Tag Archives: Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Keystone Owners Association V. Bernadette M. Bennett

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Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-12-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed. The Respondent (Homeowner) was found in violation of Governing Documents for installing an unapproved driveway extension that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the $1,500.00 filing fee and comply with all Governing Documents henceforth. No civil penalty was levied.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keystone Owners Association Counsel Erica L. Mortenson
Respondent Bernadette M. Bennett Counsel Thomas A. Walcott

Alleged Violations

Mountain Park Association CC&Rs Art. IV, Sec. 2; Keystone CC&Rs Art. V, Sec. 5.19; Rules (35% Frontage Limit)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed. The Respondent (Homeowner) was found in violation of Governing Documents for installing an unapproved driveway extension that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the $1,500.00 filing fee and comply with all Governing Documents henceforth. No civil penalty was levied.

Why this result: Respondent failed to obtain prior written approval for the driveway alteration and failed to prove the affirmative defense of laches.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized Driveway Extension Exceeding 35% of Total Yard Frontage Area

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by installing a driveway extension exceeding 35% of the total yard frontage area without prior written approval. The ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation occurred and the Respondent failed to establish the affirmative defense of laches.

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $1,500.00 for the filing fee and comply henceforth with the Governing Documents.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, ARC, Driveway, Frontage Area, CC&Rs, Laches
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Westburne Supply, Inc. v. Diversified Design and Construction, Inc., 170 Ariz. 598, 600, 826 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1992)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62 (1992)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H031-REL Decision – 1159036.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180542.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180545.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198622.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198623.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1225107.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227639.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227642.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1230660.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1241815.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1250037.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1159036.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180542.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1180545.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198622.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1198623.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1225107.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227639.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1227642.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1230660.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1241815.pdf

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24F-H031-REL Decision – 1250037.pdf

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This summary focuses on the hearing held on November 19, 2024 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson, concerning the dispute between Keystone Owners Association (Petitioner) and Bernadette M. Bennett (Respondent).

Key Facts and Main Issues

The core issue was Petitioner's allegation that Respondent violated the Governing Documents by installing a driveway extension that exceeds 35% of the total yard frontage area. This included allegations of violating Article IV, Section 2 of the Mountain Park Association Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Article V, Section 5.19 of Petitioner’s CC&Rs.

Key Facts Presented:

  • Respondent owns a home within Keystone, a subassociation of Mountain Park Ranch. Both associations' Governing Documents required Respondent to obtain prior written approval for any alteration to the exterior appearance.
  • Mountain Park Ranch Rules, which Keystone relied upon for enforcement, state that the parking surface shall not exceed 35 percent of the total yard frontage area.
  • Petitioner asserted that the Respondent installed the cement driveway extension without obtaining mandatory written approval.
  • An on-site inspection conducted in May 2024 determined that the driveway slabs (original 16 ft + unapproved 8 ft modification) measured 24 ft wide. Based on the lot frontage measurement of approximately 60 ft, the driveway covered 40% of the yard frontage, exceeding the 35% limit.
  • The Petitioner's right to enforce the Master Association’s rules was formalized by an Assignment Agreement signed on August 16, 2023.

Key Arguments and Proceedings

The Petitioner presented testimony from Harry Whitesell, a board member and former property appraiser, who detailed the measurements and the history of the Respondent's failed architectural requests (2015, 2017) to add parking. Petitioner argued that the Respondent ignored denial notices and that the modification was installed without approval and remains out of compliance.

The Respondent's legal strategy focused entirely on the affirmative defense of laches. Respondent's counsel argued that the condition had existed, open and obvious, since late 2017/early 2018 without enforcement. Respondent argued the HOA's delay was unreasonable, causing prejudice, and that the motivation to pursue the violation only arose after securing the enforcement authority from Mountain Park Ranch in 2023. Respondent also questioned the interpretation of "yard frontage area" used for the calculation, arguing it was ambiguous. Respondent did not present witness testimony at the hearing.

Petitioner countered the laches argument by citing a provision in the Keystone CC&Rs stating that failure to enforce a restriction "shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter".

Legal Points and Outcome

The ALJ admitted Petitioner’s Exhibits A through M and Respondent’s Exhibit 1 into evidence.

The ALJ made the following legal conclusions:

  1. Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
  2. The preponderance of the evidence showed that Respondent erected a cement driveway extension that exceeds 35 percent of the total yard frontage area, without obtaining prior approval.
  3. Respondent failed to meet the burden of establishing the affirmative defense of laches. The ALJ found that Respondent had not established sufficient "unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice" to deny the relief sought by Petitioner.

Final Decision and Order:

  • Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party.
  • Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00 within thirty days.
  • Respondent was ordered to henceforth comply with the provisions of the Governing Documents.
  • No Civil Penalty was found to be appropriate.

Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can a sub-association enforce the rules and CC&Rs of the master association?

Short Answer

Yes, if the master association has assigned those enforcement rights to the sub-association.

Detailed Answer

A sub-association (like a specific neighborhood HOA within a larger master planned community) generally enforces its own documents. However, this decision clarifies that a sub-association may be authorized to enforce the master association's governing documents if there is a specific assignment agreement executing that transfer of authority.

Alj Quote

The Governing Documents authorize Petitioner to enforce the Governing Documents, as further memorialized by an executed Assignment Agreement by and between Mountain Park Association and Keystone Owners Association signed on August 16, 2023.

Legal Basis

Assignment Agreement / Governing Documents

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • sub-associations
  • master association
  • enforcement authority

Question

If I extend my driveway without approval, does the HOA have to prove I didn't get permission, or do I have to prove I did?

Short Answer

The absence of written evidence granting approval can be used to establish a violation.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA bears the initial burden of proof for the violation, the lack of testimonial or written evidence showing that the homeowner received approval helps establish that the modification was unauthorized.

Alj Quote

However, there was no testimonial or written evidence presented to establish that Respondent was granted approval to install a driveway that exceeded 35% of the total yard frontage area.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • architectural approval
  • evidence
  • driveways
  • modifications

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for an HOA to win a violation hearing?

Short Answer

The HOA must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The HOA does not need to prove a violation 'beyond a reasonable doubt' (the criminal standard). They must only show that their contention is 'more probably true than not' or carries superior evidentiary weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9 by a preponderance of the evidence… 'A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I use the defense that the HOA waited too long to enforce the rule (laches)?

Short Answer

Yes, but you bear the burden of proving that the delay was unreasonable and caused you prejudice.

Detailed Answer

Laches is an affirmative defense. It is not enough to simply show a delay; the homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay was unreasonable and that it resulted in sufficient prejudice to deny the HOA's relief.

Alj Quote

Laches is an affirmative defense, and Respondent bears the burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence… Respondent has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that there was unreasonable delay that has resulted in prejudice to Respondent sufficient to deny the relief Petitioner seeks…

Legal Basis

A.C.C. R2-19-119(B)(2); Flynn v. Rogers

Topic Tags

  • defenses
  • laches
  • enforcement delay

Question

If I lose the hearing, can the judge make me pay the HOA's filing fees?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA's filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the judge ordered the Respondent (homeowner) to pay the Petitioner's (HOA) filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within 30 days.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner its filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

How do judges interpret the meaning of restrictive covenants (CC&Rs)?

Short Answer

They are interpreted as a whole, looking at the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

Legal interpretation does not isolate single phrases but looks at the document in its entirety to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs.

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • CC&Rs
  • covenants

Question

Can the judge issue a civil penalty (fine) in addition to ordering me to fix the violation?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge has the authority to levy a civil penalty, though they may choose not to.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, the administrative law judge has the discretion to order compliance and also levy a civil penalty for each violation. In this specific case, the judge found no civil penalty was appropriate, but the authority exists.

Alj Quote

The administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue and may levy a civil penalty on the basis of each violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalties
  • fines
  • statutory authority

Case

Docket No
24F-H031-REL
Case Title
Keystone Owners Association vs. Bernadette M. Bennett
Decision Date
2024-12-09
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erica L. Mortenson (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    HOA attorney
  • Harry Whitel (board member/witness)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Secretary of the Board
  • Tim Seyfarth (board member/president)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board President
  • Glenn Steinman (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Vice President
  • Debbie Burch (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Board Treasurer
  • Cherry Collins (board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Member at large; Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Joe Getti (ARC member/former board member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Mary Hamilton (ARC member)
    Keystone Owners Association
    Architectural Advisory Committee member
  • Dan (attorney/staff)
    Goodman Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bernadette M. Bennett (respondent)
    Lot Owner
  • Thomas A. Walcott (attorney)
    Provident Lawyers
    Respondent attorney
  • Noah Alvarado (staff)
    Staff/assistant for Respondent's Counsel
  • Christopher J. Charles (attorney/staff)
    Provident Lawyers

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Amy Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge (prior to VMT)
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Isabella (property manager)
    Vision Management
    Keystone Property Manager who was asked for documents
  • Annette Wthbon (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent
  • Carla Garvin (property management agent)
    City Management
    Former Property Management Agent

John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H058-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-10-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner John R. Ashley's petition against Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The ALJ found that the HOA did not violate the Bylaws regarding the minimum number of directors because compliance was impossible due to lack of member interest, and the issue was subsequently moot as the board currently met the minimum requirement.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R. Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC Counsel James Brewer, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner John R. Ashley's petition against Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The ALJ found that the HOA did not violate the Bylaws regarding the minimum number of directors because compliance was impossible due to lack of member interest, and the issue was subsequently moot as the board currently met the minimum requirement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut Respondent’s claim that it actively sought a third board member. The Respondent was exonerated under the legal doctrine of impossibility of performance, and the current compliance with the three-member minimum rendered the dispute moot.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding the minimum number of Board Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws by having only two Board Directors dismiss and order a redo of the 1/9/2023 Annual Membership Meeting for 3/7/2023, arguing that three directors were required to properly handle the Association’s affairs.

Orders: The petition is dismissed. Respondent was unable to comply with the Bylaws requiring three directors due to impossibility (lack of member interest) while actively seeking compliance, and the dispute is currently moot as the board now has three or more members.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: impossibility of performance, board structure, election dispute, bylaw violation, Planned Communities Act, mootness
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • Garner v. Ellingson, 18 Ariz. 181, 182 (App. 1972)
  • Whelan v. Griffith Consumers Company, 170 A.2d 229, 230 (D.C. App., 1961)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Assân v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1075520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:40 (45.8 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078604.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:43 (47.9 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078608.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:46 (5.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1099484.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:11:49 (104.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1075520.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:49 (45.8 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078604.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:52 (47.9 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1078608.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:56 (5.5 KB)

23F-H058-REL Decision – 1099484.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:59:01 (104.5 KB)

This summary addresses the administrative hearing held on September 14, 2023, in the matter of John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, INC (No. 23F-H058-REL).

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioner John R. Ashley challenged the actions of the Rancho Reyes II Community Association (Respondent). The sole issue of the hearing was whether the Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of the Community Bylaws. This bylaw requires the affairs of the Association to be managed by "not less than three (3) nor more than nine (9) directors".

The violation Petitioner alleged was that two sitting Board Directors (Sherry Ortega and Maria Ruelas) acted alone (on or about January 19, 2023) in dismissing the results of the January 2023 Annual Membership Meeting and ordering a redo election for March 7, 2023, when at least three directors were required to handle Association affairs. It was established that the Board operated with only two members from late 2021 until the March 2023 election.

The January 2023 election, in which five members were elected, was invalidated by the two existing board members after the community manager suspected fraud and irregularities (including stuffed ballots, improper envelopes, and an elected candidate whose husband stated she did not submit her name and was not fluent in English).

Key Arguments

Petitioner's Argument: Petitioner argued the decision to redo the election was invalid because it was made by fewer than three directors, thus violating the Bylaw. Petitioner also contended that the two directors (Ortega and Ruelas) were not duly elected in 2022, asserting that there were effectively zero legal board members when the re-election was ordered. Petitioner further argued that the Respondent's claims of fraud were "non-existent" under ARS title 33, Section 1812, because the board was responsible for approving returned ballots prior to the meeting.

Respondent's Legal Defense: Respondent asserted that operating with only two members was due to impossibility or impracticability of performance. Respondent argued that it actively sought a third board member, but homeowners were not interested in serving. Respondent relied on Arizona case law, stating that "when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated" (*Garner v. Ellingson*). The Respondent maintained that the re-election was necessary due to the severe irregularities in the January vote.

Outcome and Legal Decision

On October 4, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision dismissing the Petition.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ found that while the Bylaws required a minimum of three directors, the preponderance of the evidence showed that the Respondent actively sought a third member, and it was "unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws" due to lack of interest from members. The ALJ implicitly accepted the Respondent's defense that non-compliance was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties.

Furthermore, the ALJ noted that the Association currently has at least three duly elected board members (elected in March 2023), meaning the issue of Bylaw compliance "is no longer in dispute". Based on the impossibility defense and the resolution of the current dispute regarding board size, the Petition was ordered dismissed.

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Questions

Question

Can my HOA be penalized for having fewer than the required number of board members if no one volunteers to serve?

Short Answer

Likely not. If the HOA actively seeks candidates but no one steps up, they may be exonerated due to 'impossibility of performance.'

Detailed Answer

The decision establishes that if an HOA board is understaffed (e.g., 2 members when bylaws require 3) because homeowners refuse to volunteer despite recruitment efforts, the HOA is not held liable. The legal principle of 'impossibility' applies when circumstances beyond the parties' control prevent compliance with the bylaws.

Alj Quote

It is well settled that when, due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the party failing to perform is exonerated.

Legal Basis

Contract Law Principles (Garner v. Ellingson); Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • Board Composition
  • Impossibility Defense
  • Bylaws

Question

If my HOA has already fixed a violation by the time of the hearing, can I still get a ruling against them?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA comes into compliance before the decision is made, the dispute may be considered resolved and the petition dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner sued because the board had too few members. However, by the time of the hearing, a full board had been elected. The judge dismissed the petition because the violation was no longer active and compliance was not in dispute.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, because the preponderance of the evidence has shown that Respondent was unable to comply with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws and compliance with Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws is no longer in dispute, the Petition must be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Mootness

Topic Tags

  • Procedural
  • Mootness
  • Dismissal

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden to prove the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.' This means they must convince the judge that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article IV, Section 1 of its Bylaws, by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Legal Standards
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

What counts as 'preponderance of the evidence' in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

Evidence that makes a claim 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

It is not about the quantity of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence. It must be sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Legal Definitions

Question

How are HOA bylaws and restrictive covenants interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are interpreted to support the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.

Detailed Answer

The judge will look at the documents as a whole rather than isolating a single sentence, ensuring that the interpretation gives effect to the intended purpose of the rules.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation Principles (Powell v. Washburn)

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Bylaws

Question

Can an HOA board order a new election if they suspect fraud in the previous one?

Short Answer

Yes, this action was accepted in the context of this decision.

Detailed Answer

The decision notes that the community manager and board members decided to hold a new election after consulting with an attorney regarding suspected fraudulent tactics and unfair processes in the initial election.

Alj Quote

Respondent’s community manager suspected that the election was not a fair process and that certain individuals used fraudulent tactics to influence the election. After consulting with Respondent’s attorney, the community manager along with Ms. Ortega decided to hold a new election in March of 2023.

Legal Basis

Board Authority

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Fraud
  • Board Powers

Case

Docket No
23F-H058-REL
Case Title
John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-10-04
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
Office of Administrative Hearings
Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R. Ashley (petitioner)
    Represented himself
  • Rmulo Gonzalez (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; contested re-election procedures
  • James Canella (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election; member of the community who desired to serve
  • Daniel Walker (board member elect)
    Elected in January 2023 election
  • Richard Springer (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board
  • Charles Seers (witness reference)
    Homeowner mentioned by Petitioner as willing to serve on the board; name variations include Charles Zippers

Respondent Side

  • James Brewer (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
    Represented Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association
  • Leah M. McKeever (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Lynn M. Allen (attorney)
    Tyson & Mendes, LLP
  • Sherry Ortega (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Vice President since March 2023; President previously; testified for Respondent
  • Maria Ruelas (board member)
    Rancho Reyes II Community Association
    Director in 2022 until March 2023
  • Kimberly Schone (COO/witness)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Chief Operating Officer, testified for Respondent
  • Ronda Raal (CEO/property manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    CEO of the management company
  • Sammy (assistant)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Assistant who helped count ballots for January 2023 election; name variations include Tammy, Cammy, Samantha
  • Joy (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Manager during January 2023 election period
  • Jennifer (manager)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Current manager of the account
  • Vince (management staff)
    Mission Management (Community Manager)
    Saw ballot video footage

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Also referred to as Fala Moses Thompson
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • VNunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • DJones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents
  • Labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
    Recipient of official documents

Other Participants

  • Cordova Sapola (board member elect)
    Elected in March 2023 election; unresponsive and did not attend meetings
  • Eugenia Francisco (elected candidate)
    Elected in January 2023 election but refuted candidacy; name variations include Eugene Silva
  • Yolanda Molina (former board member)
    Former Treasurer; resigned December 2021
  • Mario Martinez (witness reference)
    Adam LMC
  • Diane (former property manager)
    First manager for the HOA around 2017-2018

Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed after the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 5.4, finding that this section applies to use restrictions on individual Lots and Members, not the Association itself.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony Payson Counsel —
Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1 Counsel Sean K. Mohnihan

Alleged Violations

CC&R Section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed after the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 5.4, finding that this section applies to use restrictions on individual Lots and Members, not the Association itself.

Why this result: The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Section 5.4 because the HOA does not own or operate the nuisance-causing television, and the CC&R section governs restrictions on lot Owners/Members, not the Association. OAH jurisdiction is limited to finding the governing document or statute violated by the respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's alleged failure to enforce nuisance provision (CC&R Section 5.4) regarding neighbor's outdoor television.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA failed to perform its duty to enforce CC&R Section 5.4 by refusing to seek removal of a neighbor's large, outdoor television that created noise disturbances and was deemed a nuisance.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • CC&R Section 5.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Homeowners Association, CC&R, Nuisance, Enforcement, Jurisdiction, Outdoor TV
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32- 2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1047496.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T10:25:11 (57.5 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1053240.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T10:25:17 (98.4 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1047496.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:58 (57.5 KB)

23F-H041-REL Decision – 1053240.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:01 (98.4 KB)

The legal matter of *Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1* (No. 23F-H041-REL) was heard virtually by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson on April 13, 2023.

Key Facts and Petitioner's Allegations:

Petitioner Anthony Payson, a homeowner within the community, alleged that the Respondent Homeowners Association (HOA) neglected its duty to enforce the Covenants, Codes, & Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that a large, outdoor television/movie theater installed by his neighbor violated CC&R Section 5.4 (Nuisances), which prohibits anything kept on a lot that "will or might disturb the peace, quiet, comfort, or serenity of the occupants of the surrounding property". Petitioner sought an order compelling the HOA to enforce the CC&Rs and require the neighbor to remove the television.

Respondent's Key Arguments:

The Respondent HOA, represented by Sean K. Mohnihan, orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The HOA argued that the Petitioner was alleging a violation of Section 5.4 by the neighbor, not the Association itself, and the Association neither owns nor operates the TV.

Crucially, the HOA asserted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction to hear disputes among neighbors or to enforce common law duties to enforce CC&Rs. Furthermore, the HOA maintained that the Petitioner failed to provide reliable evidence (such as a log book, police reports, or a noise study) to substantiate a nuisance claim, despite the HOA having requested such documentation before initiating enforcement action.

Hearing Proceedings and Evidence:

The ALJ held the motion to dismiss in abeyance but proceeded with the presentation of evidence. Petitioner Payson testified that the TV had disturbed his peace and quiet on at least one occasion involving a hockey game, and that its mere existence constituted a violation because it *might* cause disturbance. Payson admitted he did not provide the HOA with specific dates, times, decibel readings, or video evidence of the disturbance, as the HOA had requested. The Respondent ultimately elected not to call witnesses, relying instead on the Petitioner's testimony and the jurisdictional arguments.

Outcome and Legal Decision:

In the final decision issued May 1, 2023, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent (The Foothills Homeowners Association #1) violated CC&R Section 5.4.

The ALJ determined that CC&R Section 5.4 addresses use restrictions on Members and Lots. Since the provisions refer to actions of members, any breach of that Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. The OAH’s authority, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), is limited to finding whether the governing document or statute has been violated by the respondent. Because the Petitioner did not contend or provide facts establishing that the HOA stored property that caused noise or disturbed the peace, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof against the Association.

The petition was ordered dismissed.

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Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H041-REL”, “case_title”: “In the Matter of Anthony Payson vs The Foothills Homeowners Association #1”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-01”, “alj_name”: “Velva Moses-Thompson”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can I use the ADRE administrative hearing process to force my HOA to enforce CC&R rules against a neighbor?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no, if the specific rule applies to member conduct rather than Association conduct.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) clarified that the dispute process is for determining if the Respondent (the HOA) violated a statute or governing document. If a CC&R provision restricts how a ‘lot’ may be used, a violation of that rule is a breach by the member (the neighbor), not the Association. Therefore, the HOA cannot be found guilty of violating a rule that governs homeowner behavior.”, “alj_quote”: “These provisions refer to what members may and may not do within the Association. Therefore, any breach of this Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated CC&R Section 5.4.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Section 5.4; OAH Jurisdiction”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement”, “jurisdiction”, “neighbor disputes” ] }, { “question”: “Does the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have jurisdiction to decide if my HOA was negligent or violated common law duties?”, “short_answer”: “No, the OAH jurisdiction is strictly limited to violations of statutes and governing documents.”, “detailed_answer”: “The tribunal does not have the authority to hear claims based on common law, such as negligence or general failure to perform a duty, unless it is a specific violation of the statutes or the community documents tailored to the Association’s conduct.”, “alj_quote”: “To the extent that Petitioner alleged that Respondent may have violated common law, or any other laws, the OAH lacks jurisdiction to make such a determination.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “common law”, “negligence” ] }, { “question”: “What remedies or penalties can I request from the administrative judge if I win my case against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Relief is limited to a finding of violation, an order to comply, return of filing fees, and civil penalties.”, “detailed_answer”: “The administrative process cannot award damages for things like pain, suffering, or lost property value. The remedies are strictly defined by statute: finding a violation occurred, ordering the HOA to abide by the provision, returning the petitioner’s filing fee, and levying a civil penalty.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner’s relief in this venue is limited to e is limited to a finding that the governing document or statute at issue has been violated by the respondent, an order that Respondent abide by the provision in the future, and to have the filing fee returned to the petitioner and a civil penalty levied against Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Ariz. Rev. Stat. §32- 2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “remedies”, “penalties”, “civil penalty” ] }, { “question”: “Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner bringing the case must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not the HOA’s job to disprove the claims initially; the burden lies with the person filing the petition.”, “alj_quote”: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated on its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “evidence”, “legal standard” ] }, { “question”: “What is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard used in these hearings?”, “short_answer”: “It means the claim is more probable than not to be true.”, “detailed_answer”: “This legal standard requires that the evidence presented must convince the judge that the petitioner’s argument is more likely true than the opposing side’s argument. It is described as the ‘greater weight of the evidence.'”, “alj_quote”: ““A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.””, “legal_basis”: “Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standard”, “definitions”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “How are vague or ambiguous rules in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?”, “short_answer”: “They are construed to give effect to the intent of the parties and the underlying purpose of the document.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting restrictive covenants, the judge looks at the document as a whole. If the covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced exactly as written to match the intent.”, “alj_quote”: ““Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.””, “legal_basis”: “Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553”, “topic_tags”: [ “interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “legal principles” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Payson (petitioner)
    Homeowner

Respondent Side

  • Sean K. Mohnihan (HOA attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Appeared for Respondent The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
  • Jason E Smith (attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Listed with counsel
  • Gabron (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Linda Armo (board member)
    The Foothills Homeowners Association #1
    Board representative/potential witness
  • Philip Brown (former HOA attorney)
    Previously represented the HOA; wrote a letter to Petitioner

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barry Callahan (neighbor)
    Alleged violator of CC&Rs, neighbor to Petitioner

Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel —
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:33 (132.3 KB)

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case hearing concerning the dispute between Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch (Petitioners) and Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioners filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about January 11, 2021, alleging the Respondent violated community Bylaws, specifically Article 4 Section 1.

The central issue was whether the HOA improperly maintained an unfilled seat on its Board of Directors. Petitioners asserted that the HOA violated the Bylaws by leaving a Board seat vacant for a period of time and attempted to prevent Petitioner Marinda Minch from joining the Board.

Respondent's defense focused on the interpretation of Article IV of the Bylaws. The Board's number is set at seven directors. A director resigned in August 2020, leaving six members. The subsequent annual meeting in October 2020 filled two regularly expiring seats via election, in which Petitioners were candidates but were not elected.

The August 2020 vacancy was subject to Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, which states that in the event of resignation, the successor "shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board" to serve the unexpired term.

Hearing Proceedings and Arguments

Petitioners' Argument: Petitioner Marinda Minch testified that the Board delayed filling the vacancy (until November 2020) because of personal dislike for her, and she had petitioned the Board three times for appointment.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent’s President, Bradley Hudson, testified that the Board decided the newly elected Board should fill the vacancy. At the November 11, 2020, virtual meeting, a motion to appoint Ms. Minch failed (2-4 vote), and the Board subsequently appointed another individual (4-2 vote), thereby filling all seven seats. Crucially, the Respondent argued, and the ALJ noted, that the Bylaws do not contain a timeframe within which a vacancy due to resignation must be filled.

Legal Points and Outcome

Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Article IV Sections 1, 2, and 3 must be read collectively. The process used by the Board to fill the August vacancy—selection by the remaining Board members—complied with Article IV, Section 3. Because the Bylaws did not mandate an immediate appointment timeframe, the Respondent was found to have acted within the scope of the community documents.

Final Decision: The Petitioners failed to sustain their burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), v. Montelena Master

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) Counsel —
Respondent Montelena Master Community Association Counsel Troy Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-442, A.R.S. § 33-1806

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA

Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:43 (95.8 KB)

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)

This is a concise summary of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of *Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association*.

Concise Summary of Administrative Hearing

Key Facts and Parties

The hearing took place on January 27, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. Petitioner, Aaron Ricks, filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about October 27, 2020, alleging violations of community documents and statute. The dispute centered on alleged "unlawful fees ($5,000 in total)" that Petitioner claimed he was forced to pay to sell his home. The specific fee at issue was a $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser each time a parcel was sold.

Main Issues and Legal Basis

The core issue for the hearing was whether the Respondent, Montelena Master Community Association, violated A.R.S. § 33-1806, A.R.S. § 33-442, and the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) Article 6.9.2/6.9.2.9, specifically regarding the imposition of the transfer fee.

The legal focus was A.R.S. § 33-442, which generally prohibits transfer fees but provides exceptions. The key exception cited was A.R.S. § 33-442(C)(3), which allows fees if they are used exclusively for a purpose authorized in the document, touch and concern the land, and are not passed through to a specific third party or declarant (unless authorized to manage property or part of an approved development plan).

Key Arguments

  1. Respondent’s Position (Motion for Summary Judgment): Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing the Petition should be dismissed because the CC&Rs (Sections 7.15 and 6.6) authorized the fee, which touched and concerned the land. A 2010 Board Resolution specified the Transfer Fee was "to be used exclusively to fund the Master Association’s operating expenses and/or the Master Association’s reserves". Counsel argued this usage was sufficient to meet A.R.S. § 33-442(C) requirements. Respondent also asserted that the CC&R sections cited by the Petitioner (6.9.2 and 6.9.2.9) addressed a "Contribution to Reserves," not the specific Transfer Fee being contested.
  2. Petitioner’s Position: Petitioner acknowledged the statutory exception but argued that the transfer fee must be used for a very specific limited purpose (e.g., a swimming pool or landscaping project), rather than a general purpose like operating expenses or reserves, for the fee to be compliant with A.R.S. § 33-442. Petitioner also asserted that specific CC&R sections precluded the fee. (Petitioner offered no argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1806).

Legal Points and Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Petitioner failed to establish a violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442. Crucially, Petitioner offered no legal authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required the transfer fee to be designated for a more specific purpose than the association’s operating expenses and/or reserves identified in the governing documents.

The final decision was that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. This decision was done on February 16, 2021.

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Aaron Ricks (petitioner)
    Somerstone Properties, LLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (HOA attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:48 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:51 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:52:54 (119.9 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:29 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:31 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:32 (119.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

• Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

• Decision Date: February 10, 2021

• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

• September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

• Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

• February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

• March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

• January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

• Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

• Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

• Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

• Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

• Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

• Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.

Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.

Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel —
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

• Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

——————————————————————————–

3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Donna M Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donna M Bischoff Counsel —
Respondent Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
Bylaws Article 3, Section 2

Outcome Summary

The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Voting; proxies; absentee ballots; applicability; definition

Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with the required election materials and documentation from the October 2018 elections, violating statutory requirements for retention and availability of these materials for owner inspection.

Orders: Respondent ordered to supply Petitioner with the relevant documents, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C), within ten (10) days of the Order.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Open meetings; exceptions

Respondent postponed its required yearly 2019 meeting until January 2020, resulting in a failure to hold a unit owners' association meeting in 2019 as required by statute.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)

Selection

Respondent's board of directors declared write-in ballots invalid for the November 20, 2019, election. Since the Bylaws were silent on prohibiting write-in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Condominium Association, Election Procedures, Annual Meeting, Statutory Violation, Bylaw Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Bylaws Article 3, Section 2
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:24:42 (108.5 KB)

20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:15 (108.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Donna M. Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019033-REL), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge found entirely in favor of the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, concluding that the Respondent, Country Hills West Condominium Association (“the Association”), committed multiple violations of Arizona state statutes and its own governing documents.

The core violations upheld by the court are:

1. Failure to Hold a Required Annual Meeting: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold its required annual meeting within the 2019 calendar year, repeatedly postponing it until January 2020.

2. Failure to Provide Election Records: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with complete election materials for inspection, including ballots, envelopes, and sign-in sheets from the October 2018 election.

3. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots: The Association violated Article 3, Section 2 of its Bylaws by unilaterally prohibiting write-in ballots for the 2019 election, despite its governing documents being silent on the issue.

As a result, the Association was ordered to provide the requested documents to the Petitioner within ten days and to reimburse her $1,500 filing fee within thirty days. The decision underscores the legal obligation of homeowners’ associations to adhere strictly to statutory requirements for meetings, elections, and record transparency.

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I. Case Overview

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by homeowner Donna M. Bischoff with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 11, 2019.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donna M Bischoff, Petitioner, v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019033-REL

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date

March 10, 2020

Decision Date

March 30, 2020

Petitioner Representative

Donna M. Bischoff (on her own behalf)

Respondent Representative

Doug Meyer, President and Director

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, asserted that the Country Hills West Condominium Association committed violations of state law and its own governing documents. The specific allegations were:

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B): Failure to hold the mandatory annual unit owners’ association meeting within the 2019 calendar year.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C): Failure to make election materials, including ballots and related items, available for inspection by a unit owner.

• Violation of Bylaws Article 3, Section 2: Improperly invalidating election ballots by prohibiting write-in candidates without any authority from the governing documents.

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish these violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

III. Core Issues and Factual Findings

The hearing established several key facts that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. The testimony from both Ms. Bischoff and the Association’s President, Doug Meyer, was central to these findings.

A. Failure to Hold the 2019 Annual Meeting

• Timeline of Events: The Association’s required annual meeting for 2019 was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019. It was subsequently postponed three times: first to December 19, 2019; then to December 30, 2019; and ultimately held on January 24, 2020.

• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer testified that the postponements were necessary because write-in candidates appeared on the ballot, which the board had prohibited. He stated that the board “needed time to reprint the ballot and mail them out.”

• Conclusion of Law: The evidence was undisputed that no annual meeting took place during the 2019 calendar year. The Judge concluded that by postponing the meeting into the following year, the Association was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B), which mandates that “A meeting of the unit owners’ association shall be held at least once each year.”

B. Denial of Access to Election Records

• Petitioner’s Request: In October 2018, Ms. Bischoff requested to see the election results from the October 2018 meeting, specifically seeking to know which units had voted.

• Respondent’s Response: The Association initially did not provide the results. A few weeks prior to the March 2020 hearing, it supplied Ms. Bischoff with vote tallies and a list of unit members who voted. However, it failed to provide the full scope of required materials.

• Missing Documentation: The Association did not provide the “ballots, envelopes, related materials, and sign-in sheets” as mandated by statute for inspection.

• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer argued that no election actually occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting because there was no quorum. He further made the admission that the Association had not achieved a quorum for any meeting in the preceding 20 years. He claimed that without an election, there was no obligation to publish ballots.

• Conclusion of Law: The Judge found that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). The statute requires that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… and made available for unit owner inspection for at least one year.” The partial and delayed provision of records was insufficient to meet this legal requirement.

C. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots

• The Dispute: The November 20, 2019, meeting was cancelled because some ballots contained write-in candidates. The board of directors informed members that write-in ballots were prohibited and would be “thrown out.”

• Petitioner’s Argument: Ms. Bischoff argued that the board could not “choose how to interpret a silent document.” She pointed out that the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation do not prohibit write-in ballots and that the same board had allowed them in a 2017 election.

• Respondent’s Position: Mr. Meyer acknowledged that the Bylaws were silent on the issue but stated the Association needed to “figure out how to handle” them. A membership meeting to discuss the issue was held on December 30, 2019, but failed to achieve a quorum.

• Conclusion of Law: The Judge determined that the Association violated its own Bylaws. The decision states, “absent any clear language in the A.R.S. or the Bylaws prohibiting write in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.” The board’s unilateral prohibition was therefore found to be improper.

IV. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge upheld the petition on all issues, finding that the Petitioner had successfully proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Final Order:

Based on the foregoing conclusions, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Petition filed by Donna M. Bischoff is upheld on all issues.

2. The Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

3. The Respondent must supply the Petitioner with the relevant election documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) within ten (10) days of the Order.

4. The Respondent must pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the Order.

5. No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The Order is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Study Guide: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2019033-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and a condominium association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in the legal dispute, and what were their roles?

2. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, allege against the Respondent?

3. Why was the 2019 yearly meeting for the Country Hills West Condominium Association repeatedly rescheduled?

4. What was the Respondent’s position on the validity of write-in ballots for the November 20, 2019, election?

5. What information did the Petitioner request from the October 2018 election, and what was the initial response?

6. What is the definition of “quorum” according to the association’s Bylaws, and why was it significant in this case?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet in this hearing?

8. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) regarding association meetings?

9. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) regarding election materials?

10. What were the key components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and the Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the homeowner who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the homeowners association accused of violations.

2. The Petitioner alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C) and § 33-1248(B), as well as Article 3, Section 2 of the association’s Bylaws. These allegations related to the handling of yearly meetings and elections.

3. The 2019 yearly meeting was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019, but was rescheduled three times, ultimately taking place in January 2020. The first cancellation was because some ballots contained write-in candidates, which the board deemed prohibited.

4. The Respondent’s representative, Doug Meyer, testified that members were informed that write-in ballots were not valid for the November 20, 2019, election. He stated that any ballots with write-in candidates would have been thrown out.

5. The Petitioner requested to see the election results from the October 2018 election, specifically wanting to know which units voted. While she was eventually given the voting tallies, the Respondent did not initially provide the requested results.

6. Quorum is defined in Article 4, Section 3 of the Bylaws. It was significant because the Respondent’s president, Mr. Meyer, acknowledged that the association had not achieved a quorum for its meetings in the last 20 years, and thus no election occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting.

7. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

8. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold a required yearly meeting within the calendar year of 2019. The evidence showed that the meeting scheduled for 2019 was postponed until January 2020.

9. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with all required election materials from the 2018 election. While vote tallies were eventually provided, the statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related materials be retained and made available for inspection for at least one year.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s Order upheld the Petition on all issues, deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, and required the Respondent to supply the relevant documents within 10 days. The Order also mandated that the Respondent reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the information presented in the source document to construct a comprehensive argument for each prompt.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s handling of the write-in ballot issue for the 2019 election. Discuss the legal basis (or lack thereof) for their actions as presented in the hearing, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that their prohibition of these ballots was a violation of the Bylaws.

2. Explain the concept of “quorum” as it relates to this case. How did the association’s failure to achieve a quorum for 20 years impact its governance, specifically regarding the 2018 meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to produce election records?

3. Describe in detail the specific violations of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that the Country Hills West Condominium Association was found to have committed. For each statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)), detail the legal requirement and explain how the Respondent’s actions failed to meet that standard.

4. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Using testimony and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof for her allegations.

5. Outline the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Beyond the simple outcome, explain the significance of each component of the order, including the validation of the petition, the designation of a “prevailing party,” the directive to supply documents, and the financial remedy awarded.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Antara Nath Rivera.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which a homeowner or planned community organization can file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statutes cited were A.R.S. §§ 33-1250(C) and 33-1248(B).

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, the Bylaws of Country Hills West Association, Inc. were a key document.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency where petitions filed with the Department of Real Estate are heard before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Donna M. Bischoff.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. The Respondent had not achieved quorum for 20 years.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or a legal action is brought. In this case, Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

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20F-H2019033-REL

1 source

This source is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The document details the hearing held on March 10, 2020, where the Petitioner alleged the Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the association’s Bylaws. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed violations related to the failure to hold a required yearly meeting in 2019, the failure to provide election materials for inspection, and the improper prohibition of write-in ballots where the Bylaws were silent. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately upheld the Petition on all issues, finding the Respondent in violation, and ordered the Association to provide the requested documents and pay the Petitioner’s $1,500.00 filing fee.

1 source

What were the specific legal violations found against the Condominium Association regarding meetings and documents?
How did the lack of clarity in the Bylaws regarding write-in ballots impact the association’s actions?
What was the ultimate outcome of this administrative hearing, including the ordered remedies for the petitioner?

Based on 1 source

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donna M Bischoff (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Doug Meyer (president, director, witness)
    Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
    Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted electronically to Commissioner

Will Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019003-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge decision, issued following a rehearing, dismissed the Petitioner's dispute petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated its governing documents by reasonably denying the retroactive application for the unapproved glass view fence.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Will Schreiber Counsel Aaron M. Green
Respondent Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines HH Walls/View Fences and CC&R’s Article 12.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge decision, issued following a rehearing, dismissed the Petitioner's dispute petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated its governing documents by reasonably denying the retroactive application for the unapproved glass view fence.

Why this result: Petitioner installed the fence prior to seeking approval, failing to comply with the procedural requirements (Design Guidelines Section HH). Consequently, the HOA's denial based on consistency and maintenance concerns was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of Petitioner's glass view fence modification

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied the retroactive approval of a glass view fence installed without prior permission. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval pursuant to Design Guidelines Section HH, and that the Respondent's denial was reasonable due to procedural failure, community inconsistency (Design Guidelines Section E), and liability/maintenance concerns (CC&R Article 12.3).

Orders: Petitioner Will Schreiber’s Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R’s Article 12.3
  • Design Guidelines Section HH
  • Design Guidelines Section E
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Homeowner dispute, View fence, Architectural approval, Design Guidelines, CC&R's violation, Retroactive approval, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019003-REL-RHG Decision – 769789.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:11 (42.2 KB)

20F-H2019003-REL-RHG Decision – 775433.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:17 (123.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcome of the dispute between homeowner Will Schreiber (Petitioner) and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning an unapproved glass fence. The case, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, centered on Mr. Schreiber’s retroactive application for a glass view fence he installed without prior permission, which replaced a wrought iron fence.

The Homeowners Association (HOA) denied the application, citing a lack of consistency with community design standards, as well as significant maintenance and liability concerns stipulated in the governing documents. The Petitioner argued the denial was unreasonable, asserting that a glass fence is visually similar to having no fence (an approved option), that the HOA failed to provide a valid reason for denial, and that safety concerns were unfounded.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed Mr. Schreiber’s petition. The final decision concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing the HOA had violated its own rules. The ruling affirmed that the HOA’s denial was reasonable because the Petitioner did not follow the required procedure of seeking approval before installation, as mandated by the community’s Design Guidelines. The decision underscored the HOA’s right to enforce uniformity and manage its maintenance and liability responsibilities as defined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Case Identification and Participants

Detail

Information

Case Name

Will Schreiber, Petitioner, vs. Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019003-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Antara Nath Rivera

Petitioner

Will Schreiber

Petitioner’s Counsel

Aaron M. Green, Esq.

Respondent

Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association (a subdivision of McDowell Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nick Nogami, Esq. (at hearing); Mark K. Sahl, Esq. (on record)

Property Address

11551 East Caribbean Lane, Scottsdale, Arizona, 85255

Procedural History and Timeline

1. November 2017: Petitioner submitted an architectural form for backyard work, which was approved by the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC). This submission did not mention any changes to fencing.

2. January 2019: During a violation tour, the HOA discovered that Petitioner had replaced the pre-existing wrought iron view fencing with an unapproved glass fence.

3. January 24, 2019: After being contacted by the HOA, Petitioner submitted a second variance request seeking retroactive approval for the installed glass fence.

4. March 5, 2019: The HOA sent a letter to Petitioner requesting that the fence be returned to its original wrought iron condition.

5. May 10, 2019: The HOA officially notified Petitioner that his appeal was denied because the application was not filed in a timely manner (i.e., prior to installation).

6. July 2, 2019: Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging violations of community documents.

7. August 9, 2019: The HOA filed its Answer, denying all claims, and a Motion to Dismiss.

8. October 2, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s Motion to Dismiss.

9. December 10, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Rehearing.

10. January 30, 2020: A rehearing was held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

11. February 4, 2020: The HOA’s counsel submitted a Posthearing Memorandum without leave from the tribunal.

12. February 14, 2020: The ALJ issued an order reopening the record solely to allow the Petitioner an opportunity to respond to the HOA’s unauthorized filing by February 24, 2020.

13. March 16, 2020: The ALJ issued the final decision, ordering that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Will Schreiber)

The Petitioner’s case rested on the argument that the HOA’s denial of his glass fence was arbitrary and unreasonable.

• Lack of Justification: Petitioner claimed the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) met with him but failed to provide any verbal or written reasons for the initial disapproval.

• Aesthetic and Functional Equivalence: He argued a glass fence is “just as invisible” as having no fence at all, an option permitted by the HOA. He contended that since his neighbor did not have a wrought iron fence, denying his glass fence on grounds of consistency was illogical.

• Safety and Maintenance: Petitioner asserted that the safety glass used was comparable to that of the Grand Canyon Skywalk and had been inspected and approved by a Scottsdale City Inspector. He argued the HOA’s concerns about safety, fire barriers, and continuity were manufactured “excuses.” He also offered to waive the HOA’s maintenance responsibility for the fence.

• Procedural Failure: The core of the petition was the allegation that the HOA violated its own community documents, specifically “Design Guidelines HH Walls/View Fences and CC&R’s Article 12.”

Respondent’s Position (Cimarron Hills HOA)

The HOA’s defense, presented primarily through the testimony of Whitney Bostic, focused on procedural compliance, community uniformity, and non-negotiable maintenance responsibilities.

• Violation of Process: The HOA established that the Petitioner installed the glass fence prior to seeking approval, in direct violation of the Design Guidelines which require submission of detailed plans for any view fence modifications. His approved 2017 plans made no mention of fencing.

• Lack of Consistency: Ms. Bostic testified that out of 656 homes in the Cimarron Hills subdivision and 3,800 homes in the master McDowell Mountain Ranch association, none had a glass fence. The established design standard allows only for a wrought iron fence or no fence at all to maintain community conformity.

• Maintenance and Liability: The HOA argued that under Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs, it is legally responsible for maintaining the exterior half of all boundary view fences and the five-foot easement from the boundary wall. This responsibility cannot be waived by a homeowner. A glass fence introduces unique maintenance concerns and liability risks, such as shards of glass falling into an area of HOA responsibility.

• Multi-Level Review: The decision to deny the request was made after consideration by both the Cimarron Hills DRC and the master association (MMRHA), which weighed factors of consistency, responsibility, and maintenance before issuing a denial.

Governing Documents Cited

The decision in this case was based on the interpretation of several key sections of the community’s governing documents.

• CC&Rs Article 12.3 (Boundary Walls and Association Responsibility): This article explicitly states that the Association “shall be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.” This formed the basis of the HOA’s argument regarding non-waivable liability and maintenance obligations.

• Design Guidelines Section HH (View Fencing): This section mandates that “The Owner shall submit for approval from the DRC including detailed drawings of proposed changes… for view fence modifications.” The Petitioner’s failure to do this prior to installation was a central fact in the case. It also specifies the approved paint color for fences, “MMR Brown Fence.”

• Design Guidelines Section E (General Principles): This section outlines the DRC’s goal to “maintain consistency of the community and of its decisions.” It notes that variances may be granted but “shall remain consistent with the architectural and neighborhood characteristics.” This supported the HOA’s argument against introducing a unique fence type.

• Design Guidelines Section GG (View Decks): While pertaining to decks, this section was cited to show the level of detail required in applications to the DRC, including materials, dimensions, and impact on views, underscoring the formal process the Petitioner bypassed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ, Antara Nath Rivera, dismissed Will Schreiber’s petition, finding in favor of the Cimarron Hills HOA.

• Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated Article 12.3 of its CC&Rs.

• Failure to Follow Procedure: The judge concluded that the Petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval to change his existing fence, pursuant to Section HH of the Design Guidelines.” The key issue was not the aesthetics of the fence, but the Petitioner’s failure to abide by the required approval process before installation.

• Reasonableness of Denial: The ALJ found that the “Respondent was reasonable in its denial” and “did not violate any rules or regulations.” The evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s decision was based on established principles of uniformity, consistency, and its obligations under the CC&Rs.

• Final Order: The petition was formally dismissed. The order noted that as a decision from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.

Study Guide: Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Will Schreiber and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, based on the provided legal documents. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner, Will Schreiber, take that initiated the dispute with the Homeowners Association?

3. According to the Respondent, what were the primary reasons for denying the Petitioner’s request for the glass fence?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the fairness of the Respondent’s denial, particularly in relation to his neighbor?

5. What was the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win his case, and did he meet it?

6. Identify two specific governing documents that were central to the Respondent’s defense and the final ruling.

7. Who was Whitney Bostic, and what key information did her testimony provide during the rehearing?

8. What procedural event occurred on or about February 4, 2020, that prompted the Administrative Law Judge to issue the “Order Holding Record Open” on February 14, 2020?

9. According to the CC&Rs, who is responsible for maintaining the “Boundary Wall” that separates a lot from an “Area of Association Responsibility”?

10. What was the final outcome of the administrative rehearing held on January 30, 2020?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Will Schreiber, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Schreiber filed a petition against the HOA, alleging a violation of community documents after they denied his request for a fence modification.

2. Mr. Schreiber replaced his preexisting wrought iron view fencing with glass fencing without first receiving approval from the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC). He then submitted a variance request on January 24, 2019, seeking retroactive approval for the already-installed fence.

3. The Respondent denied the request based on several factors, including the need for design consistency across the community’s 656 homes, as no other home had a glass fence. They also cited maintenance concerns and potential liability, as the HOA is responsible for the exterior half of view fences and a five-foot easement from the boundary wall.

4. The Petitioner argued that the denial was unreasonable because his neighbor was allowed to have no fence at all. He contended that a glass fence was “just as invisible” as no fence and that the concept was essentially the same.

5. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means convincing the judge that his contention was more probably true than not. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.

6. The two central documents were the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Cimarron Hills (CC&Rs) and the Cimarron Hills Design Guidelines For Community Living (Design Guidelines). The Respondent specifically cited Sections E (General Principles), GG (View Decks), and HH (Walls/View Fences) of the Design Guidelines.

7. Whitney Bostic testified on behalf of the Respondent HOA. She explained that the glass fence was unapproved, inconsistent with the 656 homes in the community, and posed maintenance and liability concerns for the HOA.

8. Counsel for the Respondent submitted a Posthearing Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without having been granted permission (leave) by the tribunal. Because the Petitioner did not have an opportunity to respond, the judge reopened the record to allow him to do so by February 24, 2020.

9. According to Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs, the resident is responsible for their side of the wall, but the Association is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner Will Schreiber’s Petition be dismissed. The judge found that the Respondent HOA’s denial of the glass fence was reasonable and that it did not violate any of its rules or regulations.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and facts presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing of the petition on July 2, 2019, to the final decision on March 16, 2020. Discuss the significance of the initial dismissal, the subsequent rehearing, and the order to reopen the record.

2. Examine the concept of “consistency” as described in Section E of the Design Guidelines. How did this principle form the foundation of the Respondent’s case, and why was it a more compelling argument than the Petitioner’s claims about aesthetics and safety?

3. The Petitioner argued that since his neighbor was permitted to have no fence, his “invisible” glass fence should also be permitted. Deconstruct this argument and explain why it ultimately failed to persuade the Administrative Law Judge, citing the Respondent’s counterarguments regarding maintenance and responsibility.

4. Discuss the role of the governing community documents (the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines) in this dispute. Explain how specific articles, such as CC&R Article 12.3 and Design Guideline Section HH, were applied to the facts of the case to reach a final decision.

5. Define “preponderance of the evidence” as described in the legal decision. Detail the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent at the rehearing and evaluate why the Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this evidentiary standard.

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge (Antara Nath Rivera) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the final decision.

Answer

The formal written response filed by the Respondent on August 9, 2019, denying all complaint items in the Petition.

Areas of Association Responsibility

Areas that the Homeowners Association is responsible for maintaining, as defined in the CC&Rs. This includes the exterior side of boundary walls and a five-foot easement.

An acronym for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Cimarron Hills, a primary governing document for the community.

Design Guidelines

A document titled Cimarron Hills Design Guidelines For Community Living that supplements the CC&Rs and provides specific rules on community aesthetics, including fences.

Design Review Committee (DRC)

A committee within the HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying residents’ proposed architectural and landscape modifications.

Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Will Schreiber with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 2, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

McDowell Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association (MMRHA)

The master association of which the Cimarron Hills HOA is a subdivision. The MMRHA also considered and denied the Petitioner’s request.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action; in this case, the homeowner, Will Schreiber.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed; in this case, the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association.

Retroactive Approval

Approval sought for a modification or construction that has already been completed without prior authorization.

Variance

A formal exception to the standard Design Guidelines that the DRC may grant on a case-by-case basis.

The Glass Fence Standoff: 4 Critical Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle with His HOA

Introduction: The Dream Project and the Unseen Rules

Will Schreiber had a vision for his Scottsdale, Arizona home: a sleek, modern property with an uninterrupted backyard view. To preserve that stunning vista, he installed an elegant glass fence—a choice that seemed perfect for the landscape. His neighbors didn’t complain; in fact, there’s no evidence the fence bothered anyone. But his Homeowners Association (HOA) denied the project, triggering a legal dispute that went before an administrative law judge. Mr. Schreiber ultimately lost.

The conflict wasn’t driven by neighborhood animosity, but by the impersonal application of community documents. This case offers a masterclass in the often counter-intuitive world of HOA governance. The reasons he lost reveal surprising and invaluable lessons for any homeowner considering a modification to their property.

1. The most critical mistake wasn’t the fence—it was the timing.

The core reason the homeowner lost his case had less to do with the aesthetics of glass versus wrought iron and everything to do with procedural failure. He installed the fence before getting formal approval from the HOA.

The timeline of events was fatal to his argument. In November 2017, the HOA approved Mr. Schreiber’s plan for backyard improvements, but this plan made no mention of fencing. At some point after, he installed the unapproved glass fence. It wasn’t until a routine violation tour in January 2019 that the HOA discovered the new fence. Only after being caught, on January 24, 2019, did the homeowner submit a request for retroactive approval.

In the end, the judge’s decision hinged on this sequence. The key question wasn’t whether a glass fence was a good idea, but whether the HOA’s denial was reasonable “because Petitioner failed to abide by the regulations to get approval for the glass fence prior to installing it.” In any dispute with an HOA, following the established process is paramount. Once you break the rules of that process, the merits of your project often become irrelevant.

2. A logical argument can lose to a written rule.

The homeowner presented a seemingly logical and compelling argument. He contended that his neighbor didn’t have a fence at all, and a glass fence was conceptually the same thing. In his words:

A glass fence was “just as invisible” as not having a fence. In essence, both were the same concept.

To add weight to his point, he made a powerful real-world comparison, arguing the safety glass he used was similar to that of the railing of the Grand Canyon Skywalk tourist attraction.

This “common sense” approach, however, failed to persuade the judge. The HOA’s decision wasn’t based on a subjective interpretation of “invisibility” or a comparison to national landmarks. It was based on the binding community documents. The Design Guidelines were written to promote uniformity and consistency. According to the HOA, the established rules were clear: a homeowner could have a wrought iron fence or no fence at all. A glass fence was not an approved option. The lesson here is stark: the governing documents create the binding reality for every member of the community. A personal, logical argument is not a valid defense against a clearly written rule you have contractually agreed to follow.

3. The HOA’s biggest concern wasn’t curb appeal; it was risk.

While the dispute appeared to be about aesthetics, the HOA’s defense focused on much more practical and significant concerns: consistency, maintenance, and liability. These arguments reveal the often-unseen function of an HOA, which is to manage shared risk for the entire community.

The HOA presented several key points:

• Consistency: Out of 3,800 homes in the master community and 656 in the sub-community, not a single one had a glass fence. Approving this one would set a precedent that could undermine the community’s uniform design.

• Maintenance: The community’s CC&Rs (Article 12.3) explicitly stated the Association was responsible for maintaining “the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.” This meant the HOA would be financially and logistically on the hook for repairing and maintaining an unfamiliar and potentially costly material.

• Safety & Liability: The HOA raised a critical safety issue. If the glass fence were to break, “large amount of glass shards would fall onto an area of Respondent’s responsibility, causing additional liability for Respondent.”

Sensing the maintenance issue was a key obstacle, Mr. Schreiber made a reasonable offer: he was willing to waive the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the glass fence. However, this proactive solution came too late. Because he had already violated the approval process, his concession was not enough to overcome the HOA’s other concerns about precedent and liability, which remained firmly grounded in the community’s governing documents.

4. In a dispute, you are the one who has to prove the HOA is wrong.

When a homeowner takes their HOA to court, the legal scales are not perfectly balanced from the start. The legal decision in this case clearly states the principle: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article 12.3 of its CC&Rs.”

In simple terms, “burden of proof” meant it was Mr. Schreiber’s job to convince the judge with a “preponderance of the evidence”—meaning it was more likely true than not—that the HOA had broken its own rules when it denied his request. It was not the HOA’s job to prove it was right; it was his job to prove they were wrong.

The judge ultimately found that the homeowner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval.” The conclusion was that the “Respondent was reasonable in its denial.” It is not enough to feel you have been wronged; in a legal setting, you must be able to demonstrate with convincing evidence that the organization violated its own governing documents.

Conclusion: The Unwritten Lessons of Community Living

HOA rules can be a source of frustration, but this case demonstrates that they form a complex web of process, liability, and shared responsibility that exists for reasons beyond simple aesthetics. The homeowner’s dream of a glass fence was shattered not by a neighbor’s complaint, but by a series of procedural missteps and a misunderstanding of the contract he was bound by.

This case wasn’t just about a fence; it was about the power of a contract you agree to when you buy a home. How well do you really know your own community’s rulebook?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Will Schreiber (petitioner)
    Complainant
  • Aaron M. Green (petitioner attorney)
    Law Office of Aaron Green, P.C.

Respondent Side

  • Nick Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Represented Respondent at hearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Whitney Bostic (witness)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitting agent for Order
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel —
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:32 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
    Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
    Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
    Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Clerk)
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal