Tag Archives: CC&R Interpretation

Jennifer J Sullivan v. The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association,

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-08-08
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition, finding that the HOA's CC&Rs (Section 4.1) prohibited nonresidential use, including short-term renting (deemed a business by the tribunal), unless the lot was rented or leased for month-to-month or longer terms. Therefore, rentals shorter than a month were prohibited.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jennifer J Sullivan Counsel —
Respondent The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Michael S. McLeran

Alleged Violations

Article 4, Section 4.1 of the Community’s CC&Rs; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition, finding that the HOA's CC&Rs (Section 4.1) prohibited nonresidential use, including short-term renting (deemed a business by the tribunal), unless the lot was rented or leased for month-to-month or longer terms. Therefore, rentals shorter than a month were prohibited.

Why this result: The tribunal determined the Petitioner failed to meet her burden, as her short-term rental operation constituted a prohibited nonresidential use/business under Section 4.1 of the CC&Rs, which only permits leasing for Month to Month or Longer Terms.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenging HOA Violation Notice for Short-Term Rental Restriction

Petitioner challenged the Courtesy Violation Notice issued by the HOA for operating a short-term rental (Airbnb) with a minimum rental period less than month-to-month, arguing the CC&Rs did not explicitly prohibit such rentals. The HOA maintained that Section 4.1 prohibited nonresidential use, unless leased for month-to-month or longer terms, thereby prohibiting short-term rentals/business use.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition was denied. Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • PAL versus Washburn 211 Arizona 553 2006
  • Burke versus Voiceream Wireless Corporation 2 2007 Arizona 393 quarter of appeal 2004
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02, and 41-1092

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, short-term rental, CC&R interpretation, business use, 30-day minimum
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • PAL versus Washburn 211 Arizona 553 2006
  • Burke versus Voiceream Wireless Corporation 2 2007 Arizona 393 quarter of appeal 2004
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02, and 41-1092

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1050430.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:07:40 (47.3 KB)

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1081482.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:07:50 (59.0 KB)

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1081483.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:08:00 (117.7 KB)

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1050430.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:20 (47.3 KB)

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1081482.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:23 (59.0 KB)

23F-H043-REL Decision – 1081483.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:27 (117.7 KB)

Case Summary: Jennifer J. Sullivan vs. The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.

This matter (No. 23F-H043-REL) was a contested case before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), heard on July 24, 2023, by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Adam D. Stone. Petitioner Jennifer J. Sullivan, a homeowner in The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent), challenged a violation notice she received for operating a short-term rental (Airbnb).

Key Facts and Background

Petitioner Sullivan had owned her townhome since 2006 and began renting it on a short-term basis (minimum 3 days) through Airbnb in September 2021. She testified that she had registered for a Transaction Privilege Tax number and was pursuing a license under new city rules, acknowledging that the rental was a business. The Association issued a Courtesy Violation Notice on November 22, 2022, citing a violation of Article 4, Section 4.1 of the community's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) due to the short-term rental operation.

Main Issues and Arguments

The core legal issue centered on the interpretation of CC&R Section 4.1, titled "Residential Use":

> "All Lots shall be used, improved and devoted exclusively to Single family Residential Use. No gainful occupation, profession, trade or other nonresidential use shall be conducted on any Lot. This Section shall not preclude the Residential Leasing or Renting of a Lot for Month to Month or Longer Terms".

  1. Petitioner's Argument: Sullivan contended that the CC&Rs do not contain an explicit minimum rental period, and therefore, rentals shorter than 30 days are permissible. She argued that Arizona law (ARS 33-1806.01) requires HOAs to list a minimum rental period if they intend to restrict short-term leasing, which the Elk Run CC&Rs failed to do. She asserted that renting a home is considered a residential use.
  1. Respondent's Argument: The Association, represented by Michael McLeran, argued that Section 4.1 must be read in its entirety to uphold the community's character. They asserted that operating a short-term rental for profit (as evidenced by Petitioner's tax licensing) constitutes a "gainful occupation, profession, trade or other nonresidential use," which is prohibited. The final sentence of Section 4.1 allowing "Month to Month or Longer Terms" clarifies the *only* exception where renting for profit is permitted, thereby implicitly prohibiting shorter-term rentals. Testimony from the original CC&R signatory, John Vail, supported the intent for a minimum 30-day rental period.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The ALJ issued a Decision on August 8, 2023, denying the Petitioner's petition.

The ALJ found that Petitioner Sullivan failed to meet her burden of proving that the Association violated relevant statutes or documents. The tribunal concluded that Sullivan was "clearly running a business out of the home".

The ALJ adopted the Respondent's interpretation of Section 4.1: nonresidential use (i.e., operating a rental business for gainful occupation) is *only* permitted if the lots are rented or leased for month to month or longer terms. Thus, the ALJ ruled that, as currently written, any renting or leasing shorter than a month was prohibited.

The Petitioner's request for reimbursement of her $500 filing fee was also denied.

Questions

Question

If my CC&Rs allow leasing for 'month to month or longer terms', does that automatically prohibit short-term rentals like Airbnb?

Short Answer

Yes. The tribunal interprets 'month to month or longer' as an exclusive permission, meaning any rental term shorter than a month is prohibited.

Detailed Answer

Even if the CC&Rs do not explicitly state 'no short-term rentals', a clause permitting 'month to month or longer' terms generally implies that shorter terms are not permitted under the restrictions against non-residential use.

Alj Quote

Rather the tribunal reads the section to mean that nonresidential use is only permitted if the lots were rented or leased for month to month or longer terms. … Thus, as currently written, any renting or leasing shorted than a month was prohibited.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation / CC&R Section 4.1

Topic Tags

  • short-term rentals
  • CC&R interpretation
  • Airbnb

Question

Can listing a home on Airbnb be legally considered 'running a business' or 'non-residential use'?

Short Answer

Yes. Applying for a business license and remitting transaction privilege taxes can establish that a homeowner is conducting a business from the home.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that applying for a municipal business license and paying transaction taxes (which are typical for rentals) demonstrated that the homeowner was using the property for a gainful occupation or business, rather than simple residential use.

Alj Quote

Petitioner was clearly running a business out of the home, as she has applied for a business license with Flagstaff, and was remitting Transaction Privilege Tax.

Legal Basis

Finding of Fact 6 / Conclusion of Law 6

Topic Tags

  • business use
  • taxes
  • commercial activity

Question

Does an HOA have to explicitly use the phrase 'no short-term rentals' in the CC&Rs to ban them?

Short Answer

No. The absence of a specific exclusion for short-term rentals does not mean they are permitted if other language restricts leasing terms.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the argument that short-term rentals were allowed simply because the CC&Rs didn't explicitly name and ban them. The restrictions on non-residential use and specific permissions for monthly rentals were sufficient to create the ban.

Alj Quote

Further, tribunal was not convinced that simply because it does not mention the exclusion for short-term rentals that the same was permitted.

Legal Basis

Conclusion of Law 6

Topic Tags

  • CC&R interpretation
  • implicit restrictions
  • rental rules

Question

Who has to prove their case in a hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

When a homeowner petitions for a hearing alleging the HOA violated statutes or documents, it is the homeowner's responsibility to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(D).

Legal Basis

Conclusion of Law 3

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

If I lose my hearing against the HOA, will I get my $500 filing fee reimbursed?

Short Answer

No. Reimbursement is typically denied if the petition is denied.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the Respondent (HOA) was not required to reimburse the filing fee paid by the homeowner.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

Order / ARS § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • costs

Case

Docket No
23F-H043-REL
Case Title
Jennifer J Sullivan vs The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-08-08
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If my CC&Rs allow leasing for 'month to month or longer terms', does that automatically prohibit short-term rentals like Airbnb?

Short Answer

Yes. The tribunal interprets 'month to month or longer' as an exclusive permission, meaning any rental term shorter than a month is prohibited.

Detailed Answer

Even if the CC&Rs do not explicitly state 'no short-term rentals', a clause permitting 'month to month or longer' terms generally implies that shorter terms are not permitted under the restrictions against non-residential use.

Alj Quote

Rather the tribunal reads the section to mean that nonresidential use is only permitted if the lots were rented or leased for month to month or longer terms. … Thus, as currently written, any renting or leasing shorted than a month was prohibited.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation / CC&R Section 4.1

Topic Tags

  • short-term rentals
  • CC&R interpretation
  • Airbnb

Question

Can listing a home on Airbnb be legally considered 'running a business' or 'non-residential use'?

Short Answer

Yes. Applying for a business license and remitting transaction privilege taxes can establish that a homeowner is conducting a business from the home.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that applying for a municipal business license and paying transaction taxes (which are typical for rentals) demonstrated that the homeowner was using the property for a gainful occupation or business, rather than simple residential use.

Alj Quote

Petitioner was clearly running a business out of the home, as she has applied for a business license with Flagstaff, and was remitting Transaction Privilege Tax.

Legal Basis

Finding of Fact 6 / Conclusion of Law 6

Topic Tags

  • business use
  • taxes
  • commercial activity

Question

Does an HOA have to explicitly use the phrase 'no short-term rentals' in the CC&Rs to ban them?

Short Answer

No. The absence of a specific exclusion for short-term rentals does not mean they are permitted if other language restricts leasing terms.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the argument that short-term rentals were allowed simply because the CC&Rs didn't explicitly name and ban them. The restrictions on non-residential use and specific permissions for monthly rentals were sufficient to create the ban.

Alj Quote

Further, tribunal was not convinced that simply because it does not mention the exclusion for short-term rentals that the same was permitted.

Legal Basis

Conclusion of Law 6

Topic Tags

  • CC&R interpretation
  • implicit restrictions
  • rental rules

Question

Who has to prove their case in a hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

When a homeowner petitions for a hearing alleging the HOA violated statutes or documents, it is the homeowner's responsibility to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(D).

Legal Basis

Conclusion of Law 3

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

If I lose my hearing against the HOA, will I get my $500 filing fee reimbursed?

Short Answer

No. Reimbursement is typically denied if the petition is denied.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the Respondent (HOA) was not required to reimburse the filing fee paid by the homeowner.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

Order / ARS § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • costs

Case

Docket No
23F-H043-REL
Case Title
Jennifer J Sullivan vs The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2023-08-08
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jennifer J Sullivan (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • David Sheffield (petitioner attorney)
    Provided legal opinion to Petitioner in 2020

Respondent Side

  • Michael S. McLeran (HOA attorney)
    Childers Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Teresa Bale (board member)
    The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board President; Witness for Respondent
  • John R. Bale (developer/witness)
    The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Original developer who drafted/signed CC&Rs; Witness for Respondent
  • Jason Miller (attorney)
    Provided opinion letter regarding CC&Rs to the Board
  • Beth Moly (attorney)
    Issued formal opinion letter regarding Section 4.1
  • Melanie Lashley (property manager)
    Homeco Rent
    Contacted by Petitioner regarding rental rules
  • Betsy Snow (board member)
    The Village at Elk Run Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Won board election against Petitioner

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • labril (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Lisa Kittredge v. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-06-13
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by allocating funds from the HOA Contingency funding stream (general assessments) for drainage issues benefitting the SunBird Golf Club, as the 2015 CC&Rs, as amended in 2021, restricted such expenditures exclusively to funds collected under Section 6.7(C).
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lisa Kittredge Counsel —
Respondent SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Counsel Lori N Brown

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by allocating funds from the HOA Contingency funding stream (general assessments) for drainage issues benefitting the SunBird Golf Club, as the 2015 CC&Rs, as amended in 2021, restricted such expenditures exclusively to funds collected under Section 6.7(C).

Key Issues & Findings

Expenditure of HOA Contingency Funds for Golf Course Drainage Maintenance

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly used annual assessments (Contingency Fund) to pay $15,968 (capped at $20,000) for cleaning drainage wells on the privately owned SunBird Golf Club property. The ALJ concluded that under the 2015 CC&Rs, as amended in 2021, the HOA was only permitted to expend funds collected specifically pursuant to Section 6.7(C) (Capital Improvement Assessment for Golf Course) for golf course drainage issues, and therefore, using the Contingency fund violated the governing documents.

Orders: Respondent must reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds and henceforth comply with the provisions of the governing documents.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions Section 6.3(A) (2015)
  • 2021 Amendment to 2015 CC&Rs
  • Section 6.7(C) of the 2021 Amendment
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, CC&R Interpretation, Unauthorized Expenditure, Contingency Fund, Drainage Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions Section 6.3(A) (2015)
  • 2021 Amendment to 2015 CC&Rs
  • Section 6.7(C) of the 2021 Amendment

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1039237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:06:37 (47.3 KB)

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1053619.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:06:41 (43.9 KB)

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1064270.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:06:47 (155.3 KB)

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1039237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:43 (47.3 KB)

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1053619.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:47 (43.9 KB)

23F-H040-REL Decision – 1064270.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:55:51 (155.3 KB)

This summary outlines the hearing proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the matter of *Lisa Kittredge vs. SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association* (No. 23F-H040-REL) before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Issues

Petitioner Lisa Kittredge filed a petition alleging that the SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association (HOA) violated governing documents by accepting financial responsibility to maintain drainage features on the privately owned, for-profit SunBird Golf Club.

The immediate action challenged was the HOA Board's December 2022 decision to allocate up to $20,000 from the HOA Contingency funding stream to open, inspect, and clean out specific drainage wells on the golf course, in response to standing water, odors, and mosquito problems affecting the community.

The main legal issue was whether the current governing documents authorized the HOA to use general homeowner assessment funds for maintenance activities on the Golf Course property.

Arguments and Proceedings

The evidentiary hearing was conducted over two days, May 1 and May 15, 2023.

Petitioner's Argument: The Petitioner argued that the expenditure was improper because the governing documents prohibit the use of general assessments for the golf course. She contended that the 1999 CC&Rs/Transition Documents, which generally exempted the HOA from maintaining the Golf Course land, were still relevant or controlling. Crucially, she argued that the 2021 Amendment to the CC&Rs explicitly restricted funding for golf course activities only to monies collected pursuant to Section 6.7(C) (the newly created $300 Capital Improvement Assessment fund for the Golf Course and Community). The Petitioner conceded that had the HOA used funds from the restricted 6.7(C) account, she would not have filed the petition.

Respondent's Argument (HOA): The HOA countered that the 1999 documents were superseded by subsequent documents, including the 2015 CC&Rs and 2021 Amendment, which were approved by residents. The HOA asserted that Section 6.3(A) of the 2015 CC&Rs authorized using assessments for "drainage areas within SunBird," arguing that fixing the drainage was necessary for the "common good" of SunBird residents, whose property values and quality of life were negatively impacted by flooding caused in part by community runoff. The HOA classified the allocation as an unbudgeted emergency expense appropriate for the Contingency Fund.

Legal Focus: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) focused strictly on the HOA's governing documents (CC&Rs, Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and Rules), excluding the 1999 leases and transition agreements as enforceable governing documents in this venue. The ALJ also found that the Petitioner did not establish that the 1999 CC&Rs were still in effect by a preponderance of the evidence, citing the clear intent of the 2008 and 2015 restatements to be the sole current CC&Rs.

Outcome and Final Decision

The ALJ determined that the Petitioner sustained her burden of proof that the Respondent violated the Association’s governing documents.

Key Legal Finding: The ALJ concluded that the 2021 Amendment was controlling regarding the funding mechanism for the Golf Course. While the 2015 CC&Rs allowed assessments for "drainage areas within SunBird," the 2021 Amendment clearly restricted the use of assessments for the golf course (including recreational facilities) to "only from funds collected pursuant to Section 6.7(C)". Since the HOA decision specified the use of the general HOA Contingency funding stream for the $20,000 project, the expenditure violated the governing documents.

Order: The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 and was further ordered to henceforth comply with the provisions of the governing documents. (3,803 characters)

Questions

Question

If my HOA adopts new CC&Rs, are the old ones still valid if they weren't explicitly listed as replaced?

Short Answer

Likely not. The ALJ determined that a community is not expected to have multiple operative sets of CC&Rs at the same time, implying the new ones supersede the old ones.

Detailed Answer

Even if an older set of CC&Rs is not explicitly listed as being replaced by a newer set, the Tribunal may find that the older set is no longer in effect. The ALJ reasoned that the clear intention of adopting amended and restated CC&Rs is to serve as the current governing documents, and it is unreasonable to expect a community to operate under multiple conflicting sets.

Alj Quote

One would not expect a community to have more than one operative set of CC&Rs at any given time.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation / Superseding Documents

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • Governing Documents
  • Amendments

Question

Can my HOA spend general assessment funds on property it doesn't own, like a private golf course?

Short Answer

No, unless the governing documents explicitly define that property as being 'served by the Association' or allow such spending.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the HOA could not spend general funds on the golf course because there was no evidence the golf course was 'served by the Association' as defined in the CC&Rs. Furthermore, because a specific amendment created a dedicated fund for golf course costs, the HOA was restricted to using only that specific fund.

Alj Quote

No evidence was submitted to establish that the SunBird Golf Course was 'served by the Association.'… Accordingly, the Association was not permitted to expend funds collected as assessments to any drainage issues for the SunBird Golf Course other than those assessments collected pursuant to Section 6.7(C) of the 2021 Amendment.

Legal Basis

CC&R Restrictions on Expenditures

Topic Tags

  • Financials
  • Common Expenses
  • Private Property

Question

If the HOA creates a specific fund for a specific project, can they use general contingency funds for it instead?

Short Answer

No. If an amendment restricts spending for a specific purpose to a specific fund, the HOA cannot use general funds.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the HOA passed an amendment allowing expenses for the golf course 'but only from funds collected' via a specific capital improvement assessment. The ALJ ruled that using general contingency funds violated this restriction.

Alj Quote

The 2021 Amendment allowed the Association to use assessments for the golf course, 'but only from funds collected' under the newly created Capital Improvement Assessment for Golf Course.

Legal Basis

Adherence to Specific Amendments

Topic Tags

  • Financials
  • Assessments
  • Contingency Funds

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning it is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Legal Standards

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the ALJ has the authority to order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

Upon finding that the HOA violated the governing documents, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse the homeowner's filing fee in certified funds.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Filing Fees

Question

What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?

Short Answer

It means the claim is 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

The ALJ defines this standard as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't wholly free the mind from doubt.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Standard of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Evidence

Case

Docket No
23F-H040-REL
Case Title
Lisa Kittredge vs SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2023-06-13
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If my HOA adopts new CC&Rs, are the old ones still valid if they weren't explicitly listed as replaced?

Short Answer

Likely not. The ALJ determined that a community is not expected to have multiple operative sets of CC&Rs at the same time, implying the new ones supersede the old ones.

Detailed Answer

Even if an older set of CC&Rs is not explicitly listed as being replaced by a newer set, the Tribunal may find that the older set is no longer in effect. The ALJ reasoned that the clear intention of adopting amended and restated CC&Rs is to serve as the current governing documents, and it is unreasonable to expect a community to operate under multiple conflicting sets.

Alj Quote

One would not expect a community to have more than one operative set of CC&Rs at any given time.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation / Superseding Documents

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • Governing Documents
  • Amendments

Question

Can my HOA spend general assessment funds on property it doesn't own, like a private golf course?

Short Answer

No, unless the governing documents explicitly define that property as being 'served by the Association' or allow such spending.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that the HOA could not spend general funds on the golf course because there was no evidence the golf course was 'served by the Association' as defined in the CC&Rs. Furthermore, because a specific amendment created a dedicated fund for golf course costs, the HOA was restricted to using only that specific fund.

Alj Quote

No evidence was submitted to establish that the SunBird Golf Course was 'served by the Association.'… Accordingly, the Association was not permitted to expend funds collected as assessments to any drainage issues for the SunBird Golf Course other than those assessments collected pursuant to Section 6.7(C) of the 2021 Amendment.

Legal Basis

CC&R Restrictions on Expenditures

Topic Tags

  • Financials
  • Common Expenses
  • Private Property

Question

If the HOA creates a specific fund for a specific project, can they use general contingency funds for it instead?

Short Answer

No. If an amendment restricts spending for a specific purpose to a specific fund, the HOA cannot use general funds.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the HOA passed an amendment allowing expenses for the golf course 'but only from funds collected' via a specific capital improvement assessment. The ALJ ruled that using general contingency funds violated this restriction.

Alj Quote

The 2021 Amendment allowed the Association to use assessments for the golf course, 'but only from funds collected' under the newly created Capital Improvement Assessment for Golf Course.

Legal Basis

Adherence to Specific Amendments

Topic Tags

  • Financials
  • Assessments
  • Contingency Funds

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning it is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.

Legal Basis

Burden of Proof

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Legal Standards

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the ALJ has the authority to order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

Upon finding that the HOA violated the governing documents, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse the homeowner's filing fee in certified funds.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Filing Fees

Question

What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?

Short Answer

It means the claim is 'more probably true than not.'

Detailed Answer

The ALJ defines this standard as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't wholly free the mind from doubt.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Standard of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Evidence

Case

Docket No
23F-H040-REL
Case Title
Lisa Kittredge vs SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2023-06-13
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lisa Kittredge (petitioner)
    Property owner, appeared on her own behalf.
  • Beth Lockwood (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner.

Respondent Side

  • Lori N. Brown (HOA attorney)
    Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP
  • Ben Bednarek (HOA attorney)
    Also referred to as Benjamin Dinard and Mr. Venorf/Benark.
  • Layne Barney (General Manager)
    SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
    Also referred to as Layne Varney.
  • Charles Brian Heitbrink (board member)
    SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
    Secretary of the Board of Directors. Also referred to as Charles Height.
  • Dirk (board member)
    SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
    Moved motion regarding drainage in Dec 2022 meeting.
  • Jim (board member)
    SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
    Seconded motion regarding drainage in Dec 2022 meeting.
  • Nancy (board member)
    SunBird Golf Resort Homeowners Association
    Made motion regarding golf purchases in Dec 2022 meeting.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Also referred to as Tammy Igener.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official correspondence.
  • vnunez (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official correspondence.
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official correspondence.
  • labril (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official correspondence.

Other Participants

  • Lewis Ne (Expert (City Engineer))
    City of Chandler
    Consulted regarding storm water drainage.
  • Thomas (Former HOA President)
    Signed 1999 declaration.

Joshua M Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-15
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge, upon rehearing, affirmed the denial of the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA timely denied the Petitioner's architectural application. The timeline for a decision did not start until October 6, 2020, when the application was considered complete, making the November 19, 2020, denial valid.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joshua M. Waldvogel Counsel —
Respondent Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3); CC&Rs Article VI, Section 6.5

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge, upon rehearing, affirmed the denial of the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA timely denied the Petitioner's architectural application. The timeline for a decision did not start until October 6, 2020, when the application was considered complete, making the November 19, 2020, denial valid.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because the interpretation of the CC&Rs stipulated that the 60-day timeline starts only upon receipt of a complete application, which the ALJ determined was October 6, 2020.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the architectural application for a casita was deemed approved due to the HOA missing the 60-day denial deadline.

Petitioner claimed his architectural application, submitted September 15, 2020, was deemed approved because the Denial Notice (November 19, 2020) occurred after the 60-day deadline (November 14, 2020). The ALJ determined that the 60-day period did not begin until the Application was complete with supporting information (October 6, 2020), making the deadline December 5, 2020, and the denial timely.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association
  • Powell v. Washburn
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Architectural Review, Deemed Approval, HOA Timeline Compliance, CC&R Interpretation, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121044-REL-RHG Decision – 933158.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:31 (106.1 KB)

21F-H2121044-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2121044-REL/900658.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:34 (103.7 KB)

Briefing on Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association (Respondent). The core of the conflict was the Petitioner’s application to build a second house, or “casita,” on his property, which was denied by the association’s Architectural Committee (ARC).

The central legal question was procedural: the timing of the association’s denial. The Petitioner argued that the 60-day review period stipulated in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) began when he submitted his initial application on September 15, 2020. By this calculation, the association’s November 19, 2020 denial was late, and his application should have been “deemed approved.”

The Respondent countered that the 60-day clock only began after the Petitioner provided a response to a request for additional information on October 6, 2020, making the application complete on that date. This would make the November 19 denial timely.

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer presided over both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. In both instances, the Judge ruled in favor of the Respondent, finding that the application was not complete until the requested information was provided. The denial was therefore timely and valid. The Petitioner failed to prove that the association violated its governing documents, and his petition was denied in both the initial decision and the final, binding decision on rehearing.

Case Background

• Case Numbers: 21F-H2121044-REL & 21F-H2121044-REL-RHG

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

• Petitioner: Joshua M. Waldvogel, owner of Lot 228 at 11208 North 164th Lane, Surprise, Arizona 85388.

• Respondent: Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association (Sycamore Estates), a homeowners association in Surprise, Arizona.

• Core Issue: Petitioner sought approval from the Sycamore Estates Architectural Committee (ARC) to build a casita on his property. The ARC denied the application. The dispute centers on whether the denial was issued within the 60-day timeframe mandated by the community’s CC&Rs.

Chronology of Key Events

September 15, 2020

Petitioner submits an architectural application to build a casita.

October 5, 2020

Sycamore Estates requests additional information, specifically the required permits for the construction.

October 6, 2020

Petitioner emails a response, stating his architect verified compliance with city “laws” but does not provide permits.

November 13, 2020

The ARC reviews the application and decides to deny it based on CC&Rs Article V, Section 5.2.

November 14, 2020

The date the Petitioner asserts the 60-day deadline for a decision expired.

November 19, 2020

Sycamore Estates issues the official Denial Notice to the Petitioner.

December 5, 2020

The date the Respondent asserts the 60-day deadline for a decision expired.

July 12, 2021

Initial administrative hearing is held.

August 2, 2021

Initial decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

November 29, 2021

A rehearing is held at the Petitioner’s request.

December 15, 2021

Final decision on rehearing is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Central Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Joshua M. Waldvogel)

• The 60-day timeline for the ARC to approve or deny the application began on the initial submission date of September 15, 2020.

• The deadline for the ARC’s decision was therefore November 14, 2020.

• The association’s request for additional information on October 5, 2020, did not “reset” or pause this timeline.

• Because the Denial Notice was not issued until November 19, 2020, five days after the deadline, the application should be considered “deemed approved” as per the CC&Rs.

• During the rehearing, the Petitioner also argued that Sycamore Estates could only require information listed on the standard submission form.

Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Estates)

• The application was not considered complete until the Petitioner responded to the request for additional information.

• The response, received on October 6, 2020, marked the start of the 60-day review period.

• The deadline for a decision was therefore December 5, 2020.

• The Denial Notice, issued on November 19, 2020, was well within this timeframe and was therefore valid.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

The case revolved around the interpretation of the Sycamore Estates CC&Rs, which function as a binding contract between the homeowner and the association.

Key CC&R Provisions

• Article VI, Section 6.5 (Application for Approval): This section contains the critical language that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. It states that the 60-day review period begins:

• Article V, Section 5.2 (Building Type and Size): This section provided the substantive basis for the ARC’s denial of the casita, as it specifies:

Legal Standard

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, as the party asserting the claim, had the burden of proof.

• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

• Contract Interpretation: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants (like the CC&Rs) are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rulings and Judicial Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge consistently sided with the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

Initial Hearing and Decision (August 2, 2021)

• Finding: The Judge concluded that the application was not complete until the Petitioner provided his response on October 6, 2020.

• Rationale: Based on the language in Article VI, Section 6.5, the 60-day clock does not start until the application and all supporting information have been submitted. The association’s request for permits was a reasonable part of gathering this supporting information.

• Conclusion: The November 19, 2020 Denial Notice was issued prior to the December 5, 2020 deadline and was therefore valid. The Judge ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

Rehearing and Final Decision (December 15, 2021)

• Basis for Rehearing: The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging the initial decision was an “abuse of discretion.” His written basis was:

• Rehearing Arguments: During the rehearing, the Petitioner acknowledged that the Findings of Fact in the initial decision were not in error and presented the same legal arguments as before.

• Final Ruling: The Judge’s conclusion remained unchanged. Upon consideration of all evidence from the rehearing, the Judge again found that the application was not complete until October 6, 2020, and the denial was timely.

• Final Order: The Judge concluded that the “Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent failed to comply with its CC&Rs” and again ordered that the “Petitioner’s petition is denied.” This order was designated as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Waldvogel v. Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel and the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association. The materials are derived from the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 2, 2021, and December 15, 2021.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what specific project was the petitioner seeking approval for?

2. What was the central procedural dispute regarding the timeline for the respondent’s decision on the application?

3. According to the community’s CC&Rs, what is the consequence if the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove an application within the specified timeframe?

4. On what substantive grounds did the Sycamore Estates Architectural Committee ultimately base its decision to deny Mr. Waldvogel’s application?

5. What key date did the petitioner, Mr. Waldvogel, argue was the start of the 60-day review period, and what was his reasoning?

6. What key date did the respondent, Sycamore Estates, argue was the start of the 60-day review period, and what was its reasoning?

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion in the initial hearing decision issued on August 2, 2021?

8. On what basis did the petitioner request a rehearing after the initial decision was rendered against him?

9. During the rehearing, did the petitioner introduce new evidence or arguments, or did he challenge the established Findings of Fact?

10. What legal standard of proof was required in this administrative hearing, and which party held the burden of proof?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Joshua M. Waldvogel, the record owner of Lot 228. The respondent was the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association. Mr. Waldvogel was seeking approval for a plan to build a second house, or casita, on his property.

2. The central dispute was determining when the 60-day timeline for the Architectural Committee’s decision officially began. The petitioner argued it started upon the initial application submission, while the respondent contended it began only after a request for additional information was answered, thereby making the application “complete.”

3. Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs states that if the committee fails to act within sixty days after a complete application and all supporting information have been submitted, “approval will not be required and this Section will be deemed to have been complied with by the Owner.”

4. The committee denied the application based on Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs. This section explicitly prohibits the construction of more than “one detached Single Family Residence” on any lot.

5. The petitioner argued the 60-day review period began on September 15, 2020, the date he submitted his initial architectural application. This would have set the deadline at November 14, 2020, making the November 19 Denial Notice late and rendering the application “deemed approved.”

6. The respondent argued the 60-day period began on October 6, 2020, the date the petitioner responded to their request for additional information (permits). Sycamore Estates maintained the application was not complete until that response was received, which would set the deadline at December 5, 2020.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the application was not complete until the petitioner provided a response to the October 5 request for information. Therefore, the Denial Notice issued on November 19, 2020, was timely and valid, and the petitioner’s petition was denied.

8. The petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” His written statement argued that the CC&Rs do not explicitly state that the review timeline restarts upon a request for more information.

9. No, the petitioner did not introduce new arguments. He presented the same arguments during the rehearing as he had in the initial hearing and acknowledged that the Findings of Fact from the first decision did not contain any errors, choosing only to argue their legal effect.

10. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The petitioner, as the party asserting a claim, had the burden of proof to establish that the respondent violated the governing documents.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses that synthesize facts and legal principles from the source documents.

1. Analyze the significance of Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs, specifically the clause “together with all supporting information, plans and specifications required by the Design Guidelines have been submitted to it.” How did the interpretation of this specific language become the central legal issue of the case, and why was it determinative of the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decisions. Explain which party had the burden of proof and evaluate how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the undisputed facts of the case to reach her conclusions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

3. The petitioner’s proposed casita was ultimately denied on the substantive grounds that it violated Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs. Why did the legal proceedings focus almost entirely on the procedural issue of the decision timeline rather than the substantive prohibition of a second residence on the lot?

4. Examine the petitioner’s basis for requesting a rehearing and the Commissioner’s decision to grant it. Despite the rehearing being granted, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision remained unchanged. Discuss the effectiveness of the petitioner’s arguments during the rehearing process as described in the legal documents.

5. The legal decisions state that CC&Rs are a contract between the parties and that unambiguous restrictive covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent. Based on the details provided in this case, explain how the principles of contract law were applied to resolve the dispute between Mr. Waldvogel and the Sycamore Estates association.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues legally binding decisions. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Application

The comprehensive and detailed written request submitted by a homeowner to the Architectural Committee for approval of construction, alteration, or other improvements that would alter the exterior appearance of the property.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the Sycamore Estates Community Association responsible for reviewing and approving or denying modifications to lots to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide evidence to prove their claims. In this matter, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Casita

A small, secondary house or guesthouse. This was the type of structure Mr. Waldvogel sought to build on his property.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. The courts treat it as a contract between the homeowners’ association and the property owners.

Denial Notice

The official written communication from the homeowners’ association (Sycamore Estates) informing a homeowner (Mr. Waldvogel) that their architectural application has been formally denied.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, homeowner Joshua M. Waldvogel.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Property

The specific lot owned by the petitioner, identified as Lot 228 of Sycamore Estates, located at 11208 North 164th Lane, Surprise, Arizona 85388.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the claims. In this case, the Sycamore Estate Parcel 13 Community Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision within the CC&Rs that limits the use of property. Article V, Section 5.2, which prohibits more than one detached residence per lot, is an example of a restrictive covenant.

He Tried to Use a 60-Day Deadline to Beat His HOA. Here’s What the Judge Decided.

Introduction: The Waiting Game

You’ve done the research, hired the architect, and finally submitted your home improvement plans to the Homeowners Association (HOA). Now, the waiting game begins. The days tick by, and you start wondering: What happens if they miss their own deadline to respond? Can you just start building?

A recent administrative law case in Arizona provides a fascinating and cautionary answer to this very question. It serves as a stark reminder that your community’s governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—are a legally binding contract, and assumptions about deadlines can lead to a losing battle.

——————————————————————————–

The Core of the Dispute: A Casita and a Calendar

The case involved Joshua M. Waldvogel, a homeowner in the Sycamore Estates community in Surprise, Arizona. His goal was to build a second house, or “casita,” on his property.

The conflict centered on a simple timeline. Waldvogel submitted his application on September 15, 2020. He argued the HOA had 60 days to respond, making the deadline November 14. When the HOA sent its denial on November 19, Waldvogel claimed that because the denial was late, his project was automatically “deemed approved.” This dispute over a five-day difference escalated to an administrative law hearing. Here are the key takeaways from the judge’s decision that every homeowner should understand.

1. The 60-Day Clock Doesn’t Start Until Your Application is “Complete”

The homeowner believed the 60-day review clock started the moment he sent his initial application. The judge, however, disagreed based on the precise wording in the HOA’s CC&Rs—the binding contract governing the community.

The power was in the fine print. Article VI, Section 6.5 of the CC&Rs stated:

In the event that the Architectural Committee fails to approve or disapprove an Application for approval within sixty (60) days after the Application, together with all supporting information, plans and specifications required by the Design Guidelines have been submitted to it, approval will not be required…

This single clause was the linchpin of the entire case. On October 5, the HOA requested additional information—specifically, the appropriate permits for the proposed construction. The next day, the homeowner responded, but according to the case findings, he “did not provide any permits as requested.” Instead, he emailed to confirm that his architect had verified the plans complied with city “laws.”

The judge ruled that the 60-day clock never started on September 15 because the application wasn’t yet “complete.” The HOA’s simple request for more information was the pivotal event. It established that the official start date for the review period was October 6, the day the homeowner provided his response. This made the November 19 denial well within the required timeframe. The crucial lesson here is that an HOA’s request for information can determine the official start date of their review, regardless of when you first submitted paperwork.

2. The Underlying Rules Are Your Biggest Hurdle

The entire legal battle focused on the procedural timeline—when the HOA denied the project. But in a twist of irony, the substance of the project—what was being proposed—was a non-starter from the beginning.

Even if the homeowner had won his argument about the deadline, his project was in direct violation of another core rule. Article V, Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs clearly stated:

No building shall be constructed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached Single Family Residence…

The homeowner fought and lost a battle over how he was denied, when the rules clearly stated his casita project was never going to be approved in the first place. This highlights a critical point: winning a procedural argument is meaningless if your project fundamentally violates the community’s substantive rules.

3. You Can Appeal, But It’s an Uphill Battle

After losing the initial hearing, the homeowner filed for a rehearing, claiming the judge’s decision was an “abuse of discretion.” The appeal, however, only solidified the original outcome and underscored the difficulty of such challenges.

The legal record from the rehearing is particularly telling. The judge noted two critical facts: first, the petitioner “acknowledged that the Findings of Fact set forth in the underlying decision in this matter did not include any errors.” Second, he “presented the same arguments during the rehearing that he provided during the initial hearing.”

In essence, the homeowner appealed without disputing the established facts and by using the same legal argument that had already failed. Unsurprisingly, the judge’s decision remained the same, and the petition was denied again. This serves as a potent reminder that challenging an HOA’s interpretation of its own governing documents can be a difficult, expensive, and often fruitless endeavor.

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Conclusion: Read the Fine Print Before You Dream

This case serves as a powerful lesson for every homeowner living under an HOA. Your community’s CC&Rs are a binding contract, and the specific language within them holds immense power. Assumptions about procedures, deadlines, and what you’re allowed to build can be costly mistakes.

It all boils down to one final, critical question: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what crucial detail might be waiting in the fine print?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joshua M. Waldvogel (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed during initial decision transmission
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed during rehearing decision transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient for case transmission

Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-04-25
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sam & Pipper O' Shaughnessy Stangl Counsel —
Respondent Sabino Vista Townhouse Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article VI of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge deemed Petitioners the prevailing party. Respondent HOA violated Article VI of the CC&Rs by failing to maintain and remove rubbish from the natural desert area within the Common Area up to the exterior building lines, as the Board's determination not to maintain the area lacked proper authority without a CC&R amendment. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the CC&Rs and refund the Petitioners' filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA maintenance obligations for common area up to exterior building lines

Petitioners alleged the HOA failed to maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures, specifically a natural desert area within the Common Area. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs require the Association to maintain and remove all rubbish within its property up to the exterior building lines, and the Board lacked the authority to refuse maintenance of the natural desert area without amending the CC&Rs.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with the requirements of Article VI of the CC&Rs going forward and must pay Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article VI of the CC&Rs
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Maintenance, CC&R Interpretation, Common Area Maintenance, Filing Fee Refund, Prevailing Party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 959583.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:59 (49.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 964651.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:03 (18.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 964655.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:07 (99.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 927714.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:13 (95.3 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 927747.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:19 (37.5 KB)

Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association: A Dispute Over Common Area Maintenance

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal decisions in the administrative case of Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl versus the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association. The central conflict revolves around the Association’s legal obligation, as defined by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), to maintain a common area behind the Petitioners’ property.

The Petitioners alleged that the Association violated Article 6 of its CC&Rs by failing to maintain this area for over two decades, resulting in the accumulation of rubbish and the creation of a habitat for pests. The Association countered that the area in question was designated “natural desert” to serve as a buffer, and that maintaining it was not required and would be cost-prohibitive.

An initial hearing in November 2021 resulted in a decision in favor of the Petitioners. The Association was granted a rehearing, which took place in April 2022. Despite new arguments from the Association regarding budget constraints, historical precedent, and alleged interference by the Petitioners, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the original decision.

The final ruling on April 25, 2022, found that the language of CC&R Article 6 is unambiguous and requires the Association to maintain “all property up to the exterior building lines.” The ALJ concluded that the Board of Directors does not have the authority to unilaterally designate a common area as “unmaintained” without formally amending the CC&Rs. Consequently, the Association was ordered to comply with Article 6 and reimburse the Petitioners’ filing fee.

Case Overview

Case Name

Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl, Petitioners, vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association, Respondent.

Case Numbers

22F-H2221009-REL (Initial Hearing)
22F-H2221009-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Key Dates

Petition Filed: August 6, 2021
Initial Hearing: November 8, 2021
Initial Decision: November 29, 2021
Rehearing: April 4, 2022
Final Decision: April 25, 2022

The Central Allegation: Violation of CC&R Article 6

The dispute is founded on the interpretation of Article 6 of the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association’s CC&Rs concerning “Common Maintenance.”

Key Provisions of Article 6:

• Maintenance Obligation: “The Association, or its duly authorized representative, shall maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures including but not limited to the landscaping… roofs, common elements, decorative walls, drainage… and be responsible for the rubbish removal of all areas within the common properties.”

• Standard of Care: “The Board of Directors of the Association shall use a reasonably high standard of care in providing for the repair, management and maintenance of said property, so that said townhouse project will reflect high pride of ownership.”

Petitioners’ Core Claim: Filed on August 6, 2021, the petition alleged that the Association violated Article 6 by failing to maintain the property behind their townhome unit. They asserted this neglect had persisted for the approximately 24 years they had lived there, leading to overgrowth and pest infestations.

The First Hearing and Decision (November 2021)

Summary of Arguments

• Petitioners (Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl):

◦ Alleged observing only 12 hours of landscaping work in their immediate back area over 24 years.

◦ Claimed the accumulated rubbish and overgrowth served as a habitat for pests, specifically mentioning “a pack rat for rattlesnakes.”

◦ Submitted a photograph of a rattlesnake skin found in their backyard as evidence.

• Respondent (Sabino Vista Townhouse Association):

◦ Testimony was provided by Charles Taylor Ostermeyer, secretary of the Board of Directors.

◦ Argued the area in question is a “natural desert area and underbrush” that begins 30 to 40 feet behind the homes.

◦ Initially claimed the Board had adopted a rule limiting maintenance to just 4 feet behind residences, citing Board meeting minutes. However, when pressed by the ALJ, Ostermeyer conceded that believing a formal rule was adopted “would be conjecture on my part.”

◦ Asserted it would be too costly to clear the entire region.

◦ Contended that the decision not to maintain the open desert area was a valid exercise of the “business judgment rule” applicable to non-profit organizations.

November 29, 2021 Decision

The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Petitioners.

• Finding: The preponderance of the evidence showed the Respondent failed to maintain the property as required by the unambiguous language of Article 6.

• Reasoning: The Respondent provided “no evidence of an Amendment to Article VI” and “no evidence of a rule properly adopted by the Board that would limit the common area to be maintained.”

• Order: The Petitioners were deemed the prevailing party, and the Association was ordered to reimburse their $500 filing fee and comply with Article 6 going forward.

The Rehearing and Final Decision (April 2022)

The Association’s request for a rehearing was granted, with the new hearing held on April 4, 2022. The Association was represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., and presented testimony from John Polasi, a Board member and Chairman of the Landscape Committee.

Rehearing Testimony and Arguments

Petitioner Arguments (Sam O’ Shaughnessy Stangl)

Respondent Arguments (John Polasi, HOA Board)

Core Issue is Deflection: Argued the Association’s narrative was a “deflection from the main issue.” Stated the HOA focused on irrelevant topics to circumvent the court’s correct original ruling.

Area is a “Natural Buffer”: The unmaintained area has existed since 1974 and serves as a natural buffer from Tanque Verde Creek, keeping wildlife out and preventing hikers/bikers from wandering into the neighborhood.

Tree Trimming Incident: Claimed the HOA falsely accused him of “singlehandedly” stopping all tree trimming. Clarified a December 2021 interaction with a contractor (Leon’s Tree Service) lasted only 30 seconds, where he refused permission to cut three shade branches in his private front courtyard.

Petitioner Hindrance: Alleged the Petitioners actively hindered tree trimming in December 2021 by refusing the contractor entry into their courtyard and blocking their driveway with an SUV to prevent the trimming of a low-hanging branch.

Pest Infestations: Maintained that pests are a significant problem, citing a recent rattlesnake sighting on his birthday (March 21) and his personal removal of “252 packrats in the last three years.”

Pest Control is Managed: Stated the HOA contracts “Mr. Packrat” to inspect the entire property quarterly. Polasi testified he had been chairman for a year and had “never heard of a single pack rider or rattlesnake anywhere.”

Misuse of Common Area: Dismissed accusations of misusing the common area as “pure deflection.” He stated his use (grilling, sitting outdoors) was adjudicated in court 18 years prior and found to be in compliance with CC&Rs.

Petitioner Misuse of Common Area: Accused the Petitioners of violating CC&Rs by placing personal items (barbecue, smoker, tables, chairs) in the common area and cutting a hole in their patio wall for water and electric lines.

Developer’s Intent: Cited a statement from Dale Chastine, the original developer, asserting the CC&Rs were written to “strictly forbid any unfettered wild growth” and require all common areas to be maintained in the same manner.

Board Authority and Historical Precedent: Cited 2020 Board Minutes that formally designated the area “35 ft to the south of southern homeowner rear wall” as “unmaintained natural desert landscape.” Referenced 1999 minutes indicating a 4-foot maintenance rule was previously in place.

New Issues: Attempted to introduce new evidence regarding a “complete drainage channel that… is now buried under debris and soil,” but the ALJ did not admit it as it was a new allegation not in the original petition.

Budgetary Constraints: Argued that maintaining the entire two-to-four-acre area would be excessively expensive. He noted the HOA had recently spent $15,000 on front-area tree trimming and $10,000 on tree repairs, and had other costs like a new pool pump.

April 25, 2022 Final Decision

The ALJ again ruled in favor of the Petitioners, affirming the initial decision.

• Core Conclusion: “Although the Board determined that it would not maintain the natural desert, the Board does not have authority under its CC&Rs to refuse to maintain any of the area of its property up to the exterior building lines.”

• Legal Reasoning: The CC&Rs are unambiguous and require the Association to maintain and remove rubbish from all property within its boundaries, including the area designated as “natural desert.”

• Path Forward for HOA: The ALJ explicitly stated, “If the Association does not want to maintain any area within its property up to the exterior building lines, the Association should amend its CC&Rs.”

• Final Order: The order from the November 29, 2021 decision was reiterated: Petitioners were deemed the prevailing party, the Respondent was ordered to pay the $500 filing fee, and the Respondent was directed to comply with Article VI of the CC&Rs.

Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association: A Case Study Guide

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl and the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with a corresponding answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the case documents.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What was the central violation alleged by the Petitioners in their August 6, 2021, petition?

2. According to Article 6 of the CC&Rs, what is the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association’s responsibility regarding property maintenance?

3. In the first hearing on November 8, 2021, what was the Respondent’s primary argument for not maintaining the area behind the Petitioners’ home?

4. What was the outcome of the first Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on November 29, 2021?

5. Who testified for the Respondent at the April 4, 2022, rehearing, and what were his roles within the Association?

6. What two historical documents did the Respondent present at the rehearing to support its maintenance policy for the area in question?

7. Describe the Respondent’s accusation against the Petitioners regarding the tree trimming service in December 2021.

8. What strategic reasons did the Respondent’s witness, John Polasi, give for leaving the desert area unmaintained?

9. In the final decision of April 25, 2022, why did the Administrative Law Judge rule against the Association despite its evidence of a board-approved maintenance plan?

10. What specific orders were issued to the Respondent in the final court decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioners alleged that the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association violated Article 6 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, they claimed the Association failed to maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior lines and patio enclosures, focusing on the unkempt two-acre area behind their townhome.

2. Article 6 requires the Association to “maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures.” This includes landscaping, common elements, and rubbish removal, and mandates that the Board of Directors use a “reasonably high standard of care” so the project reflects a high pride of ownership.

3. In the first hearing, the Respondent argued that it had applied the “business judgment rule” applicable to non-profit organizations. The Association contended it would be too costly to clear out the entire region, which it described as an open desert area with many trees and weeds.

4. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party. The ALJ ordered the Respondent to comply with Article 6 of the CC&Rs going forward and to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00.

5. John Polasi testified for the Respondent at the rehearing. He was identified as a member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors and the Chairman of the Landscaping Committee.

6. The Respondent presented minutes from a Board Meeting in February 1999, which stated that only 4 feet behind residences were maintained, with the remainder left natural. They also presented minutes from a 2020 Board Meeting that revised this policy, designating an area 35 feet from the southern homeowner walls as the maintenance boundary.

7. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioners interfered with and prevented a tree trimming project conducted by Leon’s Tree Service. The witness claimed the Petitioners refused entry into their front patio to trim overhanging limbs and moved a vehicle into their driveway to block the work.

8. John Polasi testified that the unmaintained desert area serves as a “natural buffer.” He stated it keeps animals from the adjacent Tanque Verde Creek area from coming onto homeowner property and also prevents bikers and hikers from wandering into the neighborhood.

9. The ALJ ruled that although the Board had determined it would not maintain the natural desert area, the Board does not have the authority under its CC&Rs to refuse maintenance. The judge concluded that the CC&Rs require the Association to maintain all property up to the exterior lines and that if the Association wishes to change this, it must formally amend its CC&Rs.

10. The final order deemed the Petitioners the prevailing party and directed the Respondent to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee within thirty days. It further ordered the Respondent to comply with the requirements of Article VI of the CC&Rs going forward.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for essay-length responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in both the initial and final decisions. Why was Article 6 of the CC&Rs consistently interpreted as unambiguous, and how did this interpretation override the Respondent’s “business judgment” defense and subsequent board resolutions?

2. Compare and contrast the evidence and arguments presented by the Respondent in the first hearing versus the rehearing. How did the Association’s defense strategy evolve, and what new evidence did it introduce in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Using specific examples from the testimony and exhibits, explain how the Petitioners met this burden of proof and why the Respondent’s affirmative defenses failed to meet the same standard in both hearings.

4. Examine the tension between a homeowners’ association’s governing documents (like CC&Rs) and the operational decisions made by its Board of Directors. How does this case illustrate the limits of a Board’s authority to interpret or modify its responsibilities without formally amending the core documents?

5. Evaluate the various pieces of evidence introduced during the rehearing, such as the Board Minutes from 1999 and 2020, the letter from Leon’s Tree Service, and the attempted introduction of the developer’s affidavit. What role did each piece of evidence play in shaping the arguments, and why was some evidence given more weight or deemed inadmissible by the judge?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Affidavit

A written statement confirmed by oath or affirmation, for use as evidence in court. An affidavit from the original developer, Dale Chastain, was presented but not admitted into evidence.

Affirmative Defense

A defense in which the defendant introduces evidence that, if found to be credible, will negate liability, even if it is proven that the defendant committed the alleged acts.

Arizona Dept. of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Business Judgment Rule

A legal principle that grants directors of a corporation (or non-profit association) immunity from liability for losses incurred in corporate transactions if the directors acted in good faith. This was used as a defense by the Respondent in the first hearing.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision. The interpretation of Article 6 of the CC&Rs was the central issue of the case.

Common Area

Property in a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association and intended for the use and enjoyment of all members. The dispute centered on the maintenance of a common area behind the Petitioners’ home.

Conjecture

An opinion or conclusion formed on the basis of incomplete information. A witness for the Respondent admitted his belief about a maintenance rule was “conjecture.”

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence and testimony before a judge to resolve a disputed issue.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.

Petitioners

The party that files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioners had the burden of proving their case by this standard.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted upon request, to reconsider the original decision. The April 4, 2022, hearing was a rehearing, treated as a “complete and new hearing.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or other legal document that limits the use of real property. The court noted that unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Riparian Area

An area of land adjacent to a river or stream. The Respondent’s witness described the community as being in a riparian area next to Tanque Verde Creek.

He Sued His HOA Over Landscaping and Won. They Demanded a Do-Over. He Won Again. Here Are the Lessons.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Tale of a Homeowner and His HOA

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like a constant struggle. Disputes over rules, maintenance, and responsibilities are common frustrations. But what happens when a homeowner believes their HOA is fundamentally failing to uphold its end of the bargain?

This is the story of Sam O’ Shaughnessy Stangl, a homeowner who took his HOA to court over its failure to maintain a common area behind his home. The outcome was surprising enough: he won. But when the HOA was granted a complete “do-over” hearing to re-argue the case from scratch, he won a second time.

This case, Stangl vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association, offers a powerful case study in the hierarchy of governing documents and the legal principle of plain language in contract law. Here are the surprising and powerful lessons from the repeated legal victory that every homeowner should know.

1. An HOA Board Vote Can’t Override Its Own Founding Documents

The HOA’s core defense was that its Board of Directors had made a decision to leave the area behind the homes as an “unmaintained natural desert.” This argument, however, proved legally insufficient across two separate hearings.

In the first hearing, board secretary Charles Taylor Ostermeyer testified that the board had decided to limit maintenance. However, when pressed by the judge, he admitted that claiming this decision was a formal “rule” would be “conjecture on my part.” For the rehearing, the association presented board member John Polaski, who formalized the argument, claiming the unmaintained area served as a “natural buffer.” To support this, they presented minutes from a 2020 board meeting, arguing that the board’s decision recorded in those minutes effectively created a new policy for that common area.

In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge delivered a decisive counter-ruling. The judge found that the association’s primary governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were the superior legal authority. A simple board vote recorded in meeting minutes could not nullify the binding requirements of the CC&Rs. The judge’s final order from the rehearing was unequivocal:

Although the Board determined that it would not maintain the natural desert, the Board does not have authority under its CC&Rs to refuse to maintain any of the area of its property up to the exterior building lines. … If the Association does not want to maintain any area within its property up to the exterior building lines, the Association should amend its CC&Rs.

This is a critical lesson for every homeowner. The CC&Rs function as a legally binding contract between the association and its members. A simple board resolution, a new rule, or a long-standing “tradition” cannot legally contradict the foundational covenants.

2. When the Contract is Clear, “All” Simply Means All

The entire case ultimately hinged on a single sentence in Article VI of the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association CC&Rs. This piece of text was so clear and powerful that the judge cited it as the deciding factor in both the original hearing and the rehearing. The language stated:

“The Association, or its duly authorized representative, shall maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures including but not limited to the landscaping…”

The HOA attempted to argue around this plain language. Its representatives claimed that maintaining the entire area was too costly, that it had been unmaintained since the community was built in 1974, and that it was a “riparian area” (land adjacent to a river or stream) that should be left wild.

In both hearings, the judge rejected these arguments. The word “all” was not open to interpretation. The language of the CC&Rs was unambiguous and therefore had to be enforced as it was written. This illustrates a fundamental legal principle: when contract language is clear, arguments about convenience, cost, or past practice often fail when pitted against the plain text of a governing legal document.

3. Facts are Stubborn, Even in a “Complete New Hearing”

In a highly unusual procedural twist, after losing the first hearing in November 2021, the HOA was granted a “re-hearing” in April 2022. This was not an appeal, which reviews an original decision for errors, but a complete strategic reset. The judge explained its legal significance:

“And this is a re-hearing. So it is a complete and new hearing. … as if the first hearing didn’t happen.”

The HOA used this second chance to launch a new strategy. While the first hearing’s defense centered on cost and a vague, unwritten policy, the second hearing featured a new witness and a new, two-pronged approach: formalizing the “natural buffer” argument and adding an ad hominem strategy that attempted to portray Mr. Stangl as an uncooperative resident who had personally interfered with tree trimming.

But while the HOA’s tactics shifted, the central fact of the case could not be changed. The text of the CC&Rs was the same in April 2022 as it was in November 2021. The final outcome was identical to the first. The judge once again ruled in favor of the homeowner, ordering the HOA to comply with its own CC&Rs and to reimburse Mr. Stangl’s $500 filing fee.

This demonstrates a key legal reality: while procedural tactics can create new opportunities for argument, they cannot alter the foundational text of a contract. The HOA’s strategy shifted, but the CC&Rs—the central fact of the case—remained immutable.

Conclusion: A Final Takeaway for Every Homeowner

The case of Stangl vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association offers three profound takeaways for homeowners: the CC&Rs are supreme over board decisions, the plain language of those documents is incredibly powerful, and a fact-based argument is resilient. It serves as a potent reminder that an association’s governing documents are not just suggestions—they are enforceable contracts.

The next time you question an HOA policy, will you stop at their latest newsletter, or will you go back to the source?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sam O' Shaughnessy Stangl (petitioner)
  • Pipper O' Shaughnessy Stangl (petitioner)
  • Dale Chastine (developer/witness)
    Original developer who provided an affidavit supporting petitioners
  • Lisa Chastine (witness)
    Signed father's affidavit as a witness

Respondent Side

  • Blake R. Johnson (HOA attorney)
    The Brown Law Group, PLLC
  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    The Brown Law Group, PLLC
    Appeared for rehearing; also referred to as Nathan Henderson in transcript
  • Charles Taylor Ostermeyer (board member)
    Sabino Vista Townhouse Association
    Secretary of Board; testified at original hearing
  • John Polasi (board member)
    Sabino Vista Townhouse Association
    Chairman of the Landscaping Committee; testified at rehearing
  • Leon (contractor)
    Leon's Tree Service
    Tree trimmer hired by HOA; provided a signed statement/testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted order
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted order

Other Participants

  • Barbara Barski (property manager)
    Former manager of the association

Jean Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-30
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) or the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% without a vote, as the increase remained below the Maximum Annual Assessment and complied with the statutory 20% cap.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jean Williams Counsel —
Respondent Surprise Farms II Community Association Counsel Nick Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803; CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) or the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% without a vote, as the increase remained below the Maximum Annual Assessment and complied with the statutory 20% cap.

Why this result: Petitioner’s assertion was based on an erroneous reading of the CC&Rs, confusing the maximum automatic increase of the Maximum Annual Assessment (10%) with the limit on the actual Annual Assessment increase.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the 20% increase in the Annual Assessment effective April 2020 violated statutory limits or CC&R requirements for member approval.

Petitioner alleged the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% (from $720 to $864) effective April 2020 without obtaining a 2/3 majority vote of the members.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: assessment increase, HOA assessments, statutory compliance, CC&R interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.4

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020054-REL Decision – 810957.pdf

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20F-H2020054-REL Decision – 810957.pdf

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Briefing on Administrative Law Judge Decision: Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020054-REL, where petitioner Jean Williams alleged that the Surprise Farms II Community Association improperly increased annual homeowner assessments. The ALJ dismissed the petition, concluding that the Association acted within its authority as defined by both its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona state law.

The central finding of the case is that the petitioner erroneously interpreted the CC&Rs by confusing the “Annual Assessment” (the actual amount charged to homeowners) with the “Maximum Annual Assessment” (a calculated upper limit). The ALJ determined that the Association’s 20% increase in the Annual Assessment for 2020 was permissible because:

1. It did not exceed the 20% year-over-year cap allowed by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A) without a member vote.

2. The resulting assessment of $864 was significantly below the $2,426 Maximum Annual Assessment permitted for 2020 under the community’s own CC&Rs.

Ultimately, the decision affirms the Board’s discretion to set the Annual Assessment, provided it stays within the dual constraints of the state’s percentage increase limit and the community’s own calculated maximum charge.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 20F-H2020054-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jean Williams

◦ Respondent: Surprise Farms II Community Association

• Administrative Law Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer

• Hearing Date: July 10, 2020

• Decision Date: July 30, 2020

• Nature of Dispute: The petitioner contested the validity of a 20% increase in the annual homeowners association assessment implemented in April 2020, arguing it required a member vote.

Petitioner’s Allegations

Jean Williams filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 31, 2020, alleging that the Surprise Farms II Community Association violated its governing documents and state law.

• Core Allegation: The Association illegally increased the “Maximum Monthly Assessment” by 20% without the approval of a two-thirds majority of association members.

• Cited Violations:

◦ A.R.S. § 33-1803: The statute governing assessment increases.

◦ CC&Rs Article VII, Sections 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c): The sections of the community’s governing documents that outline assessment rules.

• Petitioner’s Argument: Williams contended that the Association’s CC&Rs limited any annual assessment increase to 10% unless a vote was held. She argued that the Association’s justification for the 20% increase, which cited A.R.S. § 33-1803, was a direct violation of the community’s covenants.

Respondent’s Position and Stipulated Facts

The Surprise Farms II Community Association denied all of the petitioner’s complaints. At the hearing, the Association did not present witnesses and relied on its legal argument. The respondent stipulated to the key facts regarding the assessment increases:

• April 2019 Increase: The Annual Assessment increased from $660.00 to $720.00 per year, a 9% increase, without a vote of the members.

• April 2020 Increase: The Annual Assessment increased from $720.00 to $864.00 per year, a 20% increase, without a vote of the members.

Governing Rules and Document Analysis

The ALJ’s decision rested on a detailed interpretation of state law and two distinct concepts within the Association’s CC&Rs: the “Annual Assessment” and the “Maximum Annual Assessment.”

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A)

This state law establishes a default cap on assessment increases. It states that an association “shall not impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment without the approval of the majority of the members,” unless the community’s own documents impose an even lower limit.

CC&Rs Article VII: Key Definitions

The case hinged on the distinction between two terms defined in the CC&Rs:

1. Maximum Annual Assessment (Section 7.4): This section defines a ceiling for how much the Board could charge.

◦ It began at $480 in the first year.

◦ Crucially, this maximum automatically increases by up to 10% each year without a member vote.

◦ To raise the Maximum Annual Assessment above this automatic 10% annual increase, a two-thirds vote of members is required.

2. Annual Assessment (Section 7.2): This section defines the actual charge levied against each property.

◦ The Board has “sole discretion” to set this amount each year.

◦ The only limitation is that the Annual Assessment must be less than or equal to the “Maximum Annual Assessment” calculated under Section 7.4.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the CC&Rs or state law. The decision was based on the following key points of analysis:

Erroneous Reading of the CC&Rs

The ALJ found the petitioner’s entire argument was “predicated on her erroneous reading of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs.” The petitioner incorrectly believed the 10% automatic increase to the Maximum Annual Assessment was a cap on the Annual Assessment itself.

The decision explicitly clarifies this distinction:

“Petitioner repeatedly asserted that an increase in the Annual Assessment was limited to ten percent in any given year unless approved by a vote of the members even though Article VII, Section 7.4 was entitled Maximum Annual Assessment and consistently referenced the same. By definition, the existence of a Maximum Annual Assessment necessitates an Annual Assessment that may be less than the maximum.”

Calculation of the Maximum Annual Assessment

The ALJ used the CC&Rs’ formula (a 10% cumulative increase per year since 2003) to calculate the authorized Maximum Annual Assessment for each year. This demonstrated the significant gap between what the Association could charge and what it actually charged.

Maximum Annual Assessment

$480.00

$528.00

$580.80

$638.88

$702.76

$773.03

$850.33

$935.36

$1,028.89

$1,131.77

$1,244.94

$1,369.43

$1,369.43

$1,657.00

$1,822.70

$2,004.97

$2,205.46

$2,426.00

Legality of the 2020 Assessment Increase

The ALJ determined the Association’s 2020 increase was compliant with all rules for two reasons:

1. Compliance with State Law: The increase from $720 to $864 was exactly 20%, which is the maximum allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) without a member vote.

2. Compliance with CC&Rs: The new Annual Assessment of $864 was substantially lower than the calculated Maximum Annual Assessment of $2,426 allowed for 2020.

The Board therefore acted within its “sole discretion” as granted by Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs.

Final Order

Based on the finding that the Association acted properly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. The decision is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of the order.

Study Guide: Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020054-REL, Jean Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation Jean Williams made against the Surprise Farms II Community Association in her petition?

3. What was the specific percentage and dollar amount of the Annual Assessment increase that took effect in April 2020, and was it approved by a vote of the members?

4. According to the decision, which two governing documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

5. What limitation does Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A) place on an association’s ability to raise regular assessments?

6. How did the community’s CC&Rs define the relationship between the “Annual Assessment” set by the Board and the “Maximum Annual Assessment”?

7. What was the calculated “Maximum Annual Assessment” for the year 2020, according to the automatic increase formula in the CC&Rs?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge, what was the petitioner’s fundamental misunderstanding of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs?

9. Who bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what legal standard was required to meet it?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and on what date was the decision made?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jean Williams, who was the Petitioner appearing on her own behalf, and the Surprise Farms II Community Association, which was the Respondent represented by Nick Nogami. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. The petitioner alleged that the association improperly increased the Maximum Monthly Assessment by 20% without the required approval from a two-thirds majority of the association members. She claimed this action violated the community’s CC&Rs and that the association incorrectly used A.R.S. § 33-1803 to justify the increase.

3. Effective April 2020, the Annual Assessment increased by twenty percent, from $720.00 per year to $864.00 per year. The respondent stipulated that this increase occurred without any vote of the members.

4. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803 and specific sections of the association’s governing documents: Article VII, Section 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c) of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

5. A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) states that an association cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the previous fiscal year’s assessment without the approval of a majority of the members. This limit applies unless the community’s own documents impose an even lower limit.

6. Article VII, Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs granted the Board sole discretion to set the Annual Assessment. This discretion was limited by the provision that the amount must be subject to, and therefore less than or equal to, the “Maximum Annual Assessment” as calculated under Section 7.4.

7. Using the annual ten percent increase formula set forth in Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs, the calculated Maximum Annual Assessment for the year 2020 was $2,426.00.

8. The judge concluded that the petitioner’s case was predicated on her erroneous reading of the CC&Rs. She incorrectly believed the 10% figure in Section 7.4 applied to the Annual Assessment itself, when in fact it was the automatic escalator for the Maximum Annual Assessment, which served as a ceiling for the board’s discretion.

9. The Petitioner, Jean Williams, bore the burden of proof in this proceeding. She was required to prove her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

10. The final order, issued on July 30, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate the referenced provisions of the CC&Rs or A.R.S. § 33-1803(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the distinction between “Annual Assessment” and “Maximum Annual Assessment” as defined in the Surprise Farms II CC&Rs. Explain how the petitioner’s failure to differentiate between these two terms was central to the case’s outcome.

2. Explain the interplay between the community’s CC&Rs (specifically Article VII, Sections 7.2 and 7.4) and the state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)). How did the judge determine that the HOA’s actions complied with both governing authorities?

3. Describe the burden of proof in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required, and did they successfully meet it? Use specific details from the “CONCLUSIONS OF LAW” section to support your answer.

4. Trace the history of the assessment increases from April 2019 to April 2020. Detail the specific monetary and percentage increases for both years and explain why the 20% increase in 2020 was deemed legally permissible without a member vote, while an increase over 20% would not have been.

5. Discuss the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. What specific conclusions of law and interpretations of the CC&Rs led directly to the ruling that the respondent did not improperly increase the annual assessment?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions and rulings.

Annual Assessment

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the charge levied and assessed each year against each Lot and Parcel pursuant to Article VII, Section 7.2 hereof.” The Board has sole discretion to set this amount, as long as it does not exceed the Maximum Annual Assessment.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute relevant to this case is A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which governs HOA assessment increases.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the law and CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Surprise Farms II were recorded in 2003.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Surprise Farms II Community Association is the HOA in this case.

Maximum Annual Assessment

A ceiling on the Annual Assessment, established by the CC&Rs. This amount was set at $480 initially and designed to increase automatically by ten percent each year without a member vote, serving as the upper limit for the Board’s assessment-setting discretion.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, Jean Williams was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The legal standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is met when the evidence presented has the “most convincing force” and shows that a fact is more likely to be true than not true.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Surprise Farms II Community Association was the Respondent.

Why This Homeowner Lost Her Lawsuit Against the HOA (And What You Can Learn From It)

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter

It’s a scenario many homeowners fear: a letter from the Homeowners Association (HOA) announcing a significant and unexpected fee increase. The feeling of frustration and powerlessness can be overwhelming. When Jean Williams received notice that her HOA was raising her annual assessment by a full 20%, she believed the board had overstepped its authority. The increase seemed to be a clear violation of the community’s governing documents, so she decided to fight back and took her HOA to court. The outcome, however, was not what she—or many other homeowners—would have expected.

2.0 The Core Misunderstanding: “Maximum” Dues vs. “Actual” Dues

The foundation of Jean Williams’s case was her belief that the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) limited any annual fee increase to 10% without a vote from the members. This is where the critical misunderstanding occurred.

The judge in the case identified a crucial distinction in the legal language. The 10% limit mentioned in the CC&Rs did not apply to the Annual Assessment—the actual dollar amount billed to homeowners each year. Instead, it applied to the Maximum Annual Assessment, a theoretical ceiling on how high the fees could potentially go.

But why was this ceiling so high? The CC&Rs were designed so that this Maximum Annual Assessment would increase automatically by 10% every single year since its inception in 2003. This cumulative growth operated silently in the background for over a decade, creating a vast difference between the two figures. For the year 2020, the actual assessment billed to homeowners was $864. However, due to years of automatic increases, the allowable Maximum Annual Assessment had ballooned to $2,426. The board was operating with far more financial latitude than the petitioner realized.

3.0 How State Law Set the Real Limit at 20%

The next layer of this case involves the interplay between the HOA’s documents and state law. An Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), dictates that an HOA cannot raise regular assessments by more than 20% in a single year without a vote from the majority of members, unless the community’s own documents set a lower limit.

This is the key legal point. Williams believed her community documents did set a lower limit of 10%. Critically, however, that 10% limit applied only to the wrong variable—the theoretical Maximum Annual Assessment ceiling, not the Annual Assessment actually paid. The CC&Rs’ failure to place a specific annual cap on the actual assessment created a legal vacuum. This vacuum was automatically filled by the Arizona state statute, making its 20% cap the only legally binding limit.

The HOA’s increase from $720 to $864 was exactly 20%. This placed their action right at the maximum threshold allowed by state law without requiring a member vote, making it legally permissible.

4.0 The Fine Print: The Power of “Sole Discretion”

The HOA board’s authority was further solidified by specific language embedded in its governing documents. Article VII, Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs explicitly granted the board “sole discretion” to determine the amount of the Annual Assessment.

The true power of this clause was unlocked by its connection to the two types of assessments. The board’s “sole discretion” was the legal tool that allowed them to set the Annual Assessment at any level they chose, provided it did not exceed the automatically growing Maximum Annual Assessment ceiling. With a ceiling of $2,426 and a previous fee of only $720, the board was legally empowered to enact the 20% increase without consulting homeowners.

5.0 The Judge’s Final Word: A Cautionary Tale

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner’s entire case was built on a misreading of the governing documents. The judge’s decision offers a clear and potent lesson for all homeowners, emphasizing that the precise wording of these legal documents is everything.

In the final decision, the judge wrote:

Petitioner’s assertion that Respondent could not increase the Annual Assessment by twenty percent was predicated on her erroneous reading of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs. … By definition, the existence of a Maximum Annual Assessment necessitates an Annual Assessment that may be less than the maximum.

The judge’s reasoning is precise: creating a “maximum” assessment in a legal document inherently implies the existence of a separate “actual” assessment that can be lower. Williams’s case collapsed because she treated these two distinct legal concepts as one and the same.

6.0 Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Documents Say?

The case of Jean Williams serves as a powerful reminder of how interlocking legal mechanics can produce unexpected outcomes. The board’s power was not derived from a single rule, but from the synthesis of three distinct elements: a high Maximum Assessment ceiling created by a silent, cumulative growth clause; the board’s “sole discretion” to set actual fees anywhere underneath that ceiling; and the state law’s 20% backstop that became the only relevant limit in the absence of a specific cap in the CC&Rs.

This case proves that the devil is truly in the details. It begs a critical question for every homeowner living in a planned community: When was the last time you read your community’s CC&Rs?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jean Williams (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nick Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Surprise Farms II Community Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel —
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:58 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:00 (107.3 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:18 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:22 (107.3 KB)

Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.

Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?

3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?

4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?

5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.

Common Area

Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.

Courtesy Letter

A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.

Declarant

The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.

HOA Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.

Improvements

A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.

Pony Wall

A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”

Private Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.

Public Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.

Visible from Neighboring Property

A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”

⚖️

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG

2 sources

These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Travis Prall (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lydia Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
  • Maureen Karpinski (board member)
    Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
    President of the Board; testified
  • Frank Peake (property manager)
    Pride Community Management
    Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
  • Rebecca Stowers (community manager)
    Community Manager; testified at initial hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Charles Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-06
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association Counsel Brian C. Axt, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1. The ALJ determined that the HOA correctly clarified the status of play structures through an amendment to the Architectural Committee's regulations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) regarding allowing play structures (swing sets, treehouses) when another detached structure (garage or shed) is present.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) by permitting members to construct play structures (swingsets, treehouses, etc.) on properties that already contained one detached structure (garage or shed), arguing that the rules allowed only one detached structure of any type.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied because he failed to establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances. All play structures that the Architectural Committee has previously approved are allowed to remain, and the Architectural Committee may consider and grant future Play Structure Approval Requests.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, CC&R interpretation, detached structures, play structures, Architectural Committee regulations, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:52 (155.4 KB)

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:47 (155.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.

The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela

◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.

◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.

◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.

◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.

◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.

◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.

◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.

◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.

• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.

• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.

• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.

• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

• Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision No. 18F-H1817006-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817006-REL, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific violation did the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, allege against the Respondent?

3. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bears the initial burden?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the CC&Rs and amending the “Rules and Regulations”?

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary evidence to support his claim that the HOA historically enforced a “one detached structure” rule?

6. How did the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates HOA, legally justify its decision to permit play structures even on lots that already had a detached garage or shed?

7. How did the Respondent explain the document from its website which stated that the Board had voted to “adopt changes to the CCR’s”?

8. What did the law firm Poli & Ball conclude regarding the permissibility of play structures within the community?

9. What did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky determine was the primary intent of Article III of the CC&Rs?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, and the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association. Mr. Mandela is a homeowner within the Blue Ridge Estates development and a member of the homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D). He claimed the HOA wrongly allowed members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on their properties when another detached structure, such as a garage or shed, already existed.

3. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must convince the judge that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Charles Mandela, bears the initial burden of proof to establish that a violation occurred.

4. To amend the CC&Rs (the Declaration), an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots is required. In contrast, the Board of Directors can adopt, amend, or repeal “Rules and Regulations” by a simple majority vote of the Board.

5. The Petitioner testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA removed nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo and a playhouse. He also submitted a 2006 letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, which opined that the HOA could enforce a “one detached structure” requirement.

6. The Respondent argued that the intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent second residential dwellings on a lot, not to prohibit recreational items consistent with a family community. Therefore, the Board acted within its authority under CC&R § 4.2 to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to clarify that play structures are permitted.

7. The Respondent’s president, Joseph Hancock, testified that the wording was a typographical error made by the previous Chair of the Architectural Committee (the Petitioner). Board meeting minutes from December 2016 and October 2017 were submitted as evidence to show the Board’s actual intent was to modify the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs.

8. The Poli & Ball law firm opined that play structures are “perfectly consistent with recreation and family use” in a community intended to be a planned recreation property. The firm concluded that the HOA could change the Architectural Committee’s regulations to allow them as long as the change was consistent with the CC&Rs.

9. The Judge concluded that the purpose of Article III is to keep the community single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second dwelling. Since a play structure cannot be easily converted into a second residence, allowing one did not violate the intent of the CC&Rs.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge found that the Petitioner had not established that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances, and that the HOA had properly resolved the issue by amending its regulations.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon specific facts, arguments, and legal principles from the source document.

1. Discuss the critical distinction between amending the community’s CC&Rs and amending the Architectural Committee’s regulations. Explain how this distinction became the central pivot upon which the entire case turned.

2. Analyze the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s exhibits and testimony, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s evidence more persuasive.

3. The “Conclusions of Law” section discusses the legal principle of interpreting restrictive covenants based on the “intent of the parties.” How did Judge Mihalsky apply this principle to CC&R § 3.1, and how did the community’s stated purpose as a “uniquely planned recreation property” influence this interpretation?

4. Charles Mandela, the Petitioner, was a former board member and president of the Architectural Committee who drafted one of the key documents in question. Discuss how his past involvement in HOA governance may have shaped his legal position and the evidence he presented.

5. Trace the timeline of the “play structure” controversy as detailed in the hearing evidence, from the 2015 discrimination claim to the “clarification vote” in October 2017. How does this sequence of events illustrate the challenges of community governance and rule interpretation within a homeowners’ association?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, the ALJ from the Office of Administrative Hearings heard the dispute between the homeowner and the HOA.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for approving any construction, alteration, or improvement to the exterior of any property to ensure it complies with community standards.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. It outlines the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Declaration

The formal legal document that creates the homeowners’ association and its CC&Rs. In this case, amending the Declaration required a 75% vote of the members.

Detached Structure

A building on a property that is separate from the main residence. The dispute centered on whether play structures counted as the “one detached structure” permitted by the CC&Rs.

Improvements

A broad term defined in the CC&Rs (§ 1.17) to include buildings, garages, fences, walls, landscaping, and all other structures of every type and kind on a property.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The judge noted that if Title 33 did not apply, the Office of Administrative Hearings would lack jurisdiction to hear the case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Charles Mandela.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&Rs that limits the use of the property. The “one detached structure” rule is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Single Family Residential Use

The designated purpose of the properties in Blue Ridge Estates, meaning they are to be used exclusively as private homes for single families, not for commercial or multi-family dwelling purposes.

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.

The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela

◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.

◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.

◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.

◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.

◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.

◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.

◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.

◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.

• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.

• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.

• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.

• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

• Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf; previously served as president of the Architectural Committee.

Respondent Side

  • Brian C. Axt (attorney)
    Resnick & Louis, P.C.
    Represented Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
    Board's president; presented testimony/witness for Respondent.
  • Jason Miller (counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood
    Provided an email opinion supporting the Respondent's position.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate