Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) v. Desert Mountain Master

Case Summary

Case ID21F-H2121055-REL-RHG
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2022-01-31
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
Outcomeloss
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerNicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC)Counsel
RespondentDesert Mountain Master AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge vacated the hearing from the docket because the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew.

Why this result: The Petitioner voluntarily withdrew the request for hearing, leading to the matter being vacated from the docket.

Key Issues & Findings

statute

The party requesting the hearing voluntarily withdrew the matter.

Orders: The matter was vacated from the docket of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Analytics Highlights

Topics: voluntary withdrawal, vacated hearing, continuance granted

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 934279.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:13 (49.2 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 934302.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:18 (8.1 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 942918.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:22 (42.0 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 909217.pdf

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This summary focuses on the procedural history and final administrative disposition of the matter, Case No. 21F-H2121055-REL-RHG, before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Parties

The case involved Petitioner Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. The proceedings were conducted under the authority of the OAH, with Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson presiding over the entries.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Issues

The primary procedural actions documented are two Minute Entries concerning the scheduling and eventual removal of the case from the docket.

  1. Granting Continuance (December 22, 2021): The OAH issued a minute entry granting a continuance of the scheduled hearing, noting that good cause appearing. The matter was reset for February 23, 2022, at 9:00 AM. The hearing was scheduled to be conducted either by video conferencing or telephone participation through Google Meet, though parties retained the option to appear in person at the OAH in Phoenix if they advised the office seven days prior. In-person attendance required adherence to social distancing and masking guidelines.
  1. Vacating Hearing (January 31, 2022): Before the continued hearing date, a subsequent Minute Entry was filed vacating the hearing from the OAH docket.

Outcome and Legal Points

The most significant legal outcome was the termination of the proceedings at the administrative level. The matter was vacated because “The party requesting the hearing has voluntarily withdrawn”. This voluntary withdrawal by the petitioner rendered the scheduled hearing unnecessary and led to the closure of the case on the OAH docket.

Questions

Question

Can my HOA refuse to provide records if I am currently suing them?

Short Answer

Yes, the HOA may withhold records if they relate to pending litigation between the homeowner and the association.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, an association is permitted to withhold books and records if the disclosure relates to pending litigation. In this decision, the ALJ ruled that the HOA could withhold documents regarding a keyless entry system because it related to an ongoing lawsuit regarding short-term rental restrictions (since the entry system controlled renter access).

Alj Quote

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program from Petitioner, due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • pending litigation
  • withholding records

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Section 5.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs, Article III, Section 1 of the Association’s Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • procedure

Question

How much evidence do I need to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You need a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning your claim is more likely true than not.

Detailed Answer

The standard of proof in these administrative hearings is ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ This is defined as evidence that makes a contention ‘more probably true than not’ or carries the greater weight of convincing force.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

How long does the HOA have to respond to my request to inspect records?

Short Answer

The HOA has 10 business days to fulfill a request.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute mandates that an association must make financial and other records reasonably available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Alj Quote

The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • timelines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can the HOA charge me for copies of the records I request?

Short Answer

Yes, they can charge a fee for copies.

Detailed Answer

While the association cannot charge a member for making material available for review, they may charge a fee for providing actual copies of the records. The statute caps this fee.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • fees
  • HOA obligations

Question

What specific types of information can an HOA legally keep private?

Short Answer

The HOA can withhold privileged attorney communications, pending litigation records, closed meeting minutes, and personal or employee information.

Detailed Answer

The law lists specific categories of records that do not have to be disclosed. These include attorney-client privilege, pending litigation, minutes from executive sessions, personal/health/financial records of members or employees, and records related to employee job performance or complaints.

Alj Quote

Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to any of the following: 1. Privileged communication… 2. Pending litigation… 3. Meeting minutes… of a board meeting that is not required to be open… 4. Personal, health or financial records… 5. Records relating to the job performance…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)

Topic Tags

  • privacy
  • exemptions
  • records request

Question

Does a records request have to be directly about the lawsuit to be denied?

Short Answer

Not necessarily directly, but it must ‘relate to’ the pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner requested records about a security entry system. Even though the lawsuit was about short-term rentals, the ALJ found the records could be withheld because the entry system controlled renter access, making the records related to the litigation.

Alj Quote

The evidence presented at hearing shows that the keyless entry program controls renters’ access to Desert Mountain. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program… due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • pending litigation
  • records request
  • scope of discovery

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121055-REL
Case Title
Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) vs. Desert Mountain Master Association
Decision Date
2021-09-07
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA refuse to provide records if I am currently suing them?

Short Answer

Yes, the HOA may withhold records if they relate to pending litigation between the homeowner and the association.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, an association is permitted to withhold books and records if the disclosure relates to pending litigation. In this decision, the ALJ ruled that the HOA could withhold documents regarding a keyless entry system because it related to an ongoing lawsuit regarding short-term rental restrictions (since the entry system controlled renter access).

Alj Quote

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program from Petitioner, due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • pending litigation
  • withholding records

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Section 5.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs, Article III, Section 1 of the Association’s Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • procedure

Question

How much evidence do I need to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You need a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ meaning your claim is more likely true than not.

Detailed Answer

The standard of proof in these administrative hearings is ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ This is defined as evidence that makes a contention ‘more probably true than not’ or carries the greater weight of convincing force.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

How long does the HOA have to respond to my request to inspect records?

Short Answer

The HOA has 10 business days to fulfill a request.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute mandates that an association must make financial and other records reasonably available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Alj Quote

The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • timelines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can the HOA charge me for copies of the records I request?

Short Answer

Yes, they can charge a fee for copies.

Detailed Answer

While the association cannot charge a member for making material available for review, they may charge a fee for providing actual copies of the records. The statute caps this fee.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • fees
  • HOA obligations

Question

What specific types of information can an HOA legally keep private?

Short Answer

The HOA can withhold privileged attorney communications, pending litigation records, closed meeting minutes, and personal or employee information.

Detailed Answer

The law lists specific categories of records that do not have to be disclosed. These include attorney-client privilege, pending litigation, minutes from executive sessions, personal/health/financial records of members or employees, and records related to employee job performance or complaints.

Alj Quote

Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to any of the following: 1. Privileged communication… 2. Pending litigation… 3. Meeting minutes… of a board meeting that is not required to be open… 4. Personal, health or financial records… 5. Records relating to the job performance…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)

Topic Tags

  • privacy
  • exemptions
  • records request

Question

Does a records request have to be directly about the lawsuit to be denied?

Short Answer

Not necessarily directly, but it must ‘relate to’ the pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner requested records about a security entry system. Even though the lawsuit was about short-term rentals, the ALJ found the records could be withheld because the entry system controlled renter access, making the records related to the litigation.

Alj Quote

The evidence presented at hearing shows that the keyless entry program controls renters’ access to Desert Mountain. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program… due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • pending litigation
  • records request
  • scope of discovery

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121055-REL
Case Title
Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) vs. Desert Mountain Master Association
Decision Date
2021-09-07
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nicole Armsby (petitioner)
    NICDON 10663 LLC
    Appeared on behalf of herself, also referred to as Nikki,
  • Jon Dessaules (petitioner attorney)
    Armsby’s attorney, referred to as ‘Dom’,
  • Matthew Hoxsie (petitioner attorney)
    Greenberg Traurig, LLP
    Associate, Armsby’s attorney
  • Jordan (related party)
    Party referenced in communications between counsel regarding conditional approval to speak,

Respondent Side

  • Mark Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Kevin C. Pollock (Executive Director)
    Desert Mountain Master Association
    Also referred to as community manager
  • Curtis Ekmark (HOA attorney)
    Respondent’s attorney, listed as Curtis S. Ekmark in later filing
  • Stephen Prall (witness)
    Desert Mountain Master Association (implied)
    Presented testimony for Respondent
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner as of September 7, 2021
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner as of December 22, 2021
  • c. serrano (administrative clerk)
    OAH/ADRE (transmittal)
    Signed transmittal notices,,

Joyce H Monsanto vs. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1919053-REL-RHG
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-11-18
Administrative Law JudgeDiane Mihalsky
OutcomeThe ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJoyce H MonsantoCounsel
RespondentFour Seasons at the Manor Homeowners AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808; CC&R § 7.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA’s architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both statutory and CC&R violations,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA’s denial of application to install two flagpoles for US and military flags, and alleged failure to follow CC&R appeal process.

Petitioner challenged the HOA’s denial of her request to install two flagpoles, arguing the restriction violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 (flag statute) and that the Board failed to provide a written decision on her appeal within 45 days as required by CC&R § 7.9, which she argued meant the request was deemed approved. The ALJ found the single flagpole restriction reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) since both flags could be flown from one pole, and determined the Board satisfied the CC&R § 7.9 requirement by posting the decision in the meeting minutes within 45 days,.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied, as she failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board should not have denied her application under A.R.S. § 33-1808 or CC&R § 7. The Board can properly find Petitioner in violation of Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag display, Architectural Guidelines, CC&Rs, Statutory compliance, Planned Communities Act, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R § 7

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 749213.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:16 (163.6 KB)

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 753595.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:19 (163.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal reasoning from the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Joyce H. Monsanto versus the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). The central conflict revolves around the HOA’s denial of Ms. Monsanto’s request to install two separate flagpoles on her home to display the United States flag and the United States Marine Corps flag. The petitioner alleged this denial violated Arizona state law and the HOA’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision established two critical points: first, that the HOA’s rule limiting homeowners to a single flagpole is a “reasonable” regulation on the “placement and manner of display” explicitly permitted under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1808(B), and does not constitute a prohibition of flag display. Second, the HOA was found to have complied with its own appeal process as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The ALJ concluded that an oral denial at a board meeting, later documented in publicly posted meeting minutes, satisfied the CC&R’s requirement to “render its written decision” within a 45-day timeframe. The ruling affirms an HOA’s authority to enforce uniform aesthetic standards, provided they are reasonable and applied according to the association’s governing documents.

Case Background and Procedural History

The case was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) following a petition filed by homeowner Joyce H. Monsanto (“Petitioner”) against her HOA, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (“Respondent”).

Initial Petition: On March 6, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803) and its CC&Rs (§ 7.9) by refusing to approve her request for two flagpoles.

First Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on May 30, 2019, after which the ALJ found that the Petitioner had not proven any violation by the HOA.

Rehearing: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing on August 22, 2019. This rehearing took place on October 21, 2019.

Amended Decision: On November 18, 2019, ALJ Diane Mihalsky issued an Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision, again denying the Petitioner’s petition and affirming the previous findings. The amendment was issued to correct a typographical error and clarify the parties’ appeal rights.

The Core Dispute: A Request for Two Flagpoles

The petitioner, whose husband and two sons have long careers in the U.S. Marines and Coast Guard, sought to display both the U.S. flag and the U.S. Marine Corps flag on her home.

The Application: On August 31, 2018, she submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house, flanking her front door.

The Rationale: The Petitioner stated her desire for two separate poles was for aesthetic reasons, believing the display would look better. She also expressed concern that a single, larger flagpole installed in her front yard would obstruct the view from her front window.

The Denial: On September 22, 2018, the HOA’s Architectural Committee issued a written Notice of Disapproval, citing the Architectural Guidelines which permit only one flagpole per lot.

The Appeal: On October 1, 2018, the Petitioner submitted a written appeal to the HOA Board, arguing the denial was unreasonable, that the guidelines were not uniformly enforced, and that the board could grant a waiver under CC&R § 7.6.

Governing Rules and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of Arizona state law and the HOA’s specific governing documents.

Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808

This statute governs the right of homeowners to display certain flags.

Protection of Display: Subsection A states that an association “shall not prohibit the outdoor… display” of the American flag or a military flag, among others.

Right to Regulate: Subsection B grants associations the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations regarding the placement and manner of display.” It explicitly allows rules that “regulate the location and size of flagpoles,” “limit the member to displaying no more than two flags at once,” and limit flagpole height, while not prohibiting their installation.

HOA Architectural Guidelines

The community’s rules regarding flagpoles evolved but consistently maintained a key restriction.

Original Guideline (May 24, 2016): “Poles must not exceed 12’ in height, and only one flagpole is permitted per Lot.”

Amended Guideline (November 8, 2018): The board increased the maximum pole height to 20′ and added rules for nighttime illumination and inclement weather, but explicitly “did not change the limit of one flagpole per lot.”

HOA CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The procedural requirements for architectural review and appeals were central to the Petitioner’s claim.

Section 7.8 (Board Approval): Pertaining to initial applications, this section requires the Board to provide the owner with a “written response within sixty (60) days,” otherwise the request is deemed approved.

Section 7.9 (Appeal): Pertaining to appeals, this section requires the Board to consult with the Architectural Committee and “render its written decision” within 45 days. A failure by the Board to render a decision in this period “shall be deemed approval.” This section does not contain the same explicit language as § 7.8 requiring the response be provided to the owner.

Analysis of the Appeal Process and Conflicting Testimonies

A significant portion of the dispute centered on the events of the November 8, 2018, HOA Board meeting, where the Petitioner’s appeal was to be considered. The accounts of what transpired at this meeting were contradictory.

Petitioner’s Testimony (Joyce H. Monsanto)

Respondent’s Testimony (Anthony Nunziato, Board President)

Consultation

The board did not consult the Architectural Committee.

The board consulted with the Architectural Committee before the meeting.

Decision

The board did not consider or make any decision on her appeal.

The board considered the appeal and made a decision.

Notification

She was never told her appeal was denied at the meeting.

He was certain the board verbally informed the Petitioner that her appeal was denied at the meeting.

On December 4, 2018, draft minutes from the November 8 meeting were posted on the HOA’s website. The Petitioner acknowledged seeing them. These minutes included the following entry:

“[Petitioner’s] last request was for a waiver that would allow her to have two flagpoles on her property (one to fly the American flag and the other to fly the Marine flag). The Board rejected this request since our CC&Rs allow for the flying of both flags on a single flagpole.”

The Petitioner argued that these publicly posted draft minutes, which were not sent directly to her, did not constitute a valid written denial of her appeal under the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s claims, relying on witness credibility, statutory interpretation, and contract construction principles.

Credibility Assessment

The ALJ made a clear determination on the conflicting testimonies regarding the November 8 meeting.

• Mr. Nunziato’s testimony that the board made a decision and informed the Petitioner was found to be “credible and supported by the minutes of the meeting.”

• The Petitioner’s testimony that the board made no decision on her appeal was deemed “incredible.”

Ruling on A.R.S. § 33-1808 (State Flag Law)

The ALJ concluded that the HOA’s one-flagpole rule did not violate state law.

• The rule was found to be a “reasonable rule or regulation under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B).”

• Because the Architectural Guidelines allow for flying two flags from a single flagpole up to 20′ long, the HOA was not prohibiting the display of flags, merely regulating the manner.

• The ALJ characterized the core issue as the “Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.”

Ruling on CC&R § 7.9 (Appeal Process)

The ALJ found that the HOA had followed the procedure required by its own CC&Rs.

Consultation: Based on Mr. Nunziato’s credible testimony, the board fulfilled its duty to consult with the Architectural Committee.

“Render a Decision”: The board “rendered a decision on her appeal at the November 8, 2018 board meeting” when it orally reached a decision.

“Written Decision”: The board created a “writing memorializing its decision” by documenting it in the meeting minutes. Because the Petitioner saw these minutes on December 4, 2018, this action occurred within the 45-day window following her October 1, 2018 appeal.

No Delivery Requirement: The ALJ applied the “negative implication cannon of contract construction.” By comparing CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) with § 7.8 (initial applications), the judge noted that § 7.9 lacks the explicit requirement to provide the written decision to the owner. Therefore, posting the minutes was sufficient, and the Petitioner’s request was not “deemed approved.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the ALJ issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that the Respondent’s Board should not have denied her application to install two flagpoles on her property.

The decision concludes with a notice informing the parties that the order is binding and that any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

This study guide provides a detailed review of the legal case Joyce H. Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG, as detailed in the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision dated November 18, 2019. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner request from the Respondent that initiated this dispute?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent’s Architectural Committee initially deny the Petitioner’s request on September 22, 2018?

4. Identify the key Arizona statute cited in the case and explain its two main provisions regarding flag displays.

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the Respondent’s handling of her appeal under CC&R § 7.9?

6. According to the testimony of Board President Tony Nunziato, how did the Board address the Petitioner’s appeal at the November 8, 2018 meeting?

7. What documentary evidence did the Respondent use to support the claim that a decision on the appeal was made and written down within the required timeframe?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) find the Respondent’s one-flagpole rule to be legally permissible?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner in this case, and did she meet it according to the ALJ?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case and its practical consequence for the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Joyce H. Monsanto, a homeowner. The Respondent is the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). Ms. Monsanto is a member of the Respondent HOA because she owns a house within its development in Sun City, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house. She intended to fly the United States flag from one pole and the United States Marine Corps flag from the other.

3. The Architectural Committee denied the request because the community’s Architectural Guidelines only permitted one flagpole per lot. The written Notice of Disapproval explicitly stated this rule as the reason for the denial.

4. The key statute is A.R.S. § 33-1808. Its first provision, § 33-1808(A), prohibits an HOA from banning the display of the American flag and various military flags. The second provision, § 33-1808(B), allows an HOA to adopt reasonable rules regulating the placement, size, and number of flagpoles, explicitly permitting a limit of one flagpole per property.

5. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated CC&R § 7.9 because it failed to provide her with a formal written decision denying her appeal within the 45-day period. She contended that because she never received a dedicated letter, the request should have been “deemed approved” as stipulated in the CC&R for failure to render a timely decision.

6. Tony Nunziato testified that the Board did consult with the Architectural Committee regarding the appeal before the meeting. He stated with certainty that at the November 8, 2018 meeting, the Board considered the appeal and verbally informed Ms. Monsanto that her request for a waiver was denied.

7. The Respondent presented the draft minutes from the November 8, 2018 Board meeting, which were posted on the HOA’s website on December 4, 2018. These minutes explicitly stated that the Board rejected the Petitioner’s request for a waiver to have two flagpoles, fulfilling the requirement to have a written record of the decision within 45 days of her October 1 appeal.

8. The ALJ found the rule permissible because A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) explicitly grants HOAs the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations” which may “regulate the location and size of flagpoles” and “shall not prohibit the installation of a flagpole.” Since the HOA’s guidelines allowed for one flagpole up to 20 feet long, capable of flying two flags, the judge concluded the rule was reasonable under the statute.

9. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that her contention was more probably true than not. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner did not meet this burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or its own CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied the Petitioner’s petition. The practical consequence is that the HOA’s denial of her application for two flagpoles was upheld, and the Board could therefore properly find her in violation of the Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1808(A), which protects a homeowner’s right to display military flags, and § 33-1808(B), which grants HOAs regulatory power. How did the Administrative Law Judge balance these two provisions to reach a conclusion in this case?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the Petitioner. Detail the specific claims made by Joyce Monsanto and explain why, according to the legal decision, she failed to establish them by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Examine the procedural dispute surrounding CC&R § 7.9. Contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of a “written decision” with the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, referencing the role of the verbal notification and the meeting minutes.

4. Evaluate the role of testimony and credibility in this administrative hearing. Compare and contrast the testimony provided by Petitioner Joyce Monsanto and Respondent’s Board President Tony Nunziato regarding the events of the November 8, 2018 board meeting, and explain why the judge found Mr. Nunziato’s account more credible.

5. Based on the facts presented, construct an argument that the HOA’s actions, while legally permissible according to the judge, were inconsistent with the patriotic values of its community, which includes many retired military members. Conversely, construct an argument defending the Board’s decision as a necessary and fair application of rules essential for maintaining community standards.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues legal decisions. In this case, Diane Mihalsky served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

An Arizona Revised Statute that governs the display of flags in planned communities. It forbids HOAs from prohibiting certain flags (like the U.S. and military flags) but permits them to establish reasonable rules regarding the number, size, and location of flagpoles.

Architectural Committee

A committee established by the HOA’s CC&Rs responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving homeowners’ applications for external modifications to their property, such as installing flagpoles.

Architectural Guidelines

The specific rules adopted by the HOA that set forth requirements for property modifications. In this case, the guidelines limited each lot to one flagpole, with a maximum height of 20 feet.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. The Petitioner, Joyce Monsanto, bore the burden of proof to show the HOA had violated the law or its own rules.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that create the rules for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9, which outlines the appeal process for disapproved architectural applications.

Declarant

The original developer of a planned community who establishes the initial CC&Rs. In this case, K. Hovnanian was the Declarant for Four Seasons at the Manor.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization in a planned community responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs and managing common areas. The Respondent, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, is an HOA.

Negative Implication

A principle of legal interpretation which holds that the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the intentional exclusion of another. The ALJ used this to argue that because CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) does not specify that a written decision must be sent to the owner, unlike CC&R § 7.8 (initial applications), that requirement should not be read into the appeal rule.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing an impartial forum to resolve disputes.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Joyce H. Monsanto is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required in this civil case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact (the judge) that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Restrictive Covenant

A legally enforceable rule within the CC&Rs that limits what a homeowner can do with their property. The rule limiting homes to one flagpole is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Waiver

The act of intentionally relinquishing a known right or claim. The Petitioner argued that the HOA board could, and should, have waived the one-flagpole rule for her under CC&R § 7.6.

HOA vs. Military Family: 4 Lessons from a Legal Battle Over a Flagpole

For Joyce Monsanto, a member of a dedicated military family, displaying her patriotism was a matter of pride. Her husband served 25 years in the Marines, and her two sons have spent decades in the Marines and the Coast Guard. Naturally, she wanted to fly both the flag of the United States and the flag of the U.S. Marine Corps at her Arizona home. But when she submitted her plan to her Homeowners Association (HOA), she was met with a firm “no.”

The conflict wasn’t about the flags themselves. The Four Seasons at the Manor HOA had no issue with her displaying both. The dispute centered on how she wanted to display them. It was a disagreement over her vision for a symmetrical, two-pole display versus the HOA’s “one flagpole per lot” rule. This architectural dispute escalated from a simple request into a formal administrative hearing.

Ms. Monsanto’s fight reveals several surprising truths about the power of HOA rules and the specific language written into state law. Her case ultimately failed on two fronts—a substantive challenge to the rule itself, and a procedural challenge to how the HOA handled her appeal. Here’s what every homeowner can learn from each.

1. Your Right to Fly the Flag Has Limits—And They’re Written into Law.

Many homeowners believe the right to fly the American flag is unconditional. However, the legal reality is more nuanced. While Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1808) prevents an HOA from outright prohibiting the display of U.S. or military flags, it explicitly allows the association to create “reasonable rules and regulations” for their placement and manner of display.

The statute is specific about what these rules can cover. An HOA can legally regulate the size and location of flagpoles and can limit a homeowner to displaying no more than two flags at once. In this case, the HOA’s architectural guidelines permitted two flags, but only on a single flagpole. The Administrative Law Judge found this “one flagpole per lot” rule was a “reasonable” regulation and therefore perfectly legal. To underscore that the HOA’s stance was not about a lack of patriotism, the judge noted testimony that the HOA president himself “placed 140 small flags on his property” for Memorial Day. The issue was about the uniform enforcement of an architectural rule, not the patriotic display itself.

2. Your Personal Taste Is No Match for the Community Rulebook.

During the hearing, Ms. Monsanto acknowledged that she could fly both of her flags from a single pole as the HOA rules allowed. Her reason for wanting two poles was a matter of personal preference. She testified that she “wanted to install two flagpoles for aesthetic reasons” and also felt that a single pole placed in the middle of her lot would block the view from her front window.

The judge was unmoved by this line of reasoning. In the final decision, the response was direct and unambiguous:

Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.

This is a foundational principle of community association law: homeowners trade a degree of personal autonomy for the perceived benefits of uniform standards and predictable property values. The judge’s decision simply reaffirms that bargain. In the world of planned communities, the established rulebook will almost always outweigh an individual’s personal taste.

3. In HOA Law, the Appeal Isn’t a Re-do—It’s a Different Process.

One of Ms. Monsanto’s key arguments was procedural. She believed her appeal should have been automatically approved because the HOA failed to provide a written decision within the 45-day deadline stipulated in its own rules (CC&R § 7.9). This is where the judge identified a subtle but crucial legal distinction buried in the HOA’s governing documents.

The HOA’s CC&Rs had two different sections for architectural requests:

CC&R § 7.8 (Initial Requests): This section explicitly required the Board to “inform the submitting party of the final decision” with a “written response.”

CC&R § 7.9 (Appeals): This section, however, only required the Board to “render its written decision” within 45 days.

That small difference in wording—”written response” versus “written decision”—was the linchpin of her procedural case. The judge ruled that for an appeal, the HOA was not required to send a personal letter or direct notice to Ms. Monsanto. It only had to create a written record of its decision within the timeframe.

4. A Post on an HOA Website Can Count as an Official “Written Decision.”

The final surprise came down to what constitutes a “written decision” and how the deadline was met. Ms. Monsanto was waiting for a formal letter informing her that her appeal had been denied. She never received one. Her appeal was filed on October 1, 2018, starting a 45-day clock.

The judge found the HOA satisfied its obligation in a two-step process:

1. The Decision: The Board verbally denied her appeal during its public meeting on November 8, 2018. This action, which occurred 38 days after her appeal, fulfilled the requirement to “render its decision” within the 45-day period.

2. The Writing: That decision was then recorded in the draft meeting minutes, which were posted on the Board’s website on December 4, 2018. Ms. Monsanto acknowledged seeing the posted minutes.

The judge ruled that these online minutes satisfied the separate legal requirement for a “writing memorializing its decision.” Even though they weren’t sent directly to her, the publicly posted minutes served as the official record of the timely denial of her appeal, closing the final door on her argument for automatic approval.

Conclusion: Before You Plant Your Flag, Read the Fine Print

Joyce Monsanto’s case is a cautionary tale on two levels. First, it shows that even cherished rights like displaying the flag are subject to reasonable, neutrally-applied community rules. Second, and more critically, it demonstrates that procedural arguments live and die by the most precise definitions in the governing documents. A single word can be the difference between winning an appeal and being ordered to take your flagpole down.

This case came down to the difference between a “written response” and a “written decision”—do you know what the fine print says about your rights in your community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce H Monsanto (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Anthony Nunziato (board member)
    Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association
    President of the Board of Directors; also referred to as ‘Tony’
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Community Manager/Trestle Management (implied)
    Sent Notice of Disapproval on behalf of Respondent
  • Marc Vasquez (HOA representative)
    Addressed Petitioner’s claim regarding violation letters at the Board meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1817017-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2018-02-02
Administrative Law JudgeThomas Shedden
OutcomeThe Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerWilliam TravisCounsel
RespondentThe Val Vista Lakes Community AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.

Key Issues & Findings

Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.

Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • Bylaws Article VIII

The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.

Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • Bylaws Article VIII
  • Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.

Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.

Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812

Related election workflow tool

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:08:39 (125.4 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.

Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1817017-REL

Petitioner

William Travis

Respondent

The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Hearing Date

January 26, 2018

Decision Date

February 2, 2018

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Testifying Parties

William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)

Petitioner’s Allegations

William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:

1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.

2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.

3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.

Key Factual Findings

Election and Nomination Timeline

August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.

September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.

By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.

After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.

October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.

October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.

Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale

• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.

• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.

• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.

• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.

Association’s Position and Testimony

Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.

• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.

• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.

• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.

Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes

The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.

Document/Statute

Relevant Provision

Application in this Case

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”

This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.

Bylaws Article VIII

“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”

Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.

Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.

Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812

Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.

The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.

Conclusions of Law and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.

2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.

3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?

3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?

4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?

5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?

6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?

7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?

8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?

9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?

10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.

2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.

3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.

4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.

5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.

6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.

7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.

8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?

2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.

3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.

4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?

5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Bylaws

The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.

Nominating Committee

A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.

Self-Nomination

The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Proxy Voting

A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.

Prevailing Party

The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.

Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown

Introduction: The Devil in the Details

Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?

A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.

1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline

The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?

Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”

Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.

The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.

2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection

Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.

This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.

Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.

While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.

The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.

3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth

The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.

The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.

This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.

The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.

Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.

The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.

It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William Travis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Nicholas C. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Simone McGinnis (property manager)
    Testified as a witness
  • Cheryl Peterson-McCoy (board member)
    Nominating Committee Chairperson

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Strike, Kristyne P. vs. Las Torres Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID13F-H1314009-BFS
AgencyDepartment of Fire, Building and Life Safety
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2014-05-16
Administrative Law JudgeM. Douglas
OutcomeThe Respondent (HOA) was deemed the prevailing party and the matter was dismissed. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner's claim regarding the unauthorized concrete slab in the common area was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because the slab had been in existence since 1998 and the Petitioner had owned her unit since 2007, filing the petition in 2013.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerKrystine P. StrikeCounsel
RespondentLas Torres Homeowners AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1221, A.R.S. § 33-1218

Outcome Summary

The Respondent (HOA) was deemed the prevailing party and the matter was dismissed. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner's claim regarding the unauthorized concrete slab in the common area was barred by the one-year statute of limitations because the slab had been in existence since 1998 and the Petitioner had owned her unit since 2007, filing the petition in 2013.

Why this result: Statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-541) expired.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized alteration of common area

Petitioner alleged the Association violated statutes by allowing a neighbor to maintain and use a concrete slab in the common area as a private patio without proper consent or authorization.

Orders: The matter is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

13F-H1314009-BFS Decision – 394719.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:48:38 (125.8 KB)

13F-H1314009-BFS Decision – 399395.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:48:41 (58.3 KB)

Krystine P. Strike vs. Las Torres Homeowners Association: Administrative Law Judge Decision and Analysis

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative hearing and subsequent final decision in the matter of Krystine P. Strike vs. Las Torres Homeowners Association (No. 13F-H1314009-BFS). The dispute centered on a concrete slab constructed in a common area at Las Torres, a homeowners' association in Carefree, Arizona. Petitioner Krystine P. Strike alleged that the association violated state statutes by allowing a neighbor to use the common area as a private patio, thereby infringing on her privacy rights and improperly altering common elements.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that while the concrete slab was indeed located in a common area, it had been in existence since 1998—long before the Petitioner purchased her unit in 2007. Ultimately, the ALJ ruled that the Petitioner’s claims were time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The matter was dismissed on May 16, 2014, and the decision was certified as final on June 24, 2014.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Classification of Common Elements

A primary point of contention in the case was the legal classification of the concrete slab and the land it occupied. The Petitioner argued that the association violated statutes regarding the reallocation of common elements.

  • General Common Element vs. Limited Common Element: The Respondent (Las Torres) argued that the area was a "General Common Element" as defined in the Association's Declaration. This distinction is critical because A.R.S. § 33-1218 primarily concerns "Limited Common Elements"—areas assigned for the exclusive use of one or more (but fewer than all) units.
  • Use and Exclusivity: The Association maintained that the neighbor in unit 604 did not have exclusive rights to the area. Testimony revealed that the Association had repeatedly ordered the owner of unit 604 to remove furniture from the slab when not in use, reinforcing that the area remained common property rather than a private patio.
2. Statutory Violations and Jurisdiction

The Petitioner alleged violations of two specific Arizona Revised Statutes:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1218: Regarding the allocation and alteration of limited common elements.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1221: Regarding improvements or alterations to units and the requirement for written permission to change the appearance of common elements.

The Association countered that the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety lacked the jurisdiction to grant the specific relief requested by the Petitioner—the restoration of the common area to its unaltered state. Such a request constitutes injunctive relief, which the Association argued was outside the Department’s statutory authority under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02.

3. Statute of Limitations and the "Code of Conduct"

The most significant legal hurdle for the Petitioner was the timing of the filing. Under A.R.S. § 12-541, actions regarding liabilities created by statute must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

  • Accrual of Action: The ALJ found that the slab existed when the Petitioner moved in (2007), but she did not file her petition until 2013, approximately six years later.
  • Board Member Restrictions: The Petitioner attempted to circumvent the statute of limitations by testifying that her former role on the Board of Directors and a signed "Code of Conduct" prevented her from filing unilateral actions against the Association. She resigned in April 2013 and filed shortly thereafter. However, the ALJ did not find this argument sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
4. Historical Precedent and Documentation

The case highlighted the challenges of HOA governance over long periods.

  • Legacy Construction: The slab was built in 1998 by previous owners of units 603 and 604 with "tacit approval" from the Association and inspection by the City of Carefree.
  • Record Keeping: Testimony from Board member Pamela A. Dixon revealed that the Association had purged old records from the 1990s, meaning there was no formal written record of the original Board's approval for the slab.

Important Quotes with Context

Petitioner’s Allegation

"The association (Las Torres) has allowed an owner to alter the common area between units by placing a concrete slab, filling it with furniture, and using as her patio… The HOA did [not] consider my privacy rights. I want the common area restored to its unaltered state."

Krystine P. Strike, Petition for Hearing

Context: This quote establishes the core of the Petitioner's complaint: that the HOA's failure to enforce common area boundaries resulted in a private encroachment that affected her property rights and privacy.

Respondent’s Defense

"The area at issue is not a limited common element. The common area between Petitioner’s unit and her neighbor’s unit is simply a General Common Element… Petitioner’s neighbor does not have exclusive use to this area."

Las Torres Homeowners Association, Answer to Petition

Context: This forms the basis of the HOA's legal defense, arguing that the statutes cited by the Petitioner regarding "limited common elements" were inapplicable because the area remained open to the general community.

Administrative Law Judge’s Finding

"Because Ms. Strike’s petition was not filed within one year of the accrual of Ms. Strike’s cause of action, it is time-barred."

M. Douglas, Administrative Law Judge

Context: This was the dispositive conclusion of the case. Regardless of the merits of the encroachment claim, the delay in filing (six years after purchasing the unit) invalidated the legal standing of the petition.

Actionable Insights

Based on the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, the following insights are relevant for homeowners and associations:

CategoryInsight
Timeliness of ClaimsPotential litigants must file complaints within one year of discovering a statutory violation. Waiting several years, even for reasons of professional conduct (such as being a Board member), likely results in the claim being time-barred.
Common Area EnforcementAssociations should maintain clear distinctions between General Common Elements and Limited Common Elements. Allowing furniture or personal property to remain in general common areas can create the appearance of a private patio, leading to disputes between neighbors.
Record RetentionThe lack of records from the 1990s complicated the Association's ability to prove formal approval. HOAs should maintain permanent records of any permanent structural changes or approvals involving common elements to prevent future litigation.
Notice of ViolationThe Association’s practice of issuing multiple, documented violation letters (e.g., Nov 2013, Jan 2014, Feb 2014, April 2014) served as evidence that they were actively attempting to manage the use of the common area, even if the structure itself was permanent.
Jurisdictional AwarenessParties should be aware that administrative hearings through the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety have specific jurisdictional limits. Requests for injunctive relief, such as the physical removal of a concrete structure, may require a different legal venue.

Study Guide: Krystine P. Strike vs. Las Torres Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal case Krystine P. Strike v. Las Torres Homeowners Association (No. 13F-H1314009-BFS). It examines the legal disputes regarding common area encroachments, the interpretation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) governing condominiums, and the application of statutes of limitations in administrative hearings.


I. Case Overview and Key Concepts

Background of the Dispute

The case centers on a dispute within the Las Torres Homeowners Association in Carefree, Arizona. Krystine P. Strike (Petitioner) alleged that the association allowed the owner of an adjacent unit (Unit 604) to improperly use a concrete slab in a common area as a private patio.

The concrete slab in question was constructed in 1998 by a previous owner who owned both units 603 and 604. It was built with the tacit approval of the HOA and inspected by the City of Carefree. Ms. Strike purchased Unit 603 in 2007, nine years after the slab was installed.

Primary Legal Allegations

The Petitioner alleged violations of two specific Arizona statutes:

  1. A.R.S. § 33-1218: Governing the allocation and alteration of limited common elements.
  2. A.R.S. § 33-1221: Governing improvements and alterations to units and the appearance of common elements.

The Petitioner sought the restoration of the common area to its "unaltered state," effectively requesting the removal of the concrete slab.

Defense and Findings

The Respondent (Las Torres HOA) argued that:

  • The statutes cited were inapplicable because the area was a General Common Element, not a Limited Common Element.
  • The neighbor did not have exclusive use of the area.
  • The Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety lacked jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief (ordering the removal of the slab).
  • The claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Final Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the matter. The primary reason for dismissal was the Statute of Limitations (A.R.S. § 12-541), as the Petitioner waited approximately six years after moving into her unit to file the petition, exceeding the one-year legal limit for actions based on a liability created by statute.


II. Referenced Provisions of Law

The following table outlines the statutes central to the proceedings:

StatuteCore Provision
A.R.S. § 12-541Establishes a one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a liability created by statute.
A.R.S. § 33-1218Mandates that the allocation of limited common elements (patios, balconies, etc.) cannot be altered without the consent of affected unit owners.
A.R.S. § 33-1221Prohibits unit owners from changing the appearance of common elements or the exterior of a unit without written permission from the association.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01Permits homeowners to file petitions with the Department regarding violations of community documents or statutes.
A.A.C. R2-19-119Establishes that the burden of proof lies with the party asserting the claim, using the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.

III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. Who originally constructed the concrete slab at the center of the dispute, and when?
  • Answer: The previous owners of Units 603 and 604 constructed the slab in 1998.
  1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument regarding the classification of the common area?
  • Answer: The Respondent argued the area was a "General Common Element" rather than a "Limited Common Element," meaning no specific owner had exclusive use or a specific allocation to it under A.R.S. § 33-1218.
  1. Why did Ms. Strike argue that the statute of limitations should not apply to her?
  • Answer: She claimed that as a former member of the Board of Directors, she had signed a Code of Conduct that prevented her from filing unilateral actions against the association while serving.
  1. How did the ALJ define "Preponderion of the Evidence"?
  • Answer: It is the standard of proof where the finder of fact is persuaded that a proposition is "more likely true than not."
  1. What action did the HOA take regarding the neighbor's use of the slab in 2013 and 2014?
  • Answer: The HOA issued four letters (November 2013, January 2014, February 2014, and April 2014) asking the owner of Unit 604 to remove her patio furniture from the common area when not in use.
  1. What was the final outcome of the ALJ's Recommended Order?
  • Answer: The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the matter was dismissed.

IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Impact of the Statute of Limitations: Analyze the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the case based on A.R.S. § 12-541. Discuss why the law imposes a one-year limit on statutory claims and how the timeline of Ms. Strike’s residency (2007–2013) influenced the "accrual" of the cause of action.
  2. General vs. Limited Common Elements: Compare and contrast "General Common Elements" and "Limited Common Elements" based on the arguments presented in the case. How does the classification of an area change the legal requirements for consent and allocation under A.R.S. § 33-1218?
  3. Administrative Jurisdiction and Relief: The Respondent argued that the Department lacked jurisdiction to grant the "injunctive relief" requested by the Petitioner (restoring the area to its unaltered state). Discuss the limitations of administrative hearings compared to superior courts regarding the power to order the physical removal of structures.

V. Glossary of Important Terms

  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over an administrative hearing and issues findings of fact and recommended orders.
  • A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes): The codified laws of the state of Arizona.
  • Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.
  • Certification of Decision: The process by which an ALJ decision becomes the final administrative decision of an agency (e.g., the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety) if no other action is taken within a specific timeframe.
  • Common Element: Portions of a condominium or planned community owned by all members or the association, rather than an individual unit owner.
  • General Common Element: An area within the association that is not assigned to a specific unit and is available for use by all, as defined by the association's Declaration.
  • Injunctive Relief: A legal remedy that requires a party to do, or refrain from doing, a specific act (such as removing a concrete slab).
  • Limited Common Element: Portions of the common elements allocated by the declaration for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the units (e.g., specific patios or balconies).
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof used in civil and administrative cases, requiring that a claim be more likely true than not.
  • Statute of Limitations: A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated.

The Concrete Slab Conflict: Lessons in HOA Law and Statute of Limitations

Introduction: The Common Area Conundrum

In the complex landscape of community association governance, the boundary between individual property enjoyment and collective regulatory authority is frequently a flashpoint for litigation. Disputes often emerge when long-standing physical modifications—tolerated for years—clash with modern interpretations of a declaration’s restrictive covenants. The case of Krystine P. Strike vs. Las Torres Homeowners Association serves as a definitive case study in the risks of delayed legal action. At the center of the conflict was an unapproved concrete slab in a general common area, a modification that persisted for fifteen years before triggering an administrative showdown that ultimately hinged more on timing than on the merits of the construction itself.

Case Background: The 15-Year Timeline

The history of this dispute demonstrates how historical "tacit approval" can complicate modern enforcement. The timeline of the concrete slab is as follows:

  • 1998: The previous owners of Units 603 and 604 constructed a concrete slab in the common area to join their existing patios. This was done with the knowledge and tacit approval of the Association.
  • November 18, 1998: The City of Carefree, Arizona, inspected and approved the construction (validated via Respondent’s Exhibit 5, the City’s Inspection Card).
  • 2007: Petitioner Krystine Strike purchased Unit 603, nine years after the slab’s installation.
  • June 2012: The owner of Unit 604 petitioned to enlarge the slab. The Board denied this expansion, asserting that the area was a General Common Element and not the private property of the owner.
  • November 2013: Ms. Strike filed a formal petition with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, seeking the removal of the slab and restoration of the area to its original state.

General vs. Limited Common Elements: The Legal Friction

The legal dispute focused on the classification of the land under Arizona law. The Association successfully argued that the area was a "General Common Element" rather than a "Limited Common Element," meaning no single owner held exclusive rights to it—a distinction that shaped the Board's enforcement strategy.

Legal PointPetitioner's (Ms. Strike) AllegationRespondent's (Las Torres HOA) Defense
A.R.S. § 33-1218The HOA allowed an owner to reallocate common area without the consent of affected owners.This statute applies only to Limited Common Elements. The area is a General Common Element.
A.R.S. § 33-1221The neighbor altered the appearance of common elements without proper written permission.The Association’s Declaration (Article IV) controls the use of General Common Elements.
Injunctive ReliefPetitioner requested the common area be "restored to its unaltered state."The Department lacks jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02 to grant the injunctive relief (removal) requested.

The "Statute of Limitations" Factor

The dismissal of the case hinged on the threshold issue of timeliness. Under A.R.S. § 12-541, actions based upon a liability created by statute must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that because the slab existed and was visible when Ms. Strike purchased her unit in 2007, her 2013 filing was six years overdue. Notably, the ALJ rejected the Petitioner's argument that the "Code of Conduct" she signed as a Board member—which she claimed prevented her from filing unilateral actions—effectively paused or "tolled" the statute of limitations. The ruling clarified that Board service or personal agreements do not excuse a failure to meet statutory deadlines; the claim was officially "time-barred."

HOA Enforcement and Board Responsibility

The record reveals a Board caught between the "tacit approval" granted by their 1990s predecessors and the need to curb current owner overreach. While the Association allowed the slab to remain, they actively challenged the neighbor’s attempt to claim it as private space.

Evidence of the Board’s consistent enforcement included four violation letters sent to the owner of Unit 604 demanding the removal of personal furniture from the common area:

  1. November 1, 2013
  2. January 7, 2014
  3. February 20, 2014
  4. April 21, 2014

Board members Pamela A. Dixon and Marc Vasquez testified that these actions were officially authorized. However, the Association faced significant evidentiary hurdles because records from the 1990s had been purged, leaving the Board to rely on municipal records like the City of Carefree’s 1998 inspection card to verify the slab’s history.

Key Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

The Strike decision provides critical lessons for managing community property and legal disputes:

  1. Know Your Deadlines: In Arizona, the one-year statute of limitations is a strict barrier. If you identify a statutory violation, legal action must be initiated promptly; delays based on Board service or internal politics will not save a late claim.
  2. Due Diligence is Essential: Buyers must inspect common areas for modifications before closing. A modification that receives "tacit approval" from a previous Board can become a permanent fixture that a future Board cannot—or will not—remove.
  3. Record Keeping is a Fiduciary Duty: The purging of 1990s records nearly left the HOA without a defense. Boards must maintain permanent records of architectural approvals and common area modifications to protect the association from future litigation.
  4. General Common Elements are Not Private: The placement of furniture does not grant exclusive rights. Boards must be vigilant in ensuring that "General" areas remain open to all and do not gradually morph into "Limited" elements through owner encroachment.

Conclusion: Final Decision and Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove her case within the legally mandated timeframe. The Respondent, Las Torres Homeowners Association, was designated the prevailing party, and the matter was dismissed. This case serves as a stark reminder that in community association law, the merits of a dispute are secondary to the requirement of timely legal action.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Krystine P. Strike (petitioner)
    Unit 603 Owner
    Appeared on her own behalf; former Board member

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Attorney for Las Torres Homeowners Association
  • Pamela A. Dixon (witness)
    Las Torres Homeowners Association
    Board Member
  • Marc Vasquez (witness)
    Las Torres Homeowners Association
    Testified regarding Board meetings and violation letters

Neutral Parties

  • M. Douglas (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on transmission of decision
  • Cliff J. Vanell (Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Joni Cage (agency staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    c/o for Gene Palma
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Mailed/faxed the certification