Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

Posted on April 27, 2021 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	20F-H2020042-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2021-04-27
Administrative Law Judge	Adam D. Stone
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge, following a rehearing, affirmed the original decision, concluding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Article X regarding the denial of an architectural modification request for a patio shade. The Respondent was found to have acted in compliance with the community documents, and the appeal was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Charles P Mandela	Counsel	—
Respondent	Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners' Association	Counsel	Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article X; CC&R Section 10.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge, following a rehearing, affirmed the original decision, concluding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Article X regarding the denial of an architectural modification request for a patio shade. The Respondent was found to have acted in compliance with the community documents, and the appeal was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the CC&R's and failed to follow the procedural requirements necessary to appeal a deemed disapproval under CC&R Section 10.3.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of request for patio shade structure and alleged violation of response timeline

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of his application for a patio shade, arguing the denial was improper because the shade would be attached (not a separate structure) and that the HOA missed the 30-day response deadline. The ALJ determined that the HOA's denial based on the 'only one structure other than the residence' rule (since a shed already existed) complied with the non-exhaustive Architectural Committee Standards (Article X, 10.2). Regarding the delayed response, the ALJ noted that Section 10.3 mandated that a late response results in the request being 'deemed disapproved,' and the Petitioner failed to subsequently request the required appeal meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent violated Article X of the CC&R’s. The Respondent was declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner's appeal (rehearing) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
CC&R Article X
CC&R Section 10.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Denial, Rehearing, Burden of Proof, Deemed Disapproved

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020042-REL-RHG Decision – 876009.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:30 (118.9 KB)

20F-H2020042-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020042-REL/850032.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:33 (113.4 KB)

Briefing on Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association (“Blue Ridge”). The core issue was Blue Ridge’s denial of Mr. Mandela’s request to build a patio shade structure.

In the initial hearing on January 13, 2021, Mr. Mandela argued the denial was erroneous because the shade would be attached to his house, not a separate structure, and that similar structures existed in the community. Blue Ridge defended its decision based on Article X of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which limits properties to one structure besides the main residence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding that Blue Ridge acted within the authority granted by its CC&Rs, as its architectural standards were not exhaustive and it provided a reasonably detailed written reason for the denial.

Following this decision, Mr. Mandela was granted a rehearing, which took place on April 16, 2021. During this second hearing, he introduced a new argument that Blue Ridge had violated Article 10.3 of the CC&Rs by failing to respond to his request within the stipulated 30-day timeframe. However, the ALJ found that the same article specifies that a failure to respond results in the request being “deemed disapproved.” The ALJ concluded that Mr. Mandela had failed to follow the subsequent appeal procedures outlined in the CC&Rs and again failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Blue Ridge was declared the prevailing party. Notably, during the rehearing, Mr. Mandela testified that his request for the patio shade had since been approved by the Blue Ridge board.

Initial Hearing and Decision (Case No. 20F-H2020042-REL)

The first evidentiary hearing was held on January 13, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone to address Mr. Mandela’s petition alleging Blue Ridge violated its CC&Rs.

The Core Dispute

• Petitioner’s Request: On August 28, 2019, Charles P. Mandela submitted a request to build a “patio shade less than 200 sq. feet,” described as a four-post structure he intended to attach to the east wall of his residence.

• Respondent’s Denial: On October 25, 2019, Blue Ridge denied the request, stating: “Only one structure other than the residence may be placed on the property. The site plan that was given for review shows the residence and also a shed on property already existing, this would be the allowable limit per the Architectural Standards.”

Arguments Presented

• Petitioner (Charles P. Mandela):

◦ Argued passionately that the denial was erroneous because the patio shade was to be attached to the house, not a separate, stand-alone structure.

◦ Presented photographs of other properties within Blue Ridge Estates that had multiple structures and stand-alone patio shades similar to his proposal.

• Respondent (Blue Ridge Estates HOA):

◦ Contended it properly followed Article X of the CC&Rs in its denial.

◦ At the hearing, Blue Ridge pointed to Article III of the CC&Rs as justification, classifying the proposed shade as an additional structure on the property.

Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, concluding he had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Blue Ridge violated Article X of the CC&Rs.

• Interpretation of CC&R Section 10.2: The judge found that the architectural standards listed in this section were explicitly not exhaustive. The text states standards “may include, without limitation, provisions regarding” aspects like size, design, and placement. This allowed the architectural committee to deny the request based on the “one additional structure” rule, even if not explicitly listed.

• Compliance with CC&R Section 10.3: This section requires the committee to provide “reasonably detailed written reasons for such disapproval.” The judge found that the denial email of October 25, 2019, fulfilled this requirement. The email did not need to cite a specific CC&R section, only to provide an explanation.

• On Precedent and Fairness: The ALJ acknowledged Mr. Mandela’s evidence of similar structures on other properties. However, the decision noted: “While those properties may have had their shades approved by different members of the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee that does not follow that Mr. Mandela’s request was improperly denied under Article X.”

• Final Ruling: The petition was denied in a decision dated January 29, 2021.

Rehearing and Final Decision (Case No. 20F-H2020042-REL-RHG)

Mr. Mandela filed for a rehearing on February 5, 2021, on the grounds that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence. The Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner granted the request, and a new hearing was held on April 16, 2021.

New Testimony and Arguments

• Petitioner (Charles P. Mandela):

◦ Subsequent Approval: Testified that since the January 29, 2021 decision, his request for the patio shade had been approved by the Blue Ridge board.

◦ Procedural Violation: Argued that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Section 10.3 by failing to respond to his August 28, 2019, request within the required 30-day period, as the denial was not issued until October 25, 2019.

◦ History of Denials: Stated he had made several previous requests in 2018 and 2019 that were either denied or ignored.

◦ Discrimination: Claimed he had been discriminated against due to the previous denials.

• Respondent (Blue Ridge Estates HOA):

◦ Interpretation of Section 10.3: Argued that while the section may be “confusingly drafted,” it stipulates that if the committee fails to respond within 30 days, the request is “deemed disapproved.” Therefore, the board acted within its authority.

◦ Failure to Appeal: Contended that Mr. Mandela failed to follow the proper appeal procedure outlined in the CC&Rs, as he never specifically requested a meeting to discuss the denial.

Judge’s Final Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ affirmed the original decision, finding for the Respondent as the prevailing party and dismissing Mr. Mandela’s appeal.

• Scope of Rehearing: The judge determined that the rehearing was limited to the August 28, 2019, request and its subsequent denial, as that was the sole focus of the original petition. Mr. Mandela’s arguments about prior denials were not considered new evidence relevant to the specific violation alleged.

• Interpretation of the 30-Day Rule: The ALJ sided with the HOA’s interpretation of Section 10.3. While acknowledging that Blue Ridge took more than thirty days to issue a written denial, the judge ruled that the CC&R’s provision for a “deemed disapproved” status meant the request was properly denied under the rules.

• Petitioner’s Failure to Follow Procedure: The judge noted that Mr. Mandela admitted he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee after the denial, which was the required next step in the appeal process under Section 10.3.

• Final Ruling: The final decision, dated April 27, 2021, concluded that Mr. Mandela failed to sustain his burden of proof. The HOA was found to have acted in compliance with the CC&Rs, and the appeal was dismissed. This order was declared binding on the parties.

Timeline of Key Events

August 28, 2019

Charles Mandela submits his request to build a patio shade.

October 25, 2019

Blue Ridge HOA denies the request via email, citing the one-additional-structure limit.

January 13, 2020

Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

January 13, 2021

The first evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

January 29, 2021

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision denying Mandela’s petition.

February 5, 2021

Mandela files a request for a rehearing.

March 15, 2021

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

April 16, 2021

The rehearing is conducted.

April 27, 2021

The ALJ issues a final decision, finding for the HOA and dismissing Mandela’s appeal.

Central CC&R Provision: Article X, Section 10.3

The most heavily debated provision was Section 10.3 of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs, which outlines the procedure for architectural requests. Its language was central to the outcome of the rehearing.

Key text from Section 10.3:

“The Architectural Committee shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of such plans, specifications, and elevations to approve or disapprove of the proposed construction… In the event the Architectural Committee fails either to approve or disapprove the proposed construction… within said thirty (30) day period, such proposed construction… shall be deemed disapproved and the Owner can then request a meeting with the Architectural Committee to discuss the reasons for such disapproval…”

This clause was interpreted by the ALJ to mean that the HOA’s failure to provide a written response within 30 days automatically constituted a denial, shifting the burden to the homeowner to request a follow-up meeting, a step Mr. Mandela did not take.

Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from January 29, 2021, and April 27, 2021. The case centers on the denial of an architectural request and the interpretation of the association’s governing documents (CC&Rs).

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Quiz: Key Facts and Arguments

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal decisions.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific structure did Charles P. Mandela request approval to build on August 28, 2019?

3. What was the initial reason given by the Blue Ridge Estates HOA for denying Mr. Mandela’s request on October 25, 2019?

4. What was Mr. Mandela’s central argument during the first hearing on January 13, 2021?

5. According to the decision from the first hearing, why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that the HOA’s denial was in compliance with Section 10.2 of the CC&Rs?

6. On what grounds did Mr. Mandela file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 5, 2021?

7. During the rehearing, what new argument did Mr. Mandela raise concerning the timeline of the HOA’s denial of his August 28, 2019 request?

8. How did the HOA’s legal counsel counter Mr. Mandela’s argument regarding the 30-day response time outlined in Section 10.3?

9. What procedural step, outlined in Section 10.3, did Mr. Mandela admit he failed to take after his request was deemed denied?

10. What was the final outcome of the rehearing on April 16, 2021, and what was the judge’s conclusion regarding the HOA’s actions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Charles P. Mandela, a homeowner, and Respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association of Coconino County. Mr. Mandela filed the petition against the HOA after it denied his request to build a patio shade.

2. On August 28, 2019, Mr. Mandela requested approval to build a “patio shade less than 200 sq. feet.” The structure was a four-post shade that he intended to attach to the east side wall of his residence.

3. The HOA denied the request based on Architectural Committee Standards Article X. The denial stated that only one structure other than the residence may be placed on the property, and Mr. Mandela already had a residence and a shed.

4. Mr. Mandela’s central argument was that the denial was erroneous because the patio shade was not a separate stand-alone structure. He planned to attach it to his house, and he presented photographs of other properties with similar structures.

5. The judge ruled the denial complied with Section 10.2 because the list of standards the Architectural Committee could enforce was “not an exhaustive one.” This meant the committee could properly deny the request based on the one-structure limit, even if it wasn’t explicitly enumerated.

6. Mr. Mandela requested a rehearing on the grounds that the findings of fact were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. He also claimed the decision was not supported by the evidence or was contrary to law.

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Mandela argued that the Board violated Section 10.3 of the CC&Rs. He contended that since he made his request on August 28, 2019, and the Board did not respond until October 25, 2019, it had failed to provide a written response within the required 30-day period.

8. The HOA’s counsel argued that while Section 10.3 may be “confusingly drafted,” it specifies that if the committee fails to approve or disapprove within the 30-day period, the request is “deemed disapproved.” Therefore, the Board was within its authority.

9. Mr. Mandela admitted that he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee to discuss the reasons for the disapproval. This is the procedural step required by Section 10.3 after a request is deemed denied.

10. The final outcome was that the petition was dismissed, and the Respondent (HOA) was declared the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the HOA had not violated the CC&Rs and had acted in compliance with its governing documents.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed to promote a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, citing specific details from the legal decisions.

1. Analyze the interpretation of CC&R Section 10.3, specifically the “deemed disapproved” clause. Discuss how this clause functioned as a key legal defense for the HOA and ultimately shaped the outcome of the rehearing.

2. The legal standard in this case was “a preponderance of the evidence.” Define this standard as described in the legal text and evaluate the evidence Mr. Mandela presented in both hearings. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that Mr. Mandela failed to meet his burden of proof?

3. Compare and contrast the arguments presented by the Petitioner and Respondent in the initial hearing (January 13, 2021) versus the rehearing (April 16, 2021). How did the focus of the legal arguments shift between the two proceedings?

4. Examine the authority and jurisdiction of the Architectural Committee as outlined in CC&R Section 10.2. Discuss the significance of the phrase “Such standards and procedures may include, without limitation, provisions regarding…” in the judge’s initial decision.

5. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Mandela’s initial request in August 2019 to the final order in April 2021. Identify at least four key procedural milestones and explain their significance to the case’s progression and ultimate resolution.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Adam D. Stone, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions concerning disputes regulated by state agencies.

Architectural Committee

A body within the Blue Ridge Estates HOA established by Article X of the CC&Rs, with jurisdiction over all original construction and any modifications, additions, or alterations to the exterior of homes or properties.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations and the associations themselves in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to produce evidence that proves the facts it claims are true. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community like Blue Ridge Estates. This case centered on the interpretation of Article X of the Blue Ridge CC&Rs.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization for a planned community. In this case, the Respondent was the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County.

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a lawsuit or petition to be dismissed. The Blue Ridge HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied on October 7, 2020, allowing the case to proceed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where petitions related to disputes with HOAs are sent for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to review a legal decision. Mr. Mandela was granted a rehearing after the initial decision, based on his claim that the findings were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association was the Respondent.

Tribunal

A term used in the documents to refer to the judicial body hearing the case, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

He Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost. Here Are 5 Shocking Lessons Every Homeowner Needs to Learn.

Introduction: The Perils of a Simple Home Improvement Project

For any homeowner, the excitement of a new project—a deck, a fence, or a simple patio shade—can quickly turn to frustration when it collides with the dense rulebook of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA). What seems like a straightforward improvement can become a complex battle of bylaws and procedures.

This was the reality for Charles P. Mandela, a homeowner in the Blue Ridge Estates community. His plan to build a simple patio shade was denied by his HOA, sparking a legal challenge that went before an Administrative Law Judge. While Mr. Mandela ultimately lost his case on its legal merits, the details of his fight offer a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive world of HOA governance. This article distills the most shocking lessons from his case, providing critical insights for any homeowner living under an HOA.

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1. The “Deemed Disapproved” Clause: How an HOA’s Silence Becomes a Legal “No”

Mr. Mandela submitted his request to build a patio shade on August 28, 2019. He argued that the HOA, Blue Ridge Estates, violated its own rules, which required a response within 30 days. The HOA didn’t send its formal denial until October 25, 2019, well past the deadline. On the surface, it seemed like a clear procedural violation by the HOA.

However, a bizarre and “unartfully drafted” clause hidden in the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs) turned this logic on its head. The rule stated:

In the event the Architectural Committee fails either to approve or disapprove the proposed construction… within said thirty (30) day period, such proposed construction… shall be deemed disapproved…

Contrary to common sense, the rule meant that the HOA’s failure to respond on time resulted in an automatic denial, not a pending approval. The Administrative Law Judge was bound by this text, concluding that because the 30-day period had passed without a formal approval, the request was “properly deemed denied.”

2. The “My Neighbor Has One” Argument Is Weaker Than You Think

To support his case, Mr. Mandela presented photographs showing that “similar shades exist on other properties with additional structures.” He argued that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement by denying his project while having approved others like it. This is one of the most frequent arguments homeowners make when they feel singled out by their HOA board.

The judge’s conclusion was a stunning reality check. The legal decision stated:

While those properties may have had their shades approved by different members of the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee that does not follow that Mr. Mandela’s request was improperly denied under Article X.

The legal reasoning here is crucial for homeowners to understand. Architectural committees are not static; members change, and so can their interpretation of aesthetic standards. Each application is legally considered a distinct request, evaluated under the rules in place at that moment. A previous committee’s approval—which may have even been a mistake or a variance granted under different circumstances—does not create a binding legal precedent that forces the current committee to repeat it.

3. Procedure is Everything: A Missed Step Can Cost You the Case

The HOA’s rules contained a specific process for appealing a denial. After a project is “deemed disapproved” because the 30-day clock ran out, the homeowner must then formally request a meeting with the committee to discuss the denial.

The judge found that Mr. Mandela had failed to take this critical next step. This procedural misstep, however small it might seem, became a key factor in the case against him. The decision hinged on this procedural failure, stating:

Further, Petitioner admitted that in his several email responses that he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee, thus he failed to follow the procedures in Section 10.3.

This highlights a crucial lesson: meticulously follow every single procedural step outlined in your HOA’s documents. Failure to do so, such as not using the correct language to request a meeting, can be used to dismiss your claim, regardless of its other merits.

4. “Unartfully Drafted” Rules Can Still Be Legally Binding

Even the Administrative Law Judge acknowledged the poor quality of the HOA’s rulebook. In the decision, the judge offered a candid assessment of the rule regarding the 30-day response time, stating, “Admittedly this section is unartfully drafted…”

Despite this observation, the rule was enforced exactly as written. The judge was bound by the text, however confusing, and concluded that “from the evidence presented, the request was properly deemed denied.”

This is perhaps the most sobering lesson. Homeowners often assume that a rule that is confusing or seems illogical won’t hold up under scrutiny. This case proves that the literal text of the governing documents possesses immense power. What a rule literally says is far more important than what one might assume it should mean.

5. The Final Twist: He Lost the Case But Got His Patio Anyway

After the initial decision was made against him, Mr. Mandela requested a rehearing. During this second hearing, a surprising fact emerged. Mr. Mandela testified that “since the decision on January 29, 2021, his request for the patio shade had been approved by the Board.”

This outcome highlights a crucial dynamic: while Mr. Mandela lost the legal argument based on procedural history, his persistent engagement in the process—including filing a formal appeal—likely created enough administrative and community pressure to compel the Board to find a practical, non-legal solution. It’s a powerful reminder that a legal loss on a technicality does not always foreclose a real-world victory.

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Conclusion: Do You Really Know Your HOA’s Rules?

The case of Charles Mandela serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It reveals that HOA disputes are rarely won on appeals to fairness or common sense. Instead, they are won or lost in the fine print of the governing documents—documents that can contain counter-intuitive clauses, procedural traps, and “unartfully drafted” rules that are nonetheless legally binding.

A homeowner’s best defense is not passion or conviction, but a deep and thorough understanding of the specific rules and procedures they agreed to live by. This case forces every homeowner to ask: Are you prepared to navigate the literal text of your community’s rules, where silence can mean “no” and a neighbor’s precedent is no precedent at all?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Charles P Mandela (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Haining Xia v. Dorsey Place Condominium Association

Posted on January 22, 2021 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	21F-H2120016-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2021-07-14
Administrative Law Judge	Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Haining Xia	Counsel	—
Respondent	Dorsey Place Condominium Association	Counsel	Nick Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its Bylaws Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4. The Respondent was found to be the prevailing party, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, specifically failing to establish that an election was required during the years alleged.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to elect the Board at Annual Members Meetings in 2018 and 2019

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to elect the board during the 2018 and 2019 Annual Members Meetings. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof to establish a violation, specifically failing to establish that an election was required during those years.

Orders: Respondent is the prevailing party, and Petitioner's appeal is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 33-1202(10)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120016-REL Decision – 895555.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:48 (107.4 KB)

21F-H2120016-REL Decision – 849881.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:52 (109.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Xia v. Dorsey Place Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings, arguments, and legal proceedings from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between petitioner Haining Xia and the Dorsey Place Condominium Association (the Respondent). The core of the dispute revolves around Mr. Xia’s allegation that the Association violated its own bylaws by failing to conduct board elections during its 2018 and 2019 annual meetings.

The Respondent’s primary defense was a jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) could not hear the case because the Association’s condominium status was legally terminated in April 2019, prior to the filing of the petition. This termination was previously upheld by the Maricopa County Superior Court.

In the initial hearing on January 7, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, relying solely on assertions without presenting any documentary evidence. Consequently, the petition was denied. A rehearing was granted and held on July 2, 2021, where the petitioner submitted documents but failed to provide testimony explaining their relevance or to establish that board elections were required in the years in question. The ALJ again concluded that the petitioner did not sustain his burden of proof. The final order dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and declared the Respondent the prevailing party.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 21F-H2120016-REL / 21F-H2120016-REL-RHG

• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

• Petitioner: Haining Xia

• Respondent: Dorsey Place Condominium Association

• Presiding Administrative Law Judge: Sondra J. Vanella

• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated its Bylaws Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4 by failing to include board elections on the agendas for the 2018 and 2019 Annual Members Meetings and by never electing a board at said meetings.

Chronology of Proceedings

September 21, 2020

Haining Xia files a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Resolution Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 20, 2020

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing.

January 7, 2021

The initial administrative hearing is held.

January 22, 2021

The ALJ issues a Decision denying the Petitioner’s Petition.

February 18, 2021

The Petitioner files a request for rehearing, citing errors of law and evidence.

March 23, 2021

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 2, 2021

The rehearing is conducted.

July 14, 2021

The ALJ issues the final Decision, declaring the Respondent the prevailing party and dismissing the Petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments

Haining Xia’s case rested on several key arguments presented across both hearings.

• Primary Claim: The central assertion was that the Respondent was in “direct violation of HOA Bylaws Article 3.3, Article 4.1 and Article 4.4” because board elections were not held or even placed on the agenda for the 2018 and 2019 annual meetings.

• Challenge to Condominium Termination: Mr. Xia actively disputed the validity of the Association’s termination as a condominium.

◦ He argued the “Condominium Termination Agreement” was invalid because it “does not contain valid signatures” and represented a “usurpation of corporate power.”

◦ He maintained that because he still holds the title to his unit and the sale has not been finalized, the condominium status could not be legally changed.

◦ He stated his intention to appeal a separate Maricopa County Superior Court ruling which had already upheld the termination agreement.

• Specific Meeting Grievances:

◦ 2018 Meeting: The annual meeting, scheduled for March, was delayed until August 2018. Its stated purpose was to vote on a special assessment, but Mr. Xia asserted there was “not a valid board for that meeting.”

◦ 2019 Meeting: This meeting was held to discuss the termination agreement, but Mr. Xia claimed there was “no election of board members or appointment of officers.”

• Stated Objective: The petitioner requested “a definitive answer as to whether there were valid corporate officers” and, in the rehearing, stated he “wants a finding that there was no legitimate board and no officers appointed.”

• Personal Motivation: During the rehearing, Mr. Xia asserted that he is the only homeowner “who stood up to fight,” that he is fighting “evil,” and is “looking for justice.”

Respondent’s Position and Arguments

The Dorsey Place Condominium Association’s defense was primarily procedural and jurisdictional.

• Jurisdictional Challenge: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the OAH lacked jurisdiction over the dispute.

◦ The basis for this argument was that the Association’s status as a “Condominium” was terminated via a “Condominium Termination Agreement” recorded on April 9, 2019.

◦ As the entity no longer met the legal definition of a condominium under A.R.S. §33-1202(10), the OAH had no authority to hear a dispute between it and a unit owner.

• Superior Court Precedent: The Respondent emphasized that the validity of the termination agreement had already been adjudicated and upheld by the Maricopa County Superior Court. The ALJ noted that the OAH “does not have the authority to overturn or modify that ruling.”

• Mootness: The Respondent argued that since the termination, the property is “currently being utilized as an apartment complex,” making the petitioner’s claims moot.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The decisions issued by ALJ Sondra J. Vanella focused squarely on the legal standard of proof required of the petitioner.

The ALJ repeatedly established that the petitioner “bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Failure to Present Evidence: The ALJ found that Mr. Xia “failed to present any evidence at hearing, documentary or otherwise, but rather relied solely on his own assertions.”

• Conclusion: The petitioner did not meet his burden of proof to establish a violation of the specified bylaws.

• Order: The Petition was denied.

• Basis for Rehearing: The rehearing was granted based on the petitioner’s claim of “error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.”

• Evidence at Rehearing: Mr. Xia submitted several documents, including meeting notices for 2018 and 2019, an “Action by Written Consent,” and a “Board Resolution Filling Director and Officer Vacancies.” However, he “did not provide an explanation of the documents at hearing or testimony concerning the documents.”

• Final Conclusion: After reviewing all evidence from both hearings, the ALJ concluded that the petitioner “failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation.” Critically, the ALJ noted that Mr. Xia “failed to establish that an election was required during either of those years [2018 and 2019].”

• Final Order: The Respondent was declared the prevailing party, and the petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. This order is binding unless appealed to the superior court within 35 days.

Relevant Bylaw Articles

The petition was based on alleged violations of the following articles from the Dorsey Place Condominium Association Bylaws:

Article

Key Provision

Annual Members Meeting

States that at each annual meeting, “the Members shall elect the Board and transact such other business as may properly be brought before the meeting.”

Election

Stipulates that the Association’s affairs are managed by the Board and that “each director shall be elected at the annual meeting of Members concurrent with the expiration of the term of the director he or she is to succeed.”

Annual Board Meetings

Requires that “within thirty (30) days after each annual meeting of Members, the newly elected directors shall meet forthwith for the purpose of organization, the election of officers, and the transaction of other business.”

Study Guide: Haining Xia v. Dorsey Place Condominium Association

This guide reviews the administrative case between Haining Xia (Petitioner) and the Dorsey Place Condominium Association (Respondent) before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the core allegations, legal arguments, procedural history, and final rulings.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case and what are their roles?

2. What specific violations of the association’s Bylaws did the Petitioner allege?

3. What was the Respondent’s primary legal argument for why the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction?

4. According to the case documents, what is the legal standard known as “preponderance of the evidence”?

5. What was the initial ruling by the Administrative Law Judge on January 22, 2021, and what was the key reason for this decision?

6. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

7. What evidence did the Petitioner submit during the rehearing on July 2, 2021?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge state that the Office of Administrative Hearings could not invalidate the “Condominium Termination Agreement”?

9. What specific requirements for annual meetings are outlined in Article 3.3 of the Respondent’s Bylaws?

10. What was the final outcome of the case after the rehearing, as detailed in the order dated July 14, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Haining Xia, the Petitioner, and Dorsey Place Condominium Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner is the unit owner who filed a dispute petition, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association accused of violating its own Bylaws.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Bylaws Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4. He claimed the Respondent never elected a board at its Annual Members Meetings for 2018 and 2019 and that board elections were not included on the agendas for those meetings.

3. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction because the association’s condominium status was terminated in April 2019 via a “Condominium Termination Agreement.” As it was no longer legally a condominium, the Respondent claimed it did not meet the statutory requirements for OAH jurisdiction over such disputes.

4. The legal standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” It is also described as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

5. The initial ruling on January 22, 2021, denied the Petitioner’s Petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof because he presented no documentary evidence and relied solely on his own assertions to support his claims.

6. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that there was an “error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted this request.

7. During the rehearing, the Petitioner submitted Annual Membership Meeting Notices for 2018 and 2019, a document titled “Action by Written Consent of a Majority of the Unit Owners,” and a November 16, 2018, Board Resolution. However, he did not provide testimony or an explanation concerning these documents.

8. The Administrative Law Judge advised the Petitioner that the validity of the termination agreement had already been adjudicated and upheld by the Maricopa County Superior Court. The Office of Administrative Hearings does not have the legal authority to overturn or modify a ruling from the Superior Court.

9. Article 3.3 states that the annual meeting of Members shall be held in March each year, though it can be delayed until May 31. The purpose of this meeting is for the Members to elect the Board and transact other business that may properly be brought before the meeting.

10. After the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ruled against the Petitioner, ordering that his appeal be dismissed and naming the Respondent as the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Petitioner once again failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the jurisdictional challenge raised by the Respondent. How did the “Condominium Termination Agreement” of April 2019 fundamentally alter the legal status of the property and impact the proceedings before the Office of Administrative Hearings?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain in detail why the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, beginning with the filing of the petition on September 21, 2020, and ending with the final order on July 14, 2021. Identify the key events, decisions, and legal reasonings at each stage.

4. Evaluate the different arguments made by the Petitioner, including his claims about invalid board elections, the legitimacy of the termination agreement, and his status as a titled owner. Explain why the Office of Administrative Hearings was limited in its authority to rule on certain aspects of his claims.

5. Based on Bylaws Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4, describe the prescribed process for electing the Board of Directors and conducting annual meetings. How did the Petitioner’s specific allegations in his petition directly challenge whether the Respondent had followed these procedures?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Sondra J. Vanella.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct. The respondent bears the burden of proof for affirmative defenses.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona.

Bylaws

The set of rules governing the internal management and affairs of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. The Petitioner alleged violations of Articles 3.3, 4.1, and 4.4 of the Respondent’s Bylaws.

Condominium Termination Agreement

A legal document recorded on April 9, 2019, that officially terminated the condominium status of Dorsey Place. The Respondent argued this action removed it from the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings for condominium disputes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and residents. The Dorsey Place Condominium Association is the HOA in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent challenged the OAH’s jurisdiction on the basis that it was no longer legally a condominium.

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request made by a party to a court or other tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that conducts hearings for other state agencies. In this case, the OAH conducted the hearing for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition

The formal written request filed by the Petitioner to initiate the dispute resolution process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner is Haining Xia.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof in this civil case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and as evidence that has “the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Respondent is the Dorsey Place Condominium Association.

Superior Court

A state trial court of general jurisdiction. The Maricopa County Superior Court had previously issued a ruling upholding the validity of the Condominium Termination Agreement.

He Fought His HOA and Lost—Twice. 3 Costly Mistakes Every Homeowner Should Avoid.

The Frustration and the Fight

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of immense frustration. Rules can feel arbitrary, and board decisions can seem opaque. It’s a common feeling to believe the HOA is in the wrong and to want to stand up for your rights. But what happens when that conviction meets the cold, hard reality of the legal system?

The case of Haining Xia versus the Dorsey Place Condominium Association serves as a powerful cautionary tale for any homeowner considering a legal challenge. Mr. Xia’s core complaint was straightforward and, on its face, seemed reasonable: he alleged that his HOA violated its own bylaws by failing to hold board elections during its 2018 and 2019 annual meetings.

Despite his strong convictions, he lost his case. He was then granted a rehearing—a rare second chance—and lost again. This article explores the surprising and crucial lessons from his defeat, revealing why simply being right in principle is often not enough to win in practice.

1. Conviction Is Not Evidence

The single biggest reason for Mr. Xia’s failure was his inability to provide proof for his claims. In the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision was stark: the petitioner “failed to present any evidence at hearing, documentary or otherwise, but rather relied solely on his own assertions.”

Herein lies the central mistake for any potential litigant: in a legal proceeding, the outcome isn’t determined by who feels most wronged, but by who can meet the required standard of proof. In this case, that standard was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition clarifies this standard:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Think of it as the scales of justice. Your evidence doesn’t need to slam one side to the ground, but it must be strong enough to tip the scale, even slightly, in your favor. Mr. Xia arrived with only his convictions, which carry no weight on the scale.

During the rehearing, his testimony was filled with passionate statements, asserting that he was the only homeowner “who stood up to fight,” that he was fighting “evil,” and was simply “looking for justice.” These heartfelt convictions, however, were met with the judge’s blunt conclusion that he failed to meet his evidentiary burden. This reveals a critical lesson: in a legal setting, the passion of one’s convictions is irrelevant without factual, documentary proof to back them up.

2. Fight the Right Battle in the Right Courtroom

A significant portion of Mr. Xia’s case was derailed by a fundamental strategic error. The HOA’s attorney argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)—the body hearing the dispute—had no power over the case because the property had ceased to be a condominium in 2019 pursuant to a “Condominium Termination Agreement.”

In response, Mr. Xia tried to argue that this termination agreement was invalid, claiming it “does not contain valid signatures” and was a “usurpation of corporate power.” This was the wrong argument to make in the wrong place.

The Administrative Law Judge explicitly advised him that the validity of the termination agreement had already been decided by a higher court, the Maricopa County Superior Court. The judge stated plainly that the OAH “does not have the authority to overturn or modify that ruling.”

This wasn’t just a procedural mistake; it was a credibility-damaging tactical blunder. By focusing on an issue the court had no power to address, he appeared unprepared and distracted from the one claim he was actually there to prove. This strategic error likely damaged his credibility with the judge from the outset, underscoring the importance of understanding a court’s specific jurisdiction before you ever step foot inside.

3. A Second Chance Requires a New Strategy, Not Just New Documents

Being granted a rehearing is a significant opportunity in any legal dispute. Mr. Xia was granted this second chance after citing a specific “error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” This wasn’t a general appeal to fairness; it was a procedural opening that offered a rare chance to correct the flaws of his first attempt.

Unfortunately, he failed to capitalize on it. While he did submit documents in the second hearing, the judge noted a fatal flaw in his presentation: he “did not provide an explanation of the documents at hearing or testimony concerning the documents.”

Submitting a stack of papers is not the same as building a case. Evidence doesn’t speak for itself. Each document needed a narrative. Mr. Xia should have walked the judge through each paper, explaining: “This is the notice for the 2018 meeting. As you can see, an election is not on the agenda, which violates Bylaw 3.3. This document proves my specific claim.” Without that narrative, he just presented a puzzle with no solution.

The final, unambiguous conclusion from the second hearing was that the “Petitioner failed to establish that an election was required during either of those years.” The key takeaway is clear: a procedural victory like a rehearing is meaningless if the fundamental flaws in your case—in this instance, a lack of compelling, well-explained evidence—are not corrected.

From Principle to Proof

Mr. Xia’s journey shows a fatal progression: he began with a case built on feeling instead of fact, tried to fight it in the wrong court over a settled issue, and when given a rare chance to fix these fundamental errors, he failed to change his approach. It’s a story of how a lack of preparation can doom a case from start to finish.

This case is a stark reminder that in the eyes of the law, a right that cannot be proven does not exist. Before you begin your fight, ask yourself: are you prepared to prove your case, not just believe in it?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Haining Xia (petitioner)
Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Nick Nogami (attorney)
Dorsey Place Condominium Association
Represented Respondent
Edith Rudder (attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Listed on service list

Neutral Parties

Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
OAH
Administrative Law Judge for initial hearing and rehearing
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner who issued Order Granting Rehearing
Daniel Martin (judge)
Referenced regarding a prior Minute Entry

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on January 16, 2020 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge	Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Joan A. Tober	Counsel	—
Respondent	Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association	Counsel	Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:32 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano (Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on October 9, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818050-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brent J. Mathews	Counsel	—
Respondent	American Ranch Community Association	Counsel	Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:46 (112.4 KB)

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.

The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.

1. Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.

2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation

After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:

“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”

The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.

3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events

The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.

A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.

June 2011

The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.

November 23, 2013

Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.

July 30, 2016

Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.

August 2016

Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.

August 9, 2016

The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.

4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning

The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.

A. Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.

B. Variance vs. Amendment

The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.

• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.

C. The Board’s Delegated Authority

The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:

1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.

2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”

3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.

5. Final Order

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.

• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.

Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?

3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?

5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?

6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?

7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?

8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?

9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.

2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.

3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.

4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.

5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.

6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.

7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.

8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.

9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.

10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.

2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?

4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.

5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Architectural Review Committee

A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.

Bylaws

The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.

Petition

The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.

Variance

An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.

Well Agreement 1

A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.

Well Agreement 2

An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.

Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown

1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome

It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.

That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.

The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.

2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone

Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.

However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees

This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.

This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.

According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.

“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution

While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.

The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.

When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”

The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them

The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.

This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Brent J. Mathews (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Lynn Krupnik (attorney)
Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
Represented Respondent
Timothy Krupnik (attorney)
Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
Represented Respondent
Tiffany Taylor (community manager)
American Ranch Community Association
Testified for Respondent
Brad Baker (board member)
American Ranch Community Association
Respondent Vice President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
Signed transmission page
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient

Other Participants

Mark Kaplan (owner)
Lot 2
Executed Well Agreement 2
Diane Kaplan (owner)
Lot 2
Executed Well Agreement 2
Steven Galliano (former owner)
Lot 2
Frances Galliano (former owner)
Lot 2

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Posted on September 25, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Travis Prall	Counsel	—
Respondent	Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association	Counsel	Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:58 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:00 (107.3 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:18 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:22 (107.3 KB)

Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.

Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?

3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?

4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?

5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.

Common Area

Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.

Courtesy Letter

A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.

Declarant

The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.

HOA Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.

Improvements

A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.

Pony Wall

A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”

Private Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.

Public Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.

Visible from Neighboring Property

A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”

⚖️

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG

2 sources

These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Travis Prall (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Lydia Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski (board member)
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake (property manager)
Pride Community Management
Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers (community manager)
Community Manager; testified at initial hearing

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Tom Barrs vs Desert Ranch HOA

Posted on August 23, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818035-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$1,000.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Tom Barrs	Counsel	—
Respondent	Desert Ranch HOA	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on Issues 2 (retention of election materials) and 3 (open meetings violation). Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 objection rule) was dismissed. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner $1,000.00, representing the filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 as the evidence did not show that a Director was restricted by the Member waiver clause from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned.

Key Issues & Findings

Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on Mr. Schoeffler’s objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating or acting upon an objection to election results that was raised by a Director after the Annual Meeting adjourned, thereby waiving the claim according to the bylaw.

Orders: Petition dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election.

The HOA discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election, which violated the statutory mandate to retain ballots, envelopes, and related materials for at least one year.

Orders: Petitioner established violation and was deemed the prevailing party regarding this issue. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate. The initial order included an order for Respondent to pay Petitioner the $1,000.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when it held meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

The HOA Board members met with an attorney following the Annual Meeting without providing any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or failing to provide notice that the meeting was closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election Dispute, Records Retention, Open Meeting Violation, Filing Fee Refund

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678304.pdf

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18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678305.pdf

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18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 655766.pdf

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18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 655766.pdf

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18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678304.pdf

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18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678305.pdf

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Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the legal dispute between Petitioner Tom Barrs and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA) concerning the HOA’s March 18, 2017, Board of Directors election. The petitioner alleged that the HOA improperly overturned the initial election results, mishandled election materials, and held meetings in violation of state law and its own bylaws.

An initial ruling by an Administrative Law Judge found the HOA in violation of state statutes regarding the retention of election materials (A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)) and open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804). However, the judge ruled against the petitioner on the central claim that the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating the election after the annual meeting had concluded.

The petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing, which focused exclusively on the alleged violation of Bylaw 2.4. The final decision on rehearing, issued December 26, 2018, reaffirmed the initial ruling. The judge concluded that the investigation was properly initiated by a board member, not a general member, and that the bylaw restricting post-meeting objections did not apply to the Board of Directors itself. Consequently, the petition regarding the overturning of the election was dismissed.

Case Overview

This document details the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the administrative case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Tom Barrs

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Initial Hearing

Not specified in document

Rehearing Date

December 6, 2018

Decision Date

December 26, 2018

Key Individuals:

• Tom Barrs: Petitioner.

• Catherine Overby: HOA President, appeared for Respondent.

• Brian Schoeffler: HOA Vice President, appeared for Respondent; candidate in the disputed election.

• Jerome Klinger: Candidate initially announced as a winner of the election.

• Patrick Rice: Board member at the time of the election.

Chronology of the 2017 Election Dispute

1. Pre-March 18, 2017: Absentee ballots are sent to HOA members listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates, with a space for a write-in.

2. March 18, 2017: At the Annual Meeting, ballots are submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and write-in candidate Jerome Klinger are announced as the winners. No members object before the meeting is adjourned. Immediately following, board member Patrick Rice gathers the ballots and expresses concerns about the results.

3. March 19, 2017: Brian Schoeffler sends an email to board members asking for a review and a decision on whether a “revote” is necessary.

4. March 20, 2017: Catherine Overby emails the HOA membership, stating the election has been “contested” and that the board must investigate. She also asserts that bylaws do not allow write-in candidates, meaning she and Schoeffler were the new directors based on the vote count.

5. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Overby and Rice, meet with an attorney at Overby’s house. They discover that duplicate and proxy ballots were improperly counted.

6. Post-March 29, 2017: The board determines the valid votes resulted in a tie between Schoeffler and Klinger. A run-off election is scheduled.

7. April 29, 2017: The run-off election is held. Brian Schoeffler is announced as the winner.

8. May 10, 2017: The Board of Directors holds an organizational meeting.

Procedural History and Allegations

Initial Petition and Hearing

• March 19, 2018: Tom Barrs files a single-issue HOA Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee but including a four-page narrative alleging multiple violations.

• April 13, 2018: Barrs files an amended petition, adding an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812.

• July 30, 2018: Barrs pays to convert the petition to a multiple-issue dispute and submits a “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.”

The three core issues alleged by the petitioner were:

1. Improper Overturning of Election: The Board of Directors improperly removed Jerome Klinger by overturning the March 18, 2017 election results. The petitioner argued the challenge by the third candidate was barred by Bylaw 2.4, and the methods used violated recall protocols under A.R.S. § 33-1813 and Bylaw 3.3.

2. Improper Handling of Election Materials: The board violated A.R.S. § 33-1812 by disposing of election materials (ballot envelopes) required to be kept for one year and by selectively invalidating votes cast on invalid ballots.

3. Improperly Held Meetings: Meetings related to the 2017 election were held as closed sessions or without proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Initial Decision

Following the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision with the following conclusions:

• Violation Found: The Respondent (HOA) violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by discarding the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

• Violation Found: The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

• No Violation Found: The Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4.

Rehearing and Final Order

• October 1, 2018: Barrs files a request for rehearing, citing misconduct, insufficient penalties, errors of law, and a decision not supported by evidence.

• November 2, 2018: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

• December 6, 2018: At the rehearing, the petitioner states he is only seeking reconsideration of Issue 1 (the improper overturning of the election) and not the lack of penalties for Issues 2 and 3.

Judicial Analysis and Final Rulings

The final decision focused solely on whether the HOA’s actions violated its own bylaws regarding election challenges.

Key Bylaw and Legal Standard

• Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4: The central bylaw in dispute states:

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving the violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Analysis of Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4

• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs argued that because candidate Brian Schoeffler did not object to the election results before the March 18, 2017 meeting adjourned, Bylaw 2.4 barred the board from investigating his concerns raised the following day via email. The petitioner contended that board members are also “Members” and thus are bound by this rule.

• Evidence Presented: Testimony established that Patrick Rice, acting as a Board member, expressed concerns with the vote count immediately after the meeting adjourned. This, not Mr. Schoeffler’s subsequent email, initiated the board’s investigation. At the rehearing, the petitioner presented selected audio clips he had recorded to support his arguments but did not provide the entire recording.

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ made a critical distinction between the terms used in the HOA’s bylaws.

◦ The terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were found to have specific, non-interchangeable meanings throughout the bylaws.

◦ Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member.”

◦ The petitioner made no showing that a “Director” or the “Board of Directors” could not raise questions about the validity of election results after a meeting had adjourned.

◦ Since the investigation was initiated by a board member (Rice) and not exclusively by a member’s untimely objection (Schoeffler), the board’s actions did not violate Bylaw 2.4.

Final Order

Based on the analysis from the rehearing, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed as to Issue 1.

This order, resulting from a rehearing, is legally binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.

Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Tom Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event on March 18, 2017, served as the catalyst for the entire legal dispute?

3. What were the initial, announced results of the election held at the March 18, 2017, Annual Meeting?

4. According to the Petitioner, how did the HOA Board violate Bylaw 2.4 following the election?

5. In the initial hearing, which two of the Petitioner’s allegations were found to be valid violations committed by the Respondent?

6. Why did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

7. During the rehearing on December 6, 2018, what was the single issue that the Petitioner chose to focus on for reconsideration?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what action initiated the Board’s investigation into the election results, separate from Brian Schoeffler’s email?

9. How did the Judge’s interpretation of the terms “Member” and “Director” in the bylaws defeat the Petitioner’s primary argument on rehearing?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Issue 1 after the conclusion of the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Tom Barrs, who served as the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, appeared on his own behalf, while the Respondent was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler.

2. The dispute was triggered by the election for two vacant seats on the HOA Board of Directors held during the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The subsequent actions by the Board to investigate and ultimately overturn the initial results of this election led the Petitioner to file a dispute.

3. The initially announced results of the March 18, 2017, election declared that Ms. Catherine Overby and Mr. Jerome Klinger were the winning candidates. No members present at the meeting raised an objection to these announced results before the meeting was adjourned.

4. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection to the election results raised by Brian Schoeffler the day after the meeting. The bylaw states that any member who fails to object to an irregularity during a meeting “forever waives that claim,” and the Petitioner argued Mr. Schoeffler, as a member, had waived his right to object.

5. In the initial hearing, the Judge found that the Petitioner successfully established two violations by the Respondent. These were a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) for discarding ballot envelopes and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for holding closed meetings without proper notice.

6. The Commissioner granted the rehearing “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s Rehearing Request.” The Petitioner’s request cited multiple grounds, including misconduct by the prevailing party, errors of law, and that the initial findings of fact were not supported by the evidence or were contrary to law.

7. At the rehearing, the Petitioner stated he was only seeking reconsideration of the initial decision as it related to Issue 1. This issue was the allegation that the Board improperly overturned the election results in violation of Bylaw 2.4.

8. The Judge found that the Board’s investigation was initiated by Mr. Patrick Rice, a Board member at the time, who expressed his concerns with the vote “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” This occurred prior to and independent of the email sent by Brian Schoeffler the following day.

9. The Judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. Because the Petitioner made no showing that a “Director” (like Mr. Rice) could not raise questions after a meeting, the restriction on “Members” in Bylaw 2.4 did not apply to the Board’s actions.

10. The final order stated that the Petition was to be dismissed as to Issue 1. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated Bylaw 2.4.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017, to the run-off election on April 29, 2017. Discuss the key actions taken by the HOA Board—including the meeting with an attorney and the discovery of invalid ballots—and explain how these actions led to the legal dispute.

2. Detail the three distinct issues the Petitioner alleged in his “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.” Based on the outcome of the initial hearing, evaluate the success of these claims and explain why the Petitioner prevailed on some issues but not others.

3. The Petitioner’s case on rehearing hinged on the interpretation of Bylaw 2.4. Construct the Petitioner’s argument regarding this bylaw and then fully explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for ultimately rejecting it, focusing on the distinction between “Members” and “Directors.”

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and analyze how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this standard led to the dismissal of Issue 1 on rehearing.

5. Examine the procedural history of the case, from the initial single-issue petition to the final binding order after rehearing. What were the key procedural steps, such as amending the petition and filing for a rehearing, and how did these steps shape the final scope and outcome of the case?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the State of Arizona. The Petitioner alleged violations of several statutes, including A.R.S. § 33-1813, § 33-1811, § 33-1812, and § 33-1804.

Bylaw 2.4

The specific bylaw of the Desert Ranch HOA that was the central focus of the rehearing. It states, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Director

An elected member of the HOA’s Board of Directors. The ALJ’s decision distinguished this role from that of a general “Member.”

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing organization for the planned community of Desert Ranch, responsible for enforcing community documents and statutes.

Member

A homeowner within the planned community. The ALJ’s decision emphasized that in the bylaws, this term has a specific meaning that is not interchangeable with “Director.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, to reconsider the initial decision based on alleged errors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association.

5 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Election Gone Wrong

Introduction: When “The Rules” Aren’t What You Think

Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs) run on rules. From lawn maintenance to paint colors, the governing documents are the ultimate authority. But what happens when the rules themselves become the center of a dispute? Imagine this scenario: your HOA holds its annual board election. The results are announced, the winners are declared, and everyone goes home. Then, the next day, the board decides to overturn the result.

This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s the core of a real-life legal case that reveals surprising truths about community governance, the power of a single word, and what can happen when an election goes off the rails.

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1. An Election Isn’t Over Until the Board Says It’s Over

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The ballots for two open board seats were counted, and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates. Crucially, no members present raised an objection before the meeting adjourned. By all appearances, the election was over.

But it wasn’t. Immediately after the meeting, a board member, Mr. Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed his concerns with the election results. The next day, the losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, sent an email asking the board to “review the situation” and consider a “revote.” The board then formally announced that the election had been contested and that it was obligated to investigate.

After consulting an attorney, the board discovered several ballot irregularities, including duplicate ballots and an improperly counted proxy ballot. This new tally resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board then forced a run-off election, which Mr. Schoeffler ultimately won. While the losing candidate’s email drew attention, the true turning point had already occurred moments after the meeting ended, when a board member himself questioned the results—an act that would prove legally decisive.

2. A Single Word in the Bylaws Can Change Everything

The homeowner who filed the legal petition, Tom Barrs, built his case on a seemingly straightforward rule in the HOA’s bylaws. He argued that any challenge to the election was invalid because it wasn’t raised before the Annual Meeting adjourned. The bylaw in question, Section 2.4, reads:

Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting (whether procedural, parliamentary, substantive or technical) forever waives that claim.

The petitioner’s argument was simple: the challenge was raised after the meeting by a “Member,” so the claim was waived. The case seemed open-and-shut.

However, the Administrative Law Judge made a critical distinction that decided the case. The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific meanings and were not interchangeable. While a Member had to object during the meeting, the judge found no rule preventing a Director from raising questions later.

Because a board member, Mr. Rice, had expressed concerns immediately following the meeting, the board’s subsequent investigation was deemed permissible. This razor-thin interpretation of a single word highlights the immense power that definitions and precise language hold in governing documents.

3. The Board Broke the Law, But Still Won on the Main Issue

In a surprising twist, the judge determined that the HOA had, in fact, violated Arizona state law on two separate counts during the election controversy. The petitioner successfully proved that the board failed to follow established statutes.

The two violations established in the initial hearing were:

• Improper Destruction of Ballots: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it destroyed all of the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. This act made a true, verifiable recount impossible, directly undermining the integrity of the very election the board was claiming to investigate.

• Improper Meetings: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding closed meetings without providing proper notice to the members, particularly a meeting at the home of a board member, Ms. Overby, where the decision to hold a run-off was made. By making these critical decisions behind closed doors, the board created an appearance of secrecy that fueled the dispute and eroded member trust.

Despite proving these clear legal violations, the petitioner still lost on his primary complaint—overturning the run-off and reinstating the original election results. This outcome serves as a stark example of a pyrrhic victory. You can successfully prove that an organization broke the rules without achieving your ultimate goal in the dispute.

4. An Investigation Can Uncover a Cascade of Deeper Problems

The board’s decision to contest its own election results was controversial, but the subsequent investigation brought a cascade of other procedural failures to light. The initial challenge acted like a pulled thread that unraveled a series of previously unknown mistakes.

During the board’s meeting with its attorney, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot that were improperly counted” had skewed the original vote. This alone was enough to call the first result into question.

Furthermore, the board itself asserted that its own bylaws “did not allow for a write-in candidate.” This was a significant admission, as one of the original winners, Jerome Klinger, had been a write-in. If true, his victory would have been invalid from the start, regardless of any other challenges. The board’s investigation, initiated to resolve one perceived error, ended up exposing its own systemic incompetence—from improperly counting ballots to being unaware of its own rules regarding write-in candidates. The effort to fix the election proved the election was fundamentally broken from the start.

5. An HOA Board Can Investigate Itself

The petitioner’s case rested on the idea that board members are also “Members” of the association and are therefore bound by the same rules. If a regular member had to object during the meeting, a director should have to as well.

The judge rejected this argument, implicitly affirming the board’s higher-level fiduciary duty to ensure a fair and legal election. The final decision made it clear that the bylaws used “Member” and “Director” with distinct meanings and responsibilities. The bylaw requiring members to object during the meeting was the mechanism for an individual’s challenge; it did not override the board’s inherent duty to govern properly.

The key takeaway from the judge’s decision was unambiguous: The petitioner “made no showing that a Director could not raise questions as to the validity of the election results after the meeting adjourned.” This legally affirms a board’s power to investigate its own processes, a responsibility separate from the rules that govern challenges from the general membership.

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Conclusion: Have You Read Your Bylaws Lately?

This case serves as a powerful reminder that the dense, legalistic language of HOA governing documents is not just boilerplate. These documents have immense real-world power, dictating the outcomes of contentious disputes and shaping the governance of a community. The intricate details and specific wording can mean the difference between a final result and one that is just the beginning of a long and costly fight.

This entire, year-long legal battle hinged on the definition of a single word. When was the last time you read the fine print governing your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Tom Barrs (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf,.
Stephen Barrs (witness)
Testified for Petitioner,.

Respondent Side

Catherine Overby (board member/president)
Desert Ranch HOA
Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board President,; testified at hearing,.
Brian Schoeffler (board member/vice president)
Desert Ranch HOA
Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board Vice President,; testified at hearing,.
Patrick Rice (board member)
Desert Ranch HOA
Board member who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting,,,; involved in meeting with attorney,.

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner (ADRE))
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Issued Order Granting Rehearing; recipient of decision copy,.
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision copy.
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision copy.
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision copy.
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision copy.
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of decision copy.

Other Participants

Jerome Klinger (board director)
Desert Ranch HOA
Initially announced as a winning candidate for director,; later removed after contest; involved in run-off,.
Paula Barrs (listed resident)
Listed with Tom Barrs on mailing address.

Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Posted on February 28, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817019-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-02-09
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry L. Webster	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mountain Rose Homeowners Association	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 10, Section 10.8

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.

Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:08:57 (78.5 KB)

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:41 (78.5 KB)

Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.

Case Background

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

◦ Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.

• Adjudicating Body:

◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.

◦ Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.

• Key Dates:

◦ 2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.

◦ December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

◦ February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.

◦ February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.

Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8

Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:

• (ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.

• (iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.

• (iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.

• (v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.

Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment

In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.

• Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”

• History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”

• Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”

• Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.

• Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”

• Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.

Respondent’s Position

The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.

• Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.

• Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.

• Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”

The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.

The Definition of “Recording”

Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:

“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.

Application of Law to Facts

The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.

• Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”

• Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.“

• Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”

Conclusion of Law

Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.

“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”

Final Order and Disposition

The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.

Order:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”

The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817019-REL

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, heard on February 9, 2018. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, suggested essay topics for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the source document.

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source text.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and describe their respective roles.

2. What was the central accusation that Petitioner Jerry L. Webster made against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association?

3. Which specific article of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did Mr. Webster claim the HOA violated, and what key information did he allege was missing from the notices he received?

4. Beyond the content of the violation notices, what other complaints did Mr. Webster include in his petition regarding the HOA’s conduct?

5. According to the Mountain Rose CC&Rs, what is the specific definition of “Recording”?

6. What was the key piece of evidence that was absent from the hearing, which proved critical to the final decision?

7. What was the Mountain Rose HOA’s primary defense against Mr. Webster’s allegation that it had violated Article 10.8 of the CC&Rs?

8. In this type of administrative hearing, who holds the burden of proof, and what is the standard of proof required to win the case?

9. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson in this matter?

10. What recourse did the parties have after the judge issued the Order on February 9, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the association, and Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Webster filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, making him the accuser, while the HOA was the party responding to the allegations.

2. Mr. Webster’s central accusation was that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its own CC&Rs. He contended that the HOA engaged in prejudicial harassment by sending him a series of vague, unclear, and unwarranted violation notices over a period of more than 10 years.

3. Mr. Webster claimed the HOA violated Article 10.8, titled “Notice of Violation.” He alleged the notices he received failed to include several required subsections, including the legal description of the lot (ii), a brief description of the violation (iii), a statement that the notice was being Recorded (iv), and a statement of the specific steps needed to cure the violation (v).

4. Mr. Webster also complained that his numerous requests for clarification were ignored and that the HOA’s intent was harassment. He claimed he was fined $175 based on invalid notices and that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement, noting 22 other homes had trees touching dwellings without receiving similar notices or fines.

5. According to Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs, “Recording” is defined as placing an instrument of public record in the office of the County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona. “Recorded” means that the instrument has been placed on public record in that office.

6. The key piece of evidence absent from the hearing was any proof that the violation notices sent to Mr. Webster were ever recorded with the County Recorder of Maricopa County. The judge’s decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.”

7. The HOA’s primary defense was that the requirements of Article 10.8 only apply to recorded notices. Since the notices issued to Mr. Webster were never recorded, the HOA argued that the article’s specific formatting requirements were not applicable to their correspondence with him.

8. The burden of proof falls to the party asserting the claim, which in this case was the Petitioner, Mr. Webster. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

9. The final Order issued by the judge was that the Petitioner’s petition in the matter be dismissed. This means Mr. Webster’s case was unsuccessful.

10. After the Order was issued, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical answers. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument as presented in the petition. What was the critical legal misinterpretation regarding Article 10.8 that ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

2. Explain the direct relationship between Article 1.33 (“Recording”) and Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”). How did the specific definition in the former article completely undermine the petitioner’s entire claim, which was based on the latter?

3. Discuss the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Citing specific findings from the decision, explain exactly how the petitioner failed to meet this standard.

4. Mr. Webster raised several secondary issues in his petition, including allegations of long-term harassment, selective enforcement (“22 trees touch dwellings”), and ignored requests for clarification. Why were these claims ultimately not addressed or validated in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

5. Based on the text of Article 10.8, what is the specific function and legal purpose of a recorded Notice of Violation? Why might an HOA choose to go through the formal process of recording a notice rather than just sending an unrecorded letter to a homeowner?

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Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

An Arizona Revised Statute that permits a homeowner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of the party asserting a claim or right to prove their case. In this matter, the burden of proof fell to the Petitioner.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mountain Rose, which are the governing documents for the homeowners association.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which Mr. Webster filed his petition.

Notice of Violation (Article 10.8)

A written notice that the Association has the right to record. This article specifies that such a recorded notice must contain five key pieces of information, including the legal description of the lot and the specific steps to cure the violation. Its provisions apply specifically to notices that are formally recorded.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition. In this case, it was Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose HOA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that…is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Recording (Article 1.33)

The act of “placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona.” “Recorded” means having been so placed on public record.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, it was the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

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18F-H1817019-REL

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, addressing a dispute between Petitioner Jerry L. Webster and the Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Webster alleged that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its CC&Rs by issuing unclear and unwarranted violation notices, specifically regarding the trimming of his tree and cleaning debris, and he sought the refund of recent fines. The HOA contended that the notices were not recorded, making the specific requirements of Article 10.8—which applies to recorded notices—inapplicable to the general violation notices Mr. Webster received. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the notices in question were never officially recorded, leading to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

Audio Overview

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Quiz

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jerry L. Webster (petitioner)
Pamela Webster (witness)

Respondent Side

Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
Frank Puma (manager)
Mountain Rose

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Thomas J Stedronsky vs. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Posted on January 24, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817016-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-01-24
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.
Filing Fees Refunded	$1,000.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Thomas J Stedronsky	Counsel	—
Respondent	Copper Canyon Ranches POA	Counsel	John S. Perlman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section III (d) and (m)
CC&Rs Section VI (6.02, 6.03, 6.04, 6.05)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition entirely. The HOA did not violate CC&Rs regarding road maintenance or abuse its discretion in enforcement against Lot 77.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the Respondent violated its planned community documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent has maintained the roadway Sundance Lane properly

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated CC&Rs by failing to properly maintain Sundance Lane. Respondent countered that limited funds necessitated prioritizing roads for full-time residents, but Sundance Lane was accessible.

Orders: Complaint regarding road maintenance dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

CC&Rs Section III
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Whether Respondent has taken appropriate action against the owner of lot 77 in as much as that property allegedly resembles a junk yard

Petitioner alleged Lot 77 violated CC&Rs due to excessive storage and inoperable vehicles. Respondent showed it monitors the property, has written letters, and the owner has previously complied with HOA and County cleanup efforts.

Orders: Complaint regarding enforcement against Lot 77 dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

CC&Rs Section VI
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817016-REL Decision – 613995.pdf

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Briefing: Stedronsky v. Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817016-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas J. Stedronsky and Respondent Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to properly maintain a roadway, Sundance Lane, and by failing to take appropriate action against a neighboring property, Lot 77, which allegedly resembled a junkyard.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Diane Mihalsky, denied the petition in its entirety. The decision found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for both allegations. Regarding road maintenance, the ALJ concluded the POA acted within its reasonable discretion by prioritizing its limited funds ($35,000-$40,000 annually for 20 miles of roads) to maintain roadways used by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents. Despite the poor condition of the northern section of Sundance Lane, the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via a passenger car from the south.

Concerning Lot 77, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner did not establish a persistent violation of the CC&Rs. The evidence showed the POA had previously addressed complaints with the lot owner, who had been responsive. Furthermore, the alleged violations were largely located behind the required property buffer zone and were not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property without a telephoto lens. The decision suggests the Petitioner’s long-standing complaints were primarily motivated by his inability to sell his topographically challenging and undeveloped property.

Case Details

Case Information

Details

Case Number

18F-H1817016-REL

Petitioner

Thomas J. Stedronsky (Owner of Lot 76)

Respondent

Copper Canyon Ranches POA

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona

Presiding Judge

Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

January 10, 2018

Decision Date

January 24, 2018

Final Order

The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Core Issues

1. Whether the Respondent properly maintained the roadway Sundance Lane.
2. Whether the Respondent took appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations

Allegation 1: Improper Roadway Maintenance of Sundance Lane

The Petitioner alleged that the POA failed to maintain Sundance Lane in accordance with the CC&Rs, particularly the northern section providing access to his Lot 76.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photographs from September 2017 comparing well-maintained roads like Black Peak Parkway and Copper Hills Road with the poor condition of the northern portion of Sundance Lane near his property. These photos depicted the northern section as a “barely visible road running along the side of a steep hillside that is overgrown with vegetation and has a large number of large boulders.”

• Accessibility Issues: The Petitioner testified that in September 2017, he needed to rent a four-wheel drive truck to access his lot from the northeast via an unnamed road connecting to Sundance Lane.

• Plat Reference: The Petitioner submitted an undated and unsigned preliminary plat that stated “Roadbed 8” Native Gravel Fill Compacted to 95% Maximum Density,” but acknowledged this did not constitute an enforceable requirement for the POA.

• Admission of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that his lot was usually accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane, where it connects with Black Peak Parkway.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Road Characteristics: Mr. Wilson described Sundance Lane as an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.” He noted the northern part was rough but not impassable with four-wheel drive.

◦ Maintenance Schedule: The POA blades every roadway, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year. Sundance Lane was bladed in September 2017 and December 2017. More intensive dozer work is sometimes performed on the worst roads.

◦ Prioritization of Resources: The POA board prioritizes maintenance on roads needed by the approximately 35 full-time residents to access their parcels. With an annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000 to maintain 20 miles of roads, funds are used to better maintain the most traveled roadways.

◦ Financial Constraints: Blading all roads costs $15,000 to $20,000 per year. Paving all 20 miles would cost millions of dollars, requiring a prohibitive assessment of approximately $50,000 per parcel to raise just $1 million.

◦ Access Confirmation: Mr. Wilson testified that the resident of Lot 77 accesses his property from the south on Sundance Lane, and the Petitioner could access his lot from the south at any time. There are no residences that require access from the north side of Sundance Lane.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted photos from December 2017 and January 9, 2018, showing Sundance Lane graded, passable, and cleared of vegetation following maintenance.

• Section III (d): Grants the POA authority to “Grade and maintain the roadways as needed, provide for proper drainage of roadways, install culverts where necessary.”

• Section III (m): Requires the POA to “maintain, care for, and otherwise manage the roadways…in as good condition (deterioration loss by damage due to environmental occurrences which cannot be reasonabl[y] avoided or insured against excepted)[.]”

• Section III (b): Authorizes acts “necessary, in the reasonable discretion of the Members, for the betterment of the Property and for the general benefit and welfare of the owners.”

Allegation 2: Failure to Enforce CC&Rs against Lot 77

The Petitioner alleged the POA failed to take appropriate action against the owner of neighboring Lot 77, Jerry Hamlin, for violations including inoperable vehicles and junk, creating a nuisance.

• Photographic Evidence: The Petitioner submitted photos of Lot 77 taken in September 2017, many with a telephoto lens. These photos showed multiple vehicles (some with hoods up), a backhoe, a trailer, and vehicle parts. Notations on the photos claimed vehicles were inoperable and had been sitting for years, though this was not apparent from the images themselves.

• Potential for Nuisance: The Petitioner testified to his belief that vehicles might be leaking oil and other fluids, potentially polluting the groundwater. He acknowledged he had no direct proof as he was unwilling to trespass.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner acknowledged filing numerous complaints about Lot 77 with both the POA and Gila County over many years.

• Testimony of Joe Wilson (POA President):

◦ Enforcement Actions Taken: The POA has written letters to Mr. Hamlin in response to complaints, and Mr. Hamlin has removed vehicles and cleaned up the lot in the past.

◦ Owner’s Responsiveness: Mr. Hamlin has previously cooperated with the POA and Gila County. However, he expressed frustration with being “hassled” by the Petitioner’s continuing complaints after taking remedial action.

◦ Gila County Dismissal: A complaint filed by the Gila County Community Development Division against Mr. Hamlin was dismissed on November 6, 2013, after an inspector determined the property was “no longer in violation of Gila County Zoning Ordinances.”

◦ Condition of Vehicles: Mr. Hamlin stated to Mr. Wilson that all vehicles on the property were operable. Mr. Wilson noted that in rural areas, vehicle hoods are often left open to prevent vermin from nesting in the engine.

◦ Strategic Enforcement: The POA prefers not to take a “heavy hand” with Mr. Hamlin, as he is the “sort of man who would dig in his heels,” potentially leading to costly litigation that would deplete funds for road maintenance.

◦ Limited Enforcement Power: The POA’s primary enforcement mechanisms are writing letters and, after three failures to comply, liening the property.

• Photographic Evidence: The POA submitted recent photos showing the area was cleaner (a tire seen in the Petitioner’s photo had been removed) and that, from a distance without a telephoto lens, there were no apparent CC&R violations.

• 6.03 Storage: Allows up to 5% of a parcel for unenclosed storage, provided it is neat, orderly, and maintained at least 100 feet from the nearest property line.

• 6.04 Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment: Prohibits the repair or storage of more than one unregistered, inoperable motor vehicle within property boundaries.

• 6.05 Hazardous Materials and Nuisances: Prohibits storage of hazardous materials in a way that constitutes a fire hazard or nuisance.

Underlying Context: Petitioner’s Motivation and Property Challenges

The hearing evidence strongly suggests the Petitioner’s complaints were linked to his long-term inability to sell his unimproved 15-acre parcel, Lot 76.

• History of Complaints: The Petitioner sent numerous letters to the POA between 2012 and 2017, explicitly stating that the condition of Sundance Lane and the “junk on Lot 77” were preventing him from selling the property. A 2009 letter complained about the amount of the annual assessment due to his fixed income.

• POA’s Perspective: A September 27, 2017, letter from the POA to the Petitioner stated: “You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. … You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property.”

• Property Characteristics: The Petitioner’s Lot 76 is located at the top of a steep, rocky hill. The POA President testified that it would be “difficult to build” on the lot, as it has “no level place on which to construct a building pad” and would require a “significant amount of bulldozer work.”

• Development Plans: While the Petitioner stated he would like to build a house, he had never planned construction dates or performed a percolation test. His proposed building site was located as close as possible to Lot 77’s garage.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ denied the petition, finding the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Regarding Sundance Lane: The ALJ concluded that the POA did not abuse its discretion. Its decision to prioritize maintenance on roads used by full-time residents was deemed reasonable given its limited financial resources. The fact that Lot 76 remained accessible via passenger car from the southern end of Sundance Lane was a key factor.

• Regarding Lot 77: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other violations were more than a “transitory condition.” The decision notes that the POA monitors the lot and that the owner is “generally responsive.” Crucially, the ALJ found that the vehicles and storage on Lot 77 “occur behind the buffer zone and are not easily visible from Petitioner’s Lot 76 without binoculars or a telephoto lens.”

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817016-REL

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Stedronsky (Petitioner) vs. Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (Respondent). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions presented in the hearing.

Case Summary

The case involves a dispute between a property owner, Thomas J. Stedronsky, and the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA). Mr. Stedronsky, who owns the unimproved Lot 76, filed a petition alleging the POA violated its Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky, focused on two primary issues: whether the POA properly maintained a roadway known as Sundance Lane, and whether the POA took appropriate action against the owner of the adjacent Lot 77, which was alleged to resemble a junkyard. The Judge ultimately denied the Petitioner’s petition on both counts.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the two specific issues adjudicated at the January 10, 2018 hearing?

3. Describe the financial situation of the Copper Canyon Ranches POA as detailed in the hearing evidence.

4. What was the Petitioner’s specific complaint regarding the condition of Sundance Lane, and what evidence did he provide?

5. How did the Respondent, through its president Joe Wilson, defend its maintenance practices for Sundance Lane?

6. What were the Petitioner’s allegations against the owner of Lot 77, and what specific CC&R sections were potentially violated?

7. What actions had the Respondent and Gila County previously taken regarding complaints about Lot 77?

8. According to the legal conclusions, what is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did he succeed?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in its road maintenance practices?

10. On what grounds was the Petitioner’s complaint regarding Lot 77 dismissed?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Stedronsky, the “Petitioner,” and the Copper Canyon Ranches POA, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner owned Lot 76 in the development and filed the complaint, while the Respondent was the property owners’ association responsible for maintaining the community and enforcing its rules.

2. The two issues were: 1) Whether the Respondent had properly maintained the roadway known as Sundance Lane, and 2) Whether the Respondent had taken appropriate action against the owner of Lot 77, which the Petitioner alleged resembled a junkyard.

3. The POA receives between $35,000 and $40,000 annually from assessments of $250 per parcel. It costs the POA between $15,000 and $20,000 per year just to blade the 20 miles of roadways twice, with additional costs for culverts, backfill, and drainage ditches.

4. The Petitioner complained that the northern portion of Sundance Lane, which provides one access route to his Lot 76, was barely visible, overgrown, and required a four-wheel drive vehicle. He provided photographs taken in September 2017 showing this condition, contrasting them with photos of better-maintained roads in the development.

5. Joe Wilson testified that Sundance Lane is an old, steep mining road that is difficult to maintain perfectly. He stated that the POA blades every road, including Sundance Lane, at least twice a year and prioritizes maintenance on roads used by full-time residents due to limited funds. He also provided evidence that Lot 76 was always accessible from the southern portion of Sundance Lane.

6. The Petitioner alleged that Lot 77 was used for storage of inoperable vehicles and junk, resembling a junkyard. The relevant CC&Rs included Section 6.02 (Trash Removal), 6.03 (Storage), 6.04 (Inoperable Vehicles and Equipment), and 6.05 (Hazardous Materials and Nuisances).

7. In response to past complaints, the Respondent had written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, who subsequently removed vehicles. Gila County also pursued a code enforcement action against Mr. Hamlin, which was dismissed in November 2013 after the property was determined to no longer be in violation of county ordinances.

8. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden for either of his complaints.

9. The Judge concluded the Respondent did not abuse its discretion because it reasonably prioritized maintaining roads used by full-time residents given its limited financial resources. The decision noted that it would be an “absurdity” to expect perfect maintenance on all 20 miles of dirt roads and that the Petitioner’s lot remained accessible via the southern end of Sundance Lane.

10. The complaint was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to establish there was more than one inoperable vehicle on Lot 77 or that other issues were more than a transitory condition. The Judge found that the Respondent did monitor the lot, that the owner was generally responsive to requests, and that the items in question were behind the CC&R-required buffer zone and not easily visible from the Petitioner’s property.

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Essay Questions

Based on the source document, formulate a comprehensive response to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the concept of “reasonable discretion” as it applies to the Copper Canyon Ranches POA’s duties under the CC&Rs. How did the POA’s financial limitations and the physical characteristics of the development influence the Judge’s interpretation of this standard?

2. Evaluate the photographic evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the conditions of Sundance Lane and Lot 77. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s visual evidence, including the use of different lenses and the timing of the photographs.

3. Discuss the challenges of enforcing CC&Rs in a large, rural community like Copper Canyon Ranches. Using the dispute over Lot 77 as a case study, explain the enforcement mechanisms available to the POA and the strategic reasons a board might choose not to pursue enforcement with a “heavy hand.”

4. Examine the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Explain how this burden of proof was applied to both of the Petitioner’s claims and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the Judge to rule that the Petitioner had not met this standard.

5. Synthesize the evidence presented in the “Petitioner’s Efforts to Sell or Plans to Improve Lot 76” section. What does this evidence suggest about the Petitioner’s underlying motivations for filing the petition against the POA, and how did the Respondent use this history of complaints in its defense?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition within the Context of the Document

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to establish their claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Covenants, Easements, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Copper Canyon Ranches community, stating they should be construed to protect the value and attractiveness of the property. They outline the POA’s powers and members’ obligations.

Copper Canyon Ranches

A rural development north of Globe, Arizona, consisting of 194 large, multi-acre parcels. It is the planned community governed by the Respondent POA.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for petitions referred to it by other state bodies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition, Thomas J. Stedronsky. He is the owner of Lot 76 and a member of the Respondent association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed, the Copper Canyon Ranches Property Owners’ Association (POA).

Roadways

Defined in the CC&Rs as all roads and rights-of-way that the Association owns or is obligated to maintain within the development.

Use Restrictions

A section (Section VI) of the CC&Rs that outlines rules for property owners regarding trash removal, storage of items, inoperable vehicles, and hazardous materials.

We Read a 14-Page HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.

Introduction: The Dream of a Rural Escape Meets Reality

For many homeowners, a letter from their Homeowners Association (HOA) or Property Owners’ Association (POA) is a source of instant frustration. It often feels like a one-sided relationship governed by arbitrary rules. But what happens when a homeowner decides they’ve had enough and takes their association to court?

The story of Thomas Stedronsky offers a fascinating glimpse into this exact scenario. In 2003, he purchased a 15-acre unimproved lot in a rugged, rural Arizona development called Copper Canyon Ranches, likely dreaming of a quiet escape. Crucially, he never built on the property and does not reside there. Over the years, that dream soured, leading him to sue his Property Owners’ Association over a “barely visible” road and a neighbor’s property that he claimed resembled a “junkyard.” The official court decision reveals several surprising and counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner.

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1. Your HOA Doesn’t Have to Be Perfect, Just “Reasonable”

One of Mr. Stedronsky’s core complaints was that Sundance Lane, the road leading to his remote lot, was in terrible condition. His photos showed a path that was overgrown, rocky, and barely visible. Meanwhile, he argued, other main roads in the development were wide and well-maintained. His argument was clear: the POA was failing in its duty. But the POA’s defense was grounded in the harsh realities of the terrain. The president testified that Sundance Lane wasn’t just any road; it was an “old two-track mining road from the 1940’s or 1950’s that has never been engineered that is too steep to be a perfect road.”

This historical context was bolstered by financial reality. The POA operated on a limited annual budget of only $35,000 to $40,000, which had to cover the maintenance of 20 miles of roadways. The board president testified that they made a strategic decision to prioritize maintenance on the roads used daily by the community’s approximately 35 full-time residents.

Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of the POA. The court found that the association did not abuse its discretion. Prioritizing road maintenance based on usage and a limited budget was deemed a reasonable action. The key takeaway for homeowners is powerful: an HOA isn’t legally obligated to maintain every amenity to the same perfect standard, especially when faced with financial constraints. Their actions only need to be “reasonable.”

2. The “Rural Reality” Can Override Suburban Rules

Mr. Stedronsky’s second major complaint centered on his neighbor’s property, Lot 77, which he alleged was a junkyard filled with inoperable vehicles and clutter, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). To prove his point, he submitted photographic evidence taken with a telephoto lens. However, the credibility of his evidence was undermined when the court noted he had added his own notations to the photos—such as “All vehicles have been sitting for years”—which “were not apparent in the photograph.”

More importantly, the judge’s perspective was heavily influenced by the setting. In its final conclusion, the court officially determined that because Copper Canyon Ranches consists of large parcels in a remote area, “The CC&Rs also contemplate that parcel owners will have vehicles and other stored items on their parcels, as is common in remote rural areas.”

This point was brought to life by the colorful testimony of the POA president, Mr. Wilson. He explained that in rural areas, it’s common practice to leave vehicle hoods open. Why? To prevent mice and rats from nesting inside the engines. What looks like a clear violation in a manicured suburb is often standard, practical procedure in a rural development. This case shows that homeowner expectations—and an HOA’s enforcement standards—must adapt to the local context and culture.

3. Sometimes, an HOA’s Best Move IsNotto Enforce a Rule

Behind every HOA violation notice is a decision-making process, and this case pulls back the curtain on the strategic thinking involved. The POA president testified that they had, in fact, written letters to the owner of Lot 77, Mr. Hamlin, in the past and that he was “generally responsive.” However, they were hesitant to take a “heavy hand” with him, characterizing him as “the sort of man who would dig in his heels.”

The president’s testimony reveals a fascinating look into the pragmatic balancing act an HOA board must perform. He explained the board’s strategic calculation:

If Mr. Hamlin is pushed beyond the point where Lot 77 needs to be in compliance with the zoning code and CC&Rs, he will resist and Respondent will incur litigation costs that will decrease the amount of money available for road maintenance.

This is a crucial lesson in community governance. The board made a calculated decision that avoiding a costly and protracted legal battle with one resident was more beneficial for the community as a whole than strictly enforcing every rule to the letter. It was a choice between pursuing a single violation and preserving the limited funds needed for essential services for everyone.

4. An Unsellable Property Can Fuel a Losing Battle

While the lawsuit focused on roads and junkyards, the court documents reveal a deeper, underlying motivation. Mr. Stedronsky’s complaints were not new; they started as far back as 2009 and were often linked in his letters to his “inability to sell his property.” His frustration was made more tangible by the fact that he had informed the POA in 2013 that the lot was under contract for sale, a deal that apparently fell through.

From the POA’s perspective, the problem wasn’t the road or the neighbor—it was the lot itself. The board president described Lot 76 as “undesirable” because it was steep, rocky, and would require a significant amount of bulldozer work just to create a level place to build.

After years of complaints, the POA president sent a blunt and revealing letter to Mr. Stedronsky that was included as evidence in the case:

“You have been complaining to the POA since 2009 about your inability to sell your property. Many properties have been unable to sell due to Rural Rugged area. You sir are the only one blaming the POA and your neighbors for your inability to sell an undesirable property. The POA has done its due diligence in this matter. Please cease complaints to the POA on this matter.”

While Mr. Stedronsky’s frustration was evident, the judge ultimately found that he failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. The case was dismissed. This serves as a powerful reminder that feeling wronged, even for years, is not enough to win a legal dispute.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Pragmatism

The case of Lot 76 is a powerful story about the gap between homeowner expectations and the messy, pragmatic reality of community governance. It demonstrates that an association’s decisions are often a complex calculation involving limited budgets, local norms, and strategic risk management.

It reminds us that boards are not faceless corporations but groups of neighbors tasked with making difficult choices for the collective good. The next time you disagree with your HOA, will you see them as an adversary, or as a group of neighbors managing limited resources with “reasonable discretion”?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Thomas J Stedronsky (petitioner)
Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

John S. Perlman (attorney)
Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Joe Wilson (board president, witness)
Copper Canyon Ranches POA
Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of the decision

Other Participants

Jerry Hamlin (property owner)
Lot 77
Subject of CC&R enforcement action
Helen Hamlin (property owner)
Lot 77
Named in Gila County enforcement action related to Lot 77

Richard Long vs. Pebble Creek Resort Community

Posted on September 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717037-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-09-06
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof demonstrating the HOA violated community documents by refusing the requested block wall. The wall was prohibited by CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines because it was planned for just inside the property line and excluded the adjacent owner from use, potentially leading to prohibited parallel walls.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Richard Long	Counsel	—
Respondent	Pebble Creek Resort Community	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01; CC&Rs § 1(Hh), 2(P)(i); ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof demonstrating the HOA violated community documents by refusing the requested block wall. The wall was prohibited by CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines because it was planned for just inside the property line and excluded the adjacent owner from use, potentially leading to prohibited parallel walls.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusal to approve construction of a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall for privacy

Petitioner sought approval for a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall for privacy, built a foot or so inside his property line, designed to prevent adjacent neighbors (the Rohlmans) from using it. Respondent denied the wall based on community documents restricting such constructions to avoid parallel walls and requiring party walls to be on or immediately adjacent to the property line, granting contiguous owners the right to use them.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
CC&R § 1(Hh)
CC&R § 2(P)(i)
ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Block Wall, Privacy Wall, CC&Rs, ALC Guidelines, Party Wall

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
CC&R § 1(Hh)
CC&R § 2(P)(i)
ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 586501.pdf

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17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 588547.pdf

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17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 586501.pdf

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17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 588547.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:45 (1013.5 KB)

Briefing: Case No. 17F-H1717037-REL, Long v. Pebble Creek Resort Community

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing and final decision concerning a dispute between homeowner Richard Long (“Petitioner”) and the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request to build a 10-foot long, 6-foot high block privacy wall approximately one foot inside his property line, which the Respondent’s Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC) denied.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent’s governing documents—specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and ALC Guidelines—unequivocally prohibit the proposed wall. The ALJ concluded that a wall built so close to a property line is defined as a “Party Wall,” which must be constructed “on or immediately adjacent to” the boundary and be usable by both property owners. The Petitioner’s proposal violated these foundational rules by being set back from the property line with the explicit intent of preventing neighbor access and use.

The Respondent had offered a conditional variance for a wall to be built directly on the property line, but this required a mutual “Party Wall/Fence Agreement” with the adjacent neighbor, who refused to sign, citing concerns over property value and the legal complexity of a perpetual easement. The final ruling affirmed the Respondent’s authority to enforce its governing documents as written.

Case Overview

The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by the Petitioner with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA had violated its own governing documents by refusing to approve his proposed wall.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Richard Long, Petitioner, v. Pebble Creek Resort Community, Respondent

Case Number

No. 17F-H1717037-REL / HO 17-17/037

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Petitioner

Richard Long (Appeared on his own behalf)

Respondent

Pebble Creek Resort Community (Represented by Jack Sarsam, SVP for Robson Communities)

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Real Estate Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

August 30, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

September 6, 2017

Final Order Date

September 14, 2017

Core Dispute and Party Positions

Petitioner’s Proposal and Argument (Richard Long)

• Project: A 10-foot long, 6-foot high block wall intended to provide privacy between his patio and the patio of his adjacent neighbors, the Rohlmans.

• Proposed Location: “A foot or so inside his side of the property line.”

• Stated Intent: To construct a wall to which his neighbors could not attach or otherwise use. The Petitioner testified that if the Rohlmans later wanted their own wall (e.g., for a pool or pet), they could build a separate, parallel wall on their property.

• Rejection of Alternatives: The Petitioner acknowledged that the ALC would approve a “privacy panel wall” made of alumawood or lattice, but he rejected this option, deeming it “unsightly and flimsy.”

• Core Claim: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines did not explicitly prohibit the construction of his proposed block wall at its intended location inside his property line.

Respondent’s Position and Actions (Pebble Creek HOA)

• Initial Action: The ALC denied the Petitioner’s request.

• Rationale for Denial: The Respondent explained that walls near lot lines can become problematic, particularly if they result in “two parallel walls.” This situation can create a narrow, inaccessible space between the walls that is difficult to maintain and “becomes filled with refuse, leaves, insects, nests and rodents.”

• Conditional Variance: On May 1, 2017, the Respondent offered to approve a variance with several key conditions:

1. The wall must be constructed directly on the property line.

2. Both the Petitioner and the Rohlmans must sign a written “Party Wall/Fence Agreement” (Form ALC 48).

3. This agreement must grant current and future owners permission to “extend/complete the wall” and must be disclosed upon the sale of either home.

4. The signed agreement would be kept in the ALC files for both properties.

Neighbor’s Position (The Rohlmans)

• The Rohlmans declined to sign the Party Wall/Fence Agreement proposed by the Respondent.

• In an email submitted as evidence, they outlined their reasons for refusal:

◦ Property Value: They believed a wall on the property line would negatively affect the “current and future value” of both properties.

◦ Legal Complexity: The agreement would require granting a perpetual easement, which they identified as a legal document entailing legal expenses.

◦ Disclosure upon Sale: The easement would have to be disclosed to future buyers, which they argued “lowers the value of the property.”

◦ Future Construction: A wall on the property line could be extended by either party or future owners “without the agreement of the other party.”

◦ They concluded that “All of these requirements are onerous.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The ALJ’s decision rested on a direct interpretation of four key sections of the community’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

• CC&R § 1(Hh) – Definition of “Party Walls”

◦ This section defines a party wall as: “a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of Lots, Parcels, Common Areas or other areas in PebbleCreek Golf Resort.”

◦ The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s proposal for a wall “a foot or so inside” the property line did not meet this definition.

• CC&R § 2(P)(i) – Use of Party Walls

◦ This rule states: “Each Owner shall have the right to use the Party Wall, provided that such use does not interfere with the other Owner’s use and enjoyment thereof.”

◦ This directly contradicted the Petitioner’s goal of building a wall that his neighbors would be prohibited from using.

• ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) – Parallel Walls

◦ This guideline explicitly states: “An existing party wall along a joint property line precludes any adjacent parallel party wall, i.e. Two walls cannot be built side by side.”

◦ The Petitioner’s own testimony acknowledged the possibility of his neighbor building a parallel wall in the future, a scenario the guidelines are designed to prevent.

• ALC Guideline JJ – “Privacy Panel Wall”

◦ This section details the pre-approved alternative for privacy screening. Such a wall must be:

▪ Free-standing alumawood.

▪ Six feet in height and no more than sixteen feet in length.

▪ Located “at least three (3) feet from the property line.”

◦ This demonstrates a clear distinction in the rules between a shared “Party Wall” near the boundary and a private “Privacy Panel” set significantly back from it.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ, Diane Mihalsky, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated its governing documents.

• Key Findings of Law:

1. A block wall built “a foot inside the property line” does not conform to CC&R § 1(Hh), which requires a party wall to be “on or immediately adjacent to” the boundary.

2. The Petitioner’s intent to deny his neighbor the use of the wall violates CC&R § 2(P)(i), which grants both owners rights to use a party wall.

3. The Petitioner’s proposal creates the potential for prohibited parallel walls, violating ALC Guideline SS(4)(a).

• Conclusion: The ALJ stated that the community’s documents “unequivocally prohibit Respondent from building a 6’ high, 10’ long block wall a foot from his property line that the Rohlmans are not permitted to use.”

• Recommended Order: On September 6, 2017, the ALJ issued a recommended order that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Final Order and Subsequent Actions

• Adoption of Decision: On September 14, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

• Effect of Order: The denial of the petition became final, binding, and effective immediately.

• Conditions for Rehearing: The Final Order stipulated that a rehearing could be granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04, but only for one of the following reasons:

1. Irregularity in proceedings or abuse of discretion by the ALJ.

2. Misconduct by the Department, ALJ, or prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise that could not have been prevented.

4. Newly discovered material evidence.

5. Excessive or insufficient penalties.

6. Error in the admission or rejection of evidence.

7. The decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

8. The findings of fact are not supported by the evidence or are contrary to law.

• Judicial Review: The order is subject to judicial review through the filing of a complaint pursuant to state law.

Study Guide: Long v. Pebble Creek Resort Community (Case No. 17F-H1717037-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision concerning a dispute between homeowner Richard Long and the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association. It covers the facts of the case, the arguments presented, the relevant community rules, and the final legal outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific structure that the Petitioner, Richard Long, proposed to build, and what was its intended purpose?

2. On what grounds did the Respondent, Pebble Creek Resort Community, justify its restrictions against the type of wall the Petitioner proposed?

3. What conditional variance did the Respondent offer to the Petitioner on May 1, 2017?

4. What were the primary concerns expressed by the Petitioner’s neighbors, the Rohlmans, which led them to decline the proposed wall agreement?

5. According to ALC Guideline JJ, what alternative structure could the Petitioner have built for privacy, and what were its key requirements?

6. How do the CC&Rs define a “Party Wall,” and what right does CC&R § 2(P)(i) grant to contiguous property owners regarding such a wall?

7. What rule from the ALC Guidelines prohibits the construction of two parallel walls side-by-side, and why is this rule in place?

8. What is the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the hearing decision?

9. Who held the burden of proof to establish that the homeowners’ association violated its governing documents?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the case after the Administrative Law Judge’s decision was reviewed?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner proposed to build a 10-foot long, 6-foot high block wall for privacy between his patio and his neighbor’s patio. The wall was to be located a foot or so inside his side of the property line, so his neighbors could not attach to it.

2. The Respondent explained that walls built near, but not on, the property line can lead to problems. This can result in two parallel walls being built, creating an unmaintainable space between them that collects refuse, leaves, insects, nests, and rodents.

3. The Respondent approved a variance on the condition that the wall be built on the property line. Both the Petitioner and his neighbors (the Rohlmans) had to agree in writing that current or future owners could extend the wall, with this agreement being disclosed upon sale of either house.

4. The Rohlmans declined because they believed a wall on the property line would negatively affect their property’s value. They were also concerned about the legal expense and perpetual nature of an easement, and the possibility that future owners could lengthen the wall without consent.

5. ALC Guideline JJ permits a “privacy panel wall,” which is a free-standing alumawood wall. This wall must be 6 feet high, no longer than 16 feet, and located at least 3 feet from the property line. The Petitioner rejected this option, feeling it was “unsightly and flimsy.”

6. CC&R § 1(Hh) defines a “Party Wall” as a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of lots. CC&R § 2(P)(i) states that each owner of a contiguous property has the right to use the Party Wall, provided it does not interfere with the other owner’s use.

7. ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) states that an existing party wall along a joint property line “precludes any adjacent parallel party wall.” This rule is in place to prevent the negative situation described by the Respondent where a difficult-to-maintain space is created between two walls.

8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is also described as “the greater weight of the evidence” that is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue over the other.

9. The Petitioner, Richard Long, bore the burden of proof. He had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

10. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Petitioner’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, becoming a Final Order. The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-style response. Use the case documents to formulate a comprehensive answer supported by specific facts and citations to the community’s governing documents.

1. Analyze the conflict between the Petitioner’s desire for a specific type of privacy structure and the Respondent’s interpretation of the community’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines. How did the governing documents prioritize community standards and potential future problems over an individual homeowner’s preference?

2. Discuss the role and reasoning of the Petitioner’s neighbors, the Rohlmans. Evaluate their concerns regarding property value, easements, and future modifications as presented in their email, and explain how their refusal to sign the agreement was a critical factor in the dispute.

3. Explain the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky to reach her decision. Detail which specific sections of the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines were most influential and how she applied them to unequivocally deny the Petitioner’s request.

4. Compare and contrast the two types of structures discussed for ensuring privacy: the block wall proposed by the Petitioner and the “privacy panel wall” permitted by ALC Guideline JJ. What are the key differences in their material, specifications, placement, and the implications of those differences within the community’s rules?

5. Trace the procedural path of this dispute, from the initial petition to the Final Order. Describe the distinct roles and authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC), the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes decisions on disputes. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC)

The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and approving or denying proposed changes to properties, such as walls and fences, based on the community’s guidelines.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the community documents.

Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

The Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that creates and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association was the Respondent.

Party Wall

As defined in CC&R § 1(Hh), “a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of Lots, Parcels, Common Areas or other areas in PebbleCreek Golf Resort.” CC&R § 2(P)(i) grants each owner the right to use the Party Wall.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner Richard Long.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and “[t]he greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association.

Why Your HOA Can Control a Wall Built Entirely on Your Property

Introduction: The Privacy Paradox

Imagine you want a bit more privacy from your next-door neighbor. The solution seems simple: build a wall. To avoid any disputes, you decide to build it entirely on your land, a good foot inside your property line. It’s your property, your wall, your right. But what if your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) tells you that you can’t? This is not a hypothetical scenario; it’s precisely what happened to homeowner Richard Long when he tried to build a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall.

Mr. Long proposed building the wall just one foot inside his property line, believing this would make it a private structure, free from the shared-property rules that often complicate neighborly relations. The HOA denied his request, sparking a legal dispute. The outcome of this case provides surprising and counter-intuitive lessons that every homeowner in a planned community should understand about property rights, community rules, and the hidden logic that governs them.

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1. The Hidden Logic: Preventing the “Rodent Run”

At first glance, the HOA’s rule might seem like arbitrary overreach. Why should they care if a wall is on the property line or one foot away from it? The answer reveals a practical, long-term logic designed to prevent a specific, unpleasant problem: two parallel walls built side-by-side.

The HOA’s governing documents were written to avoid a scenario where a small, unmaintainable gap is created between two separate walls on adjacent properties. If Mr. Long built his wall a foot inside his line, and his neighbor later decided to do the same, a narrow dead space would be created between the homes. In its official written answer, the HOA vividly described the issue this creates:

This is not a good situation in that there often isn’t room between the walls to properly maintain either wall, and the area in between the two walls becomes filled with refuse, leaves, insects, nests and rodents.

This reveals a core principle of planned community management: rules are often designed not to restrict current owners, but to mitigate future risks and liabilities for the entire community. This preventative governance aims to protect the community from future blight, sanitation issues, and pest infestations.

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2. The “Immediately Adjacent” Rule: Your Property Isn’t an Island

The homeowner’s central argument was that by building the wall a foot inside his property, it was his private wall, not a shared “party wall” subject to joint rules. It was a clever attempt to circumvent the regulations, but it failed because of the precise wording in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Here, the dispute hinged on two seemingly innocuous words. The community’s CC&Rs define a “Party Wall” as a wall constructed “on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary.” The Administrative Law Judge interpreted a wall built only a foot away as falling under the definition of “immediately adjacent.” This single phrase effectively negated the homeowner’s entire strategy.

The judge’s determination that the wall qualified as “immediately adjacent” was critical. By legally defining it as a Party Wall, another rule from the CC&Rs automatically kicked in: the adjoining neighbor’s explicit right to use it. This completely undermined the homeowner’s central goal of creating a purely private structure.

As if that weren’t definitive enough, another, even more explicit rule served as the final nail in the coffin. ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) states: “An existing party wall along a joint property line precludes any adjacent parallel party wall, i.e. Two walls cannot be built side by side.” This rule directly forbids the exact “rodent run” scenario, showing that the governing documents had multiple, overlapping prohibitions against his plan.

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3. The Neighbor’s Veto: It’s a Three-Party Problem

In an attempt to find a middle ground, the HOA offered a potential compromise. They would approve the wall, but only if it were built directly on the property line and if both Mr. Long and his neighbors, the Rohlmans, signed a formal “Party Wall/Fence Agreement.” This solution, however, revealed another layer of complexity. The neighbors refused to sign.

The Rohlmans explained their reasoning in an email, highlighting concerns that went beyond simple aesthetics. They worried about the financial and legal implications of a shared wall on the property line.

[We] declined to have a wall built on the property line between our homes because it affects the current and future value of our property – and yours. Furthermore, each of us would have to grant the other an easement in perpetuity, which is a legal document… Upon the sale of our home, we would have to inform the purchaser of the easement, which lowers the value of the property.

This demonstrates a common blind spot for homeowners: disputes are rarely bilateral. The rights and financial interests of adjacent property owners create a complex, multi-party dynamic. More often than not, an HOA dispute is a three-party negotiation, and a neighbor’s consent—or lack thereof—can be the deciding factor.

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Conclusion: The Rules You Don’t Know Can Hurt You

The final outcome was decisive. The Administrative Law Judge upheld the HOA’s decision, and the homeowner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the community’s governing documents “unequivocally prohibit” the proposed wall. However, this was not a total denial of privacy. Mr. Long did have an approved option: a free-standing “alumawood” privacy panel, provided it was located three feet from the property line. He rejected this alternative because he felt it was “unsightly and flimsy.”

This case serves as a powerful reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts. The conflict was ultimately not between a homeowner’s right to privacy and the HOA, but between the homeowner’s specific aesthetic preference and the community’s established architectural standards. What you can do on your own land is deeply intertwined with the collective rules you agreed to when you purchased your home.

Before your next home improvement project, does your plan align not just with your vision, but also with the shared vision encoded in your community’s rules?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard Long (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf
Petitioner's wife (interested party)
Required, along with Petitioner, to agree in writing to the wall conditions for variance approval (Unit 39 Lot 12)

Respondent Side

Jack Sarsam (executive/witness)
Robson Communities
Senior Vice President for Robson Communities, overseeing Respondent's operations; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Administrative Law Judge who issued the decision
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner who adopted the ALJ decision in the Final Order
Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
Contact for rehearing requests; listed as HOA Coordinator

Other Participants

The Rohlmans (neighbor/interested party)
Adjacent neighbors (Unit 39 lot 11) whose refusal to sign the party wall agreement was central to the dispute

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on July 15, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717032-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	William M. Brown	Counsel	—
Respondent	Terravita Country Club, Inc.	Counsel	Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

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17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

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Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?

2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?

3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?

4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?

7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?

8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”

9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?

10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?

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Answer Key

1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.

4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.

6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.

9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.

10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”

2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.

4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?

5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.

Recommended Order

The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.

Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.

Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?

One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.

The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute

This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.

Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records

At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.

The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.

Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd

The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”

This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:

Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).

Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”

Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences

This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.

• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.

• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”

• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.

The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.

After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

William M. Brown (petitioner)
Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

Joshua Bolen (attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
Arizona Department of Real Estate