Richard E Jewell v. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.

Case Summary

Case ID22F-H2221005-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2021-10-25
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Petitioner's petition alleging the HOA violated conflict of interest statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1811) was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof, as the conflict was deemed sufficiently disclosed prior to the board action.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerRichard E JewellCounsel
RespondentCasa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.CounselNicole Payne and Carlotta L. Turman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging the HOA violated conflict of interest statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1811) was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof, as the conflict was deemed sufficiently disclosed prior to the board action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof on the alleged violation.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Member Conflict of Interest Disclosure

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated the statute regarding conflict of interest when the board hired the board president as a paid office assistant and the conflict was not disclosed by the president. The ALJ found that while the president did not disclose the conflict, the conflict was made known by another attendee prior to discussion and action, fulfilling the statutory purpose.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(c)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 1-211(B)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, Conflict of interest, Statutory interpretation, Board voting
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(c)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 1-211(B)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221005-REL Decision – 920344.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:33 (89.3 KB)

This summary pertains to the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of *Richard E Jewell, Petitioner, vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp., Respondent* (No. 22F-H2221005-REL), heard on October 7, 2021.

Concise Legal Summary

Key Facts and Issues

Petitioner Richard E. Jewell, a homeowner and member of the Respondent, Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp. (an Arizona homeowners association or HOA), alleged that the HOA board violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1811. The central issue was whether the Board of Directors improperly handled a conflict of interest when voting to hire the sitting Board President, George Pavia, as a salaried office assistant.

The Board voted on July 15, 2021, to employ Mr. Pavia for 40 hours a week at a wage of $15.00 per hour. Petitioner asserted that his only issue was that the Board President failed to personally disclose the conflict of interest prior to the action being taken.

Key Legal Points and Arguments

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1811, stipulates that if a contract or action for compensation benefits a board member, that member "shall declare a conflict of interest" in an open meeting before discussion or action. A contract entered in violation of this section is void and unenforceable.

During the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge reviewed evidence, including a recording of the July meeting. The evidence showed:

  1. At the outset of the virtual meeting, Mr. Pavia indicated he would recuse himself from the discussion.
  2. An individual attending the meeting raised the possibility of a conflict of interest.
  3. The conflict was discussed at length during the board meeting prior to any vote.
  4. Mr. Pavia refrained from participating in the vote.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1811 is to ensure HOA members are aware of conflicts prior to discussion. Interpreting the statute to achieve a "fair and sensible result", the Judge determined that the conflict was, in fact, made known and discussed prior to action. The statute's requirement was satisfied, as the fact that Mr. Pavia was not the individual who disclosed the conflict did not negate that the conflict was discussed at length and known to those voting.

Outcome

At the conclusion of the Petitioner’s presentation of evidence, Respondent moved for a directed verdict, arguing the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The motion was granted.

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent acted in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811. The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can an HOA board member also be a paid employee of the association?

Short Answer

Yes, provided the conflict of interest is properly declared.

Detailed Answer

A board member can be hired for compensation, but they must declare the conflict of interest in an open meeting before the board discusses or acts on the issue. In this case, the Board President was hired as an office assistant.

Alj Quote

If any contract, decision or other action for compensation taken by or on behalf of the board of directors would benefit any member of the board of directors . . . , that member of the board of directors shall declare a conflict of interest for that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflict of interest
  • board compensation
  • hiring

Question

Does a conflicted board member have to personally announce their own conflict of interest?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, as long as the members are made aware of the conflict.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the purpose of the law is to ensure members are aware of conflicts. If the conflict is discussed and known to attendees, it does not matter if the specific board member was not the one to voice the disclosure.

Alj Quote

The purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1811 is to ensure that the members of a homeowners association are aware of all conflicts of interest prior to any discussion… not to require that a specific board member announce to those members that such a conflict of interest exists.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflict of interest
  • procedural requirements
  • meetings

Question

Can a board member vote on a contract that benefits them financially?

Short Answer

Yes, after declaring the conflict.

Detailed Answer

State law allows a board member to vote on an issue benefiting them, provided they have declared the conflict in an open meeting before discussion or action is taken.

Alj Quote

The member shall declare the conflict in an open meeting of the board before the board discusses or takes action on that issue and that member may then vote on that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • voting rights
  • conflict of interest
  • board powers

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a complaint against their HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) is responsible for proving their claim. They must show that their version of events is more likely true than not (the greater weight of the evidence).

Alj Quote

At an administrative hearing, the party asserting a claim, right, entitlement, or affirmative defense has the burden of proof, and the standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • administrative hearing

Question

Which specific law covers conflict of interest for HOAs (Planned Communities) versus Condominiums?

Short Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 for HOAs; A.R.S. § 33-1243 for Condominiums.

Detailed Answer

It is important to cite the correct statute based on the type of community. The petitioner initially cited the condo statute (§ 33-1243) but had to correct it to the planned community statute (§ 33-1811).

Alj Quote

Petitioner indicated that he erroneously cited to A.R.S. § 33-1243(C) in his petition as that statute relates to condominium associations rather than homeowner associations. Rather, Petitioner should have referenced A.R.S. § 33-1811…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • statutes
  • jurisdiction
  • legal definitions

Question

Is a contract void if the technical requirements of declaring a conflict weren't perfectly followed?

Short Answer

Likely not, if the conflict was known and discussed.

Detailed Answer

Statutes are interpreted to produce sensible results. If the conflict was discussed at length and everyone was aware, a technical failure (like the wrong person announcing it) may not constitute a violation.

Alj Quote

The fact that Mr. Pavia was not the board member to disclose the conflict does not negate that the conflict was made known prior to any discussion and that the conflict was discussed at length during the board meeting prior to any vote.

Legal Basis

Case Law (Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission)

Topic Tags

  • contract validity
  • statutory interpretation
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221005-REL
Case Title
Richard E Jewell vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
Decision Date
2021-10-25
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can an HOA board member also be a paid employee of the association?

Short Answer

Yes, provided the conflict of interest is properly declared.

Detailed Answer

A board member can be hired for compensation, but they must declare the conflict of interest in an open meeting before the board discusses or acts on the issue. In this case, the Board President was hired as an office assistant.

Alj Quote

If any contract, decision or other action for compensation taken by or on behalf of the board of directors would benefit any member of the board of directors . . . , that member of the board of directors shall declare a conflict of interest for that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflict of interest
  • board compensation
  • hiring

Question

Does a conflicted board member have to personally announce their own conflict of interest?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, as long as the members are made aware of the conflict.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the purpose of the law is to ensure members are aware of conflicts. If the conflict is discussed and known to attendees, it does not matter if the specific board member was not the one to voice the disclosure.

Alj Quote

The purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1811 is to ensure that the members of a homeowners association are aware of all conflicts of interest prior to any discussion… not to require that a specific board member announce to those members that such a conflict of interest exists.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflict of interest
  • procedural requirements
  • meetings

Question

Can a board member vote on a contract that benefits them financially?

Short Answer

Yes, after declaring the conflict.

Detailed Answer

State law allows a board member to vote on an issue benefiting them, provided they have declared the conflict in an open meeting before discussion or action is taken.

Alj Quote

The member shall declare the conflict in an open meeting of the board before the board discusses or takes action on that issue and that member may then vote on that issue.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • voting rights
  • conflict of interest
  • board powers

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a complaint against their HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) is responsible for proving their claim. They must show that their version of events is more likely true than not (the greater weight of the evidence).

Alj Quote

At an administrative hearing, the party asserting a claim, right, entitlement, or affirmative defense has the burden of proof, and the standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • administrative hearing

Question

Which specific law covers conflict of interest for HOAs (Planned Communities) versus Condominiums?

Short Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 for HOAs; A.R.S. § 33-1243 for Condominiums.

Detailed Answer

It is important to cite the correct statute based on the type of community. The petitioner initially cited the condo statute (§ 33-1243) but had to correct it to the planned community statute (§ 33-1811).

Alj Quote

Petitioner indicated that he erroneously cited to A.R.S. § 33-1243(C) in his petition as that statute relates to condominium associations rather than homeowner associations. Rather, Petitioner should have referenced A.R.S. § 33-1811…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • statutes
  • jurisdiction
  • legal definitions

Question

Is a contract void if the technical requirements of declaring a conflict weren't perfectly followed?

Short Answer

Likely not, if the conflict was known and discussed.

Detailed Answer

Statutes are interpreted to produce sensible results. If the conflict was discussed at length and everyone was aware, a technical failure (like the wrong person announcing it) may not constitute a violation.

Alj Quote

The fact that Mr. Pavia was not the board member to disclose the conflict does not negate that the conflict was made known prior to any discussion and that the conflict was discussed at length during the board meeting prior to any vote.

Legal Basis

Case Law (Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission)

Topic Tags

  • contract validity
  • statutory interpretation
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221005-REL
Case Title
Richard E Jewell vs. Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
Decision Date
2021-10-25
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard E Jewell (petitioner)
    Jewell Company Inc.

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Carlotta L. Turman (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • George Pavia (HOA board president/employee)
    Casa Fiesta Townhouses Corp.
    Subject of conflict of interest allegation

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Ronald Borruso v. Sunland Village East Association

Case Summary

Case ID21F-H2121062-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2021-09-21
Administrative Law JudgeThomas Shedden
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.
Filing Fees Refunded$1,500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerRonald BorrusoCounsel
RespondentSunland Village East AssociationCounselNicholas Nogami, Esq. and Nikolas Eicher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 occurred.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding member speaking rights at May 27, 2021 meeting and unauthorized board meetings concerning Operations Manager job qualifications

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by restricting member speaking rights during deliberations at a special meeting on May 27, 2021, and by holding improperly noticed meetings to approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager.

Orders: Ronald Borruso’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Statute Violation, Burden of Proof, Dismissal, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121062-REL Decision – 912276.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:53 (114.4 KB)

This summary details the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Ronald Borruso, Petitioner, vs. Sunland Village East Association, Respondent (No. 21F-H2121062-REL), heard on September 3, 2021. The Petitioner, Ronald Borruso, alleged that the Association violated its Bylaws and specific provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804.

Key Facts and Legal Standard

The Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction over the matter. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the alleged violations occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Borruso refined his allegations to two main issues, both centering on the violation of association meeting requirements under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) and (C).

Main Issues and Arguments

Issue 1: Member Participation at the May 27, 2021 Special Meeting

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged that during a special meeting concerning a recall petition, the Board denied members the right to speak at an appropriate time during proceedings, violating § 33-1804(A). He argued the meeting was improperly divided into a "closed" session where members could not offer substantive comments, followed by an "Open Session Q & A" after adjournment.
  • Association's Argument: The Association maintained there was only one meeting, and it was not a violation to restrict members’ comments until after the Board provided its statements. They argued they used the term "closed" inartfully, noting that members were allowed to attend the entire 3-hour meeting, and ample opportunity was provided for comments during the Q & A session (lasting about 90 minutes).
  • Legal Point: ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(A) permits members to attend and speak at an appropriate time during deliberations, and mandates they speak once after the Board discusses an agenda item but before formal action. The ALJ noted that legally, a "closed" meeting refers to an executive session, which the Board did not conduct.

Issue 2: Unnoticed Meeting to Approve Operations Manager Qualifications

  • Petitioner's Claim: Borruso alleged the Board held un-noticed meetings to write and approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager, violating sections 33-1804(A) and (C). His primary evidence was a former Board President, Ms. Haynie, confirming in a May 6, 2021 meeting that the Board had written and approved the job description.
  • Association's Argument: Current Board members testified credibly that Ms. Haynie was wrong and that the Board had never met or voted on the job description. The description posted was similar to a previous one, and Ms. Haynie had allegedly prepared and posted it without Board approval.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Borruso failed to meet the required standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on both issues.

  1. Regarding the May 27th Meeting: The Petitioner did not prove a violation of § 33-1804(A). Although the Board was not precise in its terminology, members were allowed to attend the entire meeting, and the evidence showed it was a single meeting where members spoke after the Board's presentation.
  2. Regarding the Job Qualifications: The Petitioner failed to prove that an un-noticed meeting occurred, as the credible testimony indicated that the former President had been mistaken about the Board’s approval. Therefore, there was no violation of sections 33-1804(A) and (C).

The petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronald Borruso (petitioner)
  • Thomas Huston (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nikolas Eicher (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Mark Thurn (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Current Board President, testified for Respondent
  • Marvin Fretwell (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Joyce Haynie (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Former President, subject of recall petition
  • Kim Shallue (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Presided over May 27th meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

William Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1817017-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2018-02-02
Administrative Law JudgeThomas Shedden
OutcomeThe Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerWilliam TravisCounsel
RespondentThe Val Vista Lakes Community AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.

Key Issues & Findings

Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.

Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • Bylaws Article VIII

The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.

Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • Bylaws Article VIII
  • Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.

Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812

Related election workflow tool

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:08:39 (125.4 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.

Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1817017-REL

Petitioner

William Travis

Respondent

The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Hearing Date

January 26, 2018

Decision Date

February 2, 2018

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Testifying Parties

William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)

Petitioner’s Allegations

William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:

1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.

2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.

3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.

Key Factual Findings

Election and Nomination Timeline

August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.

September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.

By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.

After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.

October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.

October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.

Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale

• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.

• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.

• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.

• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.

Association’s Position and Testimony

Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.

• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.

• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.

• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.

Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes

The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.

Document/Statute

Relevant Provision

Application in this Case

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”

This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.

Bylaws Article VIII

“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”

Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.

Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.

Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.

The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.

Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.

2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.

3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?

3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?

4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?

5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?

6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?

7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?

8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?

9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?

10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.

2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.

3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.

4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.

5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.

6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.

7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.

8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?

2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.

3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.

4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?

5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Bylaws

The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.

Nominating Committee

A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.

Self-Nomination

The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Proxy Voting

A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.

Prevailing Party

The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.

Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown

Introduction: The Devil in the Details

Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?

A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.

1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline

The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?

Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”

Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.

The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.

2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection

Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.

This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.

Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.

While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.

The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.

3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth

The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.

The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.

This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.

The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.

Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.

The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.

It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William Travis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Nicholas C. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Simone McGinnis (property manager)
    Testified as a witness
  • Cheryl Peterson-McCoy (board member)
    Nominating Committee Chairperson

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Thomas Barrs vs. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1817008-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-12-27
Administrative Law JudgeThomas Shedden
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed Thomas Barrs' petition against the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. The Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 in any of the remaining seven allegations related to record access. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerThomas BarrsCounsel
RespondentDesert Ranch Homeowners AssociationCounselBrian Schoeffler

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Thomas Barrs' petition against the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. The Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 in any of the remaining seven allegations related to record access. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on all claims. In several instances, the Respondent either cured any potential breach (Issue 2), timely complied (Issue 1), or was under no legal obligation to fulfill the request in the manner demanded (emailing records, Issues 3, 6, 7).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure to provide records or copies, specifically via email (Issues 3, 6, 7)

Petitioner requested records (insurance policies, budget, EDC actions) be emailed. Respondent offered examination and purchase of copies. Petitioner declined the offers and blocked the attorney's emails. The ALJD determined the statute does not mandate emailing records.

Orders: Petitioner failed to prove Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding requests for emailed documents, as the statute requires records to be made reasonably available for examination or purchase of copies, not emailed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, HOA records access, A.R.S. 33-1805, right to inspect, email delivery
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133, 407 P.2d 91, 94 (1965)

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

Preview HOABallot election workflows

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H181708-REL Decision – 608861.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:56:45 (120.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Administrative Law Judge Decision in Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 18F-H1817008-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA). The central outcome of the December 1, 2017 hearing was the complete dismissal of Mr. Barrs’ petition. The ALJ determined that Mr. Barrs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1805 regarding member access to association records.

The decision hinged on a key statutory interpretation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 requires an HOA to make records “reasonably available for examination” and to provide copies upon request, but it does not obligate the association to email documents to members. The Judge found that the HOA’s offers to allow Mr. Barrs to inspect records in person were legally sufficient. The failure to access records was ultimately attributed to the petitioner’s own actions, including a self-initiated communication breakdown with a key Board member and a subsequent refusal of the HOA’s offers for in-person inspection. The Judge concluded that for each of the contested allegations, the HOA had either fulfilled its statutory duty, the requested records did not exist, or its attempts to provide access were declined by the petitioner.

Case Overview

Case Name

Thomas Barrs (Petitioner) v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent)

Case Number

18F-H1817008-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

December 1, 2017

Decision Date

December 27, 2017

Central Allegation

The Petitioner alleged nine instances where the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to accommodate requests to inspect or receive via email various HOA records.

Final Disposition

The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Allegations and Findings

The petition, filed on September 4, 2017, contained nine specific allegations of statutory violations by the HOA. These issues and the ALJ’s findings are detailed below.

Summary of Allegations

Request

Date of Request

Finding of Fact

View April 29, 2017 Board election documents

May 19, 2017

No violation; request fulfilled within statutory time limit.

View March 18, 2017 Board election documents

June 17, 2017

No violation; HOA cured any potential breach with offers to inspect, which were declined.

Email copies of insurance policies

July 11, 2017

No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.

Insurance company phone number & policy number

Aug 26, 2017

No violation; Petitioner acknowledged receipt of information.

Email Secretary’s shorthand notes from March 18 meeting

July 11, 2017

No violation; the requested notes do not exist.

Email the annual budget

July 11, 2017

No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.

Email written record of EDC actions after July 2016

July 11, 2017

No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.

Email name of EDC chairperson

July 11, 2017

Withdrawn by Petitioner at the hearing.

Email list of Board meeting dates

July 11, 2017

Withdrawn by Petitioner at the hearing.

Detailed Findings by Issue

At the hearing, the Petitioner withdrew his allegations concerning the name of the EDC chairperson (Issue 8) and the list of past Board meeting dates (Issue 9).

Issue 4 (Insurance Information): The Judge noted that Mr. Barrs “effectively acknowledged that he has received the insurance company’s phone number and the policy number.” No violation was found.

Issue 5 (Shorthand Meeting Notes): The evidence demonstrated that no shorthand notes from the March 18, 2017 meeting exist. The Board had previously informed Mr. Barrs of this fact. Consequently, the Judge found no violation.

The petitioner requested to view documents related to the April 29, 2017, election via an email sent at 8:59 p.m. on Friday, May 19, 2017. The Judge determined that this request was effectively received on the next business day, Monday, May 22, 2017. Under the statute, the HOA had ten business days, until June 5, 2017, to fulfill the request. The HOA made the documents available for Mr. Barrs’ inspection on June 3, 2017, which was within the required timeframe. The decision also dismissed related claims by Mr. Barrs regarding a “late ballot” (which was actually a nomination petition) and “undeliverable ballots” (which did not exist as mailing envelopes had no return address). The Judge concluded the HOA did not violate the statute.

These issues center on a series of requests made in June and July 2017 and a significant communication failure initiated by the Petitioner.

Background: In March 2017, after HOA Board member Brian Schoeffler asked to be removed from a resident email thread, Mr. Barrs ceased all email communication with Mr. Schoeffler and blocked his email address, preventing him from receiving any emails sent by Mr. Schoeffler.

Timeline of Events:

June 17, 2017: Mr. Barrs requested to view the March 18 election ballots (Issue 2). On June 19, Board President Catherine Overby informed him the materials were with Mr. Schoeffler and that he should contact him.

July 11, 2017: Mr. Barrs emailed the Board (excluding Mr. Schoeffler) requesting that the insurance policies (Issue 3), annual budget (Issue 6), and EDC records (Issue 7) be emailed to him.

July 12, 2017: Ms. Overby responded that she would forward the request to Mr. Schoeffler and later stated that Mr. Barrs should go to Mr. Schoeffler’s house to view the records. On the same day, Mr. Schoeffler emailed Mr. Barrs—an email Mr. Barrs did not receive—offering to meet and provide copies.

July 25, 2017: Mr. Barrs informed the Board for the first time that he had blocked Mr. Schoeffler’s emails.

July 28, 2017: Mr. Schoeffler sent another email, offering dates to meet and explaining that the statute required only that documents be made “reasonably available.”

July 29, 2017: Mr. Barrs responded to the Board, stating he “will not stipulate to the preconditions” set by Mr. Schoeffler and concluding that the documents were “apparently” not available.

Finding: The Judge found that the Board responded to the July 11 requests in a timely manner (on July 12) and continued to try and accommodate them. However, Mr. Barrs “initially delayed matters by refusing to contact Mr. Schoeffler and he then declined Respondent’s offers.” For Issue 2, the Judge concluded that even if the HOA had initially failed to provide access within ten days, it had “cured its breach” with the subsequent offers of inspection on July 12 and July 28, which Mr. Barrs declined.

Central Legal Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the burden of proof.

Burden of Proof: Mr. Barrs, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The Judge concluded that he failed to meet this standard on all counts.

Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(A): This was the pivotal legal finding. The statute reads, in part:

• The ALJ concluded that this language does not obligate an HOA to email records to a member. The statutory requirement is satisfied when the association makes the records “reasonably available” for in-person inspection and allows the member to purchase copies (for a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page).

Application to the Case: The HOA’s offer for Mr. Barrs to examine the requested documents at Mr. Schoeffler’s residence and to have copies made fulfilled its legal duty. Mr. Barrs’ insistence on receiving documents via email and his ultimate refusal of the in-person inspection offer were the reasons he did not gain access to the records.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

“IT IS ORDERED that Thomas Barrs’ petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817008-REL, Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Thomas Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final judgment as detailed in the source document.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided case information.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statutes did Thomas Barrs allege the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association had violated?

3. Describe the communication issue involving Mr. Barrs and Mr. Schoeffler that complicated the records requests made in July 2017.

4. What was the Judge’s finding regarding Mr. Barrs’ request for the Secretary’s shorthand notes from the March 18, 2017 meeting (Issue 5)?

5. Explain why the Judge determined that the Respondent’s handling of the May 19, 2017 request for election documents (Issue 1) was compliant with the statute.

6. According to the Judge’s Conclusions of Law, what does ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1805 require of an association regarding requests for records? Does this include emailing them?

7. Which of his initial nine allegations did Mr. Barrs withdraw during the hearing?

8. How did Mr. Barrs respond to Mr. Schoeffler’s July 28, 2017 email, which offered dates to meet and review documents?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bears the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Barrs, the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Barrs filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, while the HOA, represented by Brian Schoeffler, disputed the allegations.

2. Mr. Barrs alleged that the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1805 and 33-1812. The case focused on nine specific instances where Mr. Barrs alleged the HOA failed to accommodate his requests for records under section 33-1805.

3. In March 2017, Mr. Schoeffler asked to be removed from a group email thread. In response, Mr. Barrs stopped sending emails to Mr. Schoeffler and also blocked incoming emails from him, which prevented him from receiving Mr. Schoeffler’s direct offers to inspect the requested documents.

4. The Judge found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that no shorthand notes from the March 18, 2017 meeting existed. The Board had informed Mr. Barrs of this fact shortly after he made his request, and therefore the Respondent did not violate the statute.

5. Mr. Barrs’ request was emailed after business hours on Friday, May 19, 2017, making its effective receipt date Monday, May 22. The Respondent fulfilled the request on June 3, 2017, which was within the ten-business-day timeframe required by law.

6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1805 requires that an association’s records be made “reasonably available for examination” and that copies be provided upon request within ten business days. The Judge concluded that this statute does not legally obligate the Respondent to email copies of records.

7. During the hearing, Mr. Barrs withdrew his allegations regarding the request for the name of the EDC chairman (Issue 8) and the request for a list of Board meeting dates from the prior year (Issue 9).

8. On July 29, 2017, Mr. Barrs responded that he “will not stipulate to the preconditions” Mr. Schoeffler placed on his ability to review the documentation. He stated that “apparently” the documents were not available, effectively declining the offer to examine them.

9. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, to show that the Respondent committed the alleged violations.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Thomas Barrs’ petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay response for each, citing specific facts from the decision.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1805. How did the distinction between making records “reasonably available” for examination versus the petitioner’s demand for them to be emailed shape the outcome of Issues 3, 6, and 7?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Select two of Mr. Barrs’ allegations that the Judge found were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and explain the specific facts that led to that conclusion.

3. Examine the communication breakdown between Thomas Barrs and Brian Schoeffler. How did the actions of both individuals (specifically, Mr. Schoeffler’s request in March and Mr. Barrs’ subsequent blocking of emails) directly contribute to the dispute and influence the Judge’s findings?

4. Trace the timeline and events surrounding the request to view ballots from the March 18, 2017 election (Issue 2). Explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that even if the Respondent had initially failed to grant access, it had “cured its breach.”

5. Evaluate the actions of the Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, in response to Mr. Barrs’ multiple requests. Based on the Findings of Fact, construct an argument that the HOA made sufficient and reasonable efforts to comply with its statutory obligations.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Thomas Shedden) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1805 and 33-1812 were central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. Barrs bore the burden of proof.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Judge applies the relevant laws and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

An apparent committee within the HOA (“Environmental Design Committee” is a common name, though not specified). Mr. Barrs requested written records of all actions taken by the EDC after July 2016.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that outlines the factual determinations made by the Judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Hearing

The formal proceeding where the Petitioner and Respondent present their cases before the Administrative Law Judge. This hearing took place on December 1, 2017.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Judge. In this case, the order was to dismiss the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Thomas Barrs was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this matter. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

This administrative law judge decision concerns a dispute between Petitioner Thomas Barrs and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Barrs alleged that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statutes sections 33-1805 and 33-1812 on multiple occasions by failing to accommodate his requests to inspect or be emailed various association records, including election ballots, insurance policies, and financial documents. The findings of fact detail nine specific requests made by Mr. Barrs, some of which he later withdrew or were deemed satisfied. The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Barrs failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated the statute, noting that the law only requires records be made “reasonably available” for examination and copying, not necessarily emailed. Ultimately, the judge dismissed Mr. Barrs’ petition, concluding that the Respondent was the prevailing party.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Brian Schoeffler (HOA attorney)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Appeared for Respondent; also identified as a Board member
  • Catherine Overby (board president)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate