Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID21F-H2120003-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2021-06-03
Administrative Law JudgeThomas Shedden
Outcomeloss
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerKeith D SmithCounsel
RespondentSierra Foothills Condominium AssociationCounselStuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

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Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

David B. Carr vs. Sunset Plaza Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1817003-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-11-22
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomePetitioner was deemed the prevailing party only regarding the Respondent's violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 (failure to provide notice for hiring Mulcahy and Kinney). Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. All other claims, including the alleged Bylaws violation and the violation related to hiring Osselaer, were dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerDavid B. CarrCounsel
RespondentSunset Plaza Condo AssociationCounselPaige Marks, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party only regarding the Respondent's violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248 (failure to provide notice for hiring Mulcahy and Kinney). Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. All other claims, including the alleged Bylaws violation and the violation related to hiring Osselaer, were dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the Bylaws violation. The HOA successfully argued that the hiring of Osselaer was conducted during a valid emergency board meeting, exempting it from open meeting notice requirements.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Kinney and Mulcahy)

Sunset Plaza decided to hire Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm at board meetings without informing its members of those meetings.

Orders: Respondent Sunset Plaza must pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248

Violation of Open Meeting Law (Hiring Osselaer)

Petitioner alleged violation regarding the hiring of Osselaer Management Company, but the ALJ found the association was exempt because the decision was made at a valid emergency board meeting.

Orders: Petition dismissed in this respect.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248

Failure to keep correct and complete books and records of account

Petitioner alleged Sunset Plaza failed to keep accurate financial records, pointing out discrepancies and an unexplained reserve deficit between 2015 and 2016 balance sheets.

Orders: Petition dismissed in all other respects.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws

Analytics Highlights

Topics: open meeting violation, emergency meeting, governing documents, financial records, condominium association
Additional Citations:
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 41-2198.01
  • Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817003-REL Decision – 617042.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:06 (48.4 KB)

18F-H1817003-REL Decision – 617215.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:14 (57.5 KB)

18F-H1817003-REL Decision – 605735.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:20 (112.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association (Case No. 18F-H1817003-REL). The central conflict involved a petition filed by Mr. Carr, a condominium owner, alleging that the Association’s Board of Management violated Arizona’s open meeting law and engaged in financial mismanagement.

The final ruling was a partial victory for the petitioner. The judge found that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by failing to provide members with proper notice of board meetings where decisions were made to hire Kinney Management Services and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The Association admitted to this failure, citing a misunderstanding of the law, and pledged future compliance. As the prevailing party on this specific issue, Mr. Carr was awarded reimbursement for his $500 filing fee.

However, the judge dismissed all of Mr. Carr’s other allegations. The claim that a meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company violated the open meeting law was rejected, as the judge deemed it a valid emergency meeting exempt from notice requirements. Furthermore, Mr. Carr’s claims of financial mismanagement and inaccurate record-keeping in violation of the Association’s bylaws were not substantiated. The judge accepted the Association’s defense that alleged financial discrepancies stemmed from a change in accounting practices by a new management company, not from an actual deficit. No civil penalty was imposed on the Association.

I. Case Overview

Case Number: 18F-H1817003-REL

Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Petitioner: David B. Carr

Respondent: Sunset Plaza Condo Association

Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: November 21, 2017

Decision Date: November 22, 2017

Core Dispute: A petition filed by a condo owner alleging the association’s board violated state statutes and its own bylaws concerning open meetings, financial record-keeping, and the execution of contracts.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations (David B. Carr)

On August 14, 2017, Mr. Carr filed a petition outlining two primary grievances against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.

A. Violation of Open Meeting Law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248)

Mr. Carr alleged that the Association’s Board of Management took official action without holding properly authorized and noticed board meetings. This resulted in unapproved contracts and expenditures.

Direct Quotation from Petition:

“SUNSET PLAZA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION BOARD OF MANAGEMENT TAKES ACTION WITHOUT HOLDING AUTHORIZED BOARD MEETING IN VIOLATION OF AZ STATUTE 33-1248. THESE UNAUTHORIZED MEETINGS HAVE RESULTED IN CONTRACTS WITH MANAGEMENT FIRMS AND ATTORNEYS. THESE CONTRACTS HAVE RESULTED IN EXPENSES NOT APPROVED OR REVIEWED BY CONDO OWNERS.”

Specific Contracts Cited:

◦ Kinney Management (October 2016)

◦ Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016)

◦ Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016)

Requested Remedy: Cancellation of all contracts entered into without a properly called board meeting and personal repayment of all related expenditures by the signatory.

B. Violation of Bylaws and Financial Mismanagement (Article XI)

Mr. Carr contended that the Association violated Article XI of its bylaws, which requires it to “keep correct and complete books and records of account.” He identified specific financial discrepancies based on his analysis of the Association’s financial statements.

Alleged Reserve Fund Discrepancy: Mr. Carr claimed an “unexplained reserve deficit of $10,295.09” based on the following figures, noting there were no reported reserve expenses in 2016.

Financial Statement Item

Amount

2015 Year-End Reserve Equity

$10,295.09

2016 Income Statement Reserve Deposit

$9,180.00

2016 Year-End Balance Sheet Reserve Total

$2,295.44

Additional Discrepancies:

◦ The 2016 year-end balance sheet failed to identify prior and current year operating equity.

◦ An “expanded 2016 balance sheet” calculation revealed a discrepancy of $2,808.42.

Requested Remedy: A formal audit of the 2016 and 2017 financial statements and improved future reporting to identify reserve balances and homeowner equity.

III. Respondent’s Defense (Sunset Plaza Condo Association)

The Association, represented by Paige Marks, Esq., and through the testimony of board member Marilyn Gelroth, presented a defense against both allegations.

A. Response to Open Meeting Allegations

Admission: The Association conceded that it “did not provide notice of its board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney and the Mulcahy firm.”

Justification: This failure was attributed to the board’s misunderstanding of the open meeting law. The Association represented to the judge that it would abide by the law in the future.

Emergency Meeting Exemption: The Association argued that the decision to hire Osselaer Management was made at a valid emergency board meeting on September 21, 2016.

Timeline of Events: Kinney Management Services retracted its offer to manage the property on September 15, 2016, after receiving notice of a complaint Mr. Carr had filed against them with the Attorney General’s Office.

Urgency: This retraction created an urgent need for a new management company. Ms. Gelroth testified that the board “needed to move quickly because members needed to know where to send payments.” This situation, they argued, constituted an emergency under the law.

B. Response to Financial Allegations

Flawed Comparison: The Association contended that Mr. Carr’s financial analysis was fundamentally flawed because he “erroneously compared Sunset Plaza’s 2015 year end balance statement to its 2016 income statement,” which are two different types of financial records.

Change in Accounting Methods: The primary reason for the apparent discrepancies was a change in how financial data was categorized.

◦ The previous management company, Kolby, separated reserve amounts in its financial statements.

◦ The new management company, Osselaer, “does not separate reserve amounts” and is not required by law to do so. This difference in reporting style accounted for the changes Mr. Carr identified as a deficit.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, found Ms. Gelroth’s testimony credible and issued a split decision, upholding one of Mr. Carr’s claims while dismissing the other.

A. Finding on Financial Mismanagement Allegation

Conclusion: Petition Dismissed The judge ruled that Mr. Carr “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Article XI of Sunset Plaza’s Bylaws.” The Association’s explanation regarding the different accounting methods used by Kolby and Osselaer, and the flawed comparison of financial documents, was accepted as a valid defense.

B. Finding on Open Meeting Law Allegations

Conclusion: Partial Violation Confirmed

Hiring of Osselaer Management (No Violation): The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 in this instance. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempts the board from the 48-hour notice requirement. The minutes of the meeting stated the reason for the emergency.

Hiring of Kinney Management and Mulcahy Law Firm (Violation Confirmed): The judge found that Mr. Carr “established by preponderance of the evidence that Sunset Plaza violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-1248” when it decided to hire these two firms. The Association did not dispute that it failed to inform members of these board meetings, which was a key factor in the ruling.

C. Final Order

Based on the findings and conclusions of law, the judge issued the following order:

1. Prevailing Party: Petitioner David B. Carr is deemed the prevailing party solely with regard to the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.

2. Reimbursement: Sunset Plaza is ordered to pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

3. Dismissal: All other aspects of Mr. Carr’s petition are dismissed.

4. Penalty: No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in the matter.

Study Guide: Carr v. Sunset Plaza Condo Association (No. 18F-H1817003-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of David B. Carr versus the Sunset Plaza Condo Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source document.

1. What were the two primary allegations David B. Carr made against the Sunset Plaza Condo Association in his petition?

2. Identify the three specific contracts Mr. Carr claimed resulted from unauthorized board meetings.

3. Why did Kinney Management Services retract its offer to manage Sunset Plaza in September 2016?

4. What justification did Sunset Plaza provide for holding an emergency board meeting to hire Osselaer Management Company?

5. According to Sunset Plaza, why did Mr. Carr mistakenly believe there was a financial discrepancy in the association’s records?

6. Did the Sunset Plaza board admit to violating the open meeting law? If so, what was their explanation?

7. What authority do the association’s Declaration and Bylaws grant the Board of Management regarding contracts?

8. How does Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 define the requirements for an “emergency meeting” of a board of directors?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding Sunset Plaza’s hiring of the Osselaer Management Company?

10. What specific orders were issued against Sunset Plaza as a result of the judge’s decision?

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Answer Key

1. David B. Carr alleged that the Sunset Plaza Condo Association violated Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 by holding unauthorized board meetings to enter into contracts. He also alleged the association violated Article XI of its bylaws by failing to keep correct and complete books and records, citing an unexplained deficit in reserve accounts.

2. Mr. Carr’s petition identified contracts with Kinney Management (October 2016), Osselaer Real Estate (September 2016), and the Mulcahy Law Firm (May 2016). He argued these contracts were entered into without a properly called board meeting and resulted in unapproved expenses.

3. Kinney Management Services retracted its acceptance of Sunset Plaza’s offer after receiving a complaint that Mr. Carr had filed against Kinney with the Attorney General’s Office. This information was stated in a letter from Kinney to Sunset Plaza on September 15, 2016.

4. The board held an emergency meeting because after Kinney retracted its offer, they needed to move quickly to hire a new management company. Board member Marilyn Gelroth testified it was important to have a single company handle all affairs and that members needed to know where to send payments without delay.

5. Sunset Plaza contended that Mr. Carr erroneously compared two different types of financial records: the 2015 year-end balance sheet and the 2016 income statement. Furthermore, the association argued that the new management company, Osselaer, categorized financials differently than the previous company, Kolby, and did not separate out reserve amounts.

6. Yes, Sunset Plaza conceded that it did not provide notice to its members of the board meetings when it decided to hire Kinney Management and the Mulcahy Law Firm. The association contended that it did not understand the open meeting law at the time and represented to the Tribunal that it would abide by the law in the future.

7. The Declaration grants the Board the power to “enter into contracts” and generally have the powers of an apartment house manager. Article VII, section 11 of the Bylaws states the Board of Management “shall enter into contracts on behalf of the association.”

8. The statute allows an emergency meeting to be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the required forty-eight hours’ notice. At such a meeting, the board may only act on emergency matters, and the minutes must state the reason necessitating the emergency.

9. The judge concluded that Sunset Plaza did not violate Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248 when it hired Osselaer. The decision was made at a legitimate emergency board meeting, which exempted the board from the standard open meeting notification requirements.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner, David Carr, be deemed the prevailing party regarding the violation of the open meeting law. It was further ordered that Sunset Plaza pay Mr. Carr his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days, and his petition was dismissed in all other respects.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it was applied in this case. How did David B. Carr meet this burden for his claim about the open meeting law but fail to meet it for his claim about financial mismanagement?

2. Discuss the legal requirements and exceptions for board meetings under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248. Use the board’s decisions to hire Kinney Management, the Mulcahy Law Firm, and Osselaer Management Company as distinct examples to illustrate the application of this law.

3. Evaluate Sunset Plaza’s defense regarding the financial discrepancies alleged by Mr. Carr. Why was this defense successful, and what does it reveal about the potential for confusion when an association changes management companies and accounting methods?

4. Examine the powers and duties of the Sunset Plaza Board of Management as outlined in its Declaration and Bylaws. How do these documents support the board’s authority to enter into contracts, and how does that authority intersect with the procedural requirements of state law?

5. Based on the judge’s decision, critique the actions and governance of the Sunset Plaza board. What were their key procedural mistakes, what was their stated reason for these errors, and what were the ultimate consequences of their violation of the open meeting law?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Velva Moses-Thompson, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a decision based on evidence and law.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248

An Arizona statute, also known as the open meeting law, which requires that meetings of a unit owners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. It outlines requirements for meeting notices, member participation, and exceptions for emergency meetings.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an association to govern its internal management. In this case, Article XI requires the association to keep correct and complete books, records, and minutes.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the judge applies the relevant statutes and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a legal judgment.

Declaration

The legal document that creates a condominium or planned community. The Sunset Plaza Declaration grants the Board of Management the power to enter into contracts and manage the association’s affairs.

Emergency Meeting

A type of board meeting that can be called without the standard 48-hour notice to discuss business that cannot be delayed. Action at such a meeting is limited to emergency matters only.

Findings of Facts

The section of the decision that outlines the factual history of the dispute as determined by the judge based on testimony and evidence presented at the hearing.

The final, binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party, required Sunset Plaza to refund his filing fee, and dismissed the other parts of his petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Petitioner was David B. Carr.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case or a significant issue within it. The judge declared Mr. Carr the prevailing party regarding the violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1248.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sunset Plaza Condo Association.

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision resulting from a hearing held on November 21, 2017, between Petitioner David B. Carr and the Respondent Sunset Plaza Condo Association. Mr. Carr brought a petition alleging that the Condo Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (Ariz. Rev. Stat. section 33-1248) and its own bylaws by taking action without authorized board meetings and exhibiting financial discrepancies, specifically concerning reserve funds. The decision found that the Condo Association did violate the open meeting law when hiring Kinney and the Mulcahy law firms but was exempt from the open meeting requirement for the emergency meeting that resulted in hiring Osselaer Management Company. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the statutory violation and was awarded a filing fee of $500.00, though all other aspects of the petition were dismissed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David B. Carr (petitioner)
    Sunset Plaza Condo Association (member)

Respondent Side

  • Paige Marks (attorney)
    Sunset Plaza Condo Association
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Marilyn Gelroth (board member)
    Sunset Plaza Condo Association
    Testified at hearing
  • Beth Mulcahy (HOA attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Decision transmitted to her firm; firm hired by Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Received electronic transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Received electronic transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Received electronic transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Received electronic transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Received electronic transmission