David Y. Samuels v. The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H025-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-04-18
Administrative Law Judge Amy M. Haley
Outcome The petition filed by David Y. Samuels against The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association was dismissed. The Tribunal found that Samuels lacked standing to bring the action as an individual, and the cited statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (Planned Community Act), was improper for this condominium dispute.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David Y. Samuels Counsel
Respondent The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association Counsel Ashley N. Turner

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Outcome Summary

The petition filed by David Y. Samuels against The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association was dismissed. The Tribunal found that Samuels lacked standing to bring the action as an individual, and the cited statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (Planned Community Act), was improper for this condominium dispute.

Why this result: Petitioner lacked standing because the property was owned by Daso Properties, LLC, not by David Y. Samuels individually. Additionally, the Petitioner brought the action under the incorrect statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs planned communities, not condominiums.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation concerning late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessment payments

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 by charging unwarranted late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessments.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed because Petitioner lacked standing as an individual owner, and the cause of action was brought under the improper statute (Planned Community Act) for a condominium property.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: standing, condominium, planned community act, statutory violation, late fees, collection fees, attorney fees, jurisdiction, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-106(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1124651.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1133120.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1134423.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139633.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139646.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1157271.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1168680.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1124651.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:03:59 (48.4 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1133120.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:01 (39.9 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1134423.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139633.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139646.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1157271.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1168680.pdf

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This summary outlines the proceedings, arguments, and final decision in the matter of *David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association*, Case No. 24F-H025-REL, heard before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Amy M. Haley of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Background

The case concerned a dispute over fees, fines, and assessments related to a condominium unit located in Mesa, Arizona. The property owner is Daso Properties, LLC, and the Petitioner, David Y. Samuels, is the managing member who filed the petition on his own behalf. The Respondent is The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association (HOA). Samuels filed the petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department) around November 1, 2023, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 by charging late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees without documentation demonstrating they were warranted.

Hearing Proceedings and Key Arguments (April 3, 2024)

The hearing focused heavily on the status of the homeowner ledger and procedural issues.

Petitioner's Argument: Mr. Samuels argued that the HOA’s collection efforts were unethical or illegal. He contended that many of the late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees stemmed from a prior balance of $931.95 that was later forgiven or waived because the HOA or prior management companies could not provide documentation to support the charge. He argued that if the unsupported prior balance was removed, he was current (or even ahead) on assessments until 2024, rendering the substantial collection fees unreasonable. Additionally, fines totaling $1,645 were waved, which Samuels asserted was due to the charges being erroneous, not a "good faith gesture".

Respondent's Argument: The HOA, represented by counsel Ashley Turner, denied any statutory violation and asserted that the association was authorized to collect late fees and collection charges due to a delinquency that existed when the matter was referred for collections. More critically, the HOA raised two procedural arguments:

  1. Improper Statute: The HOA is a condominium association, governed by A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 9, yet the petition was brought under A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs planned communities.
  2. Lack of Standing: Mr. Samuels, as an individual, was not the legal "owner" of the unit (Daso Properties, LLC), and therefore lacked standing to bring the petition under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A).

Legal Outcome and Final Decision

The ALJ issued a decision on April 18, 2024, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803.

The petition was dismissed based on two fundamental legal flaws:

  1. Lack of Standing: The Tribunal found that David Y. Samuels, as an individual and not the property owner (Daso Properties, LLC), did not have standing to bring the action under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A).
  2. Improper Cause of Action: The Tribunal found that the statute cited, A.R.S. § 33-1803, was improper because the property is a condominium, not a planned community, meaning the Respondent was not subject to that chapter. Consequently, Petitioner stated no claim upon which relief could be granted under the cited statute.

The petition was ordered dismissed.

Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Y. Samuels (petitioner)
    Daso Properties, LLC
    Managing member of the property owner (Daso Properties, LLC); Appeared on his own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Turner (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Council for respondent; Also appeared as Ashley N. Moscarello in earlier filings.
  • Alyssa Butler (community manager)
    The Management Trust (TMT)
    Witness for the association.
  • Stephanie Beck (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.
  • Catherine Green (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.

Neutral Parties

  • Amy M. Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Conducted the hearing and issued the final decision.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Issued an order on March 19, 2024.
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • M. Neat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • A. Kowaleski (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • G. Osborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].

Gregory Ehle V. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-07-11
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition after finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency board meeting. The evidence established that no such meeting took place, and the statute does not require the Board to hold one.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory Ehle Counsel
Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Emily H. Mann, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition after finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency board meeting. The evidence established that no such meeting took place, and the statute does not require the Board to hold one.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, as he conceded he did not know if an emergency meeting was held and could not provide legal authority showing that one was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding an emergency meeting of the board members.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning the procedures for an emergency board meeting, specifically regarding a message sent out by the HOA's managing agent. The case proceeded on this single issue after Petitioner failed to pay the required additional filing fees for four total issues claimed.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not hold an emergency board meeting and was not required by A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) to hold one.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: emergency meeting, board of directors, failure to pay filing fee, burden of proof, dismissal, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964714.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964973.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965150.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965339.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967084.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967089.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967102.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 973304.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 977404.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 982867.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:36 (48.2 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964973.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:39 (18.9 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965150.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:42 (44.4 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965339.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:46 (40.0 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967084.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:50 (55.7 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967089.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:54 (45.1 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967102.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:44:59 (7.1 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 973304.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:02 (47.0 KB)

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 977404.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 982867.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:09 (106.4 KB)

This summary details the proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the administrative hearing case of *Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association* (No. 22F-H2222031-REL), held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner Gregory Ehle filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (AZDRE) around February 2, 2022, alleging four separate violations by the Respondent, Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association (Fulton Ranch). Ehle paid a $500 filing fee, but the tribunal ordered him to remit an additional $1,500 for the four claims. Ehle failed to pay the outstanding fee by the deadline (May 6, 2022). Consequently, and because Ehle failed to notify the tribunal of his preferred single issue, the ALJ determined that the sole issue to be addressed at the June 21, 2022, hearing was an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency meeting of the board members.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Arguments

The hearing took place on June 21, 2022. Petitioner Ehle, appearing on his own behalf, initially failed to appear, but the hearing proceeded after he connected virtually.

Petitioner's Argument: Ehle contended that a November 12, 2020, notice issued by Fulton Ranch regarding the cessation of responses to his emails constituted a matter of urgency that should have necessitated an emergency board meeting. Ehle alleged that if an emergency meeting had been conducted, the required minutes were not published at the next regular board meeting. However, under examination, Ehle conceded that he was unaware of whether an emergency board meeting was actually held.

Respondent's Argument: Fulton Ranch, represented by Emily Mann, Esq., argued for dismissal on multiple grounds, including a potential bar by the one-year statute of limitations. The primary argument, supported by testimony from Kevin Hearty (Division Vice President for the community manager, CCMC), was that no emergency board meeting occurred between September 2020 and November 12, 2020. Fulton Ranch asserted that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) governs the *procedure* for an emergency meeting, and since no meeting was held, no violation of the procedure could have occurred.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The ALJ issued the decision on July 11, 2022.

Key Legal Points and Findings:

  1. Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
  2. The weight of the evidence showed that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting regarding the decision concerning Mr. Ehle's emails.
  3. The ALJ explicitly concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) allows the Board to conduct an emergency meeting, but the statute does not require the Board to hold one. Ehle failed to provide legal authority supporting his contention that a meeting was mandatory.

Final Decision: Because Ehle failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2), the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition.

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory Ehle (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself.

Respondent Side

  • Emily H. Mann (HOA attorney)
    Phillips, Maceyko & Battock, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association.
  • Kevin Hardy (witness)
    CCMC
    Division Vice President for Fulton Ranch's Community Manager (CCMC).

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • A. Hansen (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • v. nunez (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • d. jones (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • l. abril (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.

Other Participants

  • Natasha Bell (community manager)
    CCMC
    Former CCMC employee who served as the association's community manager in 2020.

Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222035-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-06-24
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition filed by Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh against the Cimmarron Superstition HOA be dismissed, as the Petitioners failed to appear at the hearing set on their behalf and thus failed to meet the required burden of proof.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh Counsel
Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA Counsel Christopher Hanlon

Alleged Violations

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition filed by Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh against the Cimmarron Superstition HOA be dismissed, as the Petitioners failed to appear at the hearing set on their behalf and thus failed to meet the required burden of proof.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to appear at the hearing on June 24, 2022, and consequently did not present evidence to satisfy the burden of proof required under A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Key Issues & Findings

Petition Dismissal for Failure to Appear

Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and therefore presented no evidence to meet their burden of proof.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: dismissal, failure to appear, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 968715.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:48:17 (33.0 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 969556.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:48:21 (48.5 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 979812.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:48:25 (72.2 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 989050.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:48:28 (39.3 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 968715.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:27 (33.0 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 969556.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:30 (48.5 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 979812.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:33 (72.2 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 989050.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:36 (39.3 KB)

This summary addresses the hearing proceedings, key facts, main legal points, and final administrative outcome of the matter involving Petitioners Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh versus Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA, identified as Case No. 22F-H2222035-REL, heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Proceedings

The hearing in this matter was scheduled for June 24, 2022. The Petitioners, Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Christopher Hanlon, Esq., appeared on behalf of the Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA.

During the proceeding, Mr. Hanlon informed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, that he had learned the previous night that his key witness had tested positive for COVID and could not physically attend. Although Mr. Hanlon suggested arguing his pending motion to dismiss, the ALJ waited approximately 15 minutes, allowing a grace period, as Petitioners were representing themselves in this specific OAH matter. The Petitioners did not contact the OAH to request a delay, appear in person, or file a request to appear telephonically.

Main Legal Issues and Rationale

The central legal point supporting the decision was the allocation of the burden of proof. Pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, the burden of proof rested solely upon the Petitioners.

By failing to appear at the hearing, the Petitioners did not present any evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof.

Outcome and Final Decision

Based on the Petitioners' failure to appear and subsequent failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a Decision ordering that the petition is dismissed.

This Order was issued on June 24, 2022. The decision was declared binding on the parties unless a rehearing was granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04, requiring a request for rehearing to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

The Petitioners subsequently filed a "Notice of action (appeal)" on July 21, 2022. However, the OAH determined on August 2, 2022, that these documents would not be considered because no further action could be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving the claims in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the burden of proof lies with the party bringing the action (the Petitioners). If they fail to present evidence to support their petition, they cannot prevail.

Alj Quote

The burden of proof in this matter is on Petitioners. See A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I fail to attend my scheduled administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The petition will likely be dismissed because you failed to meet the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

Attendance is mandatory to present evidence. If a petitioner fails to appear, they offer no evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ will find that they failed to meet the burden of proof and will order the petition dismissed.

Alj Quote

By failing to appear at the hearing, Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Failure to Prosecute / Default

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements
  • dismissal

Question

Is there a grace period if I am late to my hearing?

Short Answer

The judge may allow a short grace period (e.g., 15 minutes), but if you do not appear or contact the office by then, the hearing proceeds without you.

Detailed Answer

In this specific instance, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM, but the judge noted on the record that the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 AM to allow for a grace period. Since no one appeared or contacted the office to request a delay, the dismissal proceeded.

Alj Quote

Although the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 a.m., no one appeared on behalf of Petitioners through an attorney, or contact the OAH to request that the start of the hearing be further delayed.

Legal Basis

Procedural Discretion

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing after a decision is issued?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing with the Commissioner within 30 days of service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party disagrees with the ALJ's decision, they have a strict 30-day window from the date of service of the order to file a request for a rehearing with the Real Estate Commissioner.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • rehearing
  • deadlines

Question

Can I file an appeal or new documents directly with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) after the case is closed?

Short Answer

No, once the OAH has issued its decision, it generally cannot take further action or consider new documents.

Detailed Answer

Once the ALJ issues the final order or dismissal, the OAH loses jurisdiction to act further on the matter. Subsequent filings, such as notices of appeal or new evidence, will not be considered by the OAH.

Alj Quote

The documents will not be considered because no further action can be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • jurisdiction
  • procedural requirements

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's order automatically binding?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding on all parties unless a rehearing is officially granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ carries the weight of law and binds the parties involved immediately, subject only to the granting of a specific motion for rehearing.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222035-REL
Case Title
Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh v. Cimmarron Superstition HOA
Decision Date
2022-06-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving the claims in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the burden of proof lies with the party bringing the action (the Petitioners). If they fail to present evidence to support their petition, they cannot prevail.

Alj Quote

The burden of proof in this matter is on Petitioners. See A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I fail to attend my scheduled administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The petition will likely be dismissed because you failed to meet the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

Attendance is mandatory to present evidence. If a petitioner fails to appear, they offer no evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ will find that they failed to meet the burden of proof and will order the petition dismissed.

Alj Quote

By failing to appear at the hearing, Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Failure to Prosecute / Default

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements
  • dismissal

Question

Is there a grace period if I am late to my hearing?

Short Answer

The judge may allow a short grace period (e.g., 15 minutes), but if you do not appear or contact the office by then, the hearing proceeds without you.

Detailed Answer

In this specific instance, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM, but the judge noted on the record that the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 AM to allow for a grace period. Since no one appeared or contacted the office to request a delay, the dismissal proceeded.

Alj Quote

Although the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 a.m., no one appeared on behalf of Petitioners through an attorney, or contact the OAH to request that the start of the hearing be further delayed.

Legal Basis

Procedural Discretion

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing after a decision is issued?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing with the Commissioner within 30 days of service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party disagrees with the ALJ's decision, they have a strict 30-day window from the date of service of the order to file a request for a rehearing with the Real Estate Commissioner.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • rehearing
  • deadlines

Question

Can I file an appeal or new documents directly with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) after the case is closed?

Short Answer

No, once the OAH has issued its decision, it generally cannot take further action or consider new documents.

Detailed Answer

Once the ALJ issues the final order or dismissal, the OAH loses jurisdiction to act further on the matter. Subsequent filings, such as notices of appeal or new evidence, will not be considered by the OAH.

Alj Quote

The documents will not be considered because no further action can be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • jurisdiction
  • procedural requirements

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's order automatically binding?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding on all parties unless a rehearing is officially granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ carries the weight of law and binds the parties involved immediately, subject only to the granting of a specific motion for rehearing.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222035-REL
Case Title
Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh v. Cimmarron Superstition HOA
Decision Date
2022-06-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Tosh (petitioner)
  • Elizabeth Tosh (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Christopher Hanlon (HOA attorney)
    Childers Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    Transmitted Decision

Daniel B Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-11
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Daniel B Belt Counsel
Respondent Beaver Valley Improvement Association Counsel Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order dismissing the Petitioner’s Petition because the Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing on March 10, 2022, and thus failed to meet the burden of proof.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing. Petitioner had previously indicated he would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Petition alleging violation

Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and thus failed to sustain the burden of proof required to establish the alleged violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed because Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and failed to sustain the burden of proof.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazzano v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, failure_to_appear, dismissal, rehearing, OAH
Additional Citations:

  • 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • R2-19-119(A)
  • R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • 32-2199.02(B)
  • 12-904(A)
  • 41-1092.01
  • 41-1092.07(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 936420.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:34 (52.8 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 936523.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:37 (6.7 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 942810.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:41 (53.5 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 954077.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:46 (66.4 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 915454.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:49 (133.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcomes of the administrative case Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association (No. 21F-H2121058-REL), a dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Daniel B. Belt, alleged that the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (BVIA) violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(6) by refusing to provide him with unredacted copies of election ballots, a matter he characterized as “voter fraud” and of “life and death” importance.

The case was ultimately dismissed twice. The initial decision on October 5, 2021, dismissed the petition on its merits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the petitioner failed to prove a violation, concluding that the HOA’s community documents permitted secret ballots and that state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4)) prohibited the disclosure of the personal voting information requested. Following the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, the case was dismissed a second time on March 11, 2022, after the petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, thereby failing to meet his burden of proof.

A significant theme throughout the proceedings was the petitioner’s conduct. Testimony from the HOA’s accounting services provider, Planned Development Services (PDS), described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” This conduct included a 45-day picket of the PDS office, verbal threats, and behavior that led PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner and ultimately resign its contract with the HOA. After the initial dismissal, the petitioner filed pleadings demanding that the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings act in an “appellate capacity” to “dispense justice,” a request the Director found he had no legal authority to grant. The petitioner also indicated his intent to not participate in the rehearing and to pursue the matter in federal court.

I. Case Overview and Procedural History

The Core Dispute: Access to Election Ballots

On June 8, 2021, Daniel B. Belt filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged a single violation by the Beaver Valley Improvement Association of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6), a statute governing election materials.

The specific allegation, as articulated in the petition narrative, was that “…PDS refused to give petitioner the ballots containing the names, addresses and signatures, in compliance with ARS 33-1812(6)…”. The petitioner asserted that his petition, which he characterized as addressing “voter fraud,” was a “life and death matter.”

Key Parties

Name/Entity

Representation/Affiliation

Petitioner

Daniel B. Belt

Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent

Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Represented by Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Witness (Initial Hearing)

Petra Paul

Managing Agent, Planned Development Services (PDS)

Witness (Initial & Final Hearing)

William Campbell

Member, BVIA Board of Directors

Administrative Law Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Office of Administrative Hearings

Director

Greg Hanchett

Office of Administrative Hearings

Procedural Timeline

June 8, 2021: Petitioner Daniel B. Belt files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 10, 2021: An initial hearing is held before ALJ Sondra J. Vanella.

October 5, 2021: ALJ Vanella issues a decision dismissing the petition.

January 4, 2022: A minute entry is issued continuing a scheduled rehearing to March 10, 2022.

January 14, 2022: Petitioner files a pleading perceived by the Director as a motion for a change of judge.

January 28, 2022: Petitioner files a subsequent pleading clarifying he is not seeking a change of judge but is demanding the Director review the prior proceeding.

January 31, 2022: Director Greg Hanchett issues an order stating he lacks the statutory authority to review the case in an “appellate capacity” as requested.

March 10, 2022: The rehearing convenes. The petitioner fails to appear. Respondent’s counsel moves for dismissal.

March 11, 2022: ALJ Vanella issues a final decision dismissing the petition due to the petitioner’s failure to appear and sustain his burden of proof.

II. Analysis of the Initial Hearing and Decision

Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The BVIA’s defense centered on the established practice and legal basis for maintaining voter privacy through secret ballots. Key points included:

Policy on Secret Ballots: The BVIA Board of Directors approved a “Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure” on July 10, 2004, which explicitly states that ballots will be folded “TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT.”

Reaffirmation of Policy: In a meeting on May 8, 2021, the Board unanimously passed two motions: one to allow members to review ballots without personally identifying information, and a second to “reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections be conducted with a secret ballot.”

Bylaws Protecting Privacy: The BVIA’s Bylaws (Article VII) explicitly state that “Personal . . . information about an individual Member of the Association” is not subject to inspection by parties other than the Board or its agent.

Statutory Protection: Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) prohibits the disclosure of personal records of an individual member, which includes how they voted.

Constitutional Basis: Board member William Campbell cited Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides that “secrecy in voting shall be preserved,” opining that non-secret ballots would have a “chilling effect” on member participation.

Accommodations Offered: The petitioner was offered the opportunity to review the un-redacted ballots in person (but not take copies) and was provided with redacted copies of the ballots. He refused both offers.

Key Witness Testimony

Petra Paul, Managing Agent for PDS, testified that her company’s contract with BVIA was for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing ballots, collecting returns, and verifying a quorum.

Ms. Paul’s testimony detailed the petitioner’s conduct:

Escalating Demands: The petitioner demanded ballots before the election (which was denied) and demanded un-redacted copies the Monday after the election.

Harassment and Intimidation: Ms. Paul described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” She testified that his actions grew increasingly agitated, that he refused to leave PDS’s premises, and that PDS staff was intimidated and concerned for their personal safety.

Workplace Injunction: The petitioner’s behavior, which impacted PDS’s business operations, culminated in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against him. This came after he spent 45 days picketing outside the PDS office with a large sign that stated, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.”

Threats: The injunction noted threats made by the petitioner against PDS employees, including, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.”

Contract Resignation: Due to the petitioner’s “abusive and erratic” interactions, PDS resigned its contract with the BVIA and demanded its legal fees be paid by the association.

William Campbell testified about the association’s long-standing policy of secret ballots. He acknowledged a procedural deviation—the ballots were folded for secrecy rather than being placed in manila envelopes as stipulated by the 2004 policy—but maintained that secrecy was preserved. Mr. Campbell also testified that multiple opportunities were provided in May, June, and July 2021 for members to view the ballots and confirm their votes were counted, but no one took advantage of the offers in June or July.

ALJ’s Conclusions of Law and Order (October 5, 2021)

ALJ Vanella concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the BVIA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6). The decision found that:

1. The credible evidence established that the ballots were intended to be secret pursuant to community documents.

2. The Respondent was precluded by A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) from disclosing the personal voting information demanded by the petitioner.

3. The petitioner was offered the chance to review the ballots and was provided redacted copies, both of which he declined. Based on these findings, the petition was ordered dismissed.

III. Rehearing Proceedings and Final Disposition

Petitioner’s Post-Decision Filings

Following the initial dismissal, the petitioner requested a rehearing. In subsequent filings, he created confusion regarding his intentions. A January 14, 2022 filing was perceived as a motion for a change of judge. However, in a January 28, 2022 pleading, the petitioner clarified this was not his intent. Instead, he demanded the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings intervene directly:

“if Director Hanchett declines to make the case, with rationale, that the actions of Petra Paul and ALJ Vanella did not constitute the felony crimes as cited by the Petitioner, and if Director Hanchett declines to dispense justice in this case . . . as outlined by Petitioner, those issues will be decided in federal court.

He further stated that the Director did not have the right to “pervert Petitioner’s request… for Impartial Justice and Equal Protection of the Laws, into a motion for a Change of Judge.”

Director’s Response

On January 31, 2022, Director Greg Hanchett issued an order rescinding a prior order that required the respondent to reply to the petitioner’s motion. The Director stated that the petitioner was not seeking a change of judge, but rather “seeks to have the Director review the earlier proceeding in some appellate capacity and pass judgment on the propriety of that proceeding.” Director Hanchett concluded that “There is no authority contained in either statute or rule that would permit the Director to undertake such action,” as an administrative agency has only those powers prescribed by law.

The Final Hearing and Dismissal (March 10-11, 2022)

The rehearing was held on March 10, 2022. The petitioner, Daniel Belt, failed to appear, despite having received proper notice at his address of record and email addresses. The hearing transcript notes that the petitioner had previously stated in a January 14 filing that he “would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

As the petitioner bears the burden of proof, and having failed to appear to present his case, the respondent’s counsel made a motion to dismiss. ALJ Vanella granted the motion. The final order, issued March 11, 2022, dismissed the petition, stating: “Because Petitioner failed to appear, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation by Respondent.” This decision was binding on the parties.

Study Guide for the Case of Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and respondent in this case and state the petitioner’s central allegation.

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did the petitioner claim the respondent violated, and what does this statute generally require?

3. What was the role of Planned Development Services (PDS) in the respondent’s election process, according to the testimony of Petra Paul?

4. Describe the petitioner’s behavior that prompted PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment.

5. According to William Campbell, what was the respondent’s long-standing policy regarding elections, and what documents supported this policy?

6. Explain the two offers the respondent and its agent made to the petitioner to allow him to review the election ballots.

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final order in the initial decision on October 5, 2021, and what were the two key statutes cited to support this conclusion?

8. After filing for a rehearing, what was the petitioner’s stated intention regarding his participation, and what was the ultimate outcome of the March 10, 2022, hearing?

9. What did the petitioner demand from the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings in January 2022, and how did the Director respond?

10. What evidentiary standard was the petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that he met this standard in either the initial hearing or the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Daniel B. Belt, and the respondent was the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (HOA). Belt alleged the HOA violated state law by refusing to provide him with election ballots containing the names, addresses, and signatures of the voters, an act he characterized as “voter fraud.”

2. The petitioner claimed a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6). This statute requires completed ballots to contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but it provides an exception for secret ballots, where this identifying information need only appear on the envelope.

3. Petra Paul testified that PDS was contracted for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing the annual meeting documents, collecting the returned ballots, and reviewing the number of returns to ensure a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the ballots.

4. The petitioner’s behavior was described as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” He picketed the PDS office for 45 days with a sign calling employees “Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars,” made threats such as “You’ll be sorry,” and refused to leave the premises, causing employees to fear for their personal safety.

5. William Campbell testified that the respondent had a long-standing practice of using a secret ballot. This was supported by a Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure approved in 2004 and a unanimous Board vote on May 8, 2021, to reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections would be conducted with a secret ballot.

6. First, Petra Paul of PDS offered the petitioner copies of the ballots with personal information such as names and signatures redacted, which he refused. Paul also offered him the opportunity to review the non-redacted ballots in the office but advised him he could not take them with him.

7. The judge ordered that the petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6), noting that the community’s documents permitted secret ballots, and A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4), which precludes an HOA from disclosing personal records of its members.

8. In a January 14, 2022, filing, the petitioner stated he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.” Consequently, the petitioner failed to appear at the March 10, 2022, hearing, and the judge dismissed his petition for failure to sustain his burden of proof.

9. The petitioner demanded that the Director, Greg Hanchett, review the previous hearing in an appellate capacity, determine if felony crimes were committed, and “dispense justice.” The Director responded that he had no statutory authority to perform such an appellate review and rescinded his order related to what he had mistakenly perceived as a motion for a change of judge.

10. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In the initial hearing, the judge found he failed to meet this burden because the evidence showed the respondent had not violated the law. In the rehearing, he failed to meet the burden because he did not appear to present any evidence at all.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific details and legal principles from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the conflict between a member’s right to inspect association records under A.R.S. § 33-1805 and the protection of individual members’ personal information and voting privacy as outlined in the same statute and the association’s bylaws.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the petitioner in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing. How did the petitioner’s actions (and inaction) directly lead to the dismissal of his case on two separate occasions?

3. Evaluate the actions of the Beaver Valley Improvement Association and its agent, PDS, in response to the petitioner’s demands for election materials. Did their responses align with their own bylaws, state law, and established procedures as presented in the hearings?

4. Trace the petitioner’s escalating behavior as described in the testimony of Petra Paul. How did this behavior impact PDS and ultimately factor into the context of the hearing, even if it was not the direct legal violation being adjudicated?

5. Examine the petitioner’s apparent misunderstanding of the administrative legal process, as evidenced by his filings with Director Greg Hanchett. Contrast what the petitioner demanded of the Director with the actual legal authority vested in the Director’s office according to the case documents.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute concerning the examination of a homeowners association’s financial and other records. It grants members the right to inspect records but also allows the association to withhold certain information, including personal records of individual members.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(6)

An Arizona Revised Statute detailing requirements for ballots used in HOA meetings. It mandates that ballots contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but creates an exception for secret ballots permitted by community documents.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the respondent committed the alleged violation.

Bylaws

The official rules and regulations that govern a corporation or association. The respondent’s Bylaws, specifically Article VII, were cited to justify withholding personal member information.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the HOA in this case.

Injunction Against Workplace Harassment

A court order obtained by an employer to prohibit a person from committing acts of harassment against the business and its employees. PDS obtained one against Daniel B. Belt.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or initiates a legal action. In this case, Daniel B. Belt is the petitioner.

Planned Development Services (PDS)

An HOA management and accounting company. PDS provided accounting-only services to the respondent and was the entity that interacted directly with the petitioner regarding his ballot requests.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative case. It means that the trier of fact must be convinced that it is more probably true than not that the contention is correct.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. PDS reviewed ballot returns to ensure a quorum was established for the respondent’s election.

Redacted

Edited to remove or obscure confidential or private information. The respondent offered the petitioner redacted copies of the ballots with names, email addresses, and signatures removed.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and evidence, which may be granted upon request after an initial decision. The petitioner was granted a rehearing but failed to appear.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the respondent.

Secret Ballot

A voting method in which a voter’s choices are anonymous, preventing intimidation and protecting privacy. The respondent’s bylaws and policies permitted the use of secret ballots for its elections.

An HOA Ballot Dispute, a 45-Day Picket, and 4 Shocking Lessons in Community Conflict

Introduction: When Neighborly Disagreements Go Nuclear

Disputes within Homeowners Associations (HOAs) are common, often revolving around landscaping, dues, or parking violations. But rarely do they escalate into a nearly year-long legal battle involving workplace harassment injunctions and vendor resignations. The story of one homeowner’s quest for election transparency in Arizona serves as a startling case study in how quickly a simple request can spiral out of control, offering crucial lessons for any community association. What began as a demand to see election ballots ended in a dismissed court case, but not before triggering a workplace harassment injunction, forcing its accounting firm to resign, and handing the HOA the bill for its legal fees.

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1.A Request for Ballots Can Escalate into a Harassment Injunction

The dispute began when petitioner Daniel B. Belt filed a petition against his HOA, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association. Alleging “voter fraud,” he demanded copies of unredacted election ballots in a conflict he framed as a “life and death matter.” When the HOA denied his request for unredacted copies, Mr. Belt’s tactics escalated from formal petitioning to direct, public confrontation aimed at the HOA’s accounting firm, Planned Development Services (PDS).

He picketed the PDS office for 45 consecutive days, holding a large sign that read, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.” According to court documents, he also allegedly made threats to PDS employees, stating, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.” These actions crossed a critical legal line, resulting in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner.

This escalation provides a crucial lesson in community governance. The line between passionate advocacy and unlawful harassment is critical because volunteer boards and their essential vendors are uniquely vulnerable. Tactics involving defamatory signage and direct threats don’t just amplify a grievance; they can cripple an association’s ability to function, turning a dispute over records into an existential threat to its day-to-day management.

Ms. Paul described Petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying” and that she and other employees were concerned for their personal safety.

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2.The “Right to Know” vs. The Right to Privacy and a Secret Ballot

The central conflict pitted one homeowner’s demand for total transparency against the community’s right to privacy. The petitioner insisted on receiving unredacted copies of all completed ballots, which contained the names, addresses, and signatures of every voter.

In response, the HOA did not deny access outright but instead offered a compromise. The petitioner was given the choice to either review the unredacted ballots in person under supervision or accept redacted copies with personal information removed. He refused both options. Notably, the HOA went a step further in its attempt to balance transparency with privacy. Board member William Campbell testified that he “devised a way in which he could match a members’ demographic information to the members’ vote if upon Petitioner’s inspection, something appeared irregular.”

The HOA grounded its refusal in multiple sources of authority, citing its own bylaws protecting member information, a long-standing practice of secret ballots, and, most critically, Arizona state law. A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) explicitly permits an association to withhold the personal records of its members. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed, ruling that the HOA acted correctly and that state law sided with protecting member privacy.

Mr. Campbell referenced Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution which provides that “all elections by the people shall be by ballot, or by such other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that secrecy in voting shall be preserved.”

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3.Third Parties Can Become Expensive Collateral Damage

This dispute demonstrates how community conflicts can ensnare and inflict significant damage on essential third-party vendors. The accounting firm, PDS, had a limited, non-managerial role. Its contract was for accounting services only; it facilitated the mailing of election documents, collected the returned ballots, and confirmed a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the votes.

Despite this narrow involvement, PDS bore the brunt of the petitioner’s aggressive campaign. The harassment severely impacted its business operations and, according to testimony, created an “abusive and erratic” environment. This led the firm to take two drastic steps: first, obtaining the legal injunction, and second, resigning its contract with the HOA. Critically, the collateral damage had a direct financial cost for the entire community. Court documents reveal that “PDS demanded its legal fees be paid by Respondent [the HOA]” for the costs of securing the harassment injunction.

This outcome reveals the cascading governance failures that result from such conflicts. When a key vendor like an accounting firm resigns under duress, it creates instability, raises the prospect of missed payments or financial errors, and makes it harder to secure a new vendor, who may now view the HOA as a high-risk client—with any increased costs ultimately passed on to all homeowners.

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4.You Can’t Win a Legal Battle You Refuse to Fight

In a final, counter-intuitive act, the petitioner successfully filed for a rehearing after losing his initial case, earning a second chance to argue his claims. His actions leading up to the new hearing, however, signaled a preference for performative conflict over substantive legal engagement. He attempted to have the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings review the case in an “appellate capacity,” a power the Director confirmed he did not possess, and threatened to escalate the matter to federal court.

Then came the final twist. After securing the rehearing, the petitioner submitted a filing stating he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

True to his word, on the day of the hearing—March 10, 2022—the petitioner failed to appear. As the party bringing the complaint, he carried the burden of proof. His absence meant the judge had no evidence to consider and was compelled to dismiss the case. This chapter serves as a stark lesson in strategic failure. After doing the difficult work of securing a second hearing, the petitioner abandoned the field. The legal system, for all its complexities, responds to procedure and participation, not to external threats or pronouncements. Passionate conviction is powerless if you refuse to show up and fight the battle you initiated.

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Conclusion: Drawing the Line Between Advocacy and Anarchy

The arc of this conflict—from a simple request for ballots to a multi-stage legal dispute that ended not with a bang, but a whimper—is a cautionary tale. It illustrates how a homeowner’s campaign for transparency, when pursued without regard for legal boundaries or civil discourse, can backfire completely. It left a vendor harassed, forced the community to pay its agent’s legal fees, and ultimately left the original issue unresolved. This case leaves all community leaders and members with a critical question: How can we foster a culture that balances the legitimate need for transparency with the equally important need for member privacy and basic civility?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Daniel B. Belt (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Ellen B. Davis (HOA attorney)
    HENZE COOK MURPHY, PLLC
  • William Campbell (board member/witness)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Vice President of the Board
  • Mexal (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as President in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes
  • Sarah Linkey (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as Treasurer in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes
  • Hallett (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as Director in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Listed on initial decision transmission
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Listed on subsequent transmissions
  • Greg Hanchett (Director)
    OAH/ADRE
    Issued order regarding Petitioner's filing
  • c. serrano (administrative staff)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents
  • Miranda A. (administrative staff)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents

Other Participants

  • Petra Paul (managing agent/witness)
    Planned Development Services (PDS)
    Testified regarding PDS's role with Respondent's election
  • Lori Rutledge (unknown)
    Listed on transmission list
  • Brandee Abraham (unknown)
    Listed on transmission list

Ronald Borruso v. Sunland Village East Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronald Borruso Counsel
Respondent Sunland Village East Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq. and Nikolas Eicher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 occurred.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding member speaking rights at May 27, 2021 meeting and unauthorized board meetings concerning Operations Manager job qualifications

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by restricting member speaking rights during deliberations at a special meeting on May 27, 2021, and by holding improperly noticed meetings to approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager.

Orders: Ronald Borruso’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Statute Violation, Burden of Proof, Dismissal, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121062-REL Decision – 912276.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:53 (114.4 KB)

This summary details the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Ronald Borruso, Petitioner, vs. Sunland Village East Association, Respondent (No. 21F-H2121062-REL), heard on September 3, 2021. The Petitioner, Ronald Borruso, alleged that the Association violated its Bylaws and specific provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.

Key Facts and Legal Standard

The Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction over the matter. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the alleged violations occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Borruso refined his allegations to two main issues, both centering on the violation of association meeting requirements under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) and (C).

Main Issues and Arguments

Issue 1: Member Participation at the May 27, 2021 Special Meeting

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged that during a special meeting concerning a recall petition, the Board denied members the right to speak at an appropriate time during proceedings, violating § 33-1804(A). He argued the meeting was improperly divided into a "closed" session where members could not offer substantive comments, followed by an "Open Session Q & A" after adjournment.
  • Association's Argument: The Association maintained there was only one meeting, and it was not a violation to restrict members’ comments until after the Board provided its statements. They argued they used the term "closed" inartfully, noting that members were allowed to attend the entire 3-hour meeting, and ample opportunity was provided for comments during the Q & A session (lasting about 90 minutes).
  • Legal Point: ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(A) permits members to attend and speak at an appropriate time during deliberations, and mandates they speak once after the Board discusses an agenda item but before formal action. The ALJ noted that legally, a "closed" meeting refers to an executive session, which the Board did not conduct.

Issue 2: Unnoticed Meeting to Approve Operations Manager Qualifications

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged the Board held un-noticed meetings to write and approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager, violating sections 33-1804(A) and (C). His primary evidence was a former Board President, Ms. Haynie, confirming in a May 6, 2021 meeting that the Board had written and approved the job description.
  • Association's Argument: Current Board members testified credibly that Ms. Haynie was wrong and that the Board had never met or voted on the job description. The description posted was similar to a previous one, and Ms. Haynie had allegedly prepared and posted it without Board approval.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Borruso failed to meet the required standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on both issues.

  1. Regarding the May 27th Meeting: The Petitioner did not prove a violation of § 33-1804(A). Although the Board was not precise in its terminology, members were allowed to attend the entire meeting, and the evidence showed it was a single meeting where members spoke after the Board's presentation.
  2. Regarding the Job Qualifications: The Petitioner failed to prove that an un-noticed meeting occurred, as the credible testimony indicated that the former President had been mistaken about the Board’s approval. Therefore, there was no violation of sections 33-1804(A) and (C).

The petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronald Borruso (petitioner)
  • Thomas Huston (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nikolas Eicher (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Mark Thurn (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Current Board President, testified for Respondent
  • Marvin Fretwell (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Joyce Haynie (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Former President, subject of recall petition
  • Kim Shallue (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Presided over May 27th meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

——————————————————————————–

3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:02 (99.2 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:06 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772833.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:09 (67.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

“Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Mary J Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mary J Bartle Counsel
Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions

The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.

Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.

The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.

Case Overview

Case Name

Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Petitioner

Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)

Respondent

Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)

Rehearing Date

January 14, 2020

Final Decision Date

January 30, 2020

Procedural History and Core Allegation

The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:

April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.

The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.

September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.

October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.

January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.

At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”

Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings

Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties

The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:

The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.

Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.

Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:

Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:

Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.

Legal Framework and Final Order

Applicable Legal Standards

The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.

Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”

Final Order and Implications

Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:

1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.

2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.

Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?

3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?

4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?

5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?

7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?

8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?

9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?

10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.

2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.

3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.

4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.

5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.

6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.

7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.

8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”

2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?

3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?

4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?

5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.

Bylaws

A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.

Conclusion of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.

Finding of Fact

The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.

A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.

Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?

After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.

However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.

Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win

Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.

The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.

Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:

The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.

This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.

Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken

Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.

Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.

Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”

The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser

It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.

In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:

“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.

One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.

Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners

The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.

While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mary J Bartle (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
  • Edith Rudder (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.

4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brent J. Mathews Counsel
Respondent American Ranch Community Association Counsel Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:46 (112.4 KB)

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.

The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.

1. Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.

2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation

After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:

“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”

The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.

3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events

The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.

A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.

June 2011

The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.

November 23, 2013

Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.

July 30, 2016

Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.

August 2016

Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.

August 9, 2016

The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.

4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning

The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.

A. Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.

B. Variance vs. Amendment

The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.

Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.

Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.

C. The Board’s Delegated Authority

The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:

1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.

2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”

3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.

5. Final Order

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.

Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.

Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?

3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?

5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?

6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?

7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?

8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?

9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.

2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.

3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.

4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.

5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.

6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.

7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.

8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.

9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.

10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.

2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?

4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.

5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Architectural Review Committee

A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.

Bylaws

The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.

Petition

The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.

Variance

An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.

Well Agreement 1

A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.

Well Agreement 2

An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.

Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown

1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome

It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.

That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.

The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.

2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone

Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.

However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees

This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.

This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.

According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.

“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution

While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.

The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.

When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”

The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them

The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.

This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brent J. Mathews (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lynn Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Timothy Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Tiffany Taylor (community manager)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Brad Baker (board member)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Respondent Vice President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Signed transmission page
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient

Other Participants

  • Mark Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Diane Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Steven Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2
  • Frances Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2