John Krahn, Janet Krahn & Joseph Pizzicaroli v. Tonto Forest Estates

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-06-04
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $3,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John Krahn, Janet Krahn, Joseph Pizzicaroli, Michael Holland, John R Krahn Living Trust, and Janet Krahn Living Trust Counsel
Respondent Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Dwight Jolivette

Alleged Violations

CC&R 4.32, ARS §33-1802
CC&R 4.32
A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1)
Bylaw 3.9
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted five of the six consolidated petitions in favor of the Petitioners, finding the HOA improperly assessed empty lots for septic expenses, unlawfully reimbursed a homeowner for a septic replacement part, issued deficient violation notices, failed to maintain anonymity of election ballots, and wrongfully withheld non-privileged records. The ALJ denied the petition regarding open meeting violations, ruling the HOA was permitted to discuss and decide on insurance claims related to pending litigation in a closed session. The HOA was ordered to refund $3,000 in filing fees, but no civil penalties were awarded.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the open meeting claim because the statute permits boards to consider and make decisions on matters concerning pending litigation, such as invoking insurance coverage, during closed executive sessions.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper assessment of empty lots for septic-related expenses

Petitioners alleged the HOA improperly assessed undeveloped lots for septic system expenses.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse $1,000 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $1,000.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R 4.32
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802

Improper reimbursement for septic system replacement

Petitioners alleged the HOA improperly reimbursed a homeowner $75.00 for a septic system replacement part.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R 4.32

Improper notice of violation

Petitioners alleged the HOA issued violation notices regarding trees and aesthetics without citing specific governing document provisions.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow Arizona statutes and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1)

Failure to maintain secret written ballots

Petitioners alleged the HOA failed to store election ballots anonymously after the election.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow the Bylaws and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaw 3.9

Open meeting violation

Petitioners alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by deciding to invoke liability insurance during a closed executive session.

Orders: Petition denied. Filing fee not reimbursed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Failure to provide association records

Petitioners alleged the HOA wrongfully withheld redacted violation notices requested by a member.

Orders: HOA ordered to abide by Arizona statutes and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H033-REL Decision – 1312646.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1348483.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1359111.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1362707.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1363188.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1366046.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1367553.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1369298.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1375712.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1383935.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1384517.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1384559.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1387189.pdf

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24F-H033-REL Decision – 1403043.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 24F-H033-REL


Briefing Document: Krahn et al. v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes a series of legal disputes between a group of homeowners (Petitioners), led by John Krahn, and the Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (Respondent). The disputes, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), cover a range of alleged violations of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, and Arizona state statutes.

An initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision on June 4, 2025, consolidated six petitions and found in favor of the Petitioners on five of them. These rulings ordered the HOA to comply with its governing documents and state law and to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fees for each successful petition. The single petition denied concerned the Board’s decision to file an insurance claim during a closed session.

The most contentious dispute, Case 24F-H033-REL, concerns the HOA’s practice of assessing undeveloped lots for septic system maintenance costs. The initial ruling favored the Petitioners, with the ALJ concluding that the CC&Rs “is clear that only lots with dwelling units are required to share in the Assessments.”

The HOA successfully petitioned for a rehearing on this specific case, leading to a new proceeding under a different ALJ. The rehearing, which commenced on November 4, 2025, centers on the HOA’s argument that a separate, prior ALJ ruling in an unrelated case (Burns v. TFE) created a binding precedent that compels them to assess all lots equally, creating what they term an “irreconcilable conundrum.” The Petitioners argue that the plain language of the CC&Rs is specific and controlling, limiting septic costs to lots with installed systems. The rehearing involves extensive legal argumentation, was not concluded in one day, and is scheduled to continue on January 30, 2026.

I. Initial Administrative Law Judge Decision (June 4, 2025)

The initial consolidated hearing was presided over by Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone. The decision addressed six separate petitions filed by homeowners against the Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (TFE). The Petitioners prevailed on five of the six issues.

Summary of Rulings

Case Number

Dispute

Petitioner Argument

Respondent Argument

ALJ Conclusion and Order

24F-H033-REL

Violation of CC&R 4.32 & A.R.S. § 33-1802: Assessing empty/undeveloped lots for septic-related expenses.

Septic obligations apply only to lots with dwelling units, as costs arise “after installation.”

All lots were intended to pay the full assessment amount; the CC&Rs should be read in context.

Granted. The tribunal found CC&R 4.32 is “clear that only lots with dwelling units are required to share in the Assessments issued.” HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse the $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

25F-H002-REL

Violation of CC&R 4.32: Improperly reimbursing a former Board member $75.00 for a septic system part.

The reimbursed “P-Series Float” was a replacement part, which is the homeowner’s responsibility under the CC&Rs, not a repair eligible for reimbursement.

The invoice was ambiguous as to whether it was a repair or replacement, giving the Board the right to reimburse the homeowner.

Granted. The tribunal found the part was a replacement and therefore the homeowner’s responsibility. HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse the $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

25F-H006-REL

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1): Attempting to enforce compliance with rules not found in the CC&Rs regarding tree trimming for “aesthetics.”

A violation notice for tree trimming was improper as it cited no governing section of the CC&Rs and the appeal was never scheduled.

The Board President testified that technical issues in the letters had been remedied and the HOA was not interested in collecting fines.

Granted. The notice, though a “Friendly Reminder,” failed to cite the specific CC&R section violated. HOA ordered to follow Arizona statutes and reimburse the $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded based on credible testimony of future compliance.

25F-H020-REL

Violation of Bylaw 3.9 (Secret Ballot): Adding a signature verification page to ballots, compromising anonymity.

Attaching envelopes and ballots together after an election violated the secret ballot bylaw, as it would be easy to determine how members voted.

The bylaw did not address ballot storage after an election.

Granted. The tribunal found that ballots should be stored anonymously after counting. HOA ordered to follow bylaws and reimburse the $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded based on credible testimony of an updated storage policy.

25F-H009-REL

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) (Open Meetings): Deciding to file a Directors & Officers (D&O) insurance claim outside of an open meeting.

The Board made a discretionary financial choice to file a D&O claim (for a defamation suit filed by Krahn) in a closed session, leading to the policy’s cancellation and increased premiums.

The Board had the right to invoke its insurance coverage in a closed session as it was a legal decision related to pending litigation involving a homeowner.

Denied. The tribunal found no violation. Under the statute, the Board was within its rights to discuss and decide the matter in private due to pending litigation. HOA was not required to reimburse the filing fee.

25F-H011-REL

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) (Records Request): Failing to fulfill a request for redacted association records within ten business days.

The HOA failed to produce redacted copies of similar violation notices that were requested on August 19, 2024.

The Board withheld the documents on the advice of its attorney because it was part of ongoing litigation.

Granted. The tribunal found the notices were wrongfully withheld as they were drafted prior to the litigation and were not privileged. HOA ordered to abide by Arizona statutes and reimburse the $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

II. The Rehearing of Case 24F-H033-REL (Septic Assessments)

Following the June 4, 2025 decision, the Respondent (TFE) successfully petitioned for a rehearing limited to the findings in case 24F-H033-REL.

A. Procedural History of the Rehearing

August 18, 2025: The Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing.

September 9, 2025: ALJ Adam D. Stone grants a continuance, setting the rehearing for November 4, 2025.

October 14, 2025: Petitioners’ motion to disqualify ALJ Stone for alleged personal bias is addressed. Citing new legislation (A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(A)) effective September 26, 2025, which entitles a party to one peremptory change of judge, the motion is treated as such. The case is reassigned to Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

October 27 & 28, 2025: Procedural orders are issued permitting Dennis Legere to testify and setting an exhibit exchange deadline.

November 4, 2025: The rehearing commences but is not concluded.

November 6 & 17, 2025: A further hearing date is set for January 13, 2026, and later continued to January 30, 2026.

B. Core Arguments in the Rehearing (November 4, 2025)

The rehearing focused exclusively on whether the HOA is permitted to assess undeveloped lots for septic system costs. Both sides presented extensive arguments interpreting the governing documents and prior legal decisions.

1. CC&R 4.32 is Specific and Controlling: The language in CC&R 4.32 is clear and paramount. The clause stating the HOA’s responsibility begins “After installation” of a septic system, and that costs are “payable by such Owner,” explicitly ties septic obligations to lots with existing systems and dwelling units.

2. No Obligation, No Assessment: Under A.R.S. § 33-1802, an HOA can only assess members to pay for its “obligation under the declaration.” Since the HOA has no obligation to monitor, maintain, or repair a non-existent septic system on an empty lot, it has no legal basis to assess that lot for those costs.

3. Septic Costs are a “Limited Common Expense”: The Petitioners argue that septic expenses are not a general common expense applicable to all lots. By analogy to Arizona condominium law (A.R.S. § 33-1255), these costs benefit fewer than all units and should be assessed exclusively against the units benefited.

4. CC&R 8.1 Does Not Mandate Uniformity for All Fees: The governing documents explicitly allow for differentiated fees for services like trash collection, fire protection, and cable television, which apply only to lots “upon which a dwelling unit has been constructed.” This demonstrates a framework for non-uniform assessments, refuting the claim that all assessments must be identical for all lots.

5. The Burns v. TFE Ruling is Inapplicable: The Petitioners contend that the prior ALJ ruling in the Burns case is being misapplied. That case did not address undeveloped lots; it concerned the improper “back-assessing” of a homeowner for septic pump-out costs for which the HOA had already collected funds for 15 years.

6. Respondent’s Own Legal Opinions Concur: The Petitioners presented two prior legal opinions (from 2014 and 2020) obtained by the HOA itself, which concluded that septic-related costs could be “passed on to the specific owner” as an individual assessment, separate from the “regular assessment.”

1. The Burns v. TFE Ruling Creates Binding Precedent: The HOA’s primary defense is that a 2023 ruling by ALJ Ikenhere in the Burns case prohibited them from individually assessing septic costs. That ruling mandated that septic maintenance costs are a common expense to be paid from annual assessments “allocated equally among all lots” per CC&R 8.1.

2. An “Irreconcilable Conundrum”: The HOA claims it is in a no-win situation. If they follow the Burns ruling and assess all lots equally, they are sued by Krahn. If they were to follow the initial Stone ruling and assess only developed lots, they would violate the Burns ruling and could be sued by other homeowners.

3. CC&R 8.1 is Clear and Unambiguous: Section 8.1 of the CC&Rs states that assessments “shall be allocated equally among all lots.” The Petitioners’ interpretation would render this clause meaningless. The document does not define or recognize “limited common expenses” for planned communities.

4. Septic Costs Are a “Common Expense”: The CC&Rs define “common expenses” as the “expenses of operating the association.” Since the HOA is obligated under CC&R 4.32 to monitor and maintain existing septic systems, the costs incurred are a legitimate operational expense. The Burns ruling affirmed this, classifying septic services as protecting the “health and safety of the members.”

5. “After installation” Only Expands the Common Expense Pool: The HOA argues that the “after installation” clause simply marks the point in time when the HOA’s operational expenses grow to include a new system. Once expanded, this common expense must be allocated equally among all lots per CC&R 8.1.

C. Civil Penalty Argument

The Petitioners are seeking a civil penalty of $100 against the HOA, arguing a pattern of bad faith. John Krahn presented a detailed timeline alleging:

• Protracted delays of over 300 days by the Board in formally responding to homeowner concerns.

• A former Board President admitting in a meeting that the HOA’s interpretation was “faulty” and that “empty lots should not be paying that fee,” yet persisting with the assessments.

• A refusal to negotiate a settlement, with the HOA allegedly demanding that Krahn first drop other unrelated OAH cases as a precondition for discussion, an act Krahn described as “blackmail.”

• Unreasonable counter-offers during settlement talks that required Petitioners to drop all cases and agree to never file another complaint.

III. Current Status and Next Steps

The rehearing on November 4, 2025, concluded for the day without completion. A further hearing has been scheduled for January 30, 2026, at 9:00 AM before ALJ Velva Moses-Thompson. The forthcoming session is expected to include the Respondent’s cross-examination of Mr. Krahn on his civil penalty testimony, closing arguments on that issue, and potentially the adjudication of the remaining consolidated petitions.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Krahn (petitioner)
    John R Krahn Living Trust
    Appeared and testified; listed multiple consolidated dockets as petitioner, including 24F-H033-REL, 25F-H002-REL, 25F-H006-REL, 25F-H009-REL, 25F-H011-REL, 25F-H020-REL.
  • Janet Krahn (petitioner)
    Janet Krahn Living Trust
  • Joseph Pizzicaroli (petitioner)
    Estate of Joseph Pizzicaroli
    Estate is a party to the proceedings; deceased.
  • Michael Holland (petitioner)
    Holland Family Trust
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioners.
  • Jill Burns (Estate representative/witness)
    Estate of Joseph Pizzicaroli
    Acted as representative for the Estate in legal matters; limited to witness status at the rehearing.
  • Kathryn Kendall (Estate Personal Representative)
    Estate of Joseph Pizzicaroli
    Executive Personal Representative of the Estate.

Respondent Side

  • Dwight Jolivette (HOA President/witness)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent and testified.
  • Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Steve Gower (former HOA Board President)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association
    Referenced in testimony regarding prior board actions and statements.
  • Barbara Bonilla (HOA administrative contact)
    ogdenre.com
    Listed as contact for Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association correspondence.

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
    Original Administrative Law Judge who issued the decision on June 4, 2025.
  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge assigned to the rehearing.
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Signed the Order related to the Motion to Disqualify ALJ Stone.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dennis Legere (witness)
    Ordered to testify at the hearing.

John R Krahn Living Trust/Janet Krahn Living Trust v. Tonto Forest

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-06-04
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $3,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John Krahn, Janet Krahn, Joseph Pizzicaroli, Michael Holland, John R Krahn Living Trust, and Janet Krahn Living Trust Counsel
Respondent Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Dwight Jolivette

Alleged Violations

CC&R 4.32, ARS §33-1802
CC&R 4.32
A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1)
Bylaw 3.9
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted five of the six consolidated petitions in favor of the Petitioners, finding the HOA improperly assessed empty lots for septic expenses, unlawfully reimbursed a homeowner for a septic replacement part, issued deficient violation notices, failed to maintain anonymity of election ballots, and wrongfully withheld non-privileged records. The ALJ denied the petition regarding open meeting violations, ruling the HOA was permitted to discuss and decide on insurance claims related to pending litigation in a closed session. The HOA was ordered to refund $3,000 in filing fees, but no civil penalties were awarded.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the open meeting claim because the statute permits boards to consider and make decisions on matters concerning pending litigation, such as invoking insurance coverage, during closed executive sessions.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper assessment of empty lots for septic-related expenses

Petitioners alleged the HOA improperly assessed undeveloped lots for septic system expenses.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse $1,000 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $1,000.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R 4.32
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802

Improper reimbursement for septic system replacement

Petitioners alleged the HOA improperly reimbursed a homeowner $75.00 for a septic system replacement part.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow CC&Rs and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R 4.32

Improper notice of violation

Petitioners alleged the HOA issued violation notices regarding trees and aesthetics without citing specific governing document provisions.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow Arizona statutes and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)(1)

Failure to maintain secret written ballots

Petitioners alleged the HOA failed to store election ballots anonymously after the election.

Orders: HOA ordered to follow the Bylaws and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaw 3.9

Open meeting violation

Petitioners alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by deciding to invoke liability insurance during a closed executive session.

Orders: Petition denied. Filing fee not reimbursed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Failure to provide association records

Petitioners alleged the HOA wrongfully withheld redacted violation notices requested by a member.

Orders: HOA ordered to abide by Arizona statutes and reimburse $500 filing fee. No civil penalty awarded.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Decision Documents

25F-H009-REL Decision – 1217115.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1232517.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1234660.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1237412.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1239559.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1241508.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1252902.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1267085.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1274385.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1277471.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1280310.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1284656.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1301318.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1312646.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1314117.pdf

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25F-H009-REL Decision – 1337755.pdf

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**Case Title:** 25F-H009-REL (Consolidated under 24F-H033-REL)

**Parties:**
* **Petitioners:** John Krahn, et al.
* **Respondent:** Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (TFE)

**Main Issue:**
The primary legal issue was whether the Respondent violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A) by deciding to file a claim with its Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance company during a closed executive session rather than in an open meeting.

**Key Facts and Arguments:**
* **Background:** The dispute arose after Petitioner John Krahn filed a defamation lawsuit against the TFE Board. In response to this lawsuit, the Board met in a closed session and decided to invoke its liability insurance policy to secure legal defense counsel.
* **Petitioners' Position:** The Petitioners argued that while the Board was permitted to *discuss* the litigation in a closed session, the actual discretionary financial *decision* to file an insurance claim should have been made during an open meeting. Furthermore, the Petitioners alleged that this decision caused the HOA's insurance policy to be canceled, forcing the Association to secure new coverage at a significantly higher cost. The Petitioners sought a $500 civil penalty.
* **Respondent's Position:** The Respondent contended that the Board had the right to invoke its insurance coverage in a closed session because the action constituted a legal decision regarding pending litigation initiated by a homeowner. The Respondent also clarified that the insurance policy was not canceled because of the claim, but rather because the insurance provider ceased offering that specific type of policy.

**Legal Analysis:**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) analyzed the matter under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which generally mandates open meetings for HOA boards but provides specific exceptions. Under the statute, a board may close a portion of a meeting to consider legal advice from an attorney or matters concerning pending or contemplated litigation.

The ALJ determined that because there was active, pending litigation against the Board by a homeowner, the Board was entirely within its statutory rights to both discuss and decide upon invoking its insurance policy during a closed session. The tribunal found no statutory requirement dictating that only the discussion may remain private while the subsequent decision or action must be executed in an open meeting, particularly when the litigation involves a member of the Association.

**Final Decision (Outcome):**
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proving a statutory violation. Consequently, the petition for case 25F-H009-REL was **denied**. Additionally, the ALJ ruled that the Respondent was not required to reimburse the Petitioners' filing fee, and no civil penalty was awarded.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Krahn (petitioner)
    John R Krahn Living Trust
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioners; testified regarding various CC&R, statutory, and bylaw violations.
  • Janet Krahn (petitioner)
    Janet Krahn Living Trust
  • Joseph Pizzicaroli (petitioner)
    Also received a fine notice regarding tree trimming.
  • Michael Holland (petitioner)
    Holland Family Trust
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioners.

Respondent Side

  • Dwight Jolivette (board member)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent; testified as the new Board President.
  • Barbara Bonilla (property manager)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association
    Contact for the respondent; associated with Ogden RE.

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge presiding over the consolidated cases.
  • Susan Nicolson (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received copies of the orders.

Elizabeth, Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-04-04
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Elizabeth Flint Counsel
Respondent Citation Gardens Cooperative #1 Counsel Andrew Vizcarra

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1816(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent, Citation Gardens Cooperative #1, does not meet the statutory definition of a planned community, and therefore, the statute prohibiting the denial of solar panels (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816, as the ALJ determined a cooperative's purposes and functions are separate and distinct from those of a planned community, excluding it from the planned community definition.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of request to install solar panels

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1816(A) by prohibiting the installation of a solar energy device, arguing the Cooperative qualifies as a planned community. Respondent argued it was a Cooperative Corporation, not a planned community, and the statute did not apply.

Orders: No action is required of Respondent in this matter, and the petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1816
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Solar Energy Device, Planned Community Definition, Cooperative Housing, Statutory Applicability, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1816
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/51A2icH0TP8dmKblCZUFAY

Decision Documents

23F-H026-REL Decision – 1030738.pdf

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23F-H026-REL Decision – 1046844.pdf

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Questions

Question

Does the Arizona law protecting a homeowner's right to install solar panels apply to housing cooperatives?

Short Answer

No. The ALJ ruled that housing cooperatives do not fit the legal definition of a 'planned community,' so the solar protection statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply to them.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a member of a cooperative sought to install solar panels, citing A.R.S. § 33-1816, which prevents planned communities from prohibiting solar devices. The judge determined that while the definition of a planned community does not explicitly list cooperatives as an exclusion, the nature and purpose of a cooperative are distinct enough that they do not fall under the planned community statutes. Therefore, the cooperative was not legally required to permit the installation.

Alj Quote

Although the definition of a planned community does not expressly exclude a cooperative, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community, as their purposes and functions are separate and distinct.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802; A.R.S. § 33-1816

Topic Tags

  • solar panels
  • cooperatives
  • planned community definition

Question

What happens if the HOA or respondent fails to attend the administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The hearing proceeds without them.

Detailed Answer

If the respondent (the HOA or Cooperative) has been properly notified of the hearing time and date but fails to appear or request a continuance, the Administrative Law Judge will conduct the hearing in their absence. The petitioner will still present their case, but the respondent loses the opportunity to defend themselves in person.

Alj Quote

Consequently, given that Respondent was properly noticed of the hearing, the hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence.

Legal Basis

Procedural Due Process

Topic Tags

  • hearing procedure
  • attendance
  • default

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The petitioner (typically the homeowner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not up to the HOA to disprove the claims initially; the homeowner must affirmatively establish that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Is a housing cooperative considered a 'planned community' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

No, a cooperative is legally distinct from a planned community.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a planned community generally involves real estate owned/operated by a nonprofit where owners are mandatory members. A cooperative, however, is formed to acquire, own, and operate a housing project where members hold shares. The judge ruled that these are separate legal concepts with different purposes, meaning statutes specific to 'planned communities' do not automatically apply to cooperatives.

Alj Quote

Respondent is a nonprofit corporation that was formed for the purpose of acquiring, owning and operating a cooperative housing project… the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • cooperatives
  • planned community

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is 'more probably true than not.' This is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It means the evidence must incline a fair mind to one side even slightly more than the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Common Law / A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
23F-H026-REL
Case Title
Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date
2023-04-04
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does the Arizona law protecting a homeowner's right to install solar panels apply to housing cooperatives?

Short Answer

No. The ALJ ruled that housing cooperatives do not fit the legal definition of a 'planned community,' so the solar protection statute (A.R.S. § 33-1816) does not apply to them.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a member of a cooperative sought to install solar panels, citing A.R.S. § 33-1816, which prevents planned communities from prohibiting solar devices. The judge determined that while the definition of a planned community does not explicitly list cooperatives as an exclusion, the nature and purpose of a cooperative are distinct enough that they do not fall under the planned community statutes. Therefore, the cooperative was not legally required to permit the installation.

Alj Quote

Although the definition of a planned community does not expressly exclude a cooperative, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community, as their purposes and functions are separate and distinct.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802; A.R.S. § 33-1816

Topic Tags

  • solar panels
  • cooperatives
  • planned community definition

Question

What happens if the HOA or respondent fails to attend the administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The hearing proceeds without them.

Detailed Answer

If the respondent (the HOA or Cooperative) has been properly notified of the hearing time and date but fails to appear or request a continuance, the Administrative Law Judge will conduct the hearing in their absence. The petitioner will still present their case, but the respondent loses the opportunity to defend themselves in person.

Alj Quote

Consequently, given that Respondent was properly noticed of the hearing, the hearing proceeded in Respondent’s absence.

Legal Basis

Procedural Due Process

Topic Tags

  • hearing procedure
  • attendance
  • default

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The petitioner (typically the homeowner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims. It is not up to the HOA to disprove the claims initially; the homeowner must affirmatively establish that the HOA violated the governing documents or statutes.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated applicable statutes, CC&Rs, and/or Bylaws by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Is a housing cooperative considered a 'planned community' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

No, a cooperative is legally distinct from a planned community.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that a planned community generally involves real estate owned/operated by a nonprofit where owners are mandatory members. A cooperative, however, is formed to acquire, own, and operate a housing project where members hold shares. The judge ruled that these are separate legal concepts with different purposes, meaning statutes specific to 'planned communities' do not automatically apply to cooperatives.

Alj Quote

Respondent is a nonprofit corporation that was formed for the purpose of acquiring, owning and operating a cooperative housing project… the Administrative Law Judge concludes that a cooperative does not fall within the definition of a planned community…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • definitions
  • cooperatives
  • planned community

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win a hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is 'more probably true than not.' This is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It means the evidence must incline a fair mind to one side even slightly more than the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Common Law / A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Case

Docket No
23F-H026-REL
Case Title
Elizabeth Flint v. Citation Gardens Cooperative #1
Decision Date
2023-04-04
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Elizabeth Flint (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified.

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Vizcarra (respondent representative)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Co. Management Services, L.L.C.
    Did not appear at the hearing; also referenced verbally as 'Andrew Biscara'.

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings

Other Participants

  • James Knupp (Acting Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on the service list for the Order Setting Hearing dated Feb 2, 2023.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on the service list for the Decision dated April 4, 2023.
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • vnunez (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.
  • labril (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of case documents via email address.

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.


  • don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Respondent Property Owner's Association was not found to be a 'planned community' under the applicable Arizona statute.

Why this result: The ALJ determined that the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' because its maintenance of landscaping did not constitute maintaining 'roadways' as required by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because it did not maintain 'roadways'. Petitioner argued that maintaining landscaping around the entrance sign satisfied the 'covenant to maintain roadways' requirement by defining 'roadway' as the entire 'right-of-way'. The ALJ found that 'roadway' means the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, HOA Dispute
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:22 (130.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG


This Homeowner’s Case Collapsed Over One Word — Here’s Why It Matters

Dealing with a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) can sometimes feel like navigating a maze of rules and regulations. But what happens when a dispute isn’t about a rule, but about the definition of a single, common word? In the Arizona case of Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association, a major legal conflict hinged on one seemingly simple question: What, exactly, is a “roadway”?

The answer would determine whether a state agency had the power to hear the case at all. The judge’s decision provides a masterclass in how the law interprets language, revealing practical lessons about why a single word can make or break an entire legal argument.

1. A Legal Battle Can Hinge on a Dictionary Definition

The core issue of the case was jurisdiction—whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had the authority to hear the dispute. For the department to have jurisdiction, the HOA had to qualify as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). A key part of that definition required the HOA to have a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

This is where the entire case pivoted.

The Homeowner’s Argument: The petitioner, Mr. Satterlee, argued that the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the walls, sign, and surrounding landscaping at the community entrance fulfilled this requirement. He contended that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly as a “roadway system,” which would include the entire right-of-way, landscaping and all.

The HOA’s Argument: The respondent HOA argued for a much narrower definition. They stated that a “roadway” is only the part of the road used for vehicle traffic. Since maintaining walls and landscaping is not maintaining a roadway, they argued they were not a “planned community” under the law, and therefore the state had no jurisdiction.

The entire legal question of whether the case could even proceed came down to the plain meaning of this one word.

2. Judges Don’t Guess — They Have a Method for Meaning

When a legal dispute depends on the meaning of a word in a law, judges don’t simply pick the definition they prefer. Legal interpretation follows a clear principle: start with the “plain meaning” of the words the legislature chose to use. This wasn’t just a casual search; it was a methodical application of the “plain meaning rule,” a cornerstone of statutory interpretation where judges prioritize the common, ordinary meaning of words over specialized or re-imagined definitions.

To determine the plain meaning of “roadway,” the Administrative Law Judge in this case conducted a thorough review of its common definition by consulting numerous dictionaries:

• English Oxford Living Dictionaries

• Merriam-Webster

• Dictionary.com

• Cambridge Dictionary

• American Heritage Dictionary

• Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

The collective conclusion was overwhelming. The dictionaries consistently defined a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicles, explicitly contrasting it with sidewalks, shoulders, or adjacent landscaping. This methodical approach demonstrated that the common, established meaning of the word supported the HOA’s narrow interpretation, not the homeowner’s broad one.

3. Your Own Evidence Can Be Used Against You

In a classic case of legal irony, the very evidence the homeowner presented to support his case became the primary tool the judge used to dismantle it. The homeowner submitted several official documents from Pima County, but these exhibits ended up undermining his own argument.

The judge pointed to several instances where the homeowner’s own evidence made a clear distinction between a “roadway” and the surrounding area:

• A Pima County ordinance referred to the “right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway,” treating the two as separate things. The judge noted that the petitioner tried to argue that the “shoulder of an existing roadway” referred not to the paved edge for vehicles, but to the landscaped areas beyond it—an interpretation that defies common understanding and the county’s own official language.

• County planning documents used different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’), showing they are considered distinct components.

• Another county rule stated that the “installation of landscaping” must begin after the formal completion of the “roadway project.”

The judge concluded that these documents demonstrated that in official use, “roadway” and “right-of-way” are treated as different concepts. The very evidence intended to support the homeowner’s case ended up directly contradicting it.

4. Modern Concepts Don’t Automatically Change Old Laws

The homeowner’s central supporting idea was the “Complete Streets” approach—a modern civil engineering concept that views streets as integrated systems for all users, including cars, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He argued this modern understanding should apply to the word “roadway.”

The judge rejected this argument based on a crucial point of legal reasoning: legislative intent.

The judge noted that the “Complete Streets” concept was already well-known in 2014 when the Arizona legislature amended the statute in question. The legislature could have used broader terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets” but deliberately chose not to. Instead, they specifically chose the narrower, more traditional term “roadway.” The judge inferred that this was a deliberate choice, and the court’s job was to interpret the word the legislature actually used, not one it could have used.

The judge even noted that the sheer volume of evidence the homeowner presented to redefine “roadway” was itself proof that his interpretation was not the “plain meaning”—if it were, such extensive explanation wouldn’t be necessary.

To illustrate the point with a simple, real-world example of plain meaning, the judge wrote:

One would be hard pressed to interpret that phrase [“don’t play in the street”] as a warning not to play on the sidewalk or landscaping area bordering a paved thoroughfare.

Conclusion: In Law, Precision Is Everything

The overarching lesson from this case is that in legal interpretation, every word matters. Whether it’s the dictionary definition of “roadway,” the precise language in county ordinances, or the specific terms chosen by lawmakers, the plain, established meaning of words carries immense weight.

Ultimately, the homeowner’s petition was dismissed. Because the HOA’s duty to maintain landscaping did not qualify as a “covenant to maintain roadways,” it was not a “planned community” under the statute. As a result, the state agency lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

This case shows how the specific words chosen by lawmakers years ago can have major consequences today. What common words might we be using every day that have a completely different and critical meaning in a legal context?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:14 (130.3 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (HOA attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff/clerk)
    Staff responsible for decision distribution

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Authored May 18, 2018 letter presented as documentation by Petitioner

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:49:57 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:06 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:07 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:01:18 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.


Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:11 (566.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716018-REL


Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.






Study Guide – 17F-H1716018-REL


Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716018-REL



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17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
    Represented himself

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
  • Douglas (former ALJ)
    Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)