Paul Herbert vs. Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

Posted on August 29, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-01-03
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	neutral
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brian C. Herbert	Counsel	Jeffrey D. Harris
Respondent	Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association	Counsel	Stewart F. Salwin

Alleged Violations

A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Outcome Summary

The case was resolved by settlement between the parties before adjudication, leading to the vacation of the scheduled hearing and remand to the ADRE.

Key Issues & Findings

Resolution by Settlement

The parties reached a settlement, resulting in a motion to vacate the hearing on the merits.

Orders: ORDER VACATING HEARING; matter remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: settlement

Cited:

A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Settlement, Vacated Hearing, HOA Dispute

Additional Citations:

A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817002-REL Decision – 609956.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-27T09:30:16 (51.3 KB)

18F-H1817002-REL Decision – 584947.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-27T09:30:23 (56.6 KB)

18F-H1817002-REL Decision – 609956.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:06:51 (51.3 KB)

18F-H1817002-REL Decision – 584947.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:06:55 (56.6 KB)

Briefing on Case No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG: Herbert v. Blackstone at Vistancia

Executive Summary

This briefing details the resolution of case number 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG, a dispute between Petitioner Brian C. Herbert and Respondent Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association. The central development is that the parties reached a settlement, leading their attorneys to jointly file a motion to vacate the scheduled hearing. On January 3, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings granted this motion. The hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018, was officially vacated, and the case was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for subsequent action.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG

• Forum: The Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

• Petitioner: Brian C. Herbert

• Respondent: Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

• Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Key Development: Settlement and Hearing Vacation

The primary catalyst for the case’s disposition was a mutual agreement between the parties.

• Settlement Reached: The document explicitly states that the parties “have reached a settlement.”

• Joint Motion: Following the settlement, the attorneys for both the Petitioner and the Respondent filed a joint motion to vacate the hearing on the merits of the case.

• Hearing Canceled: The order formally vacates the “continued hearing that had been scheduled on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.”

Judicial Orders and Disposition

On January 3, 2018, Judge Diane Mihalsky issued two definitive orders that concluded the proceedings at the Office of Administrative Hearings:

1. Order to Vacate: The first order vacates the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018. The document states: “IT IS ORDERED vacating the continued hearing that had been scheduled on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.”

2. Order to Remand: The second order remands, or sends back, the matter to a different state body for final processing. It specifies: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter under A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.”

Parties and Legal Representation

The following table details the key individuals and firms involved in the legal matter.

Name/Entity

Legal Counsel

Law Firm

Contact Information

Petitioner

Brian C. Herbert

Jeffrey D. Harris, Esq.

Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC

[email protected]
8355 East Hartford Drive, Suite 200, Scottsdale, AZ 85255

Respondent

Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, Esq.

Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

[email protected]
[email protected]
1400 E. Southern Ave., Suite 400, Tempe, AZ 85282

Administrative Details

• Order Date: The order was issued on January 3, 2018.

• Transmission: The document was transmitted on January 3, 2018, by “M.Aguirre” via mail, email, or facsimile.

• Recipients of the Order:

◦ Arizona Department of Real Estate:

▪ Judy Lowe, Commissioner

▪ Additional staff: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

◦ Legal Counsel: All attorneys listed in the table above.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG

This guide is designed to review the key facts, entities, and procedures detailed in the legal document concerning the case of Brian C. Herbert v. Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

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Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information found in the provided source document.

1. Who were the two primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG?

2. What was the specific legal action taken by the Administrative Law Judge on January 3, 2018?

3. What was the stated reason for vacating the hearing?

4. On what date and at what time was the original hearing scheduled to take place before it was canceled?

5. Identify the Administrative Law Judge who signed the order and the administrative body she represents.

6. Following the order to vacate the hearing, to which government agency was the matter sent for further action?

7. Which attorney and law firm represented the Petitioner in this case?

8. Identify the attorneys and the law firm that represented the Respondent.

9. What is the full title of the legal document, and what is its case number?

10. Besides the legal representatives for the Petitioner and Respondent, to which organization were copies of the order transmitted?

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Answer Key

1. The two primary parties were the Petitioner, Brian C. Herbert, and the Respondent, Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

2. The Administrative Law Judge issued an order vacating the continued hearing that had been scheduled. The order also remanded the matter to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.

3. The hearing was vacated because the attorneys for both the Petitioner and the Respondent filed a motion to vacate, indicating that the two parties had reached a settlement.

4. The canceled hearing had been scheduled to take place on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.

5. The order was signed by Diane Mihalsky, an Administrative Law Judge. She represents the Office of Administrative Hearings, located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona.

6. The matter was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The order was transmitted to the department’s Commissioner, Judy Lowe, and several other individuals within the department.

7. The Petitioner, Brian C. Herbert, was represented by Jeffrey D. Harris, Esq. of the law firm Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC.

8. The Respondent, Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association, was represented by Stewart F. Salwin, Esq. and Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, Esq. from the law firm Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC.

9. The full title of the document is “ORDER VACATING HEARING.” The case number is No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG.

10. Copies of the order were transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Specifically, they were sent to Commissioner Judy Lowe and six other email addresses associated with the department.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the information in the document. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt.

1. Describe the procedural history of this case as presented in the order. Detail the sequence of events that led to the issuance of this order and explain the mandated next step for the case.

2. Analyze the roles and relationships of all named individuals and entities in the document. Discuss the functions of the Petitioner, Respondent, their respective legal counsel, the Administrative Law Judge, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate within the context of this legal matter.

3. Explain the legal significance of a “settlement” in the context of this case. How did the settlement between Brian C. Herbert and the Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association directly influence the actions taken by the Office of Administrative Hearings?

4. Detail the formal communication process for this legal order. Identify who issued the order, the date of issuance, the methods of transmission, and the complete list of recipients, including their professional titles and affiliations where provided.

5. Based on the order’s text, discuss the legal authority under which the case was remanded. What does the citation of A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) and the subsequent remand to the Department of Real Estate suggest about the jurisdiction and procedural relationship between the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.A.C.

An abbreviation for the Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this document, it is cited as A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) as the legal basis for remanding the case.

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal rulings.

Attorney

A legal professional representing a client. The document lists Stewart F. Salwin, Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, and Jeffrey D. Harris as attorneys for the parties.

An abbreviation for “Esquire,” a courtesy title commonly used for practicing attorneys in the United States.

Hearing

A formal proceeding before a judge or administrative body to resolve a legal dispute. In this case, the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018, was vacated.

Matter

A legal case or issue being considered by a court or administrative body.

Motion

A formal request made by a party to a judge or administrative body for an order or ruling. Here, the parties filed a “motion to vacate the hearing.”

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency in Phoenix, Arizona, responsible for conducting hearings for other state agencies. It is the body that issued this order.

A formal written direction from a judge or administrative body. This document is titled an “ORDER VACATING HEARING.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Petitioner is Brian C. Herbert.

Remand

To send a case back to a lower court or another body for further action. This matter was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who responds to the legal action. In this case, the Respondent is the Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

Settlement

An agreement reached between opposing parties in a legal dispute, resolving the issue without a full hearing or trial. The parties in this case reached a settlement, leading to the motion to vacate.

Vacate

To cancel or make void a scheduled legal proceeding. The order explicitly vacates the hearing that was scheduled for January 5, 2018.

What a Single Page of Legalese Reveals About How ConflictsReallyEnd

We’ve all seen it on screen: the dramatic courtroom showdown. A lawyer points an accusatory finger, a witness breaks down on the stand, and a judge slams a gavel to seal a dramatic verdict. It’s compelling television, but it bears little resemblance to how most conflicts in our society actually end. The real story is often much quieter, hidden in plain sight within documents that most of us would dismiss as bureaucratic fine print.

This single page, an “Order Vacating Hearing” filed away in a public record, is more than just paper. This seemingly inert document upends the Hollywood version of justice and reveals three powerful truths about how our society actually functions. It’s a window into the hidden world of negotiation, procedure, and resolution that keeps our civil society from grinding to a halt.

By closely examining this order, we can uncover a story not of courtroom battles, but of quiet compromise and the powerful machinery of resolution.

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1. The Real Drama Happens Off-Screen

The most pivotal moment in this legal dispute wasn’t a climactic courtroom argument; it was an event that happened entirely behind the scenes, just before the curtain was set to rise.

An order signed by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky shows that a formal hearing was scheduled for January 5, 2018. But the order canceling that hearing was issued on January 3, 2018—a mere two days before the parties were due in court. This two-day window is where the real lawyering happens. Imagine the flurry of phone calls, the redlined settlement drafts exchanged via email, and the strategic calculations of risk versus reward that led both sides to step back from the brink. This underscores a fundamental reality of the legal system: the primary goal is often resolution, not a zero-sum victory, in order to avoid the high cost of litigation, the uncertainty of a judge’s ruling, and the immense investment of time and emotional energy.

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2. Every Dispute is a Cog in a Larger Machine

While this case involved a dispute between an individual and a community association, the document reveals a surprisingly large cast of characters. Resolving the matter required the involvement of a complex network of official entities and professionals.

A quick scan of the order shows just how many parties are plugged into this single conflict:

• The Petitioner: Brian C. Herbert

• The Respondent: Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

• The Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings

• The Law Firms: Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC, and Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC

• The Regulatory Body: The Arizona Department of Real Estate

But the story doesn’t end with a simple settlement between two parties. The order states the matter is being “remanded… to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.” From a procedural standpoint, this is significant. Remanding means sending the case back to the original agency that handled it. What this signals is that a private agreement doesn’t necessarily end the state’s interest. The regulatory body still has a role to play, ensuring the settlement aligns with public rules or addressing any remaining compliance issues.

The document’s final page reinforces this, showing it was formally transmitted not just to the lawyers, but to a list of at least six different officials at the Arizona Department of Real Estate, ensuring the entire regulatory apparatus was kept in the loop. This machinery, while complex, ensures that even a local conflict is handled within a structured, accountable system of oversight.

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3. The Most Powerful Words Aren’t in the Verdict

We often search for resolution in a judge’s lengthy, detailed ruling, full of complex legal reasoning and citations. But in this case, the single phrase that resolves the entire matter is disarmingly simple. It’s a quiet declaration of fact, not a thundering judgment.

The order states that the hearing is being vacated for one direct reason:

…because they have reached a settlement.

This short clause is far more than procedural boilerplate; it represents a fundamental shift in power. A verdict is an imposed resolution, where a third party dictates the ending. A settlement, however, is an act of agency and control. It signifies that the parties have chosen to take the outcome out of a judge’s hands and write their own ending. These six words represent the power of negotiated resolution over imposed confrontation—a conclusion built by the parties themselves, who chose compromise to avoid the risks and costs of continued conflict.

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Conclusion: The Story in the Silence

A single, seemingly mundane administrative order tells a profound story about how our society manages conflict. It reveals that the real work often happens not in a noisy courtroom, but in a quiet agreement. It shows that even small disputes are handled by a vast, interconnected system designed to ensure fairness and order. And it reminds us that the most powerful outcome is often the one achieved through mutual consent.

This perceived lack of drama is not a bug in the system; it is the core feature of a stable civil society. The quiet, predictable processes and behind-the-scenes compromises are what we value over chaotic and uncertain public battles. The next time you encounter a piece of official jargon or a formal notice, what hidden story of conflict and resolution might be waiting to be discovered?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Paul Herbert (petitioner)
Original petitioner in the related docket (18F-H1817002-REL); conceded he is the beneficiary, not the owner/trustee.
Brian C. Herbert (petitioner)
Petitioner in docket 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG; identified as the trustee of the trust that owns the property.

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
OAH
Administrative Law Judge who issued the Recommended Order of Dismissal.
Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
OAH
Administrative Law Judge who issued the Order Vacating Hearing due to settlement.
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
ADRE
M. Aguirre (staff)
Listed in electronic transmission.
LDettorre (staff)
ADRE
Electronic transmission recipient.
AHansen (staff)
ADRE
Electronic transmission recipient.
djones (staff)
ADRE
Electronic transmission recipient.
DGardner (staff)
ADRE
Electronic transmission recipient.
ncano (staff)
ADRE
Electronic transmission recipient.

Other Participants

Stewart F. Salwin (attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Jeffrey D. Harris (attorney)
Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC

James and Shawna Larson vs. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Posted on August 24, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	James and Shawna Larson	Counsel	Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent	Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.

Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:44 (105.0 KB)

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:48 (53.0 KB)

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:53 (385.9 KB)

Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.

Study Guide: Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?

3. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?

4. What was the central dispute that was ultimately decided in the November 20, 2017, hearing?

5. According to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision, what is the legal classification of the petitioners’ patio cover?

6. Which specific sections of the CC&Rs did the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, cite as the basis for its authority?

7. What key reasons did project manager Wayne King provide to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?

8. Describe the significant difference in the cost estimates for removing and replacing the patio cover as presented by the Petitioners versus the Respondent’s project manager.

9. What was the final ruling regarding who was financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the patio cover?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the Larsons’ petition following the final hearing, and which party was deemed the “prevailing party”?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which is their homeowner’s association (HOA). The dispute arose from the HOA’s plan to repair and paint the building exteriors.

2. ALJ Marwil initially recommended dismissal due to a “lack of justiciable controversy.” She found that the Petitioners had failed to cite any provision of the CC&Rs that the Respondent had currently violated, as the threatened action to remove the patio cover was speculative and had not yet occurred.

3. Commissioner Lowe rejected the dismissal because she found the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent that questioned whether “the presence of the awning [is] a violation of the Association’s governing documents,” which she interpreted as the Respondent alleging a violation.

4. The central dispute was whether the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation had the authority to mandate that homeowners, specifically the Larsons, remove their patio covers at their own expense to facilitate a building repair and painting project.

5. The final decision classifies the Petitioners’ patio cover as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). This classification was crucial to determining financial responsibility.

6. The Respondent cited sections 9 and 9(b) of the CC&Rs. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the authority to take “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep” of those exteriors.

7. Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to properly and safely complete the work using scaffolding, as required by modern safety laws. He also stated that removal was needed to repair improperly flashed areas behind the covers and to ensure the painting contractor would provide a warranty for the project.

8. The Petitioners presented bids showing the cost to remove and rebuild the cover would be between $3,980 and $5,975. In contrast, Mr. King opined these estimates were very high and that the cost should be closer to $1,000 if existing materials were reused.

9. The final ruling, based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), was that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose, the cost of reinstalling it. This is because the patio cover is a limited common element assigned specifically to their unit.

10. The final outcome was the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition. The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Use the provided documents to construct a detailed, evidence-based response.

1. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial filing to the final decision. Discuss the key turning points, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the reasoning behind the final judgment.

2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent in the November 2017 hearing. On what specific statutes and CC&R provisions did each side rely, and how did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately interpret these documents?

3. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in this case, specifically focusing on the evidence provided by project manager Wayne King. How did his testimony regarding safety, project requirements, and cost estimates influence the Administrative Law Judge’s findings on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s actions?

4. Discuss the legal concept of a “limited common element” as defined and applied in the source documents. Explain how this classification was central to the final decision regarding financial responsibility for the patio cover’s removal and reinstallation.

5. The initial Administrative Law Judge found no “justiciable controversy,” while the Commissioner later found the matter “ripe for adjudication.” Based on the details in all three documents, explain the arguments for both positions and analyze why the case ultimately proceeded to a full hearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official in the Office of Administrative Hearings who adjudicates complaints regarding condominium and planned community documents and ensures compliance with relevant statutes.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The documents that govern the community and are described as a contract between the homeowner’s association and the homeowners.

Justiciable Controversy

A real dispute that a tribunal has the authority to resolve. The initial petition was recommended for dismissal for a lack of a justiciable controversy because the Respondent’s threatened actions were deemed speculative.

Limited Common Element

A legal classification for property defined under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). In this case, the Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as such, meaning any common expense associated with its maintenance, repair, or replacement is assessed against the unit to which it is assigned.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Department of Real Estate to initiate a complaint against a homeowner’s association.

Petitioner

The party that files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowners James and Shawna Larson.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that is successful in a legal dispute. In the final order, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Ripe for Adjudication

A term used by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate to indicate that a dispute is ready to be formally heard and decided by the Administrative Law Judge.

Select all sources

583987.pdf

585505.pdf

605540.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL-RHG

3 sources

These documents chronicle the legal dispute between James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent) concerning the removal of the Larsons’ patio cover for building maintenance. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissal because the Petitioners did not allege a current violation of the governing documents, thus lacking a justiciable controversy since the association had only threatened action. However, the Department of Real Estate Commissioner rejected this recommendation, asserting that a violation of the governing documents was alleged by the Respondent, making the matter ripe for adjudication. Following a rehearing, a different ALJ issued a final decision finding that the Respondent acted reasonably in requiring the patio cover removal for safe and proper painting and repairs, concluding that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation as the cover is a limited common element.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

James Larson (petitioner)
Shawna Larson (petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger (attorney)
Counsel for Petitioners

Respondent Side

Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
Brown Alcott PLLC
Counsel for Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Wayne King (witness)
Project manager hired by Respondent for the painting project; provided testimony

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Authored Recommended Order Dismissal dated August 25, 2017
Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Authored Administrative Law Judge Decision dated December 11, 2017
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Rejected Recommendation of Dismissal
Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
Transmitted documents (Order Rejecting Recommendation of Dismissal)

Other Participants

Chris Morga (contractor)
Jacob and Co.
Mentioned as a vendor who could remove patio covers

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on July 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas Satterlee	Counsel	—
Respondent	Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association	Counsel	James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1802
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 622756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:50 (85.6 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:58 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:06 (566.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.

⚖️

17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
Represented himself

Respondent Side

James A. Robles (attorney)
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
Douglas (former ALJ)
Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)