Tag Archives: 2020

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John D Klemmer Counsel —
Respondent Caribbean Gardens Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne, Esq., Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8; Article 3, Section 3.4; Article 4, Section 4.1; Article 8, Section 8.1; and, Article 12, Section 12.4

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent Association violated the cited CC&R provisions by refusing to manage the disputed area, which the ALJ determined was a limited common element.

Why this result: The Petitioner lost because the area in dispute was determined to be a 'limited common element' (a balcony serving Unit 207) under Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)), not a 'common area' the Association was required to manage under the referenced CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusal to manage, operate, maintain and administer common area

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated multiple CC&Rs by refusing to maintain an area between Unit 206 and Unit 207, which he claimed was a common area. The HOA argued the area was a limited common element. The ALJ concluded, relying on A.R.S. § 33-1212(A), that the disputed area was a limited common element (a balcony) allocated exclusively to Unit 207, thus Petitioner failed to establish a CC&R violation.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is dismissed. Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.5
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.6
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, common elements, limited common elements, balcony dispute, CC&R violation, A.R.S. 33-1212
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212
  • A.R.S. § 33-1218
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5, 1.8
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 876384.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:57 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 843358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:03 (129.8 KB)

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 843358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:00 (129.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association (No. 21F-H2120009-REL). The core of the dispute was the legal classification of an outdoor space located between two condominium units. The Petitioner, a unit owner, argued the space was a “common area” that the Association was legally obligated to manage under its governing documents (CC&Rs). The Respondent Association countered that the space was a “balcony” or “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the adjacent unit owner.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition. While the Association’s 1973 CC&Rs and the official Plat document were ambiguous regarding the space, the decision hinged on the application of a later state statute, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1212. This statute defines balconies designed to serve a single unit as “limited common elements” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because the disputed area was only accessible from a single unit (Unit 207), the ALJ concluded it met this statutory definition. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated its CC&Rs by not treating the space as a general common area.

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Case Overview

Case Name

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Case Number

21F-H2120009-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn

Hearing Date

November 6, 2020

Decision Date

December 17, 2020

Petitioner

John D. Klemmer (Unit 101 Owner), representing himself

Respondent

Caribbean Gardens Association, represented by Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

Fundamental Dispute: The case centered on whether the Caribbean Gardens Association violated its Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by refusing to manage, operate, and maintain an outdoor area located on the second level between Units 206 and 207, which the Petitioner claimed was a common area belonging to all 40 unit owners.

Petitioner’s Position (John D. Klemmer)

The Petitioner’s case rested on the argument that the disputed area was a “common area” or “common element” as defined by the Association’s governing documents.

• Core Allegation: On April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs by refusing to administer a common area.

• Basis of Claim: The Petitioner argued that all space not explicitly delineated on the official Plat document as an “Apartment,” “patio,” or “balcony” must be considered a common area. The area in question is blank on the Plat.

• Ownership Argument: Each of the 40 unit owners possesses an “undivided ownership interest in the common areas and [common] elements.” He contended that if the Board did not acknowledge ownership, this common area would be lost to its rightful owners.

• Evidence of Misuse: The Petitioner presented photographic evidence showing that the owners of Unit 207 were exclusively occupying the space as if it were another room, adding furniture, walls, and making improvements to the exterior walls of Unit 206.

• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition alleged violations of the following articles:

◦ Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8: Definitions of “Apartment” and “Plat.”

◦ Article 3, Section 3.4: Requirement for the Association to manage Common Elements.

◦ Article 4, Section 4.1: Vests title of Common Elements in the owners.

◦ Article 8, Section 8.1: Pertains to encroachments.

◦ Article 12, Section 12.4: Binds all owners to the Declaration.

Respondent’s Position (Caribbean Gardens Association)

The Association denied the allegations, arguing that the space was not a common area under its purview.

• Core Defense: The disputed area is not a common area but is instead a “balcony” attached to Unit 207, or alternatively, a “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the Unit 207 owners.

• Testimony: Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position is that the area is a balcony. He further stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies within the community, including the one in question.

• Procedural Motions: The Association initially filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the Petitioner was seeking relief that couldn’t be granted (declaratory and injunctive), and that other procedural and constitutional issues existed. These motions were denied by the tribunal.

Findings of Fact and Evidence

The ALJ established the following key facts based on the hearing record:

• Description of Disputed Area: The space is a concrete slab on the second level, located between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It includes outside iron railings that fence it off.

• Exclusive Access: The area is not a staircase landing and can only be accessed through a door from a room within Unit 207. This access is an original feature of the building’s construction.

• Status on the Plat: The official Plat document, which defines the boundaries of apartments and their associated balconies and patios, is blank in the location of the disputed area. It is not specifically delineated in any way.

• Current Use: Photographic evidence confirmed the space contains furniture and other decorative items, indicating exclusive use by the occupants of Unit 207.

Legal Analysis and Conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ’s decision was based on an interpretation of both the community’s CC&Rs and overriding state law.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, Mr. Klemmer, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated the specified CC&R provisions.

• Ambiguity in Governing Documents: The judge acknowledged a conflict in the 1973 CC&Rs.

◦ Article 1.5 defines an “Apartment” by its depiction on the Plat, which does not include the disputed area.

◦ Article 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.” This definition would logically include the undelineated disputed area.

• Application of State Statute: The decisive factor was the application of A.R.S. § 33-1212, a statute enacted in 1985, after the CC&Rs were recorded. The judge focused on subsection 4:

• Final Conclusion: The ALJ concluded that the disputed area fits the statutory description of a balcony “designed to serve a single unit,” as it is only accessible from Unit 207. Therefore, under Arizona law, it is classified as a “limited common element” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because it is not a general common area, the Association had no obligation to manage it as such. The Petitioner thus failed to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders on December 17, 2020:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Study Guide: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association, No. 21F-H2120009-REL. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key legal and case-specific terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, John D. Klemmer, in his petition filed on August 21, 2020?

3. Describe the specific physical location and characteristics of the disputed area at the heart of this case.

4. On what grounds did the Petitioner argue that the disputed area should be considered a “common area”?

5. What was the initial position of the Caribbean Gardens Association Board regarding the status of the disputed area, as testified by Board Member Alex Gomez?

6. Before the hearing, what arguments did the Respondent make in its Motion for Summary Judgment?

7. How do the CC&Rs define an “Apartment” versus “Common Elements”?

8. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rely upon to classify the disputed area?

9. What was the final conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge regarding the nature of the disputed area?

10. What was the final recommended order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are John D. Klemmer, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Caribbean Gardens Association, the Respondent and condominium community association. Mr. Klemmer represented himself, while the Association was represented by counsel, Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

2. The Petitioner alleged that on April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs by refusing to manage, operate, maintain, and administer a specific “common area.” He claimed this refusal would lead to the loss of the area to its rightful owners, the 40 unit owners of Caribbean Gardens.

3. The disputed area is located on the second level of the building, between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It consists of a concrete slab with attached iron railings and can only be accessed through a door from Unit 207.

4. The Petitioner argued the area was a “common area” because it was not specifically delineated on the Plat document as part of an apartment, patio, or balcony. He contended that any space not explicitly designated as part of a unit on the Plat must therefore be a common element belonging to all 40 unit owners.

5. Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position was that the disputed area is not a common area but is a “balcony” attached to Unit 207. He stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies, including the one in question.

6. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondent argued that the Petitioner was seeking relief that the Tribunal could not grant, that he should have filed a derivative action, and that he had not paid sufficient filing fees for multiple issues. The Respondent also challenged the constitutionality of the Enabling Statutes and the jurisdiction of the Department and the Tribunal.

7. Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs defines an “Apartment” as the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio or balcony areas identified on said Plat. In contrast, Article 1, Section 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as all other portions of the Property except the Apartments, including specific items like pools and landscaping.

8. The Judge relied on A.R.S. § 33-1212, which states that balconies and other fixtures designed to serve a single unit but located outside its boundaries are “limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the disputed area must be a balcony “designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.” Therefore, it is considered a limited common element, and the Petitioner did not establish that the Caribbean Gardens Association had violated any CC&R provisions.

10. The recommended order was that the Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. It was further ordered that the Petitioner bear his own $500.00 filing fee.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the disputed area presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did their respective readings of the CC&Rs and the Plat document lead to their opposing conclusions?

2. Discuss the critical role of the Plat document in this dispute. Explain how the blank space on the Plat between Units 206 and 207 created an ambiguity that was central to the arguments of both parties.

3. Trace the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn. Detail her process of weighing the definitions in the 1973 CC&Rs against the provisions of the 1985 Arizona Revised Statutes to reach a final decision.

4. Evaluate the arguments raised by the Caribbean Gardens Association in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the motion was not granted, what significant legal and jurisdictional challenges did it present against the Petitioner’s case and the hearing body’s authority?

5. This case highlights a tension between a condominium’s original governing documents (the 1973 Declaration) and subsequent state law (the 1985 Condominium statutes). Discuss how this dynamic influenced the outcome and what it reveals about the hierarchy of legal authority in condominium governance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over an administrative hearing and issues a written decision. In this case, the ALJ was Kay A. Abramsohn.

Apartment

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs, it is a part of the Property intended for independent use as a dwelling unit, consisting of the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio and balcony areas identified on that Plat.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, the governing legal documents for the Caribbean Gardens community. These were originally recorded in 1973.

Common Elements

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, this term includes “general common elements” as defined in the former A.R.S. § 33-551, along with specific areas like parking, yards, the swimming pool, and “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.”

Horizontal Property Regime

The legal framework governing the property, established under A.R.S. § 33-551 through § 33-561 at the time of the 1973 Declaration. These statutes were later repealed and replaced by the current Condominium laws.

Limited Common Elements

A legal classification defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212. It refers to fixtures like porches, balconies, patios, and entryways that are designed to serve a single unit but are located outside that unit’s boundaries, and are therefore allocated exclusively to that unit.

Petition

The formal, single-issue legal document filed by John D. Klemmer with the Department to initiate the dispute, alleging that the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John D. Klemmer, a resident of Unit 101.

The official two-page survey map of the Property and all Apartments, attached to the Declaration as Exhibit “B.” It delineates the boundaries of individual units and other areas within the community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet. It means the evidence presented must be more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact in question is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Caribbean Gardens Association.

Tribunal

A term used in the decision to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the state agency authorized to hear and decide the contested matter.

Questions

Question

If a balcony or patio serves only my unit but isn't explicitly drawn on the community Plat map, is it considered general common area?

Short Answer

Likely not. Under Arizona law, fixtures designed to serve a single unit located outside its boundaries are considered 'limited common elements' allocated exclusively to that unit, even if the Plat is ambiguous.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ determined that an area not drawn on the Plat was a limited common element because it was physically accessible only from one unit. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), which defines features like balconies and patios designed to serve a single unit as limited common elements.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the disputed area must be a balcony 'designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)

Topic Tags

  • Common Elements
  • Plat Maps
  • Property Boundaries

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a petition against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must demonstrate that their claims are more probable than not. It is not the HOA's job to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must provide evidence of greater weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, as alleged, Caribbean has violated CC&Rs…

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear disputes about CC&R violations and maintenance issues?

Short Answer

Yes, the Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions and hear disputes regarding property owners and condominium associations.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that the Tribunal has the authority to hear contested matters between owners and associations regarding alleged violations of the CC&Rs and statutes.

Alj Quote

The Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions, hear disputes between a property owner and a condominium community association, and take other actions pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.), Title 33, Chapter 16.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • ADRE Authority
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who is responsible for paying the filing fee if the homeowner loses the hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) typically bears the cost of the filing fee if the petition is dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, after dismissing the homeowner's petition, the judge ordered the homeowner to bear the cost of the $500 filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Penalties
  • Hearing Costs

Question

What specifically counts as a 'limited common element' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

Fixtures like shutters, awnings, balconies, and patios that are outside a unit's boundaries but designed to serve that single unit.

Detailed Answer

State statute specifically lists items such as doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, and exterior doors as limited common elements if they are designed for the exclusive use of one unit.

Alj Quote

Any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, entryways or patios, and all exterior doors and windows or other fixtures designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit's boundaries, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212

Topic Tags

  • Definitions
  • Limited Common Elements
  • Statutes

Question

Can the HOA Board make rules regarding the use of common elements without a vote of the owners?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the exclusive right to manage and regulate common elements.

Detailed Answer

The CC&Rs in this case provided the Board with the exclusive power to establish rules governing the use and maintenance of common elements.

Alj Quote

The Board shall have the exclusive right and power to establish and impose rules and regulations governing the use, maintenance and development of all and any part of the Common Elements…

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4

Topic Tags

  • Board Authority
  • Rules and Regulations
  • Common Elements

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120009-REL
Case Title
John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association
Decision Date
2020-12-17
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John D. Klemmer (petitioner)
    represented himself

Respondent Side

  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Alex Gomez (board member)
    Caribbean Board
    testified at hearing
  • Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120012-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-13
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony & Karen Negrete Counsel —
Respondent Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Quinten Cupps, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.

Why this result: The key statute relied upon by Petitioners was deemed inapplicable to the construction of a shed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide opportunity to participate in design approval meeting for replacement shed

Petitioners alleged they were not given the opportunity to participate in a final design approval meeting for building a replacement shed on their property, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Orders: Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Design Review, Shed, Architectural Approval, Motion to Dismiss, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:33 (131.7 KB)

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:17 (131.7 KB)

This administrative hearing, held on November 2, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn, addressed a dispute between homeowners Anthony & Karen Negrete (Petitioners) and Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association (Sundance or Respondent).

Key Facts and Procedural Background:

Petitioners, long-time residents of Sundance, removed an existing shed (approved in 2005) due to deterioration from rodents and bees, and constructed a replacement shed in a new location on their property, intending to build a pool where the old shed stood. Petitioners did not initially seek approval for the replacement or the new location, believing it was unnecessary since a shed had been previously approved.

Sundance issued violation notices in March and April 2020, asserting the new shed was built without approval from the Architectural Committee. After applying for retroactive approval in June 2020, Sundance denied the application in July 2020, stating the new shed violated Design Guidelines regarding height, materials, and placement against a shared wall, and arguing the original approved shed could not be moved.

Main Issues and Arguments:

Petitioners filed a petition alleging Sundance violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b). The specific issue Petitioners raised at the hearing was that they were not given the opportunity to participate in a design approval meeting pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Sundance denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the Petition.

The Design Guidelines require prior written approval from the Design Review Committee for any improvement, alteration, or change in the exterior appearance of structures. A.R.S. § 33-1803 governs the HOA's authority regarding enforcement and fines.

Legal Points and Outcome:

Petitioners had the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The crucial legal point centered on the applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates that the association must hold a final design approval meeting allowing the member to attend.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) applies only to the "new construction of the main residential structure on a lot or for rebuilds of the main residential structure on a lot". Since the dispute involved a replacement shed—not the main residential structure—this statutory mandate for a meeting did not apply.

The ALJ concluded that Petitioners failed to establish a violation by Sundance of either A.R.S. § 33-1803 or A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Consequently, the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was granted, and Petitioners’ Petition was dismissed. Petitioners were ordered to bear their $500.00 filing fee.

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Negrete (petitioner)
  • Karen Negrete (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Quinten Cupps (HOA attorney)
    Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel —
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Vacating Hearing after the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew his request for rehearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Request for Rehearing Withdrawal

Petitioner requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision. When informed that a rehearing could only address matters occurring prior to the initial petition filing, Petitioner chose to withdraw the request for rehearing and stated intent to file a new petition challenging Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

Orders: The hearing in this matter is vacated from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: dismissed

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Rehearing, Withdrawal, Vacated Hearing, Procedural
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020063-REL Decision – 864308.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:03 (52.9 KB)

20F-H2020063-REL Decision – 864361.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:15 (8.2 KB)

20F-H2020063-REL Decision – 840677.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:22 (125.3 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the key details and resolution of case number 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG, involving Petitioner Marc Archer and Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. On March 16, 2021, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued an order vacating a scheduled rehearing. The core issue was procedural: the Petitioner’s request for rehearing was based on actions the Respondent took after the initial hearing’s decision, which falls outside the permissible scope of a rehearing. Upon being informed of this limitation, the Petitioner withdrew his request. He indicated his intent to file a new, separate petition to address the Respondent’s denial of his submission to build a house addition. The judge’s order is binding, with any appeal required to be filed in superior court within 35 days.

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Case Overview

I. Case Identification

Detail

Information

Case Name

Marc Archer, Petitioner, vs PMPE Community Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2020063-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Presiding Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Date of Order

March 16, 2021

II. Parties Involved

Name & Affiliation

Contact Information

Petitioner

Marc D. Archer

[email protected]

Respondent

PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Not provided

Respondent’s Counsel

Nicholas Nogami, Esq., Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP

[email protected]
[email protected]

Analysis of Proceedings

A. Basis for the Rehearing and Procedural Issue

The scheduled hearing was a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, Marc Archer. The basis for his request centered on events that transpired after the conclusion of the initial hearing.

• Petitioner’s Grounds for Rehearing: The request was explicitly based on “actions taken by Respondent after the decision in the initial hearing had been issued.”

• Jurisdictional Limitation: The Petitioner was informed at the hearing that the scope of a rehearing is limited to matters that occurred before the original petition was filed. The document states: “When Petitioner was informed that the only issues that could be addressed in a rehearing on his petition were those matters that occurred prior to his petition being filed…”

• Subject of New Dispute: The specific post-decision action Archer sought to challenge was the “Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.”

B. Resolution and Outcome

Faced with the procedural limitations of a rehearing, the Petitioner altered his legal strategy, leading to the cancellation of the proceeding.

• Withdrawal of Request: The Petitioner “concluded that he wished to withdraw his request for a rehearing at that time.”

• Stated Intention: Archer “indicated that he would file a new petition to challenge Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.”

• Final Order: The judge issued a formal order vacating the hearing.

Legal Standing and Appeal Process

The order issued on March 16, 2021, carries legal weight and outlines specific requirements for any subsequent appeal.

• Binding Nature of the Order: The order is binding on the parties involved, as stipulated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 32-2199.02(B).

• Appeal Requirements: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review.

◦ Venue: The appeal must be filed with the superior court.

◦ Deadline: The filing must occur within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

• Governing Statutes: The appeal process is prescribed by the following state statutes:

◦ A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)

◦ A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

◦ Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6 of the Arizona Revised Statutes

Document Distribution

Copies of the “Order Vacating Hearing” were officially distributed via mail, email, or fax on March 16, 2021, to the following parties:

• Arizona Department of Real Estate:

◦ Judy Lowe, Commissioner

◦ Additional recipients at the department ([email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected])

• Petitioner:

◦ Marc D. Archer

• Respondent’s Counsel:

◦ Nicholas Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the provided legal document.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in case No. 20F-H2020063-REL-RHG and state their respective roles.

2. What was the specific legal action taken by the Office of Administrative Hearings on March 16, 2021, and who was the presiding judge?

3. What was the original reason Marc Archer requested a rehearing?

4. Why was the Petitioner informed that his reason for a rehearing was invalid for the current proceedings?

5. What was the Petitioner’s final decision regarding his request for a rehearing, and what was the outcome for the scheduled hearing?

6. What future action did Marc Archer state he intended to take after withdrawing his request?

7. According to the document’s notice, what is the legal standing of the “Order Vacating Hearing” on the parties involved?

8. Describe the process and timeline an involved party must follow to appeal this order.

9. Who legally represented the Respondent, PMPE Community Association, Inc., in this matter?

10. To what primary state agency and specific official was a copy of this order distributed?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Marc Archer, who served as the Petitioner, and the PMPE Community Association, Inc., which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the petition, and the Respondent is the party against whom the petition was filed.

2. On March 16, 2021, an “Order Vacating Hearing” was issued, removing the matter from the calendar of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The presiding judge who signed the order was Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

3. Marc Archer’s basis for requesting a rehearing was to address actions that the Respondent, PMPE Community Association, Inc., had taken after the decision in the initial hearing had already been issued.

4. The Petitioner was informed that his basis was invalid because a rehearing can only address matters that occurred prior to the filing of his original petition. The new actions he wished to contest would require a new, separate petition.

5. After being informed about the limitations of a rehearing, the Petitioner concluded that he wished to withdraw his request. As a result, the judge ordered that the hearing be vacated from the Office of Administrative Hearings’ calendar.

6. After withdrawing his request, Marc Archer indicated that he would file a new petition. This new petition would specifically challenge the Respondent’s denial of his submission to build an addition to his house.

7. The order is legally binding on the parties, as stated in the notice section referencing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 32-2199.02(B). This means both the Petitioner and the Respondent must legally comply with the order.

8. To appeal the order, a party must seek judicial review in the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H), title 12, chapter 7, article 6, and A.R.S. § 12-904(A).

9. The Respondent was represented by Nicholas Nogami, Esq. of the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP.

10. A copy of the order was mailed or e-mailed to Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Copies were also sent to several other email addresses associated with that department.

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Essay Questions

Develop a detailed essay answer for each of the following prompts, using only information found within the source document to support your analysis.

1. Analyze the procedural error made by the Petitioner that led to the hearing being vacated. Explain the critical distinction between the scope of a “rehearing” and a “new petition” as implied by the events in the order.

2. Based on the provided document, reconstruct the timeline of events. Begin with the implied initial hearing, describe the basis for the requested rehearing, detail the procedural clarification provided to the Petitioner, and outline the subsequent actions taken by both the Petitioner and the Administrative Law Judge.

3. Discuss the legal framework governing appeals for this type of administrative order. Cite the specific Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) mentioned in the document and explain the jurisdiction, requirements, and timeline for seeking judicial review.

4. Evaluate the communication process documented in the order. Identify all named recipients of the order, their titles or affiliations, and hypothesize why each party or entity would need to be formally notified of this decision.

5. Examine the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge and the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific dispute. How does the order demonstrate the limits of their jurisdiction and the procedural rules they enforce?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and has the authority to issue legally binding orders.

Appeal

The process by which a party requests that a higher court (in this case, the superior court) review the decision of a lower body (the Office of Administrative Hearings).

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The document references A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B), § 41-1092.08(H), and § 12-904(A) to establish the legal basis for the order’s finality and the appeal process.

Judicial Review

A type of court proceeding in which a judge reviews the lawfulness of a decision or action made by a public body, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that conducts hearings for other state agencies, providing a neutral forum for disputes. In this case, it presided over the matter between Marc Archer and the PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Order Vacating Hearing

A formal directive from a judge that cancels a previously scheduled hearing and removes it from the court’s or agency’s calendar.

Petition

A formal written request submitted to a court or administrative body, initiating a legal case or making a specific application.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition with a court or administrative body. In this case, Marc Archer.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider issues that were part of the original petition. As clarified in the order, it cannot be used to address new matters that arose after the initial decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to it. In this case, PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Superior Court

A state-level trial court of general jurisdiction. The document specifies that any appeal of the administrative order must be filed with the superior court.

Select all sources
864308.pdf
864361.pdf

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20F-H2020063-REL

2 sources

The provided sources are two copies of an Order Vacating Hearing issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings in the matter of Marc Archer vs PMPE Community Association, Inc. The order, signed by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on March 16, 2021, indicates that Petitioner Marc Archer requested a rehearing based on actions taken by the Respondent after the initial decision was issued. Because the rehearing was limited to matters that occurred before the original petition was filed, Mr. Archer chose to withdraw his request for a rehearing and announced his intention to file a new petition to challenge the community association’s denial of his proposal to build a house addition. Consequently, the hearing was vacated from the administrative calendar, and the order includes a notice regarding the process for judicial review if a party wished to appeal.

2 sources

Why did Marc Archer withdraw his request for a rehearing on case 20F-H2020063-REL?
What were the specific procedural limitations governing the scope of the administrative rehearing?
How does this order relate to the Petitioner’s future challenge regarding his house addition?

Audio Overview

Video Overview

Video Overview

Mind Map Mind Map

Reports Reports

Flashcards

Flashcards

Quiz

Quiz

00:00 / 00:00

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marc Archer (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Homeowner and member of PMPE

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen
    Represented Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc.
  • Keith Kauffman (board member)
    PMPE Community Association, Inc.
    President, Treasurer, and AC member; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presided over the main hearing and issued the order vacating rehearing
  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Ruled in a prior related evidentiary hearing
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressee for transmission of orders
  • DGardner (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order via email
  • f. del sol (Staff)
    Signed transmittal of ALJ decision
  • c. serrano (Staff)
    Signed transmittal of Order Vacating Hearing
  • LDettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order via email
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order via email
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order via email
  • ncano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order via email

Other Participants

  • Carlotta L Turman (unknown)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen
    Listed in transmission details associated with PMPE counsel

Lori & James Jordan v. The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners’

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-01
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated the CC&Rs regarding sewer maintenance or deductible apportionment, finding that the Association properly applied its 2012 Rules and Regulations.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lori & James Jordan Counsel —
Respondent The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 3.04, 3.07 & 3.09; 2012 Rules and Regulations Section 19

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated the CC&Rs regarding sewer maintenance or deductible apportionment, finding that the Association properly applied its 2012 Rules and Regulations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs in apportioning a proportionate share of the insurance deductible.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over apportionment of insurance deductible following sewer backup damage in a common area.

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to apportion 43.84% ($10,958.96) of the insurance deductible to her unit following damage caused by a main sewer line blockage in a common area.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • Title 33, Chapter 9 of the Arizona Revised Statutes
  • CC&Rs Sections 3.04, 3.07, 3.09
  • 2012 Rules and Regulations Section 19

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Deductible Apportionment, Sewer Maintenance, Common Area, Condominium Documents, Rules and Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • Title 33, Chapter 9 of the Arizona Revised Statutes

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120014-REL Decision – 840033.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:25 (138.3 KB)

This summary details the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Lori & James Jordan vs. The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc.. The hearing was held on November 23, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone.

Key Facts and Main Issue

The Petitioner, Lori Jordan, is a property owner and member of The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association (“Association”). The dispute centered on damage caused to her unit (Unit 1006) around October 2018 due to a sewer backup in the main sewer line, which was allegedly caused by tree root growth in a common area.

The core issue was whether the Association violated its Community Documents—specifically CC&Rs Sections 3.04, 3.07, and 3.09—by apportioning a share of the insurance deductible to the Petitioner. Petitioner's unit was apportioned 43.84% of the deductible, totaling $10,958.96.

Key Arguments and Proceedings

  1. Petitioner's Argument: Petitioner Lori Jordan and witness Chuck Stewart argued that the sewer line blockage occurred in the common area, and because the CC&Rs (Section 3.09) made the Association responsible for the maintenance and repair of the "sewer collection system within the Property," the Association should bear the full insurance deductible.
  2. Respondent's Argument: Sean Lissarrague, Vice President of the Board, testified that the Board fulfilled its obligations under the CC&Rs by paying for the line repairs. He argued that the apportionment of the deductible was proper based on Section 19 of the 2012 Rules and Regulations. Section 19(b) and (c) grant the Board the authority to apportion the deductible when damage occurs to more than one unit and the common areas. The Association also stated that unit owners are responsible for maintaining proper gap insurance coverage.

Legal Points and Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the matter was within the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

The ALJ made the following crucial findings:

  • No CC&R Violation: Although CC&R Section 3.09 mandates the Association to maintain and repair the sewer collection system, the Association did coordinate and accomplish these repairs. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Association neglected its duty regarding maintenance or repair.
  • Deductible Allocation Upheld: The ALJ recognized that the Petitioner was primarily challenging Section 19 of the 2012 Rules and Regulations. The scenario involved damage to two units and the common area, and the Association properly applied Section 19(b) and (c) of the Rules in apportioning the deductible.

Final Decision: Based on the evidence, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated the CC&Rs by apportioning a share of the insurance deductible. The Petitioner’s petition was therefore denied. This decision is binding unless a rehearing is granted.

Questions

Question

Can the HOA require a homeowner to pay a portion of the association's insurance deductible for damage caused by a common element failure?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community Rules and Regulations authorize the Board to apportion the deductible based on repair costs.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that the Association's Board had the authority to adopt rules regarding insurance deductibles. Specifically, the rules allowed the Board to apportion the deductible among unit owners and the association based on the proportion of repair costs when damage affects multiple units and common areas, even if the damage originated from a common element like a sewer line.

Alj Quote

Sections 19(b) and (c) appears to have anticipated the present scenario. There was damaged caused to two units and the common area, and Petitioner was apportioned 43.84% of the deductible. From the evidence presented, the Association also properly applied the applicable Rules and Regulations.

Legal Basis

Rules and Regulations Section 19

Topic Tags

  • insurance
  • deductible
  • assessments
  • common elements

Question

Who is responsible for ensuring insurance coverage for the 'gap' created by an HOA's insurance deductible?

Short Answer

The homeowner is responsible for obtaining personal insurance to cover the gap.

Detailed Answer

The decision highlights that governing documents or rules may explicitly state that owners must be aware of the deductible amount and secure their own coverage to handle that cost if assessed.

Alj Quote

Each Owner needs to be aware of the amount of the Association’s insurance deductible so that the Owner can determine that their personal insurance coverage will cover any gap.

Legal Basis

Rules and Regulations Section 19(e)

Topic Tags

  • insurance
  • homeowner responsibilities

Question

If the HOA fixes a maintenance issue after it occurs (like a sewer backup), can I still claim they violated their maintenance duty to avoid paying the deductible?

Short Answer

Likely no, as long as the HOA coordinated and accomplished the repairs.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the Association coordinated and completed the repairs once the issue occurred, the homeowner failed to prove that the Association neglected its maintenance duties under the CC&Rs. Therefore, the assessment of the deductible was not invalidated by a failure to maintain.

Alj Quote

Once the sewer backed up, the Association coordinated the repairs and accomplished the same. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Association failed to properly attend to the maintenance and/or repair of the sewer lines.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 3.09

Topic Tags

  • maintenance
  • repairs
  • negligence

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the claim must be shown to be more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

Standard of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal procedure
  • evidence
  • burden of proof

Question

Can the HOA Board create rules that change how financial liabilities (like deductibles) are handled without amending the CC&Rs?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to adopt rules for the regulation of the property.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the enforcement of a rule regarding insurance deductibles found in the 'Rules and Regulations,' noting that the CC&Rs granted the authority to adopt such rules.

Alj Quote

Section 4.10 of the CC&Rs granted authority to adopt rules 'for the regulation and operation of the Property…'

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 4.10

Topic Tags

  • rulemaking
  • board authority
  • governing documents

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120014-REL
Case Title
Lori & James Jordan vs. The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2020-12-01
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA require a homeowner to pay a portion of the association's insurance deductible for damage caused by a common element failure?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community Rules and Regulations authorize the Board to apportion the deductible based on repair costs.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that the Association's Board had the authority to adopt rules regarding insurance deductibles. Specifically, the rules allowed the Board to apportion the deductible among unit owners and the association based on the proportion of repair costs when damage affects multiple units and common areas, even if the damage originated from a common element like a sewer line.

Alj Quote

Sections 19(b) and (c) appears to have anticipated the present scenario. There was damaged caused to two units and the common area, and Petitioner was apportioned 43.84% of the deductible. From the evidence presented, the Association also properly applied the applicable Rules and Regulations.

Legal Basis

Rules and Regulations Section 19

Topic Tags

  • insurance
  • deductible
  • assessments
  • common elements

Question

Who is responsible for ensuring insurance coverage for the 'gap' created by an HOA's insurance deductible?

Short Answer

The homeowner is responsible for obtaining personal insurance to cover the gap.

Detailed Answer

The decision highlights that governing documents or rules may explicitly state that owners must be aware of the deductible amount and secure their own coverage to handle that cost if assessed.

Alj Quote

Each Owner needs to be aware of the amount of the Association’s insurance deductible so that the Owner can determine that their personal insurance coverage will cover any gap.

Legal Basis

Rules and Regulations Section 19(e)

Topic Tags

  • insurance
  • homeowner responsibilities

Question

If the HOA fixes a maintenance issue after it occurs (like a sewer backup), can I still claim they violated their maintenance duty to avoid paying the deductible?

Short Answer

Likely no, as long as the HOA coordinated and accomplished the repairs.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the Association coordinated and completed the repairs once the issue occurred, the homeowner failed to prove that the Association neglected its maintenance duties under the CC&Rs. Therefore, the assessment of the deductible was not invalidated by a failure to maintain.

Alj Quote

Once the sewer backed up, the Association coordinated the repairs and accomplished the same. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Association failed to properly attend to the maintenance and/or repair of the sewer lines.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 3.09

Topic Tags

  • maintenance
  • repairs
  • negligence

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the claim must be shown to be more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the CC&Rs… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

Standard of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal procedure
  • evidence
  • burden of proof

Question

Can the HOA Board create rules that change how financial liabilities (like deductibles) are handled without amending the CC&Rs?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to adopt rules for the regulation of the property.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the enforcement of a rule regarding insurance deductibles found in the 'Rules and Regulations,' noting that the CC&Rs granted the authority to adopt such rules.

Alj Quote

Section 4.10 of the CC&Rs granted authority to adopt rules 'for the regulation and operation of the Property…'

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 4.10

Topic Tags

  • rulemaking
  • board authority
  • governing documents

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120014-REL
Case Title
Lori & James Jordan vs. The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2020-12-01
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lori Jordan (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified at the hearing
  • James Jordan (petitioner)
  • Chuck Stewart (witness)
    The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc. Board
    Testified for Petitioner; later joined Board and voted against apportionment

Respondent Side

  • Sean Lissarrague (board member)
    The Pines at Show Low Condominium Owners' Association, Inc.
    Vice President of the Board; appeared and testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received electronic transmission of the decision

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (administrative staff)
    Transmitted the electronic decision

Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sheila

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-27
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association Counsel John Halk, Esq.
Respondent Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust Counsel Mary T. Hone, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized 2nd story addition

Respondents constructed a second-story Addition to their property without first obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee, violating the community governing documents.

Orders: Respondents’ appeal is dismissed, and Foothills is deemed the prevailing party with regard to its Petition.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural review, cc&r violation, unapproved construction, second story addition, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:53:36 (135.4 KB)

21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:43 (135.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust (No. 21F-H2120004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core dispute involved the construction of a second-story addition by homeowners (Respondents) without the prior approval of the Homeowners Association (Petitioner), a direct violation of the community’s governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Foothills Club West HOA. The evidence demonstrated that the Respondents not only began construction without seeking approval but continued the project even after receiving a formal denial from the HOA’s Architectural Committee. A subsequent agreement between the parties, wherein the Respondents would demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines, was not honored by the Respondents. The ALJ dismissed the Respondents’ appeal and declared the HOA the prevailing party, validating its authority to enforce the community’s architectural standards as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust, Respondent.

• Case Number: 21F-H2120004-REL

• Jurisdiction: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn

• Hearing Date: October 5, 2020

• Decision Date: November 27, 2020

• Central Issue: The petition filed by Foothills HOA on July 24, 2020, alleged that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. This action was alleged to be in violation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.

II. Chronology of Key Events

The hearing record established the following undisputed sequence of events:

Oct. 2018

Respondents begin construction of the second-story addition.

Nov. 7, 2018

The City of Phoenix issues a stop-work order, noting a permit is required.

Nov. 7, 2018

Foothills HOA issues a violation notice to the Respondents.

Dec. 17, 2018

Respondents obtain a permit from the City of Phoenix.

Jan. 18, 2019 (approx.)

Respondents submit a request for approval to the Foothills Architectural Committee.

Jan. 18, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a penalty notice to the Respondents, with further notices issued monthly.

Feb. 22, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a formal denial of the application.

Mar. 15, 2019

The City of Phoenix gives final approval to the construction and issues a Certificate of Occupancy.

Post Feb. 2019

The parties reach an agreement for Respondents to demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines.

July 24, 2020

Foothills HOA files its petition, noting Respondents have not complied with the demolition agreement.

Oct. 5, 2020

The administrative hearing is held.

Nov. 27, 2020

The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner: Foothills Club West HOA

• Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA argued that the Respondents violated CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 by commencing construction without first obtaining approval from the Architectural Committee.

• Disregard for Denial: The HOA asserted that the Respondents completed the addition after receiving a formal denial of their application.

• Breach of Agreement: The HOA noted that the parties had reached a settlement agreement for demolition, which the Respondents failed to honor. The HOA requested that the Tribunal enforce this agreement.

• Jurisdictional Distinction: The HOA maintained that approval from the City of Phoenix was a separate matter and did not negate the requirement to obtain approval from the HOA as mandated by the governing documents.

B. Respondents: Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

• Initial Ignorance: Respondents claimed they were initially unaware of the HOA approval requirements.

• Attempted Compliance: They argued that once notified, they followed the association’s guidance, met with the Board, and sought approval.

• Vague Denial: Respondents stated they did not understand the meaning of the denial reason, “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community,” or how the addition specifically violated community rules.

• Lack of Due Process: They argued they did not receive a letter indicating an appeal process was available and therefore felt they had not received a final “denial.”

• Demolition Delay: While not disputing the existence of the demolition agreement, Respondents cited COVID-19 issues and safety concerns for their at-risk family as reasons for requesting more time.

• Final Appeal: At the hearing, Respondents reversed their position on the agreement and requested to be allowed to keep the addition.

IV. Analysis of Governing Documents

The decision centered on specific provisions within the Foothills Club West governing documents, which constitute the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 (Architectural Approval): This section was central to the case. It states in pertinent part:

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4 (Obligation to Obtain Approval): This provision explicitly sets forth a homeowner’s obligation to secure approval from the Architectural Committee.

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 (Exterior Appearance): This section clarifies that while the HOA cannot limit interior remodeling, it retains jurisdiction over any changes that are “visible from outside such [home] … or affects the exterior appearance of such [home].”

• Amended Architectural Guidelines (2013): These guidelines reinforce the CC&Rs, specifying that a homeowner’s plans must be submitted for approval through the Architectural Committee on a case-by-case basis.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions of law provided a clear framework for the final order.

A. Burden of Proof

The ALJ established that in this proceeding, the petitioner (Foothills HOA) bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondents had violated the governing documents. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

B. Core Conclusion on Violations

The ALJ found that the HOA had successfully met its burden of proof. The central conclusion of law states:

“The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Foothills has demonstrated Respondents’ violation of the community governing documents, as stated in CC&R Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, because Respondents began to construct a modification, the Addition, to their existing home prior to obtaining approval from Foothills Architectural Committee and, further, Respondents continued to construct the Addition despite receiving a denial of approval from Foothills Architectural Committee.”

This finding affirmed that the Respondents committed two distinct violations: starting work without approval and continuing work after being explicitly denied approval.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ issued a decisive order.

• Order:

• Binding Nature: The decision notes that the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is requested. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 21F-H2120004-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What was the single issue raised in the petition filed by Foothills Club West Homeowners Association?

3. According to the Petition, which specific articles and sections of the governing documents did the Respondents allegedly violate?

4. What action did the City of Phoenix take on November 7, 2018, regarding the Respondents’ construction project?

5. What reasons did the Foothills Architectural Committee provide for denying the Respondents’ application on February 22, 2019?

6. Prior to the hearing, what agreement did the parties reach in an attempt to resolve the dispute?

7. What was the Respondents’ primary argument for their actions and for their failure to comply with the association’s denial?

8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

9. Explain the difference between the City of Phoenix’s approval and the Foothills Architectural Committee’s approval, as argued by the Petitioner.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association (“Foothills”). The Respondent is the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust. Their relationship is that of a homeowners’ association and a member homeowner residing within the planned community for 22 years.

2. The single issue raised was that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. The construction was completed even after the Foothills Architectural Committee had issued a denial of the project.

3. Foothills alleged that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. These articles pertain to the rights and obligations of the association and the architectural standards requiring prior approval for modifications.

4. On November 7, 2018, the City of Phoenix issued a stop-work order for the Respondents’ construction project. The order noted that the work being performed required a permit, which had not yet been obtained.

5. The Foothills Architectural Committee denied the application because it needed copies of the City permit, the plans were incomplete, and there was no documentation on the roof line or roofing materials. Furthermore, the denial stated that the project “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community.”

6. The parties came to an agreement wherein the Respondents would complete the demolition of the second-story addition. In exchange, Foothills agreed to waive the penalties that had been imposed on the Respondents for the violation.

7. The Respondents argued that they initially did not know what was required and that they cooperated with the association’s Board once notified. They claimed they did not understand what “Fails aesthetics” meant, did not receive a letter about an appeal process, and therefore did not feel they had received a final “denial.”

8. The legal standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Foothills, bore the burden of proving the Respondents’ violation by this standard.

9. Foothills argued that approval from the City of Phoenix and approval from the association’s Architectural Committee were two different and separate matters. Even though the Respondents eventually received a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy, this did not override the CC&R requirement to first obtain approval from Foothills.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Respondents’ appeal be dismissed. The Judge deemed Foothills the prevailing party with regard to its petition, finding that Foothills had demonstrated the Respondents’ violation of the community’s governing documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing evidence and support directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner (Foothills) and the Respondents at the hearing. Discuss the key evidence and claims each party used to support their position and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s case more persuasive.

2. Explain the distinct roles and jurisdictions of the Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee and the City of Phoenix regarding the Respondents’ construction project. Why was obtaining a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy insufficient for the Respondents to proceed without violating the community’s governing documents?

3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 21F-H2120004-REL, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Discuss key filings, motions, and deadlines mentioned in the document, including the Respondents’ attempt to consolidate another case.

4. Discuss the significance of the “contract” between the parties, as defined in footnote 15. How do the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines function as this contract, and which specific sections were central to the judge’s conclusion that a violation occurred?

5. Evaluate the Respondents’ attempt to justify their failure to demolish the addition as per their agreement with Foothills, citing COVID-19 issues. How did their request at the hearing to keep the addition conflict with their prior agreement, and what does this reveal about their position in the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions.

Architectural Committee

A committee appointed by the Foothills HOA, as established by CC&R Article 9, with the authority to review, approve, or disapprove plans for construction, modifications, and additions to properties within the community.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that form a binding contract between the homeowners association and the property owners, outlining their rights and obligations.

Disclosure

The formal process by which parties in a legal case provide evidence, exhibits, and information to each other before a hearing. The deadline for disclosure in this case was September 29, 2020.

Governing Documents

The set of rules for the planned community, including the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines, which have the same force and effect as association rules.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to initiate a hearing concerning violations of community governing documents. In this case, it was a “single-issue petition.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust.

Tribunal

The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, the state agency authorized by statute to hear and decide contested matters referred to it, such as this dispute.

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21F-H2120004-REL

1 source

This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association and the Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust. The Petitioner, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, filed a petition alleging that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized second-story addition to their property in violation of the association’s governing documents, specifically the CC&Rs Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Respondents violated these community documents by beginning construction prior to obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee and continuing the work despite receiving a denial. The judge ultimately concluded that Foothills was the prevailing party and dismissed the Respondents’ appeal, effectively upholding the violation finding.

1 source

What are the specific governing document violations alleged and proven against the homeowners?
How did the legal and administrative process address the unauthorized construction dispute?
What was the final resolution ordered regarding the unapproved second-story home addition?

Based on 1 source

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Halk (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Represented Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association
  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Counsel for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Mary T. Hone (Respondent attorney)
    Mary T. Hone, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Trustees Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar
  • Subrahmanyam Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
  • Sheila Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • AHansen (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • djones (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • DGardner (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • ncano (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order

Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges vs.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges Counsel Lance Leslie
Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. Counsel Michael S. Shupe

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article VI(D)

Outcome Summary

Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.

Key Issues & Findings

View Obstruction by Pergola Approval

Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.

Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R Violation, View Obstruction, Architectural Review Committee, Filing Fee Refund, Civil Penalty Denial
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:42 (90.6 KB)

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:50 (90.6 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.

The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.

Case Number

21F-H2120005-REL

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

November 3, 2020

Decision Date

November 20, 2020

Core Allegation

Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

Petitioners’ Property

Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”

Disputed Structure

A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.

The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.

Chronology of Key Events

The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.

• February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.

• On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.

• December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.

• January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.

• July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.

• August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.

• October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.

• November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)

• Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).

• Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.

Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)

• Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:

1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.

2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.

• Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.

1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.

2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.

Findings on the Violation

• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.

• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.

Prevailing Party Status

• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.

• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.

Financial Orders and Penalties

• Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.

• Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.

Legal Framework

• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.

• Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.

Final Order

The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.

The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?

4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?

5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?

6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?

7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?

8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?

10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.

2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.

4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.

5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.

6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.

8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.

9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”

10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?

2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.

3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?

5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.

Filing Fee

The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

View Lot

A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.

View Obstructions

The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.

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21F-H2120005-REL

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This administrative law judge decision details a dispute between Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges and Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. regarding a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioners alleged that a pergola approved by the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee was a view obstruction in violation of Article VI(D) of the CC&Rs. Although the Respondent acknowledged its error and rescinded the approval for the pergola before the hearing, the matter was not dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party and ordered the Respondent to pay the petitioners’ $500 filing fee, though no additional civil penalty was assessed.

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What are the core legal and procedural issues decided in this administrative hearing?
How did the Respondent’s actions impact the Petitioners’ prevailing party status and remedy?
What is the significance of the CC&Rs and view obstruction clause in this dispute?

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donald S Fern (petitioner)
  • Judith A. Hedges (petitioner)
  • Lance Leslie (petitioner attorney)
    Law Office of Susan A Siwek

Respondent Side

  • Michael S. Shupe (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel —
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The petition was affirmed in part (Complaint #1) and denied in part (Complaint #2). The Respondent HOA was found to have improperly conducted non-privileged business via email/unanimous written consent in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fee and comply with the statute, but no civil penalty was imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged violation concerning the improper use of emergency executive sessions (Complaint #2).

Key Issues & Findings

Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session

The HOA improperly conducted association business, which should have been open to members, through unanimous written consent solicited via individual emails during the COVID-19 shutdown, violating the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward and to reimburse Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Unanimous Written Consent, COVID-19, Executive Session
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821
  • A.R.S. 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 864802.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:46 (101.9 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

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21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:04 (125.4 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by conducting association business and making decisions without open meetings accessible to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner on her primary complaint. The investigation and subsequent hearings revealed that the HOA Board, citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, utilized a process of “unanimous written consent” to approve numerous actions. This process, facilitated through individual emails to board members, was found to be an improper substitute for the open meetings required by law. The ALJ concluded that the specific transparency requirements for homeowners’ associations in A.R.S. § 33-1804 supersede the more general provisions for non-profit corporations in A.R.S. § 10-3821, which the HOA had cited as justification.

While the violation was established, no civil penalty was assessed due to the “unprecedented global pandemic.” The HOA was ordered to comply with the open meeting law moving forward and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. A second complaint from the petitioner, alleging the improper use of emergency executive sessions, was not proven and was therefore denied. A rehearing clarified the precise method of the violation—email voting rather than conference calls—but did not alter the final judgment.

Case Background and Allegations

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed on July 10, 2020. The case centered on the actions of the Solera Chandler HOA’s Board of Directors between March and August 2020.

• Petitioner: Debra K. Morin

• Respondent: Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

• Case Number: 21F-H2120001-REL

• Key Dates:

◦ Initial Hearing: October 29, 2020

◦ Initial Decision: November 18, 2020

◦ Rehearing: February 25, 2021

◦ Final Decision After Rehearing: March 17, 2021

Petitioner’s Formal Complaints

After being ordered to clarify her initial filing, the petitioner proceeded with two specific alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1804:

1. Complaint #1: Non-Privileged Business in Closed Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions by using unanimous written consent. This practice circumvented statutory requirements for providing members with agendas, giving 48-hour notice, and allowing them an opportunity to speak on key issues before the Board took action.

2. Complaint #2: Improper Emergency Executive Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions.” This was done without properly identifying the legal exception to the open meeting law, providing an agenda or 48-hour notice, or submitting minutes at the next board meeting that stated the reason for the emergency.

Key Evidence and Factual Findings

The evidence presented centered on the HOA’s governance practices during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Respondent’s Justification

The HOA’s defense rested on two main arguments:

• The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible for the Board to meet in person, necessitating alternative methods to conduct business while protecting the health of directors and members.

• The use of unanimous written consents was authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute that permits non-profit corporations to take action without a formal meeting if all directors consent in writing. The HOA acknowledged it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.

Unanimous Written Consents

At an open Board of Directors meeting on August 5, 2020, the Board formally ratified a series of actions taken via unanimous written consent during the “Covid 19 Shutdown.” A rehearing clarified the precise mechanism: a community management company would email each board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all votes were “yes,” the Board President would sign the written consent on behalf of the Board.

The actions taken through this process included:

Action Taken by Unanimous Written Consent

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of cool decking surrounding both pools.

April 30, 2020

Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

April 30, 2020

Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

May 5, 2020

Approve the Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and the addition of 420 tons of granite.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.

May 27, 2020

Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.

June 4, 2020

Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.

July 1, 2020

Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Executive Sessions

The Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions during this period, including on March 13, March 16, March 19, March 24, April 6, April 10, May 4, May 15, May 27, June 24, and August 5, 2020. An “emergency executive session” was held on May 12, 2020. The agendas for these meetings cited specific legal exceptions under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) as justification for the closure.

Legal Analysis and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation and primacy of two competing Arizona statutes.

The Core Statutory Conflict

• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA Open Meeting Law): This statute establishes a strong state policy that all HOA board and member meetings “be conducted openly.” It mandates that members receive at least 48-hours’ notice, be provided with agendas, and be permitted to “attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The statute explicitly directs that any interpretation of its provisions must be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

• A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting for Non-Profits): This statute, which applies more broadly to non-profit corporations, allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by one or more written consents signed by all directors.

Ruling on Complaint #1 (Violation Established)

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the open meeting law. The core of the ruling is that the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for homeowners’ associations must be followed, even if A.R.S. § 10-3821 provides a different mechanism for general non-profits.

The final decision states: “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.” The use of email voting to achieve unanimous consent was deemed a violation because it denied members the notice, agenda, and opportunity to speak that are guaranteed by the HOA open meeting law.

However, the ALJ gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that “no civil penalty is appropriate given the circumstances.”

Ruling on Complaint #2 (Violation Not Established)

The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board conducted improper emergency executive sessions. The decision notes that there was “nothing in the record” to suggest the Board discussed topics outside the legally permitted exceptions for closed sessions, nor was there evidence to suggest the May 12, 2020, meeting was not a genuine emergency.

Final Order and Disposition

The final judgment, issued after the rehearing, is binding on both parties.

• Outcome: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed in part (regarding Complaint #1) and denied in part (regarding Complaint #2).

• Directives to Respondent (HOA):

1. The HOA is ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

2. The HOA is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• Appeal: Any appeal of the final order must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 21F-H2120001-REL and No. 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and outcomes.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based only on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central accusation in the Petitioner’s first complaint against the Respondent?

3. What two primary justifications did the Respondent provide for its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic?

4. According to the findings of the rehearing, what specific procedure did the Respondent use to obtain “unanimous written consents”?

5. Identify the two main Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that were central to the legal dispute and briefly describe the function of each.

6. What was the final ruling on Complaint #1, and what was the judge’s reasoning?

7. Why did the Petitioner fail to prove the allegations in Complaint #2?

8. What specific factual error in the first Administrative Law Judge Decision prompted the Respondent to request a rehearing?

9. What two orders were issued against the Respondent in the final decision?

10. What specific circumstance did the Administrative Law Judge cite as a reason for not imposing a civil penalty on the Respondent?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state law, while the Respondent defended its actions before an Administrative Law Judge.

2. The Petitioner’s first complaint accused the Solera Homeowners’ Association Board of Directors of conducting non-privileged association business in closed sessions. Specifically, she alleged they used unanimous written consent to take action without providing agendas, giving 48-hour notice, or allowing members an opportunity to speak on key issues.

3. The Respondent argued that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Board of Directors from meeting in person to protect the health of members and directors. The Respondent also asserted that its use of unanimous written consents was legally authorized for non-profit corporations under A.R.S. § 10-3821.

4. The rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members replied “yes,” the item was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document.

5. The central statutes were A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821. A.R.S. § 33-1804 is the state’s open meeting law for homeowners’ associations, requiring meetings to be open to members with proper notice, while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent.

6. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Complaint #1, affirming the violation. The judge reasoned that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, the more specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 mandate that all HOA board meetings be open to members, a requirement the Respondent violated by conducting business via email.

7. The Petitioner failed to prove Complaint #2 because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s executive sessions were improper. The judge found nothing in the record to suggest the Board discussed issues outside the legal exceptions listed in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or that the May 12, 2020, session was not a genuine emergency.

8. The Respondent requested a rehearing to correct a finding in Conclusion of Law 8 of the initial decision, which incorrectly stated that the association business at issue was conducted in closed sessions via “conference calls.” The Respondent acknowledged using conference calls for executive sessions but denied using them for the actions taken by unanimous written consent.

9. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to comply with all requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future.

10. The Administrative Law Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business.” Because of these unique circumstances, the judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Discuss the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821 as it relates to the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this imply about the hierarchy of state laws governing specific entities versus general corporations?

2. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic justified their actions. To what extent did the Administrative Law Judge accept this argument, and how did it influence the final order?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and detail how it was applied to both Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. Why did the Petitioner meet this burden for the first complaint but not the second?

4. Trace the evolution of the case from the initial hearing to the rehearing. What specific finding of fact was corrected, and why was this correction significant for the legal record, even though it did not change the ultimate outcome for either complaint?

5. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), discuss the stated policy of the state of Arizona regarding homeowner association meetings. How did the Respondent’s actions, specifically the use of email for unanimous consents, contravene this policy?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 10-3821

An Arizona Revised Statute that allows the board of directors of a non-profit corporation to take action without a formal meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and evidenced by one or more written consents.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute, also known as the open meeting law for planned communities, which mandates that all meetings of an HOA board of directors must be open to all members. It requires 48-hour notice and allows for closed “executive sessions” only for specific, limited purposes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims.

Executive Session

A portion of a meeting that is closed to association members. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), executive sessions are only permitted for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or addressing confidential personal or financial information.

Open Meeting

A meeting of an HOA’s board of directors that, according to A.R.S. § 33-1804, must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Debra K. Morin.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine specific issues or correct errors from an initial decision. A rehearing was granted in this case to clarify how the unanimous written consents were executed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the statute’s plain language.

Unanimous Written Consent

A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where a board takes action without a meeting through written consents signed by all directors. The HOA used this method via individual emails to approve business, which was found to be a violation of HOA open meeting laws.

She Sued Her HOA Over Secret Pandemic Votes—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

Introduction: The Closed Doors of Your HOA

For many homeowners, it can feel like their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) board makes its most important decisions behind closed doors. You see the results—a new rule, a major repair project, a change in vendors—but the discussion and the vote happen out of sight. While the COVID-19 pandemic forced many organizations to find new ways to operate, for one Arizona HOA, their adaptation to remote work crossed a legal line, sparking a legal challenge from a resident.

The central conflict was straightforward: a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, filed a petition against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. She alleged they were making official decisions in secret through email, violating state law that guarantees homeowners the right to open meetings. While not all of her claims were affirmed, her primary complaint—that the board was conducting business in secret—led to a landmark decision for homeowner rights. The outcome of her case reveals several surprising and crucial lessons for every person living in an HOA community.

Takeaway 1: An HOA’s Open Meeting Law Trumps General Non-Profit Rules

1. Even a Pandemic Doesn’t Suspend a Homeowner’s Right to an Open Meeting

The Solera Chandler HOA board believed it was acting within the law. They argued that because they were a non-profit corporation, they could make decisions using “unanimous written consents” without a formal meeting. This practice is allowed for many non-profits under a general Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821). During the pandemic, this seemed like a practical way to conduct business without meeting in person.

However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the HOA. The judge’s key finding was that a more specific law takes precedence. The statute governing planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804, explicitly requires that all meetings of the board must be open to all members of the association. This is a critical legal lesson: when a specific law exists to govern a specific entity (like the Open Meeting Law for HOAs), it almost always overrides a more general law (like the one for all non-profits).

While the judge acknowledged the challenges of the “unprecedented global pandemic,” this did not excuse the violation, though it was cited as a reason not to issue a civil penalty.

Takeaway 2: “Meeting” by Email Is Still a Secret Meeting

2. A String of Individual Emails Can Constitute an Illegal Meeting

In the initial ruling, the judge found the board conducted business improperly, believing it was done via conference calls. Seizing on this factual error, the HOA challenged the decision and requested a rehearing, arguing their method was different and therefore permissible. In the rehearing, they clarified their actual process: the community management company would email each board member individually to request a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The HOA argued that because there was no simultaneous group discussion, this process wasn’t technically a “meeting.”

The challenge backfired. The judge’s final decision made it clear that this distinction didn’t matter. Whether by conference call or a series of individual emails, the result was the same: an illegal secret meeting. The method effectively prevented homeowners from observing the board’s process and speaking on agenda items before a vote was taken, as required by law. The HOA won their technical correction but lost the war, as the judge affirmed that the principle of transparency is more important than the specific technology used to circumvent it.

These weren’t minor housekeeping issues. The board was making substantial financial and operational decisions entirely out of public view, including:

• Repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

• Repair and replacement of the cool decking around both pools.

• Appointing new members to the Architectural Review Committee.

• Approving a retention basin project and the purchase of 420 tons of granite.

• Approving the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Takeaway 3: The Law Is Built to Favor Transparency

3. The Law Itself Has a Built-in Bias for Openness

The judge’s decision wasn’t just a narrow interpretation; it was guided by a powerful policy statement built directly into the Arizona statute for planned communities. The law itself tells judges, board members, and community managers exactly how it should be interpreted.

The text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) leaves no room for doubt:

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken. Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions…shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

This is a critical point. The law explicitly directs anyone interpreting it—including an HOA board—to resolve any ambiguity in favor of transparency and homeowner access. The default position is openness.

Takeaway 4: A Single Homeowner Can Force a Change

4. One Determined Homeowner Can Win

This case serves as an empowering lesson for homeowners who feel their board is operating in the shadows. Morin’s persistence paid off, proving that a single homeowner can successfully force a board to follow the law.

Her victory was clear and decisive. The court orders resulted in three key outcomes:

• The judge affirmed her petition, officially recognizing that the HOA had violated the law.

• The HOA was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Morin her $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome demonstrates that the system can work. An individual homeowner with a valid complaint can navigate the process and achieve a binding legal victory that forces their HOA board to operate correctly.

Conclusion: Is Your Board Operating in the Open?

The lesson from the Solera Chandler HOA case is simple: transparency in HOA governance is not optional. It is a legal requirement designed to protect the rights of every homeowner to observe and participate in the governance of their community. The convenience of an email vote cannot replace the legal mandate for an open meeting.

Don’t assume your board is operating correctly. Review your meeting minutes. Ask questions about decisions that seem to appear without public discussion. Remember, the law explicitly favors openness, and as Debra Morin proved, it’s an enforceable right.

This case was about secret votes via email, but it highlights a larger principle of transparency. Does your HOA board make it easy for you to know what is being decided and to have your voice heard?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier
  • Joshua M. Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Gail Ryan (board member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    President of Board, resigned August 5, 2020
  • Kirk Sandquist (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Tom Dusbabek (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Ken Eller (contractor)
    Approved to be hired to draft architectural drawings

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Granted Request for Rehearing
  • f. del sol (Admin staff)
    Transmitted decisions

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel —
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 892670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:29 (47.7 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:33 (132.2 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:47 (132.2 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

• Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

• Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

◦ Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

• Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

• Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

• Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

• Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

• Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

• Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

• Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

• Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

• Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.

📔

20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel —
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

• Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

• Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

• On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

• On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

• Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

• Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

Douglas E Kupel v. Hidden Valley Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-10-30
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association's conduct did not violate ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 because the Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records were in existence and subject to disclosure.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Douglas E. Kupel Counsel —
Respondent Hidden Valley Association Counsel Timothy Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association's conduct did not violate ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 because the Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records were in existence and subject to disclosure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the requested records (communications) were in existence and subject to disclosure.

Key Issues & Findings

Failing to fulfill Petitioner’s records request

Petitioner claimed the HOA failed to provide copies of all communications (written/electronic) related to information requests, open meeting law compliance, and changes to bylaws, arguing they were not exempt from disclosure under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B). The HOA asserted no disclosable records existed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition and request for civil penalty are denied. Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Records Disclosure, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 33-1805, Burden of Proof, Preponderance of Evidence
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120006-REL Decision – 834142.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:50 (147.6 KB)

21F-H2120006-REL Decision – 834142.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:55 (147.6 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Kupel vs. Hidden Valley Association

Executive Summary

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings denied a petition filed by homeowner Douglas E. Kupel against the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The core of the dispute was Kupel’s allegation that HVA violated Arizona statute ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill a comprehensive records request. While HVA provided its records retention policy and legal invoices, it withheld two categories of electronic and hard copy communications, claiming no such disclosable records existed.

Kupel argued that statements made in emails by HVA Board President Gary Freed—specifically that certain communications would be “filed as an HVA business record”—proved the existence of the requested records. HVA countered that this statement was a mistake on Freed’s part, resulting from an initial misunderstanding of retention requirements, and that no records subject to disclosure actually existed.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that Kupel failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim. The judge found that the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that the requested records existed and were being improperly withheld. Consequently, the petition was denied, and Kupel’s requests for reimbursement of his filing fee and the imposition of a civil penalty against HVA were also denied.

Case Overview

Case Name

Douglas E Kupel, Petitioner, vs. Hidden Valley Association, Respondent

Case Number

21F-H2120006-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone

Hearing Date

October 22, 2020

Decision Date

October 30, 2020

Key Parties

Douglas E. Kupel (Petitioner), Hidden Valley Association (Respondent), Gary Freed (HVA Board President)

Core Dispute: The Records Request

The central issue of the hearing was whether the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with a records request submitted by Kupel on June 22, 2020. HVA, through its community manager HOAMCO, provided a partial response on July 1, 2020.

Breakdown of the Records Request:

• Request 1 (Fulfilled): A copy of the HVA records retention policy adopted on January 15, 2020.

• Request 2 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding “information requests or open meeting law compliance” from July 2019 to the present.

• Request 3 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding any proposed, discussed, or adopted changes to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.

• Request 4 (Fulfilled): Copies of invoices, billing statements, and payment records for legal services associated with revisions to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.

HVA and its President, Gary Freed, asserted that the denied communications were not subject to disclosure under the exceptions outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B).

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Douglas E. Kupel)

• Allegation: Kupel accused HVA of willfully failing to fulfill his request, alleging that non-exempt records did exist and should have been disclosed.

• Primary Evidence: Kupel submitted several email messages from HVA President Gary Freed which contained the statement: “This communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record in the files maintained by HOAMCO for the benefit of HVA” or substantially similar language.

• Argument: Kupel testified that these emails proved the existence of communications that did not meet the statutory exclusions and, therefore, HVA had failed to fully respond to his request.

• Requested Relief:

1. An order compelling HVA to abide by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

2. Reimbursement of the $500 filing fee.

3. The levying of a civil penalty against HVA.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Hidden Valley Association)

• Witness Testimony: HVA Board President Gary Freed testified on behalf of the association.

• Core Defense: Freed testified that based on HVA’s records retention policy and his understanding of open meeting laws, “no records existed which were subject to disclosure.”

• Explanation of Contested Emails: Freed explained that his prior email statements about filing all communications were a mistake. He testified that he initially believed all communications needed to be retained but later learned this was incorrect.

• Search Process: Freed admitted that neither he nor other board members conducted a one-by-one search of every single email. However, he testified that he “may have scanned his personal e-mail” and did not dismiss the petitioner’s request “out-of-hand.”

• Association Practices: Freed asserted that HVA business was conducted via open meetings, with the exception of a single emergency situation, implying that no discoverable email correspondence regarding official business would exist.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Conclusion

The ALJ’s decision rested on the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as proof convincing the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner, Kupel, bore the burden of meeting this standard.

• Evaluation of Evidence: The judge found Kupel’s primary argument unpersuasive. The decision states, “Essentially, Petitioner is claiming that there must be other records in existence because of the language that Mr. Freed used… This is not persuasive as there was no evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that the records were in existence.”

• Credibility of Testimony: The judge gave weight to Freed’s testimony that he had been mistaken about record-keeping protocols. The decision also noted that HVA’s official records retention policy, adopted six months prior to the request, specifically outlined which communications were to be kept.

• Lack of Proof: The judge concluded that Freed believed any documents that might have existed were subject to statutory exemptions and that all relevant business was conducted in open meetings. Ultimately, Kupel failed to provide sufficient proof that discoverable records actually existed.

• Final Ruling: The ALJ concluded that “the Association’s conduct, as outlined above, did not violate the charged provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Denied

Request for Civil Penalty

Denied

Reimbursement of Filing Fee

Denied (Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s fee)

The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within thirty days of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Kupel v. Hidden Valley Association, No. 21F-H2120006-REL

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision in the matter of Douglas E. Kupel versus the Hidden Valley Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension of the facts, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the specific violation alleged by the Petitioner in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?

3. What four categories of records did the Petitioner request from the Hidden Valley Association (HVA) on June 22, 2020?

4. Which parts of the Petitioner’s records request did the HVA fulfill, and which parts did it deny?

5. What was the Petitioner’s central piece of evidence to argue that the HVA was improperly withholding existing communications?

6. How did HVA Board President Gary Freed explain the discrepancy between his email statements and the association’s refusal to provide the requested communications?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party was required to meet this standard?

8. According to Mr. Freed’s testimony, where was all official HVA business conducted?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the HVA’s conduct in this matter?

10. What three specific outcomes were mandated by the final ORDER issued on October 30, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, a property owner and member of the Hidden Valley Association, and the Respondent, the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The Petitioner brought the complaint against the Respondent, alleging a violation of state law.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill his records request. Specifically, he claimed the association improperly withheld communications records.

3. The Petitioner requested: (1) the records retention policy; (2) communications regarding information requests or open meeting law compliance; (3) communications regarding proposed changes to the association bylaws; and (4) legal invoices and payment records related to bylaw revisions.

4. The HVA fulfilled the request for the records retention policy and the legal invoices. It denied the two requests for communications between board and committee members, claiming the requested records were not subject to disclosure.

5. The Petitioner’s central evidence consisted of several emails from HVA Board President Gary Freed in which Mr. Freed stated, “[t]his communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record.” The Petitioner argued this proved that such communications existed and were official records.

6. Mr. Freed testified that he was initially mistaken in his belief that all communications needed to be retained and that this was why he included that language in his emails. He clarified that based on the HVA’s records retention policy and open meeting laws, no disclosable records of the type requested existed.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring the evidence to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

8. Mr. Freed testified that all HVA business was conducted via open meetings. He stated that there were no meetings conducted solely by email, with the exception of a single emergency situation.

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HVA was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. The judge found the HVA’s conduct did not violate the charged statute.

10. The final ORDER (1) denied the Petitioner’s petition, (2) denied the Petitioner’s request for a civil penalty against the Respondent, and (3) ordered that the Respondent shall not be required to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for in-depth analysis and discussion. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, and the Respondent, Hidden Valley Association. How did each party use the evidence and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 to support their position?

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.

3. Evaluate the testimony of HVA Board President Gary Freed. How did his explanations regarding his email statements and the association’s record-keeping practices influence the judge’s final decision?

4. Examine ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B), which outlines the exceptions for withholding records. Based on the case details, explain why the communications requested by the Petitioner were ultimately deemed non-disclosable or non-existent under this statute.

5. Describe the complete procedural history of the case, from the initial filing of the petition to the final order. Include key dates, entities involved (such as the Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings), and the final remedies sought by the Petitioner versus the actual outcome.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings and makes decisions on behalf of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute that governs the examination and disclosure of a homeowners’ association’s financial and other records by its members. It outlines the process for requests, a ten-business-day fulfillment window, and specific exemptions allowing an association to withhold certain records.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner that allows an administrative law judge to levy a civil penalty against a party found to be in violation of the law.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The official governing documents that establish the rules and obligations for a homeowners’ association and its members.

Department of Real Estate (“Department”)

The Arizona state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving disputes between homeowners and their associations.

Hidden Valley Association (HVA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association for the Hidden Valley Ranch subdivision in Prescott, Arizona, governed by CC&Rs and a Board of Directors.

HOAMCO

The company that served as the Community Manager for the Hidden Valley Association and initially responded to the Petitioner’s records request.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona to which the Department of Real Estate referred this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Douglas E. Kupel, a homeowner and member of the HVA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, making the contention more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Respondent was the Hidden Valley Association.

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Douglas E. Kupel and the Hidden Valley Association (HVA), a homeowners’ association. The core issue of the hearing, held on October 22, 2020, was whether the HVA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill Kupel’s records request for communications regarding open meeting law compliance and bylaw changes. Petitioner Kupel argued that undisclosed records existed based on emails sent by HVA Board President Gary Freed, while Freed testified that no disclosable records existed due to statutory exceptions and a mistaken belief about record retention. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s claim, concluding that Kupel failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute, thereby also denying his request for reimbursement and civil penalties.

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What are the legal requirements governing homeowner association record disclosure in Arizona?
What was the core dispute between the petitioner and the homeowner association?
How did the Administrative Law Judge decide the outcome of this specific case?

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Douglas E. Kupel (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Timothy Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Hidden Valley Association
    Represented Respondent
  • Gary Freed (board member)
    Hidden Valley Association
    Hidden Valley Ranch Association Board President and witness for HVA
  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Received service of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the Administrative Law Judge Decision