Tag Archives: Velva Moses-Thompson

The matter of *Thomas P. Hommrich vs. The Lakewood Community Association* (No. 23F-H048-REL) was heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Issues

Petitioner Thomas P. Hommrich filed a single-issue petition on March 9, 2023, alleging the Respondent Association lacked the authority to enforce a parking restriction. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed the Association improperly relied upon Article IV, Section 4.2(t) of the CC&Rs, which, in the Petitioner's view, does not prohibit parking on public residential streets. The Petitioner sought an order from the OAH prohibiting the Respondent from restricting parking access on such streets.

Article IV, Section 4.2(t) of the CC&Rs indicates the Declarant's intent is to "eliminate on-street parking at Lakewood as much as possible," requiring vehicles to be kept in garages, driveways, or designated areas. It further states that "No parking is permitted on any street within Lakewood" designated on the Map of Dedication, and allows the Association to adopt additional parking rules.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Arguments

The Association filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 8, 2023. The Respondent argued that the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the petition did not concern a violation of community documents or any statute, as required by A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A). Furthermore, the Association contended that the OAH lacked the authority to grant the specific injunctive relief requested by the Petitioner.

The Petitioner responded, asserting he was alleging that the Association breached the CC&Rs.

Legal Points and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition on May 19, 2023.

The OAH determined that the petition did not concern a violation of community documents or any statute. The most important legal point focused on jurisdiction: the OAH found that the Petitioner was essentially attempting to challenge the Association’s power to act (authority to restrict parking on public streets). Under A.R.S. § 10-3304, the Petitioner is not permitted to challenge the Association’s power to act in the OAH tribunal. The appropriate venue for seeking injunctive relief regarding an association’s power to act is a court of law (A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2)).

Outcome

The petition was dismissed. Following the dismissal, the OAH received a Motion to Amend the Petition, which it could not consider because a decision had already been rendered. However, the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was forwarded to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), as the ADRE, not the OAH, handles rehearing requests pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-2199.04(A).

The legal matter of *Anthony Payson v. The Foothills Homeowners Association #1* (No. 23F-H041-REL) was heard virtually by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson on April 13, 2023.

Key Facts and Petitioner's Allegations:

Petitioner Anthony Payson, a homeowner within the community, alleged that the Respondent Homeowners Association (HOA) neglected its duty to enforce the Covenants, Codes, & Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that a large, outdoor television/movie theater installed by his neighbor violated CC&R Section 5.4 (Nuisances), which prohibits anything kept on a lot that "will or might disturb the peace, quiet, comfort, or serenity of the occupants of the surrounding property". Petitioner sought an order compelling the HOA to enforce the CC&Rs and require the neighbor to remove the television.

Respondent's Key Arguments:

The Respondent HOA, represented by Sean K. Mohnihan, orally moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim for relief. The HOA argued that the Petitioner was alleging a violation of Section 5.4 by the neighbor, not the Association itself, and the Association neither owns nor operates the TV.

Crucially, the HOA asserted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction to hear disputes among neighbors or to enforce common law duties to enforce CC&Rs. Furthermore, the HOA maintained that the Petitioner failed to provide reliable evidence (such as a log book, police reports, or a noise study) to substantiate a nuisance claim, despite the HOA having requested such documentation before initiating enforcement action.

Hearing Proceedings and Evidence:

The ALJ held the motion to dismiss in abeyance but proceeded with the presentation of evidence. Petitioner Payson testified that the TV had disturbed his peace and quiet on at least one occasion involving a hockey game, and that its mere existence constituted a violation because it *might* cause disturbance. Payson admitted he did not provide the HOA with specific dates, times, decibel readings, or video evidence of the disturbance, as the HOA had requested. The Respondent ultimately elected not to call witnesses, relying instead on the Petitioner's testimony and the jurisdictional arguments.

Outcome and Legal Decision:

In the final decision issued May 1, 2023, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent (The Foothills Homeowners Association #1) violated CC&R Section 5.4.

The ALJ determined that CC&R Section 5.4 addresses use restrictions on Members and Lots. Since the provisions refer to actions of members, any breach of that Article would be a breach by a Member, not the Association. The OAH’s authority, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), is limited to finding whether the governing document or statute has been violated by the respondent. Because the Petitioner did not contend or provide facts establishing that the HOA stored property that caused noise or disturbed the peace, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof against the Association.

The petition was ordered dismissed.

The administrative hearing (Docket No. 23F-H038-REL) involved Petitioner Clifford S. Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association (HOA). The hearing was conducted virtually on March 31, 2023, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The core dispute concerned an HOA meeting held on or about May 31, 2022. The Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities, on two specific points: that the meeting was not noticed and that it was not open to association members.

The meeting involved two of the three HOA board members (Esmeralda Sarina-Ayala Martinez and Dave Madill) meeting with an attorney to obtain legal advice regarding the potential dissolution of the HOA and the disposition of the subdivision's 18-acre common area. Both parties stipulated during the hearing that the meeting was neither noticed nor open to the general membership.

Key Legal Arguments

1. Respondent's Argument (HOA): The HOA contended that they had not violated the statute because the meeting's purpose fell under the exception allowing a closed session for receiving legal advice from an attorney pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1). Counsel argued that the closed nature of the meeting exempted them from the typical notice requirements. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that because only two of the three board members were present, and no votes or formal actions were taken, it did not constitute an official "meeting of the board of directors" requiring statutory notice.
2. Petitioner's Argument: The Petitioner argued that even if the meeting was closed for legal advice, the law still requires notice to be given. He asserted that the HOA failed to comply with requirements, such as identifying the statutory authority for closing the meeting before proceeding, as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804(C). Mr. Burns contended that because the meeting involved two board members (which could constitute a quorum depending on the definition) discussing critical HOA business (dissolution), it should have adhered to open meeting and notice provisions.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on April 20, 2023. The ALJ’s conclusion was split, with both parties deemed prevailing on one issue.

1. Openness Issue (HOA Wins): The ALJ concluded that the HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804 by closing the meeting, as the only information discussed and obtained was legal advice from an attorney, which is an allowable exception.
2. Notice Issue (Petitioner Wins): The ALJ concluded that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when it failed to provide notice to its members of the board meeting, even though the content was privileged. The ALJ concluded that the statute requires notice even for meetings held to consider legal advice.

Orders and Remedies:

• The Respondent HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00.
• The Respondent was directed to comply with the notice requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.
• The Petitioner’s request for a civil penalty was denied.

This is a summary of the administrative hearing held on March 27, 2023, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Parties

The case, *In the Matter of Barbara J. Ryan vs. Dragoon Mountain Ranch Phase I Meadows Property Owners Association*, Docket No. 23F-H035-REL, involved Petitioner Barbara J. Ryan (Petitioner) and the Respondent Homeowners Association (HOA). The Petitioner paid $500.00 to file the dispute. The Respondent was represented by attorney Jody Corrales.

Main Issue and Core Dispute

The issue set for determination was whether the Respondent HOA violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1804 and § 33-1318) and the HOA’s Bylaws (specifically Article 7.1) by failing to hold an annual member meeting in two years.

Key Arguments and Proceedings

1. Petitioner’s Position: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent's Board of Directors had failed to hold an annual member meeting since February 2020, a period exceeding three years. This failure violated both the association's bylaws and Arizona statutes, despite multiple requests from members.
2. Undisputed Fact: The Respondent's counsel stipulated and confirmed that there had been no annual members meeting held since February 2020.
3. Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent's primary defense for the lack of meetings was attributed to ongoing legal turbulence, including contentious state court litigation (initiated around September 2021) and a subsequent Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing (August 25, 2022). The HOA argued that this reorganization process justified the delay. The Respondent also asserted that a vote by written ballot for directors in February 2021 served the same function as an annual meeting for that year.
4. ALJ Determination on Jurisdiction: The ALJ strictly limited the hearing's scope to the single paid issue concerning the failure to hold the required annual meeting, explicitly rejecting discussion on related issues such as board elections, removal proceedings, or the details of the bankruptcy, stating these matters were outside the ALJ's jurisdiction.
5. Legal Concession: Ultimately, the Respondent's counsel conceded that they had no legal defenses to the fact that they failed to hold the annual meeting.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge issued the decision on April 17, 2023:

1. Violation Found: The ALJ concluded that the preponderance of the evidence established that the Respondent violated section 7.1 of its Bylaws by failing to hold an annual meeting of the members in 2021 and 2022.
2. Prevailing Party: Petitioner Barbara J. Ryan was deemed the prevailing party.
3. Remedy: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.
4. Compliance Order: The Respondent was further directed to comply with the requirements of section 7.1 of its Bylaws going forward.
5. Penalty: No civil penalty was found appropriate in this matter.

This decision, issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson on October 5, 2022, dismissed the petition brought by Deborah Mesear, a condominium unit owner, against the Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association (the Association).

Key Facts and Legal Issue:

The dispute centered on the Association's compliance with Arizona financial reporting laws for condominiums. The core issue set for determination was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(J) (the applicable statute for condominiums) by failing to share annual financial reports for the years 2017 through 2021.

Petitioner Deborah Mesear filed her petition on May 29, 2022, alleging the Association failed to provide annual audits despite multiple requests, stating she could find no evidence that audits had been completed.

Legal Framework and Arguments:

1. Statutory Requirement: A.R.S. § 33-1243(J) mandates that the board provide for an annual financial audit, review or compilation of the association. This report must be completed no later than 180 days after the fiscal year ends and made available to unit owners within 30 days of completion.
2. Association's Defense (Compilations vs. Audits): The Association confirmed through the testimony of its community manager, Carl Westlund, that it did not prepare full audits for the relevant years, but rather financial compilations, which are substantially more limited in scope and less expensive than an audit. The Association argued that choosing a compilation complies fully with A.R.S. § 33-1243(J), as the statute permits any one of the three report types.
3. Sharing of Reports (2017–2020): After the petition was filed, the Association provided Mesear with the financial compilations for 2017 through 2020. Mesear received these reports but argued that compilations were incomplete financial reports.
4. 2021 Report Issue: Mesear emphasized that the 2021 report had not been provided. The Association testified that a compilation for 2021 had been ordered from a new accountant but was not yet completed as of the September 15, 2022, hearing date. The Association argued that Mesear's petition, filed May 29, 2022, regarding the 2021 compilation was not yet ripe because the 180-day deadline for its completion had likely not yet passed.

Outcome and Legal Decision:

The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ concluded that:

• The Association was not required to prepare annual audits; selecting annual financial compilations satisfies A.R.S. § 33-1243(J).
• The Association shared the compilations for 2017 through 2020 with Mesear.
• The issue concerning the 2021 compilation was not ripe when the May 29, 2022, petition was filed.

Ms. Mesear failed to establish that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1243. The petition was ordered dismissed.

This summary addresses the hearing proceedings, key facts, main issues, and the status of the final decision in the matter of *David G. Iadevavia v. Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.* (No. 22F-H2222044-REL) before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Summary of Hearing Proceedings

Key Facts & Procedural History

The Petitioner, David G. Iadevavia, proceeded *pro se* following the grant of his prior counsel's withdrawal. The Respondent, Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA), was represented by Carolyn Goldmith. The hearing was conducted virtually on June 27, 2022, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

The ALJ initially identified three potential issues based on Iadevavia’s petition (CCNR 2.16, ARS 33-1803, ARS 33-1804), requiring $1,500 in fees, but since only $500 was paid, the matter was narrowed to a single issue. The final issue for determination, established after a pre-hearing conference and subsequent amendment, was: Whether the Respondent Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc. selectively enforced section 2.16 of the CC&Rs against Petitioner David G. Iadevavia while at the same time not enforcing it against other homeowners, including homeowners who currently serve on the board.

The ALJ denied Iadevavia's subsequent motion to amend the hearing issue further, citing lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ also denied Iadevavia's request for a subpoena because it did not satisfy the requirements of Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113(A)(3) and (4).

Key Arguments and Legal Points

Petitioner's Argument (Iadevavia): Selective Enforcement and Ambiguity

Iadevavia, a retired professor of astronomy and physics, argued that the HOA selectively enforced the restrictive covenant, specifically CCNR 2.16, against him.

1. Object Identification: He contended that his "mobile observatory" was factually a storage shed on a trailer, not a trailer or recreational vehicle. He presented photos showing that the HOA had seemingly "grandfathered" numerous storage sheds owned by other residents, including board members, that were visible above walls. Since "storage shed" was not defined in the CCNRs, he argued the board failed to act reasonably by not grandfathering his structure.
2. CCNR Ambiguity: Iadevavia emphasized that the CCNRs lacked clear definitions for key terms like "trailer," "storage shed," "garage," or "driveway". He asserted that without unambiguous definitions, the board relied on subjectivity, leading to selective enforcement.
3. Inconsistent Application: He noted the board's delay of 270 days in denying his Architectural Review Committee (ARC) request to shield the object, despite a 30-day requirement, demonstrating that the board does not follow its own rules.

Respondent's Argument (HOA): Plain Meaning and Contract Law

The HOA focused on the plain meaning of the CCNRs and legal standards governing restrictive covenants.

1. Plain Meaning of "Trailer": The HOA asserted that Iadevavia’s object was commonly understood to be a trailer (utility trailer or RV). Witnesses confirmed the structure had features like axles, wheels, and a license plate.
2. Contractual Interpretation: The HOA argued that CCNRs are considered a contract under Arizona law, and a term is only ambiguous if it defeats the plain and obvious meaning of the restriction. They cited case law (*Arizona Builtmore Estates v. TZAK*; *Burke v. Voice Screen Wireless Corporation*) to support the reliance on commonly accepted meanings when terms are undefined.
3. Applicability of 2.16: CCNR 2.16.2 requires that vehicles like trailers must be stored in an enclosed garage or screened from view. The HOA noted that the specific violation regarding visibility was resolved when Iadevavia erected a wooden structure in early 2021. The HOA distinguished Iadevavia’s mobile trailer from stationary, constructed sheds, arguing that equating the two makes "no sense" und

This summary details the proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the administrative hearing case of *Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association* (No. 22F-H2222031-REL), held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

Key Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner Gregory Ehle filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (AZDRE) around February 2, 2022, alleging four separate violations by the Respondent, Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association (Fulton Ranch). Ehle paid a $500 filing fee, but the tribunal ordered him to remit an additional $1,500 for the four claims. Ehle failed to pay the outstanding fee by the deadline (May 6, 2022). Consequently, and because Ehle failed to notify the tribunal of his preferred single issue, the ALJ determined that the sole issue to be addressed at the June 21, 2022, hearing was an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency meeting of the board members.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Arguments

The hearing took place on June 21, 2022. Petitioner Ehle, appearing on his own behalf, initially failed to appear, but the hearing proceeded after he connected virtually.

Petitioner's Argument: Ehle contended that a November 12, 2020, notice issued by Fulton Ranch regarding the cessation of responses to his emails constituted a matter of urgency that should have necessitated an emergency board meeting. Ehle alleged that if an emergency meeting had been conducted, the required minutes were not published at the next regular board meeting. However, under examination, Ehle conceded that he was unaware of whether an emergency board meeting was actually held.

Respondent's Argument: Fulton Ranch, represented by Emily Mann, Esq., argued for dismissal on multiple grounds, including a potential bar by the one-year statute of limitations. The primary argument, supported by testimony from Kevin Hearty (Division Vice President for the community manager, CCMC), was that no emergency board meeting occurred between September 2020 and November 12, 2020. Fulton Ranch asserted that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) governs the *procedure* for an emergency meeting, and since no meeting was held, no violation of the procedure could have occurred.

Outcome and Legal Decision

The ALJ issued the decision on July 11, 2022.

Key Legal Points and Findings:

1. Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. The weight of the evidence showed that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting regarding the decision concerning Mr. Ehle's emails.
3. The ALJ explicitly concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) allows the Board to conduct an emergency meeting, but the statute does not require the Board to hold one. Ehle failed to provide legal authority supporting his contention that a meeting was mandatory.

Final Decision: Because Ehle failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2), the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition.

This summary addresses the hearing proceedings, key facts, main legal points, and final administrative outcome of the matter involving Petitioners Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh versus Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA, identified as Case No. 22F-H2222035-REL, heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Proceedings

The hearing in this matter was scheduled for June 24, 2022. The Petitioners, Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Christopher Hanlon, Esq., appeared on behalf of the Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA.

During the proceeding, Mr. Hanlon informed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, that he had learned the previous night that his key witness had tested positive for COVID and could not physically attend. Although Mr. Hanlon suggested arguing his pending motion to dismiss, the ALJ waited approximately 15 minutes, allowing a grace period, as Petitioners were representing themselves in this specific OAH matter. The Petitioners did not contact the OAH to request a delay, appear in person, or file a request to appear telephonically.

Main Legal Issues and Rationale

The central legal point supporting the decision was the allocation of the burden of proof. Pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, the burden of proof rested solely upon the Petitioners.

By failing to appear at the hearing, the Petitioners did not present any evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof.

Outcome and Final Decision

Based on the Petitioners' failure to appear and subsequent failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a Decision ordering that the petition is dismissed.

This Order was issued on June 24, 2022. The decision was declared binding on the parties unless a rehearing was granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04, requiring a request for rehearing to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

The Petitioners subsequently filed a "Notice of action (appeal)" on July 21, 2022. However, the OAH determined on August 2, 2022, that these documents would not be considered because no further action could be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Case Briefing: Judy Clapp v. Forest Trails Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings of the administrative hearing held on March 9, 2022, regarding Docket Number 22F-H2221026-l. The dispute involves a challenge by petitioner Judy Clapp against the Forest Trails Homeowners Association (HOA) concerning the landscaping of an eight-foot unpaved common area adjacent to 1473 Trail Head (the “Norman lot”).

The central conflict involves the Board’s decision to allow a homeowner to install a rock berm on association-owned land that had historically functioned as a parking lane for residents accessing a nearby trail head. The petitioner alleges this action violates the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by granting exclusive use of common area to one homeowner and eliminating a long-standing community benefit. The association contends that the Board acted within its authority to approve architectural requests, maintained consistency with community-wide landscaping standards, and addressed legitimate nuisance and erosion concerns.

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Case Overview and Hearing Details

• Date of Hearing: March 9, 2022

• Administrative Law Judge: Alvin Moses Thompson

• Petitioner: Judy Clapp (Represented by Kevin Harper)

• Respondent: Forest Trails Homeowners Association (Represented by Ed O’Brien)

• Key Witnesses: Judy Clapp (Petitioner); Dean Meyers (Board Member/Witness for Respondent)

• Subject Property: Common area adjacent to 1473 Trail Head, Prescott, Arizona.

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Primary Legal and Regulatory Framework

The dispute centers on the interpretation of specific governing documents produced as evidence:

Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

• Section 2.2 (Common Areas and Open Space): States that common areas “shall be for the use and benefit of all members” and should be left in their natural state unless used for specific purposes, including “trails, walkways, driveways, parking areas, appropriate signs, recreational amenities, [and] landscaping.”

• Section 3.4: Grants the association the authority to “own, repair, manage, operate, and maintain” common areas according to the plat.

• Section 3.4.9: Designates the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) as the “judge of all aesthetic matters” on the common area.

• Section 4.1: Provides the Board with flexibility in its decision-making regarding association property.

Architectural Guidelines

• Landscaping Provisions: Permitted on the unpaved association-owned area (approx. 8 feet) between the lot line and the street only with ACC approval.

• Exclusive Use Restriction: Mandates that any such approval “will not give the property owner exclusive use of this association property.”

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Main Themes and Arguments

1. Historical Use vs. New Architectural Approval

The petitioner argues that the area in question served as a de facto parking lane for approximately 15–20 years, accommodating up to three vehicles.

• Petitioner Position: The removal of this parking area harms residents who now must walk an additional mile or more to access trail heads. Clapp asserts the association consistently denied similar requests in the past to protect common area access.

• Respondent Position: The HOA argues that parking was never a “guaranteed right” or a “written amenity” in the declaration. They contend the Board could not “say no” to the Normans’ request because hundreds of other homeowners have similar roadside landscaping.

2. Allegations of “Exclusive Use”

A major point of contention is whether the rock berm constitutes a violation of the rule against “exclusive use.”

• Petitioner’s Argument: The installation of large boulders and a rock berm makes it impossible for vehicles to park and “unsafe” or “risky” for pedestrians to walk over, effectively gifting the land to the adjacent homeowner.

• Respondent’s Argument: The area is not fenced or walled. Members of the public or homeowners can still theoretically walk on it, meaning use is not exclusive. Dean Meyers testified that the area is “less accessible” but still accessible at the ends.

3. Nuisance Mitigation and Safety

The HOA justifies the landscaping as a solution to long-standing issues.

• Respondent’s Evidence: Dean Meyers testified that the parking area created nuisances including noise (dogs, yelling), trash, and public intrusion 40 feet from the Normans’ kitchen. Furthermore, Meyers cited an erosion issue where water was undermining the cement curb, a problem he claims the landscaping resolved.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Clapp, a former board member of 10 years, testified she never heard of safety, noise, or trash complaints regarding this site until February 2021, four months after the rocks were installed. She suggested the “safety” argument was an after-the-fact justification.

4. Conflict of Interest and Procedure

The petitioner raised concerns regarding the motivations behind the approval.

• Self-Serving Motivation: Witness Dean Meyers is a permanent board member and also the owner of the landscaping company hired by the Normans to perform the work.

• Lack of Formal Vote: Clapp testified that the work appeared to be allowed without a formal board vote, though respondent minutes from October 27, 2020, show the board requested gravel samples for the project.

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Critical Evidence and Testimony

Photographic Evidence (Exhibit 6)

The hearing reviewed nine photographs showing the evolution of the site:

• Before: A dirt “parking lane” capable of holding cars.

• After: A “rock berm” consisting of large boulders and smaller rocks that completely prohibit vehicle access.

Comparison to Other Amenities

Clapp pointed to the community tennis courts as evidence of unfair treatment.

• Tennis Court Parking: The HOA recently expanded and paved parking for tennis players (Exhibits 17, 18).

• Trail Head Parking: Conversely, the HOA eliminated parking for hikers at the trail head, which Clapp described as the community’s only other amenity.

Legal Opinion of Jim Atkinson

An email exchange (Exhibit 7) involving former Board President and attorney Jim Atkinson was introduced. Atkinson’s noted opinion stated:

• The 8-foot area is common area property, “no different than its ownership of the paved areas.”

• Parking is a permitted use under Section 2.2.

• The Board “never agreed to allow a lot owner to block access to the shoulder area.”

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Conclusions and Sought Relief

The Petitioner seeks an order confirming that the CC&Rs prohibit these specific landscaping changes and requiring the association to restore the common area to its original condition.

The Respondent maintains that the Board acted within its discretionary authority to manage common areas and treat all members fairly by approving a standard landscaping request. They argue the Petitioner is seeking a “prescriptive easement” to park in a specific spot, a right they claim does not exist under the governing documents or Arizona law.

Summary Table of Arguments

Petitioner’s View

Respondent’s View

Land Use

Reserved for the benefit of all members (parking/trails).

Subject to Board management and aesthetic discretion.

Accessibility

Rock berm creates “exclusive use” by blocking access.

No fence exists; property remains technically accessible.

Safety/Nuisance

No evidence of prior complaints; “punitive” decision.

Resolved erosion, trash, and noise nuisances.

Consistency

Association has historically denied such requests.

Hundreds of other lots have identical landscaping.

Board Ethics

Decision was self-serving (witness was the contractor).

Business was private between the contractor and homeowner.

This summary pertains to the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vance Gribble v. Legend Trail Community Association. The hearing was held on October 15, 2021, before the Office of Administrative Hearings, concerning a petition filed under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Key Facts and Issues

Vance Gribble, a homeowner in Parcel A of the Legend Trail development, filed a petition alleging the Legend Trail Community Association (HOA) violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(E) and specific provisions of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The core issue stemmed from two emails the Association sent concerning the use of ATVs and motorized scooters on community streets. The initial March 31, 2021, email broadly stated these vehicles were "not allowed" on Legend Trail streets. Gribble argued this communication prohibited the use of these vehicles, causing children to cease driving scooters on Association streets.

The Association responded, arguing the initial email was erroneously sent to the entire community and was intended only for Parcel A. A subsequent June 21, 2021, email was sent for clarification, specifying that restrictions regarding motorized vehicles applied only to private streets (Common Areas like Parcels A and E), where the respective Parcel Associations have a legal duty to maintain safety. The Association maintained it had not adopted a formal rule prohibiting the use of ATVs or scooters on the streets of Legend Trail and thus A.R.S. § 33-1808(E) (related to signs) was inapplicable.

Legal Points and Decision

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the Association violated the governing statutes or CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge focused on whether the Association took formal action to establish a rule or prohibition. A.R.S. § 10-3140 defines an "Act of the board of directors" or "Act of the members" as requiring a majority vote or written consent.

The conclusion of law found that there was no evidence presented showing the Association adopted a rule or took formal enforcement action regarding ATVs and scooters pursuant to A.R.S. § 10-3140. Furthermore, the preponderance of the evidence did not show that the Association prohibited children from engaging in recreational activity within Legend Trail (as potentially implied by A.R.S. § 33-1808(F)).

Outcome

Because the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1808(E), A.R.S. § 33-1808(F), or the cited articles of the Declaration, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Vance Gribble’s petition be dismissed.