Clifford S Burnes V. Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association

Posted on April 18, 2023 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	23F-H030-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2023-04-17
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6). The violation occurred because the Association's governing documents did not permit secret ballots, necessitating that the completed ballot contain the name, address, and signature of the voter, a requirement the distributed ballots failed to meet. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee and comply with the statute henceforth.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Clifford (Norm) S. Burnes	Counsel	—
Respondent	Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association	Counsel	John T. Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6). The violation occurred because the Association's governing documents did not permit secret ballots, necessitating that the completed ballot contain the name, address, and signature of the voter, a requirement the distributed ballots failed to meet. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee and comply with the statute henceforth.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of voting statute requiring name, address, and signature on completed ballot.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's vote by written ballot was non-compliant because the individual ballots lacked the required name, address, and signature of the voter. The ALJ concluded that since the community documents did not permit secret ballots, the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6) required the ballot itself (distinct from the envelope) to contain the name, address, and signature, and the HOA failed to meet this requirement.

Orders: Petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00 and henceforth comply with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, Voting procedures, Secret ballot, Statutory interpretation, Dissolution vote

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H030-REL Decision – 1037366.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:00:58 (47.2 KB)

23F-H030-REL Decision – 1049922.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:01:03 (128.9 KB)

23F-H030-REL Decision – 1037366.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:39 (47.2 KB)

23F-H030-REL Decision – 1049922.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:42 (128.9 KB)

This summary pertains to the hearing in the matter of *Clifford S. Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association* (No. 23F-H030-REL), held on March 28, 2023, before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Background

Petitioner Clifford S. Burnes, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association (HOA), filed a petition alleging that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6) during a December 2021 vote concerning the dissolution of the HOA. The Petitioner was represented on his own behalf, and the Respondent HOA was represented by John T. Crotty.

The specific statute at issue, A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6), requires that the completed ballot shall contain the name, address, and signature of the person voting, *except* if the community documents permit secret ballots, in which case only the envelope must contain that identifying information.

Main Issues and Arguments

The core dispute was whether the written ballots used by the HOA complied with A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6).

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Burnes argued that the blank ballot sheet distributed by the HOA did not include spaces for the name, address, or signature of the voter. He maintained that the statute clearly differentiates between the ballot and the envelope. Because the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs/Bylaws) did not explicitly permit secret ballots, the full identifying information was legally required to be on the ballot itself.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA asserted that the ballot and the envelope together constituted the "completed ballot". The envelopes required a signature and contained the lot number (which the HOA used as the address), thereby meeting the statute's requirements when considered as part of a single balloting process. The HOA also argued that the documents were silent on prohibiting secret ballots, implying that they were permitted, or at least that the Petitioner failed to prove they were prohibited. Counsel further argued that the signature could satisfy both the "name" and "signature" requirements, and that lot numbers satisfied the "address" requirement.

Legal Points Emphasized: The Administrative Law Judge focused on the plain language of the statute. The ALJ noted that the statute delineates between the ballot and the envelope and that the three requirements (name, address, and signature) must be given meaning, with the signature being a separate requirement from the name.

Outcome and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Decision on April 17, 2023, finding that the Petitioner sustained his burden of proof.

Conclusion of Law: A violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6) was established. The ALJ concluded that since the Association’s governing documents did not explicitly permit secret ballots, the completed ballots were required to contain the name, address, and signature of the person voting. Since the actual voting sheet lacked this information, the statute was violated.

Order: The Petitioner's petition was granted.

The Respondent HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00.
The Respondent was further ordered to henceforth comply with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6).

Questions

Question

Can my HOA use secret ballots where I only sign the envelope?

Short Answer

Only if the community's governing documents explicitly permit secret ballots.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, an HOA cannot use secret ballots (where identification is only on the envelope) unless the community documents specifically permit them. If the documents are silent on the matter, the ballot itself must contain the voter's identification.

Alj Quote

The completed ballot shall contain the name, address and signature of the person voting, except that if the community documents permit secret ballots, only the envelope shall contain the name, address and signature of the voter… Nothing in the Association’s governing documents permitted secret ballots.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)

Topic Tags

voting
ballots
governing documents

Question

What specific information must be written on an HOA ballot?

Short Answer

The ballot must contain the voter's name, address, and signature.

Detailed Answer

Unless secret ballots are authorized by the governing documents, the ballot itself must include three specific items: the voter's name, the voter's address, and the voter's signature.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, the completed ballots in the vote at issue were required to contain the name, address, and signature of the person voting.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)

Topic Tags

voting
compliance

Question

Does signing my signature count as writing my name on a ballot?

Short Answer

No, a signature and a name are separate legal requirements.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that a signature does not satisfy the requirement to provide a name. The statute lists them separately, meaning both must be present on the ballot.

Alj Quote

Further, the plain language of the statute identifies that each ballot must contain the name, address, and signature of the person voting. The signature is a separate requirement from the name, and the ballot was required to have all three items.

Legal Basis

Statutory Interpretation

Topic Tags

voting
legal definitions

Question

Can the HOA claim the envelope and ballot together count as a 'completed ballot'?

Short Answer

No, the law distinguishes between the ballot itself and the envelope.

Detailed Answer

The HOA cannot argue that the envelope is part of the ballot to satisfy identification requirements when secret ballots are not permitted. The statute treats the ballot and the envelope as distinct items.

Alj Quote

The plan language of the statute delineates between the ballot in a vote and the envelope in a secret ballot vote.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

Topic Tags

voting
ballots

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must provide enough evidence to prove that it is more likely than not that the HOA violated the statute.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6).

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

procedure
burden of proof

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge rules in favor of the homeowner, they may order the HOA to reimburse the $500 filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

penalties
reimbursement

Question

What agency handles disputes between homeowners and HOAs in Arizona?

Short Answer

The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Detailed Answer

Homeowners can file petitions regarding violations of community documents or statutes with the Department of Real Estate, which are then heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Alj Quote

The Department is authorized by statute to receive and to decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations and from homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102

Topic Tags

jurisdiction
agencies

Case

Docket No: 23F-H030-REL
Case Title: Clifford S. Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Decision Date: 2023-04-17
Alj Name: Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA use secret ballots where I only sign the envelope?

Short Answer

Only if the community's governing documents explicitly permit secret ballots.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)

Topic Tags

voting
ballots
governing documents

Question

What specific information must be written on an HOA ballot?

Short Answer

The ballot must contain the voter's name, address, and signature.

Detailed Answer

Unless secret ballots are authorized by the governing documents, the ballot itself must include three specific items: the voter's name, the voter's address, and the voter's signature.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, the completed ballots in the vote at issue were required to contain the name, address, and signature of the person voting.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6)

Topic Tags

voting
compliance

Question

Does signing my signature count as writing my name on a ballot?

Short Answer

No, a signature and a name are separate legal requirements.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that a signature does not satisfy the requirement to provide a name. The statute lists them separately, meaning both must be present on the ballot.

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Statutory Interpretation

Topic Tags

voting
legal definitions

Question

Can the HOA claim the envelope and ballot together count as a 'completed ballot'?

Short Answer

No, the law distinguishes between the ballot itself and the envelope.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

The plan language of the statute delineates between the ballot in a vote and the envelope in a secret ballot vote.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

Topic Tags

voting
ballots

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must provide enough evidence to prove that it is more likely than not that the HOA violated the statute.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A)(6).

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

procedure
burden of proof

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge rules in favor of the homeowner, they may order the HOA to reimburse the $500 filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

penalties
reimbursement

Question

What agency handles disputes between homeowners and HOAs in Arizona?

Short Answer

The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Detailed Answer

Homeowners can file petitions regarding violations of community documents or statutes with the Department of Real Estate, which are then heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Alj Quote

The Department is authorized by statute to receive and to decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations and from homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102

Topic Tags

jurisdiction
agencies

Case

Docket No: 23F-H030-REL
Case Title: Clifford S. Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Decision Date: 2023-04-17
Alj Name: Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Clifford S. Burnes (petitioner)
Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Also referred to as Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Clifford Barnes. Appeared pro se, testified on his own behalf.

Respondent Side

John T. Crotty (HOA attorney)
LAW OFFICES OF COLLIN T. WELCH
Represented Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association. Referred to as Mr. Kate in transcript.
Esmeralda Serena Ayala-Martinez (HOA board president / witness)
Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Also referred to as Serena Martinez. Called as witness by Petitioner.
David Medil (board member)
Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Listed as a board member in testimony (also referred to as 'Dave Matt').
Joseph Martinez (board member)
Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Listed as a board member in testimony (also referred to as 'Joseph Mar Martinez').

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Also referred to as Tammy Igenir.
Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
A. Hansen (ADRE Staff Recipient)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case transmission.
V. Nunez (ADRE Staff Recipient)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case transmission.
D. Jones (ADRE Staff Recipient)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case transmission.
L. Abril (ADRE Staff Recipient)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case transmission.

Other Participants

Carolyn Wesen Mo (observer)
Member of the public
Present during the hearing.
Collin T. Welch (Attorney (Firm Principal))
LAW OFFICES OF COLLIN T. WELCH
Name appears in firm name affiliation of Respondent's counsel.

Michael H. Jahr v. Leisure World Community Association

Posted on March 14, 2023 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	23F-H032-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2023-03-14
Administrative Law Judge	Jenna Clark
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge denied Petitioner Michael H. Jahr's petition, concluding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816, because a clothesline is not a 'solar energy device' under ARS § 44-1761, and ARS § 33-439(a) was inapplicable.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Michael H. Jahr	Counsel	—
Respondent	Leisure World Community Association	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1816(a-b)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied Petitioner Michael H. Jahr's petition, concluding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816, because a clothesline is not a 'solar energy device' under ARS § 44-1761, and ARS § 33-439(a) was inapplicable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816. The Tribunal determined that a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of ARS § 33-1816 regarding denial of utilizing solar means to reduce energy consumption.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated ARS § 33-1816 by refusing him the ability to utilize solar means (a clothesline) to reduce energy consumption, arguing the clothesline met the definition of a 'solar energy device' under ARS § 44-1761, which the HOA cannot prohibit.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. Respondent was ordered not to owe Petitioner any reimbursement for fees incurred.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1816(a-b)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1761
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439(a)
Association Rules & Regulations 2-304(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Solar Energy Device, Clothesline, Planned Community, Statutory Interpretation, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1808(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1816(a-b)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1761
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-111(4)
Association Rules & Regulations 2-304(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H032-REL Decision – 1041743.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T22:11:14 (161.1 KB)

23F-H032-REL Decision – 1057366.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T22:11:22 (55.7 KB)

23F-H032-REL Decision – 1041743.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:59 (161.1 KB)

23F-H032-REL Decision – 1057366.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:54:04 (55.7 KB)

This is a concise summary of the hearing regarding Michael H. Jahr, Petitioner, versus Leisure World Community Association (LWCA), Respondent, conducted before Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark on February 27, 2023. The matter concerned OA docket number 23 FH032L.

Key Facts and Issues

The central issue was an alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statute (ARS) § 33-1816, claiming that the Respondent denied the Petitioner the right to utilize solar means to reduce his energy consumption. This dispute revolved specifically around the Association’s denial of Petitioner’s request to use an installed in-ground sleeve for a clothesline.

The Petitioner, a homeowner in the Leisure World planned community, applied to install a sleeve in August 2022, initially listing uses including a clothesline. The request was denied for the clothesline use, but permission was later granted for a “flag pole installation sleeve”. Petitioner subsequently used the sleeve for a clothesline, resulting in an Architectural Control Courtesy Violation Notice dated October 31, 2022, which cited a violation of Association Rules & Regulations 2-304(D) prohibiting clotheslines visible from outside the residence.

Legal Arguments and Proceedings

Jurisdiction and Applicable Statute: Initially, the ALJ noted that the Petitioner incorrectly filed under condominium statutes (ARS § 33-439). The hearing proceeded after confirming the accurate statutory basis for the complaint was the planned community statute, specifically ARS § 33-1816(a-b), which prohibits associations from banning the installation or use of a "solar energy device" as defined in ARS § 44-1761.
Petitioner’s Argument: Petitioner argued that the clothesline qualified as a solar energy device because it uses the sun’s heat (solar means) to evaporate moisture (second law of thermodynamics), thereby reducing energy consumption and fitting the definition of a "system or series of mechanisms". He asserted that the legislative intent behind the statute was to allow homeowners to use solar energy to save financial resources and help with climate issues.
Respondent’s Argument: The Respondent (LWCA), represented by Assistant Community Manager Daniel Clark Collier, argued that their legal counsel determined a clothesline does not meet the definition of a solar energy device found in ARS § 44-1761. LWCA noted that the rules prohibiting clotheslines were in place prior to Petitioner moving in. The Respondent argued that extending the definition to a clothesline would absurdly extend it to nearly any object heated by the sun.
Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge noted that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association violated the relevant statute.
Relief Requested: Petitioner requested relief, including reimbursement of his filing fee and injunctive action. The ALJ clarified that monetary relief (other than potential filing fee reimbursement) and injunctive relief (such as a temporary restraining order) were not permissible in this administrative tribunal; the tribunal's authority was limited primarily to ordering a party to abide by the specified statute or imposing a civil penalty.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision finding that the clothesline is not a solar energy device. The Tribunal found that the Association acted within its lawful authority to deny permission to erect the clothesline.

The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. Consequently, the Respondent was not ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for any incurred filing fees. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816. The decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner. (Note: A subsequent order addressed a poten

Questions

Question

Can my HOA prohibit me from using a clothesline in my backyard?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community rules prohibit them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an HOA can prohibit clotheslines because they do not qualify as protected solar energy devices under Arizona law. In this case, the association's rules explicitly prohibited clotheslines visible from outside the residence.

Alj Quote

Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record… the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device. Moreover, Petitioner knew or should have known that clotheslines were prohibited by the Association under Rules & Regulations 2-304(D).

Legal Basis

Rules & Regulations 2-304(D); ARS 33-1816

Topic Tags

architectural_control
prohibited_items
solar_energy

Question

Is a clothesline considered a 'solar energy device' legally protected by Arizona statute?

Short Answer

No, a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarified that a clothesline does not fit the legal definition of a 'solar energy device' (specifically a 'system or series of mechanisms') under A.R.S. § 44-1761, and therefore does not enjoy the statutory protection that voids HOA restrictions on solar devices.

Alj Quote

Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record, including the aforementioned germane statutory definitions, and lacking any binding citations offered from a court of competent jurisdiction, the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device.

Legal Basis

ARS 44-1761(8); ARS 33-439(a)

Topic Tags

solar_energy
definitions
statutory_interpretation

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

When a homeowner petitions for a hearing, they bear the burden of proving that the HOA violated community documents or statutes. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning it is more probable than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

burden_of_proof
legal_standards
hearing_procedure

Question

Can I be reimbursed for my filing fees if I lose the hearing?

Short Answer

No, reimbursement is generally not awarded if the petition is denied.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the HOA did not owe the homeowner any reimbursement for fees incurred during the filing process.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent does not owe Petitioner any reimbursement(s) for fees incurred in association with the filing of this petition.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

fees
reimbursement
penalties

Question

Are CC&Rs considered a binding contract?

Short Answer

Yes, CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the HOA and the homeowner.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that when a property is purchased within a planned community, the buyer agrees to be bound by the CC&Rs, which function as a contract.

Alj Quote

Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Legal Basis

Common Law

Topic Tags

cc&rs
contract_law
governing_documents

Question

Can I use a flag pole sleeve for something other than a flag, like a clothesline?

Short Answer

No, if the permit was granted specifically for a flag pole.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner obtained a permit for a flag pole sleeve but used it for a clothesline. The HOA was entitled to issue a violation notice because the use differed from the approved purpose and violated other rules.

Alj Quote

Respondent did, however, grant Petitioner’s sleeve request with the explicit instruction that its use was for the purpose of flag display… As such, the Association’s October 31, 2022, VIOLATION NOTICE was not issued unlawfully or in error.

Legal Basis

ARS 33-1808(a)

Topic Tags

architectural_requests
permits
flag_poles

Question

How do courts interpret words in statutes that aren't explicitly defined?

Short Answer

They use the ordinary meaning of the words, often consulting dictionaries.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ looked to the 'natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning' of words. Since the statute did not define 'clothesline,' the judge consulted Merriam Webster to define terms like 'system' and 'mechanism' to see if a clothesline fit the description.

Alj Quote

Words should be given 'their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning.'… BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY does not define 'clothesline' or 'solar energy device.' Per Merriam Webster, however, 'system' means a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole

Legal Basis

Statutory Construction Principles

Topic Tags

legal_standards
definitions
interpretation

Question

What is the deadline for filing a request for a rehearing?

Short Answer

30 days from the service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to request a rehearing, they must file it with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.

Legal Basis

ARS 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

appeals
deadlines
procedural_requirements

Case

Docket No: 23F-H032-REL
Case Title: Michael H. Jahr vs. Leisure World Community Association
Decision Date: 2023-03-14
Alj Name: Jenna Clark
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA prohibit me from using a clothesline in my backyard?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community rules prohibit them.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Rules & Regulations 2-304(D); ARS 33-1816

Topic Tags

architectural_control
prohibited_items
solar_energy

Question

Is a clothesline considered a 'solar energy device' legally protected by Arizona statute?

Short Answer

No, a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

ARS 44-1761(8); ARS 33-439(a)

Topic Tags

solar_energy
definitions
statutory_interpretation

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

burden_of_proof
legal_standards
hearing_procedure

Question

Can I be reimbursed for my filing fees if I lose the hearing?

Short Answer

No, reimbursement is generally not awarded if the petition is denied.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the HOA did not owe the homeowner any reimbursement for fees incurred during the filing process.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent does not owe Petitioner any reimbursement(s) for fees incurred in association with the filing of this petition.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

fees
reimbursement
penalties

Question

Are CC&Rs considered a binding contract?

Short Answer

Yes, CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the HOA and the homeowner.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that when a property is purchased within a planned community, the buyer agrees to be bound by the CC&Rs, which function as a contract.

Alj Quote

Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Legal Basis

Common Law

Topic Tags

cc&rs
contract_law
governing_documents

Question

Can I use a flag pole sleeve for something other than a flag, like a clothesline?

Short Answer

No, if the permit was granted specifically for a flag pole.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

ARS 33-1808(a)

Topic Tags

architectural_requests
permits
flag_poles

Question

How do courts interpret words in statutes that aren't explicitly defined?

Short Answer

They use the ordinary meaning of the words, often consulting dictionaries.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Statutory Construction Principles

Topic Tags

legal_standards
definitions
interpretation

Question

What is the deadline for filing a request for a rehearing?

Short Answer

30 days from the service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to request a rehearing, they must file it with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

ARS 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

appeals
deadlines
procedural_requirements

Case

Docket No: 23F-H032-REL
Case Title: Michael H. Jahr vs. Leisure World Community Association
Decision Date: 2023-03-14
Alj Name: Jenna Clark
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Michael H. Jahr (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Daniel Clark Collier (assistant community manager)
Leisure World Community Association
Appeared on behalf of Respondent and testified as a witness
Regis Salazar (witness)
Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Jenna Clark (ALJ)
OAH
Susan Nicolson (commissioner)
ADRE
Recipient of recommended decision

Other Participants

AHansen (ADRE staff)
ADRE
Recipient of electronic transmission
vnunez (ADRE staff)
ADRE
Recipient of electronic transmission
djones (ADRE staff)
ADRE
Recipient of electronic transmission
labril (ADRE staff)
ADRE
Recipient of electronic transmission

Amy Hillburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association

Posted on November 17, 2022 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	23F-H008-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2022-11-17
Administrative Law Judge	Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) had ceased holding regularly scheduled meetings since March 2022, thereby negating the statutory requirement that such committee meetings must be open to members.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Amy Hilburn	Counsel	—
Respondent	Stetson Valley Owners Association	Counsel	Melissa Doolan, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804 and Article 6.2 of the Bylaws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) had ceased holding regularly scheduled meetings since March 2022, thereby negating the statutory requirement that such committee meetings must be open to members.

Why this result: The ARC successfully argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only mandates open access for 'any regularly scheduled committee meetings.' Since they transitioned to using an online portal on an irregular schedule, they were no longer holding 'regularly scheduled meetings,' meaning the statute did not require them to be open.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to hold open meetings where members can comment prior to a vote.

Petitioner alleged the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was violating A.R.S. § 33-1804 (open meetings statute) by failing to hold open meetings, particularly after the ARC began processing requests using an online portal which allows for discussion and voting among members outside of noticed meetings. Historically, the ARC held regularly scheduled meetings on the first Tuesday of every month until March 2022. The ALJ ultimately ruled that since March 2022, the ARC was not holding 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' as defined by the statute.

Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 32-2199
Article 6.2 of the Bylaws
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meeting Law, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Regularly Scheduled Meetings, Online Portal, Statutory Interpretation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
Article 6.2 of the Bylaws

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Decision Documents

23F-H008-REL Decision – 1005178.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-27T09:47:07 (48.8 KB)

23F-H008-REL Decision – 1005178.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:08 (48.8 KB)

23F-H008-REL Decision – 1013302.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:12 (110.8 KB)

The hearing in the matter of *Amy Hilburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association* (No. 23F-H008-REL) was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sondra J. Vanella at the Office of Administrative Hearings on November 9, 2022.

Key Facts and Main Issue

The Petitioner, Amy Hilburn, filed a dispute petition on or about August 19, 2022, alleging that the Stetson Valley Owners Association (HOA) violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 and Article 6.2 of its Bylaws. The sole issue determined at the hearing was whether the Association's Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings where homeowner members could comment prior to a vote of the committee.

The core legal point centered on A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which mandates that "all meetings of the members' association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings" must be open to all members, who are permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner Hilburn argued that the ARC previously held regularly scheduled meetings on the first Tuesday of every month from 2011 until February 2022, often without proper notice. Petitioner provided evidence, including old Meeting Minutes (2017–2021) and the Respondent's Paint Architectural Change Request Form, which stated the ARC reviewed applications on the first Tuesday of every month, demonstrating the regularity of the meetings.

Petitioner acknowledged that the ARC ceased holding traditional open meetings after July 2022, choosing instead to process applications through an online portal. However, she argued that the ability for ARC members to exchange comments and make decisions via this portal constitutes "discussion" and a form of regularly occurring meeting that should be open to the community, consistent with the legislature's intent for transparency.

Respondent’s Arguments

The Respondent, represented by Melissa Doolan, Esq., contended that the Association was following state law because the ARC does not currently hold regularly scheduled meetings. Testimony from Community Manager Danielle Miglio and ARC Member Ann Renee Wilsey established that since March 2022, the ARC moved to processing requests solely through an online portal to provide faster homeowner turnaround.

Respondent witnesses testified that under the portal system, ARC members are notified via email, but they view the request documentation and vote on their own time; there is no regularly scheduled time for them to convene, comment, or vote. Because the meetings are not "regularly scheduled," the open meeting requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) does not apply. The Respondent noted that the few in-person or virtual meetings that occurred in 2022 (April, June, and July) were noticed to the members.

Final Decision and Outcome

The ALJ found that while the ARC had held regularly scheduled meetings prior to utilizing the online portal system, the credible evidence established that since March 2022, the ARC has not been holding regularly scheduled meetings.

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or Article 6.2 of the Bylaws, noting that the statute does not require the ARC to hold regularly scheduled meetings.

The ALJ ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H008-REL”, “case_title”: “Amy Hilburn v. Stetson Valley Owners Association”, “decision_date”: “2022-11-17”, “alj_name”: “Sondra J. Vanella”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Does my HOA’s architectural committee have to hold open meetings for every decision?”, “short_answer”: “No, only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The law specifically mandates that meetings of the members, the board of directors, and ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings be open. If a committee does not maintain a regular schedule, the open meeting requirement may not apply.”, “alj_quote”: “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Open Meetings”, “Committees”, “Homeowner Rights” ] }, { “question”: “Can an HOA committee conduct business through an online portal instead of meeting in person?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, utilizing an online portal to process requests is permitted and may result in the activity not being classified as a “regularly scheduled meeting.””, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that moving committee business to an online portal where members review and vote on their own time effectively meant they were not holding ‘regularly scheduled meetings,’ thus bypassing the open meeting requirement.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Miglio testified that since August 2022, the ARC has not held regularly scheduled meetings because the ARC conducts its business through an online portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(e)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Digital Tools”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA committee required by law to hold regularly scheduled meetings?”, “short_answer”: “No, there is generally no statutory requirement that committees must hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision explicitly states that nothing in the cited statutes or bylaws required the Architectural Review Committee to adhere to a regular meeting schedule.”, “alj_quote”: “…nothing in the provisions cited by Petitioner require the ARC to hold regularly scheduled meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA Obligations”, “Committees”, “Scheduling” ] }, { “question”: “Do committee members have to discuss and vote on requests at the same time?”, “short_answer”: “No, committee members can review requests and vote asynchronously on their own time.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ accepted testimony that committee members could view requests and vote individually whenever they chose, rather than convening at a specific time.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Wilsey testified that there is no regularly scheduled time to look at the requests, comment, and/or vote.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(h)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Voting”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] }, { “question”: “What is the burden of proof for a homeowner suing their HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner must prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.””, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard means the homeowner must convince the judge that their claim is ‘more probably true than not.’ It refers to the convincing force of the evidence rather than the amount.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence… A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 2-3”, “topic_tags”: [ “Legal Standards”, “Burden of Proof”, “Dispute Process” ] }, { “question”: “Can committee members comment to each other online without it being an open meeting?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the ability to comment via a portal does not necessarily create a “meeting” if done asynchronously.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision noted that members could comment to each other through the portal, but because there was no regularly scheduled time for this interaction, it did not trigger the open meeting statute.”, “alj_quote”: “Members of the ARC have the ability to comment to each other through the portal and vote on the requests through the portal.”, “legal_basis”: “Fact Finding 3(g)”, “topic_tags”: [ “Communication”, “Committees”, “Open Meetings” ] }, { “question”: “If an HOA committee previously held regular meetings, are they forced to continue doing so?”, “short_answer”: “No, past practices do not mandate future behavior if the committee changes its process.”, “detailed_answer”: “Although the committee had a history of regular monthly meetings from 2011 to 2022, the ALJ ruled based on their current practice of using a portal, finding no violation because they were not currently meeting regularly.”, “alj_quote”: “The credible and probative evidence of record established that… prior to the ARC utilizing the online portal system, the ARC was holding regularly scheduled meetings. However, since March 2022, the ARC has not been holding regularly scheduled meetings…”, “legal_basis”: “Conclusion of Law 6”, “topic_tags”: [ “Precedent”, “Procedure”, “Committees” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Amy Hilburn (petitioner)
Stetson Valley Owners Association member
Appeared pro se; former Board President

Respondent Side

Melissa Doolan (HOA attorney)
Travis Law Firm
Danielle Miglio (community manager, witness)
Oasis Community Management
Ann Renee Wilsey (ARC member, witness)
Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
Nichollet Widner (board member, witness)
Stetson Valley Owners Association Board President
Tom Young (board member, observer)
Stetson Valley Owners Association Board
Pam Weller (ARC member, observer)
Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
Omar Chavez (board member, observer)
Stetson Valley Owners Association Board
Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
Travis Law Firm
Transmitting staff
Elizabeth Franco (community manager staff)
Oasis Community Management
Referenced in Petitioner's Exhibit 6 testimony
Benjamin Butler (ARC chairperson)
Stetson Valley Owners Association ARC
Referenced in Petitioner's Exhibit 6 testimony

Neutral Parties

Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
OAH
Louis Dettorre (commissioner)
ADRE
AHansen (ADRE staff)
ADRE
vnunez (ADRE staff)
ADRE
djones (ADRE staff)
ADRE
labril (ADRE staff)
ADRE
c. serrano (OAH staff)
OAH
Transmitting staff

Other Participants

Amanda McGawan (observer)
Lisa Vargas (observer)
Nick Jackson (observer)

Richard E Jewell v. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.

Posted on October 25, 2021 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	22F-H2221005-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2021-10-25
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The Petitioner's petition alleging the HOA violated conflict of interest statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1811) was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof, as the conflict was deemed sufficiently disclosed prior to the board action.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Richard E Jewell	Counsel	—
Respondent	Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.	Counsel	Nicole Payne and Carlotta L. Turman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging the HOA violated conflict of interest statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1811) was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof, as the conflict was deemed sufficiently disclosed prior to the board action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof on the alleged violation.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Member Conflict of Interest Disclosure

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated the statute regarding conflict of interest when the board hired the board president as a paid office assistant and the conflict was not disclosed by the president. The ALJ found that while the president did not disclose the conflict, the conflict was made known by another attendee prior to discussion and action, fulfilling the statutory purpose.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1811
A.R.S. § 33-1243(c)
A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 1-211(B)
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, Conflict of interest, Statutory interpretation, Board voting

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1811
A.R.S. § 33-1243(c)
A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 1-211(B)
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

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Decision Documents

22F-H2221005-REL Decision – 920344.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:33 (89.3 KB)

22F-H2221005-REL Decision – 920344.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:39:53 (89.3 KB)

This summary pertains to the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of *Richard E Jewell, Petitioner, vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp., Respondent* (No. 22F-H2221005-REL), heard on October 7, 2021.

Concise Legal Summary

Key Facts and Issues

Petitioner Richard E. Jewell, a homeowner and member of the Respondent, Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp. (an Arizona homeowners association or HOA), alleged that the HOA board violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1811. The central issue was whether the Board of Directors improperly handled a conflict of interest when voting to hire the sitting Board President, George Pavia, as a salaried office assistant.

The Board voted on July 15, 2021, to employ Mr. Pavia for 40 hours a week at a wage of $15.00 per hour. Petitioner asserted that his only issue was that the Board President failed to personally disclose the conflict of interest prior to the action being taken.

Key Legal Points and Arguments

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1811, stipulates that if a contract or action for compensation benefits a board member, that member "shall declare a conflict of interest" in an open meeting before discussion or action. A contract entered in violation of this section is void and unenforceable.

During the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge reviewed evidence, including a recording of the July meeting. The evidence showed:

At the outset of the virtual meeting, Mr. Pavia indicated he would recuse himself from the discussion.
An individual attending the meeting raised the possibility of a conflict of interest.
The conflict was discussed at length during the board meeting prior to any vote.
Mr. Pavia refrained from participating in the vote.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1811 is to ensure HOA members are aware of conflicts prior to discussion. Interpreting the statute to achieve a "fair and sensible result", the Judge determined that the conflict was, in fact, made known and discussed prior to action. The statute's requirement was satisfied, as the fact that Mr. Pavia was not the individual who disclosed the conflict did not negate that the conflict was discussed at length and known to those voting.

Outcome

At the conclusion of the Petitioner’s presentation of evidence, Respondent moved for a directed verdict, arguing the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The motion was granted.

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent acted in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can an HOA board member also be a paid employee of the association?

Short Answer

Yes, provided the conflict of interest is properly declared.

Detailed Answer

A board member can be hired for compensation, but they must declare the conflict of interest in an open meeting before the board discusses or acts on the issue. In this case, the Board President was hired as an office assistant.

Alj Quote

If any contract, decision or other action for compensation taken by or on behalf of the board of directors would benefit any member of the board of directors . . . , that member of the board of directors shall declare a conflict of interest for that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

conflict of interest
board compensation
hiring

Question

Does a conflicted board member have to personally announce their own conflict of interest?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, as long as the members are made aware of the conflict.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the purpose of the law is to ensure members are aware of conflicts. If the conflict is discussed and known to attendees, it does not matter if the specific board member was not the one to voice the disclosure.

Alj Quote

The purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1811 is to ensure that the members of a homeowners association are aware of all conflicts of interest prior to any discussion… not to require that a specific board member announce to those members that such a conflict of interest exists.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

conflict of interest
procedural requirements
meetings

Question

Can a board member vote on a contract that benefits them financially?

Short Answer

Yes, after declaring the conflict.

Detailed Answer

State law allows a board member to vote on an issue benefiting them, provided they have declared the conflict in an open meeting before discussion or action is taken.

Alj Quote

The member shall declare the conflict in an open meeting of the board before the board discusses or takes action on that issue and that member may then vote on that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

voting rights
conflict of interest
board powers

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a complaint against their HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) is responsible for proving their claim. They must show that their version of events is more likely true than not (the greater weight of the evidence).

Alj Quote

At an administrative hearing, the party asserting a claim, right, entitlement, or affirmative defense has the burden of proof, and the standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

legal standards
burden of proof
administrative hearing

Question

Which specific law covers conflict of interest for HOAs (Planned Communities) versus Condominiums?

Short Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 for HOAs; A.R.S. § 33-1243 for Condominiums.

Detailed Answer

It is important to cite the correct statute based on the type of community. The petitioner initially cited the condo statute (§ 33-1243) but had to correct it to the planned community statute (§ 33-1811).

Alj Quote

Petitioner indicated that he erroneously cited to A.R.S. § 33-1243(C) in his petition as that statute relates to condominium associations rather than homeowner associations. Rather, Petitioner should have referenced A.R.S. § 33-1811…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

statutes
jurisdiction
legal definitions

Question

Is a contract void if the technical requirements of declaring a conflict weren't perfectly followed?

Short Answer

Likely not, if the conflict was known and discussed.

Detailed Answer

Statutes are interpreted to produce sensible results. If the conflict was discussed at length and everyone was aware, a technical failure (like the wrong person announcing it) may not constitute a violation.

Alj Quote

The fact that Mr. Pavia was not the board member to disclose the conflict does not negate that the conflict was made known prior to any discussion and that the conflict was discussed at length during the board meeting prior to any vote.

Legal Basis

Case Law (Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission)

Topic Tags

contract validity
statutory interpretation
enforcement

Case

Docket No: 22F-H2221005-REL
Case Title: Richard E Jewell vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
Decision Date: 2021-10-25
Alj Name: Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Questions

Question

Can an HOA board member also be a paid employee of the association?

Short Answer

Yes, provided the conflict of interest is properly declared.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

conflict of interest
board compensation
hiring

Question

Does a conflicted board member have to personally announce their own conflict of interest?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, as long as the members are made aware of the conflict.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

conflict of interest
procedural requirements
meetings

Question

Can a board member vote on a contract that benefits them financially?

Short Answer

Yes, after declaring the conflict.

Detailed Answer

State law allows a board member to vote on an issue benefiting them, provided they have declared the conflict in an open meeting before discussion or action is taken.

Alj Quote

The member shall declare the conflict in an open meeting of the board before the board discusses or takes action on that issue and that member may then vote on that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

voting rights
conflict of interest
board powers

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a complaint against their HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) is responsible for proving their claim. They must show that their version of events is more likely true than not (the greater weight of the evidence).

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

legal standards
burden of proof
administrative hearing

Question

Which specific law covers conflict of interest for HOAs (Planned Communities) versus Condominiums?

Short Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 for HOAs; A.R.S. § 33-1243 for Condominiums.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

statutes
jurisdiction
legal definitions

Question

Is a contract void if the technical requirements of declaring a conflict weren't perfectly followed?

Short Answer

Likely not, if the conflict was known and discussed.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Case Law (Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission)

Topic Tags

contract validity
statutory interpretation
enforcement

Case

Docket No: 22F-H2221005-REL
Case Title: Richard E Jewell vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
Decision Date: 2021-10-25
Alj Name: Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard E Jewell (petitioner)
Jewell Company Inc.

Respondent Side

Nicole Payne (respondent attorney)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
Carlotta L. Turman (respondent attorney)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
George Pavia (HOA board president/employee)
Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
Subject of conflict of interest allegation

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmission
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmission
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmission

Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Posted on February 19, 2021 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Lee & Kim Edwards	Counsel	Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent	Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1255
Declaration Article I, Section 5
Declaration Article II, Section 5
Declaration Article II, Section 7
Declaration Article IV, Section 4
Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
A.R.S. § 33-1255
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:11 (123.6 KB)

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 856603.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:19 (98.1 KB)

Assessment Methodology Dispute: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowners Lee & Kim Edwards (Petitioners) and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association (Respondent) concerning a change in the methodology for calculating homeowner assessments. The core of the conflict was the Association’s decision to shift from a historical practice of assessments based on unit square footage to a uniform rate where each of the 26 units pays an equal 1/26 share of the common expenses.

The dispute was adjudicated by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in two separate hearings. In both instances, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petitions filed by the Edwards.

Key Takeaways:

• Change in Methodology: The Association’s Board, acting on legal advice received in January 2020, concluded that its 40-year practice of using a square-footage-based assessment violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Board subsequently implemented a 1/26 equal-share assessment method after a majority of homeowners selected this option.

• Initial Ruling on “Uniform Rate”: In the first hearing in February 2021, the Petitioners argued that the historical square footage method was a “uniform rate” and that the Association had waived its right to change the long-standing practice. The ALJ rejected this, finding that the new 1/26 rate complied with the CC&Rs’ requirement for a “uniform rate” (Article VI, Section 9) and aligned with each unit’s specified 1/26 undivided interest in the common elements (Article VI, Section 4(d)).

• Rehearing Ruling on State Statute: The Petitioners were granted a rehearing in July 2021, where they argued that the 1/26 method violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255 by improperly charging all owners for “limited common elements” like patios and parking spaces. The ALJ again ruled against the Petitioners, concluding that the state statute did not apply. The ruling was based on a key provision in the statute: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The judge found that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise by defining patios and parking as general common elements and explicitly mandating that costs be shared based on each unit’s 1/26 interest.

• Final Outcome: The petition was definitively dismissed after the rehearing, making the ALJ’s order binding. The Association’s adoption of the 1/26 assessment rate was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

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Background of the Dispute

The legal conflict originated from a single-issue petition filed on November 20, 2020, by Lee and Kim Edwards, owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development. The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged that the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically Article VI, Section 9, and Article IV, Section 1.

The central issue was the Association Board’s decision to change the long-standing method of calculating homeowner assessments. For over 40 years, assessments had been based on the square footage of each unit. In 2020, the Board implemented a new system where the Association’s annual budget was divided equally among the 26 units, with each owner paying a 1/26 share. The Petitioners sought to enforce the historical calculation method unless and until the CC&Rs were properly amended.

Chronology of the Assessment Change

• Historical Practice: For more than four decades, the Association calculated and charged member assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit.

• Legal Consultation (January 2020): Two members of the Association’s Board consulted with an attorney regarding the legality of the historical assessment method.

• Attorney Recommendation (January 24, 2020): The attorney advised the Association that, to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs, it should calculate assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas. The attorney’s letter stated:

• Homeowner Consultation: Following the legal advice, the Board informed homeowners that the prior square-footage method violated the CC&Rs. The Board sought input on three potential assessment methods: the 1/26 rate, a variable blended rate, or continuing with the square footage rate. A majority of homeowners selected the 1/26 rate. The Board noted that any method other than the 1/26 rate would require a formal amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Implementation (September 26, 2020): The Board officially notified homeowners that it would begin charging assessments based on the 1/26 rate and that an amendment to the CC&Rs was not necessary to implement this change.

Initial Hearing and Decision (February 2021)

An evidentiary hearing was held on February 9, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners (Edwards)

1. The historical square footage rate qualified as a “uniform rate” and was compliant with the CC&Rs.
2. By using the square footage rate for over 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different method like the 1/26 rate.

Respondent (Association)

1. The plain language of the CC&Rs requires that each homeowner pay an assessment based on the 1/26 rate.
2. It is not legally possible to waive a mandatory CC&R requirement through past practice.

On February 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the petition. The judge’s conclusions of law were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs:

• Uniform Rate Compliance: The ALJ determined that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed that the Association’s 1/26 rate was a uniform rate that complied with Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove that the Association had violated its governing documents.

• Outcome: The Association was deemed the prevailing party, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing and Final Decision (July 2021)

The Petitioners filed a request for a rehearing on March 30, 2021, which was granted. The rehearing was held on July 8, 2021. The Respondent did not appear at this hearing, as its counsel had withdrawn from representation without formally notifying the tribunal.

In the rehearing, the Petitioners introduced a new argument, alleging that the 1/26 assessment method violated Arizona state law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1255.

• The core of this argument was that the 1/26 rate improperly included charges for “limited common elements,” such as patios and assigned parking spaces.

• The Petitioners contended that this forced all homeowners to pay for the maintenance of elements that were assigned to and benefited fewer than all units, in direct violation of the statute.

On July 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition. The ruling hinged on the precise wording of both the state statute and the Association’s Declaration.

• Applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1255: The judge found that the statute did not apply to this matter. The relevant section of the law, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), begins with the critical phrase: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

• Supremacy of the Declaration: The ALJ concluded that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise. The CC&Rs explicitly:

◦ Define “Common Elements” broadly to include patios and parking areas (Article I, Section 3).

◦ Establish that each unit has an “undivided interest in the general common areas” of 1/26 (Article I, Section 5).

◦ Mandate that each unit’s share of costs for repair and maintenance of common areas is the “same as its undivided interest in the common elements” (Article IV, Section 4(d)).

• Final Outcome: Because the Declaration’s specific provisions overrode the general terms of the state statute, the Association was found to be in compliance. The petition was dismissed, and the order was deemed binding on the parties.

Key Legal Principles and Definitions

Concept

Definition / Application in Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioners were required to establish their claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The ALJ found the Petitioners failed to meet this standard in both hearings.

Restrictive Covenants

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent and be interpreted as a whole. The ALJ’s decisions were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs’ language.

Common Elements (per CC&Rs)

A broad definition including multifamily structures, land, roofs, ceilings, foundations, storage spaces, patios, parking areas, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and conduits.

Unit (per CC&Rs)

A freehold estate consisting of the interior space of an apartment. The definition explicitly states that common elements are not part of the unit.

Undivided Interest (per CC&Rs)

Article I, Section 5 clearly establishes that “The undivided interest in the general common areas… which shall be conveyed with each respective units shall be 1/26.” This provision was central to the final ruling.

Study Guide: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Lee & Kim Edwards and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association, based on the provided legal decisions. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a detailed glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central conflict between the Petitioners (Lee & Kim Edwards) and the Respondent (Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association)?

2. For over 40 years, how did the Association historically calculate assessments for homeowners?

3. What specific event in January 2020 prompted the Association’s Board to change the assessment method?

4. In the first hearing on February 9, 2021, what were the two main arguments presented by Mr. Edwards?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the “uniform rate” requirement from CC&Rs Article VI, Section 9 in the initial decision?

6. Upon what new legal grounds did the Petitioners base their March 30, 2021, request for a re-hearing?

7. According to the CC&Rs, what is the defined undivided interest in the general common areas for each unit?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately conclude that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255 did not apply in this case?

9. What legal standard of proof did the Petitioners need to meet to successfully prove their case?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the re-hearing held on July 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The central conflict concerned the method for calculating homeowner assessments. The Petitioners argued for the historical method based on unit square footage, while the Respondent implemented a new method where each of the 26 units paid an equal share (1/26 rate) of the Association’s costs.

2. For over 40 years, the Association historically calculated assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit. This practice was changed by the Board in 2020.

3. In January 2020, two Board members met with an attorney who advised that to comply with the CC&Rs, the Association should charge assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas, not on square footage.

4. Mr. Edwards argued that the historical square footage rate was a “uniform rate” that complied with the CC&Rs. He also contended that by using this method for 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different assessment method like the 1/26 rate.

5. The Judge concluded that the Respondent’s assessment method, based on a uniform rate of 1/26 of the Association’s costs for each unit, did comply with Article VI, Section 9. Therefore, the Petitioners failed to prove the Association had violated the CC&Rs.

6. The Petitioners based their request for a re-hearing on the new allegation that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255. They argued the 1/26 rate improperly required members to pay for limited common elements, such as patios and parking spaces, not assigned to them.

7. According to Article I, Section 5 of the Declaration (CC&Rs), the undivided interest in the general common areas established and conveyed with each respective unit is 1/26.

8. The Judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1255 did not apply because the statute itself contains an exception: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” In this case, the Association’s Declaration explicitly required that each member be charged an assessment equivalent to their 1/26 interest in the total costs, which included patios and parking areas.

9. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

10. Following the re-hearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ordered that the petition of Lee & Kim Edwards be dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the order was declared binding on the parties.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Trace the evolution of the Petitioners’ legal strategy from the initial petition filed on November 20, 2020, to the arguments made during the re-hearing on July 8, 2021. How did their core arguments change, and what new evidence or legal statutes were introduced?

2. Analyze the concept of a “uniform rate” as required by Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs. Discuss how both the Petitioners and the Respondent interpreted this phrase to support their respective assessment methods (square footage vs. 1/26 rate).

3. Explain in detail the role of A.R.S. § 33-1255 in the re-hearing. Why did the Petitioners believe it supported their case, and what specific language in both the statute and the Association’s Declaration led the Administrative Law Judge to rule that it did not apply?

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Association’s Board of Directors in 2020. Consider their consultation with an attorney, their communication with homeowners, and their final decision to implement the 1/26 rate. Discuss whether these actions were consistent with the powers and obligations outlined in the CC&Rs.

5. Discuss the legal argument of “waiver” raised by Mr. Edwards in the first hearing. Explain what he meant by this and why the Association’s 40-year history of using a square-footage-based assessment was central to this claim. Why did this argument ultimately fail?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

1/26 Rate

The assessment method where the Association’s annual budget is divided 26 ways, with each unit responsible for paying an equal portion. This is based on each unit’s 1/26 undivided interest in the common areas as specified in the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The independent judicial officer who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits a condominium unit owner to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing regarding alleged violations of the Condominium Act.

A.R.S. § 33-1255

The Arizona Revised Statute concerning common expenses. It states that unless the declaration provides otherwise, expenses for a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, and expenses benefitting fewer than all units shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of condominium associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to establish its claims by a required standard of evidence. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. Also referred to as the “Declaration” in the provided documents.

Common Area / Common Elements

As defined in Article I, Section 3 of the CC&Rs, this includes the multifamily structure (except for the units), land, air space, bearing walls, roofs, storage spaces, patios, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and other premises designed for common use.

Declaration

Another term for the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Lee & Kim Edwards

The Petitioners in the case and owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Lee & Kim Edwards.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to be met by the Petitioners. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association.

Restricted Common Area

As defined in Article I, Section 3(b) of the CC&Rs, this refers to a separately designed and exclusive parking area for each unit as assigned by the Board of Directors.

Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development.

Square Footage Rate

The historical method of calculating assessments for over 40 years, where each unit’s assessment was based on its square footage.

Uniform Rate

A requirement from Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs that states both regular and special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units. The interpretation of this term was central to the dispute.

As defined in Article I, Section 4 of the CC&Rs, a separately designated freehold estate consisting of the space bounded by the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and floors of each apartment. It does not include common elements.

Waiver

A legal argument made by the Petitioners that because the Association had charged assessments based on square footage for 40 years, it had relinquished or “waived” its right to enforce a different method.

4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Could Upend How You See Your Fees

Introduction: The 40-Year Mistake

If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA), you likely operate under a simple assumption: the way things have always been done is the correct and legal way. Monthly fees, maintenance schedules, and community rules that have been in place for decades feel permanent and unassailable. But what if they aren’t?

This was the central question in the case of Lee & Kim Edwards versus the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association. For over 40 years, the Association calculated homeowner fees based on the square footage of each unit—a practice that seemed fair and logical, and one that was never questioned by residents.

Then came the twist. In January 2020, after consulting with an attorney, the HOA board announced a shocking revelation: their 40-year-old assessment method was a direct violation of the community’s own governing documents. The board presented the legal findings to the community and sought their input on how to proceed. After being given the choice between the old method, a blended rate, or a new flat-rate fee that complied with the rules, most homeowners voted for the compliant flat-rate system for every single unit, regardless of its size.

Homeowners sued to keep the old method, sparking a legal battle that went all the way to an administrative court. The resulting decisions offer surprising and crucial lessons for every homeowner paying HOA dues. Here are the four most impactful takeaways from the case that could change how you view your own community’s rules.

1. “Past Practice” Means Nothing if It Violates the Rules

The primary argument made by the petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, was that the Association had “waived its right” to change the assessment method. After all, by using the square-footage calculation for four decades, hadn’t they established an unbreakable precedent? It seemed like a common-sense argument rooted in history and consistency.

The court, however, completely rejected this line of reasoning. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was not based on historical practice but on the clear, written rules found in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association argued that it’s “not possible to waive the CC&R requirement,” and the court agreed.

The Lesson: This case powerfully demonstrates that tradition or “how things have always been done” cannot override the explicit language of an HOA’s governing documents. The CC&Rs are a contract. The lesson is clear: if your HOA’s practice contradicts its documents, the practice is invalid. The board has a fiduciary duty to follow the written rules, not a 40-year-old mistake.

2. Your CC&Rs Are a Binding Contract—Read Them

Throughout the legal proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently referred back to the specific text of the CC&Rs to make a final decision. The entire case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of a few key sentences written decades ago.

The most critical passage, which decided the outcome, was from Article VI, Section 4(d) of the community’s governing documents:

“Each unit’s share shall be the same as its undivided interest in the common elements of the total amount determined under the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.” —Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association CC&Rs, Article VI, Section 4(d)

This single sentence was the linchpin. It explicitly linked each unit’s assessment share to its “undivided interest in the common elements.” Another section of the document, Article I, Section 5, had already established that interest as an equal 1/26 for all 26 units.

The Lesson: This is a classic example of legal cross-referencing in a contract. Section 4(d) provided the instruction (base fees on “undivided interest”), while Article I, Section 5 provided the specific value (1/26). With both parts present and unambiguous, the court had no choice but to enforce them exactly as written, leaving no room for interpretations based on fairness or history. The contract was the contract.

3. A “Uniform Rate” Might Not Mean What You Think

One of the central points of contention was the term “uniform rate.” Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs required that all assessments “must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units.”

The homeowners argued that the square footage rate was, in fact, a “uniform rate”—a consistent price per square foot applied to every unit. It’s an interpretation many of us might find reasonable.

However, the HOA Board and the court had a different interpretation. The judge found that the flat 1/26 rate was the correct interpretation of a “uniform rate” because it was uniformly applied to every unit’s established 1/26 interest in the common areas. In the court’s view, the “rate” being applied uniformly was the 1/26 fraction of the total budget. The fact that this resulted in different dollar amounts for square-footage fees was irrelevant; the legal share was what had to be uniform.

The Lesson: Common-sense terms like “uniform” can have very specific legal meanings within the context of your governing documents. The true definition is found not in a dictionary, but in how the term is defined and applied by the rest of the document’s provisions.

4. Your HOA’s Rules Can Sometimes Override State Law

In a final attempt to overturn the decision, the petitioners filed for a re-hearing. This time, they cited a specific Arizona state law, A.R.S. 33-1255. This statute says that expenses for “limited common elements”—things like assigned patios or parking spaces that only benefit specific units—should be assessed only against those units that benefit from them. The homeowners argued that the new 1/26 flat fee unfairly forced them to pay for their neighbors’ patios and parking spots, a direct violation of state law.

Surprisingly, this argument also failed. The reason is found in the crucial introductory clause of the state law itself: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Because the Scottsdale Embassy’s Declaration did provide otherwise—by explicitly rolling all general and restricted common area costs into the total budget before calculating each unit’s 1/26 share—the community’s own rules legally superseded the default state statute. The judge concluded that the state law “does not apply to this matter because the Declaration requires” a different method.

The Lesson: This is perhaps the most counter-intuitive lesson of all. This demonstrates a key principle of contract law and planned community governance: state statutes often provide a “default” rule for situations a community’s documents don’t address. However, they also grant communities the power to create their own specific rules, which, if legally permissible, will take precedence. Homeowners cannot assume that a state law automatically protects them if their community’s own governing documents have a more specific rule in place.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What You Agreed To?

The central message from the Scottsdale Embassy case is undeniable: in an HOA, the written word is law. The CC&Rs and other governing documents are a binding contract that dictates the rules, regardless of 40 years of history, common-sense assumptions, or even some default state laws. What you believe is fair or standard practice is irrelevant if the document you agreed to upon purchase says otherwise.

This case was decided by a few sentences written decades ago. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from cover to cover?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Lee Edwards (petitioner, witness)
Kim Edwards (petitioner)
Teresa H. Foster (petitioner attorney)
Ellis & Baker, P.C.
Also referred to as Terri Foster and Terry Foster

Respondent Side

Lauren Vie (respondent attorney)
Appeared for initial hearing; later noted as withdrawn
Caleb Koch (board president, witness)
Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
Mary Edinburgh (board member, witness)
Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
Beth Mulcahy (respondent attorney)
Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
Recipient of transmission; noted as withdrawn counsel prior to rehearing

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Electronic transmission recipient
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Electronic transmission recipient
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Electronic transmission recipient
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Electronic transmission recipient
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Electronic transmission recipient

Other Participants

Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
Associated with transmission for petitioner's attorney

Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on December 14, 2020 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	21F-H2120012-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2020-12-13
Administrative Law Judge	Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome	The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Anthony & Karen Negrete	Counsel	—
Respondent	Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Quinten Cupps, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.

Why this result: The key statute relied upon by Petitioners was deemed inapplicable to the construction of a shed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide opportunity to participate in design approval meeting for replacement shed

Petitioners alleged they were not given the opportunity to participate in a final design approval meeting for building a replacement shed on their property, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Orders: Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Design Review, Shed, Architectural Approval, Motion to Dismiss, Statutory Interpretation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:33 (131.7 KB)

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:17 (131.7 KB)

This administrative hearing, held on November 2, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn, addressed a dispute between homeowners Anthony & Karen Negrete (Petitioners) and Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association (Sundance or Respondent).

Key Facts and Procedural Background:

Petitioners, long-time residents of Sundance, removed an existing shed (approved in 2005) due to deterioration from rodents and bees, and constructed a replacement shed in a new location on their property, intending to build a pool where the old shed stood. Petitioners did not initially seek approval for the replacement or the new location, believing it was unnecessary since a shed had been previously approved.

Sundance issued violation notices in March and April 2020, asserting the new shed was built without approval from the Architectural Committee. After applying for retroactive approval in June 2020, Sundance denied the application in July 2020, stating the new shed violated Design Guidelines regarding height, materials, and placement against a shared wall, and arguing the original approved shed could not be moved.

Main Issues and Arguments:

Petitioners filed a petition alleging Sundance violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b). The specific issue Petitioners raised at the hearing was that they were not given the opportunity to participate in a design approval meeting pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Sundance denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the Petition.

The Design Guidelines require prior written approval from the Design Review Committee for any improvement, alteration, or change in the exterior appearance of structures. A.R.S. § 33-1803 governs the HOA's authority regarding enforcement and fines.

Legal Points and Outcome:

Petitioners had the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The crucial legal point centered on the applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates that the association must hold a final design approval meeting allowing the member to attend.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) applies only to the "new construction of the main residential structure on a lot or for rebuilds of the main residential structure on a lot". Since the dispute involved a replacement shed—not the main residential structure—this statutory mandate for a meeting did not apply.

The ALJ concluded that Petitioners failed to establish a violation by Sundance of either A.R.S. § 33-1803 or A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Consequently, the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was granted, and Petitioners’ Petition was dismissed. Petitioners were ordered to bear their $500.00 filing fee.

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

Architectural Review
Improvements
Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

Meetings
Statutory Interpretation
Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

modifications
Architectural Review
Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

Legal Procedure
Burden of Proof
Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

Architectural Guidelines
Restrictions
Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

Violations
Fines
Enforcement

Case

Docket No: 21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title: Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date: 2020-12-13
Alj Name: Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

Architectural Review
Improvements
Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

Meetings
Statutory Interpretation
Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

modifications
Architectural Review
Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

Legal Procedure
Burden of Proof
Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

Architectural Guidelines
Restrictions
Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

Violations
Fines
Enforcement

Case

Docket No: 21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title: Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date: 2020-12-13
Alj Name: Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Anthony Negrete (petitioner)
Karen Negrete (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Quinten Cupps (HOA attorney)
Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Posted on June 5, 2019 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919047-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Victor L Pattarozzi	Counsel	—
Respondent	Estrella Vista Homeowners Association	Counsel	Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled

Additional Citations:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:09 (89.8 KB)

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

▪ Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

• Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

• “Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

• Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.

Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

• Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

▪ Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

• Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

• Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Stuart Glenn (board member)
Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmittal
Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
Listed in the final section of the document

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on February 4, 2019 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918029-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Nathan Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Val Vista Lakes Community Association	Counsel	Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition

Additional Citations:

33-1803(E)
32-2199.01
33-1803(C)
33-1803(D)
R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:59:54 (88.4 KB)

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:46 (88.4 KB)

Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

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Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

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Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

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Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

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Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.

Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.

📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Nathan Brown (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
Goodman Law Group
Appeared for the Respondent
Simone McGinnis (general manager)
Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Presented testimony
Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
Goodman Law Group
Recipient of transmission
Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
Goodman Law Group
Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
F Del Sol (admin staff)
Transmitted document

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on September 25, 2018 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas P. Satterlee	Counsel	—
Respondent	Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association	Counsel	James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)

Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.

don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

James A. Robles (attorney)
Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol (staff)
Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

Ana M. Olivares (Director)
Pima County Transportation
Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on June 25, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen	Counsel	—
Respondent	Carter Ranch Homeowners Association	Counsel	Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1813
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1813
A.R.S. § 33-1804

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Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-27T09:32:07 (142.9 KB)

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:07 (142.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

• Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

• Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

• Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

• Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

• Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

• Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

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Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.

Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Represented Respondent
Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
Witness for Respondent
Lance Van Horne (Board President)
Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Received decision
Felicia Del Sol (staff)
Transmitted decision

Other Participants

Roxanne Gould (board member)
Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
Steve Brownell (board member)
Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
Trish Brownell (board member)
Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
Steve F. (candidate)
Candidate in board election
Dave (candidate)
Candidate in board election