Tag Archives: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Keystone Owners Association V. Bernadette M. Bennett

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Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-12-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed. The Respondent (Homeowner) was found in violation of Governing Documents for installing an unapproved driveway extension that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the $1,500.00 filing fee and comply with all Governing Documents henceforth. No civil penalty was levied.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keystone Owners Association Counsel Erica L. Mortenson
Respondent Bernadette M. Bennett Counsel Thomas A. Walcott

Alleged Violations

Mountain Park Association CC&Rs Art. IV, Sec. 2; Keystone CC&Rs Art. V, Sec. 5.19; Rules (35% Frontage Limit)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed. The Respondent (Homeowner) was found in violation of Governing Documents for installing an unapproved driveway extension that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the $1,500.00 filing fee and comply with all Governing Documents henceforth. No civil penalty was levied.

Why this result: Respondent failed to obtain prior written approval for the driveway alteration and failed to prove the affirmative defense of laches.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized Driveway Extension Exceeding 35% of Total Yard Frontage Area

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by installing a driveway extension exceeding 35% of the total yard frontage area without prior written approval. The ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation occurred and the Respondent failed to establish the affirmative defense of laches.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $1,500.00 for the filing fee and comply henceforth with the Governing Documents.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, ARC, Driveway, Frontage Area, CC&Rs, Laches
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1159036.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180542.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180545.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198622.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198623.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1225107.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227639.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227642.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1230660.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1241815.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1250037.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1159036.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180542.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180545.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198622.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198623.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1225107.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227639.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227642.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1230660.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1241815.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1250037.pdf

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This summary focuses on the hearing held on November 19, 2024 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson, concerning the dispute between Keystone Owners Association (Petitioner) and Bernadette M. Bennett (Respondent).

Key Facts and Main Issues

The core issue was Petitioner's allegation that Respondent violated the Governing Documents by installing a driveway extension that exceeds 35% of the total yard frontage area. This included allegations of violating Article IV, Section 2 of the Mountain Park Association Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Article V, Section 5.19 of Petitioner’s CC&Rs.

Key Facts Presented:

  • Respondent owns a home within Keystone, a subassociation of Mountain Park Ranch. Both associations' Governing Documents required Respondent to obtain prior written approval for any alteration to the exterior appearance.
  • Mountain Park Ranch Rules, which Keystone relied upon for enforcement, state that the parking surface shall not exceed 35 percent of the total yard frontage area.
  • Petitioner asserted that the Respondent installed the cement driveway extension without obtaining mandatory written approval.
  • An on-site inspection conducted in May 2024 determined that the driveway slabs (original 16 ft + unapproved 8 ft modification) measured 24 ft wide. Based on the lot frontage measurement of approximately 60 ft, the driveway covered 40% of the yard frontage, exceeding the 35% limit.
  • The Petitioner's right to enforce the Master Association’s rules was formalized by an Assignment Agreement signed on August 16, 2023.

Key Arguments and Proceedings

The Petitioner presented testimony from Harry Whitesell, a board member and former property appraiser, who detailed the measurements and the history of the Respondent's failed architectural requests (2015, 2017) to add parking. Petitioner argued that the Respondent ignored denial notices and that the modification was installed without approval and remains out of compliance.

The Respondent's legal strategy focused entirely on the affirmative defense of laches. Respondent's counsel argued that the condition had existed, open and obvious, since late 2017/early 2018 without enforcement. Respondent argued the HOA's delay was unreasonable, causing prejudice, and that the motivation to pursue the violation only arose after securing the enforcement authority from Mountain Park Ranch in 2023. Respondent also questioned the interpretation of "yard frontage area" used for the calculation, arguing it was ambiguous. Respondent did not present witness testimony at the hearing.

Petitioner countered the laches argument by citing a provision in the Keystone CC&Rs stating that failure to enforce a restriction "shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter".

Legal Points and Outcome

The ALJ admitted Petitioner’s Exhibits A through M and Respondent’s Exhibit 1 into evidence.

The ALJ made the following legal conclusions:

  1. Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
  2. The preponderance of the evidence showed that Respondent erected a cement driveway extension that exceeds 35 percent of the total yard frontage area, without obtaining prior approval.
  3. Respondent failed to meet the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of laches. The ALJ found that Respondent had not established sufficient "unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice" to deny the relief sought by Petitioner.

Final Decision and Order:

  • Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party.
  • Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00 within thirty days.
  • Respondent was ordered to henceforth comply with the provisions of the Governing Documents.
  • No Civil Penalty was found to be appropriate.

Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erica L. Mortenson (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    HOA attorney
  • Harry Whitel (board member/witness)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Secretary of the Board
  • Tim Seyfarth (board member/president)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board President
  • Glenn Steinman (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Vice President
  • Debbie Burch (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Cherry Collins (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Member at large; Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Joe Getti (ARC member/former board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Mary Hamilton (ARC member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Dan (attorney/staff)
    Goodman Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bernadette M. Bennett (respondent)
    Lot Owner
  • Thomas A. Walcott (attorney)
    Provident Lawyers
    Respondent attorney
  • Noah Alvarado (staff)
    Staff/assistant for Respondent's Counsel
  • Christopher J. Charles (attorney/staff)
    Provident Lawyers

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Amy Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge (prior to VMT)
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Isabella (property manager)
    Vision Management
    Keystone Property Manager who was asked for documents
  • Annette Wthbon (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent
  • Carla Garvin (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent

John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H058-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-10-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner John R. Ashley's petition against Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The ALJ found that the HOA did not violate the Bylaws regarding the minimum number of directors because compliance was impossible due to lack of member interest, and the issue was subsequently moot as the board currently met the minimum requirement.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R. Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC Counsel James Brewer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner John R. Ashley's petition against Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The ALJ found that the HOA did not violate the Bylaws regarding the minimum number of directors because compliance was impossible due to lack of member interest, and the issue was subsequently moot as the board currently met the minimum requirement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut Respondent’s claim that it actively sought a third board member. The Respondent was exonerated under the legal doctrine of impossibility of performance, and the current compliance with the three-member minimum rendered the dispute moot.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding the minimum number of Board Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws by having only two Board Directors dismiss and order a redo of the 1/9/2023 Annual Membership Meeting for 3/7/2023, arguing that three directors were required to properly handle the Association’s affairs.

Orders: The petition is dismissed. Respondent was unable to comply with the Bylaws requiring three directors due to impossibility (lack of member interest) while actively seeking compliance, and the dispute is currently moot as the board now has three or more members.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: impossibility of performance, board structure, election dispute, bylaw violation, Planned Communities Act, mootness
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1075520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:40 (45.8 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078604.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:43 (47.9 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078608.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:46 (5.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1099484.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:49 (104.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1075520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:49 (45.8 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078604.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:52 (47.9 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078608.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:56 (5.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1099484.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:59:01 (104.5 KB)

This summary addresses the administrative hearing held on September 14, 2023, in the matter of John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC (No. 23F-H058-REL).

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioner John R. Ashley challenged the actions of the Rancho Reyes II Community Association (Respondent). The sole issue of the hearing was whether the Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Community Bylaws. This bylaw requires the affairs of the Association to be managed by "not less than three (3) nor more than nine (9) directors".

The violation Petitioner alleged was that two sitting Board Directors (Sherry Ortega and Maria Ruelas) acted alone (on or about January 19, 2023) in dismissing the results of the January 2023 Annual Membership Meeting and ordering a redo election for March 7, 2023, when at least three directors were required to handle Association affairs. It was established that the Board operated with only two members from late 2021 until the March 2023 election.

The January 2023 election, in which five members were elected, was invalidated by the two existing board members after the community manager suspected fraud and irregularities (including stuffed ballots, improper envelopes, and an elected candidate whose husband stated she did not submit her name and was not fluent in English).

Key Arguments

Petitioner's Argument: Petitioner argued the decision to redo the election was invalid because it was made by fewer than three directors, thus violating the Bylaw. Petitioner also contended that the two directors (Ortega and Ruelas) were not duly elected in 2022, asserting that there were effectively zero legal board members when the re-election was ordered. Petitioner further argued that the Respondent's claims of fraud were "non-existent" under ARS title 33, Section 1812, because the board was responsible for approving returned ballots prior to the meeting.

Respondent's Legal Defense: Respondent asserted that operating with only two members was due to impossibility or impracticability of performance. Respondent argued that it actively sought a third board member, but homeowners were not interested in serving. Respondent relied on Arizona case law, stating that "when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated" (*Garner v. Ellingson*). The Respondent maintained that the re-election was necessary due to the severe irregularities in the January vote.

Outcome and Legal Decision

On October 4, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision dismissing the Petition.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ found that while the Bylaws required a minimum of three directors, the preponderance of the evidence showed that the Respondent actively sought a third member, and it was "unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws" due to lack of interest from members. The ALJ implicitly accepted the Respondent's defense that non-compliance was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties.

Furthermore, the ALJ noted that the Association currently has at least three duly elected board members (elected in March 2023), meaning the issue of Bylaw compliance "is no longer in dispute". Based on the impossibility defense and the resolution of the current dispute regarding board size, the Petition was ordered dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R. Ashley (petitioner)
    Represented himself
  • Rmulo Gonzalez (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; contested re-election procedures
  • James Canella (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election; member of the community who desired to serve
  • Daniel Walker (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election
  • Richard Springer (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board
  • Charles Seers (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board; name variations include Charles Zippers

Respondent Side

  • James Brewer (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
    Represented Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association
  • Leah M. McKeever (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Lynn M. Allen (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Sherry Ortega (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Vice President since March 2023; President previously; testified for Respondent
  • Maria Ruelas (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Director in 2022 until March 2023
  • Kimberly Schone (COO/witness)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Chief Operating Officer, testified for Respondent
  • Ronda Raal (CEO/property manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    CEO of the management company
  • Sammy (assistant)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Assistant who helped count ballots for January 2023 election; name variations include Tammy, Cammy, Samantha
  • Joy (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Manager during January 2023 election period
  • Jennifer (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Current manager of the account
  • Vince (management staff)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Saw ballot video footage

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Also referred to as Fala Moses Thompson
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • VNunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • DJones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • Labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents

Other Participants

  • Cordova Sapola (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; unresponsive and did not attend meetings
  • Eugenia Francisco (elected candidate)
    Elected in January 2023 election but refuted candidacy; name variations include Eugene Silva
  • Yolanda Molina (former board member)
    Former Treasurer; resigned December 2021
  • Mario Martinez (witness reference)
    Adam LMC
  • Diane (former property manager)
    First manager for the HOA around 2017-2018

Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed after the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 5.4, finding that this section applies to use restrictions on individual Lots and Members, not the Association itself.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony Payson Counsel —
Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1 Counsel Sean K. Mohnihan

Alleged Violations

CC&R Section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed after the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 5.4, finding that this section applies to use restrictions on individual Lots and Members, not the Association itself.

Why this result: The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Section 5.4 because the HOA does not own or operate the nuisance-causing television, and the CC&R section governs restrictions on lot Owners/Members, not the Association. OAH jurisdiction is limited to finding the governing document or statute violated by the respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's alleged failure to enforce nuisance provision (CC&R Section 5.4) regarding neighbor's outdoor television.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA failed to perform its duty to enforce CC&R Section 5.4 by refusing to seek removal of a neighbor's large, outdoor television that created noise disturbances and was deemed a nuisance.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • CC&R Section 5.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Homeowners Association, CC&R, Nuisance, Enforcement, Jurisdiction, Outdoor TV
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1047496.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T10:25:11 (57.5 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1053240.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T10:25:17 (98.4 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1047496.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:58 (57.5 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1053240.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:01 (98.4 KB)

The legal matter of *Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1* (No. 23F-H041-REL) was heard virtually by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson on April 13, 2023.

Key Facts and Petitioner's Allegations:

Petitioner Anthony Payson, a homeowner within the community, alleged that the Respondent Homeowners Association (HOA) neglected its duty to enforce the Covenants, Codes, & Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that a large, outdoor television/movie theater installed by his neighbor violated CC&R Section 5.4 (Nuisances), which prohibits anything kept on a lot that "will or might disturb the peace, quiet, comfort, or serenity of the occupants of the surrounding property". Petitioner sought an order compelling the HOA to enforce the CC&Rs and require the neighbor to remove the television.

Respondent's Key Arguments:

The Respondent HOA, represented by Sean K. Mohnihan, orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The HOA argued that the Petitioner was alleging a violation of Section 5.4 by the neighbor, not the Association itself, and the Association neither owns nor operates the TV.

Crucially, the HOA asserted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction to hear disputes among neighbors or to enforce common law duties to enforce CC&Rs. Furthermore, the HOA maintained that the Petitioner failed to provide reliable evidence (such as a log book, police reports, or a noise study) to substantiate a nuisance claim, despite the HOA having requested such documentation before initiating enforcement action.

Hearing Proceedings and Evidence:

The ALJ held the motion to dismiss in abeyance but proceeded with the presentation of evidence. Petitioner Payson testified that the TV had disturbed his peace and quiet on at least one occasion involving a hockey game, and that its mere existence constituted a violation because it *might* cause disturbance. Payson admitted he did not provide the HOA with specific dates, times, decibel readings, or video evidence of the disturbance, as the HOA had requested. The Respondent ultimately elected not to call witnesses, relying instead on the Petitioner's testimony and the jurisdictional arguments.

Outcome and Legal Decision:

In the final decision issued May 1, 2023, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent (The Foothills Homeowners Association #1) violated CC&R Section 5.4.

The ALJ determined that CC&R Section 5.4 addresses use restrictions on Members and Lots. Since the provisions refer to actions of members, any breach of that Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. The OAH’s authority, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), is limited to finding whether the governing document or statute has been violated by the respondent. Because the Petitioner did not contend or provide facts establishing that the HOA stored property that caused noise or disturbed the peace, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof against the Association.

The petition was ordered dismissed.

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Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H041-REL”, “case_title”: “In the Matter of Anthony Payson vs The Foothills Homeowners Association #1”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-01”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can I use the ADRE administrative hearing process to force my HOA to enforce CC&R rules against a neighbor?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, if the specific rule applies to member conduct rather than Association conduct.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) clarified that the dispute process is for determining if the Respondent (the HOA) violated a statute or governing document. If a CC&R provision restricts how a ‘lot’ may be used, a violation of that rule is a breach by the member (the neighbor), not the Association. Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Payson (petitioner)
    Homeowner

Respondent Side

  • Sean K. Mohnihan (HOA attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Appeared for Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
  • Jason E Smith (attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Listed with counsel
  • Gabron (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Linda Armo (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Philip Brown (former HOA attorney)
    Previously represented the HOA; wrote a letter to Petitioner

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barry Callahan (neighbor)
    Alleged violator of CC&Rs, neighbor to Petitioner

Gregory Ehle V. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-07-11
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition after finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency board meeting. The evidence established that no such meeting took place, and the statute does not require the Board to hold one.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory Ehle Counsel —
Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Emily H. Mann, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition after finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency board meeting. The evidence established that no such meeting took place, and the statute does not require the Board to hold one.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, as he conceded he did not know if an emergency meeting was held and could not provide legal authority showing that one was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding an emergency meeting of the board members.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning the procedures for an emergency board meeting, specifically regarding a message sent out by the HOA's managing agent. The case proceeded on this single issue after Petitioner failed to pay the required additional filing fees for four total issues claimed.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not hold an emergency board meeting and was not required by A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) to hold one.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: emergency meeting, board of directors, failure to pay filing fee, burden of proof, dismissal, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964714.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964973.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965150.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965339.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967084.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967089.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967102.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 973304.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 977404.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 982867.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964714.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964973.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965150.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965339.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967084.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967089.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967102.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 973304.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 977404.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 982867.pdf

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This summary details the proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the administrative hearing case of *Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association* (No. 22F-H2222031-REL), held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner Gregory Ehle filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (AZDRE) around February 2, 2022, alleging four separate violations by the Respondent, Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association (Fulton Ranch). Ehle paid a $500 filing fee, but the tribunal ordered him to remit an additional $1,500 for the four claims. Ehle failed to pay the outstanding fee by the deadline (May 6, 2022). Consequently, and because Ehle failed to notify the tribunal of his preferred single issue, the ALJ determined that the sole issue to be addressed at the June 21, 2022, hearing was an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency meeting of the board members.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Arguments

The hearing took place on June 21, 2022. Petitioner Ehle, appearing on his own behalf, initially failed to appear, but the hearing proceeded after he connected virtually.

Petitioner's Argument: Ehle contended that a November 12, 2020, notice issued by Fulton Ranch regarding the cessation of responses to his emails constituted a matter of urgency that should have necessitated an emergency board meeting. Ehle alleged that if an emergency meeting had been conducted, the required minutes were not published at the next regular board meeting. However, under examination, Ehle conceded that he was unaware of whether an emergency board meeting was actually held.

Respondent's Argument: Fulton Ranch, represented by Emily Mann, Esq., argued for dismissal on multiple grounds, including a potential bar by the one-year statute of limitations. The primary argument, supported by testimony from Kevin Hearty (Division Vice President for the community manager, CCMC), was that no emergency board meeting occurred between September 2020 and November 12, 2020. Fulton Ranch asserted that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) governs the *procedure* for an emergency meeting, and since no meeting was held, no violation of the procedure could have occurred.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The ALJ issued the decision on July 11, 2022.

Key Legal Points and Findings:

  1. Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
  2. The weight of the evidence showed that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting regarding the decision concerning Mr. Ehle's emails.
  3. The ALJ explicitly concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) allows the Board to conduct an emergency meeting, but the statute does not require the Board to hold one. Ehle failed to provide legal authority supporting his contention that a meeting was mandatory.

Final Decision: Because Ehle failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2), the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition.

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory Ehle (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself.

Respondent Side

  • Emily H. Mann (HOA attorney)
    Phillips, Maceyko & Battock, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association.
  • Kevin Hardy (witness)
    CCMC
    Division Vice President for Fulton Ranch's Community Manager (CCMC).

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • A. Hansen (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • v. nunez (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • d. jones (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • l. abril (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.

Other Participants

  • Natasha Bell (community manager)
    CCMC
    Former CCMC employee who served as the association's community manager in 2020.

Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel —
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:33 (132.3 KB)

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case hearing concerning the dispute between Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch (Petitioners) and Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioners filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about January 11, 2021, alleging the Respondent violated community Bylaws, specifically Article 4 Section 1.

The central issue was whether the HOA improperly maintained an unfilled seat on its Board of Directors. Petitioners asserted that the HOA violated the Bylaws by leaving a Board seat vacant for a period of time and attempted to prevent Petitioner Marinda Minch from joining the Board.

Respondent's defense focused on the interpretation of Article IV of the Bylaws. The Board's number is set at seven directors. A director resigned in August 2020, leaving six members. The subsequent annual meeting in October 2020 filled two regularly expiring seats via election, in which Petitioners were candidates but were not elected.

The August 2020 vacancy was subject to Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, which states that in the event of resignation, the successor "shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board" to serve the unexpired term.

Hearing Proceedings and Arguments

Petitioners' Argument: Petitioner Marinda Minch testified that the Board delayed filling the vacancy (until November 2020) because of personal dislike for her, and she had petitioned the Board three times for appointment.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent’s President, Bradley Hudson, testified that the Board decided the newly elected Board should fill the vacancy. At the November 11, 2020, virtual meeting, a motion to appoint Ms. Minch failed (2-4 vote), and the Board subsequently appointed another individual (4-2 vote), thereby filling all seven seats. Crucially, the Respondent argued, and the ALJ noted, that the Bylaws do not contain a timeframe within which a vacancy due to resignation must be filled.

Legal Points and Outcome

Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Article IV Sections 1, 2, and 3 must be read collectively. The process used by the Board to fill the August vacancy—selection by the remaining Board members—complied with Article IV, Section 3. Because the Bylaws did not mandate an immediate appointment timeframe, the Respondent was found to have acted within the scope of the community documents.

Final Decision: The Petitioners failed to sustain their burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:48 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:51 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:54 (119.9 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:29 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:31 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:32 (119.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

• Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

• Decision Date: February 10, 2021

• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

• September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

• Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

• February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

• March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

• January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

• Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

• Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

• Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

• Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

• Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

• Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.

Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.

Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:18:30 (141.7 KB)

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:18 (141.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

• Parties Involved:

◦ Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

◦ Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

• Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

• Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

• Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

• Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

• Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

• Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

• Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

• Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

• Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

• Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

• Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

• Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

• Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

• Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.

He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

• Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

• Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision

Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES Counsel —
Respondent Starwood Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:08 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:20 (104.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:55 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:00 (104.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

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Case Overview

• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
[email protected]

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
[email protected]

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

• Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between Patricia Davies-Brown, et al., and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL?

2. What specific architectural feature was the central point of the dispute?

3. What were the three main questions the Petitioners raised in their petition filed on March 26, 2018?

4. How did the Respondent (Starwood Estates HOA) justify the approval of other reflective metal roofs in the community?

5. According to the Petitioners, which two procedural errors did the Board of Directors commit when approving the Martins’ roof?

6. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the prohibition of “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioners were required to meet, and did they succeed?

8. Which governing documents grant the Board of Directors the authority to approve architectural plans?

9. When was the disputed roof originally approved by the Board, and what was the vote count?

10. What evidence did the Board review before its initial approval, and what evidence was not reviewed at that time?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioners were Patricia Davies-Brown (Individually and as Trustee of the Trust), Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies. The Respondent was the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association.

2. The central dispute was an aluminum, “copper-colored metal roof” installed by homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin on their property at Lot 40 of Starwood Estates. The Petitioners challenged the HOA Board’s approval of this roof.

3. The Petitioners’ petition questioned whether the roof blended with the “natural surrounding and landscape,” whether it constituted a “reflective surface,” and if so, whether the Board and ACC violated the CC&Rs and Guidelines by permitting it.

4. The Respondent submitted evidence of other reflective green and red metal roofs within the Pinetop Country Club area that had been previously approved by the Board. This was used to argue that roofs with a shine were not explicitly barred.

5. The Petitioners contended the Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample. They also argued that the roof required approval from the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) and could not be approved by the Board alone.

6. The Judge concluded that the bar on reflective surfaces, as written in the Architectural Guidelines, applies specifically to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines that does not contain the same prohibition.

7. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing their contention is more probably true than not. The Judge ruled that they failed to meet this standard.

8. Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs states that actions taken by the Board are valid, and Article VII of the Starwood Bylaws grants the Board the power to exercise Association authority and to review and approve architectural plans. The Judge found this authority allowed the Board to approve the roof.

9. The roof was approved by the Board of Directors in the summer of 2013. The approval passed with a 5-1 vote, with Petitioner Scott R. Davies being the sole board member who voted against it.

10. Before approving the roof, the Board reviewed a brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof. However, the Board did not observe a physical sample of the actual roofing material.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for deeper, analytical consideration of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between CC&Rs Section 3.1.4 (requiring ACC approval) and other governing documents (like CC&Rs Section 5.2 and Bylaws Article VII) that grant broad authority to the Board. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent contradiction in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioners failed to meet this standard with respect to their claims about the roof’s reflective nature and its harmony with the natural surroundings.

3. Examine the interpretation of the Architectural Guidelines regarding “reflective surfaces.” How did the Respondent and the Administrative Law Judge construe this rule, and what evidence and reasoning supported their interpretation over the Petitioners’ broader application?

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s evidence (e.g., the blurred photograph vs. the brochure and photos of other roofs) and explain how this likely influenced the outcome of the case.

5. Based on the issues raised in this case, what specific changes or clarifications could be made to the community’s CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines to prevent similar disputes in the future?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

ACC (Architectural Committee)

A committee, as referenced in the CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines, responsible for approving exterior alterations and ensuring all building materials and colors conform to community standards.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Velva Moses-Thompson) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts hearings, evaluates evidence, and issues a binding decision on the matter.

Architectural Guidelines

A set of community documents establishing goals and specific rules for exterior appearance, colors, materials, and site development to retain the character of Starwood Estates.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which is empowered by the CC&Rs and Bylaws to conduct the affairs of the Association and approve architectural plans.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, including the powers and duties of the Board of Directors.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in the Starwood Estates community that govern what homeowners may or may not do with their property.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the ALJ’s decision that applies legal principles, statutes, and case law to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the ALJ’s decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies, who brought the complaint against the HOA.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has a greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, persuading the fact-finder that a contention is more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which had to defend its decision to approve the roof.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

This Copper Roof Caused a Legal Battle: 3 Surprising Lessons Every Homeowner Should Learn

Introduction: The Neighborhood Dispute That Went to Court

The relationship between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a delicate balance. Architectural rules, designed to maintain a community’s aesthetic, often become a source of friction. But what happens when a disagreement over design choices escalates?

In the case of Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, a dispute over Jeff and Karen Martin’s new copper-colored metal roof didn’t just cause whispers over the fence—it went all the way to a formal administrative hearing. When the HOA board approved the roof in a 5-1 vote, the lone dissenting board member, Scott R. Davies, joined two other homeowners to formally challenge the decision.

This seemingly simple disagreement over a roofing material reveals several powerful, and often counter-intuitive, lessons for anyone living in a planned community. From the structural placement of a single sentence to the evidentiary power of a blurry photograph, this case offers a masterclass in HOA law. Here are three surprising lessons every homeowner should learn.

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1. The Devil in the Document: How a Single Sentence Can Decide Everything

The first major lesson from this case is that the hyper-specific wording and structure of your community guidelines are paramount. The location and context of a rule can be just as important as the rule itself.

The petitioners’ core argument was that the copper-colored roof violated the Architectural Guidelines because it was a “reflective surface,” which they believed was forbidden. On the surface, this seems like a straightforward complaint.

However, the HOA mounted a successful counter-argument based on document structure. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation. The rules for roofs were addressed in a distinct section titled “Roofs, Materials, and Pitches.” The ban on “reflective surfaces,” meanwhile, was located in an entirely separate section, “Exterior Appearance and Colors,” which also contained rules for windows and doors. This seemingly minor structural detail was the deciding factor on this point.

The exact rule the petitioners cited, found in the “Exterior Appearance and Colors” section, illustrates the point perfectly:

Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.

Because this prohibition was not located in the roofing section, the judge concluded it applied only to windows, doors, and general exterior surfaces—not roofs. This case highlights that homeowners must read their community documents with extreme care. A prohibition you think is universal might, in fact, be limited to a very specific context by its placement in the text.

2. The Power of Precedent: What Your Neighbors Did Years Ago Matters Today

The second key takeaway is that an HOA board’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the character of the surrounding area, not just by what has been approved inside the development’s gates.

During the hearing, the HOA presented evidence of other reflective metal roofs, including green and red ones, that existed in the broader Pinetop Country Club area. Starwood Estates is part of this larger community, and the judge’s official findings noted this evidence, which significantly supported the HOA’s position to approve the Martins’ copper-colored roof.

This reveals a nuanced lesson: an HOA doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Once a certain style or material becomes common in the surrounding region, it can establish a de facto community standard. This makes it significantly more difficult for other homeowners to argue against a similar request, as the board can point to the broader neighborhood aesthetic to justify its decision. Before you challenge a project, it’s crucial to look not only at what has been approved within your HOA, but also at the character of the community at large.

3. The Burden of Proof: Your Complaint Is Only as Good as Your Evidence

The third critical lesson is that in any formal dispute, the quality of your evidence is non-negotiable. A subjective feeling or personal opinion holds little weight without objective proof.

The petitioners attempted to prove the roof was overly reflective by submitting a photograph as evidence. However, the judge’s official findings delivered a devastating blow, noting with precise and revealing language: “Although the image showed a reflective the image, the photograph was blurred.”

This detail underscores a vital point: in a legal or formal setting, a complaint must be backed by clear, objective proof. Weak or poor-quality evidence, like a blurred photo, can completely undermine an otherwise valid concern. Even though the image hinted at the issue, its poor quality rendered it useless. If you are going to make a claim, the burden is on you to prove it with convincing, high-quality evidence. Without it, your case is likely to be dismissed.

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Conclusion: Before You Build or Battle, Do Your Homework

The Starwood Estates case serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA rules requires diligence. From this single dispute over a copper roof, we learn to read the fine print—and the structure—of governing documents, understand the power of aesthetic standards in the broader community, and ensure any complaint is backed by strong, clear evidence.

The next time you plan a home project or question a neighbor’s, ask yourself: have you really done your homework on the rules, the history, and the facts?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Davies-Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of petitioners
  • Bart A. Brown, Jr. (petitioner)
  • Scott R. Davies (petitioner, board member)
    Starwood Estates HOA Board
    Voted against the roof approval

Respondent Side

  • Kristopher L. Smith (HOA attorney)
    O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Daniel Campbell (HOA attorney)
    O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
  • Pat Knight (board member)
    Starwood Estates HOA Board

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • A Hansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D Gardner (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • C Serrano (OAH Staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted the order

Other Participants

  • Jeff Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
    Starwood Estates
    Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
  • Karen Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
    Starwood Estates
    Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debbie Westerman Counsel —
Respondent Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes Counsel Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • CC&R § 5(G)
  • CC&R § 7(B)
  • CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:57:11 (161.6 KB)

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:15 (161.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?

4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?

6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?

7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?

8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?

9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.

4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.

5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.

6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.

7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.

8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.

9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.

10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case’s themes and legal principles. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal concept of a “restrictive covenant.” Using the CC&Rs from the Bridgewood Townhomes development as an example, explain how these covenants function to regulate property use and how they are interpreted and enforced in a legal dispute.

2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the structural integrity and cost of the different CMU block sizes. Discuss the quality of the evidence (e.g., expert testimony, technical documents, contractor bids) and explain which side made a more compelling argument on this point.

3. Discuss the role and authority of a homeowners’ association Board of Directors as demonstrated in this case. How did the Board use its authority under the CC&Rs to create and enforce the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” and what does the judge’s decision say about the reasonableness of its actions?

4. The concept of “architectural continuity” and preserving the original “Al Beadle design” was central to the Respondent’s argument. Explain the significance of this argument and analyze why the Administrative Law Judge found it to be a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner’s request.

5. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, from the Petitioner’s initial Architectural Request in October 2017 through the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. What do the steps taken by both parties reveal about the formal processes for dispute resolution within this planned community?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition (as used in the source document)

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Request

A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.

Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.

Common Area

Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Limited Common Elements

Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Subpoena Duces Tecum

A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.

TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15

Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.

Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.

When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.

By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.

Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality

At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.

The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”

Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.

Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail

The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.

Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.

This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.

Pro Tip: Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner

Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.

The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.

Actionable Advice: If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.

Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”

While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.

In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”

A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.

This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.

Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks

The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.

This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debbie Westerman (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • Kelly Zernich (witness)
    Petitioner's realtor
  • Richard Ross (witness)
    Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor

Respondent Side

  • Mark E. Lines (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • R. Patrick Whelan (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines, LLC
  • Michael Brubaker (board member/witness)
    Respondent's Board president

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barb Warren (homeowner/applicant)
    Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitted the decision electronically

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel —
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaw § 3.6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.

Why this result: Respondent established that the Board performed all reasonable actions to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner's obstructionist tactics, rendering enforcement of the Bylaw impossible as it would lead to an absurdity.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusing to fill vacancies on Respondent’s Board of Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, and Bylaw § 3.6 does not empower the Board to conscript unwilling members.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Board Vacancies, Bylaw 3.6, Obstructionist Tactics, Refusal to Serve
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:00 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:04 (1160.4 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:29 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:32 (1160.4 KB)

Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and final order concerning a petition filed by homeowner Jason West (“Petitioner”) against the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated its own Bylaw § 3.6 by failing to fill vacant board positions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent had made repeated and reasonable efforts to fill the vacancies but was unsuccessful due to a lack of willing and eligible candidates. The ALJ concluded that the governing bylaw mandates the appointment of willing members but does not grant the power to conscript individuals to serve against their will. Furthermore, the decision determined that the shortage of volunteers was attributable, in part, to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics,” which created a hostile and dysfunctional environment, leading to a series of board member resignations and deterring potential candidates.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 17F-H1716031-REL

• Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner and member of the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

• Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, representing a small community of approximately 40 homes.

• Core Allegation: On April 10, 2017, the Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging the Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

• Hearing Date: June 21, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

• Final Disposition: The Petitioner’s petition was denied in a decision dated June 28, 2017. This decision was adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017, making it binding on the parties.

Governing Bylaw in Dispute

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 3.6 of the HOA’s Bylaws, which states:

Vacancies. Vacancies on the Board caused by any reason other than the removal of a director in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of these Bylaws shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the first regular or special meeting of the Board held after the occurrence of such vacancy, even though the directors present at such meeting may constitute less than a quorum. Each person so elected shall serve the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Role / Affiliation

Key Testimony / Actions

Jason West

Petitioner, Homeowner, Former Board President

Filed the petition alleging bylaw violation. Previously filed recall petitions against other board members, resigned from the board himself, and proposed a bylaw amendment that disqualified newly elected members.

Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray

Respondent’s Board President

Testified that the board made repeated efforts to find volunteers, but no one was willing to serve, citing the Petitioner’s behavior as a major cause for resignations and lack of interest.

Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla

Community Manager, National Property Service (NPS)

Testified about sending multiple email requests for board candidates on behalf of the board, which yielded no interested parties other than those who would later be disqualified.

Christina Van Soest

Former Board Member

Resigned on Feb. 8, 2017, stating, “I have found the direction of some of the board does not appear to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.” Testified she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner.

Elizabeth Mayhew

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 4, 2017, citing stress directly related to the Petitioner: “I have enough stress daily with my job and cannot handle this or him. It is making me physically ill and he is not worth that.”

Myron (“Ray”) Elmer

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 5, 2017, with the stated reason: “[d]ue to continued problems Jason etc.”

Korey Hjelmeir & Debra Epstein

Former Board Members

Testified for the Petitioner’s rebuttal. Both had previously resigned in June 2016 in response to the Petitioner’s recall petitions and were later disqualified from serving by a bylaw amendment he proposed.

Chronology of Board Destabilization and Resignations

The hearing evidence established a pattern of significant board turnover and dysfunction between June 2016 and June 2017.

• June 23, 2016: Board members Adrian Justiniano, Debra Epstein, and Korey Hjelmeir resigned after the Petitioner filed recall petitions against them.

• August 3, 2016: The Petitioner, June Thompson, and Christina Van Soest were elected to the Board. The Petitioner served as president.

• August 18, 2016: The Board expanded from 3 to 5 members, appointing Gina Murray and Ray Elmer.

• August 29, 2016: June Thompson resigned.

• February 8, 2017: Christina Van Soest resigned, citing the board’s direction and her discomfort with the Petitioner’s “research into members’ backgrounds and history, and the way he was making Board decisions.”

• February 18, 2017: The Petitioner resigned from the Board because he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

• April 4, 2017: Elizabeth Mayhew resigned, stating she could not handle the stress caused by the Petitioner and his “verbal assaults, constant lashing out, and personal attacks.”

• April 5, 2017: Ray Elmer resigned, attributing his departure to “continued problems Jason etc.” This left Gina Murray as the sole remaining board member.

Respondent’s Efforts to Fill Vacancies

The Respondent provided evidence of multiple, documented attempts to recruit new board members.

• February 23, 2017: Following the resignations of Ms. Van Soest and the Petitioner, Community Manager Eddie Padilla sent an email requesting “motivated and dedicated individuals” to serve on the Board. No one responded.

• March 31, 2017: At an open Board Meeting with “Board appointments” on the agenda, Gina Murray asked for volunteers and nominations from the floor. No one responded.

• April 4 & 18, 2017: Mr. Padilla sent two further emails requesting members interested in serving on the board to submit biographies for an upcoming annual meeting. The only individuals to respond and submit biographies were Mr. Justiniano and Ms. Hjelmeir.

• May 15, 2017: At the annual meeting, Ms. Murray again accepted nominations from the floor. Debra Epstein was nominated.

• June 5, 2017: After the newly elected board was disqualified, Mr. Padilla sent another email asking for volunteers.

Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision identified the Petitioner’s own actions as a primary cause for the board’s inability to fill vacancies.

• Instigation of Resignations: The Petitioner’s recall petitions in June 2016 and behavior cited in the 2017 resignation letters from Van Soest, Mayhew, and Elmer directly contributed to the board vacancies.

• Contradictory Claims: The Petitioner testified that four individuals (Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti) were interested in serving. However, the sign-in sheet for the March 31, 2017 meeting, where appointments were to be made, showed none of these individuals were present.

• Disqualifying Bylaw Amendment: The Petitioner proposed a new bylaw, § 3.12, which was passed at the May 15, 2017 meeting. It stated:

• Attempted Removal of Remaining Director: On June 12, 2017, the Petitioner submitted a petition to remove Gina Murray, the last remaining original board member, which would have left the board entirely vacant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s conclusions of law were decisive in denying the petition.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its bylaws.

2. Interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6: The Judge ruled that while the bylaw requires the Board to appoint members to fill vacancies, “it does not empower the Board to conscript members who are not willing to serve on the Board.”

3. Principle of Absurdity: Citing legal precedent, the decision stated that bylaws must be construed to avoid an absurd result. Forcing an HOA to operate without a board because no eligible members are willing to serve, especially when the situation is exacerbated by the Petitioner, would be such an absurdity.

4. Respondent’s Due Diligence: The Judge found that “Respondent established that the Board has done all it could to fill vacancies.”

5. Petitioner’s Culpability: The final conclusion explicitly states that “at this time, no eligible members are willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner’s obstructionist tactics, including Petitioner and his claimed supporters.”

Based on these findings, the ALJ ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The order became final and binding upon adoption by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017.

Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

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Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jason West (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; testified on his own behalf
  • Linda Siedler (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Teresa Price (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bret Morse (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; submitted absentee ballot; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bryan Brunatti (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; attended meeting and counted ballots; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray

Respondent Side

  • Stewart F. Salwin (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Represented the Respondent
  • Eugenia Murray (board president, witness)
    Only current Board member at the time of hearing; testified for Respondent
  • Edward Padilla (property manager, witness)
    National Property Service (NPC)
    Community Manager; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    ADRE Commissioner who adopted the ALJ Decision

Other Participants

  • Korey Hjelmeir (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election
  • Debra Epstein (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election; appeared via Skype at a meeting
  • Adrian Justiniano (former board member)
    Resigned and later sought re-election
  • June Thompson (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2016
  • Christina Van Soest (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2017
  • Myron Elmer (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • Elizabeth Mayhew (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • David Epstein (member)
    Appeared via Skype at a meeting; expressed interest in serving on Board
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Individual to whom requests for rehearing should be addressed