David G. Iadevavia v. Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-07-29
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The HOA did not violate its duties by selectively enforcing CC&R Section 2.16 against Petitioner regarding his mobile observatory.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David G. Iadevavia Counsel
Respondent Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Section 2.16

Outcome Summary

The HOA did not violate its duties by selectively enforcing CC&R Section 2.16 against Petitioner regarding his mobile observatory.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the mobile observatory was not a trailer under the plain and obvious meaning of CC&R Section 2.16, or that the HOA's enforcement constituted illegal selective enforcement.

Key Issues & Findings

Selective enforcement of CC&R Section 2.16 regarding vehicles/trailers.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA selectively enforced CC&R Section 2.16 (regarding parking/vehicles/trailers) against him concerning his 'mobile observatory' while failing to enforce the rule or similar rules against other homeowners (sheds).

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge determined that the HOA did not violate its duties by selectively enforcing CC&R Section 2.16 against the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Arizona Biltmore Estates vs. TZAC, 868 T2 1030
  • Arizona Biltmore Estates vs. TZAC, 177 Arizona 47
  • Burke versus Voice Screen Wireless Corporation, 87P381
  • Burke versus Voice Screen Wireless Corporation, 207 Arizona 393
  • Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 6.13(1)(b),(c) (2000)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • A.R.S. 41-1092.07
  • A.A.C. R2-19-106(D)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-113(A)(3) and (4)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Selective Enforcement, Trailer, Mobile Observatory, Parking
Additional Citations:

  • CC&R Section 2.16
  • Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
  • Arizona Biltmore Estates vs. TZAC
  • Burke versus Voice Screen Wireless Corporation

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 973802.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 974694.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 975118.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977059.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977202.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977294.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978417.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978990.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978991.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 979005.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 982403.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 993469.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 973802.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 974694.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 975118.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:47:12 (40.9 KB)

22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977059.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977202.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 977294.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978417.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978990.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 978991.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 979005.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 982403.pdf

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22F-H2222044-REL Decision – 993469.pdf

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This summary addresses the hearing proceedings, key facts, main issues, and the status of the final decision in the matter of *David G. Iadevavia v. Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.* (No. 22F-H2222044-REL) before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Summary of Hearing Proceedings

Key Facts & Procedural History

The Petitioner, David G. Iadevavia, proceeded *pro se* following the grant of his prior counsel's withdrawal. The Respondent, Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA), was represented by Carolyn Goldmith. The hearing was conducted virtually on June 27, 2022, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.

The ALJ initially identified three potential issues based on Iadevavia’s petition (CCNR 2.16, ARS 33-1803, ARS 33-1804), requiring $1,500 in fees, but since only $500 was paid, the matter was narrowed to a single issue. The final issue for determination, established after a pre-hearing conference and subsequent amendment, was: Whether the Respondent Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc. selectively enforced section 2.16 of the CC&Rs against Petitioner David G. Iadevavia while at the same time not enforcing it against other homeowners, including homeowners who currently serve on the board.

The ALJ denied Iadevavia's subsequent motion to amend the hearing issue further, citing lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ also denied Iadevavia's request for a subpoena because it did not satisfy the requirements of Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113(A)(3) and (4).

Key Arguments and Legal Points

Petitioner's Argument (Iadevavia): Selective Enforcement and Ambiguity

Iadevavia, a retired professor of astronomy and physics, argued that the HOA selectively enforced the restrictive covenant, specifically CCNR 2.16, against him.

  1. Object Identification: He contended that his "mobile observatory" was factually a storage shed on a trailer, not a trailer or recreational vehicle. He presented photos showing that the HOA had seemingly "grandfathered" numerous storage sheds owned by other residents, including board members, that were visible above walls. Since "storage shed" was not defined in the CCNRs, he argued the board failed to act reasonably by not grandfathering his structure.
  2. CCNR Ambiguity: Iadevavia emphasized that the CCNRs lacked clear definitions for key terms like "trailer," "storage shed," "garage," or "driveway". He asserted that without unambiguous definitions, the board relied on subjectivity, leading to selective enforcement.
  3. Inconsistent Application: He noted the board's delay of 270 days in denying his Architectural Review Committee (ARC) request to shield the object, despite a 30-day requirement, demonstrating that the board does not follow its own rules.

Respondent's Argument (HOA): Plain Meaning and Contract Law

The HOA focused on the plain meaning of the CCNRs and legal standards governing restrictive covenants.

  1. Plain Meaning of "Trailer": The HOA asserted that Iadevavia’s object was commonly understood to be a trailer (utility trailer or RV). Witnesses confirmed the structure had features like axles, wheels, and a license plate.
  2. Contractual Interpretation: The HOA argued that CCNRs are considered a contract under Arizona law, and a term is only ambiguous if it defeats the plain and obvious meaning of the restriction. They cited case law (*Arizona Builtmore Estates v. TZAK*; *Burke v. Voice Screen Wireless Corporation*) to support the reliance on commonly accepted meanings when terms are undefined.
  3. Applicability of 2.16: CCNR 2.16.2 requires that vehicles like trailers must be stored in an enclosed garage or screened from view. The HOA noted that the specific violation regarding visibility was resolved when Iadevavia erected a wooden structure in early 2021. The HOA distinguished Iadevavia’s mobile trailer from stationary, constructed sheds, arguing that equating the two makes "no sense" und

Questions

Question

Can I claim that my HOA violated a CC&R provision meant to regulate homeowner behavior, such as parking rules?

Short Answer

No. CC&R provisions regulating conduct like parking are rules for homeowners to follow, not the HOA.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that a homeowner cannot successfully argue that the HOA violated a CC&R section designed to regulate homeowner conduct (e.g., parking restrictions). Such sections govern what a homeowner can or cannot do, but do not impose a direct duty on the HOA itself that can be violated in the manner described.

Alj Quote

This is a CC&R that regulates the homeowners. A homeowner may violate this section, but not the HOA… This is not a section that the HOA would violate in and of itself.

Legal Basis

CC&R Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Violations
  • HOA Obligations
  • Legal Standards

Question

Am I entitled to a rebuttal closing argument after the hearing record closes?

Short Answer

No. Rebuttal closing arguments are generally not permitted under OAH rules.

Detailed Answer

Homeowners should make all necessary arguments during the hearing. The procedural rules for the Office of Administrative Hearings do not entitle a petitioner to a rebuttal closing argument, especially if one was not requested during the hearing itself.

Alj Quote

Petitioner is not entitled to a rebuttal closing argument pursuant to the rules that govern hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. … Furthermore, Petitioner did not request a rebuttal closing at the time of the hearing.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-116

Topic Tags

  • Hearing Procedures
  • Homeowner Rights
  • Closing Arguments

Question

Can I amend the hearing issue to include general claims about the HOA's duty to treat members fairly?

Short Answer

The tribunal may deny such amendments if it lacks jurisdiction over broad common law claims.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a motion to amend the hearing issue to include violations of duties to 'treat members fairly' and 'act reasonably' (citing the Restatement of Property) was denied by the ALJ specifically due to a lack of jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to amend the hearing issue is denied due to lack of jurisdiction.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • Amending Claims
  • Fairness

Question

Will my request for a subpoena automatically be granted?

Short Answer

No. Subpoena requests must strictly follow the Arizona Administrative Code requirements.

Detailed Answer

A homeowner's request for a subpoena will be denied if it fails to satisfy the specific requirements outlined in the administrative rules (R2-19-113). It is not automatic; the correct form and substance are required.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that the request for subpoena is denied. The request does not satisfy the requirements of Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113(A)(3) and (4).

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Subpoenas
  • Procedural Requirements

Question

Does the filing fee cover multiple unrelated issues in my petition?

Short Answer

No. The filing fee is tied to the number of issues; additional issues require additional payment.

Detailed Answer

If a petition includes multiple distinct issues (e.g., CC&R violation, notice violation, open meeting violation), the homeowner may be required to pay a higher fee. In this case, three issues required a total of $1,500, whereas a single issue was $500.

Alj Quote

With the violation of CC&R 2.16 and also 33-1803 and 33-1804. Those would be three separate issues and that would require a total payment of $1,500.

Legal Basis

Filing Fees

Topic Tags

  • Filing Fees
  • Petition Process
  • Costs

Question

Can the hearing be conducted virtually instead of in person?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ can order the hearing to be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings utilizes platforms like Google Meet to allow parties to appear virtually for hearings.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that the hearing in this matter will be conducted either by video conferencing or telephone participation through Google Meet

Legal Basis

Hearing Procedures

Topic Tags

  • Virtual Hearing
  • Accessibility
  • Procedure

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222044-REL
Case Title
David G. Iadevavia vs. Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2022-07-08
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can I claim that my HOA violated a CC&R provision meant to regulate homeowner behavior, such as parking rules?

Short Answer

No. CC&R provisions regulating conduct like parking are rules for homeowners to follow, not the HOA.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that a homeowner cannot successfully argue that the HOA violated a CC&R section designed to regulate homeowner conduct (e.g., parking restrictions). Such sections govern what a homeowner can or cannot do, but do not impose a direct duty on the HOA itself that can be violated in the manner described.

Alj Quote

This is a CC&R that regulates the homeowners. A homeowner may violate this section, but not the HOA… This is not a section that the HOA would violate in and of itself.

Legal Basis

CC&R Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Violations
  • HOA Obligations
  • Legal Standards

Question

Am I entitled to a rebuttal closing argument after the hearing record closes?

Short Answer

No. Rebuttal closing arguments are generally not permitted under OAH rules.

Detailed Answer

Homeowners should make all necessary arguments during the hearing. The procedural rules for the Office of Administrative Hearings do not entitle a petitioner to a rebuttal closing argument, especially if one was not requested during the hearing itself.

Alj Quote

Petitioner is not entitled to a rebuttal closing argument pursuant to the rules that govern hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. … Furthermore, Petitioner did not request a rebuttal closing at the time of the hearing.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-116

Topic Tags

  • Hearing Procedures
  • Homeowner Rights
  • Closing Arguments

Question

Can I amend the hearing issue to include general claims about the HOA's duty to treat members fairly?

Short Answer

The tribunal may deny such amendments if it lacks jurisdiction over broad common law claims.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a motion to amend the hearing issue to include violations of duties to 'treat members fairly' and 'act reasonably' (citing the Restatement of Property) was denied by the ALJ specifically due to a lack of jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion to amend the hearing issue is denied due to lack of jurisdiction.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • Amending Claims
  • Fairness

Question

Will my request for a subpoena automatically be granted?

Short Answer

No. Subpoena requests must strictly follow the Arizona Administrative Code requirements.

Detailed Answer

A homeowner's request for a subpoena will be denied if it fails to satisfy the specific requirements outlined in the administrative rules (R2-19-113). It is not automatic; the correct form and substance are required.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that the request for subpoena is denied. The request does not satisfy the requirements of Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113(A)(3) and (4).

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-113

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Subpoenas
  • Procedural Requirements

Question

Does the filing fee cover multiple unrelated issues in my petition?

Short Answer

No. The filing fee is tied to the number of issues; additional issues require additional payment.

Detailed Answer

If a petition includes multiple distinct issues (e.g., CC&R violation, notice violation, open meeting violation), the homeowner may be required to pay a higher fee. In this case, three issues required a total of $1,500, whereas a single issue was $500.

Alj Quote

With the violation of CC&R 2.16 and also 33-1803 and 33-1804. Those would be three separate issues and that would require a total payment of $1,500.

Legal Basis

Filing Fees

Topic Tags

  • Filing Fees
  • Petition Process
  • Costs

Question

Can the hearing be conducted virtually instead of in person?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ can order the hearing to be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings utilizes platforms like Google Meet to allow parties to appear virtually for hearings.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that the hearing in this matter will be conducted either by video conferencing or telephone participation through Google Meet

Legal Basis

Hearing Procedures

Topic Tags

  • Virtual Hearing
  • Accessibility
  • Procedure

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222044-REL
Case Title
David G. Iadevavia vs. Ventana Shadows Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2022-07-08
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David G. Iadevavia (petitioner)
  • Jill H. Perrella (attorney)
    Snell & Wilmer LLP

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC
  • Bill Borg (witness/board member)
  • Jason Bader (witness/board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (OAH staff)
  • M Alvarez (OAH staff)
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Rick Abbott (spectator)

Judy Clapp v. Forest Trails Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-29
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Forest Trails Homeowners Association violated its governing documents when it approved landscaping that obstructed parking in a common area.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Judy Clapp Counsel Kevin Harper
Respondent Forest Trails Homeowners Association Counsel Edward D. O'Brien; Edith I. Rudder

Alleged Violations

Declaration § 2.2; Declaration § 2.21; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Forest Trails Homeowners Association violated its governing documents when it approved landscaping that obstructed parking in a common area.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the evidentiary burden that the HOA violated the Declaration or related statutes. The ALJ found that the Declaration permits landscaping in the common area (Section 2.2) and the petitioner presented no legal authority mandating the disputed area remain solely available for parking.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation concerning landscaping in common area preventing parking.

Petitioner Judy Clapp alleged the HOA improperly approved the adjacent homeowner's (Normans) landscaping project in the common area next to Lot 1473 Trailhead. She claimed this blocked a historical parking area used by multiple homeowners, violating Declaration Section 2.2 (common area use for benefit of all members, including parking as a permitted use) and Architectural Guidelines (prohibiting exclusive use of common area).

Orders: The petition was dismissed. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the Declaration or any statute.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Declaration § 2.2
  • Declaration § 2.21
  • Architectural Guidelines
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Declaration § 3.4
  • Declaration § 4.1

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Common Area, Landscaping, Parking, Architectural Control Committee, Exclusive Use, HOA Governance
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration § 2.2
  • Declaration § 2.21
  • Architectural Guidelines
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Declaration § 3.4
  • Declaration § 4.1

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 958497.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Hearing_Scheduled.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_AppearanceRespondent.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Payment.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Response_Petition_Form.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Hearing_Scheduled.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Notice_AppearanceRespondent.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Notice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Payment.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:10 (223.9 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 944374/HO22-21026_Response_Petition_Form.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – 958497.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:16 (122.6 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Hearing.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:18 (92.4 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:19 (125.2 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Hearing_Scheduled.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_AppearanceRespondent.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_Hearing.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:23 (1111.9 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Notice_Petition.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:25 (1303.7 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Payment.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:21:26 (223.9 KB)

22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2221026-REL Decision – HO22-21026_Response_Petition_Form.pdf

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Case Briefing: Judy Clapp v. Forest Trails Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings of the administrative hearing held on March 9, 2022, regarding Docket Number 22F-H2221026-l. The dispute involves a challenge by petitioner Judy Clapp against the Forest Trails Homeowners Association (HOA) concerning the landscaping of an eight-foot unpaved common area adjacent to 1473 Trail Head (the “Norman lot”).

The central conflict involves the Board’s decision to allow a homeowner to install a rock berm on association-owned land that had historically functioned as a parking lane for residents accessing a nearby trail head. The petitioner alleges this action violates the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by granting exclusive use of common area to one homeowner and eliminating a long-standing community benefit. The association contends that the Board acted within its authority to approve architectural requests, maintained consistency with community-wide landscaping standards, and addressed legitimate nuisance and erosion concerns.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview and Hearing Details

Date of Hearing: March 9, 2022

Administrative Law Judge: Alvin Moses Thompson

Petitioner: Judy Clapp (Represented by Kevin Harper)

Respondent: Forest Trails Homeowners Association (Represented by Ed O’Brien)

Key Witnesses: Judy Clapp (Petitioner); Dean Meyers (Board Member/Witness for Respondent)

Subject Property: Common area adjacent to 1473 Trail Head, Prescott, Arizona.

——————————————————————————–

Primary Legal and Regulatory Framework

The dispute centers on the interpretation of specific governing documents produced as evidence:

Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Section 2.2 (Common Areas and Open Space): States that common areas “shall be for the use and benefit of all members” and should be left in their natural state unless used for specific purposes, including “trails, walkways, driveways, parking areas, appropriate signs, recreational amenities, [and] landscaping.”

Section 3.4: Grants the association the authority to “own, repair, manage, operate, and maintain” common areas according to the plat.

Section 3.4.9: Designates the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) as the “judge of all aesthetic matters” on the common area.

Section 4.1: Provides the Board with flexibility in its decision-making regarding association property.

Architectural Guidelines

Landscaping Provisions: Permitted on the unpaved association-owned area (approx. 8 feet) between the lot line and the street only with ACC approval.

Exclusive Use Restriction: Mandates that any such approval “will not give the property owner exclusive use of this association property.”

——————————————————————————–

Main Themes and Arguments

1. Historical Use vs. New Architectural Approval

The petitioner argues that the area in question served as a de facto parking lane for approximately 15–20 years, accommodating up to three vehicles.

Petitioner Position: The removal of this parking area harms residents who now must walk an additional mile or more to access trail heads. Clapp asserts the association consistently denied similar requests in the past to protect common area access.

Respondent Position: The HOA argues that parking was never a “guaranteed right” or a “written amenity” in the declaration. They contend the Board could not “say no” to the Normans’ request because hundreds of other homeowners have similar roadside landscaping.

2. Allegations of “Exclusive Use”

A major point of contention is whether the rock berm constitutes a violation of the rule against “exclusive use.”

Petitioner’s Argument: The installation of large boulders and a rock berm makes it impossible for vehicles to park and “unsafe” or “risky” for pedestrians to walk over, effectively gifting the land to the adjacent homeowner.

Respondent’s Argument: The area is not fenced or walled. Members of the public or homeowners can still theoretically walk on it, meaning use is not exclusive. Dean Meyers testified that the area is “less accessible” but still accessible at the ends.

3. Nuisance Mitigation and Safety

The HOA justifies the landscaping as a solution to long-standing issues.

Respondent’s Evidence: Dean Meyers testified that the parking area created nuisances including noise (dogs, yelling), trash, and public intrusion 40 feet from the Normans’ kitchen. Furthermore, Meyers cited an erosion issue where water was undermining the cement curb, a problem he claims the landscaping resolved.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Clapp, a former board member of 10 years, testified she never heard of safety, noise, or trash complaints regarding this site until February 2021, four months after the rocks were installed. She suggested the “safety” argument was an after-the-fact justification.

4. Conflict of Interest and Procedure

The petitioner raised concerns regarding the motivations behind the approval.

Self-Serving Motivation: Witness Dean Meyers is a permanent board member and also the owner of the landscaping company hired by the Normans to perform the work.

Lack of Formal Vote: Clapp testified that the work appeared to be allowed without a formal board vote, though respondent minutes from October 27, 2020, show the board requested gravel samples for the project.

——————————————————————————–

Critical Evidence and Testimony

Photographic Evidence (Exhibit 6)

The hearing reviewed nine photographs showing the evolution of the site:

Before: A dirt “parking lane” capable of holding cars.

After: A “rock berm” consisting of large boulders and smaller rocks that completely prohibit vehicle access.

Comparison to Other Amenities

Clapp pointed to the community tennis courts as evidence of unfair treatment.

Tennis Court Parking: The HOA recently expanded and paved parking for tennis players (Exhibits 17, 18).

Trail Head Parking: Conversely, the HOA eliminated parking for hikers at the trail head, which Clapp described as the community’s only other amenity.

Legal Opinion of Jim Atkinson

An email exchange (Exhibit 7) involving former Board President and attorney Jim Atkinson was introduced. Atkinson’s noted opinion stated:

• The 8-foot area is common area property, “no different than its ownership of the paved areas.”

• Parking is a permitted use under Section 2.2.

• The Board “never agreed to allow a lot owner to block access to the shoulder area.”

——————————————————————————–

Conclusions and Sought Relief

The Petitioner seeks an order confirming that the CC&Rs prohibit these specific landscaping changes and requiring the association to restore the common area to its original condition.

The Respondent maintains that the Board acted within its discretionary authority to manage common areas and treat all members fairly by approving a standard landscaping request. They argue the Petitioner is seeking a “prescriptive easement” to park in a specific spot, a right they claim does not exist under the governing documents or Arizona law.

Summary Table of Arguments

Petitioner’s View

Respondent’s View

Land Use

Reserved for the benefit of all members (parking/trails).

Subject to Board management and aesthetic discretion.

Accessibility

Rock berm creates “exclusive use” by blocking access.

No fence exists; property remains technically accessible.

Safety/Nuisance

No evidence of prior complaints; “punitive” decision.

Resolved erosion, trash, and noise nuisances.

Consistency

Association has historically denied such requests.

Hundreds of other lots have identical landscaping.

Board Ethics

Decision was self-serving (witness was the contractor).

Business was private between the contractor and homeowner.

Study Guide: Judy Clapp v. Forest Trails Homeowners Association (Docket No. 22F-H2221026-I)

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing held on March 9, 2022, regarding a dispute over common area usage, landscaping rights, and parking access within the Forest Trails community.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2–3 sentences based on the provided hearing transcript and documents.

1. What is the central issue of the dispute between Judy Clapp and the Forest Trails Homeowners Association?

2. How does Section 2.2 of the Forest Trails Declaration define the purpose and permitted uses of “common areas”?

3. What physical modification to the area near 1473 Trail Head triggered this legal action, and who performed the work?

4. What is the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the “exclusive use” of the landscaped common area?

5. How does the Association justify its decision to approve the Normans’ landscaping request despite member objections?

6. What did the 2002–2003 review of the plat and CC&Rs reveal to the Association board regarding the 8-foot strips alongside the roadways?

7. What “nuisances” did the Respondent cite as reasons for prohibiting parking at the trail head location?

8. How does the Petitioner use the example of the community tennis courts to argue that the Association’s parking policy is inconsistent?

9. According to the testimony of Dean Myers, what is the Association’s policy regarding damage to homeowner-installed landscaping caused by snowplows?

10. What specific legal relief is the Petitioner seeking from the Administrative Law Judge?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. The dispute centers on the Association’s decision to allow a specific homeowner (the Normans) to landscape a common area in a way that prohibits long-standing member parking. The Petitioner argues this violates the Declaration’s provision that common areas benefit all members, while the Association claims the right to manage aesthetics and address nuisances.

2. Section 2.2 states that common areas are for the “use and benefit of all members” and should generally be left in their natural state. However, it explicitly allows these areas to be used for specific purposes, including trails, walkways, driveways, parking areas, landscaping, and utility easements.

3. The Normans installed large boulders and a rock berm on the association-owned unpaved roadway shoulder to prevent vehicles from parking there. This work was executed by Dean Myers, who is a permanent member of the Association’s Board of Directors and the owner of a landscaping company.

4. The Petitioner argues that the installation of the rock berm effectively grants the Normans “exclusive use” of the common area by making it physically inaccessible to others. She contends this violates the Architectural Guidelines, which state that landscaping approval shall not give a property owner exclusive use of association property.

5. The Association argues it must treat all members fairly, noting that hundreds of other residents have been allowed to landscape the common area up to the roadside. They assert that denying the Normans’ request would have unfairly “singled them out” when similar requests are universally approved.

6. The board realized that the 8-foot unpaved areas on each side of the paved roads were not private property but were actually “common areas” owned and managed by the Association. Following this discovery, the Association took over maintenance responsibilities, such as weed control and erosion management, for these strips.

7. The Respondent claimed that parking at the trail head created nuisances including trash, noise, and “public intrusion” from non-residents. Additionally, Dean Myers testified that parking was exacerbating erosion issues that were beginning to undermine the concrete street curb.

8. The Petitioner points out that the Association recently expanded and paved parking at the community tennis courts to benefit members who play tennis. She argues it is discriminatory to improve amenities for one group of members while removing a traditional parking benefit for those who use the hiking trails.

9. The Association generally holds the homeowner responsible for the costs of repairing any landscaping that extends into the common area if it is damaged by a snowplow. This serves as a condition of allowing private landscaping on association-owned land; the board only pays if the plow operator acted “stupidly.”

10. The Petitioner is seeking an order confirming that the Declaration prohibits these specific landscaping changes. Furthermore, she is requesting that the Association be ordered to restore the common area to its original condition to allow for continued member parking.

——————————————————————————–

Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts. (Answers not provided).

1. Aesthetics vs. Utility: Analyze the tension between the Board’s authority to judge “aesthetic matters” (Section 3.4.9) and the “permitted uses” of common areas (Section 2.2). Which authority should take precedence when a visual improvement eliminates a functional use?

2. The Definition of Exclusive Use: Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that the rock berm does not constitute “exclusive use” because there is no fence. Contrast this with the Petitioner’s testimony regarding the physical safety and accessibility of the area for members.

3. Conflicts of Interest in Governance: Discuss the implications of Dean Myers serving as both the board member approving (or allowing) the project and the contractor performing the work. How does this dual role affect the Association’s “fairness” argument?

4. Safety and Nuisance as Justification: Examine the evidence provided for safety concerns and nuisances at the trail head. Was the Association’s response (permitting boulders) a proportionate and evidenced-based solution to the problems described?

5. Historical Practice vs. Written Code: Explore the legal weight of “decades of practice” versus the literal interpretation of the Plat and Declaration. Should sixteen years of uninterrupted use by members create a protected right to park, even if not explicitly marked on a plat map?

——————————————————————————–

Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Architectural Control Committee (ACC)

The body (often the Board of Directors in this case) responsible for reviewing and approving or denying changes to property and common areas.

Common Area

Land owned by the Homeowners Association for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of all members, such as the 8-foot strips adjacent to roadways.

Declaration (CC&Rs)

The “Amended Declaration of Covenant Conditions and Restrictions,” which serves as the primary governing document for the Forest Trails community.

Developer Position

A permanent seat on the Board of Directors reserved for the original developer or their representative (currently held by Dean Myers).

Easement

A legal right to use another’s land for a specific limited purpose; in this case, the trail head access is described as an easement between two lots.

Exclusive Use

The sole right to use a portion of property to the exclusion of others; prohibited for private owners on association common areas.

GIS (Geographic Information System)

Digital mapping technology used in the hearing to show property lines and the relationship between lots and association-owned streets.

Natural State

The original, undeveloped condition of land; Section 2.2 mandates common areas be kept this way unless used for specific permitted purposes like trails or parking.

Petitioner

The party initiating the legal grievance or “petition” (Judy Clapp).

Plat / Plat Map

An official map drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land, including lots, streets, and common areas.

Respondent

The party responding to the legal grievance (Forest Trails Homeowners Association).

Rock Berm

A man-made barrier or mound constructed of rocks and boulders used in this case to physically block vehicle access to a shoulder.

Study Guide: Judy Clapp v. Forest Trails Homeowners Association (Docket No. 22F-H2221026-I)

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing held on March 9, 2022, regarding a dispute over common area usage, landscaping rights, and parking access within the Forest Trails community.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2–3 sentences based on the provided hearing transcript and documents.

1. What is the central issue of the dispute between Judy Clapp and the Forest Trails Homeowners Association?

2. How does Section 2.2 of the Forest Trails Declaration define the purpose and permitted uses of “common areas”?

3. What physical modification to the area near 1473 Trail Head triggered this legal action, and who performed the work?

4. What is the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the “exclusive use” of the landscaped common area?

5. How does the Association justify its decision to approve the Normans’ landscaping request despite member objections?

6. What did the 2002–2003 review of the plat and CC&Rs reveal to the Association board regarding the 8-foot strips alongside the roadways?

7. What “nuisances” did the Respondent cite as reasons for prohibiting parking at the trail head location?

8. How does the Petitioner use the example of the community tennis courts to argue that the Association’s parking policy is inconsistent?

9. According to the testimony of Dean Myers, what is the Association’s policy regarding damage to homeowner-installed landscaping caused by snowplows?

10. What specific legal relief is the Petitioner seeking from the Administrative Law Judge?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. The dispute centers on the Association’s decision to allow a specific homeowner (the Normans) to landscape a common area in a way that prohibits long-standing member parking. The Petitioner argues this violates the Declaration’s provision that common areas benefit all members, while the Association claims the right to manage aesthetics and address nuisances.

2. Section 2.2 states that common areas are for the “use and benefit of all members” and should generally be left in their natural state. However, it explicitly allows these areas to be used for specific purposes, including trails, walkways, driveways, parking areas, landscaping, and utility easements.

3. The Normans installed large boulders and a rock berm on the association-owned unpaved roadway shoulder to prevent vehicles from parking there. This work was executed by Dean Myers, who is a permanent member of the Association’s Board of Directors and the owner of a landscaping company.

4. The Petitioner argues that the installation of the rock berm effectively grants the Normans “exclusive use” of the common area by making it physically inaccessible to others. She contends this violates the Architectural Guidelines, which state that landscaping approval shall not give a property owner exclusive use of association property.

5. The Association argues it must treat all members fairly, noting that hundreds of other residents have been allowed to landscape the common area up to the roadside. They assert that denying the Normans’ request would have unfairly “singled them out” when similar requests are universally approved.

6. The board realized that the 8-foot unpaved areas on each side of the paved roads were not private property but were actually “common areas” owned and managed by the Association. Following this discovery, the Association took over maintenance responsibilities, such as weed control and erosion management, for these strips.

7. The Respondent claimed that parking at the trail head created nuisances including trash, noise, and “public intrusion” from non-residents. Additionally, Dean Myers testified that parking was exacerbating erosion issues that were beginning to undermine the concrete street curb.

8. The Petitioner points out that the Association recently expanded and paved parking at the community tennis courts to benefit members who play tennis. She argues it is discriminatory to improve amenities for one group of members while removing a traditional parking benefit for those who use the hiking trails.

9. The Association generally holds the homeowner responsible for the costs of repairing any landscaping that extends into the common area if it is damaged by a snowplow. This serves as a condition of allowing private landscaping on association-owned land; the board only pays if the plow operator acted “stupidly.”

10. The Petitioner is seeking an order confirming that the Declaration prohibits these specific landscaping changes. Furthermore, she is requesting that the Association be ordered to restore the common area to its original condition to allow for continued member parking.

——————————————————————————–

Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the source context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts. (Answers not provided).

1. Aesthetics vs. Utility: Analyze the tension between the Board’s authority to judge “aesthetic matters” (Section 3.4.9) and the “permitted uses” of common areas (Section 2.2). Which authority should take precedence when a visual improvement eliminates a functional use?

2. The Definition of Exclusive Use: Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that the rock berm does not constitute “exclusive use” because there is no fence. Contrast this with the Petitioner’s testimony regarding the physical safety and accessibility of the area for members.

3. Conflicts of Interest in Governance: Discuss the implications of Dean Myers serving as both the board member approving (or allowing) the project and the contractor performing the work. How does this dual role affect the Association’s “fairness” argument?

4. Safety and Nuisance as Justification: Examine the evidence provided for safety concerns and nuisances at the trail head. Was the Association’s response (permitting boulders) a proportionate and evidenced-based solution to the problems described?

5. Historical Practice vs. Written Code: Explore the legal weight of “decades of practice” versus the literal interpretation of the Plat and Declaration. Should sixteen years of uninterrupted use by members create a protected right to park, even if not explicitly marked on a plat map?

——————————————————————————–

Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Architectural Control Committee (ACC)

The body (often the Board of Directors in this case) responsible for reviewing and approving or denying changes to property and common areas.

Common Area

Land owned by the Homeowners Association for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of all members, such as the 8-foot strips adjacent to roadways.

Declaration (CC&Rs)

The “Amended Declaration of Covenant Conditions and Restrictions,” which serves as the primary governing document for the Forest Trails community.

Developer Position

A permanent seat on the Board of Directors reserved for the original developer or their representative (currently held by Dean Myers).

Easement

A legal right to use another’s land for a specific limited purpose; in this case, the trail head access is described as an easement between two lots.

Exclusive Use

The sole right to use a portion of property to the exclusion of others; prohibited for private owners on association common areas.

GIS (Geographic Information System)

Digital mapping technology used in the hearing to show property lines and the relationship between lots and association-owned streets.

Natural State

The original, undeveloped condition of land; Section 2.2 mandates common areas be kept this way unless used for specific permitted purposes like trails or parking.

Petitioner

The party initiating the legal grievance or “petition” (Judy Clapp).

Plat / Plat Map

An official map drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land, including lots, streets, and common areas.

Respondent

The party responding to the legal grievance (Forest Trails Homeowners Association).

Rock Berm

A man-made barrier or mound constructed of rocks and boulders used in this case to physically block vehicle access to a shoulder.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Judy Clapp (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Also referred to as Judith Ellen Black
  • Kevin Harper (Petitioner Attorney)
    Harper Law PLC
  • Rick Ohanesian (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Listed in Respondent's Amended Notice of Appearance
  • Lucy McMillan (Former Board Member)
    Forest Trails HOA
    Listed as witness but not present

Respondent Side

  • Edward D. O'Brien (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Edith I. Rudder (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Dean Meyers (Board Member)
    Forest Trails HOA Board
    Developer position on board; Professional landscaper hired by the Normans; Witness
  • James Norman (Homeowner)
    Forest Trails HOA
    Owner of lot 30; requested landscaping
  • Cynthia Norman (Homeowner)
    Forest Trails HOA
    Owner of lot 30
  • Jim Atkinson (HOA Attorney)
    Former Board President; identified as Association attorney in testimony
  • Nancy Char (Board President)
    Forest Trails HOA
    Current president mentioned in testimony
  • Marissa (Property Manager)
    Community Asset Management LLC
    Mentioned in meeting minutes regarding sample handling

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transcribed as 'Alvin Moses Thompson' in audio transcript
  • Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
    ADRE
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • Lenor Hemphill (Former Board Member)
    Forest Trails HOA
    Sent email regarding landscaping issue

The Sun Groves Homeowners Association v. David L & Makenzie Lockhart

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed as the Respondents stipulated they violated the CC&R Article 10.11.1 concerning parking, and were ordered to pay the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fees.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sun Groves Homeowners Association Counsel Robert H. Willis, Esq.
Respondent David L. and Stephanie J. Lockhart Counsel Andrew Ellis, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner (HOA) prevailed as the Respondents stipulated they violated the CC&R Article 10.11.1 concerning parking, and were ordered to pay the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fees.

Why this result: Respondents stipulated that they were in violation of Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of parking restrictions

Respondents stipulated that they were in violation of the SGHA CC&R’s regarding parking restrictions.

Orders: Petition granted; Respondents assessed the cost of Petitioner’s filing fees in the amount of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Stipulation, CC&R Violation, Parking
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120019-REL Decision – 854057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:59 (84.7 KB)

21F-H2120019-REL Decision – 854057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:42 (84.7 KB)

The administrative legal case hearing, *The Sun Groves Homeowners Association (SGHA) v. David L. and Stephanie J. Lockhart*, was held on February 9, 2021, before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The proceeding was overseen by Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone.

Key Facts and Jurisdiction

The Petitioner, Sun Groves Homeowners Association, is a planned community organization. Respondents, David L. and Stephanie J. Lockhart, are homeowners and members of SGHA. The case was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), which, along with the OAH, is authorized by A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) to hear petitions regarding violations of planned community documents.

Main Issue and Legal Points

SGHA filed a complaint alleging that the Lockharts were in violation of Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s. This specific article restricts the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks, requiring them to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway, or in Board-designated areas. The most critical legal point of the hearing was that the Respondents stipulated (agreed) that they were in violation of Article 10.11.1 of the CC&R’s. The Respondents also stipulated that SGHA was the prevailing party in the matter.

Final Decision and Outcome

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the tribunal issued a Conclusion of Law finding that the Respondents had violated Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioners’ petition. As the prevailing party, SGHA was awarded costs, and the Lockharts were ordered to pay Petitioner’s filing fees in the amount of $500.00. The Order became binding unless a request for rehearing was filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Questions

Question

Can my HOA restrict parking on the street or in front of my house?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs specifically restrict parking to garages or driveways.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld a CC&R provision that prohibited parking private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks anywhere on the property or adjacent roadways, except within a garage or private driveway.

Alj Quote

No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 10.11.1

Topic Tags

  • Parking
  • CC&Rs
  • Restrictions

Question

If I admit to a violation during a hearing, what happens?

Short Answer

The judge will accept the admission and issue a finding that the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

When a homeowner stipulates (agrees) that they were in violation of a specific rule, the tribunal accepts this admission as fact and rules accordingly without needing further evidence.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the tribunal finds that Respondents violated Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s.

Legal Basis

Stipulation of Parties

Topic Tags

  • Hearing Procedure
  • Stipulation
  • Evidence

Question

Can the HOA force me to pay their filing fees if they win?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the homeowner to pay the HOA's filing fees.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowners agreed to pay the HOA's $500.00 filing fee as part of the stipulation that the HOA was the prevailing party, and the judge ordered this assessment.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED assessing the cost of Petitioner’s filing fees in the amount of $500.00.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Fees
  • Costs

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have authority to hear HOA violation cases?

Short Answer

Yes, state law allows owners or HOAs to file petitions regarding violations of community documents.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute permits planned community organizations (HOAs) or owners to file petitions with the Department regarding violations, which are then heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department for a hearing concerning violations of planned community documents under the authority Title 33, Chapter 16.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • ADRE
  • Process

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's decision final?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ is legally binding on both the homeowner and the HOA unless a request for a rehearing is successfully granted.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Status
  • Appeals
  • Binding Order

Question

How much time do I have to appeal or request a rehearing?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing within 30 days of the service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to challenge the decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • Appeals
  • Deadlines
  • Procedure

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120019-REL
Case Title
The Sun Groves Homeowners Association vs. David L & Makenzie Lockhart
Decision Date
2021-02-10
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA restrict parking on the street or in front of my house?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs specifically restrict parking to garages or driveways.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld a CC&R provision that prohibited parking private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks anywhere on the property or adjacent roadways, except within a garage or private driveway.

Alj Quote

No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 10.11.1

Topic Tags

  • Parking
  • CC&Rs
  • Restrictions

Question

If I admit to a violation during a hearing, what happens?

Short Answer

The judge will accept the admission and issue a finding that the violation occurred.

Detailed Answer

When a homeowner stipulates (agrees) that they were in violation of a specific rule, the tribunal accepts this admission as fact and rules accordingly without needing further evidence.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the tribunal finds that Respondents violated Article 10.11.1 of the SGHA CC&R’s.

Legal Basis

Stipulation of Parties

Topic Tags

  • Hearing Procedure
  • Stipulation
  • Evidence

Question

Can the HOA force me to pay their filing fees if they win?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the homeowner to pay the HOA's filing fees.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowners agreed to pay the HOA's $500.00 filing fee as part of the stipulation that the HOA was the prevailing party, and the judge ordered this assessment.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED assessing the cost of Petitioner’s filing fees in the amount of $500.00.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Fees
  • Costs

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have authority to hear HOA violation cases?

Short Answer

Yes, state law allows owners or HOAs to file petitions regarding violations of community documents.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute permits planned community organizations (HOAs) or owners to file petitions with the Department regarding violations, which are then heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department for a hearing concerning violations of planned community documents under the authority Title 33, Chapter 16.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • ADRE
  • Process

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's decision final?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ is legally binding on both the homeowner and the HOA unless a request for a rehearing is successfully granted.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Status
  • Appeals
  • Binding Order

Question

How much time do I have to appeal or request a rehearing?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing within 30 days of the service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to challenge the decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • Appeals
  • Deadlines
  • Procedure

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120019-REL
Case Title
The Sun Groves Homeowners Association vs. David L & Makenzie Lockhart
Decision Date
2021-02-10
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert H. Willis (attorney)
    Burdman Willis, PLLC

Respondent Side

  • David L. Lockhart (respondent)
  • Stephanie J. Lockhart (respondent)
    Proper co-Respondent in this matter
  • Makenzie Lockhart (listed respondent)
    Respondent’s daughter
  • Andrew Ellis (attorney)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:22 (95.4 KB)

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:39 (95.4 KB)

Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.

The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.

Case Background

Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.

Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.

Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.

The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.

Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1

The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:

Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)

Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.

Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.

Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”

Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)

The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.

Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.

Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.

Legal Standards Applied

Standard

Description

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Covenant Interpretation

In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.

Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation

The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:

• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.

Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction

The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.

• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

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Review Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?

3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?

4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?

5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?

6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?

7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?

8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?

9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?

10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.

2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.

3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.

4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.

5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.

8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.

1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?

2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.

3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?

5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Declaratory Judgment

A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.

Waiver

The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.

Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons

The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.

Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation

Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.

This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:

“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.

Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase

In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The court defined this standard as:

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”

The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.

Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door

The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.

The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.

The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:

“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.

Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner

Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.

While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wendy Ellsworth (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Brian Hatch (petitioner attorney)
    Brian A. Hatch PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL-RHG/733509.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:04 (38.6 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:08 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:11 (108.8 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:45 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:49 (108.8 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.

4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)