&Rs: Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules for a planned community or condominium.
  • Common Area: Spaces within a condominium project that are owned or used by all members of the association.
  • Good Faith: An honest intent to act without taking an unfair advantage over another person; acting on the basis of information actually possessed.
  • Indemnification: A legal agreement to provide financial protection against loss or liability.
  • Limited Common Area: A portion of the common area reserved for the exclusive use of one or more (but fewer than all) of the units (e.g., a patio or walkway directly outside a unit).
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases requiring that a fact be more likely true than not.
  • Recusal: The act of a person (like a board member) disqualifying themselves from participating in a decision due to a potential conflict of interest.
  • Variance: An official deviation from the set rules or bylaws granted by the governing body (the Board).

The "Pandora’s Box" Dilemma: Lessons from the Stewart vs. Canyon Gate HOA Dispute

1. Introduction: When Home Improvements Meet HOA Realities

Imagine the satisfaction of completing a home improvement project, only to receive a cease-and-desist letter from your HOA Board. This is the nightmare scenario for many homeowners: you’ve modified a common area or balcony, believing it was your right, only to find you have bypassed the Association’s governing documents. What follows is often a high-stakes legal chess match over board authority and the elusive definition of "good faith."

The dispute in Lawrence M. Stewart vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. serves as a masterclass in this conflict. When Mr. Stewart implemented unauthorized changes to the common areas around his unit, he triggered a legal battle that reached the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings—not once, but twice. This case provides a critical look at why a Board’s decision to deny a variance is often legally fortified and illustrates the steep uphill climb homeowners face when alleging "bad faith."

2. The Conflict: Unauthorized Changes and the Request for a Variance

The friction began when Mr. Stewart modified common or limited common areas without securing prior Board approval. On November 15, 2017, the Association’s legal counsel issued a stark ultimatum: submit a written request for a variance or face a civil lawsuit to compel the restoration of the area.

At the time, the situation was complicated by the fact that Mr. Stewart was a sitting member of the Board. During a tense Board meeting on February 18, 2018, the atmosphere soured. Sensing that his colleagues, Sandra Fernandez and David Larson, had already made up their minds, Mr. Stewart resigned his position mid-meeting. Immediately following his resignation, the remaining two members voted unanimously to deny the variance.

Perhaps the most telling aspect of the legal proceedings that followed was that the Association presented no witnesses. They did not need to. By relying purely on the legal interpretation of the governing documents and the Petitioner’s failure to meet his burden of proof, the Association successfully defended its position without a single person taking the stand on its behalf.

3. The Legal Tug-of-War: Is Good Faith a "Shield" or a "Sword"?

Mr. Stewart’s primary legal gambit rested on Bylaw Section 5.4, which he argued required the Board to act in "good faith." However, the Association dismantled this argument by clarifying that the bylaw was never intended to be a "sword" used to overturn Board votes. Instead, it is an indemnification provision—a "shield" designed to protect Board members from personal financial liability.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) emphasized that Section 5.4 protects members from damages or monetary loss. Because Mr. Stewart was seeking to validate a variance rather than suing for money, the "shield" was legally irrelevant to his cause of action.

Petitioner’s Interpretation (Mr. Stewart) Association’s Interpretation (Successful Argument)
Argued Section 5.4 imposes a performance duty on the Board to act in "good faith" when denying variances. Argued Section 5.4 is an indemnification provision protecting members from personal liability.
Attempted to use the section as a "sword" to invalidate the Board’s vote. Successfully used the section as a "shield" against liability for damages, not a standard for voting.
4. Proving Bias: Why the "Preponderance of Evidence" Matters

In administrative law, the "burden of proof" is the Petitioner's heaviest lift. Mr. Stewart was required to prove his case by a "Preponderance of Evidence." As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 1373, this means:

"The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."

Mr. Stewart alleged that Board member David Larson was personally biased against him. To support this, he presented three pieces of evidence across the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing:

  • A Professional Biography: A bio of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager.
  • Meeting Notes: Notes from November 2017 where Mr. Larson used the term "Fair Notice" regarding towing and enforcement, and stated he was too busy to discuss Board business in driveways.
  • Election Correspondence (Rehearing Evidence): A letter from October 2018 where Mr. Larson urged members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

The ALJ found these "feelings" of bias legally insufficient. The judge noted that the "Fair Notice" comments were standard enforcement language, and the election letter—though part of a contentious rehearing process—did not prove the original variance denial was made in bad faith. Mr. Stewart could not point to any specific biased information, and the court ruled that personal friction does not automatically equate to a legal breach of duty.

5. The "Pandora’s Box" Defense and Selective Enforcement

The Association’s most potent defense was the "Pandora’s Box" argument. They argued that granting a variance for unauthorized work would set a community-wide precedent, effectively stripping the Board of its ability to enforce standards in the future.

Citing the legal precedent of Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, the ALJ noted that an Association must act "reasonably." The judge found the "Pandora's Box" concern to be a quintessential example of reasonableness. Even if Mr. Stewart’s changes were not "readily seen by others," the Board’s duty is to the long-term integrity of the governing documents, not the aesthetics of a single unit.

Mr. Stewart also claimed "selective enforcement," providing photos of other non-conforming units. The ALJ rejected this evidence for three reasons:

  1. Lack of History: Stewart could not prove if those units had received variances more than two years prior.
  2. Pre-approval Unknown: He could not confirm if those changes had been pre-approved, rendering a variance unnecessary.
  3. No Probative Value: The photos were legally irrelevant because Stewart failed to show those owners had actually gone through the same variance process and been granted an exception.
6. Conclusion: Navigating HOA Disputes with Clarity

The final ruling was clear: the petition was dismissed, and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association was deemed the prevailing party. This case reinforces that Boards are afforded significant discretion when they act to prevent a "Pandora's Box" of non-compliance. Consistency is a Board's greatest defense, and the burden of overturning a decision is a high bar that requires more than just a sense of unfairness.

Key Takeaways for Homeowners
  • [ ] Prior Approval is Non-Negotiable: Always secure written approval from the Board before modifying common or limited common areas.
  • [ ] The "Shield" is Not a "Sword": Understand that bylaws regarding "good faith" are often designed to protect Board members from personal liability, not to provide a path to overturn their votes.
  • [ ] Evidence Over Emotion: To win an administrative hearing, you must provide a "preponderance of evidence." Personal feelings of bias or animosity are rarely enough.
  • [ ] Respect the Precedent: A Board’s primary responsibility is to the Governing Documents. Decisions based on preventing a negative community-wide precedent are almost always viewed as "reasonable" by the courts.

By adhering strictly to the governing documents and ensuring all approvals are in hand before a single hammer swings, homeowners can avoid the "Pandora’s Box" of costly, protracted litigation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Stewart (Petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (Counsel for Respondent)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Nichols C. S. Nogami (Counsel for Respondent)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also listed as Nicolas C. S. Nogami in related rehearing documents
  • Sandra Fernandez (Board Member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
  • David Larson (Board Member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F. Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings

Attila Revesz vs. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium ,Association of Phoenix

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 15F-H1415008-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2015-05-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Attila Revesz Counsel —
Respondent Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association of Phoenix Counsel Craig Boates

Alleged Violations

Article 2.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge deemed Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association the prevailing party and dismissed Attila Revesz's petition. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws regarding the annual meeting and quorum requirements.

Why this result: The ALJ found credible testimony that a quorum was present (including a member via telephone) and Petitioner offered no substantial evidence to the contrary.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold valid annual meeting

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated Bylaws Article 2.1 by failing to hold a valid annual meeting. Petitioner claimed a quorum was not present because a board member attended by telephone, which Petitioner disputed. The ALJ found credible testimony that the board member attended by phone and a quorum of homeowners was present.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Article 2.1 of Bylaws

Decision Documents

15F-H1415008-BFS-rhg Decision – 463171.pdf

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15F-H1415008-BFS-rhg Decision – 469839.pdf

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Administrative Law Judge Decision: Attila Revesz vs. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document details the administrative proceedings and final decision regarding Case No. 15F-H1415008-BFS. The petitioner, Attila Revesz, a member of the Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association of Phoenix, alleged that the Association violated Article 2.1 of its Bylaws by failing to hold an annual meeting in 2014.

The Respondent, Shadow Mountain Villas, contended that a meeting held on May 22, 2014, constituted a valid annual meeting. The central conflict of the case rested on whether a proper quorum of Board members and homeowners was present during this meeting. Following a hearing held on May 7, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden determined that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The petition was dismissed, and the decision was certified as the final administrative action of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety on July 1, 2015.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. The Validity of the 2014 Annual Meeting

The core of the dispute was the Petitioner's claim that no annual meeting occurred in 2014. While a meeting did take place on May 22, 2014, the Petitioner argued it was invalid due to:

  • Lack of a Board Quorum: Three Board members are required for a quorum. Two were present in person, but the third (Angelo Peri) participated via telephone.
  • Lack of a Homeowner Quorum: The Petitioner challenged whether enough homeowners were present, either in person or by proxy, to conduct business.

The Respondent provided testimony from Jo-Ann Greenstein, vice-president of RealManage, who affirmed that a quorum was met for both the Board and the homeowners.

2. Evidentiary Standards and Credibility

The decision hinged largely on the credibility of witness testimony regarding the telephonic presence of Board member Angelo Peri:

  • Testimony Conflict: A witness for the Petitioner, Rick Sanchez, testified he did not see a telephone or hear anyone on a phone during the meeting. Conversely, Ms. Greenstein testified that Mr. Peri was present via cell phone, noting the room lacked a landline.
  • Documentary Errors: Draft minutes of the meeting initially listed Mr. Peri as absent. Ms. Greenstein clarified that these were errors typical of draft documents and that the final adopted minutes correctly showed Mr. Peri as present.
3. Petitioner Inconsistency

A significant factor in the ALJ’s decision was the behavior of the Petitioner following the contested meeting. Despite challenging the meeting's validity, the Petitioner and his witness, Mr. Sanchez, were elected to the Board at that very meeting via voice-vote. Evidence showed that during 2014, both individuals acted in their capacity as Board members based on those election results. The ALJ noted that by acting as a director, the Petitioner implicitly accepted the validity of the meeting where he was elected.

4. Burden of Proof in Administrative Hearings

As the Petitioner, Mr. Revesz bore the legal burden to prove the Association’s violation by a "preponderance of the evidence." The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner did not provide substantial evidence to rebut the Respondent's testimony regarding quorum or the finality of the approved minutes.

Important Quotes with Context

Quote Context
"Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." The legal definition of "Preponderance of the Evidence" used by the ALJ to evaluate the case (citing Black’s Law Dictionary).
"This finding is strongly supported by the fact that Mr. Revesz, by acting as a director or Board member during 2014, accepted that he had been elected as Board member at the May 22, 2014 annual meeting." The ALJ's justification for crediting the Respondent's version of events, noting the Petitioner's contradictory actions.
"Ms. Greenstein provided credible testimony that Mr. Peri was present by telephone at the May 22, 2014 annual meeting and that there was a quorum." The ALJ’s formal finding regarding the presence of the necessary Board members to validate the meeting.
"No action by the Department of Fire Building and Life Safety was received… the attached Administrative Law Judge Decision is certified as the final administrative decision." The statement by Interim Director Greg Hanchett confirming that the decision became final because the Department did not modify or reject it within the statutory timeframe.

Procedural Timeline and Certification

The administrative process followed a specific statutory timeline:

  • February 6, 2015: Notice of Hearing issued.
  • May 7, 2015: Hearing conducted.
  • May 22, 2015: ALJ Decision transmitted to the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.
  • June 26, 2015: Deadline for the Department to accept, reject, or modify the decision.
  • July 1, 2015: Decision certified as final after no action was taken by the Department.

Actionable Insights

Documentation and Minutes

The case highlights the importance of accurate record-keeping. While draft minutes contained errors regarding attendance, the eventual adoption of corrected minutes in March 2015 served as critical evidence. Organizations should ensure that minutes are reviewed and formally approved to establish a definitive record of proceedings.

Telephonic Participation

The decision confirms that telephonic participation (in this case, via cell phone) can satisfy quorum requirements, provided it is documented and the individual is considered "present."

Consistency in Legal Challenges

Challenging the validity of a meeting while simultaneously benefiting from and acting upon the outcomes of that meeting (such as an election) significantly weakens a petitioner's standing and credibility in an administrative hearing.

Rights to Appeal

Parties dissatisfied with a certified final decision have the right to:

  1. Request a rehearing from the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09(A).
  2. Seek judicial review in Superior Court, though they may be required to request a rehearing first. Filing a notice of action with the Office of Administrative Hearings is required within ten days of filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Attila Revesz v. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing and subsequent certification in the matter of Attila Revesz v. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association of Phoenix (Case No. 15F-H1415008-BFS). It outlines the legal standards, factual disputes, and administrative procedures involved in this case.

I. Case Overview and Key Facts

The dispute centers on a petition filed by Attila Revesz, a homeowner and member of the Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association. Revesz alleged that the Association violated Article 2.1 of its Bylaws by failing to hold a proper annual meeting in 2014.

The Central Dispute

The Association maintained that an annual meeting was held on May 22, 2014. Revesz contested the validity of this meeting based on two primary arguments:

  1. Lack of Board Quorum: Revesz argued there were not enough Board members present.
  2. Lack of Homeowner Quorum: Revesz argued there were not enough homeowners present to conduct business.
Evidence and Testimony
  • The Petitioner’s Case: Rick Sanchez testified he did not see a phone or hear anyone on a phone during the meeting. Draft minutes initially listed Board member Angelo Peri as absent.
  • The Respondent’s Case: Jo-Ann Greenstein (RealManage) testified that a quorum of homeowners was present (personally or by proxy). She clarified that while there was no landline in the room, Board member Angelo Peri attended via cell phone.
  • The Conflict of Action: Following the May 22, 2014 meeting, Revesz and Sanchez were elected to the Board by voice-vote and subsequently acted in their capacities as Board members throughout 2014. This behavior was cited by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as evidence that they accepted the validity of the meeting at the time.

II. Key Concepts and Legal Standards

1. Burden and Standard of Proof

Under Arizona Administrative Code § R2-19-119, the Petitioner carries the burden of proof. The required standard is a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence that is more convincing than the evidence offered in opposition, making the fact sought to be proven "more probable than not."

2. Quorum Requirements
  • Board Quorum: For Shadow Mountain Villas, three Board members constitute a quorum.
  • Homeowner Quorum: Must be established through members present in person or via proxy.
  • Telephonic Presence: The case established that presence via cell phone constitutes being present for the purposes of a quorum, even if a physical landline is not available.
3. Administrative Procedure
  • Agency Action: The Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety has a specific window to accept, reject, or modify an ALJ's decision.
  • Final Certification: If the Department takes no action within the statutory timeframe (pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08), the ALJ’s decision is automatically certified as the final administrative decision.

III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. Who was the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presided over the hearing?
  2. What was the specific Bylaw article allegedly violated by the Association?
  3. On what date was the contested annual meeting held?
  4. According to the Association's records, how many Board members are required for a quorum?
  5. What was the Association's explanation for the draft minutes listing Angelo Peri as absent?
  6. Why was the Board election on May 22, 2014, conducted by voice-vote rather than a written ballot?
  7. By what date did the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety have to act before the ALJ decision was automatically certified?
  8. What error was noted regarding Attila Revesz's name in the Board meeting minutes?
  9. Who provided the testimony regarding the presence of homeowners via proxy?
  10. What is the first step a party must take if they wish to challenge the final administrative decision in Superior Court?

IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Preponderance of Evidence: Analyze the ALJ’s determination that Revesz failed to meet the preponderance of evidence standard. Discuss how the Association’s testimony regarding telephonic attendance and the Petitioner’s own subsequent actions as a Board member weighed against the Petitioner's claims.
  2. The Validity of Telephonic Participation: Evaluate the implications of the ALJ's finding that a Board member's presence via cell phone satisfies quorum requirements. How does this decision reflect the practicalities of modern administrative meetings versus traditional landline or in-person requirements?
  3. Administrative Certification and Finality: Explain the process by which an ALJ decision becomes "final." Discuss the significance of the June 26, 2015, deadline in this case and what the Department’s inaction meant for the legal standing of the ALJ's original order.

V. Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) An official who presides over hearings and adjudicates disputes involving government agencies.
Bates Numbers A numbering system used to identify and track individual pages of evidence or documents in a legal matter.
Certification The process by which an ALJ decision is officially designated as the final agency action, often due to the passage of time without modification by a director.
Preponderance of the Evidence The legal standard of proof in civil and administrative cases; evidence that makes a claim more likely to be true than not.
Proxy Authority given by one person to another to act or vote on their behalf, often used to establish a quorum in homeowner association meetings.
Quorum The minimum number of members of an assembly or board that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Respondent The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed; in this case, the Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association.
Voice-vote A voting method in which those in favor say "aye" and those opposed say "no," used here because the number of candidates matched the number of open seats.

Quorum, Cell Phones, and Irony: Lessons from an HOA Legal Dispute

The Hook: When Governance Becomes Personal

In the world of Homeowners Association (HOA) governance, a single cell phone can be the difference between a valid election and a total administrative collapse. The legal showdown of Attila Revesz vs. Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association of Phoenix serves as a masterclass in how meeting formalities, witness credibility, and digital presence dictate the legitimacy of association leadership. What began as a homeowner's challenge to a 2014 annual meeting evolved into a high-stakes investigation into the very definition of "presence" in the digital age.

The Core Complaint: A Question of Legitimacy

The dispute was initiated on November 28, 2014, when Petitioner and homeowner Attila Revesz filed a "Single Issue Petition" against the Shadow Mountain Villas Condominium Association. Mr. Revesz alleged that the Association had fundamentally violated Article 2.1 of its Bylaws by failing to hold a valid annual meeting in 2014.

At the heart of the Petitioner's argument was the claim that the meeting conducted on May 22, 2014, was a legal nullity. He contended that the Association failed to achieve a quorum for both the Board of Directors and the homeowners. Under the Association’s governing documents, three Board members are required to constitute a quorum. Mr. Revesz argued that since this threshold was not met, any business conducted—including the election of new directors—was invalid.

The Quorum Controversy: Presence via Cell Phone

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was tasked with reconciling two wildly different accounts of the May 22nd meeting. The Association asserted that a Board quorum was achieved through the attendance of Russell Hutchinson and Shelly Rothgeb in person, supplemented by Board member Angelo Peri via telephone.

  • Witness Volatility: The hearing featured a dramatic shift in testimony. Rick Sanchez, appearing for the Petitioner, initially admitted during cross-examination that the meeting minutes were approved without objection in March 2015. However, under follow-up questioning by Mr. Revesz, Mr. Sanchez reversed his position, claiming no vote had occurred. This inconsistency weakened the Petitioner’s case in real-time.
  • The "Draft" Minute Fallacy: Mr. Revesz relied on draft minutes which listed Mr. Peri as absent. The Association countered with the final minutes adopted in March 2015, which recorded Mr. Peri’s telephonic presence. Jo-Ann Greenstein, vice-president of the management firm RealManage, testified that draft minutes are inherently prone to clerical errors. A prime example of this administrative fallibility was found in the Board meeting minutes, where Mr. Revesz himself was erroneously listed as "Attilla Balbo."

Key Evidence While the Petitioner’s witness noted the absence of a landline in the room, the ALJ found the manager’s testimony more credible. The Association successfully established that modern technology satisfies attendance requirements; Board Member Angelo Peri’s participation via cell phone was sufficient to constitute a quorum.

The Paradox of the Petitioner: An Unexpected Election

Perhaps the most striking element of this case is the "ironic twist" detailed in Finding of Fact #12. Attila Revesz, the man suing to declare the meeting invalid, was actually elected to the Board at that very meeting. Because there were only three candidates for three open positions, the election was finalized by a simple voice vote.

From a legal standpoint, Mr. Revesz’s subsequent behavior created an "estoppel-adjacent" scenario. After the meeting, he and Mr. Sanchez accepted their positions and actively served as Board members throughout the remainder of 2014. The ALJ noted that by acting in an official capacity and exercising the powers granted by that election, the Petitioner tacitly validated the legitimacy of the meeting he later sought to overturn.

Legal Standards: The "Preponderance of Evidence"

In administrative hearings, the burden of proof is not "beyond a reasonable doubt," but rather a lower threshold known as the Preponderance of the Evidence.

Element Description
Standard of Proof Preponderance of the Evidence (A.A.C. § R2-19-119).
Definition Evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposition (more probable than not).
Burden of Proof Rests entirely on the Petitioner (Mr. Revesz).
Result of Failure If the evidence is "tied" or unconvincing, the Petitioner fails to meet the burden and loses the case.

The ALJ determined that Mr. Revesz failed to meet this burden. While the Petitioner questioned the homeowner quorum, he provided no substantial evidence to rebut Ms. Greenstein’s testimony that a quorum was reached through a combination of personal attendance and proxies.

The Final Verdict: Certification and Dismissal

On May 22, 2015, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision in favor of Shadow Mountain Villas. Per Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 41-1092.08), the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety was granted a window until June 26, 2015, to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s findings.

Because the Department took no action by the June 26 deadline, the decision was officially certified as the final administrative decision on July 1, 2015. The final order deemed the Association the prevailing party and dismissed Mr. Revesz’s petition in its entirety.

Key Takeaways for HOA Members

  • Prioritize Formal Adoption Over Draft Records: Draft minutes are legally unreliable. Boards must ensure that the formal approval process is used to correct clerical errors (like the "Attilla Balbo" misspelling) before records are finalized.
  • Digital Presence is Legal Presence: Unless specifically prohibited by an HOA’s bylaws, telephonic participation—including via cell phone—is a valid method for establishing a quorum.
  • Conduct Constitutes Acceptance: A homeowner cannot easily challenge the validity of an election if they have spent months acting as an elected official. Your behavior as a member or director can serve as a legal validation of the Association’s actions.
  • The Rebuttal Requirement: To challenge a manager’s testimony regarding homeowner quorums and proxies, a petitioner must provide "substantial evidence." Mere skepticism of the results is insufficient to meet the burden of proof.