Brian D Sopatyk v. Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID21F-H2121065-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2021-11-01
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomePetitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issues 1 and 3, while Respondent was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issue 2. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$1,000.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerBrian D. SopatykCounselJacob A. Kubert, Esq.
RespondentXanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.CounselPenny L. Koepke, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issues 1 and 3, while Respondent was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issue 2. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 2 because he failed to prove the Respondent's no-pet policy was arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that screen doors are not permitted in Xanadu under CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2), and CC&R Article 7 (Architectural Committee authority) does not override this explicit prohibition.

Orders: Respondent is directed to comply with the requirements of CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) going forward.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
  • CC&R Article 7

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)

Petitioner alleged violation concerning the 'no-pet' policy. The ALJ concluded that Respondent is not required to allow pets, but may allow them with Board approval, and the Petitioner did not establish that the policy was arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 12-548

Alleged violation of CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

The ALJ concluded that the marquee is common area, and the Association was not authorized under CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) to charge a separate assessment or rental fee for its use. Furthermore, there was no evidence the $50 assessment complied with CC&R Article 6 § 5 (special assessment requirements).

Orders: Respondent is directed to comply with the requirements of CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) going forward.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 5
  • A.R.S. § 12-548

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Condominium, CC&R Violation, Assessment Dispute, Architectural Control, Pet Policy, Statute of Limitations Defense
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 12-548
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2)
  • CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)
  • CC&R Article 6 § 5
  • CC&R Article 7

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 913797.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:37:41 (41.8 KB)

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 913859.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:37:47 (5.9 KB)

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 921820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:37:55 (100.1 KB)

21F-H2121065-REL Decision – 921823.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:00 (112.8 KB)

This summary outlines the proceedings, arguments, and final decision in the matter of *Brian D. Sopatyk vs. Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.*, heard before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Proceedings

The Petitioner, Brian D. Sopatyk, a unit owner and member of the Respondent condominium association (Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.), filed a triple-issue petition on or about June 29, 2021, alleging violations of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The matter was referred to the OAH for an evidentiary hearing. The hearing took place on September 21, 2021, with Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson presiding. The record was held open until October 12, 2021, solely for receiving post-hearing briefs concerning the application of the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations. The Arizona Department of Real Estate has jurisdiction over these types of petitions regarding alleged condominium association violations.

Main Issues and Arguments

Petitioner Sopatyk brought three claims, asserting the Respondent violated specific CC&R articles:

  1. Issue 1 (Screen Doors): Whether Respondent violated CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) by directing and authorizing the installation of security screen doors, which are external items generally prohibited. Respondent argued the Architectural Committee had the authority to allow the installations under CC&R Article 7.
  2. Issue 2 (Pets): Whether Respondent violated CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1) by barring pets without guidelines. Respondent contended that this CC&R article does not require them to allow pets.
  3. Issue 3 (Marquee Assessment): Whether Respondent violated CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) by levying a $50 monthly fee on commercial units for marquee repair costs. Petitioner argued repairs must be paid out of the reserve fund derived from regular common expenses. Respondent countered that the $50 charge was a rental fee for unit owners advertising on the marquee, not an unauthorized assessment.

The Respondent also raised the affirmative defense that A.R.S. § 12-548 (Statute of Limitations) barred Issues 2 and 3.

Key Legal Points and Final Decision

The ALJ issued a decision on November 1, 2021, relying on the principle that unambiguous restrictive covenants must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

  1. Statute of Limitations: The ALJ rejected the defense, concluding that A.R.S. § 12-548 is inapplicable because that statute pertains to actions for debt evidenced by a written contract, which the petition was not.
  2. Issue 1 (Screen Doors): Petitioner prevailed. The ALJ concluded that screen doors are absolutely not permitted under CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2). CC&R Article 7 granting authority to the Architectural Committee cannot override the clear bar established by Article 2 § 3(a)(2), as doing so would render the prohibition meaningless.
  3. Issue 2 (Pets): Respondent prevailed. The CC&R permits, but does not require, the Board to allow pets. The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the consistent prohibition of pets was arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.
  4. Issue 3 (Marquee Assessment): Petitioner prevailed. The ALJ concluded the marquee is part of the common area. The Association was not authorized under CC&R Article 6 § 2(a) to charge a separate assessment or rental fee for its use. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the $50 charge complied with the requirements for imposing a special assessment under CC&R Article 6 § 5.

Outcome: The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding Issues 1 and 3, and the Respondent prevailed regarding Issue 2. The Respondent was ordered to comply with CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) and Article 6 § 2(a) going forward. Respondent was further ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 within thirty days. No civil penalty was imposed.

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board or Architectural Committee authorize an improvement (like a screen door) if the CC&Rs explicitly ban it?

Short Answer

No. The Board cannot use its general approval powers to override specific prohibitions in the CC&Rs.

Detailed Answer

Even if an Architectural Committee has the authority to approve improvements, they cannot authorize items that are specifically prohibited by other sections of the CC&Rs. Doing so would render the specific prohibition meaningless.

Alj Quote

If Respondent were permitted to authorize the installation of screen doors through the approval of the Architectural Committee, the bar in CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) would have no meaning.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Control
  • Board Authority
  • CC&R Interpretation

Question

If the CC&Rs say pets are allowed 'with Board permission,' does the Board have to let me have a pet?

Short Answer

No. The Board has discretion to deny permission.

Detailed Answer

If the CC&Rs state that animals are not allowed without express permission, the Board is not required to grant that permission. As long as the Board has consistently prohibited pets and not acted arbitrarily, they can enforce a no-pet policy.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent is not required, but may allow pets with the Board’s approval… Petitioner did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent has arbitrarily or unreasonably applied CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1).

Legal Basis

Board Discretion

Topic Tags

  • Pets
  • Rules Enforcement

Question

Can the HOA charge a 'rental fee' or separate assessment to specific owners for the use or repair of a common area structure?

Short Answer

Not usually. Common area maintenance should be paid from general reserve funds or regular assessments.

Detailed Answer

The HOA cannot arbitrarily charge a 'rental fee' or specific assessment for a common area amenity (like a marquee sign) if the CC&Rs require common area improvements to be funded by the reserve fund or regular assessments.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the marquee is a part of the common area of Xanadu and therefore, the Association was not authorized under CC&R Article 6 § 2(a), to charge a separate assessment or rental fee for the use of the marquee.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

Topic Tags

  • Assessments
  • Common Areas
  • Financials

Question

Is there a statute of limitations for filing a petition against my HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

Short Answer

No.

Detailed Answer

The statute of limitations that applies to debts (A.R.S. § 12-548) does not apply to ADRE petitions because they are not actions for debt. The Department itself does not have statute of limitations provisions.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 12-548 is inapplicable to the petition filed in this matter because the statute applies to actions for debt evidenced by a contract in writing. The petition does not relate to a debt and furthermore, the Department does not have any statute of limitations provisions.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 12-548 (distinguished)

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Statute of Limitations

Question

Can the HOA levy a special assessment for repairs without a vote of the members?

Short Answer

No, not if the CC&Rs require a member vote.

Detailed Answer

If the CC&Rs stipulate that special assessments for capital improvements require the assent of a certain percentage of voters (e.g., 2/3), the HOA cannot impose the cost without holding that vote.

Alj Quote

Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at hearing that the $50 assessment was imposed that complied with CC&R Article 6 § 5.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 6 § 5

Topic Tags

  • Special Assessments
  • Voting

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge has the authority to order the HOA to reimburse the prevailing party for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Fees

Question

How are conflicts or ambiguities in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are construed as a whole to determine the underlying purpose.

Detailed Answer

Restrictive covenants are interpreted by looking at the document as a whole to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Common Law Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • CC&R Interpretation

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121065-REL
Case Title
Brian D. Sopatyk vs. Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-11-01
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board or Architectural Committee authorize an improvement (like a screen door) if the CC&Rs explicitly ban it?

Short Answer

No. The Board cannot use its general approval powers to override specific prohibitions in the CC&Rs.

Detailed Answer

Even if an Architectural Committee has the authority to approve improvements, they cannot authorize items that are specifically prohibited by other sections of the CC&Rs. Doing so would render the specific prohibition meaningless.

Alj Quote

If Respondent were permitted to authorize the installation of screen doors through the approval of the Architectural Committee, the bar in CC&R Article 2 § 3(a)(2) would have no meaning.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Control
  • Board Authority
  • CC&R Interpretation

Question

If the CC&Rs say pets are allowed 'with Board permission,' does the Board have to let me have a pet?

Short Answer

No. The Board has discretion to deny permission.

Detailed Answer

If the CC&Rs state that animals are not allowed without express permission, the Board is not required to grant that permission. As long as the Board has consistently prohibited pets and not acted arbitrarily, they can enforce a no-pet policy.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent is not required, but may allow pets with the Board’s approval… Petitioner did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent has arbitrarily or unreasonably applied CC&R Article 3 § 3(d)(1).

Legal Basis

Board Discretion

Topic Tags

  • Pets
  • Rules Enforcement

Question

Can the HOA charge a 'rental fee' or separate assessment to specific owners for the use or repair of a common area structure?

Short Answer

Not usually. Common area maintenance should be paid from general reserve funds or regular assessments.

Detailed Answer

The HOA cannot arbitrarily charge a 'rental fee' or specific assessment for a common area amenity (like a marquee sign) if the CC&Rs require common area improvements to be funded by the reserve fund or regular assessments.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the marquee is a part of the common area of Xanadu and therefore, the Association was not authorized under CC&R Article 6 § 2(a), to charge a separate assessment or rental fee for the use of the marquee.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 6 § 2(a)

Topic Tags

  • Assessments
  • Common Areas
  • Financials

Question

Is there a statute of limitations for filing a petition against my HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

Short Answer

No.

Detailed Answer

The statute of limitations that applies to debts (A.R.S. § 12-548) does not apply to ADRE petitions because they are not actions for debt. The Department itself does not have statute of limitations provisions.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 12-548 is inapplicable to the petition filed in this matter because the statute applies to actions for debt evidenced by a contract in writing. The petition does not relate to a debt and furthermore, the Department does not have any statute of limitations provisions.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 12-548 (distinguished)

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Statute of Limitations

Question

Can the HOA levy a special assessment for repairs without a vote of the members?

Short Answer

No, not if the CC&Rs require a member vote.

Detailed Answer

If the CC&Rs stipulate that special assessments for capital improvements require the assent of a certain percentage of voters (e.g., 2/3), the HOA cannot impose the cost without holding that vote.

Alj Quote

Furthermore, there was no evidence presented at hearing that the $50 assessment was imposed that complied with CC&R Article 6 § 5.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 6 § 5

Topic Tags

  • Special Assessments
  • Voting

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge has the authority to order the HOA to reimburse the prevailing party for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Fees

Question

How are conflicts or ambiguities in the CC&Rs interpreted by the judge?

Short Answer

They are construed as a whole to determine the underlying purpose.

Detailed Answer

Restrictive covenants are interpreted by looking at the document as a whole to understand the intent of the parties and the purpose of the restrictions.

Alj Quote

Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein.

Legal Basis

Common Law Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • CC&R Interpretation

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121065-REL
Case Title
Brian D. Sopatyk vs. Xanadu Lake Resort Condominium, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-11-01
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian D. Sopatyk (petitioner)
    Unit Owner
  • Jacob A. Kubert (petitioner attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Penny L. Koepke (respondent attorney)
    Maxwell Morgan PC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting agent mentioned in distribution list

Darryl Jacobson-Barnes & Robert Barnes v. Circle G Ranches 4

Case Summary

Case ID21F-H2120022-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2021-08-24
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Darryl L. Jacobson-Barnes and Robert Barnes, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated any of the cited Arizona Revised Statutes or that the alleged CC&R violation was outside the scope of Article III, § 3.10. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerDarryl Jacobson-Barnes & Robert BarnesCounselAnthony L. Perez, Esq.
RespondentCircle G Ranches 4 Homeowners AssociationCounselClint G. Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(D) and (E)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5)
A.R.S. § 33-1811
Article III, § 3.10 (CC&Rs)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Darryl L. Jacobson-Barnes and Robert Barnes, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated any of the cited Arizona Revised Statutes or that the alleged CC&R violation was outside the scope of Article III, § 3.10. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803(D) and (E), 33-1804(5), or 33-1811, or that the alleged unapproved flood light violation was outside the scope of the cited CC&R provision (Article III, § 3.10).

Key Issues & Findings

The Association violated A.R.S.§ 33-1803(D) and (E) by failing to properly respond to the Barnes response to the notice of alleged violation and proceeding with enforcement actions.

Petitioner failed to establish the HOA violated these statutes because the HOA's May 27, 2020 notice contained all required information under A.R.S. § 1803(D)(1)-(4), rendering A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) inapplicable.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

The association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5) in rendering its decision on the Barnes contest of the notice.

Petitioner failed to establish violation of meeting procedures, as the appeal was discussed in an open session, and the subsequent closed session was justified to allow the HOA to seek legal counsel pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)

The alleged violation and resulting penalty imposed are void and unenforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

Petitioner failed to prove violation. A.R.S. § 33-1811 applies only to contracts, decisions, or actions for compensation, and no evidence was presented that the Petitioner's appeal involved such compensation.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

The alleged violation is outside the scope of the cited CC&R Article III, § 3.10.

Petitioner failed to prove the violation (installation of an unapproved flood light) was outside the scope of Article III, § 3.10, which requires prior approval for 'other structure[s]'.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • Article III, § 3.10 (CC&Rs)
  • Article IV, 4.6 (CC&Rs)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Architectural Control Committee, CC&R Enforcement, Floodlight, Meeting Procedure, Statutory Compliance
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • Article III, § 3.10 (CC&Rs)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

21F-H2120022-REL Decision – 895732.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:28 (39.8 KB)

21F-H2120022-REL Decision – 895827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:31 (5.6 KB)

21F-H2120022-REL Decision – 906326.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:34 (99.4 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case heard in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concerning Darryl Jacobson-Barnes & Robert Barnes (Petitioner) and Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association (Respondent/HOA). The case number was 21F-H2120022-REL, and the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was Velva Moses-Thompson. Hearings were held on January 26, 2021, March 3, 2021, and July 14, 2021, with the record held open until August 4, 2021.

Key Facts and Dispute Background

The dispute originated when a member of the HOA Board of Directors filed a complaint alleging that Petitioner had installed an unapproved floodlight at the back of their home. On May 27, 2020, the HOA issued a violation notice alleging a violation of Article III, Section 3.10 of the HOA CC&Rs, which requires prior approval of design, location, and materials for structures constructed on the property.

Petitioner requested a hearing regarding the notice. After the parties failed to resolve the issue of "excessive light trespass" following an initial July 9, 2020 open appeal session, the Board held another appeal hearing on July 24, 2020. The Board voted on the appeal in a closed, executive session in order to obtain legal advice. The Board notified the Petitioner that their appeal was denied around August 18, 2020. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department) outlining four alleged violations by the HOA.

Main Legal Issues

The OAH hearing focused on four issues set for determination:

  1. Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(D) and (E) by failing to respond properly to the notice contest and proceeding with enforcement.
  2. Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5) by rendering its decision on the contest in a closed session.
  3. Whether the alleged violation and resulting penalty were void and unenforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1811.
  4. Whether the alleged violation (the unapproved floodlight) was outside the scope of the cited CC&R Article III, § 3.10.

Key Legal Findings and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D) and (E): The ALJ found no violation. The evidence showed the HOA's May 27, 2020 notice of violation provided all the requisite information (including the CC&R provision, observation date, observer name, and contest process) required under A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1)-(4). Since the notice was compliant, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) were not triggered and did not apply.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(a)(5): The ALJ found no violation. While the Board voted in a closed session, credible testimony demonstrated that the session was closed to allow the HOA to seek legal counsel concerning the decision, which is permissible pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811: The ALJ found no violation. This statute pertains to the validity of actions for compensation (contracts, decisions, etc.) taken by the Board, and no evidence was presented that Petitioner’s appeal involved such an action.
  • Scope of CC&R Article III, § 3.10: The ALJ determined the allegation regarding the unapproved floodlight fell within the scope of CC&R Article III, § 3.10. This article governs the construction of structures, including "other structure[s]," requiring prior approval from the Architectural Control Committee.

Outcome

The ALJ concluded that the petition filed by Darryl L. Jacobson-Barnes and Robert Barnes should be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed, and the Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association is deemed the prevailing party in this matter. The decision was signed on August 24, 2021.

Questions

Question

What specific information must be included in a violation notice for it to be legally sufficient?

Short Answer

The notice must include the provision violated, the date of observation, the name of the observer, and the process to contest it.

Detailed Answer

An HOA violation notice is considered sufficient if it includes four key pieces of information: the specific community document provision alleged to be violated, the date the violation was observed, the first and last name of the person who observed it, and the process the member must follow to contest the notice. If these are present, the HOA has met its obligation.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that the HOA notified Petitioner of the provision of the community documents that had allegedly been violated, the date the violation was observed, the first and last name of the person who observed the violation, and the process the member must follow to contest the notice through the May 27, 2020 notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)

Topic Tags

  • violation notices
  • due process
  • HOA procedures

Question

Does the HOA have to send a second 'explanation' letter after I receive a violation notice?

Short Answer

No, not if the original notice already contained all the legally required details.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, the requirement for an HOA to provide a written explanation (often detailed in A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)) is only triggered if the initial violation notice was missing required information. If the initial notice fully satisfied the statutory requirements (provision, date, observer, contest process), the HOA is not required to send further explanation letters before proceeding.

Alj Quote

If a homeowner’s association satisfies the requirements in A.R.S. § 1803(D) (1)-(4) in its notice of violation, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (E) is not triggered and does not apply.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)

Topic Tags

  • violation notices
  • legal requirements

Question

Can the HOA Board go into a closed session to decide on my appeal?

Short Answer

Yes, if the closed session is used to seek legal counsel regarding the decision.

Detailed Answer

While appeals generally involve open discussion, the Board is permitted to adjourn to an executive (closed) session to deliberate if they need to obtain legal advice concerning the decision. This does not violate the open meeting requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Alj Quote

The preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(5) because Petitioner’s appeal was discussed in an open session. Moreover, the HOA presented credible testimony that the session was closed to allow the HOA to seek legal counsel concerning its decision in Petitioner’s appeal

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • board meetings
  • open meeting law
  • executive session

Question

Do I need architectural approval to install a floodlight?

Short Answer

Yes, floodlights can be considered 'structures' or changes requiring approval under CC&Rs.

Detailed Answer

Even if not a building, items like floodlights attached to a home can fall under the scope of CC&R restrictions regarding 'structures' or unapproved changes. The ALJ found that an allegation of an unapproved floodlight falls within the scope of architectural control provisions.

Alj Quote

Respondent alleged that an unapproved flood light was installed at the back of Petitioner’s home. Such allegation falls within the scope of CC&R Article III, § 3.10.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article III, § 3.10

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • home improvements
  • lighting

Question

Can I use A.R.S. § 33-1811 to void a penalty if I disagree with the violation?

Short Answer

Generally no, unless the decision involved a conflict of interest or compensation for a board member.

Detailed Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 specifically addresses the validity of contracts or decisions involving compensation/conflicts of interest. It is not a catch-all statute to void standard violation penalties where no such compensation or conflict exists.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1811 applies to the validity of any contract, decision, or action for compensation taken by or on behalf of the Board. There was no evidence presented at hearing that the Petitioner’s appeal involved a contract, decision or other action for compensation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflicts of interest
  • penalties
  • statutory interpretation

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove the HOA violated the law by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner (the homeowner) to provide evidence that carries greater weight or is more convincing than the evidence offered by the HOA.

Alj Quote

At this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • hearings
  • burden of proof

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120022-REL
Case Title
Darryl Jacobson-Barnes & Robert Barnes vs. Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2021-08-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What specific information must be included in a violation notice for it to be legally sufficient?

Short Answer

The notice must include the provision violated, the date of observation, the name of the observer, and the process to contest it.

Detailed Answer

An HOA violation notice is considered sufficient if it includes four key pieces of information: the specific community document provision alleged to be violated, the date the violation was observed, the first and last name of the person who observed it, and the process the member must follow to contest the notice. If these are present, the HOA has met its obligation.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that the HOA notified Petitioner of the provision of the community documents that had allegedly been violated, the date the violation was observed, the first and last name of the person who observed the violation, and the process the member must follow to contest the notice through the May 27, 2020 notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)

Topic Tags

  • violation notices
  • due process
  • HOA procedures

Question

Does the HOA have to send a second 'explanation' letter after I receive a violation notice?

Short Answer

No, not if the original notice already contained all the legally required details.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, the requirement for an HOA to provide a written explanation (often detailed in A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)) is only triggered if the initial violation notice was missing required information. If the initial notice fully satisfied the statutory requirements (provision, date, observer, contest process), the HOA is not required to send further explanation letters before proceeding.

Alj Quote

If a homeowner’s association satisfies the requirements in A.R.S. § 1803(D) (1)-(4) in its notice of violation, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (E) is not triggered and does not apply.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(E)

Topic Tags

  • violation notices
  • legal requirements

Question

Can the HOA Board go into a closed session to decide on my appeal?

Short Answer

Yes, if the closed session is used to seek legal counsel regarding the decision.

Detailed Answer

While appeals generally involve open discussion, the Board is permitted to adjourn to an executive (closed) session to deliberate if they need to obtain legal advice concerning the decision. This does not violate the open meeting requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Alj Quote

The preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(5) because Petitioner’s appeal was discussed in an open session. Moreover, the HOA presented credible testimony that the session was closed to allow the HOA to seek legal counsel concerning its decision in Petitioner’s appeal

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1)

Topic Tags

  • board meetings
  • open meeting law
  • executive session

Question

Do I need architectural approval to install a floodlight?

Short Answer

Yes, floodlights can be considered 'structures' or changes requiring approval under CC&Rs.

Detailed Answer

Even if not a building, items like floodlights attached to a home can fall under the scope of CC&R restrictions regarding 'structures' or unapproved changes. The ALJ found that an allegation of an unapproved floodlight falls within the scope of architectural control provisions.

Alj Quote

Respondent alleged that an unapproved flood light was installed at the back of Petitioner’s home. Such allegation falls within the scope of CC&R Article III, § 3.10.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article III, § 3.10

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • home improvements
  • lighting

Question

Can I use A.R.S. § 33-1811 to void a penalty if I disagree with the violation?

Short Answer

Generally no, unless the decision involved a conflict of interest or compensation for a board member.

Detailed Answer

A.R.S. § 33-1811 specifically addresses the validity of contracts or decisions involving compensation/conflicts of interest. It is not a catch-all statute to void standard violation penalties where no such compensation or conflict exists.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1811 applies to the validity of any contract, decision, or action for compensation taken by or on behalf of the Board. There was no evidence presented at hearing that the Petitioner’s appeal involved a contract, decision or other action for compensation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • conflicts of interest
  • penalties
  • statutory interpretation

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove the HOA violated the law by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative proceedings, the burden is on the petitioner (the homeowner) to provide evidence that carries greater weight or is more convincing than the evidence offered by the HOA.

Alj Quote

At this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • hearings
  • burden of proof

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120022-REL
Case Title
Darryl Jacobson-Barnes & Robert Barnes vs. Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2021-08-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Darryl Jacobson-Barnes (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Darryl Lynn Barnes–Jacobson and Darryl Barnes
  • Robert Barnes (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Robert A Barnes and Bob Barnes
  • Anthony L. Perez (petitioner attorney)
    Boyes Legal, PC

Respondent Side

  • Clint G. Goodman (respondent attorney)
    Goodman Holmgren Law Group
  • Michelle Mooney (board member)
    Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association Board of Directors
    Filed complaint against Petitioner
  • Jennifer Amundson (property manager)
    VISION Community Management
    Also referred to as Jen Amundson; inspected violation
  • Amanda Stewart (board member)
    Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association Board of Directors
    Board President

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE contact)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (administrative staff)
    Transmitted July 14, 2021 Order
  • Miranda Alvarez (administrative staff)
    Transmitted August 24, 2021 Order

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2020060-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-09-16
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerLaura B GanerCounsel—
RespondentVincenz Homeowners AssociationCounselMark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

• Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2020043-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-09-08
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerWendy EllsworthCounselBrian Hatch
RespondentVincenz Homeowners' AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:22 (95.4 KB)

Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.

The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.

Case Background

• Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.

• Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.

• Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.

• Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.

The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.

Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1

The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:

Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)

Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.

• Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.

• Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”

• Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)

The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.

• Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

• Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.

• Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.

Legal Standards Applied

Standard

Description

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Covenant Interpretation

In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.

Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation

The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:

• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.

Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction

The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.

• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

——————————————————————————–

Review Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?

3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?

4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?

5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?

6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?

7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?

8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?

9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?

10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.

2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.

3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.

4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.

5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.

8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.

1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?

2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.

3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?

5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Declaratory Judgment

A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.

Waiver

The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.

Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons

The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.

Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation

Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.

This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:

“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.

Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase

In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The court defined this standard as:

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”

The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.

Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door

The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.

The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.

The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:

“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.

Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner

Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.

While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wendy Ellsworth (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Brian Hatch (petitioner attorney)
    Brian A. Hatch PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

John B. Clark Jr. v. Foothills Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019007-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-02-04
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws when removing him from the Design Review Committee. The judge found the HOA replaced the Petitioner to ensure quorum could be met, not for pretextual or political reasons.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJohn B. Clark Jr.CounselMitchell Vasin
RespondentFoothills Community AssociationCounselB. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Articles of Incorporation 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15; Bylaws Art II 2.3, Art III 3.5, Art IV 4.8(c)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws when removing him from the Design Review Committee. The judge found the HOA replaced the Petitioner to ensure quorum could be met, not for pretextual or political reasons.

Why this result: The HOA provided evidence that the removal was based on the need to ensure quorum for meetings, given Petitioner's frequent absences. Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or specific bylaw violations.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal from Design Review Committee

Petitioner alleged the HOA removed him from the Design Review Committee (DRC) for pretextual reasons and in bad faith, violating various Articles and Bylaws.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_lose

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

20F-H2019007-REL Decision – 767866.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:22:49 (103.9 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Clark v. Foothills Community Association (No. 20F-H2019007-REL)

Executive Summary

In February 2020, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision in the matter of John B. Clark Jr. v. Foothills Community Association. The case centered on a petition filed by Mr. Clark, a long-term member of the Association’s Design Review Committee (DRC), who was removed from his position in July 2019.

The Petitioner alleged that his removal was based on "pretextual" reasons and "bad faith," asserting violations of the Association's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The Respondent, Foothills Community Association, maintained that the removal was necessitated by the Petitioner's chronic absenteeism and the DRC's requirement to meet a quorum to conduct business.

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petition. The decision concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish any violations of governing documents or statutes. The ruling affirmed that the Association's need for operational efficiency and quorum maintenance constituted a valid, non-pretextual reason for removing a committee member.


Analysis of Key Themes

1. Operational Necessity and Quorum Requirements

The central justification for the Petitioner's removal was the Association's inability to ensure a quorum for DRC meetings. The DRC meetings were held on the second Wednesday of every month. Evidence presented by the Respondent indicated that the Petitioner’s attendance had been significantly inconsistent:

  • Long-term attendance: Since April 2015, the Petitioner attended 19 out of 54 meetings.
  • Recent attendance: In the 18 meetings prior to his removal, the Petitioner attended only four.

The Association argued that while alternates could be called when a quorum was not met, those alternates were often unavailable. Consequently, the Board determined that replacing the Petitioner with a more consistently available member was necessary for the Committee to conduct business efficiently.

2. Allegations of Pretext and "Politics"

The Petitioner contended that his removal "wreaked of politics" and was done in bad faith. He argued that:

  • His professional commitments as an Air Force Reservist, realtor, and American Airlines pilot were known to the Board since 2011.
  • A change in meeting time from 3:00 PM to 2:00 PM made attendance more difficult.
  • No one had previously expressed concerns regarding his absences.

Despite these assertions, the ALJ found that the Petitioner provided no substantive evidence to prove that the Association’s stated reason—the need for a quorum—was a pretext for a different, underlying motive.

3. Procedural Compliance and Governance

The Association demonstrated adherence to procedural requirements regarding the removal and appointment of committee members:

  • Notice and Agendas: Meeting notices and agendas for the May and June 2019 Board meetings (where DRC appointments were discussed) were uploaded to the Association's website.
  • Public Deliberation: The minutes of the May 22, 2019, meeting noted that new members would be appointed. The June 26, 2019, minutes recorded the unanimous approval of two new DRC members and two alternates.
  • Documentation: The Respondent’s Bylaws (Article IV, Section 4.8(c)) require the secretary to keep minutes of all proceedings, a duty the ALJ found the Association had fulfilled.
4. Legal Standards and Jurisdiction

The case highlighted several critical legal boundaries:

  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish violations by a "preponderance of the evidence"—meaning the contention is more probably true than not. The ALJ found the Petitioner failed this standard for all alleged violations.
  • Jurisdictional Limits: The ALJ noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks jurisdiction to determine violations of A.R.S. § 10-3830.
  • Attorney's Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The ALJ ruled that the Department of Real Estate and OAH are not empowered by statute to award attorney's fees in these specific administrative proceedings, as they do not constitute a "court action."

Important Quotes and Context

Regarding the Removal Notice

"With the need for the Committee to meet quorum on a monthly basis to conduct business in an efficient manner for the homeowners, and recognizing your commitments and schedule often necessitate your absence, the Board has selected a new member for the Committee."

— Foothills Board of Directors, Letter to John B. Clark Jr. (July 10, 2019)

Context: This was the formal notification sent to the Petitioner. It framed the removal as a matter of organizational efficiency rather than personal performance or misconduct.

Regarding Attendance Records

"The truth of the matter is, since April of 2015 you have attended only 19 of the 54 DRC meetings and only 4 of the last 18."

— Michael Owen (Board Member), Email to Petitioner (July 16, 2019)

Context: This email provided the factual basis for the Board's decision, countering the Petitioner's claim that his removal was politically motivated.

Regarding the ALJ's Legal Conclusion

"Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent removed him from the DRC for a pretextual reason. The preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent removed Petitioner and replaced him with a new member due to its desire to meet quorum on a monthly basis."

— Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

Context: This is the core legal finding that led to the dismissal of the petition, affirming the Association's right to manage committee membership based on attendance.


Actionable Insights

For Homeowners' Associations (HOAs)
  • Maintain Rigorous Attendance Records: The Association’s ability to provide specific attendance statistics (19 of 54 meetings) was crucial in defending against claims of "pretext."
  • Utilize Public Agendas and Minutes: Transparency in documenting when committee changes will be discussed and decided protects the Board from allegations of "bad faith" or "secret" dealings.
  • Link Removals to Operational Needs: When removing a volunteer or committee member, framing the decision around "the need to meet quorum" and "conduct business in an efficient manner" provides a defensible, objective rationale.
For Committee Members and Volunteers
  • Communication of Absences is Not Immunity: While the Petitioner asserted he always notified the DRC of his absences, the ruling suggests that even "excused" or explained absences can lead to removal if they hinder the committee's ability to reach a quorum.
  • Monitor Association Digital Platforms: The Petitioner claimed he was unaware of the pending changes, but the ALJ noted that notices and agendas were available on the Association website and sent via standard channels.
Procedural Note on Litigation
  • Attorney's Fee Limitations: Parties entering administrative hearings through the Arizona Department of Real Estate should be aware that, unlike standard civil litigation, the prevailing party is generally not entitled to recover attorney's fees because the hearing is an administrative claim rather than a court "action."

Comprehensive Study Guide: Clark v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019007-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between John B. Clark Jr. (Petitioner) and Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It explores the legal issues, findings of fact, and the ultimate decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) regarding a dispute over removal from a homeowners’ association committee.


I. Key Concepts

Administrative Jurisdiction and Authority

The Arizona Department of Real Estate is authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions regarding homeowners’ associations (HOAs). While the Department has jurisdiction over certain Title 33 violations, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) does not have jurisdiction over all laws; for instance, the ALJ in this case noted a lack of jurisdiction to determine violations of A.R.S. § 10-3830.

Burden of Proof: Preponderance of the Evidence

In administrative hearings of this nature, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof. They must establish that the Respondent violated the governing documents (Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws) by a "preponderance of the evidence." This standard means the contention must be shown to be more probably true than not, possessing superior evidentiary weight that inclines a fair mind to one side.

The Role of the Design Review Committee (DRC)

The DRC is a specialized committee within the HOA. Maintaining a quorum—the minimum number of members required to be present—is essential for the committee to conduct business efficiently for the homeowners.

Procedural Transparency

HOA operations are governed by transparency requirements. This includes:

  • Notice and Agendas: Meeting notices and agendas must be uploaded to the association’s website.
  • Open Sessions: Significant actions, such as the appointment or removal of committee members, should be recorded in the minutes of Board of Director’s Open Session Meetings.
  • Record Keeping: Bylaws typically require the secretary to keep minutes of all proceedings of the Board and the Members.
Attorney’s Fees in Administrative Hearings

In Arizona administrative proceedings involving a member’s petition against an HOA filed with the Department of Real Estate, the Department and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) are not empowered to award attorney’s fees. This is because such hearings are not considered "actions" under the statutes that typically authorize such awards.


II. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 20F-H2019007-REL?

Answer: John B. Clark Jr. (Petitioner) and Foothills Community Association (Respondent).

2. How long did the Petitioner serve on the Design Review Committee (DRC) before his removal?

Answer: From 2011 to 2019.

3. What specific reason did the Board of Directors provide in their July 10, 2019, letter for selecting a new DRC member?

Answer: The need for the Committee to meet quorum on a monthly basis and the recognition that the Petitioner's schedule necessitated frequent absences.

4. According to the testimony of Michael Owen, what was the Petitioner’s attendance record for DRC meetings since April 2015?

Answer: He attended only 19 of 54 DRC meetings, and only 4 of the most recent 18.

5. Which specific Articles of Incorporation did the Petitioner allege were violated?

Answer: Articles 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, and 15.

6. What was the Petitioner's professional background, and why did it impact his attendance?

Answer: He was an Air Force Reservist, a realtor, and a pilot for American Airlines. His "on call" schedule as a pilot made it difficult to attend meetings, especially after the meeting time was moved from 3:00 PM to 2:00 PM.

7. On what dates were the Open Session Meetings held where the DRC membership was discussed and finalized?

Answer: May 22, 2019, and June 26, 2019.

8. What was the ALJ’s final ruling regarding the Petitioner’s claim of "pretextual" removal?

Answer: The ALJ concluded the Petitioner failed to prove the removal was pretextual, finding instead that the Respondent removed him due to the desire to meet quorum monthly.

9. Why was the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees denied?

Answer: The legislature has not authorized the Department or OAH to award attorney’s fees in these specific administrative proceedings.


III. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. Analyzing the Preponderance of Evidence Explain the concept of "preponderance of the evidence" as defined in the document. How did this standard influence the ALJ's decision to dismiss the petition despite the Petitioner’s claims of political motivations?

2. Organizational Efficiency vs. Member Commitment The Board acknowledged the Petitioner’s years of service but ultimately replaced him to ensure a quorum. Discuss the balance between an HOA’s duty to its members to "conduct business in an efficient manner" and its relationship with long-serving volunteers who have professional scheduling conflicts.

3. Procedural Due Process in HOAs The Petitioner claimed he was removed in "bad faith" and for "pretextual" reasons. Evaluate the role of the Association’s website, meeting minutes, and agendas in providing a defense against these claims. How does documented transparency (as shown by Ms. Wontor's testimony) serve as a legal safeguard for homeowners’ associations?


IV. Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)A judge who conducts hearings and makes decisions in disputes involving administrative agencies.
BylawsThe internal rules and regulations that govern the day-to-day operations of an organization, such as an HOA.
Design Review Committee (DRC)A committee within an HOA responsible for reviewing and approving changes to properties to ensure they meet community standards.
Homeowners’ Association (HOA)An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.
JurisdictionThe official power to make legal decisions and judgments over a specific matter or geographic area.
Preorderance of the EvidenceThe evidentiary standard in civil cases where a claim is proved if it is shown to be more likely true than not.
PretextualA reason given in justification of a course of action that is not the real reason; a false excuse.
QuorumThe minimum number of members of an assembly or committee that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
RespondentThe party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, the Foothills Community Association.
StatuteA written law passed by a legislative body.

Attendance and Authority: Lessons from a Design Review Committee Removal Dispute

1. Introduction: A Conflict in the Foothills

In the administrative case of John B. Clark Jr. vs. Foothills Community Association, we see a classic governance conflict: the tension between a volunteer’s personal professional excellence and the operational needs of a homeowners’ association (HOA). Mr. Clark, a long-serving volunteer on the Design Review Committee (DRC) from 2011 to 2019, challenged his removal after the Board of Directors replaced him to ensure consistent meeting quorums. The resulting legal battle, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), serves as a masterclass in how boards must navigate "bad faith" allegations and "pretextual" removal claims. This post analyzes the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision and provides actionable insights for boards facing similar volunteer disputes.

2. The Petitioner’s Case: Claims of Political Pretext

The Petitioner, Mr. Clark, was a highly accomplished community member—an Air Force Reservist, realtor, and pilot for American Airlines. His defense fell into a common "governance trap": the belief that professional stature and a history of service create a permanent right to a committee seat, regardless of current availability. Clark argued that the Board had been aware of his demanding "on call" schedule since 2011 and that he consistently communicated his availability.

When the Board removed him in 2019, Clark alleged the decision "reeked of politics" and was executed in bad faith. He claimed his removal violated several of the Association’s governing documents, specifically:

  • Articles of Incorporation: Articles 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, and 15.
  • Bylaws: Article II, Section 2.3; Article III, Section 3.5; and Article IV, Section 4.8(c).

Clark’s frustration stemmed from a lack of prior warnings regarding his absences, particularly after a meeting time change from 3:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. made his attendance more difficult. However, as the ruling would show, a volunteer's personal schedule does not override the Association’s duty to maintain a functioning committee.

3. The Association’s Defense: The Reality of Meeting Quorum

The Foothills Community Association (the Respondent) framed the removal not as a personal or political attack, but as an operational necessity. In a formal letter dated July 10, 2019, the Board thanked Mr. Clark for his years of service while explicitly stating that the DRC required a monthly quorum to conduct business efficiently for all homeowners.

To prove this wasn't "pretextual," the Association relied on hard data provided by Board member Michael Owen.

The Attendance Record The Association’s records revealed a significant lack of participation. Since April 2015, the Petitioner attended only 19 out of 54 DRC meetings. More critically, he attended only 4 of the last 18 meetings prior to his removal.

The Association further demonstrated a transparent process. Community Manager Patricia Wontor testified that meeting notices and agendas were posted on the association's website. Crucially, the Board proved that the decision was not made in the dark: the open session minutes from May 22, 2019, and June 26, 2019, documented the discussion and unanimous approval of the new DRC appointments.

4. The ALJ Decision: Burden of Proof and Findings of Fact

In these proceedings, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof under the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard. This requires proving that a contention is "more probably true than not," or that the evidence has "the most convincing force."

The ALJ found that Clark failed to meet this burden. While Clark felt the removal was political, the Association’s documented evidence of poor attendance provided a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for the Board’s action.

A vital legal takeaway for boards is the "Jurisdiction Gap" identified in this case. The Petitioner attempted to argue that the Association violated A.R.S. § 10-3830. However, the ALJ ruled that the OAH lacked jurisdiction over this statute. This is because the Department of Real Estate and OAH are limited to hearing disputes regarding Title 33 (the HOA and Planned Communities statutes). A.R.S. § 10-3830 falls under Title 10 (the Nonprofit Corporation Act). Homeowners often attempt to use corporate law in these hearings, but a Governance Specialist knows that administrative judges are strictly confined to the "single-issue" jurisdiction of Title 33.

5. Why Attorney's Fees Were Denied

A significant risk for associations in OAH disputes is the "American jurisprudence" principle regarding legal costs. Even though the Foothills Community Association prevailed, their request for attorney’s fees was denied.

In Arizona, A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) allows a winning party to recover fees in "actions" arising out of a contract. However, the ALJ clarified that an administrative hearing before the Department of Real Estate is not an "action" in the legal sense. Because the legislature has not specifically granted the OAH the power to award fees in these administrative member petitions, each party must bear their own costs. Boards should always weigh this financial reality—that they may win the case but still lose the legal fees—when deciding whether to litigate or settle.

6. Key Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

This case provides a roadmap for defensible committee management:

  1. Attendance is Essential: Participation logs are the ultimate defense. Boards have a fiduciary duty to ensure committees can meet quorum; if a member cannot participate, removal is a legitimate and defensible operational choice.
  2. Minutes are the "Smoking Gun": The Association’s victory was secured by the May 22 and June 26, 2019 minutes. These proved the Board followed a transparent process in open sessions, neutralizing claims of "secret" political maneuvering.
  3. The Burden of Proof is High: Petitioners must provide more than "feelings" of bad faith. They must provide evidence that outweighs the Association’s documented business reasons.
  4. Know Your Statutes: Administrative hearings are restricted. Arguments based on the Nonprofit Corporation Act (Title 10) will likely be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in a forum designed for Title 33 disputes.

7. Conclusion

The dispute in the Foothills highlights the need for clear, proactive communication regarding volunteer expectations. While the Association's decision was legally sound, a formal attendance policy might have prevented the dispute entirely.

The Final Order, issued February 4, 2020, dismissed the petition and stands as a binding decision. For any party dissatisfied with such a ruling, the only recourse is a formal request for a rehearing, which must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order's service. This case serves as a reminder that in HOA governance, objective data and recorded minutes are a board’s strongest shield.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John B. Clark Jr. (petitioner)
    Foothills Community Association
    Homeowner; former Design Review Committee (DRC) member; Air Force Reservist; realtor; pilot
  • Mitchell Vasin (petitioner attorney)
    Vasin & Rocco, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (respondent attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Patricia Wontor (property manager)
    Premier Community Management
    Community Manager for Foothills Community Association; witness
  • Michael Owen (board member)
    Foothills Community Association
    Witness; sent email to Petitioner regarding removal
  • Jeffrey B. Corben (respondent attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Listed on service list

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted order
  • A. Leverette (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed transmission of order

Jeffrey S Audette vs. Sun Harbor Community Association dba Desert

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019009-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-12-25
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3) or the CC&Rs. The HOA reasonably determined the Petitioner's unauthorized construction of block walls was inconsistent with architectural guidelines regarding setbacks and view preservation.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJeffrey S. AudetteCounselMark J. Bainbridge
RespondentSun Harbor Community Association dba Desert Harbor Homeowners AssociationCounselLauren Vie

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3) or the CC&Rs. The HOA reasonably determined the Petitioner's unauthorized construction of block walls was inconsistent with architectural guidelines regarding setbacks and view preservation.

Why this result: The Petitioner modified his property without required prior approval. The modification (block walls in a setback area) violated specific architectural guidelines. The Petitioner provided no evidence that the HOA had not enforced these guidelines against other homeowners (selective enforcement).

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

Petitioner alleged the HOA unreasonably denied his request to replace wrought iron fences with block walls and inconsistently enforced rules.

Orders: Petition dismissed; Respondent deemed prevailing party.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • CC&R Article IV, Section 2(a)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

20F-H2019009-REL Decision – 760862.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:04 (87.1 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Jeffrey S. Audette v. Sun Harbor Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and subsequent decision in the matter of Jeffrey S. Audette v. Sun Harbor Community Association dba Desert Harbor Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2019009-REL). The dispute arose when the Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Audette, replaced wrought iron fencing with five-foot-high block walls on his lakefront property without obtaining prior authorization from the Respondent, Sun Harbor Community Association (Sun Harbor).

The Petitioner alleged that the Association unreasonably denied his construction plans and practiced inconsistent enforcement of community rules. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Sun Harbor acted reasonably and within the scope of its governing documents. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish selective enforcement or a violation of Arizona law. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and Sun Harbor was deemed the prevailing party.


Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Procedural Non-Compliance and Prior Approval

A central theme of the case is the Petitioner’s failure to adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in the Sun Harbor Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

  • Unauthorized Modification: In February 2018, the Petitioner replaced two wrought iron fences with five-foot-high block walls.
  • Lack of Prior Consent: This construction occurred before the Petitioner requested permission from the Sun Harbor Architectural Committee.
  • Retrospective Denial: When the Petitioner eventually submitted a request in March 2018, the Committee denied it, and the Association upheld this denial upon appeal.
2. Architectural Guidelines and Setback Restrictions

The decision highlights specific technical violations regarding the placement and height of the new structures.

  • The 15-Foot Setback Rule: Sun Harbor Architectural Guidelines prohibit any structure, fence, or shrub with a solid height greater than three feet within the 15-foot setback of the concrete shoreline.
  • Violation Specifics: The Petitioner’s block walls were five feet high and located within the restricted 15-foot lake lining setback.
  • Preservation of Harmony and Views: Testimony from Association representatives established that the block walls were "inharmonious with the surroundings" and "obscured the view of the lake" for other homeowners, specifically those on lots 1 through 9.
3. Standards of Evidence and Selective Enforcement

The Petitioner attempted to defend the modification by claiming that Sun Harbor inconsistently enforced its rules.

  • Burden of Proof: Under Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119, the party asserting a claim (the Petitioner) bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Insufficient Evidence: While the Petitioner provided photographs of other properties allegedly in violation of the three-foot height limit, he failed to provide written or oral testimony proving that the Association had not enforced the guidelines against those specific homeowners.
  • The Precedent Concern: The Association testified that its denial was partly based on a desire to avoid creating a precedent that would allow other homeowners to replace iron fences with high block walls.

Important Quotes with Context

QuoteContext
"The Committee will take into consideration the suitability of the proposed alteration… the harmony thereof with the surroundings and the effect of the alteration as planned on any adjacent or neighboring property."Found in the Sun Harbor Architectural Guidelines (Sept 2002), this establishes the Association's broad authority to judge projects based on aesthetics and community impact.
"No structure, fence or shrubs with a solid height greater than 3 feet are allowed in the 15-foot setback of the concrete shoreline, with the exception of approved docks."The specific rule from the Architectural Guidelines that the Petitioner's five-foot wall violated.
"The CC&Rs are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms."A legal conclusion citing Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, reinforcing that homeowners are legally bound by the association's governing documents.
"An association shall not unreasonably withhold approval of a construction project’s architectural plans."A reference to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3), which serves as the legal standard for determining if an HOA's denial was lawful.
"A preponderance of the evidence is: The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."The legal standard used by the ALJ to evaluate the claims, citing Black’s Law Dictionary.

Actionable Insights

For Community Associations (HOAs)
  • Consistency in Documentation: The Association's success in this matter was tied to having clear, written Architectural Guidelines that specified height and setback requirements.
  • Aesthetic Justification: Boards should document how a non-compliant structure impacts the "harmony" of the community or the views of other residents, as these are defensible reasons for denial under Arizona law.
  • Precedent Awareness: Associations may validly deny a request if granting it would set an undesirable precedent for the community, provided the denial is based on existing CC&Rs.
For Homeowners and Members
  • The "Prior Approval" Mandate: Homeowners must obtain written approval before beginning construction. Attempting to seek approval after the fact (retrospective approval) puts the homeowner at a significant legal and financial disadvantage.
  • Sub-Association vs. Master Association: Approval from a sub-association does not automatically grant approval from the master association. Homeowners must ensure they have consent from all relevant governing bodies.
  • Substantiating Selective Enforcement: To successfully argue selective enforcement, a homeowner must provide more than just photos of other violations; they must prove that the association actively chose not to enforce rules in those specific instances while enforcing them against the homeowner.
Legal and Regulatory Takeaways
  • Preponderance of Evidence: In administrative hearings regarding HOA disputes, the petitioner must provide convincing force to their claims. Merely showing that neighbors approve of a change is insufficient to override the contractual obligations of the CC&Rs.
  • Contractual Nature of CC&Rs: The courts and administrative offices treat CC&Rs as unambiguous contracts. If the terms are clear, they will be enforced as written to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Study Guide: Audette v. Sun Harbor Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Jeffrey S. Audette (Petitioner) and Sun Harbor Community Association (Respondent). It explores the legal obligations of homeowners within an association, the authority of architectural committees, and the standards of proof required in administrative law.


Key Concepts and Case Overview

1. Architectural Control and Prior Approval

Under Sun Harbor’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R) Article IV, Section 2(a), homeowners are strictly required to obtain written notification and approval from the Architectural Committee before undertaking any structural changes. This ensures that alterations are suitable in terms of materials, site location, and harmony with the surrounding environment.

2. Specific Property Restrictions

The Sun Harbor Architectural Guidelines (adopted September 2002) establish specific limitations for waterfront properties:

  • The 15-Foot Setback: No structure, fence, or shrub with a solid height greater than 3 feet is permitted within the 15-foot setback of the concrete shoreline.
  • Exceptions: The only structures generally exempt from this height restriction are approved docks.
3. Legal Status of CC&Rs

In Arizona, CC&Rs are viewed as a legal contract between the association and the property owner. Courts and administrative bodies must enforce these documents according to their clear and unambiguous terms to give effect to the intent of the parties involved.

4. Burden of Proof in Administrative Hearings

In an administrative hearing, the party asserting a claim (the Petitioner) bears the "burden of proof." The standard used is a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning the evidence presented must have the most convincing force and demonstrate that the claim is more likely true than not.

5. Selective Enforcement Claims

A common defense in HOA disputes is the allegation of selective enforcement—the idea that the association is enforcing rules against one member while ignoring similar violations by others. To succeed, the petitioner must provide concrete evidence (written or oral) that the association knowingly failed to enforce guidelines in those other instances.


Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. What specific modification did Mr. Audette make to his property that led to the violation notice?

Mr. Audette removed two wrought iron fences and replaced them with 5-foot high block walls.

2. Why did the Sun Harbor Architectural Committee deny Mr. Audette’s retroactive request for the block walls?

The request was denied because the walls exceeded the 3-foot height limit within the 15-foot setback and were deemed inharmonious with the surroundings, specifically obscuring the view of the lake.

3. Which state agency has authority over disputes involving homeowners' associations in this case?

The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

4. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, as cited in the case, how is "preponderance of the evidence" defined?

It is the greater weight of the evidence; evidence that has the most convincing force and inclines a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

5. What was Mr. Audette's argument regarding the visibility of his block walls?

He asserted that no other homeowners could see the walls except for his immediate neighbors to the left and right, both of whom approved of the modification.

6. What is the association’s legal obligation regarding the approval of architectural plans under A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)?

An association shall not unreasonably withhold approval of a construction project’s architectural plans.

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Audette’s claim of selective enforcement?

Mr. Audette provided no written or oral testimony to establish that the association had failed to enforce the guidelines against other homeowners who he claimed were also in violation.


Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Contractual Obligations vs. Property Rights: Analyze the legal argument that CC&Rs serve as a binding contract. How does this contractual nature limit a homeowner's ability to modify their property, even if they have the support of their immediate neighbors?
  2. The "Harmony" Standard in Architectural Review: The Sun Harbor Architectural Committee is tasked with considering the "harmony" of a proposed change with its surroundings. Discuss the subjective and objective elements of this standard as applied to the view of Desert Harbor Lake and the precedent of moving from wrought iron to solid block walls.
  3. Evaluating Selective Enforcement: Mr. Audette provided photographs of other properties to argue that the association inconsistently enforced its rules. Explain the evidentiary gap between showing "other violations exist" and proving "selective enforcement" according to the ALJ's findings.

Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)A professional hearing officer who presides over administrative proceedings and issues decisions based on findings of fact and conclusions of law.
A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)The Arizona Revised Statute stipulating that homeowners' associations cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural plans.
CC&RCovenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and limitations for a planned community.
InharmoniousA term used by the association to describe a structure that does not fit aesthetically or functionally with the surrounding properties or environment.
PetitionerThe party who initiates a lawsuit or petition; in this case, Jeffrey S. Audette.
Preponderance of the EvidenceThe standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, requiring that a fact be more likely than not to be true.
RespondentThe party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Sun Harbor Community Association.
SetbackThe minimum distance a structure must be kept from a property line, shoreline, or other defined boundary.
Sub-associationA secondary homeowners' association governing a specific subset of homes within a larger master association.

The Price of a View: Lessons from a Waterfront HOA Dispute

1. Introduction: The High Cost of Bypassing the Board

For many residents in planned communities, the home is a castle, but the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions) are the contractual bedrock that defines how that castle can be modified. When personal preference collides with community standards, the resulting neighborly friction often shifts from the front yard to the courtroom. A homeowner attempting to enhance their privacy or "improve" their property without following established protocols can quickly find themselves in a legal quagmire, proving that the cost of a better view is far higher when it bypasses the board.

The case of Jeffrey S. Audette vs. Sun Harbor Community Association (doing business as Desert Harbor Homeowners Association) serves as a quintessential cautionary tale. This dispute centered on a waterfront property owner who replaced open wrought iron fences with solid five-foot-high block walls within a restricted setback area—all without securing the necessary prior approval from the Master Association.

2. The Timeline of a Conflict

The path from a backyard renovation to an administrative judgment is often paved with missed opportunities for compliance. The chronological breakdown of this dispute highlights a nearly two-year struggle:

  • February 2018: Without obtaining prior permission, Mr. Audette removes two wrought iron fences and replaces them with five-foot-high block walls located within 15 feet of the lake lining setback.
  • March 2018: Mr. Audette submits a retroactive construction plan to the Sun Harbor Architectural Committee. The committee denies the request, leading the homeowner to file an internal appeal.
  • May 9, 2018: Following the denial of his appeal, Sun Harbor issues a formal violation notice citing CC&R Article IV, Section 2(a) for the unauthorized conversion of the fences.
  • September 4, 2019: Mr. Audette files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), alleging that the Association improperly denied his request and was inconsistent in its enforcement of community rules.
  • December 5, 2019: The matter reaches a formal evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

3. The Homeowner’s Defense: Permission vs. Process

Mr. Audette’s defense was built on the argument that the Association’s denial was unreasonable and discriminatory. Notably, Mr. Audette had previously served on the Sun Harbor board, making this a case where a former "insider" found himself at odds with the very process he once helped oversee—a reminder that personal history does not exempt one from current regulations. His primary arguments included:

  • Sub-Association Approval: He claimed he had secured permission from his specific sub-association before construction commenced.
  • Immediate Neighbor Consent: He testified that the neighbors directly to his left and right approved of the new block walls.
  • Past Board Practices: Drawing on his experience as a former board member, he argued that the Association traditionally granted requests that had already received a "green light" from a sub-association.
  • Limited Visibility: He contended that the walls were only visible to his immediate neighbors and did not negatively impact the community at large.
  • Selective Enforcement Claims: To meet the high bar of selective enforcement, he submitted photographs of other properties in the community that he alleged were also in violation of height restrictions.

4. The Association’s Stand: Aesthetics and Regulations

The Association stood firmly on the "Sun Harbor Architectural Guidelines" adopted in September 2002. These rules exist to preserve the visual "harmony" of the community. Per Finding of Fact #17, the Architectural Committee is required to consider specific factors including the suitability of the alteration, the materials used, the topography and finished grade elevation of the site, and the effect on adjacent properties.

The Association focused heavily on the specific restrictions for shoreline lots:

"No structure, fence or shrubs with a solid height greater than 3 feet are allowed in the 15-foot setback of the concrete shoreline, with the exception of approved docks." (Sun Harbor Architectural Guidelines, pg. 11).

The Association argued that while the guidelines allowed for 3-foot structures, Mr. Audette’s 5-foot walls were fundamentally inharmonious. Testimony from the Association emphasized that these walls obscured lake views for residents on lots 1 through 9. Furthermore, the board expressed a valid concern regarding precedent: allowing one homeowner to swap transparent wrought iron for solid block would fundamentally alter the character of the waterfront for everyone.

5. The Legal Verdict: Why the HOA Prevailed

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petition. The legal reasoning offers a masterclass in HOA law:

  • The Burden of Proof: In this administrative venue, the Petitioner (Mr. Audette) bore the burden of proving his case by a "Preponderance of the Evidence."
  • Defining the Standard: The Judge utilized Black’s Law Dictionary to define this standard as: "The greater weight of the evidence… evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that… is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."
  • Failure to Prove Unreasonableness: Under A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3), an association cannot "unreasonably withhold" approval. However, the legal reality was not that the HOA proved it was right, but that Mr. Audette failed to prove the HOA acted unreasonably. The Association’s adherence to its height and harmony guidelines was found to be a reasonable exercise of its authority.
  • The Selective Enforcement Trap: The Judge found that Mr. Audette failed to establish selective enforcement. Simply providing photos of other violations is insufficient; a petitioner must prove that the Association knowingly allowed those violations to persist without taking enforcement action.

6. Key Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

This case yields several vital insights for those living in or managing common-interest communities:

  1. Prior Approval is Mandatory: Never assume that a sub-association’s "okay" or a neighbor’s "thumbs up" overrides the Master Association’s authority. Process must always precede construction.
  2. Respect the Setbacks: Shoreline and common-area setbacks are often the most strictly protected zones in a community. In this case, the distinction between the allowed 3-foot height and the offending 5-foot wall was the difference between a compliant project and a legal violation.
  3. The Evidence Gap in Selective Enforcement: To successfully argue selective enforcement, a homeowner must provide more than just pictures of other non-compliant homes. You must provide written or oral testimony proving that the board was aware of those violations and failed to act. Without proof of board inaction, photos are just pictures of other people’s potential problems.
  4. Process Over Personal History: Even former board members are subject to the current rules. Familiarity with the system is no substitute for following the current, written architectural guidelines.

7. Final Summary

The integrity of a community’s aesthetic depends on the consistent application of its governing documents. As Audette vs. Sun Harbor illustrates, the CC&Rs are not mere suggestions but binding contracts. Bypassing the architectural review process is a high-risk gamble that can result in expensive litigation, the dismissal of your claims, and the eventual requirement to tear down the very improvements you sought to enjoy. Following the rules from the start is the only guaranteed way to protect both your property and your peace of mind.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey S. Audette (Petitioner)
    Sun Harbor Community Association (Member)
    Homeowner; former board member
  • Mark J. Bainbridge (attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Lauren Vie (attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Yvette Rushford (witness)
    Testified for Sun Harbor
  • Bud Levey (witness)
    Testified for Sun Harbor
  • Beth Mulcahy (attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Listed in distribution list

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received electronic transmission of order

Marc D Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1919063-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-09-03
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (HOA) and dismissed the petition. The HOA's rejection of the flat roof design was found to be reasonable and consistent with the architectural rules requiring pitched roofs to predominate and designs to be harmonious with surrounding structures.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerMarc D. ArcherCounsel—
RespondentPMPE Community Association, Inc.CounselNichols C. Hogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (HOA) and dismissed the petition. The HOA's rejection of the flat roof design was found to be reasonable and consistent with the architectural rules requiring pitched roofs to predominate and designs to be harmonious with surrounding structures.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute; the evidence showed the HOA's decision was based on valid architectural rules.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

Petitioner sought approval for a garage addition with a flat roof. The Board denied final approval because the design was not harmonious with surrounding structures (pitched roofs) and did not meet the exception for hidden flat roofs.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

19F-H1919063-REL Decision – 733775.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:20:41 (86.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed briefing on the administrative hearing between Petitioner Marc D. Archer and Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1919063-REL). The dispute centered on the Petitioner's proposal to construct a garage addition with a flat roof, which the Association Board declined to approve in its final form.

The Petitioner alleged that the Association unreasonably withheld approval in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1817(3), arguing that the design was harmonious and that the Association’s enforcement of rules was arbitrary and discriminatory. The Association maintained that its governing documents—specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Architectural Rules—prioritize pitched roofs and visual harmony with surrounding structures.

On September 3, 2019, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson ruled in favor of the PMPE Community Association, dismissing the petition. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association acted unreasonably or violated statutory requirements.


Analysis of Key Themes

1. Architectural Harmony and Structural Consistency

The primary conflict arose from the discrepancy between the Petitioner's proposed design and the existing aesthetic of the community. While the Petitioner’s residence already featured a pitched roof on the existing garage, his plan for the addition utilized a flat roof.

  • Respondent’s Position: The Association argued that pitched roofs are a fundamental component of the community's visual environment and must predominate.
  • Petitioner’s Position: Archer argued the flat roof was harmonious because it mirrored a pitched roof/flat patio combination on the opposite side of his home.
  • Legal Finding: The judge found that the Association’s insistence on a pitched roof was reasonable, as the proposed flat roof was inconsistent with the existing structures, including Archer's own pitched garage roof.
2. The "Visible From Neighboring Property" Standard

A critical point of contention was whether the proposed addition violated visibility standards set forth in CC&R 1.34.

  • The 9-Foot Threshold: The adjoining wall was 9 feet tall. The Petitioner’s proposed flat roof would exceed this height.
  • The Visibility Rule: Under CC&R 1.34, an object is "visible from neighboring property" if it can be seen by a person six feet tall standing at ground level on an adjoining lot or common area. However, objects in a backyard that do not exceed the height of the enclosing wall are exempt from this definition.
  • Association's Compromise: The Board indicated it would allow a flat roof only if its height remained below the adjacent wall to ensure it was not visible from neighboring properties.
3. Allegations of Arbitrary Enforcement

The Petitioner attempted to demonstrate that the Association enforced CC&Rs inconsistently. He cited instances where other homeowners allegedly:

  • Kept a kitchen countertop in a front yard for nearly a year.
  • Constructed patio additions that were purportedly not harmonious with surrounding structures.
  • Kept a cart on their property longer than allowed.

The Association denied these claims, asserting consistent enforcement. Ultimately, the court found the Petitioner's evidence insufficient to prove that the Association’s specific decision regarding his garage was discriminatory or arbitrary.

4. Statutory and Contractual Compliance

The decision reinforced the legal standing of CC&Rs as contracts.

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(3): This statute prohibits associations from "unreasonably" withholding approval of architectural plans.
  • Contractual Obligation: Citing Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, the ruling noted that CC&Rs are contracts and all parties are required to comply with their terms.
  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner held the burden of proof to show a violation by a "preponderance of the evidence." The court defined this as the "greater weight of the evidence" or "evidence that has the most convincing force."

Important Quotes and Context

QuoteContext
"“Visible From Neighboring Property” means… that such object is or would be visible to a person six feet tall, standing at ground level on any part of the adjoining Lot or Common Area."CC&R 1.34 Definition: Establishes the objective physical standard used to determine if a structure infringes on the community's visual environment.
"Since roofscapes will form an important part of the visual environment, they must be carefully designed. It is intended that pitched roofs predominate."PMPE Architectural Rules Section 4.4: The specific guideline the Board used to justify requiring a pitched roof instead of a flat one.
"The Board… may promulgate architectural design, with particular regard to the harmony of the design with the surrounding structures and topography."CC&R Article 5.10: Grants the Board the legal authority to judge the "harmony" of a project, which was central to their rejection of Archer's plans.
"Mr. Archer failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that PMPE violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)."Conclusion of Law: The final determination that the Petitioner's arguments regarding unreasonable withholding of approval were legally insufficient.

Actionable Insights for Stakeholders

For Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs)
  • Maintain Clear Definitions: The use of specific measurements (e.g., the "six-foot tall person" standard in CC&R 1.34) provides a defensible, objective basis for architectural decisions.
  • Document "Harmony": When rejecting a plan based on "harmony with surrounding structures," associations should point to specific existing architectural features (like pitched roofs) that the proposal contradicts.
  • Offer Conditional Approvals: The Board’s willingness to allow the flat roof if it remained below the wall height demonstrated a reasonable attempt at compromise, which likely supported their "reasonable" standing in court.
For Homeowners
  • Align with Predominant Features: If governing documents state that a certain style (like pitched roofs) must "predominate," proposing a different style for a large addition carries a high risk of rejection.
  • Understand the Burden of Proof: In administrative hearings regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(3), the homeowner must provide "convincing force" that the Board's decision was unreasonable. Simply pointing to other minor violations in the neighborhood (like a countertop in a yard) may not be enough to prove discriminatory enforcement regarding structural additions.
  • Review Visibility Restrictions: Before designing additions, homeowners should measure existing perimeter walls, as these often serve as the height limit for structures to remain exempt from "Visible From Neighboring Property" restrictions.

Archer v. PMPE Community Association: Administrative Law Case Study

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Marc D. Archer and the PMPE Community Association, Inc. (No. 19F-H1919063-REL). It covers the legal standards, architectural regulations, and the specific findings of fact that led to the dismissal of the petitioner's claim regarding homeowners' association (HOA) architectural approvals.

Key Concepts and Legal Principles

1. Architectural Standards and Harmony

Under the PMPE CC&Rs and Architectural Rules, specific design principles govern modifications to residences.

  • Predominance of Pitched Roofs: According to Architectural Rule 4.4, pitched roofs are intended to predominate because roofscapes form a vital part of the visual environment.
  • Design Harmony: Article 5.10 grants the Board or Architectural Committee the authority to evaluate designs based on their harmony with surrounding structures and topography.
  • Flat Roof Requirements: While flat roofs are permitted in some instances (such as patio areas), they must have parapets. In this case, the Board allowed a flat roof only if it remained below the height of the adjacent wall to ensure it was not visible from neighboring properties.
2. "Visible From Neighboring Property"

CC&R 1.34 establishes a specific objective standard for determining visibility:

  • The Six-Foot Standard: An object is considered visible if it can be seen by a person six feet tall standing at ground level on any part of an adjoining lot or common area.
  • The Wall Exception: Objects in a backyard enclosed by a wall are not deemed "visible" if they do not exceed the height of that wall. In this case, the wall height was established at 9 feet.
3. Legal Standards of Proof and Authority
  • Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) has authority over these matters pursuant to A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
  • Statutory Restriction (A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)): An association is legally prohibited from "unreasonably" withholding approval of architectural plans.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: This is the standard of proof required at the hearing. It is defined as the "greater weight of the evidence" or evidence that possesses the most "convincing force," inclining an impartial mind toward one side of the issue.
  • Contractual Nature of CC&Rs: In Arizona, CC&Rs are viewed as a contract between the parties. If the terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. What was the specific height of the adjoining wall in the Archer residence dispute?

The adjoining wall was 9 feet high.

2. According to CC&R 1.34, how is a person's height and position defined when determining if an object is "Visible From Neighboring Property"?

The person is defined as being six feet tall and standing at ground level on any part of the adjoining Lot or Common Area.

3. What was the Board’s primary reason for refusing final approval of Mr. Archer’s garage addition?

The Board learned that the addition would have a flat roof enclosed on all sides with a height exceeding the 9-foot adjoining wall, making it visible from neighboring properties.

4. What does A.R.S. § 33-1817(3) stipulate regarding an HOA’s power over construction plans?

It stipulates that an association shall not unreasonably withhold approval of a construction project’s architectural plans.

5. How does PMPE Architectural Rule 4.4 describe the preferred style for roofs?

It states that roofscapes are an important part of the visual environment and that it is intended for pitched roofs to predominate.

6. On what grounds did Mr. Archer argue that the Board's enforcement of the CC&Rs was "arbitrary and discriminatory"?

He contended that the Board allowed other homeowners to have non-harmonious patio additions, a kitchen countertop in a front yard for nearly a year, and a cart for longer than allowed.


Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. The Balance of Reasonableness in HOA Governance

A.R.S. § 33-1817(3) prohibits an HOA from "unreasonably" withholding approval. Analyze the Board's decision in Archer v. PMPE through the lens of this statute. Consider whether the Board's willingness to allow a flat roof only if it remained below the wall height constitutes a reasonable compromise or an arbitrary restriction, given the neighborhood's preference for pitched roofs.

2. Consistency and Selective Enforcement

Mr. Archer alleged that the HOA practiced arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by highlighting violations by other residents (e.g., the kitchen countertop and carts). Discuss the legal challenge of proving selective enforcement in an administrative hearing. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments insufficient to prove that the Board violated the law in Mr. Archer's specific case?

3. Contractual Interpretation of CC&Rs

Arizona law treats CC&Rs as contracts. Explore the implications of this classification. If a CC&R clearly defines a term like "Visible From Neighboring Property," to what extent does the Board have discretion to deviate from that definition? Discuss how the "unambiguous" nature of the PMPE CC&Rs influenced the Judge's final decision.


Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)The Arizona Revised Statute that prevents HOAs from unreasonably withholding architectural plan approvals.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)The presiding official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who hears evidence and issues a decision in administrative disputes.
CC&RsCovenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the legal governing documents that dictate the rules and residents' obligations within a community.
Harmony of DesignA criteria used by the Board to ensure that new construction matches the existing aesthetics and topography of surrounding structures.
ParapetA low protective wall along the edge of a roof; required for all flat roof patio areas under PMPE Architectural Rules.
Pitched RoofA sloping roof; the architectural style that the PMPE rules state should "predominate" in the community.
Preponderance of the EvidenceThe legal standard of proof requiring that a claim is more likely to be true than not (the "greater weight" of evidence).
RespondentThe party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, PMPE Community Association, Inc.
Visible From Neighboring PropertyAn object visible to a six-foot person at ground level on an adjoining lot; objects below the height of a backyard wall are exempt.

Roof Wars: Lessons in HOA Architectural Compliance and Community Standards

1. Introduction: The Conflict Under the Eaves

For homeowners, the boundary between personal property rights and community governance is often defined by the roofline. While a property owner may view a garage addition as a functional necessity, a Homeowners Association (HOA) views that same structure through the lens of aesthetic uniformity and "harmony of design." This tension is the focal point of Marc D. Archer vs. PMPE Community Association, Inc. (No. 19F-H1919063-REL), a case that highlights the legal complexities of architectural compliance.

The core dispute involved a homeowner’s attempt to construct a flat-roof garage addition in a community where pitched roofs are the mandated standard. This case provides a critical look at how administrative courts evaluate "reasonableness" and the high evidentiary bar homeowners must clear when alleging arbitrary enforcement by a Board.

2. The Project and the Initial Denial

Upon review of the Findings of Fact, the dispute began in September 2017 when the Petitioner, Mr. Archer, submitted plans for a garage addition to the Respondent, the PMPE Board. While the Board initially issued a preliminary approval, they withheld final authorization after a detailed review revealed that the proposed structure deviated from the community's architectural standards.

The proposed addition included the following specifications:

  • Roof Style: A flat roof design, enclosed on all sides.
  • Height: A structure reaching a height that would exceed the 9-foot adjoining wall.
  • Visual Relationship: The new flat roof would be physically attached to the Petitioner’s existing garage, which featured an arched/pitched roof.

Critically, the Board did not issue a blanket denial. In an attempt at compromise, the Board notified the Petitioner that the flat roof would be acceptable if—and only if—the height remained below the adjacent wall. This would have utilized the visibility exception in the CC&Rs. However, the Petitioner insisted on a height exceeding the wall, leading to the final denial and subsequent legal challenge.

3. Defining "Visible From Neighboring Property"

The legal pivot point of this case rests on the definition of visibility. If a structure is "visible," it is subject to the full weight of the HOA’s architectural guidelines.

Terms to Know: "Visible From Neighboring Property" Under PMPE CC&R 1.34, an object is "Visible From Neighboring Property" if it can be seen by a six-foot-tall person standing at ground level on any portion of an adjoining lot or common area. The Exception: An object located in a backyard enclosed by a wall is not deemed visible if it does not exceed the height of the wall enclosing that backyard. This "wall height" standard is a safe harbor for homeowners, but once a structure rises above that line, it falls under Board jurisdiction for aesthetic harmony.

4. The Homeowner's Challenge: Claims of Arbitrary Enforcement

The Petitioner challenged the denial under A.R.S. § 33-1817(3), asserting that the Board was unreasonably withholding approval. He presented three primary arguments to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ):

  1. Harmony of Design: The Petitioner argued the flat roof was harmonious because it mirrored the opposite side of his home, which featured a pitched roof adjacent to a flat-top patio.
  2. Inconsistent Enforcement: He alleged that the HOA was targeting him while ignoring violations by other neighbors, thereby acting in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
  3. Specific Examples of Non-Compliance: To support the claim of inconsistency, he cited "whataboutism" examples, such as a neighbor keeping a kitchen countertop in a front yard for a year and others leaving carts in yards past allowable timeframes.

5. The HOA’s Defense: The Predominance of Pitched Roofs

The Respondent argued that the Petitioner's request would violate the fundamental "roofscape" of the community. Their defense was rooted in the specific technical requirements of the governing documents:

HOA Rule/ArticleSpecific Design Requirement
Article 5.10Grants the Board/Architectural Committee authority to promote design with particular regard to harmony with surrounding structures and topography.
Section 4.4 (Architectural Rules)Establishes that roofscapes are vital to the visual environment; it is mandated that pitched roofs predominate.
Section 4.4 (Technical Specs)Pitched roofs must be hipped whenever possible and maintain a maximum slope of five to 12 feet (5’ to 12’).
Section 4.4 (Flat Roofs)While flat roofs are generally discouraged, all flat roof patio areas must have parapets.

The Respondent emphasized that since the Petitioner’s existing garage featured a pitched roof, an attached flat-roof addition would create a jarring architectural disconnect.

6. The Administrative Decision: Why the HOA Prevailed

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson applied the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard, as required by Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119. Under this standard, the Petitioner must prove their case with "the greater weight of the evidence"—meaning the evidence must be more than 50% convincing. In administrative law, a "tie" or a 50/50 split in evidence means the Petitioner has failed to meet their burden, and the HOA prevails.

The ALJ's ruling for the Respondent was based on two key legal conclusions:

  • Reasonableness of the Board: The Board’s decision was deemed reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(3) because the rules explicitly prioritize pitched roofs. The Board's offer of a compromise (keeping the roof below wall height) further demonstrated a lack of malice or unreasonableness.
  • The Failure of "Whataboutism": The judge dismissed the Petitioner’s claims regarding kitchen countertops and yard carts. Legally, the failure to enforce minor maintenance or "clutter" rules does not waive an HOA's right to enforce major, permanent structural and architectural standards. Structural harmony is a distinct legal tier from temporary yard maintenance.

7. Conclusion: 4 Essential Takeaways for Homeowners

The dismissal of the Petitioner’s case provides a roadmap for navigating architectural disputes in Arizona:

  • Understand the "Harmony" Clause: Architectural harmony is not just about matching your neighbors; it is about matching the existing structures on your own lot. As established in Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, CC&Rs are binding contracts. If your home is designed with pitched roofs, a flat-roof addition is a difficult legal sell.
  • The Visibility Standard: Your "building rights" are often tied to the height of your perimeter wall. If a structure exceeds the wall height and becomes visible to a six-foot-tall neighbor, you lose the "safe harbor" protection and must strictly adhere to architectural design rules.
  • The Petitioner’s Burden of Proof: In an administrative hearing, the homeowner carries the heavy lifting. You must prove the Board is being unreasonable. Per Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119, if the evidence is only equally balanced, the homeowner loses.
  • Contractual Obligations: Arizona courts, following cases like Powell v. Washburn, treat CC&Rs as unambiguous contracts. Judges will prioritize the clear terms of the document—such as "pitched roofs shall predominate"—to protect the original intent of the community's design.

Homeowners should meticulously review their association's specific "Architectural Rules" before finalizing designs, as these documents often contain technical specifications—like roof slope and parapet requirements—that are just as binding as the CC&Rs themselves.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marc D. Archer (petitioner)
    PMPE Community Association, Inc. (Member)
    Appeared on behalf of himself; testified

Respondent Side

  • Nichols C. Hogami (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Keith Scott Kauffman (witness)
    PMPE Board of Directors
    Member of the PMPE Board of Directors; testified

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted order

Myron H Colvin vs. Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H19190064-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-08-27
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the HOA violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ ruled that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the Petitioner's request to determine if his own actions constituted a violation.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerMyron H. ColvinCounsel—
RespondentTierra Del Sol RV Resort AssociationCounselNicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 4.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the HOA violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ ruled that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the Petitioner's request to determine if his own actions constituted a violation.

Why this result: Failure to prove HOA violation; lack of jurisdiction for declaratory judgment.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over lot setbacks and paver installation violation notice

Petitioner installed concrete pavers in his lot's setback area. The HOA issued a Notice of Violation stating the pavers violated CC&R § 4.3 because they were not small enough to be moved by one person. Petitioner argued he had approval and sought a hearing regarding the alleged violation. The ALJ found Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

19F-H19190064-REL Decision – 733836.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:18:46 (83.2 KB)

Administrative Law Briefing: Colvin v. Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association

Executive Summary

This briefing examines the administrative law decision in the matter of Myron H. Colvin v. Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association (No. 19F-H19190064-REL). The dispute arose when the Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association (the Association) issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. Colvin regarding the installation of concrete pavers within the setback area of his lot.

The primary legal question concerned whether the pavers complied with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 4.3, which requires improvements in setback areas to be movable by one person without mechanical assistance. While Mr. Colvin sought a determination that he had not violated the CC&Rs, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition. The ruling was based on two factors: the Petitioner’s failure to prove that the Association itself violated the CC&Rs and the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment regarding an owner’s compliance status.

Case Overview

FeatureDetails
Case NameMyron H. Colvin v. Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association
Case Number19F-H19190064-REL
Hearing DateAugust 7, 2019
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
PetitionerMyron H. Colvin (Self-represented)
RespondentTierra Del Sol RV Resort Association (Represented by Nicholas Nogami, Esq.)
Final OrderPetition Dismissed

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of CC&R Section 4.3 (Lot Setbacks)

The central technical conflict involves the definition of allowable improvements within designated setback areas. Per the Association’s CC&Rs, setbacks are defined as:

  • Front: Five (5) feet.
  • Sides: Three (3) feet.
  • Rear: Three (3) feet.

Section 4.3 explicitly prohibits permanent or temporary structures, improvements, or vehicles (excluding golf carts and car dollies) in these areas. The only exception is for landscaping features, provided they can be "moved by one person unassisted by mechanical devices."

The dispute focused on whether Mr. Colvin’s concrete pavers met this "movability" requirement. The Association alleged the pavers were too large for manual removal, whereas Mr. Colvin contended the Association had previously approved his plan to cut the pavers into 3 x 5 ft pieces.

2. Procedural Burden of Proof

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)), the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. This standard requires the Petitioner to prove that their contention is "more probably true than not."

In this matter, the ALJ found that Mr. Colvin failed to meet this burden. Rather than proving the Association violated the CC&Rs, Mr. Colvin focused his arguments on defending his own actions. The ALJ noted that the Association can only be found in violation if it, as an entity, placed an unapproved object or improvement in a setback area—an allegation Mr. Colvin did not make.

3. Jurisdictional Limitations of the OAH

A critical theme in the decision is the distinction between a violation hearing and a request for a declaratory judgment. While the Arizona Department of Real Estate (DRE) has jurisdiction over violations of planned community documents (A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)), that jurisdiction is specific.

The ALJ concluded that the tribunal did not have the authority to grant a "declaratory judgment." Mr. Colvin was essentially asking the court to declare that he was not in violation of the rules. The OAH determined it lacks the legal jurisdiction to provide such a determination for a homeowner seeking to pre-emptively clear their own record of a violation notice.


Important Quotes with Context

On the Definition of Setback Restrictions

"Each Lot shall be subject to a setback area… No permanent or temporary structures, improvements (other than landscaping)… shall be located within such setback area… [any] Improvement, other than landscaping features which can be moved by one person unassisted by mechanical devices, [shall not] encroach on or overhang any area designated in this Declaration as a lot setback."

— CC&R § 4.3 (as cited in Finding of Fact #13)

Context: This quote establishes the specific criteria that led to the Notice of Violation. It defines the strict limitations on what may occupy the three-to-five-foot perimeter of a lot.

On the Burden of Evidence

"A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not… superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."

— Conclusion of Law #3

Context: The ALJ uses this definition to explain the standard Mr. Colvin failed to meet when attempting to challenge the Association's actions.

On the Scope of the Tribunal’s Authority

"To the extent that Mr. Colvin is requesting a declaratory judgment regarding his alleged violation, this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination."

— Conclusion of Law #5

Context: This serves as the primary legal basis for the dismissal. It clarifies that the Office of Administrative Hearings is not empowered to issue rulings that merely validate a homeowner's compliance to satisfy an internal HOA dispute.


Actionable Insights

For Homeowners in Planned Communities
  • Clarification of Approval: Even if an Association approves a request for an improvement (as they did twice for Mr. Colvin), the final installation must strictly adhere to the specific text of the CC&Rs. Approval of a "request to place pavers" does not necessarily override the specific material requirements (such as weight and movability) found in the governing documents.
  • Understanding the Petitioner's Role: When filing a petition with the Department of Real Estate, the homeowner must prove that the Association violated the rules. Defending one's own actions against a notice of violation may not be sufficient grounds for an administrative hearing if the Association's own conduct remains within its legal authority.
For Association Boards and Management
  • Enforcement Authority: The decision reinforces that A.R.S. § 33-1803 authorizes associations to enforce CC&Rs. Providing specific remediation steps in a Notice of Violation (e.g., "cutting the concrete… into small 100 pound sections") helps demonstrate that the Association is acting in accordance with its governing documents.
  • Jurisdictional Defense: Associations facing similar petitions can successfully argue for dismissal if the Petitioner is seeking a declaratory judgment of their own compliance rather than proving a specific breach of duty by the Association.
Legal Recourse and Rehearing
  • Time Sensitivity: Parties dissatisfied with an Administrative Law Judge's decision have a strictly defined window of 30 days from the service of the Order to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate (pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09).

Study Guide: Colvin v. Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Myron H. Colvin (Petitioner) and the Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association (Respondent). It explores the factual background, legal standards, and the final decision rendered by the Office of Administrative Hearings.


I. Case Background and Timeline

The dispute centers on the installation of concrete pavers in a lot's setback area and the interpretation of the community's governing documents.

  • Initial Request (March 2018): Myron H. Colvin submitted a request to Tierra Del Sol to install concrete pavers in the setback area of his lot. This was approved, but the project was delayed because Colvin left the state.
  • Second Request (March 2019): Colvin submitted a second request for the same project, which was also approved by the Association.
  • Notice of Violation (May 8, 2019): After installation, Tierra Del Sol issued a notice alleging a violation of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 4.3. The Association claimed the pavers were too large to be moved by one person without mechanical assistance.
  • Proposed Remedies: The Association suggested Colvin could correct the violation by removing the concrete or cutting it into small sections weighing approximately 100 pounds.
  • Legal Action: On May 10, 2019, Colvin filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (DRE). An evidentiary hearing was held on August 7, 2019.

II. Key Legal Concepts and CC&R Interpretation

CC&R Section 4.3: Lot Setbacks

The central regulation in this case defines the restricted areas of a lot and the types of items permitted within them:

  • Setback Dimensions: 5 feet across the front; 3 feet on both sides; 3 feet at the rear.
  • Prohibited Items: Permanent or temporary structures, improvements (except landscaping), vehicles (except golf carts and car dollies), Park Models, or Recreational Vehicles.
  • The "One Person" Rule: Landscaping features are only permitted in the setback if they can be moved by one person unassisted by mechanical devices.
Legal Standards and Burden of Proof

The case was governed by the following legal principles:

  • Jurisdiction: Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 32-2199(B) grants the Department of Real Estate authority over violations of planned community documents.
  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner (Colvin) bears the burden of establishing that the Respondent (Association) violated the CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • Restrictive Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous covenants are enforced to reflect the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole, giving effect to all provisions.

III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. According to CC&R § 4.3, what are the specific dimensions of the setback areas for a lot?

Answer: The setback areas consist of five feet across the front and three feet on both sides and the rear.

2. Why did Tierra Del Sol allege that the concrete pavers violated the CC&Rs?

Answer: The Association alleged the pavers were not small enough to be removed by one person without the assistance of a mechanical device, as required for improvements in the setback area.

3. What specific weight did the Association suggest for the concrete sections to bring them into compliance?

Answer: The Association advised cutting the concrete into small 100-pound sections.

4. What is the definition of "preponderance of the evidence" used by the tribunal?

Answer: It is proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is "more probably true than not," or evidence that has the "most convincing force."

5. Why was Myron Colvin’s petition ultimately dismissed?

Answer: Colvin failed to establish that the Association violated Section 4.3. Additionally, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to provide a declaratory judgment on whether Colvin himself had violated the CC&Rs.


IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Analysis of the Burden of Proof: Explain the legal significance of the "Petitioner bears the burden of proof." In the context of this case, why did the Administrative Law Judge find that Mr. Colvin failed to meet this burden even though he was the one who received a notice of violation?
  2. The Limits of Administrative Jurisdiction: Discuss the distinction between a hearing to determine if a Homeowners Association (HOA) violated its own documents and a request for a "declaratory judgment." Why did the tribunal refuse to rule on whether Colvin was actually in violation of the CC&Rs?
  3. Interpretation of Restrictive Covenants: CC&R § 4.3 includes a clause regarding "landscaping features which can be moved by one person unassisted by mechanical devices." Evaluate how such a clause balances the aesthetic interests of the homeowner with the functional requirements of the Association.

V. Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)The Arizona Revised Statute that permits owners or planned community organizations to file petitions concerning violations of community documents.
CC&RsCovenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and limitations for property use within a community.
Declaratory JudgmentA legal determination by a court or tribunal that resolves legal uncertainty for the litigants, which the Office of Administrative Hearings ruled it did not have jurisdiction to provide in this specific context.
ImprovementAny structure or addition to a lot; under § 4.3, improvements in setbacks are generally restricted unless they are movable landscaping features.
Mechanical DeviceAny tool or machinery used to assist in moving objects; its use is prohibited for moving items intended to be placed in the setback area under the "one person" rule.
Preponderance of the EvidenceThe evidentiary standard where a claim is proved if it is shown to be more likely true than not; superior evidentiary weight.
SetbackA specific area of a lot (front, side, or rear) where structures and certain improvements are restricted to ensure space between properties or roads.
TribunalA person or institution (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) with authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes.

The Weight of Compliance: Lessons from the Tierra Del Sol Setback Dispute

1. When Lot Improvements Meet the Fine Print

For many RV resort enthusiasts, the appeal of a permanent lot lies in the ability to customize. Whether it’s a new awning or a pristine patio, these improvements define the resort lifestyle. However, as one resident at Tierra Del Sol RV Resort recently discovered, there is a significant legal distance between "getting approval" and "being in compliance."

The dispute between homeowner Myron H. Colvin and the Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association serves as a cautionary tale for all planned community members. At the center of the conflict was a common upgrade—concrete pavers—that led to a Notice of Violation and an administrative hearing. By examining the nuances of this case, we can uncover how specific CC&R technicalities and jurisdictional boundaries determine the outcome of homeowner disputes.

2. From Green Light to Red Tape: The Project Timeline

The path to litigation began with what appeared to be a straightforward request. The timeline reveals a project that was approved twice but ultimately fell short of the community’s literal standards:

  • March 2018: Mr. Colvin submits his first request to the Association to install concrete pavers in his lot's setback area. The Association grants approval.
  • The Intervening Year: The project is stalled when Mr. Colvin leaves the state, preventing the immediate installation of the pavers.
  • March 2019: Upon his return, Mr. Colvin submits a second request for the same project. Once again, the Association issues an approval.
  • May 8, 2019: Shortly after the pavers are finally installed, the Association issues a formal Notice of Violation.

While the project was approved by the Architectural Officer, the execution—specifically the physical size and weight of the installed pavers—was deemed a breach of the community’s governing documents.

3. Decoding Section 4.3: The "One-Person" Rule and the 100-Pound Safe Harbor

The legal core of this dispute is Section 4.3 of the CC&Rs, which governs lot setbacks. Setbacks are designated "no-build" zones (five feet at the front, three feet on the sides and rear) intended to remain clear for utility access and safety.

The exact text of CC&R § 4.3 states:

"…in no event shall any Recreational Vehicle, its slide-out, or any Improvement, other than landscaping features which can be moved by one person unassisted by mechanical devices, encroach on or overhang any area designated in this Declaration as a lot setback."

To clarify this for members, the Association provided a "Safe Harbor" suggestion: the violation could be remedied if the concrete was cut into sections weighing no more than 100 pounds.

CategoryRestriction Details
Permitted LandscapingMust be movable by 1 person without tools or mechanical devices (e.g., no dollies, forklifts, or heavy machinery).
Prohibited StructuresNo sheds, Arizona Rooms, or permanent structures of any kind.
Vehicles & Slide-outsStrictly prohibited from overhanging the setback area.
Specific ExemptionsGolf carts and car dollies are permitted.

The Association’s grievance was that Mr. Colvin’s pavers were too large and heavy to be moved by a single person unassisted, effectively turning a "landscaping feature" into a "permanent improvement" prohibited in the setback.

4. The Legal Paradox: Why You Can’t Sue the Board for Your Own Violation

On August 7, 2019, the parties met for an administrative hearing. Mr. Colvin’s defense was built on the fact that he had received prior approval to place pavers cut into 3×5 foot pieces. He argued that because the Association approved the plan, he was not in violation.

However, the Association raised a brilliant, albeit frustrating, legal defense. They argued that under A.R.S. § 32-2199(B), the tribunal only has the authority to hear petitions regarding violations committed by the Association. Since the Association did not place the pavers in the setback—Mr. Colvin did—the Association could not have violated Section 4.3.

This created a procedural wall for the homeowner. In these hearings, the Petitioner (Mr. Colvin) bears the Burden of Proof. He had to establish his case by a Preponderance of the Evidence, meaning he had to prove it was "more probably true than not" that the Association broke a rule. Because the CC&Rs restrict what owners do, not what the Board does, the Petitioner’s argument was fundamentally misplaced.

Furthermore, the Association argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a "declaratory judgment." In layperson’s terms, the court is not a consulting firm; it cannot provide a "stamp of approval" or pre-emptive advice to a homeowner looking to overturn a violation notice.

5. The Verdict: Dismissal and the Limits of Jurisdiction

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson ultimately dismissed the petition. The decision rested on two primary Conclusions of Law:

  1. Failure to Establish a Violation by the Respondent: The Petitioner admitted to placing the pavers himself. Therefore, the Association did not violate the restriction against placing objects in the setback.
  2. Lack of Jurisdiction: The tribunal does not have the legal authority to decide whether a member's personal actions constitute a violation when that member is seeking a "second opinion" to challenge a notice.

The final order was issued on August 27, 2019, and transmitted to the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

6. Key Takeaways: Lessons for Every Resort Member

This case provides essential insights for anyone living under the governance of an HOA or RV resort:

  1. Approval Is Not Absolute: An initial nod from an Architectural Officer is a green light to proceed, but it is not a shield against the literal text of the CC&Rs. If the finished product (e.g., the weight of a paver) violates the written code, the approval is effectively voided by the non-compliant execution.
  2. The Tribunal is Not a "Second Opinion": Administrative hearings are for adjudicating breaches of law by the Association. They are not a venue to seek "declaratory relief" or to ask a judge to tell the Board to leave you alone.
  3. The Burden of Proof is Yours: When you file a petition, you must prove the Association did something wrong. Proving that you followed a plan that later turned out to be a violation is rarely enough to win a case against the Board.
  4. The Hierarchy of Authority: While an Architectural Officer may review your plans, the Board of Directors and the written CC&Rs remain the ultimate authority. Always ensure your project meets the "fine print" standards—like the "one-person" weight limit—before the concrete is poured.

7. Conclusion: The Constant State of Compliance

The Tierra Del Sol dispute highlights a vital truth of resort living: compliance is a constant state, not a one-time event. Obtaining a permit is only the first step; maintaining the project within the technical bounds of the CC&Rs is what prevents a costly legal setback.

The order in this matter became binding upon its issuance. Under Arizona law, any party wishing to challenge such a decision has a 30-day window to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. For homeowners, the best defense remains a thorough understanding of the "one-person" rule and a cautious approach to the setback line.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Myron H. Colvin (petitioner)
    Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association (member)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (attorney)
    Tierra Del Sol RV Resort Association
    Esq.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received electronic transmission of order

Peter de Scheel vs. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1919048-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-06-19
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA violated the CC&Rs. The evidence established that architectural beams are part of the 'exterior' which the Association must maintain, rather than the 'roof' which is excluded from Association maintenance. The HOA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that beams were part of the roof.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerPeter de ScheelCounsel—
RespondentSandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.CounselBradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

Article V Section 1; Article VI Section 1(c)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA violated the CC&Rs. The evidence established that architectural beams are part of the 'exterior' which the Association must maintain, rather than the 'roof' which is excluded from Association maintenance. The HOA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that beams were part of the roof.

Key Issues & Findings

Exterior Maintenance Responsibility (Architectural Beams)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by requiring him to repair architectural beams. The dispute centered on whether beams were part of the 'roof' (owner responsibility) or 'exterior' (HOA responsibility).

Orders: Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee. Respondent is responsible for the repair and maintenance of architectural beams.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • Article V Section 1
  • Article VI Section 1(c)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

19F-H1919048-REL Decision – 716710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:18 (103.6 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: de Scheel v. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative decision in the matter of Peter de Scheel vs. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc. (No. 19F-H1919048-REL). The dispute centered on whether the Sandpiper Scottsdale Association (the Respondent) or the homeowner, Peter de Scheel (the Petitioner), was responsible for the repair and maintenance of architectural wood beams on the Petitioner’s property.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Petitioner. The decision determined that under the Association's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), architectural wood beams are classified as part of the "exterior building surfaces," which the Association is obligated to maintain. The Association's argument that the beams were part of the roof—an item specifically excluded from Association maintenance—was rejected. As a result, the Association was ordered to cease requiring the Petitioner to perform these repairs and to reimburse his $500 filing fee.


Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of Maintenance Obligations under CC&Rs

The core of the legal dispute rested on the interpretation of Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 1(c) of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.

  • Association Obligations: The CC&Rs mandate that the Association provide exterior maintenance for each "Improved Lot." This includes painting, repairing, replacing, and caring for "exterior building surfaces and other such exterior improvements."
  • Specific Exclusions: The CC&Rs list specific items for which the Association is not responsible. These include:
  • Roofs (except for Condominium Lots).
  • Glass surfaces, air conditioning units, and landscaping (trees, shrubs, grass).
  • Walks, driveways, and parking areas.
  • Improvements within a patio or enclosed yard.

The Petitioner successfully argued that because architectural wood beams were not specifically listed in these exclusions, they fell under the general category of "exterior building surfaces" maintained by the Association.

2. The Distinction Between "Roof" and "Architectural Beams"

The Respondent attempted to classify the architectural beams as part of the "roof" to trigger the maintenance exclusion. However, the ALJ found this argument inconsistent with the Association's own communications. Both the community manager and the Board President had issued communications (newsletters and emails) that listed "roofs" and "architectural beams" as separate items.

The Judge concluded that the Respondent failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that architectural beams are legally or functionally part of the roof. Instead, the evidence supported the conclusion that they are exterior building surfaces.

3. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standards

The case was decided based on the preponderance of the evidence—meaning the proof showed the Petitioner’s contention was "more probably true than not."

  • Petitioner’s Burden: To establish that the Association violated the CC&Rs by shifting maintenance responsibility to the homeowner.
  • Respondent’s Burden: To establish affirmative defenses (e.g., that the beams were part of the roof and thus excluded from Association maintenance).

The court found the Petitioner met his burden, while the Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to support its reclassification of the beams.

4. Association Classification (Planned Unit Development vs. Condominium)

A secondary theme involved the legal nature of the Association. While the CC&Rs contained language regarding "Condominium Lots," the Board President testified that the development is a Planned Unit Development (PUD) and never met the criteria for a condominium association because a "declaration of horizontal property regime" was never submitted. This distinction influenced the application of Article V, Section 1, which has different roof maintenance rules for Condominium Lots versus standard Improved Lots.


Important Quotes with Context

QuoteContext
"The Association shall provide exterior maintenance upon each Improved Condominium Lot and Improved Lot… as follows: paint, repair, replace and care for exterior building surfaces."Article V, Section 1 of the CC&Rs. This serves as the primary basis for the Association's duty to maintain the exterior of the homes.
"Such exterior maintenance shall not include roofs, except in the case of Improved Condominium Lots."Article V, Section 1 of the CC&Rs. This is the specific exclusion the Association attempted to use to avoid responsibility for the beams.
"Please remember that our CC&Rs require each owner to maintain their property including driveways, roofs, architectural beams and posts…"Newsletter/Email from Respondent. This internal communication was used as evidence against the Association, as it listed roofs and beams as separate entities.
"Respondent did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the architectural beams are a part of the roof."ALJ Conclusion of Law. The Judge's final determination on the Association's primary defense.
"Restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes, giving effect to all provisions contained therein."Legal Standard cited by the ALJ. Explains the methodology used to interpret the Association's governing documents.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs)
  • Consistency in Communication: Associations must ensure that newsletters and informal communications do not contradict or broaden the scope of the CC&Rs. By listing "beams" separately from "roofs" in a newsletter, the Association undermined its own legal argument that beams were part of the roof.
  • Definition of Exclusions: If an Association intends for specific exterior elements (like beams or posts) to be the owner's responsibility, those items should be explicitly listed in the "Exclusions" section of the CC&Rs.
  • Historical Practice vs. Written Code: The Association argued that homeowners had "historically" repaired roofs. However, historical practice does not override unambiguous language in the CC&Rs regarding "exterior building surfaces."
For Homeowners
  • Reviewing Specific CC&R Articles: When faced with a repair notice, homeowners should cross-reference the specific repair requested against the "Exterior Maintenance" sections of their CC&Rs.
  • Identifying Omissions: If a specific architectural feature is not listed in the "Association shall not maintain" list, there is a strong legal argument that it remains the Association's responsibility as an "exterior surface."
Legal Implications
  • Reimbursement of Fees: Under A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B), if an Association is found in violation of its governing documents, it may be ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fees ($500 in this case).
  • Binding Nature: The ALJ’s order is binding unless a rehearing is granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Study Guide: de Scheel v. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Peter de Scheel v. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc. (No. 19F-H1919048-REL). It covers the legal disputes regarding homeowner association (HOA) maintenance responsibilities, the interpretation of restrictive covenants, and the evidentiary standards used in Arizona administrative hearings.


1. Case Overview and Background

Core Dispute

The primary issue in this case was determining whether the homeowner (Petitioner) or the Homeowners Association (Respondent) was responsible for the repair and maintenance of disintegrating architectural wood beams.

  • Petitioner: Peter de Scheel, a homeowner in the Sandpiper Scottsdale Association.
  • Respondent: Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc., a planned unit development.
  • Initial Action: In August 2018, the HOA notified the Petitioner that he must repair his architectural wood beams by December 25, 2018. The Petitioner argued the HOA was responsible under the community's governing documents.
Legal Context

The case was heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE). Per A.R.S. § 32-2199(B), the ADRE is authorized to decide petitions regarding violations of planned community documents.


2. Key Legal Concepts

The Burden of Proof

In this administrative matter, the Petitioner held the burden of proof to establish a violation of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by a preponderance of the evidence.

  • Definition: A preponderance of the evidence means that the contention is "more probably true than not" or possesses "superior evidentiary weight."
  • Affirmative Defenses: The Respondent bears the burden to establish any affirmative defenses using the same standard.
Interpretation of CC&Rs

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. Covenants must be:

  1. Construed as a whole.
  2. Interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.
  3. Evaluated to give effect to all provisions contained within them.
Governing CC&R Articles

The case centered on the following provisions from the Sandpiper Scottsdale Association CC&Rs:

ProvisionTitleKey Language/Requirement
Article V, Section 1Exterior MaintenanceThe Association shall provide exterior maintenance upon each Improved Lot (paint, repair, replace exterior building surfaces).
Article VI, Section 1(c)Duties and PowersThe Association shall maintain the exterior of Living Units subject to the limitations in Article V.
Article I, Section 9DefinitionsDefines "Lot" and "Improved Lot" (a lot with a completed single-family residence).

3. Evidence and Testimony

Arguments for the Homeowner (Petitioner)
  • Architectural beams are part of the exterior building surface.
  • Article V, Section 1 does not list "architectural beams" as an exception to the Association’s maintenance duties.
  • While roofs are an exception, architectural beams are distinct from the roof.
Arguments for the Association (Respondent)
  • Historical Practice: The Association has consistently required homeowners to repair beams for years.
  • Roof Categorization: The Board President argued that architectural beams are functionally part of the roof (which homeowners are responsible for maintaining).
  • Association Status: Although the CC&Rs mention "condominiums," the Association argued it is a planned unit development because no declaration of horizontal property regime was ever submitted.
Findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The ALJ determined that the Association failed to prove that architectural beams are part of the roof. Because the CC&Rs specifically distinguished roofs from architectural beams in newsletters and failed to list beams as an exception in Article V, the Association was found responsible for their maintenance.


4. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. What was the specific deadline given to the Petitioner to repair the wood beams?
  • Answer: December 25, 2018.
  1. According to Article V, Section 1, what are the specific exceptions to the Association's exterior maintenance responsibility?
  • Answer: Roofs (except for Improved Condominium Lots), glass surfaces, air conditioning units, trees, shrubs, grass, walks, driveways, parking areas, landscaping, and improvements within patio or enclosed yard spaces.
  1. What amount was the Respondent ordered to reimburse the Petitioner following the decision?
  • Answer: $500.00 (the filing fee for the petition).
  1. Who served as the Administrative Law Judge for this case?
  • Answer: Velva Moses-Thompson.
  1. How does Article I, Section 9 define an "Improved Lot"?
  • Answer: A Lot upon which has been completed a single-family residence.
  1. Under what Arizona Revised Statute is the Order binding on the parties?
  • Answer: A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B).

5. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Role of Historical Practice vs. Written Contract: Analyze the Association's argument that they had "consistently required" homeowners to repair beams since 1984. Why did the ALJ prioritize the written text of the CC&Rs over the historical testimony of the community managers?
  2. Ambiguity in Restrictive Covenants: The Respondent argued that architectural beams should be considered part of the roof. Discuss how the Association’s own communication (newsletters and emails) undermined this argument and how it impacted the ALJ’s determination that the beams were part of the "exterior."
  3. Condominium vs. Planned Unit Development: The CC&Rs describe a "planned residential area consisting of townhouses, interspersed condominiums and common area." However, testimony suggested the Association never met the criteria for a condominium. Explain how this distinction (or lack thereof) influenced the interpretation of maintenance responsibilities for roofs under Article V.

6. Glossary of Important Terms

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199: The Arizona statute granting the Department of Real Estate the authority to hear disputes between homeowners and associations.
  • CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing documents that outline the rules, requirements, and responsibilities of homeowners and the association within a development.
  • Declarant: The entity (usually the developer) that originally created the CC&Rs and the community.
  • Horizontal Property Regime: A legal structure required to officially establish a condominium; the Respondent argued this was never submitted.
  • Improved Lot: A plot of land within the subdivision that has a completed single-family residence.
  • Living Unit: A term used in the CC&Rs to refer to the individual residential structures within the development.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The evidentiary standard in civil and administrative cases requiring that a claim be more likely true than not.
  • Restrictive Covenant: A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits or dictates the use of the property or the obligations of the owner.

Homeowner vs. HOA: Who Really Pays for Architectural Wood Beams?

1. Introduction: The High Stakes of HOA Maintenance

In the often-contentious world of planned communities, few things trigger a legal battle faster than a high-cost repair bill. For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a delicate balance of shared benefits and individual burdens. However, when an Association attempts to shift its maintenance obligations onto individual owners through creative—and often legally flawed—interpretations of governing documents, the stakes escalate from mere disagreement to a pivotal fight for property rights.

The case of Peter de Scheel vs. Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc. serves as a landmark victory for homeowners facing arbitrary assessments. At the center of this dispute was a seemingly simple question: Who is responsible for "disintegrating" architectural wood beams? The outcome provides a masterclass in how to hold a Board accountable to the literal text of the law.

2. The "Beams of Contention": Background of the Dispute

The conflict began on August 21, 2018, when the Sandpiper Scottsdale Association (the Association) issued a formal notification to homeowner Peter de Scheel. The Association alleged that the architectural wood beams on his property were "disintegrating" and demanded their repair by December 25, 2018.

Mr. de Scheel, recognizing the financial implications of this demand, challenged the Board's authority. He argued that under the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), the maintenance of these structural exterior elements was the Association's responsibility, not his. When the Association refused to yield, de Scheel took the necessary legal step to protect his interests: he filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on February 14, 2019. He alleged a direct violation of Article V and Article VI of the CC&Rs, setting the stage for an evidentiary hearing to determine the boundaries of contractual obligation.

3. Decoding the CC&Rs: What the Rules Actually Say

As any seasoned legal analyst knows, the CC&Rs are the "constitution" of the community. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) focused on Article V, Section 1 and Article VI, Section 1(c) to determine where the Association’s duties ended and the Homeowner’s began.

The Association’s Maintenance Scope Per the CC&Rs, the Association is mandated to provide exterior maintenance upon each Improved Lot, specifically to:

  • Paint, repair, and replace exterior building surfaces.
  • Maintain and care for "other such exterior improvements."

The Explicit Exceptions The governing documents also provide a definitive list of items the Association is not responsible for. These exceptions are narrow and must be interpreted strictly:

  • Roofs (Except in the case of Improved Condominium Lots).
  • Glass surfaces and air conditioning units.
  • Landscaping, including trees, shrubs, and grass.
  • Walks, driveways, and parking areas.
  • Improvements built by an owner within a patio or enclosed yard space.

The Critical Omission Under the principle of contractual interpretation, what is not listed is often as important as what is. The ALJ noted that "architectural beams" were conspicuously absent from the list of exceptions. Furthermore, the definition of an "Improved Lot" in Article I, Section 13 made a clear distinction between a standard Lot and a Condominium Lot—a distinction that would later prove fatal to the Association’s defense.

4. The HOA’s Defense: A Failure of Legal Consistency

The Association’s defense strategy relied on a blend of witness testimony and a shifting legal identity. Witnesses Mary Lou Pace (Community Manager), Pamela L. Polo (Former Property Manager), and Carol Nesland (Board President) all attempted to argue that architectural beams should be classified as part of the "roof," thereby falling under the maintenance exception.

However, the Association struggled with its own legal standing. In its initial written answer to the petition, the Association claimed to be a condominium association. Yet, during the hearing, Board President Carol Nesland reversed this position, admitting the Association was actually a planned unit development (PUD). She conceded that the developers had never filed a "declaration of horizontal property regime"—the legal instrument required to create a condominium. Without this regime, the Association could not legally enforce the "roof" exception against Mr. de Scheel, as the CC&Rs only applied that exception to "Improved Condominium Lots."

Perhaps most damaging to the Association was its own history of communication. The Homeowner presented a January 2019 email from the Community Manager and a newsletter from the Board President that explicitly listed "roofs" and "architectural beams" as separate maintenance items. In legal terms, this constituted a "party admission." By distinguishing between the two in their own correspondence, the Association undermined their affirmative defense that the beams were merely an extension of the roof.

5. The Verdict: A Victory for Homeowner Clarity

The ALJ applied the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard, which requires the evidence to show that a contention is "more probably true than not." While the Homeowner bore the initial burden of proving a violation, the Association bore the burden of proving its affirmative defense—that the beams fell under the roof exception.

The judge found the Association’s arguments unconvincing. The evidence demonstrated that the beams were exterior building surfaces, and the Association failed to prove they were legally part of the roof.

The Final Order On June 19, 2019, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Homeowner, Peter de Scheel. The Association was found in violation of the CC&Rs for attempting to force the Homeowner to repair the beams. In a final symbolic and financial victory for de Scheel, the judge ordered the Association to reimburse the Homeowner’s $500.00 filing fee.

6. Key Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

This case serves as a vital reminder that an HOA's power is not absolute; it is strictly limited by its own governing documents.

  1. Specificity in CC&Rs is Mandatory: If an item is not explicitly listed as an exception to the Association’s maintenance duties, it generally remains the Association’s responsibility under "exterior building surfaces." Courts will not "read in" exceptions that aren't there.
  2. Internal Communications are Evidence: Newsletters and emails are not just community updates; they are legal records. When a Board separates items in a newsletter for "clarity," they may inadvertently create evidence that those items are legally distinct entities.
  3. The Burden of Affirmative Defenses: If an HOA claims a maintenance item is a homeowner’s responsibility based on an exception in the CC&Rs, the HOA bears the burden of proving that exception applies. A failure to maintain legal consistency—such as the "Condo vs. PUD" flip-flop seen here—can destroy the Board's credibility.

Homeowners should never accept a Board's demand for repair at face value. Before opening your wallet, conduct an audit of your CC&Rs. If the documents do not explicitly exempt the Association from maintaining a specific exterior element, the Law may be on your side.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Peter de Scheel (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (Attorney)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C.
    Attorney for Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
  • Mary Lou Pace (Community Manager)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; also referred to as Mary Loud Pace
  • Carol Nesland (Board President)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; President of the Board of Directors
  • Pamela L. Polo (Former Property Manager)
    Sandpiper Scottsdale Association, Inc.
    Witness; manager from 1984 to 2015

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-04-22
Administrative Law JudgeVelva Moses-Thompson
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.
Filing Fee Reimbursement$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerWilliam P. LeeCounsel—
RespondentGreenlaw Townhouses Unit TwoCounselTimothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Case Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:16:51 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:16:56 (118.5 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
    Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate