Clifford S Burnes V. Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-04-13
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws by not holding elections. The Bylaw states the annual meeting is for the purpose of 'electing or announcing the results of the election of Directors' and transacting 'other business' (which included dissolution), and the HOA was not required to hold elections if results could have been announced or if dissolution proceedings were underway.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford S Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association Counsel John T. Crotty

Alleged Violations

SCHA Bylaws Article 2.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws by not holding elections. The Bylaw states the annual meeting is for the purpose of 'electing or announcing the results of the election of Directors' and transacting 'other business' (which included dissolution), and the HOA was not required to hold elections if results could have been announced or if dissolution proceedings were underway.

Why this result: The Bylaws did not strictly require elections be held, and Petitioner failed to object to the board remaining in place to oversee the dissolution.

Key Issues & Findings

Annual meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws by failing to hold Board of Directors elections at the 2021 annual meeting. Respondent argued the language ('for the purpose of electing or announcing the results') did not require elections and that the dissolution vote superseded the immediate need for elections, especially since no one objected at the meeting.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Election Dispute, Dissolution, Annual Meeting, Burden of Proof, Waiver
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

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Video Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H031-REL Decision – 1035344.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:01:26 (51.8 KB)

23F-H031-REL Decision – 1049021.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:01:32 (114.7 KB)

23F-H031-REL Decision – 1035344.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:49 (51.8 KB)

23F-H031-REL Decision – 1049021.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:51 (114.7 KB)

This summary concerns the hearing held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) on March 29, 2023, in the matter of *Clifford S Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association* (SCHA), Docket No. 23F-H031-REL.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The central issue was whether the Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association (Respondent) violated its Bylaws, specifically Article 2.1, by failing to hold Board of Directors elections at the annual meeting on December 11, 2021.

Article 2.1 mandates that an annual meeting "shall be held at least every twelve (12) months… for the purpose of electing or announcing the results of the election of Directors and transacting such other business as may properly come before the meeting".

Key facts established during the hearing include:

  1. The annual meeting was held on December 11, 2021.
  2. At that meeting, the voting members properly approved a vote to dissolve the SCHA.
  3. The Board President and Vice President, whose terms were ending, volunteered to remain in their positions to oversee the dissolution process.
  4. No elections were held for the subsequent 2022 calendar year.
  5. Petitioner Clifford S. Burnes was present at the meeting but did not voice an objection to the board members remaining or to the lack of elections at that time.

Key Arguments

Petitioner's Argument: Petitioner Burnes argued that the use of the word "shall" and the phrase "for the purpose of electing" in Article 2.1 constituted a requirement for elections to be held annually, and the SCHA violated this bylaw. Mr. Burnes requested that the ALJ find in his favor, require the SCHA to comply, reimburse his filing fee, and impose a civil fine on the HOA.

Respondent's Argument: The SCHA, represented by John T. Crotty, denied the claim. The Respondent argued that Article 2.1 provided options: either holding elections *or* announcing the results of elections, and also permitted transacting "such other business," which included the majority-approved dissolution. The SCHA argued that had the dissolution vote failed, an election would have been held. Crucially, the SCHA argued that Mr. Burnes waived his claim of violation by failing to object at the meeting, despite his familiarity with the governing documents.

Legal Outcome and Final Decision

The ALJ determined that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the violation of Article 2.1 by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The legal analysis found that Article 2.1, as written, did not strictly require elections to be held at the meeting itself, as it allowed for results to be announced. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that the clear approval of the dissolution vote meant there would be no need for a new board once the process was complete. The ALJ deemed the Petitioner’s failure to raise an objection at the meeting to be "most harmful" to his claim.

The ALJ issued an Order denying the Petitioner’s petition.

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23F-H031-REL

3 sources

These sources document a legal dispute between Clifford S. Burnes and the Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association regarding an alleged violation of community bylaws. The conflict centers on a December 2021 annual meeting where the association voted to dissolve the organization but did not hold new elections for its leadership. Burnes argued that Article 2.1 of the bylaws mandated an election, while the association maintained that the dissolution vote rendered new elections unnecessary. An administrative hearing transcript captures the testimony of both parties, highlighting disagreements over meeting procedures and the legal interpretation of governing documents. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that no mandatory election requirement was violated. The final decision emphasizes that the petitioner failed to object during the meeting and did not meet the burden of proof for his claims.

What are the legal arguments for and against dissolving the HOA?
How did the judge interpret the ‘purpose’ of the annual meeting?
Explain the role of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

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23F-H031-REL

3 sources

These sources document a legal dispute between Clifford S. Burnes and the Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association regarding an alleged violation of community bylaws. The conflict centers on a December 2021 annual meeting where the association voted to dissolve the organization but did not hold new elections for its leadership. Burnes argued that Article 2.1 of the bylaws mandated an election, while the association maintained that the dissolution vote rendered new elections unnecessary. An administrative hearing transcript captures the testimony of both parties, highlighting disagreements over meeting procedures and the legal interpretation of governing documents. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that no mandatory election requirement was violated. The final decision emphasizes that the petitioner failed to object during the meeting and did not meet the burden of proof for his claims.

What are the legal arguments for and against dissolving the HOA?
How did the judge interpret the ‘purpose’ of the annual meeting?
Explain the role of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Thursday, February 12

Save to note

Today • 2:17 PM

3 sources

Video Overview

Mind Map

Reports

Flashcards

Quiz

Infographic

Slide Deck

Data Table

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford S. Burnes (petitioner)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association Member
    Also referred to as Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Respondent Side

  • John T. Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
  • Esmerina Martinez (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
    President; referred to as Serena Martinez or Esmerelda Martinez in sources.
  • Dave Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
    Vice President; referred to as Dave Matt or Dave Mel in testimony.
  • Joseph Martinez (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmittal.
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmittal.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmittal.
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmittal.

Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:33 (132.3 KB)

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case hearing concerning the dispute between Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch (Petitioners) and Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioners filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about January 11, 2021, alleging the Respondent violated community Bylaws, specifically Article 4 Section 1.

The central issue was whether the HOA improperly maintained an unfilled seat on its Board of Directors. Petitioners asserted that the HOA violated the Bylaws by leaving a Board seat vacant for a period of time and attempted to prevent Petitioner Marinda Minch from joining the Board.

Respondent's defense focused on the interpretation of Article IV of the Bylaws. The Board's number is set at seven directors. A director resigned in August 2020, leaving six members. The subsequent annual meeting in October 2020 filled two regularly expiring seats via election, in which Petitioners were candidates but were not elected.

The August 2020 vacancy was subject to Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, which states that in the event of resignation, the successor "shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board" to serve the unexpired term.

Hearing Proceedings and Arguments

Petitioners' Argument: Petitioner Marinda Minch testified that the Board delayed filling the vacancy (until November 2020) because of personal dislike for her, and she had petitioned the Board three times for appointment.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent’s President, Bradley Hudson, testified that the Board decided the newly elected Board should fill the vacancy. At the November 11, 2020, virtual meeting, a motion to appoint Ms. Minch failed (2-4 vote), and the Board subsequently appointed another individual (4-2 vote), thereby filling all seven seats. Crucially, the Respondent argued, and the ALJ noted, that the Bylaws do not contain a timeframe within which a vacancy due to resignation must be filled.

Legal Points and Outcome

Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Article IV Sections 1, 2, and 3 must be read collectively. The process used by the Board to fill the August vacancy—selection by the remaining Board members—complied with Article IV, Section 3. Because the Bylaws did not mandate an immediate appointment timeframe, the Respondent was found to have acted within the scope of the community documents.

Final Decision: The Petitioners failed to sustain their burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020061-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-03
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Samuel T Paparazzo Counsel
Respondent Coronado Ranch Community Association Counsel Mark Stahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.

Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.

Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117

Related election workflow tool

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Decision Documents

20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf

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20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf

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Briefing Document: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020061-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Samuel T. Paparazzo versus the Coronado Ranch Community Association. The central conclusion of the proceeding is the denial of the Petitioner’s claims. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Arizona state statutes or its own governing bylaws in the conduct of its April 2, 2020, annual meeting.

The critical takeaways from the decision are as follows:

Meeting Format and Notice: The Association’s decision to move its annual meeting to a virtual platform (ClickMeeting) was deemed a lawful and appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Arizona Governor’s related executive orders. The notification methods, which included physical signs and multiple emails, were found to be sufficient.

Right to Speak: The Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the right to speak because he was “blocked” from the online chat feature was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the issue stemmed from “user error”—the Petitioner typed messages but failed to transmit them by pressing ‘enter’ or ‘send’. The fact that 26 other members successfully used the chat feature demonstrated its functionality.

Meeting Conduct: The Association’s president properly called the meeting to order before delegating chairing responsibilities to the Association’s Managing Agent, an action the Petitioner conceded was within the president’s authority.

Board Elections: The election of all five Board of Director positions simultaneously, rather than in staggered terms, was justified by unique circumstances. The Association’s 2019 annual meeting failed to achieve a quorum, preventing an election and resulting in a “carryover of open seats,” which necessitated filling all positions in the 2020 election.

Ultimately, the ALJ found that the Association and its Board acted within the scope of their statutory authority and that the challenges raised by the Petitioner were without merit.

I. Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 3, 2020, following an evidentiary hearing held on August 18, 2020.

Case Number: 20F-H2020061-REL

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark

Petitioner: Samuel T. Paparazzo (Homeowner and Association Member)

Respondent: Coronado Ranch Community Association (HOA)

Central Issue: The core of the dispute was whether the Coronado Ranch Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes and specific sections of its own bylaws during its annual meeting on April 2, 2020.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

On May 15, 2020, Samuel Paparazzo filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging that the Association committed the following violations:

1. Improper Notice of Meeting: Providing less than 10-days’ notice regarding a “change in venue” for the annual meeting to only a small portion of the membership, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Association Bylaw 2.3.

2. Denial of Right to Speak: Preventing the Petitioner from exercising his right to speak by “blocking” or otherwise disabling his use of the online “chat feature” during the virtual meeting, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A).

3. Improper Meeting Conduct: Failing to properly call the annual meeting to order, in violation of Association Bylaw 2.7.

4. Improper Board Election: Conducting the Board of Directors election without the “staggered” terms required by the bylaws, in violation of Association Bylaw 3.1.

III. Factual Chronology and Key Evidence

The decision outlines a clear sequence of events, heavily influenced by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Feb. 20, 2020

The Association issues its initial notice for the annual meeting, scheduled for April 2, 2020, at Coronado Elementary School.

Mar. 12, 2020

The Association mails election ballots to all Members.

Mar. 19, 2020

Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-09, limiting certain business operations to slow the spread of COVID-19.

~Mar. 25, 2020

The Association’s President, Bob Hicks, officially moves the meeting to the virtual ClickMeeting platform.

Mar. 25 – Apr. 1

The Association notifies Members of the change via 12 signs at 6 community entrances and three separate email blasts to approximately 750 Members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.

Mar. 30, 2020

Governor Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-18, the “Stay Home, Stay Healthy, Stay Connected” order.

Apr. 1, 2020

Two signs are placed at the entrance to the original meeting location, Coronado Elementary School, informing of the change.

Apr. 2, 2020

The Annual Meeting is held via ClickMeeting.
• President Hicks calls the meeting to order and then appoints Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the remainder of the meeting.
• A quorum is achieved based on attendees and absentee ballots.
• An election is held for all 5 open Board positions due to a lack of quorum at the 2019 meeting.
• The Petitioner types messages in the chat window but fails to hit “enter” or click “send” to transmit them. He receives no response to an email for help sent during the meeting.
• At least 26 other Members successfully use the chat feature.

IV. Analysis of Key Issues and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge systematically addressed and dismissed each of the Petitioner’s four allegations, concluding that the Board acted lawfully and within its authority.

A. Meeting Notice and Venue Change

Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 2.3 (Notice of Meetings).

Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ concluded that the notice of the Association’s 2020 annual meeting was “timely and properly noticed.” The move to an online platform was not an arbitrary venue change but a necessary and reasonable measure to comply with the Governor’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Association made a multi-faceted effort to inform Members through physical signs and repeated emails.

◦ The Petitioner received notice of the modification and, crucially, “failed to raise an objection prior to or during the meeting at issue.”

◦ A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objections to defective notice, as stated in Bylaw 2.3.

B. Right to Speak

Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) (Open Meetings and Member Participation).

Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ determined the Petitioner’s inability to communicate during the meeting was the result of “user error” and not a deliberate act by the Association to silence him.

Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Petitioner wrote messages but never finalized the action by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button.

◦ The chat feature was demonstrably functional, as it was “successfully used by no less than 26 other Members during the annual meeting.”

◦ The decision explicitly states, “The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.”

C. Conduct of Meeting

Alleged Violation: Bylaw 2.7 (Organization and Conduct of Meeting).

Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The meeting was lawfully conducted.

Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Association President, Bob Hicks, called the meeting to order and took roll before appointing Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the rest of the meeting.

◦ The Petitioner “conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority task Agent Bishop with chairing the annual meeting.”

D. Board of Directors Election

Alleged Violation: Bylaw 3.1 (Number and Terms of Office).

Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The election for all five Board seats was deemed “lawful and appropriate given the circumstances.”

Supporting Evidence:

◦ The bylaw’s provision for staggered terms could not be implemented because the 2019 annual meeting lacked a quorum, which meant no election took place that year.

◦ This lack of a 2019 vote “resulted in a carryover of open seats,” necessitating a vote for all five Board positions in 2020.

◦ The Petitioner “admitted that it had not been possible for the Association to stagger Board electees in the 2020 vote because no quorum had been reached to vote in 2019.”

V. Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.”

Legal Standard: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the record did not establish any violations and that the Petitioner “failed to sustain his burden of proof in this matter.”

Date of Order: The decision was issued on September 3, 2020.

Study Guide: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 20F-H2020061-REL, Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the four specific allegations the Petitioner made against the Association regarding its Annual Meeting?

3. How did the Association notify its members of the change from an in-person meeting to a virtual one?

4. What was the legal justification for the Association’s decision to move the Annual Meeting to an online platform?

5. What evidence was presented to counter the Petitioner’s claim that he was “blocked” from using the online chat feature?

6. According to the Association’s bylaws, who has the authority to chair the annual meeting and delegate that responsibility?

7. Why did the 2020 Board of Directors election involve voting for all five open positions instead of being staggered?

8. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this hearing?

9. What two key Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) relate to member meeting notices and the right to speak?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind it?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Samuel T. Paparazzo, the Petitioner, who is a property owner and member of the Association, and the Coronado Ranch Community Association, the Respondent, which is the homeowners’ association for the subdivision. The Petitioner brought the complaint, and the Respondent defended its actions.

2. The Petitioner alleged that: (i) inadequate notice of the “change in venue” was given; (ii) he was denied his right to speak by being blocked from the online chat feature; (iii) the meeting was not properly called to order; and (iv) the Board of Directors vote was not properly “staggered.”

3. The Association notified members of the move to the ClickMeeting platform by placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances, sending three separate emails to approximately 750 members, and placing 2 signs at the entrance of the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.

4. The legal justification was the need to comply with executive orders issued by Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey (2020-09, 2020-12, and 2020-18) to slow the spread of COVID-19. The online platform was adopted to allow homeowners to safely access the meeting while adhering to physical distancing mandates.

5. The evidence showed that the Petitioner wrote messages but never hit the “enter” key or “send” button to transmit them. Furthermore, the record indicates that no less than 26 other members successfully used the chat feature during the meeting.

6. According to Bylaw Section 2.7, the President of the Association, Bob Hicks, has the authority to call the meeting to order and chair it. The Petitioner conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority to delegate the chairing of the meeting to the Association’s Managing Agent, Kevin Bishop.

7. The election involved all five positions because a quorum had not been achieved at the Association’s 2019 annual meeting. This lack of a quorum prevented a vote from taking place, resulting in a carryover of all open board seats to the 2020 election.

8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof required, meaning the evidence must be more probably true than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, bore the burden of proving his allegations by this standard.

9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) requires notice to be sent not fewer than 10 nor more than 50 days in advance of a meeting. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) ensures that all meetings are open to members and that members are permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge reasoned that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof, as the evidence showed the Association’s actions were lawful and appropriate responses to the circumstances, and the Petitioner’s inability to participate was due to user error.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated executive orders in the events of this case. How did these external factors influence the Association’s actions and the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

2. The judge concluded that the Petitioner’s inability to use the chat function was due to “user error.” Discuss the evidence that supports this conclusion and explore the legal line between an association’s responsibility to provide access and a member’s responsibility to utilize the provided tools correctly.

3. Explain the relationship between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT.). How did the judge use both to evaluate the legality of the Association’s handling of the annual meeting and election?

4. The Petitioner argued that the online platform constituted a “change in venue” that required more extensive notice. Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the legal merits of this argument in the context of a virtual meeting necessitated by a public health crisis.

5. Discuss the concept of “quorum” as it applied to both the 2019 and 2020 annual meetings. How did the failure to achieve quorum in one year directly impact the procedures and outcome of the election in the following year?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judicial officer (Jenna Clark in this case) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1 specifically regulates planned communities (homeowners’ associations).

Association

The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the homeowners’ association for the residential development in Gilbert, Arizona. It is governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the Association that detail the structure of day-to-day governance, including voting processes, quorum requirements, meeting provisions, and other operating guidelines.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use within the development.

Declarant Control Period

An initial period in an association’s history where the developer (the “Declarant”) controls the Board of Directors. In this case, this period ended for the Association in 2005.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

The Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency that was referred this matter to conduct an evidentiary hearing and decide the case.

Petitioner

Samuel T. Paparazzo, the property owner and Association member who filed the petition with the Department, alleging violations by the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

Quorum

The minimum number of members required to be present or represented by ballot for a meeting to be valid and for votes to be taken. The failure to achieve quorum at the 2019 meeting resulted in a carryover of open board seats.

Respondent

The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the party against whom the petition was filed. The Respondent denied all allegations and was represented by legal counsel.

He Sued His HOA Over a Virtual Meeting—The Judge’s Ruling Contains 4 Critical Lessons for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The New Battlefield for Neighborhood Disputes

Cast your mind back to the chaotic spring of 2020. The world was locking down, businesses were scrambling to go remote, and the delicate social contracts of our neighborhoods were fraying. For millions living in Homeowners’ Associations, this meant the abrupt cancellation of in-person meetings, replaced by a frantic pivot to unfamiliar virtual platforms. In this pressure cooker of uncertainty and technical glitches, minor grievances quickly escalated into major legal battles.

The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association is a quintessential legal drama of that era. A frustrated homeowner, believing he was silenced and his rights ignored during a virtual meeting, took his HOA to court. The judge’s decision, however, serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It distills four surprising and impactful lessons that every homeowner should understand as community governance becomes increasingly digital.

1. The Takeaway: You Can’t Claim You Were Silenced If You Forgot to Hit ‘Send’

The petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, leveled a serious charge: that the HOA had denied his right to speak by “blocking” him from using the online chat feature during the annual meeting. In his view, this was an intentional act of suppression.

The digital evidence, however, told a very different story. While Mr. Paparazzo had typed several messages, he had never actually transmitted them by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button. While he did email for assistance during the meeting without receiving a timely response, the court found the chat feature was fully functional, proven by the fact that at least 26 other members used it successfully. The judge’s ruling was a stark lesson in digital accountability:

Petitioner’s inability to effectively communicate with the Association during the annual meeting was the result of user error. … The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.

This establishes a critical precedent for our digital age. The analysis here goes beyond simple “user error.” It suggests that a baseline of digital literacy is becoming a prerequisite for effective civic participation. Courts may have little sympathy for claims of disenfranchisement that stem from a failure to master the basic tools of modern communication.

2. The Takeaway: An Emergency Can Justify Last-Minute Changes

Next, the petitioner challenged the HOA on procedural grounds—a classic move in community disputes. He argued that the association failed to provide proper notice for the virtual meeting. The HOA had correctly noticed its in-person meeting for April 2, 2020, back on February 20. But by late March, holding that meeting had become impossible.

The judge’s response to this claim is a masterclass in how legal “reasonableness” can override rigid bylaws during a crisis. The court noted the rapidly evolving timeline of the pandemic: Governor Ducey issued executive orders limiting business operations on March 19, prohibiting the closure of essential services on March 23, and issuing the “Stay Home” order on March 30. Faced with these superseding government mandates, the HOA moved the meeting online on March 25.

Crucially, the HOA’s communication efforts were extensive and documented. They didn’t just send a single email. The board notified its members by:

• Placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances to the community.

• Sending three separate email blasts to approximately 750 members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.

• Placing 2 additional signs at the entrance to the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.

The judge concluded that the HOA’s actions were a justifiable response to an unprecedented emergency. This wasn’t a board ignoring its rules; it was a board taking necessary steps to comply with government orders and protect its members, legally justifying the short-notice change in format.

3. The Takeaway: Just Showing Up Can Waive Your Right to Complain

This lesson hinges on a legal concept every homeowner must understand: waiver by attendance. Buried in the association’s bylaws was Section 2.3, which states: “A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objection to the lack of notice or defective notice of the meeting.”

This is not mere legalese; it’s a common and powerful clause designed to ensure the finality of meetings. It prevents a member from strategically attending a meeting, remaining silent about a potential procedural flaw, and then launching a lawsuit later if they don’t like the outcome. The judge noted that the petitioner attended the virtual meeting but did not object to the notice “prior to or during” the event. By participating without raising a formal objection at the time, he legally accepted the meeting’s procedures and waived his right to challenge them later.

4. The Takeaway: The Past Can Haunt the Present

The petitioner’s final major complaint appeared to be a slam dunk: the election for the Board of Directors was not “staggered” as explicitly required by Bylaws Section 3.1. Instead of a mix of one- and two-year terms to ensure continuity, all five open board positions were elected at once. On its face, this was a clear violation.

But the reason for this anomaly demonstrates the domino effect of governance. The judge found that in the previous year, 2019, the association had failed to achieve a quorum for its annual meeting. Because there was no quorum, no vote could occur, creating a “carryover of open seats.” This failure in 2019 created a governance debt that had to be paid in 2020. The only lawful way to do so was to elect members to all five vacant positions. This shows that an HOA is a continuous legal entity; one year’s procedural failure doesn’t just disappear—it creates unusual but legally necessary circumstances the next.

Conclusion: A Final Thought for the Digital Neighborhood

The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association offers a clear and compelling look at the collision between established community rules, the new realities of digital life, and the chaos of unforeseen global events. It shows that while bylaws and statutes provide a framework, their application can be shaped by emergencies, past events, and even a single user’s technical skills.

As our communities increasingly operate online, who bears the greater responsibility for ensuring effective communication—the organization hosting the meeting, or the individual attending it?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Samuel Paparazzo (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Samuel T Paparazzo

Respondent Side

  • Mark Stahl (HOA attorney)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Also spelled Mark Sahl in source
  • Timothy Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
  • Kevin Bishop (community manager)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Appeared as a witness for Respondent; Also referred to as 'Agent Bishop' and chaired part of the annual meeting
  • Bob Hicks (HOA Board President)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Delegated chairing of the annual meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

Preview HOABallot election workflows

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

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20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

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20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772833.pdf

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Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

“Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Mary J Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mary J Bartle Counsel
Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions

The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.

Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.

The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.

Case Overview

Case Name

Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Petitioner

Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)

Respondent

Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)

Rehearing Date

January 14, 2020

Final Decision Date

January 30, 2020

Procedural History and Core Allegation

The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:

April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.

The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.

September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.

October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.

January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.

At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”

Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings

Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties

The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:

The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.

Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.

Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:

Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:

Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.

Legal Framework and Final Order

Applicable Legal Standards

The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.

Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”

Final Order and Implications

Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:

1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.

2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.

Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?

3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?

4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?

5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?

7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?

8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?

9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?

10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.

2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.

3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.

4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.

5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.

6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.

7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.

8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”

2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?

3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?

4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?

5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.

Bylaws

A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.

Conclusion of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.

Finding of Fact

The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.

A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.

Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?

After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.

However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.

Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win

Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.

The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.

Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:

The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.

This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.

Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken

Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.

Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.

Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”

The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser

It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.

In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:

“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.

One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.

Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners

The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.

While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mary J Bartle (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
  • Edith Rudder (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate