Olga Carnahan v. White Mountain Lake Vistas

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019021-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-13
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent did not violate the CC&Rs. The specific article cited by the Petitioner (Article 12.3) governed amendments to the Declaration and Plat, not the purchase of real property, and therefore did not require a membership vote.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Olga Carnahan Counsel
Respondent White Mountain Lake Vistas Counsel Edward O’Brien

Alleged Violations

Article 12.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent did not violate the CC&Rs. The specific article cited by the Petitioner (Article 12.3) governed amendments to the Declaration and Plat, not the purchase of real property, and therefore did not require a membership vote.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the CC&Rs required a membership vote for the Board to purchase lots.

Key Issues & Findings

Purchase of lots without membership vote

Petitioner alleged the HOA Board violated CC&Rs by purchasing two lots without a membership vote. The Board argued Article 12.3 applies to amendments, not property purchases, and no vote was required.

Orders: The Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Article 12.3

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019021-REL Decision – 763430.pdf

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20F-H2019021-REL Decision – 763430.pdf

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Briefing: Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas Administrative Decision

Executive Summary

On January 13, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera issued a decision in the matter of Olga Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas (No. 20F-H2019021-REL). The case centered on a dispute regarding the authority of a Homeowners Association (HOA) Board of Directors to purchase real property without a membership vote.

The Petitioner, Olga Carnahan, alleged that the Respondent, White Mountain Lake Vistas, violated Article 12.3 of the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by purchasing two lots (#54 and #65) without obtaining a two-thirds majority approval from the membership. The Respondent argued that the cited article applied specifically to amendments of the CC&Rs and Plats, not to the acquisition of property.

Following a hearing held on December 26, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The ALJ ruled that the CC&Rs did not require a membership vote for the purchase of the lots and that the Petitioner’s secondary concerns regarding financial impact were not ripe for adjudication. Consequently, the Petition was dismissed.

Case Overview

Key Information Details
Case Name Olga Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas
Case Number 20F-H2019021-REL
Hearing Date December 26, 2019
Decision Date January 13, 2020
Presiding Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Primary Issue Alleged violation of CC&Rs Article 12.3 regarding property acquisition without a vote.
Verdict Petition Dismissed

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of CC&Rs vs. Board Authority

The central conflict of the case was the interpretation of Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner interpreted the requirement for a two-thirds membership vote for "Amendments" as a requirement for any major board action, including the purchase of lots. However, the Respondent testified—and the ALJ confirmed—that Article 12.3 specifically governs the process for amending the Declaration or the Plat. The Board maintained that their authority to purchase property to address drainage issues did not trigger the amendment requirements of Article 12.3.

2. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standards

In administrative hearings under A.R.S. § 32-2199, the Petitioner carries the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." This means the Petitioner must prove that their contention is "more probably true than not." The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to provide evidence that any provision in the CC&Rs specifically authorized or required a membership vote for the purchase of property. Without a specific provision linking property acquisition to a membership vote, the Petitioner could not sustain her burden.

3. Procedural Ripeness and Financial Speculation

During the hearing, the Petitioner introduced a second argument: that the purchase of the lots would cause a future financial loss to the Association due to the loss of HOA fees from those lots. The ALJ designated this issue as "not ripe." Because the Respondent had not yet made definitive plans for the lots (such as merging them or making Plat changes) and the financial impact was speculative, it did not constitute an immediate violation of the community documents.

4. Board Transparency and Member Consent

The evidence showed that while the Board was not legally required to hold a vote, they did discuss the purchase at a September 20, 2019, meeting. The Board testified that members present agreed with the idea of purchasing the lots to address drainage issues. The dispute arose because the Petitioner requested a formal vote, which the Board denied based on their interpretation of the CC&Rs. This highlights the distinction between a Board seeking member opinion and a Board being legally bound by a membership vote.


Important Quotes and Context

On Article 12.3 (Amendments)

"This Declaration may be amended by the written approval or affirmative vote, or any combination thereof, of two-thirds (2/3) of the Membership." — CC&Rs Article 12.3.1

Context: This is the specific clause the Petitioner relied upon to argue that a vote was necessary for the lot purchase. The ALJ ultimately ruled that this clause applies only to formal amendments of the Declaration text.

On Administrative Authority to Amend

"The Board may amend this Declaration or the Plat, without obtaining the approval or consent of any Owner… in order to conform this Declaration or the Plat to the requirements or guidelines of [federal, state, or local agencies]." — CC&Rs Article 12.3.2

Context: This section outlines specific instances where the Board can act even without the two-thirds vote mentioned in 12.3.1, demonstrating that the Board has broad powers regarding the Plat under certain conditions.

On the Burden of Proof

"A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not." — Findings of Fact, quoting Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Context: This legal standard was used to evaluate whether Olga Carnahan had provided enough evidence to show the HOA violated its rules. The ALJ concluded she had not.

On the Final Ruling

"Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent lacked the authority to purchase the lots without a vote. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish that Respondent violated Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs." — Conclusion of Law #8

Context: This is the ALJ's final determination, leading directly to the dismissal of the petition.


Actionable Insights

For Homeowners Association Boards
  • Clarify Governing Document Scope: Ensure that the distinction between "Board Actions" (e.g., purchasing property for maintenance/drainage) and "Amendments to Declarations" is clearly communicated to members to prevent litigation.
  • Documentation of Intent: The Respondent’s ability to point to specific reasons for the purchase (drainage issues) and the lack of any formal Plat changes helped demonstrate that they were not circumventing Article 12.3.
  • Meeting Minutes as Evidence: The Respondent successfully used meeting minutes (Exhibits #6 and #7) to show that they had consulted with members, even if a formal vote was not legally required.
For Members/Petitioners
  • Verify Specificity of Allegations: Before filing a petition under A.R.S. § 32-2199, a member should ensure the specific Article cited actually governs the action in question. In this case, citing an "Amendment" clause for a "Purchase" action led to dismissal.
  • Understand Ripeness: Legal challenges must be based on current violations rather than fears of future financial loss. Arguments regarding "future" adverse effects on finances are likely to be dismissed as not ripe.
  • Evidentiary Requirements: Petitioners must provide more than testimony; they must provide community documents that explicitly mandate the procedure they claim was bypassed.

Case Study Guide: Olga Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Olga Carnahan and the White Mountain Lake Vistas Homeowners Association. It explores the legal interpretations of community documents, the evidentiary standards in administrative hearings, and the specific application of Arizona Revised Statutes regarding planned community disputes.


1. Case Overview and Core Themes

The central conflict in this case involves a homeowner (Petitioner) alleging that the Board of Directors of White Mountain Lake Vistas (Respondent) violated the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by purchasing real property without a membership vote.

Key Themes:
  • Board Authority vs. Membership Approval: The distinction between actions requiring a supermajority vote and those within the Board's discretionary power.
  • Interpretation of CC&Rs: The legal necessity of applying specific articles to relevant actions (e.g., distinguishing between "amending a declaration" and "purchasing property").
  • Evidentiary Burdens: The requirement for a Petitioner to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence in an administrative setting.
  • Ripeness of Claims: Determining whether a violation has actually occurred or if the claim is based on future, speculative harm.

2. Fact Summary and Timeline

Date Event
June 30, 2017 Petitioner purchases lot #43 within the community.
July 2, 2019 CC&Rs are amended by a 2/3 membership vote per Article 12.3.
Sept 20, 2019 Board meeting held; drainage issues regarding lots #54 and #65 are discussed. Board indicates intent to purchase the lots.
Oct 11, 2019 Petitioner learns of the sale of lots #54 and #65 to the Respondent.
Oct 14, 2019 Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Nov 20, 2019 Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.
Dec 26, 2019 Administrative hearing held before Judge Antara Nath Rivera.
Jan 13, 2020 Administrative Law Judge issues the decision to dismiss the Petition.

3. Analysis of Article 12.3 (Amendments)

The Petitioner’s case relied primarily on Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs. The following table breaks down the relevant subsections and their legal applications as determined during the hearing:

Subsection Provision Details Application in Case
12.3.1 The Declaration may be amended by written approval or affirmative vote of 2/3 of the Membership. The Judge ruled this applies only to amendments to the CC&Rs, not the purchase of property.
12.3.2 The Board may amend the Declaration or the Plat without Owner consent to conform to federal/state/local guidelines (FHA, VA, etc.). This grants the Board unilateral power to amend Plats in specific regulatory contexts.
12.3.3 Approved amendments must be signed by the President/VP and recorded with the County Recorder. Procedural requirement for valid amendments; did not apply as no amendment occurred.

4. Short-Answer Practice Questions

Q1: What was the primary legal issue raised by the Petitioner?

  • Answer: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs by purchasing two lots (#54 and #65) without obtaining a 2/3 majority vote from the membership.

Q2: How did the Respondent justify the purchase of lots #54 and #65?

  • Answer: The Board testified that the lots were purchased to address drainage issues affecting the community. They further argued that the CC&Rs contained no provision requiring a membership vote for the purchase of property.

Q3: What standard of proof was required for the Petitioner to win the case?

  • Answer: The Petitioner was required to establish the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning she had to prove the contention was more probably true than not.

Q4: Why did the Administrative Law Judge deem the Petitioner's secondary argument regarding financial loss as "not ripe"?

  • Answer: The Petitioner argued the purchase would cause future financial loss due to missing HOA fees. The Judge found this did not establish an immediate violation and therefore was not yet a justiciable issue for the hearing.

Q5: Who bears the burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses in this administrative hearing?

  • Answer: The Respondent bears the burden to establish affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.

5. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Limits of Homeowner Oversight: Analyze the tension between homeowner expectations and the Board's operational authority. In the context of Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas, discuss why the Petitioner's expectation of a vote was legally unsupported despite her presence at the meeting where the idea was discussed.
  2. Statutory Interpretation of CC&Rs: Critique the Petitioner’s application of Article 12.3. Explain the legal distinction between "amending a community document" and "executing a real estate transaction," and discuss how specific language in CC&Rs limits or expands Board power.
  3. Administrative Law and the Preponderance of Evidence: Evaluate the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings in HOA disputes. How does the standard of "preponderance of the evidence" differ from "beyond a reasonable doubt," and why is this lower threshold appropriate for civil disputes involving planned communities?

6. Glossary of Important Terms

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq: The Arizona Revised Statutes that permit an owner or planned community organization to file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents.
  • Affirmative Defense: A fact or set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent's otherwise unlawful conduct.
  • CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The declaration that sets forth the rules, regulations, and requirements for a planned community.
  • Department (Arizona Department of Real Estate): The state agency responsible for overseeing HOA dispute petitions before they are sent to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
  • Plat: A map or plan of a piece of land showing how it has been subdivided into lots.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: Evidence that has the most convincing force; proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
  • Ripeness: A legal doctrine used to determine if a case is ready for adjudication. A claim is not "ripe" if it is based on speculative future events rather than an actual, immediate violation.
  • Special Warranty Deed: A deed in which the seller warrants only against defects in the title that occurred during their period of ownership.

HOA Authority vs. Homeowner Rights: Lessons from the White Mountain Lake Vistas Dispute

1. Introduction: The Power Struggle in Planned Communities

In the realm of common-interest developments, a perpetual tension exists between the authority of the Board of Directors and the expectations of the membership. This friction often intensifies when a Board exercises its power to manage community assets or expend association funds. Homeowners frequently view significant acquisitions through the lens of a democratic vote, while Boards often operate under the mandate of their corporate powers.

The case of Olga Carnahan vs. White Mountain Lake Vistas (No. 20F-H2019021-REL) serves as a quintessential study in this jurisdictional tug-of-war. The dispute centers on a fundamental question of HOA governance: Does a Board of Directors possess the unilateral authority to purchase real property, or does such an acquisition constitute an amendment to the community’s governing documents requiring a membership vote?

2. The Dispute: The Purchase of Lots #54 and #65

The conflict arose when Olga Carnahan, an owner of lot #43 who was not a member of the Board during her tenure in the community, challenged the Association’s purchase of two vacant lots, specifically lots #54 and #65. In October 2019, Carnahan filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Board had bypassed the procedural requirements set forth in Article 12.3 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Carnahan’s petition was built on two primary grievances:

  • Lack of Membership Consent: She asserted that the Board was legally obligated to obtain a majority or two-thirds vote from the homeowners before acquiring new land, arguing that such a significant action should be a community-wide decision.
  • Financial Erosion: Beyond the procedural challenge, the Petitioner raised concerns regarding the fiscal impact on the Association. She argued that the purchase resulted in an immediate loss of revenue, as the HOA would no longer collect assessments from these previously privately owned, fee-paying lots.
3. The Defense: Solving Drainage Issues

The Respondent Board, represented by Secretary/Treasurer Rose Thomas and President Joyce Dick, justified the purchase as an exercise of their duty to maintain the community's infrastructure. The acquisition was not intended as a speculative real estate venture but as a strategic solution to chronic drainage issues affecting those specific lots and the surrounding area.

The Board testified that the matter was discussed transparently during a meeting on September 20, 2019. While Petitioner Carnahan was present at this meeting and expressed support for the drainage solution, she insisted on a formal membership vote. The Board, however, maintained that the CC&Rs granted them the authority to act independently. After gauging the general support of the members in attendance, the Board voted unanimously to proceed with the purchase. Notably, while the Petitioner alleged that a vote was supposed to occur at a subsequent meeting on October 11, 2019, the evidence showed she was not present at that meeting, leaving her testimony regarding those specific proceedings without firsthand weight.

4. Legal Deep Dive: Decoding CC&Rs Article 12.3

The resolution of this dispute required a precise interpretation of Article 12.3. As a legal analyst, it is vital to distinguish between a Board's Business Power (the authority to manage assets) and the Contractual Framework (the CC&Rs and Plats that define the community).

Provision Scope of Authority
Subsection 12.3.1 The Declaration may be amended only with the written approval or affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Membership.
Subsection 12.3.2 The Board may amend the Declaration or the Plat without owner or First Mortgagee consent to conform to requirements of federal agencies (FNMA, FHLMC, FHA, VA) or any federal, state, or local government agencies.

Analysis of Authority Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Antara Nath Rivera’s decision hinged on the fact that Article 12.3 governs "Amendments"—changes to the written text of the Declaration or the physical descriptions in the Plat. The act of purchasing property is a corporate transaction, not a textual amendment to the community's servitudes. Because the lots remained vacant and no changes had been recorded to the Plat, the 2/3 vote requirement for amendments was never triggered. In the world of community associations, Boards generally have the power to manage corporate assets without seeking "shareholder" approval for every transaction unless the governing documents explicitly state otherwise.

5. The Verdict: Why the Petition Failed

The ALJ dismissed the petition, citing several critical legal and procedural deficiencies:

  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The burden of proof lay with the Petitioner to show that a violation occurred. Carnahan failed to identify any provision in the CC&Rs that specifically required a membership vote for property acquisition. Furthermore, her absence from the October 11 meeting weakened her evidentiary standing regarding alleged Board commitments.
  • Ripeness and Injury: The judge found the petition was "not ripe." Because the Board had not yet filed a Plat change or amended the Declaration, there was no "action" to adjudicate. The lots remained vacant, and the Board was still merely researching options for conversion or merging.
  • Procedural Scope: During the hearing, the Petitioner attempted to introduce a second issue regarding future financial impacts. The ALJ noted that this was a "single issue petition" and that the financial argument did not establish an immediate violation of the governing documents.

The final order was definitive: "IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed."

6. Compelling Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

The White Mountain Lake Vistas case offers three critical lessons for the governance of planned communities:

  1. Know Your Definitions (Business Power vs. Contractual Framework): A property purchase is typically an exercise of Board Business Power—the authority to manage the association’s assets and common areas. An amendment, conversely, is a change to the community’s Contractual Framework. Unless the CC&Rs specifically restrict the Board’s power to acquire land, the amendment procedures do not apply to simple real estate transactions.
  2. The Burden of Proof: In administrative disputes, the homeowner bears the responsibility to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Subjective feelings of unfairness or the belief that a vote "should" happen are insufficient to overcome the legal authority granted to the Board by the governing documents.
  3. Read the Meeting Minutes and Attend: Documentation is the bedrock of HOA law. The September 20 meeting minutes proved that the Board had communicated its intent and gathered feedback. Owners who fail to attend meetings or review minutes may find themselves filing "premature" legal challenges based on a misunderstanding of Board actions and authority.
7. Conclusion: The Importance of Governing Documents

The Carnahan case reaffirms that the CC&Rs and Plats are the "constitution" of the HOA. They serve as the final authority in any dispute, defining the boundaries of Board power and owner rights. While homeowners may have valid concerns about community finances or transparency, those concerns must be anchored in the specific language of the Declaration to have legal standing. Clear, proactive communication between Boards and owners—particularly regarding complex issues like drainage and land acquisition—remains the best defense against costly and ultimately unsuccessful litigation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Olga Carnahan (Petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Edward O’Brien (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Appeared on behalf of White Mountain Lake Vistas
  • Rose Thomas (Board Secretary/Treasurer)
    White Mountain Lake Vistas Board
    Witness
  • Joyce Dick (Board President)
    White Mountain Lake Vistas Board
    Witness

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted order

Mangus (AKA Gary) L.D. MacLeod Grantor and Trustee v. Mogollon

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919070-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-12-02
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent provided all responsive records in its possession. The tribunal held that A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) does not require an association to obtain and produce records it does not have.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mangus (AKA Gary) L.D. MacLeod Grantor and Trustee Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory Stein

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent provided all responsive records in its possession. The tribunal held that A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) does not require an association to obtain and produce records it does not have.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the ALJ ruled that the statutory requirement to make records available does not extend to records not in the association's possession.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records (CD history trail)

Petitioner requested specific historical records regarding four CDs. Respondent provided records in its possession and some obtained from banks, but Petitioner argued Respondent was required to obtain further 'history trails' it did not possess.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919070-REL Decision – 756469.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:44 (91.2 KB)

19F-H1919070-REL Decision – 756469.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:17:12 (91.2 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

On December 2, 2019, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden issued a decision in the matter of Mangus L.D. MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1919070-REL). The dispute centered on whether the Respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc., violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to provide certain financial records requested by the Petitioner, Mangus MacLeod.

The Petitioner contended that the Association was legally obligated to obtain and produce bank records related to four Certificates of Deposit (CDs) from 2017, even if those records were not currently in the Association's possession. The Respondent maintained that it had provided all responsive records it possessed and had even assisted the Petitioner in obtaining additional records directly from financial institutions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) does not require an association to procure records it does not have. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.


Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The central legal question was the scope of an association's duty to make "financial and other records" available. The Petitioner argued that because certain records (like bank history trails) are mentioned in an association’s records retention policy, they must be produced upon request regardless of whether the association actually possesses them.

The ALJ rejected this interpretation, noting that:

  • Statutes must be interpreted to provide "fair and sensible" results.
  • The tribunal cannot expand a statute to include requirements not explicitly stated in its provisions.
  • Requiring an association to obtain records it does not possess would constitute an "absurd and unreasonable construction" of the law.
2. Possession vs. Acquisition

The case distinguished between records held by the Association and records held by third-party entities (banks).

  • Respondent's Position: On April 22, 2019, the Association provided all records it currently had, including some newly acquired from banks via the Board president's proactive efforts.
  • Petitioner's Position: The Association was responsible for obtaining the full "history trail" of the CDs from the banks to facilitate a proper audit.

The ALJ found that once the Association provided all records in its possession, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.

3. Evidentiary Standards and Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ determined that the Petitioner failed to:

  • Identify any responsive records that were actually in the Respondent’s possession at the time of the request.
  • Provide substantial evidence that the Respondent failed to comply with a second records request.
4. Good Faith Cooperation

The findings of fact highlight that the Respondent, specifically Board president Craig Albright and the management company (HOAMCO), acted cooperatively. This included:

  • Contacting three banks to solicit records.
  • Directly accompanying the Petitioner to banks in June 2019 to help produce records.
  • Maintaining communication regarding the lack of hardcopy or electronic formats for older 2017 records.

Key Quotes and Contextual Analysis

Quote Source Context Significance
"The 'core' issue in this matter is whether 'other records' as used in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1805(A) includes all records listed in that retention policy regardless of whether Respondent actually has those records." Finding of Fact #18 Defines the Petitioner's legal theory: that a retention policy creates an absolute mandate to produce, even if the records must be sought from third parties.
"Courts will not place an absurd and unreasonable construction on statutes." Conclusion of Law #4 (Citing State v. McFall) Establishes the judicial boundary for interpreting HOA records laws; the ALJ used this to dismiss the idea that HOAs must "hunt" for missing records.
"Mr. MacLeod acknowledged that he could not identify any records that were responsive to his requests that were in the possession of Respondent when he made those requests." Finding of Fact #20 This admission was fatal to the Petitioner's case, as the statute governs existing records of the association.
"The preponderance of the evidence shows that Respondent provided Mr. MacLeod with copies of all records it had that were responsive to his first request." Conclusion of Law #8 The ultimate factual finding that cleared the Respondent of the alleged violation.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners' Associations (HOAs)
  • Possession is the Metric: Compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) is generally measured by the production of records currently in the association's possession (either physical or electronic).
  • Documentation of Effort: The Respondent’s success was bolstered by the ability to show they contacted banks and worked with the management company (HOAMCO) to find responsive documents. Associations should document all efforts to fulfill record requests.
  • Third-Party Suggestion: When records are held by third parties (like banks), suggesting that the requester contact those entities directly is a valid and helpful response, though not strictly required by the statute to obtain those records for them.
For Petitioners/Members
  • Identifying Possession: Before filing a petition, a member should be able to provide evidence that the association actually holds the records being withheld.
  • Retention Policy vs. Statute: A retention policy dictates what an association should keep, but the statutory penalty for non-production under § 33-1805 applies to what the association has available for examination.
  • Meeting the Standard of Proof: Petitioners must provide "substantial evidence" (evidence that would permit a reasonable person to conclude the finding is substantiated) to prevail in administrative hearings.
Procedural Takeaway
  • Cooperation as Defense: While the hearing involved "hours of testimony" and "a thousand pages of proposed exhibits," the ALJ focused on the Respondent’s cooperative behavior and the credible testimony of the Board president regarding the April 22nd production of documents. This suggests that demonstrating "good faith" can be a powerful defense in administrative disputes.

MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.: A Study Guide on Association Records and Statutory Requirements

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Mangus L.D. MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (No. 19F-H1919070-REL). The case centers on the interpretation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 regarding the duty of a homeowners' association to provide records to its members.


Key Concepts and Case Overview

Core Dispute

The primary issue in this matter is whether an association is legally required to obtain and produce records that are not currently in its possession to satisfy a member’s request under A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner, Mangus MacLeod, sought the "history trail" for four Certificates of Deposit (CDs) held by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. dating back to 2017.

Legal Venue and Parties
  • Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
  • Petitioner: Mangus (AKA Gary) L.D. MacLeod, Grantor and Trustee.
  • Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (managed by HOAMCO).
  • Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

This statute governs the availability of association records:

  • Availability: All financial and other records of the association must be made reasonably available for examination.
  • Timeline for Examination: The association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.
  • Timeline for Copies: The association has ten business days to provide copies of requested records upon a request for purchase.

Summary of Findings and Legal Conclusions

Factual Timeline
Date Event
April 13 & May 3, 2019 Mr. MacLeod makes formal requests for CD records from 2017.
April 22, 2019 HOAMCO (Respondent's management) provides all records currently in possession.
June 12, 2019 Mr. MacLeod files a petition alleging non-compliance.
June 2019 Board president Craig Albright assists MacLeod by visiting banks to produce further records.
Oct & Nov 2019 Administrative hearings are conducted.
December 2, 2019 Administrative Law Judge issues a decision dismissing the petition.
Judicial Reasoning
  1. Possession of Records: The court found that the Respondent provided all records it had in its possession at the time of the request. The Respondent even went beyond its legal duty by soliciting new records from banks to assist the Petitioner.
  2. Statutory Interpretation: The judge ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) does not require an association to obtain records it does not have. Expanding the statute to include such a requirement would be "absurd and unreasonable."
  3. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to provide "substantial evidence" that the Respondent withheld any records that were actually in its possession.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. Who bears the burden of proof in this administrative hearing? Answer: The Petitioner (Mangus MacLeod).

2. What is the standard of proof required for this case? Answer: Preponderance of the evidence.

3. According to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), how many business days does an association have to provide copies of requested records? Answer: Ten business days.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss Mr. MacLeod’s petition? Answer: Because the Respondent provided all records it possessed that were responsive to the request, and the law does not require associations to obtain records from third parties (like banks) that they do not currently hold.

5. How did the Board president, Craig Albright, demonstrate cooperation after the petition was filed? Answer: He accompanied Mr. MacLeod to several banks in June 2019 to help have records produced directly for him.


Essay Questions for Deeper Exploration

1. Statutory Construction and Judicial Restraint

The decision references State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, stating that a tribunal "may not expand or extend a statute to include that which is not within its provisions." Discuss how this principle applied to the Judge’s interpretation of "other records" in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Why would requiring an association to retrieve third-party records be considered an "absurd and unreasonable" construction of the law?

2. The Definition of "Reasonably Available"

Under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), records must be made "reasonably available." Based on the findings of fact in this case, evaluate whether Mogollon Airpark, Inc. and its management company, HOAMCO, met this standard. Consider the actions taken by the Board president to contact banks and the information sent via email on April 22, 2019.

3. Evidentiary Weight and Witness Credibility

On the first day of the hearing, witness Craig Albright was described as "confused" regarding when certain bank records were obtained. On the second day, however, the Judge found his testimony "credible." Analyze the importance of witness credibility in administrative hearings and how the final determination of facts (Findings of Fact #15 and #16) influenced the legal outcome.


Glossary of Important Terms

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805: The specific Arizona statute governing the inspection and copying of association records by members.
  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge who moves over trials and adjudicates disputes involving administrative agencies.
  • HOAMCO: The management company for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Petitioner: The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition (in this case, Mangus MacLeod).
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof where the evidence has the "most convincing force" and shows that a fact is more likely true than not.
  • Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.).
  • Substantial Evidence: Evidence that would permit a reasonable person to conclude that a proposed finding should be substantiated.
  • Tribunal: A court or forum of justice; in this context, the Office of Administrative Hearings.

The Limits of Transparency: Lessons from MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

1. Introduction: The Tension Between Transparency and Practicality

In the world of community association governance, transparency is a statutory mandate, yet it is frequently tested by the practical realities of record-keeping. A recurring flashpoint for litigation involves a fundamental question: does an association’s duty to provide records extend to documents it does not actually possess?

This tension reached a definitive conclusion in a dispute between homeowner Mangus MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The matter, litigated before the Arizona Department of Real Estate (Case No. 19F-H1919070-REL) and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings, serves as a critical boundary-marker for the rights of members and the administrative obligations of boards. The ruling clarifies that while transparency is essential, the law does not require an association to perform the impossible or the extra-statutory.

2. The Request: A Search for the "History Trail"

The conflict began in the spring of 2019. On April 13 and May 3, Petitioner Mangus MacLeod submitted formal requests to Mogollon Airpark, Inc. to examine and copy records dating back to 2017 concerning four Certificates of Deposit (CDs) held by the association. Mr. MacLeod's stated motive was to establish a "history trail" for these assets, which he argued was necessary for a "proper audit" of the association’s financial standing.

In response, Board President Craig Albright took proactive steps to satisfy the request. He coordinated with the association’s treasurer and contacted three separate financial institutions to retrieve the records. While two banks cooperated electronically, a third refused. The gathered documents, combined with records already in the association’s possession, were delivered to MacLeod via the management company, HOAMCO, on April 22, 2019.

Despite these efforts, MacLeod remained dissatisfied. He contended that the association was legally required to obtain the missing 2017 bank records, asserting that the association’s responsibility was not limited by what was currently in its filing cabinets but extended to any records it should have according to its internal policies.

3. Arguments from Both Sides
Petitioner (MacLeod) Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)
Statutory Expansion: Argued that the term "other records" in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) should be interpreted to include all documents listed in the HOA’s records retention policy, regardless of whether the HOA actually possesses them. Possession-Based Compliance: Asserted that the association satisfied its legal duty by providing all responsive records currently in its possession or control.
Mandatory Procurement: Claimed the HOA has an affirmative legal obligation to retrieve records from third parties (banks) if a member requests them for an audit. Reasonable Effort: Argued that there is no statutory mandate to "create" a record or "procure" third-party documents that the association does not hold.
The "Audit" Motive: Asserted that the "history trail" was essential for financial oversight and that the HOA’s failure to produce it hindered member transparency. Good Faith Action: Highlighted Board President Albright’s extensive efforts to assist, including personally accompanying the Petitioner to banks to attempt to retrieve the data.
4. The Legal Verdict: Interpreting A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden focused the ruling on the strict construction of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires that association records be made "reasonably available for examination."

In his analysis, the ALJ firmly constrained the scope of the statute, refusing to "legislate from the bench" by expanding the law’s requirements. The court relied on three core legal principles to reach its decision:

  1. Avoidance of Absurdity: Citing Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona and State v. McFall, the ALJ noted that statutes must be interpreted to provide a "fair and sensible result" and that courts must reject "absurd and unreasonable construction."
  2. Statutory Limits: Referencing State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, the ALJ emphasized that a tribunal may not expand or extend a statute to include requirements not expressly written in its provisions.
  3. Defining "Reasonably Available": The ALJ clarified that "reasonably available" pertains to the manner and timing of access to records the association actually has—it does not create a mandate for the association to hunt down, procure, or produce records held by third parties.

The ALJ concluded that equating a "retention policy" list with a "mandatory production" list was an unreasonable construction of the law.

5. Critical Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

The MacLeod decision provides a roadmap for handling records disputes with precision and professional distance:

  • Possession vs. Obligation: A board’s duty is to produce what it has. The law does not require an association to "go hunting" for third-party records. If a record is not in the association's possession or control, the association has no statutory obligation to go out and get it.
  • The Credibility of Good Faith: During the hearing, Board President Albright was initially "confused" about the exact dates some records were obtained. However, because his underlying documentation (Exhibit 11) was solid and his actions—such as accompanying the petitioner to the bank—showed a clear intent to cooperate, the ALJ found his testimony credible.
  • The Burden of Proof is Substantial: Under Arizona Administrative Code § R2-19-119, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." The "smoking gun" in this case was MacLeod’s own admission: he could not identify a single record that the HOA actually possessed that was being withheld.
  • Internal Policies are Not Statutes: While a "records retention policy" is a best-practice internal document, it does not expand the association’s legal liability under A.R.S. § 33-1805. A homeowner cannot use an internal policy to force a board to perform duties that the state legislature did not expressly authorize.
6. Conclusion: A Fair and Sensible Result

The ruling in MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. reinforces a standard of reasonableness. While transparency is the law, it is not an unlimited license for members to demand administrative labor from their boards. By adhering to the "fair and sensible" standard, the ALJ protected community associations from being forced to act as private investigators for individual members. For boards, the takeaway is clear: document your records, cooperate in good faith, and rest assured that your legal obligations end where your actual possession of records begins.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mangus (AKA Gary) L.D. MacLeod (Petitioner)
    Appeared and testified

Respondent Side

  • Gregory Stein (Attorney for Respondent)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Craig Albright (Board President)
    Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
    Witness; testified
  • Brian Dye (Community Manager)
    HOAMCO

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted the order

Joyce H Monsanto vs. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joyce H Monsanto Counsel
Respondent Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808; CC&R § 7.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both statutory and CC&R violations,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of application to install two flagpoles for US and military flags, and alleged failure to follow CC&R appeal process.

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of her request to install two flagpoles, arguing the restriction violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 (flag statute) and that the Board failed to provide a written decision on her appeal within 45 days as required by CC&R § 7.9, which she argued meant the request was deemed approved. The ALJ found the single flagpole restriction reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) since both flags could be flown from one pole, and determined the Board satisfied the CC&R § 7.9 requirement by posting the decision in the meeting minutes within 45 days,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish that the Respondent's Board should not have denied her application under A.R.S. § 33-1808 or CC&R § 7. The Board can properly find Petitioner in violation of Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag display, Architectural Guidelines, CC&Rs, Statutory compliance, Planned Communities Act, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R § 7

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 749213.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:16 (163.6 KB)

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 753595.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:19 (163.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal reasoning from the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Joyce H. Monsanto versus the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). The central conflict revolves around the HOA’s denial of Ms. Monsanto’s request to install two separate flagpoles on her home to display the United States flag and the United States Marine Corps flag. The petitioner alleged this denial violated Arizona state law and the HOA’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision established two critical points: first, that the HOA’s rule limiting homeowners to a single flagpole is a “reasonable” regulation on the “placement and manner of display” explicitly permitted under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1808(B), and does not constitute a prohibition of flag display. Second, the HOA was found to have complied with its own appeal process as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The ALJ concluded that an oral denial at a board meeting, later documented in publicly posted meeting minutes, satisfied the CC&R’s requirement to “render its written decision” within a 45-day timeframe. The ruling affirms an HOA’s authority to enforce uniform aesthetic standards, provided they are reasonable and applied according to the association’s governing documents.

Case Background and Procedural History

The case was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) following a petition filed by homeowner Joyce H. Monsanto (“Petitioner”) against her HOA, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (“Respondent”).

Initial Petition: On March 6, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803) and its CC&Rs (§ 7.9) by refusing to approve her request for two flagpoles.

First Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on May 30, 2019, after which the ALJ found that the Petitioner had not proven any violation by the HOA.

Rehearing: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing on August 22, 2019. This rehearing took place on October 21, 2019.

Amended Decision: On November 18, 2019, ALJ Diane Mihalsky issued an Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision, again denying the Petitioner’s petition and affirming the previous findings. The amendment was issued to correct a typographical error and clarify the parties’ appeal rights.

The Core Dispute: A Request for Two Flagpoles

The petitioner, whose husband and two sons have long careers in the U.S. Marines and Coast Guard, sought to display both the U.S. flag and the U.S. Marine Corps flag on her home.

The Application: On August 31, 2018, she submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house, flanking her front door.

The Rationale: The Petitioner stated her desire for two separate poles was for aesthetic reasons, believing the display would look better. She also expressed concern that a single, larger flagpole installed in her front yard would obstruct the view from her front window.

The Denial: On September 22, 2018, the HOA’s Architectural Committee issued a written Notice of Disapproval, citing the Architectural Guidelines which permit only one flagpole per lot.

The Appeal: On October 1, 2018, the Petitioner submitted a written appeal to the HOA Board, arguing the denial was unreasonable, that the guidelines were not uniformly enforced, and that the board could grant a waiver under CC&R § 7.6.

Governing Rules and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of Arizona state law and the HOA’s specific governing documents.

Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808

This statute governs the right of homeowners to display certain flags.

Protection of Display: Subsection A states that an association “shall not prohibit the outdoor… display” of the American flag or a military flag, among others.

Right to Regulate: Subsection B grants associations the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations regarding the placement and manner of display.” It explicitly allows rules that “regulate the location and size of flagpoles,” “limit the member to displaying no more than two flags at once,” and limit flagpole height, while not prohibiting their installation.

HOA Architectural Guidelines

The community’s rules regarding flagpoles evolved but consistently maintained a key restriction.

Original Guideline (May 24, 2016): “Poles must not exceed 12’ in height, and only one flagpole is permitted per Lot.”

Amended Guideline (November 8, 2018): The board increased the maximum pole height to 20′ and added rules for nighttime illumination and inclement weather, but explicitly “did not change the limit of one flagpole per lot.”

HOA CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The procedural requirements for architectural review and appeals were central to the Petitioner’s claim.

Section 7.8 (Board Approval): Pertaining to initial applications, this section requires the Board to provide the owner with a “written response within sixty (60) days,” otherwise the request is deemed approved.

Section 7.9 (Appeal): Pertaining to appeals, this section requires the Board to consult with the Architectural Committee and “render its written decision” within 45 days. A failure by the Board to render a decision in this period “shall be deemed approval.” This section does not contain the same explicit language as § 7.8 requiring the response be provided to the owner.

Analysis of the Appeal Process and Conflicting Testimonies

A significant portion of the dispute centered on the events of the November 8, 2018, HOA Board meeting, where the Petitioner’s appeal was to be considered. The accounts of what transpired at this meeting were contradictory.

Petitioner’s Testimony (Joyce H. Monsanto)

Respondent’s Testimony (Anthony Nunziato, Board President)

Consultation

The board did not consult the Architectural Committee.

The board consulted with the Architectural Committee before the meeting.

Decision

The board did not consider or make any decision on her appeal.

The board considered the appeal and made a decision.

Notification

She was never told her appeal was denied at the meeting.

He was certain the board verbally informed the Petitioner that her appeal was denied at the meeting.

On December 4, 2018, draft minutes from the November 8 meeting were posted on the HOA’s website. The Petitioner acknowledged seeing them. These minutes included the following entry:

“[Petitioner’s] last request was for a waiver that would allow her to have two flagpoles on her property (one to fly the American flag and the other to fly the Marine flag). The Board rejected this request since our CC&Rs allow for the flying of both flags on a single flagpole.”

The Petitioner argued that these publicly posted draft minutes, which were not sent directly to her, did not constitute a valid written denial of her appeal under the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s claims, relying on witness credibility, statutory interpretation, and contract construction principles.

Credibility Assessment

The ALJ made a clear determination on the conflicting testimonies regarding the November 8 meeting.

• Mr. Nunziato’s testimony that the board made a decision and informed the Petitioner was found to be “credible and supported by the minutes of the meeting.”

• The Petitioner’s testimony that the board made no decision on her appeal was deemed “incredible.”

Ruling on A.R.S. § 33-1808 (State Flag Law)

The ALJ concluded that the HOA’s one-flagpole rule did not violate state law.

• The rule was found to be a “reasonable rule or regulation under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B).”

• Because the Architectural Guidelines allow for flying two flags from a single flagpole up to 20′ long, the HOA was not prohibiting the display of flags, merely regulating the manner.

• The ALJ characterized the core issue as the “Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.”

Ruling on CC&R § 7.9 (Appeal Process)

The ALJ found that the HOA had followed the procedure required by its own CC&Rs.

Consultation: Based on Mr. Nunziato’s credible testimony, the board fulfilled its duty to consult with the Architectural Committee.

“Render a Decision”: The board “rendered a decision on her appeal at the November 8, 2018 board meeting” when it orally reached a decision.

“Written Decision”: The board created a “writing memorializing its decision” by documenting it in the meeting minutes. Because the Petitioner saw these minutes on December 4, 2018, this action occurred within the 45-day window following her October 1, 2018 appeal.

No Delivery Requirement: The ALJ applied the “negative implication cannon of contract construction.” By comparing CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) with § 7.8 (initial applications), the judge noted that § 7.9 lacks the explicit requirement to provide the written decision to the owner. Therefore, posting the minutes was sufficient, and the Petitioner’s request was not “deemed approved.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the ALJ issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that the Respondent’s Board should not have denied her application to install two flagpoles on her property.

The decision concludes with a notice informing the parties that the order is binding and that any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

This study guide provides a detailed review of the legal case Joyce H. Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG, as detailed in the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision dated November 18, 2019. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner request from the Respondent that initiated this dispute?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent’s Architectural Committee initially deny the Petitioner’s request on September 22, 2018?

4. Identify the key Arizona statute cited in the case and explain its two main provisions regarding flag displays.

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the Respondent’s handling of her appeal under CC&R § 7.9?

6. According to the testimony of Board President Tony Nunziato, how did the Board address the Petitioner’s appeal at the November 8, 2018 meeting?

7. What documentary evidence did the Respondent use to support the claim that a decision on the appeal was made and written down within the required timeframe?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) find the Respondent’s one-flagpole rule to be legally permissible?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner in this case, and did she meet it according to the ALJ?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case and its practical consequence for the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Joyce H. Monsanto, a homeowner. The Respondent is the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). Ms. Monsanto is a member of the Respondent HOA because she owns a house within its development in Sun City, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house. She intended to fly the United States flag from one pole and the United States Marine Corps flag from the other.

3. The Architectural Committee denied the request because the community’s Architectural Guidelines only permitted one flagpole per lot. The written Notice of Disapproval explicitly stated this rule as the reason for the denial.

4. The key statute is A.R.S. § 33-1808. Its first provision, § 33-1808(A), prohibits an HOA from banning the display of the American flag and various military flags. The second provision, § 33-1808(B), allows an HOA to adopt reasonable rules regulating the placement, size, and number of flagpoles, explicitly permitting a limit of one flagpole per property.

5. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated CC&R § 7.9 because it failed to provide her with a formal written decision denying her appeal within the 45-day period. She contended that because she never received a dedicated letter, the request should have been “deemed approved” as stipulated in the CC&R for failure to render a timely decision.

6. Tony Nunziato testified that the Board did consult with the Architectural Committee regarding the appeal before the meeting. He stated with certainty that at the November 8, 2018 meeting, the Board considered the appeal and verbally informed Ms. Monsanto that her request for a waiver was denied.

7. The Respondent presented the draft minutes from the November 8, 2018 Board meeting, which were posted on the HOA’s website on December 4, 2018. These minutes explicitly stated that the Board rejected the Petitioner’s request for a waiver to have two flagpoles, fulfilling the requirement to have a written record of the decision within 45 days of her October 1 appeal.

8. The ALJ found the rule permissible because A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) explicitly grants HOAs the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations” which may “regulate the location and size of flagpoles” and “shall not prohibit the installation of a flagpole.” Since the HOA’s guidelines allowed for one flagpole up to 20 feet long, capable of flying two flags, the judge concluded the rule was reasonable under the statute.

9. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that her contention was more probably true than not. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner did not meet this burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or its own CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied the Petitioner’s petition. The practical consequence is that the HOA’s denial of her application for two flagpoles was upheld, and the Board could therefore properly find her in violation of the Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1808(A), which protects a homeowner’s right to display military flags, and § 33-1808(B), which grants HOAs regulatory power. How did the Administrative Law Judge balance these two provisions to reach a conclusion in this case?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the Petitioner. Detail the specific claims made by Joyce Monsanto and explain why, according to the legal decision, she failed to establish them by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Examine the procedural dispute surrounding CC&R § 7.9. Contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of a “written decision” with the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, referencing the role of the verbal notification and the meeting minutes.

4. Evaluate the role of testimony and credibility in this administrative hearing. Compare and contrast the testimony provided by Petitioner Joyce Monsanto and Respondent’s Board President Tony Nunziato regarding the events of the November 8, 2018 board meeting, and explain why the judge found Mr. Nunziato’s account more credible.

5. Based on the facts presented, construct an argument that the HOA’s actions, while legally permissible according to the judge, were inconsistent with the patriotic values of its community, which includes many retired military members. Conversely, construct an argument defending the Board’s decision as a necessary and fair application of rules essential for maintaining community standards.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues legal decisions. In this case, Diane Mihalsky served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

An Arizona Revised Statute that governs the display of flags in planned communities. It forbids HOAs from prohibiting certain flags (like the U.S. and military flags) but permits them to establish reasonable rules regarding the number, size, and location of flagpoles.

Architectural Committee

A committee established by the HOA’s CC&Rs responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving homeowners’ applications for external modifications to their property, such as installing flagpoles.

Architectural Guidelines

The specific rules adopted by the HOA that set forth requirements for property modifications. In this case, the guidelines limited each lot to one flagpole, with a maximum height of 20 feet.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. The Petitioner, Joyce Monsanto, bore the burden of proof to show the HOA had violated the law or its own rules.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that create the rules for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9, which outlines the appeal process for disapproved architectural applications.

Declarant

The original developer of a planned community who establishes the initial CC&Rs. In this case, K. Hovnanian was the Declarant for Four Seasons at the Manor.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization in a planned community responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs and managing common areas. The Respondent, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, is an HOA.

Negative Implication

A principle of legal interpretation which holds that the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the intentional exclusion of another. The ALJ used this to argue that because CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) does not specify that a written decision must be sent to the owner, unlike CC&R § 7.8 (initial applications), that requirement should not be read into the appeal rule.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing an impartial forum to resolve disputes.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Joyce H. Monsanto is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required in this civil case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact (the judge) that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Restrictive Covenant

A legally enforceable rule within the CC&Rs that limits what a homeowner can do with their property. The rule limiting homes to one flagpole is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Waiver

The act of intentionally relinquishing a known right or claim. The Petitioner argued that the HOA board could, and should, have waived the one-flagpole rule for her under CC&R § 7.6.

HOA vs. Military Family: 4 Lessons from a Legal Battle Over a Flagpole

For Joyce Monsanto, a member of a dedicated military family, displaying her patriotism was a matter of pride. Her husband served 25 years in the Marines, and her two sons have spent decades in the Marines and the Coast Guard. Naturally, she wanted to fly both the flag of the United States and the flag of the U.S. Marine Corps at her Arizona home. But when she submitted her plan to her Homeowners Association (HOA), she was met with a firm “no.”

The conflict wasn’t about the flags themselves. The Four Seasons at the Manor HOA had no issue with her displaying both. The dispute centered on how she wanted to display them. It was a disagreement over her vision for a symmetrical, two-pole display versus the HOA’s “one flagpole per lot” rule. This architectural dispute escalated from a simple request into a formal administrative hearing.

Ms. Monsanto’s fight reveals several surprising truths about the power of HOA rules and the specific language written into state law. Her case ultimately failed on two fronts—a substantive challenge to the rule itself, and a procedural challenge to how the HOA handled her appeal. Here’s what every homeowner can learn from each.

1. Your Right to Fly the Flag Has Limits—And They’re Written into Law.

Many homeowners believe the right to fly the American flag is unconditional. However, the legal reality is more nuanced. While Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1808) prevents an HOA from outright prohibiting the display of U.S. or military flags, it explicitly allows the association to create “reasonable rules and regulations” for their placement and manner of display.

The statute is specific about what these rules can cover. An HOA can legally regulate the size and location of flagpoles and can limit a homeowner to displaying no more than two flags at once. In this case, the HOA’s architectural guidelines permitted two flags, but only on a single flagpole. The Administrative Law Judge found this “one flagpole per lot” rule was a “reasonable” regulation and therefore perfectly legal. To underscore that the HOA’s stance was not about a lack of patriotism, the judge noted testimony that the HOA president himself “placed 140 small flags on his property” for Memorial Day. The issue was about the uniform enforcement of an architectural rule, not the patriotic display itself.

2. Your Personal Taste Is No Match for the Community Rulebook.

During the hearing, Ms. Monsanto acknowledged that she could fly both of her flags from a single pole as the HOA rules allowed. Her reason for wanting two poles was a matter of personal preference. She testified that she “wanted to install two flagpoles for aesthetic reasons” and also felt that a single pole placed in the middle of her lot would block the view from her front window.

The judge was unmoved by this line of reasoning. In the final decision, the response was direct and unambiguous:

Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.

This is a foundational principle of community association law: homeowners trade a degree of personal autonomy for the perceived benefits of uniform standards and predictable property values. The judge’s decision simply reaffirms that bargain. In the world of planned communities, the established rulebook will almost always outweigh an individual’s personal taste.

3. In HOA Law, the Appeal Isn’t a Re-do—It’s a Different Process.

One of Ms. Monsanto’s key arguments was procedural. She believed her appeal should have been automatically approved because the HOA failed to provide a written decision within the 45-day deadline stipulated in its own rules (CC&R § 7.9). This is where the judge identified a subtle but crucial legal distinction buried in the HOA’s governing documents.

The HOA’s CC&Rs had two different sections for architectural requests:

CC&R § 7.8 (Initial Requests): This section explicitly required the Board to “inform the submitting party of the final decision” with a “written response.”

CC&R § 7.9 (Appeals): This section, however, only required the Board to “render its written decision” within 45 days.

That small difference in wording—”written response” versus “written decision”—was the linchpin of her procedural case. The judge ruled that for an appeal, the HOA was not required to send a personal letter or direct notice to Ms. Monsanto. It only had to create a written record of its decision within the timeframe.

4. A Post on an HOA Website Can Count as an Official “Written Decision.”

The final surprise came down to what constitutes a “written decision” and how the deadline was met. Ms. Monsanto was waiting for a formal letter informing her that her appeal had been denied. She never received one. Her appeal was filed on October 1, 2018, starting a 45-day clock.

The judge found the HOA satisfied its obligation in a two-step process:

1. The Decision: The Board verbally denied her appeal during its public meeting on November 8, 2018. This action, which occurred 38 days after her appeal, fulfilled the requirement to “render its decision” within the 45-day period.

2. The Writing: That decision was then recorded in the draft meeting minutes, which were posted on the Board’s website on December 4, 2018. Ms. Monsanto acknowledged seeing the posted minutes.

The judge ruled that these online minutes satisfied the separate legal requirement for a “writing memorializing its decision.” Even though they weren’t sent directly to her, the publicly posted minutes served as the official record of the timely denial of her appeal, closing the final door on her argument for automatic approval.

Conclusion: Before You Plant Your Flag, Read the Fine Print

Joyce Monsanto’s case is a cautionary tale on two levels. First, it shows that even cherished rights like displaying the flag are subject to reasonable, neutrally-applied community rules. Second, and more critically, it demonstrates that procedural arguments live and die by the most precise definitions in the governing documents. A single word can be the difference between winning an appeal and being ordered to take your flagpole down.

This case came down to the difference between a “written response” and a “written decision”—do you know what the fine print says about your rights in your community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce H Monsanto (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Anthony Nunziato (board member)
    Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association
    President of the Board of Directors; also referred to as 'Tony'
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Community Manager/Trestle Management (implied)
    Sent Notice of Disapproval on behalf of Respondent
  • Marc Vasquez (HOA representative)
    Addressed Petitioner's claim regarding violation letters at the Board meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919068-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ found the HOA violated CC&R 4.3 regarding the timing of budget delivery. While the Petitioner prevailed on the violation and was awarded the $500 filing fee, the ALJ denied the request to rescind the dues increase and denied civil penalties.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&R 4.3

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found the HOA violated CC&R 4.3 regarding the timing of budget delivery. While the Petitioner prevailed on the violation and was awarded the $500 filing fee, the ALJ denied the request to rescind the dues increase and denied civil penalties.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to deliver budget 15 days prior to meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R 4.3 by failing to deliver the budget 15 days before the meeting. The HOA mailed the budget exactly 15 days prior (Jan 2 for Jan 17 meeting), but the ALJ ruled the contract required delivery, not just mailing, 15 days prior.

Orders: Respondent must pay to Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919068-REL Decision – 735330.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:24 (80.1 KB)

19F-H1919068-REL Decision – 735330.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:17:02 (80.1 KB)

Administrative Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative law decision in Case No. 19F-H1919068-REL, involving Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. The central dispute concerned whether the Association complied with its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding the timely delivery of budget documentation to members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, determined that the Association violated CC&R section 4.3 by failing to deliver the 2019 budget to the Petitioner at least fifteen days before the annual meeting. While the Petitioner was declared the prevailing party and awarded a refund of his $500 filing fee, the court declined to rescind the 2019 dues increase or issue civil penalties.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of Delivery Timelines

The core of the legal dispute rested on the distinction between "mailing" and "delivery." CC&R section 4.3 stipulates that the Board must cause a copy of the budget and assessment amounts to be delivered to each unit owner at least fifteen days prior to the meeting where the budget is presented.

The evidence established that:

  • The annual meeting occurred on January 17, 2019.
  • The Association mailed the budget on January 2, 2019 (exactly fifteen days before the meeting).
  • The Petitioner did not actually receive the budget fifteen days before the meeting.

The ALJ concluded that merely placing the budget in the mail fifteen days prior does not satisfy a requirement for "delivery" by that same date, as the transit time naturally delays the delivery beyond the required window.

2. Contractual Nature of CC&Rs

The decision reinforces the legal principle that CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between a Homeowners Association and its members. The tribunal emphasized that:

  • Both parties are required to comply with the explicit terms of the CC&Rs.
  • The court must give effect to the "clear and unambiguous terms" of these documents.
  • The Association’s failure to meet the specific delivery deadline constituted a breach of its contractual duty under section 4.3.
3. Burden of Proof and Evidentiary Standards

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof under the standard of a "preponderance of the evidence." This case highlights how credible personal testimony, combined with physical evidence (such as a postmarked envelope), can meet this standard. The ALJ found the Petitioner's testimony regarding the receipt of the budget to be credible, which was sufficient to incline the "fair and impartial mind" toward his side of the issue.

4. Remedies and Judicial Discretion

While the Petitioner successfully proved a violation, the court exercised discretion regarding the requested remedies. The decision illustrates a distinction between a procedural violation and the substantive validity of Association actions:

  • Procedural Violation: Confirmed (Late delivery of budget).
  • Awarded Remedy: Refund of the $500 filing fee to the Petitioner.
  • Denied Remedies: The court refused to rescind the 10% dues increase and declined to issue civil penalties, as the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that such measures were appropriate or necessary.

Key Case Data

Category Details
Case Number 19F-H1919068-REL
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date August 21, 2019
Decision Date September 4, 2019
Relevant CC&R Section 4.3 (Budget Delivery)
Prevailing Party Michael J. Stoltenberg
Financial Award $500.00 (Filing Fee Reimbursement)

Important Quotes with Context

On the Definition of Preponderance of Evidence

"The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that… is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other." (Citing Black’s Law Dictionary)

Context: This quote establishes the legal threshold the Petitioner had to meet to prove the Association violated the CC&Rs.

On Contractual Compliance

"The CC&Rs are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms… the tribunal must give effect to a contract’s clear and unambiguous terms."

Context: The ALJ used this to explain why the Association could not be excused from the strict 15-day delivery requirement, regardless of their mailing efforts.

On the Specific Violation

"The preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association placed the budget in the mail on January 2, 2019, which is fifteen days before the meeting, but it was not delivered to Mr. Stoltenberg on that date and was not delivered to him fifteen days before the meeting as required."

Context: This finding is the pivot point of the decision, clarifying that mailing a document on the deadline date is insufficient if the requirement is "delivery."

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners Associations
  • Buffer Mailing Dates: When CC&Rs require "delivery" by a certain date, Associations should account for mail transit times. Mailing exactly on the deadline (e.g., 15 days before a meeting for a 15-day requirement) will likely result in a violation if the document is not received on that same day.
  • Review Mandatory Timelines: Associations must strictly adhere to the timelines set in their CC&Rs for budget preparation (60 days prior to fiscal year) and member notification (30 days prior to meetings).
  • Dues Increase Authority: The case notes that dues increases up to 10% do not require membership approval under these specific CC&Rs, though procedural notice requirements still apply.
For Association Members
  • Documenting Receipts: Maintaining evidence of postmarks and arrival dates is crucial when alleging procedural violations by an Association.
  • Single-Issue Petitions: Petitioners should be aware that administrative hearings may require identifying a single issue or paying additional fees for multi-issue hearings.
  • Limited Remedies: Even if a violation is proven, the court may only award the recovery of filing fees rather than the rescission of Association financial decisions (like dues increases) unless a specific harm or lack of authority is demonstrated.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Michael J. Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919068-REL). It covers the legal standards, factual findings, and final rulings issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.


Core Case Overview

The case centers on a dispute regarding the procedural requirements for notifying homeowners of annual budgets and assessment increases. The Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, alleged that the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (the Association) failed to comply with its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) regarding the timely delivery of budget documentation.

Key Legal Standards
  • Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over this matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
  • Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bears the burden of proof.
  • Standard of Proof: The standard is a "preponderance of the evidence," defined as the greater weight of the evidence or evidence that has the most convincing force.
  • Contractual Nature of CC&Rs: Legal precedent establishes that CC&Rs are a contract between the parties, and the tribunal must give effect to the contract’s clear and unambiguous terms.

Factual Findings and Timeline

The dispute focused on the Association's actions leading up to the 2019 fiscal year and its annual meeting.

2019 Budget and Dues Increase
  • Meeting Date: The Association conducted its annual meeting on January 17, 2019.
  • Dues Adjustment: Monthly dues were increased by 10% to a total of $154 per month. Under the Association's rules, dues increases of up to 10% do not require membership approval.
  • Notice of Increase: The Association informed members of the dues increase in November 2018.
CC&R Section 4.3 Requirements

Section 4.3 of the CC&Rs outlines specific timelines for the Board of Directors:

  1. Preparation: The budget must be prepared at least 60 days before the fiscal year and at least 30 days before the meeting where it is presented.
  2. Delivery: A copy of the budget and assessment amounts must be delivered to each unit owner at least 15 days prior to the meeting.
The Violation

The evidence showed that the Association postmarked the 2019 budget on January 2, 2019. While this was 15 days before the January 17 meeting, the budget was not actually delivered to Mr. Stoltenberg 15 days prior. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that mailing the document on the 15th day did not satisfy the requirement for delivery "at least fifteen days prior" to the meeting.


Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. Who had the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the required standard?

The Petitioner (Michael J. Stoltenberg) had the burden of proof, and the required standard was a "preponderance of the evidence."

2. Why was the Petitioner required to limit his petition to a single issue?

The Administrative Law Judge informed the Petitioner that his initial petition encompassed multiple issues (violations of CC&R 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, etc.). He was required to either identify a single issue for the hearing or pay a fee for a multi-issue hearing.

3. What specific violation did the ALJ find the Association committed?

The Association violated CC&R section 4.3 by failing to deliver a copy of the budget to the Petitioner at least 15 days before the meeting at which the budget was considered.

4. What was the Association’s defense regarding the timing of the budget notification?

The Association postmarked the budget on January 2, 2019, exactly 15 days before the meeting; however, the law requires delivery, not just mailing, by that deadline.

5. Did the dues increase of 10% require a vote from the membership?

No. Dues increases of up to 10% do not require approval of the membership under the Association's governing documents.

6. What was the final remedy awarded to the Petitioner?

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and the Association was ordered to reimburse his $500 filing fee.


Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. The Distinction Between Mailing and Delivery in Contractual Obligations Analyze the ALJ’s interpretation of CC&R section 4.3. Discuss why the postmark date of January 2nd was insufficient to meet a "fifteen-day delivery" requirement for a meeting held on January 17th. How does this distinction affect how Homeowners Associations should manage their administrative timelines?

2. Remedies and Limits of Administrative Authority The Petitioner requested that the 2019 dues increase be rescinded and a civil penalty be issued. However, the ALJ denied these requests despite finding a violation. Based on the source context, explore the potential reasons why the procedural violation regarding the budget delivery did not automatically invalidate the dues increase itself.


Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) A judge who presides over hearings and adjudicates disputes involving government agencies (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings).
CC&Rs Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents and rules that constitute a contract between a Homeowners Association and its members.
Filing Fee The cost paid by a petitioner to initiate a legal matter. In this case, the fee was $500.00.
Fiscal Year The 12-month period used by the Association for budgeting and financial reporting.
Preponderance of the Evidence The standard of proof where the evidence is of "superior evidentiary weight" and more "convincing" than the opposing evidence.
Prevailing Party The party in a lawsuit or legal proceeding who succeeds on the main issues.
Petitioner The party who brings a legal petition or complaint to the tribunal (Michael J. Stoltenberg).
Respondent The party against whom a legal action is brought (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association).
Rescinded To cancel, revoke, or repeal a decision or agreement.

The "Delivery" Deadline: Lessons in HOA Transparency from Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro

1. Introduction: When Procedure Meets Property Rights

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a balancing act between community standards and personal property rights. However, as any seasoned legal analyst will tell you, this relationship is governed strictly by contract law. When a Board fails to adhere to the procedural requirements of its own governing documents, it risks not only community trust but also a formal administrative remedy.

The case of Michael J. Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association stands as a pivotal cautionary tale. It demonstrates that even when an Association acts in good faith to announce a dues increase, a single procedural oversight regarding the definition of the word "delivered" can result in a legal defeat. This post analyzes how a $500 filing fee refund turned on the precise timing of a budget distribution.

2. The Dispute: A Question of Timing

In early 2019, Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg challenged the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association following a budget meeting that resulted in an assessment increase. While Mr. Stoltenberg’s initial petition alleged a wide array of violations—including CC&Rs 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, and various parts of Article 4—he ultimately employed a focused legal strategy, narrowing his claim to a single, provable issue of procedural non-compliance.

The conflict centered on the following facts:

  • The Annual Meeting: Conducted on January 17, 2019.
  • The Assessment Change: A 10% increase, raising monthly dues to $154.
  • The Regulatory Conflict: CC&R Section 4.3, which mandates specific timelines for budget distribution.

The Petitioner’s primary allegation was that the Association committed a contractual breach by failing to deliver the 2019 budget within the mandatory 15-day window prior to the meeting.

3. The Legal Threshold: CC&R Section 4.3 Analyzed

The Association’s obligations were not mere suggestions; they were contractual mandates. The Board's failure to distinguish between "mailing" and "delivery" created the grounds for the dispute.

Legal Spotlight: CC&R Section 4.3 Requirements Under the Association’s governing documents, the Board has two distinct temporal duties: 1. Preparation Duties: The Board must prepare a budget at least 60 days before the fiscal year and at least 30 days before the meeting at which it is presented. 2. Delivery Duties: The Board "shall cause a copy of the budget and the amount of the assessments… to be delivered to each unit owner at least fifteen days prior to that meeting."

The Association, represented by the testimony of Diana Crites of Crites Property Management, argued that they had fulfilled their duty by informing members of the increase in November 2018 and mailing the budget on January 2, 2019. However, the legal standard for "delivery" is not met by the mere act of placing an item into the stream of transit.

4. The ALJ’s Decision: Mailing is Not Delivery

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden applied the Preponderance of the Evidence standard to this matter. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, this is "the greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."

The ALJ’s logic focused on the "15-day math." If a meeting is held on the 17th, and the document is mailed on the 2nd, it is physically and legally impossible for the document to be "delivered" (received) on that same day.

HOA's Position The ALJ's Ruling Legal Logic
The Association mailed the budget on January 2, 2019, exactly 15 days prior to the meeting. Mailing on the deadline day is insufficient to satisfy a delivery requirement. "Delivery" implies receipt. Because the document was in transit on the 15th day, it was not delivered "at least 15 days prior."

The Verdict: The ALJ ruled that the Association violated Section 4.3. As a result, the Association was ordered to pay Mr. Stoltenberg $500 to reimburse his filing fee—effectively shifting the cost of litigation to the non-compliant Association.

5. Nuance in the Verdict: Limits to Homeowner Remedies

While the Petitioner secured a victory on the procedural point, the ruling highlights the limitations of administrative remedies. Homeowners should note that a procedural "win" does not always result in a total reversal of Association policy:

  1. Dues Increase Upheld: Because the 10% increase did not exceed the threshold requiring membership approval under the CC&Rs, the ALJ did not rescind the increase. The $154 monthly rate remained valid.
  2. No Civil Penalties: The ALJ determined that while a violation of the CC&Rs occurred, the circumstances did not warrant additional punitive civil penalties beyond the reimbursement of the filing fee.
6. Final Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

The Stoltenberg case offers three high-impact lessons for community governance:

  • For Boards: Delivery Means Receipt. If governing documents require "delivery" by a specific deadline, mailing the document on that day is a breach of contract. Boards and management companies—such as Crites Property Management in this instance—must account for postal transit times to ensure documents are in the homeowners' hands by the deadline.
  • For Homeowners: Document Everything. Mr. Stoltenberg’s case was won on evidence, not just anecdotally. His presentation of the January 2nd postmark on the envelope was the pivotal "smoking gun" that proved the Association's timeline was flawed.
  • For Both: Contracts Matter. This ruling reinforces the precedent set in Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association (205 Ariz. 485), which establishes that CC&Rs are binding contracts. Tribunals are legally bound to give effect to the clear and unambiguous terms of these documents. Procedural transparency is a contractual obligation, not a courtesy.
7. Conclusion: The Value of Accountability

The Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro decision serves as a vital reminder that in the world of HOAs, details matter. While the Association had notified members of the increase as early as November, their failure to strictly adhere to the 15-day delivery window for the final budget resulted in a financial penalty and a formal finding of violation. Ultimately, strict adherence to procedural deadlines is the only way for a Board to insulate itself from the costs and scrutiny of administrative litigation.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Diana Crites (witness)
    Crites Property Management
    Testified for the Association
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Listed in transmission block

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted order
  • F. Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the transmission of the order

Sellers, John A. v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919066-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-08-26
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1258. The Association provided available records, and the remaining requested items either did not exist or were properly withheld under statutory exceptions for privileged communications and pending litigation.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John A Sellers Counsel
Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association Counsel Edward D. O'Brien

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1258. The Association provided available records, and the remaining requested items either did not exist or were properly withheld under statutory exceptions for privileged communications and pending litigation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the requested documents existed or were improperly withheld. The Respondent successfully demonstrated that it had provided all non-privileged records in its possession and that specific meeting minutes and emails did not exist.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to Provide Records

Petitioner alleged the Association failed to provide records requested on April 29, 2019, specifically emails regarding specific individuals, legal invoices, executive session minutes, and communications regarding a petition signing.

Orders: The Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919066-REL Decision – 733561.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:15 (99.9 KB)

19F-H1919066-REL Decision – 733561.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-11T06:35:50 (99.9 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative law judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between John A. Sellers (Petitioner) and the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent). The case, presided over by ALJ Antara Nath Rivera, centered on allegations that the Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1258 by failing to provide requested records in a timely and complete manner.

The Petitioner submitted a consolidated records request on April 29, 2019, seeking legal invoices, communications with specific third parties, executive session minutes, and records regarding a member petition. Following a hearing on August 5, 2019, the ALJ determined that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association withheld existing, non-exempt documents. Consequently, the Petition was dismissed on August 26, 2019.

Analysis of Key Themes

1. Statutory Obligations for Record Disclosure

Under A.R.S. § 33-1258, condominium associations are mandated to make financial and other records "reasonably available for examination" to members within ten business days of a written request. However, the statute provides specific exceptions where an association may withhold records, including:

  • Privileged Communications: Correspondence between the association and its attorney.
  • Pending Litigation: Documents specifically relating to active legal matters.
  • Executive Sessions: Meeting minutes or records of board sessions not required to be open to all members under A.R.S. § 33-1248.

The Respondent successfully argued that they had adhered to these standards by providing redacted documents where the information fell under attorney-client privilege or executive session exemptions.

2. The Burden of Proof and Evidence of Existence

A central theme of the decision is the Petitioner’s burden to prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that a violation occurred. In administrative proceedings, this means the Petitioner must show that the facts sought to be proved are "more probable than not."

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden regarding items for which the Association claimed no records existed. Specifically:

  • Item #1 (Third-party communications): The Petitioner believed these emails existed to prove communications about him, but the Association testified they were not in their possession.
  • Item #4 (Meeting records for a notarized petition): The Petitioner opined that 21 signatures could not have been collected without a meeting. The Association clarified that no such meetings occurred; rather, individual residents took actions regarding the Petitioner’s divorce proceedings independently.
3. Transparency vs. Legal Redaction

The Association sought to demonstrate a high degree of transparency to counter the Petitioner's claims. Evidence presented by Association President Jeff Kaplan indicated that:

  • The Association received over 400 emails from the Petitioner in three years, approximately 100 of which were records requests.
  • The Association provided documents beyond those requested to facilitate transparency.
  • Financial and bank records were kept accessible to all residents via the Association’s website.

The ALJ accepted that the Association’s use of redactions for legal invoices and executive session minutes was a lawful application of the exceptions provided in A.R.S. § 33-1258(B).

Key Petitioner Requests and Court Findings

Request Item Description Association Response ALJ Conclusion
Item #1 Communications between the HOA/Agents and ROI/Mrs. Sellers. Records do not exist/not in Association's possession. Petitioner failed to prove documents existed at the time of request.
Item #2 Unredacted legal invoices for the current Petition. Provided redacted versions citing attorney-client privilege. Petitioner acknowledged compliance after receiving documents.
Item #3 Records/minutes for all Executive Sessions since the Petition filing. Provided redacted minutes; cited A.R.S. § 33-1248 exemptions. Petitioner did not dispute that records were exempt under the statute.
Item #4 Records regarding meetings held to sign a petition against the Petitioner. No such meetings occurred; signatures were individual actions. Petitioner failed to prove documents existed.

Important Quotes

Regarding the Records Request

"Please consider this email as one consolidated renewed records request… for the following: 1. Copies of all records and communications… with and between ROI, Mrs D Sellers, and or any of their Agents since Nov 1 2018."

  • Context: Petitioner John Sellers’ formal email to Association President Jeff Kaplan on April 29, 2019, which formed the basis of the dispute.
Regarding Statutory Exceptions

"Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to… Privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association [and] Pending litigation."

  • Context: A citation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(B), used by the ALJ to define the legal boundaries of what an Association is permitted to keep confidential.
Regarding the Final Ruling

"Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that these documents existed at the time of the April 29, 2019 request such that Respondent’s failure to provide the documents was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258."

  • Context: The ALJ’s legal justification for dismissing the Petition regarding items for which no physical records could be produced.

Actionable Insights

  • Verification of Record Existence: For members filing records requests, the belief that a document "should" exist is insufficient for a legal victory; there must be evidence that the record actually exists or was required to be maintained.
  • Understanding Redactions: Association members should be aware that "unredacted" requests for legal invoices are frequently denied based on attorney-client privilege and pending litigation exceptions established in state law.
  • Association Compliance Strategies: To defend against claims of non-compliance, associations should maintain a clear paper trail of all documents provided and ensure that all residents have standing access to basic financial records (e.g., via a community website).
  • Standard of Evidence: Parties in administrative hearings must prepare to meet the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Mere opinion or speculation—such as the Petitioner’s opining that a meeting "must have happened" to collect signatures—is typically dismissed if countered by testimony of non-existence.

Case Analysis: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

This study guide examines the administrative law proceedings regarding a dispute between a condominium unit owner and a homeowners association (HOA). It focuses on the statutory requirements for records disclosure, the legal exceptions to such requests, and the burden of proof required in administrative hearings.


Key Legal Concepts and Statutory Framework

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1258: Records Disclosure

This statute governs the availability of association records to its members. The core requirements include:

  • Reasonable Availability: All financial and other records must be made available for examination by a member or their designated representative.
  • Timeline: The association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or provide copies of records.
  • Cost: Associations may not charge for the review of materials but may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.
Statutory Exceptions to Disclosure

Under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B), an association may withhold books and records if the portion relates to:

  1. Attorney-Client Privilege: Communications between the association and its legal counsel.
  2. Pending Litigation: Records specifically related to ongoing legal disputes.
  3. Executive Session Minutes: Records of board meetings not required to be open to all members pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1248.
Burden of Proof

In administrative hearings regarding HOA disputes (A.R.S. § 41-2198.01), the Petitioner bears the burden of proof. They must establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the evidence shows that the alleged fact is more probable than not.


Summary of the Dispute: Case No. 19F-H1919066-REL

The Petitioner, John A. Sellers, filed a petition against the Respondent, Rancho Madera Condominium Association, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 for failure to provide records requested on April 29, 2019.

The Four Record Requests
Item # Petitioner's Request Respondent's Position / ALJ Finding
1 Records/emails between Association agents and ROI, Mrs. D. Sellers, or their agents since Nov 2018. Records do not exist; Petitioner failed to prove existence.
2 Unredacted legal invoices for the current Petition, including those paid by insurance. Redacted versions provided; unredacted versions are protected by attorney-client privilege.
3 Notices, emails, and minutes for Executive Sessions since the AZDRE Petition was filed. Redacted minutes provided; records are exempt under A.R.S. § 33-1248/33-1258(B).
4 Communications/notices regarding member meetings held to sign a notarized petition against the Petitioner. No such meetings occurred; signatures were gathered by residents independently. Records do not exist.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. According to A.R.S. § 33-1258, how many business days does an association have to fulfill a request for records?
  • Answer: Ten business days.
  1. What is the maximum fee per page an association can charge for making copies of records?
  • Answer: Fifteen cents ($0.15) per page.
  1. Under what legal theory did the Respondent justify redacting legal invoices in Item #2?
  • Answer: Attorney-client privilege and the "pending litigation" exception.
  1. Who bears the burden of proof in an HOA dispute process petition before the Arizona Department of Real Estate?
  • Answer: The Petitioner.
  1. Why was the Petitioner's request for records of meetings on April 6 and April 8, 2019 (Item #4) denied?
  • Answer: The Respondent testified that no such meetings occurred, and therefore no minutes or records existed.
  1. What does "preponderance of the evidence" mean in the context of this hearing?
  • Answer: Evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposition, showing a fact is more probable than not.
  1. Is an association required to provide unredacted minutes of an Executive Session of the Board?
  • Answer: No; under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(3), these are exempt from disclosure if the session is not required to be open under A.R.S. § 33-1248.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Statutory Boundaries of Transparency: Analyze the balance between a member’s right to transparency and an association’s right to privileged communication. Use the ALJ’s ruling on Item #2 and Item #3 to support your argument regarding why certain records remain protected even when a member claims there is "no litigation exception."
  2. The "Non-Existent Document" Defense: In this case, several requests were dismissed because the Respondent claimed the documents did not exist. Discuss the Petitioner’s responsibility in proving the existence of documents versus the Respondent's duty to provide them. How does the ALJ’s ruling on Item #5 clarify the relevance of "record retention policies" in a disclosure dispute?
  3. The Role of Administrative Jurisdiction: Explain the jurisdictional roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings in HOA disputes as outlined in A.R.S. § 41-2198.01. Why is this administrative process used instead of a standard civil court for these specific disputes?

Glossary of Important Terms

  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over an administrative hearing, hears evidence, and issues a decision or order.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248: The Arizona statute governing open meeting requirements for condominium associations.
  • Attorney-Client Privilege: A legal principle that keeps communications between an attorney and their client confidential and protected from disclosure.
  • Executive Session: A portion of a board meeting that is closed to the general membership, typically used to discuss legal, personnel, or sensitive matters.
  • Notice of Hearing: A formal document issued to notify parties of the date, time, and location of a legal proceeding.
  • Petitioner: The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition; in this case, John A. Sellers.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, requiring that a claim be more likely true than not.
  • Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Rancho Madera Condominium Association.
  • Statutory Exception: A specific condition or circumstance defined in law that exempts a party from a general legal requirement.

HOA Transparency vs. Legal Privacy: Lessons from Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

1. Introduction: The Conflict Over Information

In the governed ecosystem of Arizona condominiums, the "right to know" is a frequent flashpoint between unit owners and their associations. While transparency is the bedrock of community trust, it often collides with an association’s statutory right to protect privileged legal strategies and executive deliberations. This tension is not merely academic; it frequently results in high-stakes administrative litigation.

The case of John A. Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association (No. 19F-H1919066-REL) provides a masterclass in how these disputes are adjudicated. Decided by the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) in 2019, the ruling clarifies the boundaries of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1258, illustrating exactly what records an association must produce—and where the law allows them to shut the door.

2. The Paper Trail: 400 Emails and a Consolidated Request

The dispute reached a boiling point when Petitioner John Sellers, joined by Margaret SwanTKO, issued a "consolidated renewed records request" on April 29, 2019. Alleging that previous requests had been ignored, Sellers demanded four specific categories of documentation under A.R.S. § 33-1258:

  • Third-Party Communications: All records and communications—including emails and conference call notes—between the Association, its agents, and legal counsel (Carpenter Hazelwood) regarding ROI and Mrs. D. Sellers since November 1, 2018.
  • Unredacted Legal Invoices: Complete, unredacted invoices related to the ADRE petition, with Sellers arguing that no litigation exception applied to these financial records.
  • Executive Session Records: All notices, emails, and minutes for every Executive Session of the Board since the filing of the petition, specifically including the meeting where counsel was retained.
  • The "Vendetta" Petition Records: All communications and notices regarding member meetings held to sign a notarized petition—a document that allegedly characterized Sellers as having a "vendetta."

3. The Association’s Defense: "Above and Beyond" Compliance

Represented by Board President Jeff Kaplan, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association countered that it was not the Association being opaque, but rather the Petitioner being overzealous. Kaplan testified to a staggering administrative burden: the Association had received over 400 emails from Sellers in the three years preceding the hearing, approximately 100 of which were formal records requests.

Kaplan argued that the Association had acted with extreme transparency, even going "above and beyond" by providing documents Sellers hadn't specifically requested. To further prove their commitment to disclosure, the Association maintained financial and bank records on a community website accessible to all residents at any time.

4. Legal Analysis: Understanding A.R.S. § 33-1258

The resolution of these disputes hinges on A.R.S. § 33-1258, which serves as the definitive guide for HOA record disclosure in Arizona. The statute establishes a clear "General Rule" for transparency while carving out narrow "Statutory Exceptions" to protect sensitive information.

HOA Records: Disclosure vs. Exclusion
General Rule (A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)) Statutory Exceptions (A.R.S. § 33-1258(B))
Availability: All financial and other records must be made available within ten business days of a written request. Attorney-Client Privilege: Privileged communications between the association and its legal counsel are exempt.
Access: Records must be open for examination by a member or their designated representative. Pending Litigation: Records specifically related to active or pending legal matters may be withheld.
Costs: Associations may charge up to $0.15 per page for copies but cannot charge for the time spent reviewing the materials. Executive Sessions: Meeting minutes or records for board sessions not required to be open under A.R.S. § 33-1248 (e.g., personnel or legal matters).

5. The Judge’s Ruling: The Limits of Discovery

Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera dismissed the petition on August 26, 2019, after applying the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard. This required the Petitioner to prove it was "more probable than not" that a violation occurred. The ruling turned on several key findings:

  • Items #1 and #4 (The Existence of Records): Sellers "strongly believed" emails and meeting minutes regarding a "vendetta petition" existed. However, Kaplan testified that no such meetings occurred on the dates Sellers alleged (April 6 or 8, 2019). The Judge ruled that Sellers failed to prove the records existed. Under the law, an association cannot be penalized for failing to produce non-existent documents.
  • Item #2 (The Admission of Satisfaction): While Sellers originally demanded unredacted legal invoices, he admitted during the hearing that he was satisfied with the redacted versions eventually provided. This admission effectively neutralized the claim.
  • Item #3 (Executive Sessions): The Association provided redacted minutes of executive sessions. Sellers did not dispute that these records fell under the statutory exceptions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(B).
  • The "Human Interest" Context: The testimony revealed that the "notarized petition" Sellers sought records for was actually an effort by neighbors who were unhappy with him. These residents had even attended Sellers’ divorce proceedings to influence the court against awarding him the house, as they no longer wished to have him as a neighbor.

6. Key Takeaways for HOA Members and Boards

The Sellers decision offers three critical lessons for community association stakeholders:

  1. The Burden of Proof is on the Requester: It is not enough to suspect that an association is hiding documents. To prove a violation, a member must provide evidence that the records actually exist. Furthermore, a "record retention policy" does not change the outcome; if a record is not in the association's possession at the time of the request, there is no violation of § 33-1258.
  2. Privilege and Redaction are Standard: While members have a right to see legal invoices, they do not have a right to see the legal strategy contained within them. Redacting privileged information regarding current litigation is the legally accepted middle ground.
  3. Statutory Exceptions are Absolute: The protections for attorney-client privilege and executive sessions under A.R.S. § 33-1258(B) and § 33-1248 are robust. Boards that maintain organized records and apply these exceptions consistently are well-positioned to defeat "fishing expedition" style petitions.

7. Conclusion: Balancing Rights and Regulations

The dismissal of John Sellers' petition underscores a fundamental reality of community association law: the right to information is not an absolute right to every scrap of paper. By providing bank records via a website and complying with redacted requests, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association demonstrated the "above and beyond" transparency that judges look for.

For associations, the lesson is to remain organized and responsive. For members, the lesson is to understand that the law protects the board's ability to consult with counsel and deliberate in private. Without this balance, the administrative burden of endless requests can quickly overshadow the actual management of the community.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John A. Sellers (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; member of the Association
  • Margaret SwanTKO (member)
    Listed in consolidated records request with John Sellers

Respondent Side

  • Jeff Kaplan (board president)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    Testified on behalf of Respondent
  • Ed O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Edith I. Rudder (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Listed on distribution list

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list

Other Participants

  • Mrs. D. Sellers (unknown)
    Mentioned in records request regarding communications

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:18:30 (141.7 KB)

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:18 (141.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

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Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.

He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision

Loraine Brokaw vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918017-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-01
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Loraine Brokaw Counsel
Respondent Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Counsel Sean K Moynihan, Esq. and Jason E Smith, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment Dispute, Uniform Assessment Rate, Bylaws Interpretation, Planned Community, Governing Document Precedence
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:16:43 (137.2 KB)

19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:53 (137.2 KB)

Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Loraine Brokaw versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (POA). The central conflict concerned the POA Board’s decision to increase Ms. Brokaw’s annual assessment from 150% to 200% for a single residence constructed across two separate lots.

The Petitioner, Ms. Brokaw, argued that this increase was unlawful and capricious, violating a nearly thirty-year practice that had been formalized by a 2003 Board decision granting her a reduced assessment. The POA contended that its action, taken on the advice of counsel, was necessary to comply with the Association’s governing documents, which mandate uniform assessments for all lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the homeowner’s petition. The decision established a critical legal precedent for the Association: the unambiguous language of the governing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) takes precedence over any past Board decisions, informal agreements, or long-standing practices, regardless of their duration. Because the Petitioner owns two distinct, legally unconsolidated lots, the ALJ found that the Board’s action to assess each lot at the full, uniform rate was not a violation, but rather a correct and required application of the community’s Bylaws.

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I. Case Overview

Parties: Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent).

Jurisdiction: Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), State of Arizona.

Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL.

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.

Hearing Date: March 25, 2019.

Decision Date: April 01, 2019.

II. Central Issue of the Dispute

The hearing was convened to address the following issue, as stated in the NOTICE OF HEARING:

“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”

The core of the dispute was the Association Board’s decision in 2017 to increase the annual assessment for the Petitioner’s property—a single home built across two adjacent lots—from 150% to 200% of the standard single-lot assessment rate. The Petitioner sought to compel the Board to revert to the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for costs associated with the petition.

III. Petitioner’s Position and Key Testimony

Property History: The Petitioner testified that her husband first bought property in Sin Vacas in 1979. In 2003, the couple purchased an adjacent lot and constructed a new home that spanned across both properties (Lots 156 and 157).

Claim of Lot Combination: The Petitioner claimed to have legally combined the two lots but presented no supporting documentation to the tribunal.

Historical Assessment Practice: The Petitioner testified that as of 2003, the Association’s practice was to assess properties as follows:

100%: For a home on a single lot.

25%: For an undeveloped vacant lot.

150%: For a residence situated on two lots.

2003 Board Decision: On March 24, 2003, the Petitioner received written confirmation from the Board that it had voted to grant her a reduced assessment of 150%, formalizing the existing practice for her property.

2017 Assessment Change: On or about December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company advising that the Board had decided to raise her assessment to 200%, citing “advice of counsel.”

Rationale for Increase: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the change but was ultimately informed that the Board determined all plats needed to be assessed uniformly according to the Association’s governing documents. She was also told that to be assessed as a single lot, she would need to formally combine the lots on the county plat map, a process estimated to cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the community.

IV. Respondent’s Position

The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association declined to present witnesses or exhibits. Its position at the hearing was that the dispute arose from differing interpretations of the language within the governing Bylaws. The Association’s counsel stated that the matter would be resolved based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant governing texts.

V. Analysis of Governing Documents

The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978.

Document Section

Key Provision

Relevance to the Case

Bylaws Article I, Section 5

Defines a “Lot” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties.”

This established that the Petitioner’s two properties, being separately numbered on the subdivision map, constitute two distinct lots for assessment purposes.

Bylaws Article IV, Section 6

“Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”

This clause was central to the Judge’s decision. It establishes a clear mandate for uniformity in assessments across all lots of the same type (CR-1), which the 150% rate violated by treating two CR-1 lots differently from others.

Bylaws Article IV, Section 7

States the Board of Directors shall “fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot.”

This empowers the Board to set assessments but reinforces that they must do so on a per-lot basis, consistent with the uniformity requirement.

VI. Judge’s Findings and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge made the following key determinations, leading to the denial of the petition:

Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated community documents or Arizona statutes.

Undisputed Material Facts: The Judge found it undisputed that:

1. The Petitioner owns two distinct CR-1 lots (Lot 156 and Lot 157).

2. The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map.

3. The Petitioner’s residence is constructed across both lots.

Primacy of Governing Documents: The central conclusion of the decision was that the Association’s governing documents supersede any past Board decisions or long-standing informal agreements. The Judge stated:

Uniformity is Mandatory: The Bylaws require that the Association assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was found to be complying with the Declaration.

Board’s Action as Corrective: The 2017 Board’s action was not a breach of contract or an unlawful act. Instead, it was an appropriate correction of the previous Board’s 2003 order, which was inconsistent with the Bylaws’ uniformity mandate. The Petitioner’s argument that the 2003 order should supersede the 2017 order was deemed inaccurate.

VII. Final Order

Based on the findings and legal conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

The decision affirmed that the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803) or the Association’s Bylaws.

Study Guide: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

This guide reviews the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling in the administrative hearing case No. 19F-H1918017-REL, Loraine Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in the hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Office of Administrative Hearings?

3. What specific action taken by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file her petition?

4. Describe the assessment practice that the Sin Vacas Board had in place for the Petitioner’s property from 2003 until the change in 2017.

5. What was the Association’s stated reason for increasing the Petitioner’s assessment from 150% to 200%?

6. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what is the rule for how special assessments must be fixed and apportioned?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge determine that the Petitioner owned two separate lots?

8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and did the Petitioner successfully meet it?

9. Why did the Judge rule that the 2003 Board Order reducing the Petitioner’s assessment was not a binding contract?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Loraine Brokaw, the Petitioner, who brought the action, and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

2. The Petitioner requested that the Association’s Board be compelled to honor the 30-year assessment schedule and charge her the 150% assessment rate. She also requested that the Board reimburse her for the costs of bringing the petition.

3. The Petitioner filed her petition after receiving a letter on or about December 4, 2017, from the Association’s management company. This letter advised her that the Board had decided to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% based on “advice of counsel.”

4. Beginning in 2003, the Association assessed a home on a single lot at 100%, an undeveloped vacant lot at 25%, and a residence spanning two lots, like the Petitioner’s, at 150%. The Petitioner received written confirmation of her reduced 150% assessment from the Board on March 24, 2003.

5. The Association’s Board increased the assessment after determining that all plats needed to be assessed uniformly, per the Association’s Restatement. The increase was meant to bring her two lots into compliance with the governing documents.

6. Bylaws Article IV, Section 6 states that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”

7. The Judge’s conclusion was based on the undisputed fact that the Petitioner’s two properties, Lots 156 and 157, have never been officially combined or consolidated into a single numbered lot on the Pima County Assessor’s Office plat map.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means proving a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof.

9. The Judge ruled that the 2003 Board Order was not a binding contract because the Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association. Therefore, the Association’s governing documents took precedence over the informal agreement.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge concluded that the Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate state statutes or the Association’s Bylaws.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Discuss the hierarchy of authority between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) and a Board Order, as interpreted in this case.

2. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” in the context of this hearing. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard lead to the denial of her petition?

3. The Petitioner’s case relied heavily on past practice and a 2003 Board decision to grant her a reduced assessment. Discuss why this argument was ultimately insufficient to overcome the explicit language of the Association’s governing documents.

4. Examine the contractual nature of a homeowners’ association’s CC&Rs as described in the Findings of Fact. How does this contractual relationship between the Association and each property owner shape the obligations and rights of both parties?

5. The Respondent (Sin Vacas POA) declined to present witnesses or exhibits, taking a passive stance at the hearing. Discuss the potential legal strategy behind this approach and how the undisputed material facts of the case made this a viable option.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders.

Association

The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, a homeowners’ association for the Sin Vacas subdivision in Tucson, Arizona, responsible for managing, maintaining, and improving the property.

Assessment

A fee levied by the Association on property owners to promote the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of residents and for the improvement and maintenance of common areas and private streets.

Bylaws

The specific articles and sections within the CC&Rs that govern the Association’s operations, including definitions, assessment rules, and voting procedures.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents for the Association, recorded with Pima County on April 13, 1978. They form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties, with the exception of the Common Area. This case deals specifically with CR-1 lots.

OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)

An independent state agency to which the Department refers matters for evidentiary hearings. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret contracts between parties.

Petitioner

Loraine Brokaw, a property owner in the Sin Vacas subdivision and member of the Association who filed the petition against the Association.

Planned Community

A real estate development where owners of separately owned lots are mandatory members of a nonprofit association and are required to pay assessments for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win her case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the greater weight of evidence.

Respondent

The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the entity against whom the petition was filed.

Select all sources
698354.pdf

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19F-H1918017-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner challenged the Association’s decision to raise her annual assessment, arguing that the increase was arbitrary and contravened a decades-long practice of assessing her two lots at a combined 150% rate, rather than the new 200% rate. The decision outlines the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, confirming that the Association is governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Bylaws, which require uniform assessment rates for all developed lots. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated any community documents or statutes, reasoning that the governing documents take precedence over any prior informal agreement, and denied the Petitioner’s request.

1 source

What was the core legal basis for rejecting the petitioner’s assessment challenge?
How did the Association’s governing documents dictate uniform assessment requirements?
What legal implications arose from the Board’s decision to change long-standing practice?

Based on 1 source

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Loraine Brokaw (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jason Smith (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
  • Sean Moynihan (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Robert Brokaw (witness)
    Observed the hearing
  • Jack Juraco (witness)
    Observed the hearing

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

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  • 33
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Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

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  • 20
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 38
  • 61
  • 73
  • 74
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Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 7
  • 32
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  • 37
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Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:31 (102.8 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:35 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:39 (144.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Venue and Adjudication:

Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.

Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.

How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-09
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla Counsel
Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.

Why this result: Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.

Key Issues & Findings

Vote count required to amend declaration

Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions

Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.

Orders: Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

Unauthorized fines in excess of $50

Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA elections, absentee ballots, waiver doctrine, amendment procedure, fines
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673729.pdf

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18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673828.pdf

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Briefing Document: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Scott S. Servilla versus the Village of Oakcreek Association. The final order, issued on January 9, 2019, following a rehearing, denied the petitioner’s claims. The central issue revolved around a homeowners association vote held on November 10, 2016, where two distinct amendments—one concerning property leasing and another a schedule of fines—were combined into a single item on the ballot.

The petitioner argued this ballot format violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. However, the ALJ’s decision did not rule on the merits of this statutory violation. Instead, the petition was denied based on the legal doctrine of waiver. The ALJ concluded that the petitioner, having received the allegedly defective ballot more than a month before the vote, had forfeited his right to challenge the procedure by failing to raise any objection until after the vote was completed and the unfavorable outcome was known. The decision heavily relies on the precedent set by the Arizona Supreme Court in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, which established that a party cannot knowingly allow a flawed election to proceed and then protest only after receiving an undesirable result. The ALJ’s decision is binding, with any appeal required to be filed in superior court.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was a dispute brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the validity of an amendment to the association’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla

Respondent

Village of Oakcreek Association

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

November 29, 2018

Record Held Open Until

December 20, 2018

Decision Issued

January 9, 2019

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Petition: On or about November 13, 2017, Scott S. Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Village of Oakcreek Association, an HOA with 2436 homeowners.

2. Expansion of Claims: The petitioner initially filed a single-issue petition with a $500 fee but was ordered by the ALJ to either specify the single issue or pay for a multi-issue hearing. The petitioner paid an additional $1,000 and proceeded with three distinct claims.

3. First ALJ Decision: Following an initial hearing, the ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove two of his three claims. On the second claim—the improper ballot format—the judge found a statutory violation had occurred but concluded that “because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism to the Administrative Law Judge, no remedy could be ordered.”

4. Request for Rehearing: The petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing that the conclusion of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

5. Rehearing Granted: On or about September 21, 2018, the Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing, which was held on November 29, 2018.

III. The Central Dispute: The November 10, 2016 Vote

The core of the dispute was the validity of a vote taken during a Special Meeting of Members on November 10, 2016.

Bundled Amendments: The vote’s stated purpose was to approve the “Leasing and Schedule of Fines Assessment.” This single proposal combined two separate and substantive changes to the Master Declaration:

1. Addition of Section 4.23: Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations, which established a minimum lease term of 30 days and prohibited leasing less than an entire unit.

2. Replacement of Section 5.08: Schedule of Fines, which permitted the association’s committee to adopt a new schedule specifying fines for violations.

Ballot Format: The absentee ballot provided members with only a single voting choice: “FOR THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

Statutory Violation Alleged: The petitioner contended this format violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires that a ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

Vote Outcome: A total of 1,067 ballots were received (approximately 44% of members). Of those, 564 voted in favor of the amendment, constituting approximately 53% of the votes cast.

IV. Key Arguments at Rehearing

Statutory Violation: The ballot was legally defective because it combined two distinct proposed actions into one vote, denying members the right to vote on each separately as required by statute.

Evidence of Dissent: The petitioner argued that a subsequent vote in April 2017, in which members rejected a proposal to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limit, demonstrated that “had the proposed amendment been broken into two parts, the part of the proposed amendment dealing with the fines most likely would have failed.”

Requested Remedy: The petitioner argued that based on case law, the ALJ was authorized to declare the entire amendment void and unenforceable.

Waiver of Objection: The respondent’s primary argument was that the petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot format. The petitioner received the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, but did not raise an objection until April 2017, long after the November 10, 2016 vote was completed.

Lack of Enforcement Provision: The respondent also maintained its earlier position that even if a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) occurred, the statute itself provides no enforcement mechanism or remedy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s final decision denied the petitioner’s petition in its entirety, based solely on the legal principle of waiver.

The ALJ found that the petitioner’s failure to object to the ballot’s format in a timely manner was fatal to his claim.

Awareness of Defect: The petitioner received the absentee ballot on October 4, 2016, over a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This provided sufficient time to identify the procedural issue and raise an objection.

Failure to Act: By not objecting before the vote, the petitioner allowed the flawed process to proceed. He only lodged a complaint after the results were not in his favor.

Forfeiture of Rights: The ALJ concluded, “As Petitioner was or should have been aware of the alleged issues with the ballot, he waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot when he allowed the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016.”

The decision rested on the Arizona Supreme Court case Zajac v. City of Casa Grande (2004), which itself relied on Allen v. State (1913). This precedent establishes that a party cannot remain silent about a known procedural defect in an election process and then challenge the process only after an unfavorable outcome.

Key Principle: The ALJ articulated the principle from Zajac: “one cannot knowingly let a defective vote proceed only to complain and seek redress if the results are not to the individual’s liking.”

Direct Quotation: The decision directly quotes the ruling in Zajac to finalize its point: “He cannot have it both ways; that is, he cannot allow the [vote] to proceed without objection, and then be permitted thereafter to assert his protest.”

Petition Denied: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

Binding Decision: As the decision was issued as a result of a rehearing, it is legally binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served (January 9, 2019).

Study Guide: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case involving Petitioner Scott Servilla and Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of January 9, 2019. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based entirely on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what roles did they play?

2. What were the two distinct proposed changes that were combined into a single voting item on the November 10, 2016 absentee ballot?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute did the Petitioner allege was violated by the format of the ballot, and what does that statute require?

4. What was the numerical outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote on the proposed amendment?

5. What was the Respondent’s primary legal argument for why the Petitioner’s complaint about the faulty ballot should be dismissed?

6. What key legal precedent, specifically the case of Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rely upon in the final decision?

7. According to the decision, when did the Petitioner receive the ballot, and why was this date critical to the ALJ’s final ruling?

8. What was the finding in the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision regarding the ballot issue, and why did it lead to a request for a rehearing?

9. Describe the separate vote that occurred in April 2017 and explain how the Petitioner used it to support his argument regarding the 2016 vote.

10. What was the final order issued by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on January 9, 2019, and what was the legal basis for this order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Scott S. Servilla (who appeared on his own behalf), and the Respondent, the Village of Oakcreek Association (a homeowners association represented by Mark Sahl). The Petitioner filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. The two proposed changes were the addition of a new section, 4.23, concerning “Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations,” and the complete replacement of an existing section, 5.08, titled “Schedule of Fines.” The ballot presented these as a single item called the “LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) and A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2). The statute requires that an absentee ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

4. A total of 1067 ballots were received, representing approximately 44 percent of the members. Of those who voted, 564 (approximately 53 percent) voted in favor of the proposed amendment.

5. The Respondent’s primary argument was that the Petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot’s format. The Respondent contended that the Petitioner should have raised his objection before the vote occurred, rather than waiting until after the results were known.

6. The ALJ relied on the precedent set in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande. This Arizona Supreme Court case established the principle that an individual aware of a procedural issue with an election cannot wait to see the results before lodging a complaint.

7. The Petitioner acknowledged receiving the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, more than a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This date was critical because it demonstrated that the Petitioner had ample time to object to the ballot’s format before the vote took place, supporting the ALJ’s waiver finding.

8. In the initial decision, the ALJ found that a violation of the statute had occurred regarding the ballot but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute lacked an enforcement mechanism. The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging that this conclusion was contrary to the law and that the ALJ did have the authority to declare the amendment void.

9. In April 2017, a separate proposed amendment to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limitation was voted down by the members. The Petitioner argued this subsequent vote demonstrated that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if members had been given a separate opportunity to vote on it.

10. The final order, issued January 9, 2019, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The legal basis was the doctrine of waiver; the ALJ ruled that because the Petitioner was aware of the alleged issues with the ballot before the vote and failed to object, he waived his right to complain about it after the results were announced.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses based on the details and legal reasoning presented in the source documents.

1. Explain the legal doctrine of waiver as applied in this case. How did the timeline of events, from the receipt of the ballot to the filing of the petition, support the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande?

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of “proposed action” under A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Although the Judge ultimately ruled on procedural grounds, which party’s interpretation of the statute appears more consistent with the law’s text and intent?

3. Discuss the procedural history of this case, from the initial filing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate through the first decision, the request for reconsideration, and the final ruling on rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the administrative hearing process and the remedies available to petitioners?

4. The Petitioner attempted to use the results of an April 2017 vote to argue that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if voted on separately. Evaluate the strength and relevance of this argument within the legal context of the case.

5. Imagine the Petitioner had raised his objection to the ballot format before the November 10, 2016 vote. Based on the information in the decision, how might the proceedings and the ultimate outcome have been different?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The Petitioner alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 and § 33-1812.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at a meeting. The format of this ballot was the central issue of the rehearing.

By-Laws

The rules that govern the internal operations of an association. The Petitioner cited a violation of By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII concerning a $50 fine limit.

Department (The Department)

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner first filed his petition against the homeowners association.

Master Declaration

A core governing document for a homeowners association that establishes rules, restrictions, and obligations for homeowners. The November 10, 2016 vote was to amend this document.

A formal, binding decision issued by a judge. The final document in this case was an order denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Scott Servilla & Heidi H. Servilla.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence offered in opposition.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case granted to reconsider the initial decision. A rehearing was granted after the Petitioner argued that the initial finding of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Village of Oakcreek Association.

Waiver

A legal doctrine where a party intentionally or through inaction gives up a known right or claim. The ALJ ruled the Petitioner waived his right to object to the ballot by not raising the issue before the vote.

Zajac v. City of Casa Grande

An Arizona Supreme Court case that established a key legal precedent used in this decision. It holds that a party cannot knowingly allow a defective vote to proceed and then complain only if the results are unfavorable.

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This document summarizes the administrative law judge decision in the rehearing case of Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association, Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG1. This matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on November 29, 2018, with the record held open until December 20, 20181.

Procedural History (Original Decision vs. Rehearing)

Petitioner Scott Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) against the Village of Oakcreek Association (Respondent) alleging multiple violations of statute and the community’s Master Declaration2,3.

Original Decision: The Administrative Law Judge initially ruled on three issues4. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to prove two claims5. However, the ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) regarding the written ballot, but concluded that because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism, no remedy could be ordered5.

Rehearing Grant: Following this initial decision, Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing the conclusion that no remedy existed was contrary to law6. The ADRE Commissioner granted the request for rehearing6.

Key Facts and Issue for Rehearing

The central issue during the rehearing concerned the statutory violation found in the original decision: whether the November 10, 2016 vote to amend the Master Declaration was invalid because the absentee ballot failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)4,7.

The Ballot Violation: A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) requires that absentee ballots set forth “each proposed action” and provide an opportunity to vote for or against “each proposed action”7. The Respondent’s proposed amendment bundled two distinct actions: the addition of leasing restrictions and the complete replacement of the Schedule of Fines8,9,10. The ballot only allowed members to vote “FOR” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” as a single package9.

Key Legal Argument and Decision

At the rehearing, the core legal debate shifted from whether a violation occurred to whether the Petitioner was entitled to relief, specifically whether the ALJ could declare the amendment void and unenforceable6,11.

Respondent’s Defense and the Doctrine of Waiver: Respondent argued that Petitioner had waived the right to object because he did not raise any complaint about the defective ballot prior to the vote12. Petitioner received the ballot more than one month before the November 10, 2016 vote13.

ALJ Legal Conclusion: Drawing on Arizona Supreme Court precedent (Zajac v. City of Casa Grande)10,14, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that an individual cannot allow a known defective vote to proceed and only complain afterward if dissatisfied with the results15,16. Because Petitioner failed to raise an objection to the faulty ballot prior to the scheduled vote, he waived his right to bring a subsequent complaint about the ballot16.

Based on the application of the waiver doctrine, the ALJ found that Petitioner’s claim as to the ballot must fail16. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner’s petition is denied17. This order, resulting from the rehearing, is binding on the parties17.

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“violation(s)”: “Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and Declaration regarding the required majority vote (1173 votes) for the November 10, 2016 amendment.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
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“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-002”,
“type”: “statute”,
“citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“caption”: “Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions”,
“violation(s)”: “The written ballot used for the November 10, 2016 amendment violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) and (B)(2) because it bundled two distinct proposed actions (Leasing Restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by receiving it over a month prior and allowing the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016, without raising a complaint.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
]
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-003”,
“type”: “governing_document”,
“citation”: “By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII”,
“caption”: “Unauthorized fines in excess of $50”,
“violation(s)”: “Respondent allegedly violated By-Laws by imposing fines in excess of $50 per violation, especially after a proposed amendment to raise the fines was voted down.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
}
],
“money_summary”: {
“issues_count”: 3,
“total_filing_fees_paid”: 1500.0,
“total_filing_fees_refunded”: 0.0,
“total_civil_penalties”: 0.0
},
“outcomes”: {
“petitioner_is_hoa”: false,
“petitioner_win”: “loss”,
“summarize_judgement”: “The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”
]
},
“analytics”: {
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
],
“tags”: [
“HOA elections”,
“absentee ballots”,
“waiver doctrine”,
“amendment procedure”,
“fines”
]
}
}

{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”,
“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“decision_date”: “2019-01-09”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
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},
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},
{
“name”: “Heidi H Servilla”,
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},
{
“name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”,
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“notes”: “Administrative Law Judge [3], [4], [1], [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
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“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
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},
{
“name”: “Judy Lowe”,
“role”: “commissioner”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Granted the request for rehearing [5]”
},
{
“name”: “c. serrano”,
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“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on November 29, 2018 [6], [7]”
},
{
“name”: “Felicia Del Sol”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on January 9, 2019 [8]”
},
{
“name”: “LDettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “ncano”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
}
]
}

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Scott Servilla (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla
  • Heidi H Servilla (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted documents

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:16:51 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

Select all sources
703187.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

1 source

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
    Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate