Elizabeth, Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1

Posted on April 4, 2023 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	23F-H026-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2023-04-04
Administrative Law Judge	Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent, Citation Gardens Cooperative #1, does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, and therefore, the statute prohibiting the denial of solar panels (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Elizabeth Flint	Counsel	—
Respondent	Citation Gardens Cooperative #1	Counsel	Andrew Vizcarra

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1816(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent, Citation Gardens Cooperative #1, does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, and therefore, the statute prohibiting the denial of solar panels (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816, as the ALJ determined a cooperative's purposes and functions are separate and distinct from those of a planned community, excluding it from the planned community definition.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of request to install solar panels

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816(A) by prohibiting the installation of a solar energy device, arguing the Cooperative qualifies as a planned community. Respondent argued it was a Cooperative Corporation, not a planned community, and the statute did not apply.

Orders: No action is required of Respondent in this matter, and the petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1816
A.R.S. § 33-1802
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Solar Energy Device, Planned Community Definition, Cooperative Housing, Statutory Applicability, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1816
A.R.S. § 33-1802
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1030738.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:00:13 (53.2 KB)

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1046844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:00:22 (104.2 KB)

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1030738.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:11 (53.2 KB)

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1046844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:15 (104.2 KB)

This summary outlines the proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the matter of *Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1*, Docket No. 23F-H026-REL.

Key Facts and Hearing Proceedings

The hearing was held on March 21, 2023, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Sondra J. Vanella of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Petitioner Elizabeth Flint appeared on her own behalf, but Respondent Citation Gardens Cooperative #1 did not appear. Respondent's representative, Andrew Vizcarra, informed the Petitioner via email prior to the hearing that he would miss the meeting due to his son's illness, did not wish to reschedule, and asked that the documents Respondent had submitted "stand in his place". The hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence, with the Petitioner bearing the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Main Issue and Legal Arguments

The single-issue petition alleged that Citation Gardens Cooperative #1 violated A.R.S. § 33-1816(A) by denying the Petitioner’s request to install solar panels on her townhouse without providing reasons. A.R.S. § 33-1816(A) mandates that a planned community association "shall not prohibit the installation or use of a solar energy device," notwithstanding any contrary provision in the community documents.

Respondent's Position (as submitted): The statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816(A)) did not apply because the Cooperative argued it is governed solely by the Arizona Non-Profit Corporation Act, is not a "planned community," and the Petitioner is a "Member," not a "homeowner".

Petitioner's Argument: The Petitioner maintained that the Cooperative meets the statutory definition of a planned community (A.R.S. § 33-1802). She argued that a planned community and a nonprofit corporation are not mutually exclusive classifications, noting that the statutory definition for a planned community specifically references a "nonprofit corporation". Furthermore, she asserted that she is both a member and an owner/shareholder (owning 1/44th of the corporation). Since the Respondent did not fall into any of the statutory exclusions for a planned community (timeshare, condominium, or real estate development not managed by an association), the Cooperative must comply with the solar panel statute.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The ALJ issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision on April 4, 2023.

The central legal point was whether the Cooperative qualified as a planned community under A.R.S. § 33-1802. The ALJ acknowledged that the definition of a planned community requires the existence of a nonprofit corporation to own and operate the real estate. However, the ALJ concluded that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community because their "purposes and functions are separate and distinct," despite the statutory definition not expressly excluding cooperatives.

As the Respondent was not found to be a planned community, the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816.

The final order was that the petition is dismissed, and no action is required of the Respondent.

Case

Docket No: 23F-H026-REL
Case Title: Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date: 2023-04-04
Alj Name: Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Questions

Question

Does the Arizona law protecting a homeowner's right to install solar panels apply to housing cooperatives?

Short Answer

No. The ALJ ruled that housing cooperatives do not fit the legal definition of a 'planned community,' so the solar protection statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply to them.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802; A.R.S. § 33-1816

Topic Tags

solar panels
cooperatives
planned community definition

Question

What happens if the HOA or respondent fails to attend the administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The hearing proceeds without them.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Consequently, given that Respondent was properly noticed of the hearing, the hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence.

Legal Basis

Procedural Due Process

Topic Tags

hearing procedure
attendance
default

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The petitioner (typically the homeowner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

burden of proof
legal standards

Question

Is a housing cooperative considered a 'planned community' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

No, a cooperative is legally distinct from a planned community.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802

Topic Tags

definitions
cooperatives
planned community

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Common Law / A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

evidence
legal standards

Case

Docket No: 23F-H026-REL
Case Title: Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date: 2023-04-04
Alj Name: Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal: OAH
Agency: ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Elizabeth Flint (petitioner)
Appeared on her own behalf and testified.

Respondent Side

Andrew Vizcarra (respondent representative)
Tucson Realty & Trust Co. Management Services, L.L.C.
Did not appear at the hearing; also referenced verbally as 'Andrew Biscara'.

Neutral Parties

Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings

Other Participants

James Knupp (Acting Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Listed on the service list for the Order Setting Hearing dated Feb 2, 2023.
Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Listed on the service list for the Decision dated April 4, 2023.
AHansen (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case documents via email address.
vnunez (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case documents via email address.
djones (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case documents via email address.
labril (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of case documents via email address.

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on September 25, 2018 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas P. Satterlee	Counsel	—
Respondent	Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association	Counsel	James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)

Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.

don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

James A. Robles (attorney)
Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol (staff)
Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

Ana M. Olivares (Director)
Pima County Transportation
Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on July 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas Satterlee	Counsel	—
Respondent	Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association	Counsel	James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 622756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:50 (85.6 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:58 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:06 (566.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.

⚖️

17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
Represented himself

Respondent Side

James A. Robles (attorney)
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
Douglas (former ALJ)
Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)

Leckey, Richard M. vs. Dreamland Villa Community Club

Posted on January 26, 2009 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	08F-H089008-BFS
Agency	DFBLS
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2009-01-26
Administrative Law Judge	Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss. The single issue raised by Petitioner regarding proxy votes from 2004 pre-dated the enabling legislation for the OAH's jurisdiction (effective Sept 21, 2006), which does not have retroactive effect. Furthermore, the ALJ ruled that the Respondent's Constitution is not a planned community document subject to OAH jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Richard M. Leckey	Counsel	—
Respondent	Dreamland Villa Community Club	Counsel	Jeffrey B. Corben, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Respondent’s Constitution Article V, Section 1; By-Laws Article X, Sections 1 and 3; By-Laws Article XI, Section 3 and 3(c)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss. The single issue raised by Petitioner regarding proxy votes from 2004 pre-dated the enabling legislation for the OAH's jurisdiction (effective Sept 21, 2006), which does not have retroactive effect. Furthermore, the ALJ ruled that the Respondent's Constitution is not a planned community document subject to OAH jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction over acts occurring prior to enabling legislation and over the Association's Constitution.

Key Issues & Findings

Validity of 404 signatures used as proxy votes

Petitioner challenged the validity of proxy votes from 2004. Respondent argued the act pre-dated enabling legislation and the Constitution is not a planned community document.

Orders: Respondent's Request to Dismiss Petition granted; matter vacated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
A.R.S. §§ 41-2198
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)
Ayala v. Hill, 136 Ariz. 88

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

08F-H089008-BFS Decision – 206585.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:35:45 (75.4 KB)

08F-H089008-BFS Decision – 206585.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:50 (75.4 KB)

Administrative Law Decision: Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative decision in Case No. 08F-H089008-BFS, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute involved Petitioner Richard M. Leckey and Respondent Dreamland Villa Community Club regarding the validity of a 2004 vote that transitioned the Respondent from a voluntary club into a planned community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The ruling established three critical points:

• Statutory Limitations: Administrative agencies possess only the powers granted by statute and lack common law or inherent powers.

• Non-Retroactivity: The enabling legislation providing for administrative hearings in planned community disputes (effective September 21, 2006) does not apply retroactively to acts occurring in 2004.

• Document Definition: A community’s “Constitution” does not qualify as a “planned community document” under A.R.S. § 33-1802, placing it outside the tribunal’s oversight.

Core Dispute and Allegations

The case originated from a January 2004 balloting process conducted by the Dreamland Villa Community Club. This vote resulted in the organization becoming a “planned community”; prior to this, it operated as a voluntary club.

The Petitioner’s Claims

The Petitioner challenged the validity of 404 signatures used during the 2004 balloting. While initially identified as proxy votes, the Petitioner later filed a “Correction of Testimony” clarifying that the signatures in question were counted as either regular or absentee ballots.

The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent violated specific internal governance documents:

• Constitution: Article V, Section 1.

• By-Laws: Article X, Sections 1 and 3; Article XI, Sections 3 and 3(c).

The Discovery Argument

The Petitioner argued that although the act in question occurred in January 2004, he did not become aware of the alleged violations until November 2007. This date of discovery fell after the effective date of the legislation (September 21, 2006) that authorized the Office of Administrative Hearings to oversee such matters.

Jurisdictional and Statutory Framework

The decision heavily emphasized the limited scope of administrative tribunals compared to general courts.

Limits of Agency Power

Citing Ayala v. Hill, the ALJ noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings has no common law or inherent powers. Its jurisdiction is strictly confined to:

1. Determining if an association violated provisions of “planned community documents” (defined as Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, or Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions [CC&Rs]).

2. Determining if an association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16.

Definition of Planned Community Documents

A primary point of contention was whether the Respondent’s Constitution fell under the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The ALJ concluded that the Constitution is not a planned community document as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802. Consequently, the tribunal lacked the authority to address any alleged violations of that specific document.

Legal Analysis and Findings

The Respondent moved for dismissal based on the timing of the events and the nature of the documents involved. The ALJ’s analysis focused on the following factors:

Analysis of Enabling Legislation

The legislation enabling the Office of Administrative Hearings to resolve planned community disputes became effective on September 21, 2006. The ALJ found that:

• The legislation does not provide for retroactive effect.

• A cause of action must come into existence or continue to exist after the effective date of the legislation to be heard.

• The 2004 balloting was a discrete act that occurred prior to the enabling legislation.

Determination on “Ongoing” Disputes

The ALJ rejected the notion that the discovery of the act in 2007 brought the matter within the tribunal’s reach. The ruling stated that the matter did not present an “ongoing or current dispute within the spirit and intent of the enabling legislation.” Because the act itself was pre-legislative, the ALJ determined it did not give rise to a cause of action that could be brought before the tribunal.

Final Decision and Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that because the central issue pertained to an act occurring before the effective date of the enabling legislation, no cause of action existed for the tribunal to adjudicate.

Key Rulings:

• Dismissal of By-Law Claims: It was unnecessary to address the alleged violations of the By-Laws because no valid cause of action existed under the non-retroactive statute.

• Dismissal of Constitutional Claims: The tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the Respondent’s Constitution. Even if the Constitution were a planned community document, the claim would still fail due to the timing of the act.

Final Order: The Respondent’s Request to Dismiss Petition was granted, and the matter was vacated from the docket. Per A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A), the order represents the final administrative decision and is not subject to requests for rehearing.

Administrative Law Study Guide: Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club

This study guide examines the administrative law decision in the matter of Richard M. Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club (No. 08F-H089008-BFS). It focuses on issues of jurisdiction, the retroactivity of legislation, and the definition of planned community documents.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided administrative decision. Each answer should be between two and three sentences.

1. What was the central issue Richard M. Leckey raised during the pre-hearing conference?

2. How did the legal status of the Dreamland Villa Community Club change as a result of the January 2004 balloting?

3. Which specific internal documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument regarding the timing of the alleged violations?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to justify the timing of his petition despite the event occurring in 2004?

6. According to the decision, what defines the limits of the power and duties of the Office of Administrative Hearings?

7. What is the specific jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding planned community disputes?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refuse to address the alleged violations of the Respondent’s Constitution?

9. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the retroactivity of the enabling legislation?

10. What was the final outcome of the case and what is the status of the ruling?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. What was the central issue Richard M. Leckey raised during the pre-hearing conference? The Petitioner sought to challenge the validity of 404 signatures used as ballots during a January 2004 vote. These signatures, which were counted as either regular or absentee ballots, were the basis for the Respondent becoming a planned community.

2. How did the legal status of the Dreamland Villa Community Club change as a result of the January 2004 balloting? Prior to the January 2004 action, the Dreamland Villa Community Club operated as a voluntary club. Following the balloting and the counting of the contested signatures, the organization transitioned into a “planned community.”

3. Which specific internal documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated? The Petitioner asserted that the Respondent violated Article V, Section 1 of its Constitution. Additionally, he alleged violations of Article X (Sections 1 and 3) and Article XI (Sections 3 and 3(c)) of the Respondent’s By-Laws.

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument regarding the timing of the alleged violations? The Respondent argued that the act complained of occurred in 2004, which predated the September 21, 2006, effective date of the enabling legislation. Consequently, they maintained that no violation could be found because the law providing for administrative hearings was not yet in effect.

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to justify the timing of his petition despite the event occurring in 2004? The Petitioner argued that while the act itself occurred in early 2004, he did not become aware of the alleged misconduct until November 2007. He contended that because his discovery of the act happened after the September 2006 effective date, the petition should be considered valid.

6. According to the decision, what defines the limits of the power and duties of the Office of Administrative Hearings? The powers and duties of administrative agencies like the Office of Administrative Hearings are strictly limited to those granted by statute. They do not possess any common law or inherent powers beyond what is specifically authorized by the legislature.

7. What is the specific jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding planned community disputes? The Office has limited jurisdiction to determine only if an association violated provisions of its planned community documents (such as Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, or CC&Rs) or A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16. Jurisdiction is explicitly defined under A.R.S. §§ 41-2198 and 41-2198.01(B).

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refuse to address the alleged violations of the Respondent’s Constitution? The ALJ concluded that the Respondent’s Constitution does not qualify as a “planned community document” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802. Therefore, the tribunal lacked the legal jurisdiction to determine whether a violation of that specific document had occurred.

9. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the retroactivity of the enabling legislation? The ALJ determined that the enabling legislation does not provide for any retroactive effect and only applies to causes of action that come into existence after the effective date. Because the disputed signatures were from 2004, the matter did not represent a current or ongoing dispute within the spirit of the law.

10. What was the final outcome of the case and what is the status of the ruling? The ALJ granted the Respondent’s request to dismiss the petition and vacated the matter from the OAH docket. Under A.R.S. § 41.2198.04(A), this order constitutes the final administrative decision and is not subject to requests for rehearing.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case facts and legal principles outlined in the source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. Statutory Authority and Administrative Jurisdictions: Discuss the significance of the ruling that administrative agencies lack “common law or inherent powers.” How does this principle protect or limit the rights of parties like Leckey?

2. The Principle of Non-Retroactivity: Analyze the ALJ’s reasoning for dismissing the petition based on the effective date of September 21, 2006. Why is the date of the “act” prioritized over the Petitioner’s “date of discovery”?

3. Defining Planned Community Documents: Examine the distinction the ALJ made between a “Constitution” and “planned community documents” under A.R.S. § 33-1802. What are the legal implications for an organization when its primary governing document is ruled outside the jurisdiction of a specialized administrative tribunal?

4. Procedural Dismissal vs. Merit Review: The ALJ decided it was “unnecessary to address the alleged violations” of the By-Laws because no cause of action existed. Evaluate the efficiency and fairness of dismissing a case on jurisdictional grounds before examining the actual merits of the alleged violations.

5. The Transition from Voluntary Club to Planned Community: Based on the context of the case, discuss the legal complexities involved when a voluntary organization seeks to become a regulated planned community, specifically regarding the validity of the balloting process.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1802

The specific Arizona Revised Statute that defines what constitutes a “planned community document.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions for administrative agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Cause of Action

A set of facts sufficient to justify a right to sue to obtain money, property, or the enforcement of a right against another party.

Common Law Powers

Authority derived from judicial decisions and custom rather than from specific statutes; the OAH was ruled not to possess these.

Enabling Legislation

A statute that grants new authority to a government official or agency, such as the law allowing administrative hearings for planned communities effective Sept. 21, 2006.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a legal body to make legal decisions and judgments regarding specific types of cases or documents.

Petitioner

The party who presents a petition to a court or administrative body (Richard M. Leckey in this matter).

Planned Community Documents

Specific legal filings including Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that govern a planned community.

Proxy Vote

A ballot cast by one person on behalf of another; in this case, the Petitioner initially challenged signatures used as proxy votes.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who responds to the allegations (Dreamland Villa Community Club in this matter).

Retroactive Effect

The application of a law to events that took place before the law was passed; the ALJ ruled the enabling legislation had no such effect.

Voluntary Club

The legal status of the Respondent prior to the 2004 vote, distinguishing it from a mandated planned community.

Why the Past Stays in the Past: 4 Surprising Lessons from the Dreamland Villa Legal Battle

The 404-Signature Dispute

In the matter of Leckey v. Dreamland Villa Community Club, homeowner Richard M. Leckey challenged the very foundation of his community’s status. The conflict centered on a 2004 vote that transformed Dreamland Villa from a “voluntary club” into a “planned community,” a shift that fundamentally altered the rights and obligations of every resident.

Leckey targeted 404 signatures used during that January 2004 balloting, which he initially described as proxy votes before clarifying in a “Correction of Testimony” that they were counted as regular or absentee ballots. This case highlights a frustrating reality: what happens when you discover a potential injustice years after the ink has dried on the deal?

The great irony of the Leckey case is that the truth regarding those 404 signatures was never actually investigated. Because of rigid jurisdictional boundaries, the court never reached the “what” of the alleged fraud; it was entirely defeated by the “where” and the “when.”

The “Non-Retroactive” Barrier

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the case primarily because the enabling legislation allowing the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to oversee such disputes did not take effect until September 21, 2006. Since the controversial vote occurred in 2004, the tribunal determined it simply lacked the authority to look backward in time.

This serves as a critical lesson for homeowners: when new laws are passed to provide protections or oversight, they rarely reach back to heal old wounds. In the eyes of the administrative court, the timeline is a hard wall that cannot be breached, regardless of the merit of the underlying claim.

The Myth of “Inherent Power”

Homeowners often walk into a hearing assuming that any judge has the “inherent power” to right a clear wrong. However, as an “Information Architect” of HOA law must warn, the OAH is not a general common law court; it is a creature of statute with a very narrow, pre-defined “menu” of powers.

Unlike a Superior Court judge, an Administrative Law Judge cannot exercise “broad justice” or create equitable remedies unless the legislature specifically wrote that power into the law. If the statute doesn’t explicitly say the judge can do it, the judge cannot do it.

The Structural Loophole of Document Labels

A major component of Leckey’s challenge involved the “Constitution” of the Dreamland Villa Community Club. Here, the court revealed a structural loophole: the OAH’s jurisdiction is strictly limited by A.R.S. §§ 41-2198 and 41-2198.01(B) to specific “planned community documents.”

In Arizona, this “menu” of reviewable documents typically includes Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and CC&Rs. Because the governing document in question was labeled a “Constitution,” the ALJ concluded it was not a planned community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802, leaving the court without the power to even address whether its provisions were violated.

For the homeowner, this is a vital architectural warning: the label of a document can determine your level of legal protection. A community governed by a “Constitution” rather than traditional “Bylaws” may inadvertently—or intentionally—bypass the administrative oversight meant to protect homeowners.

The Discovery Rule vs. The Statutory Clock

Leckey argued that while the signatures were collected in 2004, he did not discover the alleged issue until November 2007—well after the 2006 enabling legislation was in place. He believed this “discovery” should bring his case within the court’s timeframe.

The ALJ rejected this argument, taking a hardline stance on the statutory clock. The court ruled that for a dispute to be heard, the underlying act must be “ongoing or current within the spirit and intent of the enabling legislation,” rather than a completed act from the past that was only recently discovered.

This highlights the high cost of delayed discovery in administrative law. The court prioritizes the finality of the effective date over the homeowner’s personal timeline of awareness, effectively locking the door on historical grievances.

A Final Thought for Homeowners

The dismissal of the Dreamland Villa case serves as a stark reminder that in the world of HOA litigation, jurisdiction and document structure are often more important than the facts of the grievance. If your community is undergoing a transition, “real-time” vigilance is your only true protection; once the statutory window closes, it rarely opens again.

As more voluntary clubs transition into formal planned communities, we must ask: how can homeowners ensure transparency at the moment of change? If the courtroom doors are locked to the past, the only way to protect the future of a community is to get the “architecture” of the governing documents right the first time.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard M. Leckey (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

Jeffrey B. Corben (attorney)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.

Neutral Parties

Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Robert Barger (Director)
Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Listed in mailing distribution
Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Listed in mailing distribution