Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:22 (95.4 KB)

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:39 (95.4 KB)

Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.

The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.

Case Background

Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.

Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.

Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.

The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.

Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1

The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:

Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)

Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.

Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.

Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”

Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)

The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.

Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.

Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.

Legal Standards Applied

Standard

Description

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Covenant Interpretation

In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.

Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation

The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:

• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.

Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction

The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.

• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

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Review Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?

3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?

4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?

5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?

6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?

7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?

8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?

9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?

10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.

2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.

3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.

4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.

5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.

8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.

1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?

2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.

3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?

5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Declaratory Judgment

A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.

Waiver

The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.

Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons

The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.

Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation

Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.

This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:

“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.

Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase

In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The court defined this standard as:

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”

The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.

Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door

The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.

The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.

The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:

“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.

Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner

Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.

While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wendy Ellsworth (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Brian Hatch (petitioner attorney)
    Brian A. Hatch PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times

Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 816310.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:18 (199.6 KB)

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 847175.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:21 (246.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision in the case of Debra K. Morin versus the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), dated January 8, 2021. The central dispute involved a homeowner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain its common areas in good condition and repair.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petitioner’s case, finding conclusively in favor of the Solera HOA. The decision rested on a critical provision within the association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which designates the Solera Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas. This clause grants the Board exclusive discretion, superseding an individual homeowner’s opinion on the timing or quality of maintenance.

Despite the petitioner presenting extensive photographic evidence documenting various maintenance issues, the ALJ concluded that this evidence failed to prove a violation of the governing documents. The petitioner did not meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had acted outside its granted authority. The ruling affirms that the authority of the Board is explicitly elevated above that of an individual homeowner in matters of common area maintenance under the controlling legal documents.

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I. Case Background and Procedural History

The case originates from a petition filed by Debra K. Morin, a four-year resident of the Solera community, against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Tribunal).

A. Initial Petition

On March 12, 2020, Ms. Morin filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company (Premier) had violated numerous governing documents, including the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules & Regulations (R&Rs).

Issue #1: Alleged that Solera did not permit “direct communication from homeowners” and sought to have this “policy” rescinded.

Issue #2: Alleged that Solera was not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in “good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included uncontrolled weeds and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other common areas.

B. Procedural Developments

Motion to Dismiss: Solera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the issues were outside the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction.

Withdrawal of Issue #1: At a May 20, 2020 hearing, the Tribunal noted its jurisdiction did not extend to non-governing documents like the Board’s Code of Ethics. Consequently, Ms. Morin withdrew Issue #1. The Tribunal denied the Motion to Dismiss for the remaining “bare-bones” maintenance allegation in Issue #2.

Initial Decision (August 19, 2020): Following the original hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Solera was the “sole judge” regarding maintenance of the AREAS and had not violated its governing documents. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Request (September 24, 2020): Ms. Morin filed a request for rehearing, citing irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and arguing the decision was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Rehearing Granted and Conducted: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing, which was conducted telephonically on December 16, 2020.

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II. Core Arguments of the Parties

The fundamental conflict centered on the interpretation of the maintenance standards outlined in the community’s CC&Rs.

A. Petitioner’s Position (Debra K. Morin)

Ms. Morin’s case was built on the principle of equal application of maintenance standards.

Central Argument: The same maintenance standard requiring homeowners to keep their lots “in good condition and repair at all times” (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2) must be applied equally to Solera’s responsibility for the common AREAS (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1).

Core Belief: Because homeowners are given no discretion regarding delays in maintenance, Solera should not be able to take months to address reported issues.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted extensive documentation, including over 80 photographs (referenced in the rehearing as “310 pictures”), emails, and other documents. This evidence was intended to show persistent maintenance failures, including:

◦ Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations

◦ Poor exterior condition of the Community Center

◦ Deficiencies in street asphalt, storm drains, sidewalks, and curbing

◦ Water pooling and intrusion issues

◦ Exposed landscaping lights and irrigation lines

◦ Unremoved tree stumps

B. Respondent’s Position (Solera HOA)

Solera’s defense relied entirely on the specific authority granted to its Board by the governing documents.

Central Argument: The association met its responsibilities, and the petitioner’s subjective opinions about what, when, or how maintenance should be done are irrelevant.

Dispositive Legal Provision: Solera consistently cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”

Interpretation: This provision grants the Board exclusive discretion and authority to determine the nature and timing of maintenance, insulating its decisions from a single homeowner’s critique.

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III. Analysis and Key Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

The Rehearing Decision provided a thorough review of the evidence and legal arguments, ultimately reinforcing the original ruling in favor of Solera.

A. The “Sole Judge” Clause and Board Authority

The ALJ’s conclusion hinged on the unambiguous language of the CC&Rs, which establishes a clear hierarchy of authority.

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1: This article was identified as the dispositive text. It states, in pertinent part: “the Board ‘shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS], but all [AREAS], and the Improvements located thereon, shall be maintained in good condition and repair at all times.'” The ALJ found that the “sole judge” provision grants the Board exclusive authority to determine how the “good condition and repair” standard is met.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5: This section further strengthens the Board’s position by granting Solera the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with its interpretation being “final, conclusive and binding.”

Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ concluded that these provisions clearly lift the Board’s authority above that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance.

B. Rejection of the “Equal Standard” Argument

The petitioner’s primary argument for an equal, non-discretionary standard for both the HOA and homeowners was explicitly rejected.

• The ALJ found that the petitioner “failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard is required to be applied to the Board as it is applied to a homeowner.”

• The governing documents themselves create different levels of authority and obligation for the Board versus individual owners.

C. Evaluation of Evidence and Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterates that the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Photographic Evidence: The ALJ acknowledged reviewing all photographs from both hearings. The decision states that this evidence successfully documented “the existence, at those dates embedded in the photographs, of items that deal with maintenance and repairs in various locations of Solera AREAS.”

Failure to Prove a Violation: Crucially, while the photos proved maintenance issues existed, they did not prove a violation of the CC&Rs. Because the Board is the “sole judge,” the existence of a weed or a cracked curb does not automatically constitute a breach of its duties, as the Board retains discretion over the timeline and method of repair.

D. Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision affirmed the Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction, noting that many of the petitioner’s underlying frustrations were not legally actionable in this venue.

Not Actionable: A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with the Board, its management company, or the General Manager is “not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

Irrelevant Documents: Arguments based on City of Chandler standards, the landscaping contract with Integrated Landscape Management (ILM), or Premier’s General Manager job description were deemed irrelevant, as the Tribunal’s review is limited to the association’s governing documents and applicable state statutes.

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IV. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on an exhaustive review of the record from both the original hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Finding: The petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The ALJ concluded that Solera is in compliance with its governing documents, including CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Order:

IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

◦ The order was issued on January 8, 2021.

◦ As a decision issued after a rehearing, the order is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative rehearing case No. 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG, between Petitioner Debra K. Morin and Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms derived from the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and who represented them at the telephonic hearing on December 16, 2020?

2. What were the two initial issues Petitioner Debra K. Morin raised in her petition filed on March 12, 2020?

3. Why did the Petitioner withdraw Issue #1 from her petition during the May 20, 2020 hearing?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?

5. What type of evidence did the Petitioner primarily present to document the alleged maintenance failures in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?

6. What specific clause in the CC&Rs did Solera (the Respondent) rely on to defend its actions and decisions regarding maintenance?

7. What were the primary reasons the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the relevance of non-governing documents, such as the City of Chandler ordinances and the Premier Management Company job description?

9. What is the legal standard of proof that a petitioner must meet in these proceedings, and how is it defined in the decision?

10. What was the final conclusion and order of the Administrative Law Judge in the Rehearing Decision issued on January 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Debra K. Morin, who represented herself, and the Respondent, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association (Solera). Solera was represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Issue #1 alleged that Solera did not allow direct communication from homeowners. Issue #2 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company were not providing proper oversight to maintain the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair.

3. The Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after the Tribunal ruled that the statutory parameters of its jurisdiction did not include the interpretation or application of a non-governing document like the Board’s Code of Ethics. The allegations regarding ethics and mismanagement based on this code were therefore removed from consideration.

4. The Petitioner’s central argument was that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that just as homeowners are required by CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 to maintain their lots in good condition at all times, Solera must be held to the same standard for common AREAS under CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

5. The Petitioner presented an “enormity” of photographic evidence to document the maintenance issues. The decision notes she presented over eighty photographs at the original hearing and an additional “310 pictures” were mentioned in the rehearing, showing weeds, debris, exposed wiring, and other issues at various dates.

6. Solera relied on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states that the Solera Board of Directors “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Solera argued that the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on maintenance were therefore not relevant.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request, which claimed: irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by evidence, or contrary to law.

8. The Judge ruled that such documents were not relevant or justiciable. City standards were not under review, and the management company’s job description and landscape contract were not Solera governing documents, so they could not be used to prove a violation of the association’s governing documents.

9. The petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, and it represents the greater weight of evidence.

10. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The Judge found Solera to be the prevailing party, in compliance with CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, and ordered that the Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the balance of power between a homeowner and an HOA as depicted in this case. Discuss how specific clauses in the CC&Rs, particularly Article 7 (Section 7.1) and Article 9 (Sections 9.5 and 9.9), grant authority to the Board and limit the recourse available to an individual owner within the association’s own framework.

2. Examine the role and limitations of evidence in this administrative hearing. Why was the Petitioner’s photographic evidence, despite its volume, ultimately insufficient to meet the burden of proof? Discuss the distinction made by the Tribunal between evidence of a maintenance issue and evidence of a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued for an equal application of the “maintenance standard” to both homeowners and the HOA, stating “[t]here must be equal consideration to have a valid contract.” Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific language found in the Solera CC&Rs. Is the concept of “equal consideration” legally applicable in the way the Petitioner suggests?

4. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (the Tribunal) in HOA disputes as described in the decision. Explain why the Tribunal could rule on the maintenance of common areas but had to dismiss claims related to the Solera Code of Ethics, City of Chandler ordinances, and Premier Management’s internal documents.

5. Based on the findings of fact, trace the procedural journey of this case from the initial petition to the final rehearing order. Identify the key turning points, such as the Motion to Dismiss and the Order Granting Rehearing, and explain their impact on the scope and outcome of the dispute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact, issues decisions, and conducts rehearings.

Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)

The common areas within the Solera community that the homeowners’ association is responsible for managing and maintaining. This includes landscaping, the Community Center exterior, street conditions, storm drains, sidewalks, walls, and curbing.

Articles of Incorporation

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit A.

By-Laws

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit B.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A primary governing document for the Solera at Springfield Lakes community. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both the homeowners and the association.

Maintenance Standard

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party (in this case, Solera) asking for a petition or case to be dismissed on the grounds that the issues are outside the Department’s jurisdiction or that the requested relief cannot be granted as a matter of law.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in the Solera community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for a petitioner to win in these proceedings. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Premier Management Company (Premier)

The management company hired by the Solera Board of Directors to handle duties including the oversight of a General Manager.

Project Documents

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.37 as the CC&Rs, any supplements to the CC&Rs, the By-Laws, the Rules and Regulations (R&Rs), and the Design Guidelines.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit D.

Tribunal

A term used to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the body responsible for conducting administrative hearings for disputes referred by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

🧑‍⚖️

20F-H2020051-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision regarding a dispute between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner initially filed a two-issue complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the HOA had violated various governing documents, primarily concerning lack of direct homeowner communication and a failure to maintain Association Responsibility Areas (AREAS) in good condition. After the first issue was withdrawn due to jurisdictional limitations, the initial decision dismissed the petition, finding the HOA was the sole judge of appropriate maintenance under the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This rehearing decision, granted due to claims of procedural irregularities and arbitrary findings, ultimately reaffirms the original dismissal, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the governing documents.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
  • Denise Frazier (general manager/witness)
    Premier Management Company / Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
    Solera's onsite general manager who testified

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative)
    Transmitted the original August 19, 2020 Decision

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed after rehearing because Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner continually refused Respondent access to his locked back yard for landscaping maintenance, and the CC&Rs requiring landscaping do not mandate pool maintenance.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation due to refusal of access to the back yard and misinterpretation of CC&R obligations regarding pool maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020 and acting in bad faith, asserting that pool/hardscape maintenance was included in landscaping duties, and requesting the maximum fine. Respondent countered that they consistently maintained the front yard but were denied access to the locked backyard due to Petitioner's pool liability concerns.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed/denied as Petitioner failed to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Respondent was ordered, going forward, to communicate the days and times they will be performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner can provide access.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Duties, Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, CC&Rs, Access Refusal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:27 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:33 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:32 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:36 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:21 (124.1 KB)

Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the scope of landscaping maintenance obligations as defined by the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duties under CC&Rs § 5.1 by not maintaining his property’s unique landscaping, which he argued included replenishing rock, staining paths, and servicing his swimming pool and associated hardscape. He further claimed the HOA was acting in bad faith and failing to comply with a previous court ruling.

The Respondent countered that it had consistently performed standard landscaping on the Petitioner’s front yard since January 2020. However, it was repeatedly denied access to the backyard, a fact the Petitioner admitted, citing liability concerns due to his pool. The HOA provided evidence of multiple attempts to access the yard and testimony that its maintenance duties are uniform across the community and do not include “concierge” services or pool maintenance.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the petition in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision rested on two key points: 1) The Petitioner failed to provide access to the area in question, preventing the HOA from performing its duties. 2) The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the term “landscaping” under the CC&Rs could be reasonably interpreted to include swimming pool maintenance. This conclusion was strongly supported by the separate licensing classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pool service (R-6) issued by the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, which establishes them as distinct services under state regulation.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Personnel

Name/Entity

Affiliation / Title

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Homeowner, 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

Respondent Counsel

Nicole Payne, Esq.

Legal Representative

Respondent Witness

Diana Crites

Owner, Crites and Associates (Property Management Co.)

Respondent Witness

Rian Baas

Owner, Mowtown Landscape (HOA Landscaping Contractor)

Presiding Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Administrative Law Judge

Case Details

Details

Initial Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL

Initial Hearing

August 3, 2020

Initial Decision

August 17, 2020

Rehearing Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG

Rehearing

February 2, 2021

Rehearing Decision

February 12, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict involved the interpretation of the HOA’s maintenance obligations under its governing documents. The Petitioner argued for an expansive definition of “landscaping” that encompassed his entire property exterior, including a swimming pool. The HOA maintained that its duties were limited to standard, uniform landscaping services and that pool maintenance was explicitly excluded. The dispute was compounded by the Petitioner’s refusal to grant the HOA’s landscaper access to his backyard.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition, filed on or about April 21, 2020, and subsequent arguments in two hearings, were based on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA violated § 5.1 of its CC&Rs by failing “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.”

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: As the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the Petitioner contended it should include all types of features outside of structures. His specific demands included:

◦ Maintenance of unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Replenishment of thin or worn-out rock ground cover.

◦ Staining of walking paths.

◦ Full maintenance of his “water feature,” identified as a swimming pool. This included the pump, filter, chemicals, patio, and all related hardscape.

Refusal to Grant Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked.” He stated this was for liability reasons due to the pool and refused access to the HOA’s landscapers. At the rehearing, he argued the HOA failed to communicate its schedule to allow him to provide temporary access.

Budgetary Failure: He asserted that the HOA did not properly budget for the costs associated with maintaining his unique landscaping.

Grounds for Rehearing: After the initial denial, the Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including irregularity in proceedings, errors in evidence admission, and claims of “Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues” related to hearing loss.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a defense centered on its consistent attempts to fulfill its obligations and the Petitioner’s own actions preventing them from doing so.

Consistent Front Yard Maintenance: Both the HOA property manager and its landscaping contractor testified that the Petitioner’s front yard had been continuously maintained since landscaping services began in January 2020.

Denial of Backyard Access: The HOA’s primary defense was that it was physically prevented from servicing the backyard. Evidence presented to support this included:

Testimony from Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): His crews were at the property weekly. Between January and March 2020, he or his crew knocked and left notes or business cards four to five times with no response.

Witness Testimony: In March 2020, a woman at the residence (presumably the Petitioner’s wife) explicitly instructed a landscaper that “she does not want anyone in the back yard because she had a pool and that is the reason for the lock on gate.”

Documentary Evidence: A text message dated March 24, 2020, from Mr. Baas to property manager Diana Crites memorialized this interaction. A photograph of the locked gate was also submitted.

Scope of Services: Ms. Crites testified that HOA landscape services are uniform throughout the community and include front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing in backyards (if access is granted), and sprinkler system upkeep. They do not provide “concierge” services such as maintaining potted plants, driveways, or pools (except for the community pool, which is serviced by a separate contractor).

Access as a Prerequisite: Ms. Crites explained that backyard maintenance is contingent on homeowners leaving their gates unlocked, and some owners choose not to grant access due to pets or other reasons.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s initial petition based on a clear set of facts.

Findings of Fact: The judge found the evidence presented by the Respondent to be credible. The Petitioner’s own admission that he refused to allow access to his backyard since January 2020 was a critical factor. The evidence established that the HOA had consistently maintained the front yard and made multiple, documented attempts to access the backyard.

Conclusions of Law: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.” Because the Petitioner denied access, he could not establish that the Respondent had violated any CC&R.

Rehearing and Final Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner for the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, the judge again reviewed the case and ultimately dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool and hardscape. The Petitioner failed to offer any definition or legal authority to support his expansive interpretation.

Analysis of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the common definitions of “landscaping” from various dictionary and legal sources “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

Arizona Registrar of Contractors (ROC) Licensing: The judge’s conclusion was decisively reinforced by the State of Arizona’s contractor licensing classifications:

◦ The R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license (formerly Landscaping) is for installing garden walls, irrigation, and other landscape features. It specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

◦ The R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license is a separate classification required to service residential pools.

◦ The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services.”

Final Order: The petition was dismissed. The judge noted that because the Petitioner denied access, the Respondent was not in violation. However, the judge provided a forward-looking recommendation: “it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Represented Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
  • Diana Crites (property manager)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent’s property management company; appeared as witness
  • Rian Baas (witness)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Listed as recipient of the decision
  • Luis (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Crew member mentioned in text message regarding attempted access to petitioner's yard
  • Jill (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Printed papers for Luis regarding access to petitioner's yard

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 14.8

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Section 14.8. The provision was determined to be inapplicable, governing the Association’s obligation to provide notice, not the methods homeowners must use to send payments.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. CC&Rs Section 14.8 was inapplicable, and Petitioner's chosen restricted delivery method for assessment payments caused delays, which were not the responsibility of the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 concerning notice obligations.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 by improperly handling or failing to receive his monthly assessment payments, which he sent via restricted delivery to a board member despite receiving instructions to mail payments to the Association's designated P.O. Box address.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • CC&Rs 14.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner assessments, CC&Rs interpretation, restricted delivery, jurisdiction, notice provision, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
  • CC&Rs 14.8
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020049-REL Decision – 861466.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:54 (145.6 KB)

20F-H2020049-REL Decision – 811290.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:59 (131.7 KB)

Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro HOA: Case Analysis and Legal Findings

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative legal case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL). The central dispute arose when Mr. Stoltenberg, a homeowner, was assessed late fees on his monthly dues after unilaterally altering his payment method. He began sending payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific volunteer board member, which resulted in significant processing delays and non-deliveries.

The petitioner alleged the Association was acting in “bad faith” and violating Section 14.8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively found that Section 14.8, which governs notices sent from the Association to its members, was entirely inapplicable to payments sent by a member to the Association. The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions were the direct cause of the payment delays and subsequent late fees.

The petitioner’s initial petition was denied. A subsequent request for rehearing was granted, but the rehearing affirmed the original decision. The ALJ reiterated that the cited CC&R section was inapplicable, noted a lack of jurisdiction over other statutes the petitioner raised, and concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof in either proceeding.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties and Governing Documents

Petitioner: Michael J. Stoltenberg, a condominium owner within the Rancho Del Oro development and a member of the homeowners’ association.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a condominium association in Yuma, Arizona, governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.

Governing Authority: The CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner. The specific provision at the center of the dispute is Section 14.8 of the Bylaws, titled “Notices.” This section has remained unamended since the original CC&Rs were recorded on August 30, 1985.

Initial Petition and Jurisdictional Scope

On March 2, 2020, Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.” The petition cited violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, as well as Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Mr. Stoltenberg sought an order compelling the Association to comply with these regulations and the issuance of a civil penalty.

Upon filing, the Department advised the petitioner that the HOA Dispute Process lacks jurisdiction over disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Consequently, the case was narrowed to a single issue, and the petitioner was assessed a $500 filing fee. The sole issue for the hearing was formally defined as: “Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.”

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

Outcome

March 2, 2020

Petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg.

The case is initiated.

July 14, 2020

Initial evidentiary hearing is held.

Both parties present arguments.

August 3, 2020

Amended ALJ Decision is issued.

The petitioner’s petition is denied.

August 28, 2020

Petitioner submits a rehearing request.

Grounds cited: errors of law and an arbitrary decision.

September 9, 2020

Rehearing request is granted.

A new hearing is scheduled.

February 16, 2021

Rehearing is held.

The same issue is re-examined.

March 8, 2021

Final ALJ Decision is issued.

The petitioner’s petition is denied again; the order is binding.

Factual Analysis of the Dispute

Payment Instructions and Petitioner’s Actions

On January 4, 2016, the petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366. The correspondence explicitly stated, “Please send your payments to the above address.”

Despite these clear instructions, beginning in November 2019, the petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to this P.O. Box via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for pickup by board member Rhea Carlisle only.

The petitioner’s stated rationale for this change was a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company (PMC) had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments. However, the petitioner was aware of several key facts:

• The Association employed a PMC to pick up its mail.

• Ms. Carlisle was an unpaid volunteer board member, not an employee of the PMC.

• Diana Crites was the Association’s listed Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020.

Consequences of Restricted Delivery

The petitioner’s unilateral decision to restrict delivery caused significant disruption to the receipt of his payments. This led to his assessments being recorded as untimely, which in turn resulted in the Association assessing late fees against his account. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence “in danger of foreclosure by the Association.”

A timeline of payment delivery issues presented as evidence includes:

Payment Period

USPS Action

December 2019

Picked up.

January 25, 2020

Returned to petitioner by USPS.

January 30, 2020

Picked up.

February 26, 2020

Picked up.

April 17, 2020

Picked up.

June 8, 2020

Returned to petitioner by USPS.

Legal Rulings and Core Arguments

Central Legal Text: CC&Rs Section 14.8 (“Notices”)

The entire case hinged on the interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws. The text reads:

“Any notice permitted or required by this Declaration or the Bylaws may be delivered either personally or by mail. If delivery is by mail, it shall be deemed to have been delivered seventy-two (72) hours after a copy of the same has been deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to each person at the current address given by such person to the secretary of the Board or addressed to the Unit of such person if no address has been given to the secretary.”

ALJ’s Interpretation: In both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, the ALJ found the language of Section 14.8 to be clear, “neither vague nor ambiguous,” and definitively inapplicable to the case. The ruling stated that the “language of Section 14.8 speaks specifically to the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information. Section 14.8 has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.”

Arguments Presented

• He had always technically mailed his monthly payments on time to the correct P.O. Box.

• He filed the petition out of concern over incurring late fees and the potential loss of his home.

• During the rehearing, he argued that the initial decision failed to properly interpret Section 14.8 and should have also applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842 (concerning standards of conduct for nonprofit officers).

• Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was entirely inapplicable to the facts presented, as it governs the Association’s outbound notice obligations, not a member’s inbound payments.

• The Department and the Office of Administrative Hearings lack jurisdiction under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT.

• The petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof required to show a violation.

Final Conclusions and Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were definitive. The core conclusions of law were as follows:

1. Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the CC&Rs and failed to meet this burden.

2. Inapplicability of CC&Rs Section 14.8: The provision cited by the petitioner was found to be wholly irrelevant to the matter of a homeowner mailing payments to the Association.

3. Assignment of Responsibility: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner’s own choices were the cause of the issue. The decision states, “By restricting the delivery of his monthly assessment payments, Petitioner inadvertently caused delay in their ability to be picked up by the Association.” There was “no credible evidence in the record to suggest that the action(s) Petitioner volitionally took are Respondent’s responsibility.”

4. Rehearing Findings: In the final decision, the ALJ noted that the petitioner “did not introduce any evidence tending to suggest that there was an ‘error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law…'” or that the prior decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Final Order: Based on the foregoing, the ALJ ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied. The order issued on March 8, 2021, was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, procedures, and outcomes presented in the official decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided legal documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what was their relationship to one another?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Petitioner take regarding his monthly assessment payments starting in November 2019?

4. According to the Association, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs not applicable to the Petitioner’s complaint?

5. What were the negative consequences the Petitioner faced as a result of his payments being received late by the Association?

6. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did the judge find he had met it?

7. What were the two grounds upon which the Petitioner requested a rehearing after the initial decision?

8. Why was the Petitioner’s citation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) § 10-3842 dismissed during the proceedings?

9. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on March 08, 2021, following the rehearing?

10. After the final order was issued, what was the Petitioner’s sole remaining avenue for appeal?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J Stoltenberg, the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Stoltenberg was a condominium owner and a member of the Association, which governed the residential development where he lived.

2. In his petition filed on March 2, 2020, Stoltenberg alleged the Association violated Section 14.8 of its CC&Rs and Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801. He specifically claimed the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to the Association’s P.O. Box via restricted delivery from the United States Postal Service. He specified that the mail was for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only, despite knowing she was a volunteer and not an employee of the property management company that handled mail.

4. The Association argued that Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was inapplicable because it governs the Association’s notice obligations to its members. The judge agreed, stating the section has no binding authority over how homeowners send mail to the Association.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence in danger of foreclosure.

6. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing the contention is more probably true than not. The judge concluded in both decisions that the Petitioner failed to sustain this burden of proof.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding” and because “[t]he findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

8. The citation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations, was dismissed because it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate’s HOA Dispute Process. The Petitioner was advised of these jurisdictional limitations when he filed his petition.

9. The final ruling issued on March 8, 2021, denied the Petitioner’s petition once again. The judge affirmed the original findings, concluding there was no violation of Section 14.8 and that the Petitioner had not introduced any evidence to support his grounds for a rehearing.

10. After the final order resulting from the rehearing, the Petitioner’s only remaining recourse was to seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal had to be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Formulate a comprehensive essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and details from the source documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark in her interpretation of Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs. Explain why this section was deemed inapplicable to the Petitioner’s situation and how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome in both the hearing and rehearing.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required, and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this standard in the judgment of the court.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, starting from the initial petition. Detail the key dates, filings (petition, answer, rehearing request), hearings, and decisions, explaining the significance of each step in the administrative legal process from March 2020 to March 2021.

4. Examine the actions of the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, beginning in November 2019. Evaluate his rationale for unilaterally changing his payment method, the specific steps he took, and how his choices directly led to the late fees and risk of foreclosure he sought to avoid.

5. Explain the roles and jurisdictional limitations of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in this dispute. Why were certain statutes cited by the Petitioner, such as those under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT., dismissed by the court as being outside its purview?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues decisions for state agencies.

Answer

The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on March 24, 2020, denying all items in the Petitioner’s complaint.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings regarding disputes within homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Specific statutes were cited by the Petitioner and referenced by the court.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association responsible for governing the real estate development and enforcing its CC&Rs.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The governing body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

An acronym for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the judge’s decision that details the factual background, procedural history, and evidence presented during the hearing.

Hearing

A formal proceeding before an administrative law judge where parties present evidence and arguments. In this case, hearings were held on July 14, 2020, and February 16, 2021.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Department’s jurisdiction was limited and did not extend to disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency that provides administrative law judges to conduct hearings for other state agencies, ensuring impartiality.

The final, binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the order was to deny the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg.

Petition

The formal legal document filed by the Petitioner on March 2, 2020, to initiate the hearing process with the Department.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to a party to re-examine the issues of a case, typically requested on grounds of legal error or an unjust decision. The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restricted Delivery

A service offered by the United States Postal Service (USPS) that ensures mail is delivered only to a specific addressee or their authorized agent.

Statutory Agent

An individual or entity designated to receive legal notices and service of process on behalf of a corporation or association. For the Association, this was Diana Crites.

Select all sources
811290.pdf
861466.pdf

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20F-H2020049-REL-RHG

2 sources

These documents contain the Administrative Law Judge Decisions stemming from a dispute between a homeowner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association regarding the timely delivery of monthly assessment payments. The initial decision in August 2020 denied the homeowner’s petition, finding that the Association did not violate Section 14.8 of the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), as that provision governs the Association’s notice obligation to members, not homeowners’ mail to the Association. Following a granted request for rehearing due to alleged errors of law, the subsequent March 2021 decision affirmed the original ruling, concluding that the homeowner’s self-imposed restriction on mail delivery caused the delays and that the relevant CC&R section was inapplicable to the petitioner’s complaint. Both decisions noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction over one of the statutes cited by the petitioner.

2 sources

What were the legal and procedural reasons for granting the rehearing request?
How did the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8 resolve the core dispute?
What was the Petitioner’s basis for claiming a violation against the Association?

Based on 2 sources

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Appeared telephonically for Respondent
  • Rhea Carlisle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Unpaid volunteer board member
  • Diana Crites (statutory agent)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020
  • Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (attorney contact)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Recipient of electronic transmission for Respondent in initial decision

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    ADRE
    Transmitted decision electronically (c/o Commissioner Judy Lowe)

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:53 (188.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.

MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date

June 19, 2020

Decision Date

July 28, 2020

The Cross-Petitions

The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.

Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”

MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.

Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.

Core Allegations:

1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.

2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.

Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

Analysis of the Disputed Amendment

The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.

Key Provisions of the Amendment

Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).

Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”

Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.

Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”

Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.

MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment

In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:

• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.

• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.

• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”

Background and History of the Dispute

Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.

Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.

Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.

Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.

Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:

December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.

April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues

The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.

Stipulated Fact #11

The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:

“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”

Conflicting Legal Standards

Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”

Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”

Parties’ Core Arguments

MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.

MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.

Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)

Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.

Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.

Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.

Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)

Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.

Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.

Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.

Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.

Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”

Final Order

1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.

3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):

◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.

◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.

4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.

Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?

2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?

3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?

4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?

5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?

6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.

7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?

8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?

Answer Key

1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.

3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.

4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.

5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.

8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.

10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.

2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.

4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.

5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.

Amendment

The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.

A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”

Declaration

The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.

Hangar Tracts

Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.

Magnus L.D. MacLeod

The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.

Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.

Petition #19

The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.

Petition #34

The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Residential Lots

Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.

Tract G

An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.

Unit 4B

The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.

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20F-H2019019-REL

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This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.

1 source

What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey M. Proper (attorney)
    JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC
    Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Craig Albright (board member)
    MAP Board of Directors
    Then President of the MAP Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Magnus L.D. MacLeod (party)
    Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
  • Pat MacLeod (HOA president)
    HOA
    Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017

Susan L Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020046-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-23
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L. Alandar Counsel
Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804
CC&R’s Article V Section C; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
CC&R’s Article III Section A; CC&R’s Article IV Section C.23; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.

Key Issues & Findings

Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.

Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.

Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
  • Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
  • Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:42 (157.4 KB)

20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:55 (157.4 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.

The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:

Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.

Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.

Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.

Case Overview

On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020046-REL

Petitioner

Susan L. Alandar

Respondent

Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

June 11, 2020

Decision Date

July 23, 2020

Final Disposition

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings

Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session

Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.

Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.

Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club

Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.

Factual Background:

◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.

◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.

◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.

◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.

Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda

Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.

Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.

Key Referenced Authority

The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:

Document

Provision

Relevance to the Case

Arizona Revised Statutes

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”

Article III, Section A

Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.

Article IV, Section C

Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.

Article V, Section C

Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.

Bylaws

Article IV.E.8

Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.

Ventana Lakes Rules

Rule 8.3.B

Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?

2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?

3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?

4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?

6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?

8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.

2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.

3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.

4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.

6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.

7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.

8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.

10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?

3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.

4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.

5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.

Common Areas

Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.

Executive Session

A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

Select all sources
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20F-H2020046-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.

1 source

What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L. Alandar (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Represented Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge who signed the decision.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (Staff/Clerk)
    Transmitted the decision to the attorney for the Respondent.

Werner A Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Werner A Reis Counsel
Respondent Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Counsel Edward O’Brien, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article III, section 1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the undisputed material facts supported the finding that the Association's actions were authorized by the governing documents (CC&Rs Articles II and VI) and did not deny or impede member access or use of the Common Areas.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.

Petitioner alleged that the Board's decision to paint pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players, thereby violating CC&Rs Article III section 1.

Orders: The ALJ denied the petition (on rehearing), concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The Association was authorized to manage and maintain Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not violated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, CC&Rs Interpretation, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.05(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1061(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – 792741.pdf

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20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – 806920.pdf

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20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019026-REL/770924.pdf

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Briefing Document: Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner Werner A. Reis (Petitioner) and the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Respondent) concerning the modification of a common area tennis court. The core of the dispute, adjudicated under case numbers 20F-H2019026-REL and 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG, was the Association’s decision in June 2019 to paint pickleball lines on one of its two community tennis courts. The Petitioner alleged this action violated Article III, section 1 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), infringing upon his nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment. The Association contended that its Board of Directors acted within its authority, as granted by the CC&Rs, to manage, maintain, and improve common areas for the benefit of all members.

Following an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark ruled decisively in favor of the Association. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Key findings established that the Board was fully authorized to make the modification without a member vote, that tennis play was not restricted, and that the Petitioner’s easement rights were not violated. The Petitioner’s arguments, based on a potential future conflict rather than an actual experienced impediment, were deemed “unfounded” and “without merit.” The final order, issued on July 14, 2020, denied the petition, affirming the Association’s right to manage the recreational facilities in this manner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter involves a formal complaint by a homeowner against his townhouse association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Detail

Information

Case Numbers

20F-H2019026-REL, 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Werner A. Reis

Respondent

Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark

Core Issue

Whether the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents (CC&Rs Article III, section 1) by adding pickleball lines to one of two community tennis courts.

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II. Procedural History

The dispute progressed through a formal administrative hearing process, including a petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final order.

November 18, 2019: Werner Reis files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 4, 2019: The Association files its ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

January 31, 2020: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Jenna Clark.

February 20, 2020: The ALJ issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition, finding he failed to sustain his burden of proof.

March 26, 2020: The Petitioner submits a REQUEST FOR REHEARING to the Department.

April 22, 2020: The Department grants the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

May 20, 2020: During a prehearing conference, both parties stipulate that no factual dispute exists and agree to adopt the prior hearing record and submit written closing arguments in lieu of a new hearing.

June 24, 2020: Deadline for written closing arguments. The Association submits a 17-page argument; the OAH receives no closing argument from the Petitioner.

July 14, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision, again denying the petition and ordering that the initial decision from February be the final order in the matter.

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III. Analysis of the Dispute

The central conflict was the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs regarding the Board’s authority to modify common areas versus a member’s right to their use and enjoyment.

Petitioner’s Position (Werner A. Reis)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that adding pickleball as a competing use for a tennis court fundamentally diminished the rights of tennis-playing members.

Core Allegation: The Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants every member a “nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common Areas.”

Argument on Infringement: The Petitioner argued the Association created a situation where “Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play,” which he claimed “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment.”

Impediment of Enjoyment: He contended that reducing the number of exclusively available tennis courts from two to one amounts to “an impediment of enjoyment rights.”

Creation of Competition: He accused the Association of “creating a new class of people” (pickleball players) who could access the courts, creating new competition for members on a first-come, first-served basis.

Hypothetical Conflict: The “crux” of his complaint was the possible future conflict between his desire to play two singles matches simultaneously and up to sixteen “outsiders playing a raucous game of pickleball on the other designated tennis court.”

Requested Remedy: The Petitioner requested an order requiring the Association to designate the courts for tennis playing only.

Respondent’s Position (Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association)

The Association defended its decision as a reasonable exercise of the Board’s authority to manage community property for the benefit of all residents.

Board Authority: The Board asserted that its decision was permitted by Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants it the authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” without requiring a member vote. Article VI further requires the Board to maintain and manage recreational facilities.

Benefit to Community: The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests, and was also considered as a potential means to generate revenue.

No Restriction of Use: The Association maintained that tennis play was not restricted. Both courts remained available seven days a week on a first-come, first-served basis, with no changes to the reservation system. One court remained available exclusively for tennis at all times.

Nature of Modification: The modification involved painting lines and using portable nets, which must be detached after play. The permanent tennis nets on both courts remained in place.

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IV. Summary of Evidence and Testimony

Testimony from the Association’s representatives and the Petitioner established the key undisputed facts of the case.

Testimony for the Association (Charles Mitchell & Arland Averell)

Board Authority Confirmed: Charles Mitchell, the Board Director, testified that CC&Rs Articles II and VI, along with the Association’s Articles of Incorporation, authorize the Board to manage and improve common areas, including painting lines on the tennis courts.

Historical Context: Arland Averell, a 20-year Board member, explained that a taped pickleball court had existed in 2015 but was damaged. The Board decided in April 2019 to reestablish it with painted lines in response to requests from several families.

Practical Use: Pickleball is generally played only by a few families, typically on Saturday mornings. When pickleball is being played on the modified court, the other tennis court is always available.

No Denial of Access: Director Mitchell confirmed that the Petitioner had never been denied access to the tennis courts at any time.

Testimony of the Petitioner (Werner A. Reis)

Recent Homeowner: The Petitioner described himself as a “snowbird” who had purchased his townhouse in November 2019, shortly before filing his complaint.

Conflict is Hypothetical: He admitted that he “has not played tennis in ‘years'” and, as a result, “has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.”

No Direct Observation: The Petitioner testified that he had not personally observed contemporaneous tennis and pickleball games being played. His concerns about safety and inconvenience were speculative.

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V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions consistently found the Petitioner’s arguments to be legally and factually unsupported.

Conclusions of Law

Undisputed Facts: The Judge concluded that the material facts were not in dispute. The Association’s governing documents clearly authorize the Board to maintain, manage, and improve the Common Areas, including the recreational facilities.

No Violation of Easement Rights: The ruling stated, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner’s easement rights have not been violated by the Association because the Board painted blue pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts.”

Petitioner’s Arguments Dismissed: The Judge found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “unfounded” and “without merit.” Specifically, the claim that the availability of only one dedicated court was an “impediment of enjoyment rights” was rejected.

Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: In both the initial decision and the final order, the Judge concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof” by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs.

Failure to Prosecute Rehearing: The final decision noted that the Petitioner “did not provide OAH with a closing argument in support of his request for rehearing.”

Final Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision issued on July 14, 2020, affirmed the initial February 24, 2020, decision and was designated as the FINAL ORDER in the matter, binding on both parties.

Study Guide: Reis vs. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, in his petition filed on November 18, 2019?

2. On what grounds did the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association’s Board of Directors justify its decision to add pickleball lines to a tennis court?

3. According to the testimony of Arland Averell, what prompted the Board to reestablish a pickleball court in April 2019, and what was a prior experience with a pickleball court?

4. Describe the central, or “crux,” of the Petitioner’s complaint as summarized in the hearing evidence.

5. What key admissions did the Petitioner make during his testimony regarding his own tennis activity and his personal experience with the alleged conflict?

6. According to Director Charles Mitchell’s testimony, what is the physical setup of the nets on the courts, and how does this differ between tennis and pickleball?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is that standard defined in the legal documents?

8. What was the outcome of the initial evidentiary hearing held on January 31, 2020, and on what basis did the Administrative Law Judge reach this conclusion?

9. Describe the procedural change that occurred for the rehearing after the parties’ prehearing conference on May 20, 2020.

10. What action, or lack thereof, by the Petitioner on June 24, 2020, contributed to the final ruling in the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The specific violation claimed was the modification of one of the two existing tennis courts for use as a pickleball court.

2. The Association’s Board of Directors justified the decision as an improvement to the Common Areas for the benefit of the Association, which it was permitted to do under Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs. The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests.

3. Arland Averell testified that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish the pickleball court with painted lines after several families requested it, and the Board also saw it as a way to generate additional revenue. A previous pickleball court established in 2015 had lines made of tape which were damaged approximately four months after being applied.

4. The crux of the Petitioner’s complaint was the possible future conflict between his personal desire to play two singles tennis matches on both courts simultaneously and the potential for up to sixteen “outsiders” to be playing a “raucous game of pickleball” on the modified court.

5. The Petitioner admitted that he had not played tennis in “years” and, as a result, had never actually faced the conflict he was complaining about. He also stated he had never been denied access to the courts and had not observed contemporaneous games of tennis and pickleball being played.

6. Director Mitchell testified that both tennis courts have fixed tennis nets. The pickleball court, however, has portable nets which must be attached for use and then detached at the end of play.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. Following the January 31, 2020, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proof and that the evidence showed his easement rights had not been violated, as one tennis court always remained available.

9. During the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed. They agreed to vacate the scheduled rehearing, adopt the evidentiary record from the first hearing without presenting new evidence, and submit written closing arguments instead.

10. On the deadline of June 24, 2020, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a 17-page closing argument from the Respondent (the Association). The Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, failed to submit a closing argument, which was noted in the final decision denying his petition again.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Formulate your answers by synthesizing information from across the case documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the rights granted to members under CC&Rs Article III, section 1 (“easement of use and enjoyment”) and the powers granted to the Board under CC&Rs Article II, section 1 (“manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas”). How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent tension in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of the “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain why Werner Reis’s testimony and arguments ultimately failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial petition on November 18, 2019, to the final order on July 14, 2020. Identify the key events and decisions at each stage, including the initial hearing, the request for rehearing, and the final disposition.

4. Evaluate the strength of the Petitioner’s case. Focus specifically on the evidence he presented versus the evidence presented by the Association’s witnesses, Charles Mitchell and Arland Averell.

5. The Petitioner argued that the availability of only one tennis court when pickleball is in play constituted an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” Explain the Association’s counter-arguments and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s argument to be “unfounded” and “without merit.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Jenna Clark) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders and decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for the Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature that regulate planned communities and govern the administrative hearing process.

Association

The Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association, a non-profit Arizona corporation serving as the property owner’s association for the development. In this case, it is the Respondent.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Association, empowered by the CC&Rs and Articles of Incorporation to manage, maintain, and improve the Common Areas.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce the degree of evidence required to prove their case. The standard required here was “preponderance of the evidence.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, controlling property use within the development. The Restated Declaration was recorded on June 8, 2015.

Common Areas

Property within the development, such as the tennis courts, for the mutual benefit of all owners. The Association’s Board is granted authority to manage and improve these areas.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings regarding disputes in planned communities.

Easement of use and enjoyment

A non-exclusive, perpetual right granted to every member of the Association to use and enjoy the Common Areas, as established in CC&Rs Article III, section 1.

OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)

An independent state agency to which the Department refers cases for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Werner A. Reis, a townhouse owner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and representing the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association.

Snowbird

A colloquial term used by the Petitioner to describe himself as an out-of-state retiree who resides in Arizona during the winter months.

5 Surprising Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Lawsuit Over a Pickleball Court

Introduction: The Battle for the Tennis Court

Disputes with a homeowner association (HOA) are a common feature of suburban life, often revolving around landscaping, paint colors, or parking. But when you combine the rigid world of HOA rules with the explosive popularity of pickleball, you get a conflict that is uniquely modern. In a real-life legal case from Sedona, Arizona, one homeowner took his HOA to court over the decision to add pickleball lines to one of the community’s two tennis courts.

What might seem like a minor neighborhood squabble became a formal legal challenge, complete with hearings, testimony, and an official judicial decision. The court documents from this case offer a surprisingly revealing look into community rules, personal grievances, and the peculiar nature of legal battles. More importantly, they reveal several counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living in a planned community.

——————————————————————————–

1. You Can Sue Over a Problem That Doesn’t Exist (But You Probably Won’t Win)

The core of the legal challenge was filed by Werner Reis, a new homeowner in the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association. His complaint was over the modification of one of two community tennis courts to accommodate pickleball. The “crux” of his complaint was a concern over a possible future conflict: a hypothetical scenario where he might want to play two singles tennis matches while a large group of “outsiders” played a “raucous game of pickleball.”

This seems like a specific, if forward-thinking, concern. But the timeline and testimony revealed a truly bizarre situation. According to court records, Reis purchased his townhouse in November 2019 and filed his lawsuit on or about November 18, 2019—meaning he initiated a formal legal action within days or weeks of becoming a member of the community. Even more stunning was this fact from his own testimony:

Petitioner has not played tennis in “years.” As such, Petitioner has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.

The entire legal challenge—filed almost immediately upon moving in—was based on a hypothetical grievance for a sport the petitioner hadn’t even played in years. Unsurprisingly, the Administrative Law Judge found his argument “unfounded.” The lesson is clear: a legal claim based on “what if” is unlikely to succeed without any actual harm.

2. Your HOA’s Governing Documents Are a Legally Binding Contract

Many homeowners view their HOA’s rules as guidelines, but legally, they are a binding contract called Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). When you buy a property, you agree to their terms.

In its defense, the HOA pointed directly to its governing documents. Article VI requires the Board to manage all recreational facilities, and Article II, section 1, gives it the explicit authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” for the “general welfare and benefit of the Owners”—all without a member vote. This clause was the legal bedrock of the Board’s defense; in the eyes of the law, painting lines to accommodate a popular new sport is not a degradation of an amenity, but an improvement of it, squarely within the Board’s mandate.

The tennis courts are legally defined as “Common Areas.” This gave the Board the unambiguous right to paint new lines on them. This is an impactful takeaway for all homeowners: while you may feel a sense of personal ownership over shared amenities, the Board has broad, legally-defined powers to manage them for the entire community.

3. A Board’s Duty Is to Adapt to the Community’s Evolving Interests

The HOA Board’s decision wasn’t a whim; it was a response to a persistent community interest with a history. Testimony from a 20-year Board member, Arland Averell, revealed that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish a pickleball court “after several families requested they do so.” As a secondary benefit, the Board also saw it as a way to “generate additional revenue.”

But this wasn’t the community’s first foray into the sport. Court records show that back in 2015, the association had a pickleball court with taped lines, but it was damaged after only four months. This context is crucial. The 2019 decision to paint permanent lines was not just a reaction to new requests but an institutional lesson learned. It shows the Board was responding to a long-term, evolving interest and choosing a more durable solution, fulfilling its duty to adapt common resources to meet new demands.

4. An “Infringement” Requires an Actual Impediment

The petitioner’s legal argument was very specific. He claimed that adding pickleball “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment” and that having only one guaranteed tennis court is an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” He summarized his grievance with the line:

“Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play.”

However, the facts presented in court systematically dismantled this argument. The evidence showed:

• One of the two courts remained exclusively for tennis at all times.

• Both courts were still available for tennis on a first-come, first-served basis.

• The pickleball nets were portable and had to be detached at the end of play, leaving the court ready for tennis.

• Most critically, the petitioner himself testified that he had “never been denied access to the tennis courts at issue at any time.”

The judge determined that no violation occurred because the petitioner’s rights were never actually impeded. This reveals the critical legal distinction between an inconvenience and an infringement. The petitioner’s entire case rested on a hypothetical future inconvenience, but the law requires an actual, demonstrable impediment to rights. Since his own testimony confirmed one had never occurred, his claim was impossible to prove.

5. If You Demand a Rehearing, You Should Probably Show Up with an Argument

In a final, bizarre twist, the story doesn’t end with the initial ruling in February 2020. The petitioner filed a “REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” which the court granted, giving him a second chance to make his case.

To streamline the process, both parties agreed to skip a new evidentiary hearing and instead submit written “Closing Arguments” to the judge. The HOA’s legal team submitted a detailed, 17-page argument. What happened next was documented in the final court order:

OAH did not receive a closing argument from Petitioner.

The petitioner, who had initiated the entire legal process and successfully demanded a second chance, was given the final word. He had the opportunity to submit a closing argument that could have vindicated his entire complaint. Instead, he offered only silence. By ghosting his own rehearing, he left the judge with no choice but to conclude that he had once again “failed to sustain his burden of proof” and make the original ruling against him final.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Court of Community Opinion

This case is a fascinating lesson in the difference between a personal annoyance and an actual legal violation. It demonstrates that in the world of HOAs, feelings and hypothetical concerns carry little weight compared to the cold, hard text of the governing documents. Those documents give boards significant power, but also charge them with the difficult task of balancing the desires of all residents, not just the grievance of one.

As pickleball courts continue to replace shuffleboard courts and community gardens pop up in unused green spaces, this story leaves us with a critical question: As our communities change, how do we balance protecting the familiar traditions we love with making space for the new ones our neighbors are asking for?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Werner A Reis (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Edward O’Brien (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
  • Mark Sall (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Also cited as Mark Sahl)
  • Charles Mitchell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Current Director of the Association's Board
  • Arland Averell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Served on the Board for the past twenty years

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (department contact)
    ADRE
    Electronic contact for ADRE
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Administrative staff/Clerk noted on document transmission

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-05-05
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the controversy was not ripe. The Petitioner admitted that he had denied the HOA permission to enter his property to perform the maintenance he was suing them for not performing.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

Governing Documents

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the controversy was not ripe. The Petitioner admitted that he had denied the HOA permission to enter his property to perform the maintenance he was suing them for not performing.

Why this result: The matter was not ripe for determination because the Petitioner had denied the Respondent access to the property.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide landscaping maintenance

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to maintain landscaping. Petitioner admitted he had notified Respondent it was not allowed to enter his property until January 2020.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Decision Documents

20F-H2019005-REL-RHG Decision – 787446.pdf

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20F-H2019005-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019005-REL/752939.pdf

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**Case Summary: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Case No. 20F-H2019005-REL-RHG Date of Rehearing Decision:** May 5, 2020

Overview This summary details the proceedings of an administrative rehearing before the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The matter involves a dispute regarding landscaping maintenance obligations. It is crucial to distinguish between the original decision (dismissed for lack of ripeness) and the subsequent rehearing (which affirmed the dismissal).

Procedural History: The Original Decision In the initial proceeding (Case No. 20F-H2019005-REL), Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg alleged that the Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA), failed to comply with a prior ruling requiring it to provide landscaping maintenance.

During the original hearing on October 30, 2019, the Petitioner admitted to the following facts:

  • In 2013, he notified the HOA it was not allowed to enter his property.
  • In April 2019, he notified the HOA that he expected maintenance to resume in January 2020.
  • At the time of the 2019 hearing, the HOA still did not have permission to enter the property.

On November 14, 2019, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer dismissed the petition. The ALJ ruled that because the HOA was barred from the property at the time of filing, the allegation that the HOA was violating governing documents was "not ripe for determination".

The Rehearing: Case No. 20F-H2019005-REL-RHG The Petitioner requested a rehearing, arguing he was being "proactive" in seeking a resolution before the anticipated January 2020 violation. He further argued that by the time a rehearing occurred, the HOA would be in violation. The rehearing was granted and held on May 5, 2020.

Key Arguments at Rehearing

  1. Petitioner’s Admissions: The Petitioner reiterated that he had denied the HOA access until January 2020.
  2. New Claims: The Petitioner attempted to expand the scope of the dispute by arguing the HOA failed to maintain his neighbors’ properties.
  3. Current Controversy: The Petitioner argued that the HOA’s ongoing failure to maintain the landscaping after January 2020 created a present controversy.

**Legal Analysis and

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent at hearing
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Listed on distribution list for the rehearing order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list

Will Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019003-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-03-16
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge decision, issued following a rehearing, dismissed the Petitioner's dispute petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated its governing documents by reasonably denying the retroactive application for the unapproved glass view fence.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Will Schreiber Counsel Aaron M. Green
Respondent Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines HH Walls/View Fences and CC&R’s Article 12.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge decision, issued following a rehearing, dismissed the Petitioner's dispute petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated its governing documents by reasonably denying the retroactive application for the unapproved glass view fence.

Why this result: Petitioner installed the fence prior to seeking approval, failing to comply with the procedural requirements (Design Guidelines Section HH). Consequently, the HOA's denial based on consistency and maintenance concerns was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of Petitioner's glass view fence modification

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied the retroactive approval of a glass view fence installed without prior permission. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval pursuant to Design Guidelines Section HH, and that the Respondent's denial was reasonable due to procedural failure, community inconsistency (Design Guidelines Section E), and liability/maintenance concerns (CC&R Article 12.3).

Orders: Petitioner Will Schreiber’s Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R’s Article 12.3
  • Design Guidelines Section HH
  • Design Guidelines Section E
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Homeowner dispute, View fence, Architectural approval, Design Guidelines, CC&R's violation, Retroactive approval, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019003-REL-RHG Decision – 769789.pdf

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20F-H2019003-REL-RHG Decision – 775433.pdf

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Briefing Document: Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcome of the dispute between homeowner Will Schreiber (Petitioner) and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning an unapproved glass fence. The case, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, centered on Mr. Schreiber’s retroactive application for a glass view fence he installed without prior permission, which replaced a wrought iron fence.

The Homeowners Association (HOA) denied the application, citing a lack of consistency with community design standards, as well as significant maintenance and liability concerns stipulated in the governing documents. The Petitioner argued the denial was unreasonable, asserting that a glass fence is visually similar to having no fence (an approved option), that the HOA failed to provide a valid reason for denial, and that safety concerns were unfounded.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed Mr. Schreiber’s petition. The final decision concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing the HOA had violated its own rules. The ruling affirmed that the HOA’s denial was reasonable because the Petitioner did not follow the required procedure of seeking approval before installation, as mandated by the community’s Design Guidelines. The decision underscored the HOA’s right to enforce uniformity and manage its maintenance and liability responsibilities as defined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Case Identification and Participants

Detail

Information

Case Name

Will Schreiber, Petitioner, vs. Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019003-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Antara Nath Rivera

Petitioner

Will Schreiber

Petitioner’s Counsel

Aaron M. Green, Esq.

Respondent

Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association (a subdivision of McDowell Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nick Nogami, Esq. (at hearing); Mark K. Sahl, Esq. (on record)

Property Address

11551 East Caribbean Lane, Scottsdale, Arizona, 85255

Procedural History and Timeline

1. November 2017: Petitioner submitted an architectural form for backyard work, which was approved by the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC). This submission did not mention any changes to fencing.

2. January 2019: During a violation tour, the HOA discovered that Petitioner had replaced the pre-existing wrought iron view fencing with an unapproved glass fence.

3. January 24, 2019: After being contacted by the HOA, Petitioner submitted a second variance request seeking retroactive approval for the installed glass fence.

4. March 5, 2019: The HOA sent a letter to Petitioner requesting that the fence be returned to its original wrought iron condition.

5. May 10, 2019: The HOA officially notified Petitioner that his appeal was denied because the application was not filed in a timely manner (i.e., prior to installation).

6. July 2, 2019: Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging violations of community documents.

7. August 9, 2019: The HOA filed its Answer, denying all claims, and a Motion to Dismiss.

8. October 2, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s Motion to Dismiss.

9. December 10, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Rehearing.

10. January 30, 2020: A rehearing was held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

11. February 4, 2020: The HOA’s counsel submitted a Posthearing Memorandum without leave from the tribunal.

12. February 14, 2020: The ALJ issued an order reopening the record solely to allow the Petitioner an opportunity to respond to the HOA’s unauthorized filing by February 24, 2020.

13. March 16, 2020: The ALJ issued the final decision, ordering that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Will Schreiber)

The Petitioner’s case rested on the argument that the HOA’s denial of his glass fence was arbitrary and unreasonable.

Lack of Justification: Petitioner claimed the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) met with him but failed to provide any verbal or written reasons for the initial disapproval.

Aesthetic and Functional Equivalence: He argued a glass fence is “just as invisible” as having no fence at all, an option permitted by the HOA. He contended that since his neighbor did not have a wrought iron fence, denying his glass fence on grounds of consistency was illogical.

Safety and Maintenance: Petitioner asserted that the safety glass used was comparable to that of the Grand Canyon Skywalk and had been inspected and approved by a Scottsdale City Inspector. He argued the HOA’s concerns about safety, fire barriers, and continuity were manufactured “excuses.” He also offered to waive the HOA’s maintenance responsibility for the fence.

Procedural Failure: The core of the petition was the allegation that the HOA violated its own community documents, specifically “Design Guidelines HH Walls/View Fences and CC&R’s Article 12.”

Respondent’s Position (Cimarron Hills HOA)

The HOA’s defense, presented primarily through the testimony of Whitney Bostic, focused on procedural compliance, community uniformity, and non-negotiable maintenance responsibilities.

Violation of Process: The HOA established that the Petitioner installed the glass fence prior to seeking approval, in direct violation of the Design Guidelines which require submission of detailed plans for any view fence modifications. His approved 2017 plans made no mention of fencing.

Lack of Consistency: Ms. Bostic testified that out of 656 homes in the Cimarron Hills subdivision and 3,800 homes in the master McDowell Mountain Ranch association, none had a glass fence. The established design standard allows only for a wrought iron fence or no fence at all to maintain community conformity.

Maintenance and Liability: The HOA argued that under Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs, it is legally responsible for maintaining the exterior half of all boundary view fences and the five-foot easement from the boundary wall. This responsibility cannot be waived by a homeowner. A glass fence introduces unique maintenance concerns and liability risks, such as shards of glass falling into an area of HOA responsibility.

Multi-Level Review: The decision to deny the request was made after consideration by both the Cimarron Hills DRC and the master association (MMRHA), which weighed factors of consistency, responsibility, and maintenance before issuing a denial.

Governing Documents Cited

The decision in this case was based on the interpretation of several key sections of the community’s governing documents.

CC&Rs Article 12.3 (Boundary Walls and Association Responsibility): This article explicitly states that the Association “shall be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.” This formed the basis of the HOA’s argument regarding non-waivable liability and maintenance obligations.

Design Guidelines Section HH (View Fencing): This section mandates that “The Owner shall submit for approval from the DRC including detailed drawings of proposed changes… for view fence modifications.” The Petitioner’s failure to do this prior to installation was a central fact in the case. It also specifies the approved paint color for fences, “MMR Brown Fence.”

Design Guidelines Section E (General Principles): This section outlines the DRC’s goal to “maintain consistency of the community and of its decisions.” It notes that variances may be granted but “shall remain consistent with the architectural and neighborhood characteristics.” This supported the HOA’s argument against introducing a unique fence type.

Design Guidelines Section GG (View Decks): While pertaining to decks, this section was cited to show the level of detail required in applications to the DRC, including materials, dimensions, and impact on views, underscoring the formal process the Petitioner bypassed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ, Antara Nath Rivera, dismissed Will Schreiber’s petition, finding in favor of the Cimarron Hills HOA.

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated Article 12.3 of its CC&Rs.

Failure to Follow Procedure: The judge concluded that the Petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval to change his existing fence, pursuant to Section HH of the Design Guidelines.” The key issue was not the aesthetics of the fence, but the Petitioner’s failure to abide by the required approval process before installation.

Reasonableness of Denial: The ALJ found that the “Respondent was reasonable in its denial” and “did not violate any rules or regulations.” The evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s decision was based on established principles of uniformity, consistency, and its obligations under the CC&Rs.

Final Order: The petition was formally dismissed. The order noted that as a decision from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.

Study Guide: Schreiber v. Cimarron Hills HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Will Schreiber and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, based on the provided legal documents. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner, Will Schreiber, take that initiated the dispute with the Homeowners Association?

3. According to the Respondent, what were the primary reasons for denying the Petitioner’s request for the glass fence?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument regarding the fairness of the Respondent’s denial, particularly in relation to his neighbor?

5. What was the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win his case, and did he meet it?

6. Identify two specific governing documents that were central to the Respondent’s defense and the final ruling.

7. Who was Whitney Bostic, and what key information did her testimony provide during the rehearing?

8. What procedural event occurred on or about February 4, 2020, that prompted the Administrative Law Judge to issue the “Order Holding Record Open” on February 14, 2020?

9. According to the CC&Rs, who is responsible for maintaining the “Boundary Wall” that separates a lot from an “Area of Association Responsibility”?

10. What was the final outcome of the administrative rehearing held on January 30, 2020?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Will Schreiber, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Schreiber filed a petition against the HOA, alleging a violation of community documents after they denied his request for a fence modification.

2. Mr. Schreiber replaced his preexisting wrought iron view fencing with glass fencing without first receiving approval from the HOA’s Design Review Committee (DRC). He then submitted a variance request on January 24, 2019, seeking retroactive approval for the already-installed fence.

3. The Respondent denied the request based on several factors, including the need for design consistency across the community’s 656 homes, as no other home had a glass fence. They also cited maintenance concerns and potential liability, as the HOA is responsible for the exterior half of view fences and a five-foot easement from the boundary wall.

4. The Petitioner argued that the denial was unreasonable because his neighbor was allowed to have no fence at all. He contended that a glass fence was “just as invisible” as no fence and that the concept was essentially the same.

5. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means convincing the judge that his contention was more probably true than not. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.

6. The two central documents were the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Cimarron Hills (CC&Rs) and the Cimarron Hills Design Guidelines For Community Living (Design Guidelines). The Respondent specifically cited Sections E (General Principles), GG (View Decks), and HH (Walls/View Fences) of the Design Guidelines.

7. Whitney Bostic testified on behalf of the Respondent HOA. She explained that the glass fence was unapproved, inconsistent with the 656 homes in the community, and posed maintenance and liability concerns for the HOA.

8. Counsel for the Respondent submitted a Posthearing Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law without having been granted permission (leave) by the tribunal. Because the Petitioner did not have an opportunity to respond, the judge reopened the record to allow him to do so by February 24, 2020.

9. According to Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs, the resident is responsible for their side of the wall, but the Association is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner Will Schreiber’s Petition be dismissed. The judge found that the Respondent HOA’s denial of the glass fence was reasonable and that it did not violate any of its rules or regulations.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and facts presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing of the petition on July 2, 2019, to the final decision on March 16, 2020. Discuss the significance of the initial dismissal, the subsequent rehearing, and the order to reopen the record.

2. Examine the concept of “consistency” as described in Section E of the Design Guidelines. How did this principle form the foundation of the Respondent’s case, and why was it a more compelling argument than the Petitioner’s claims about aesthetics and safety?

3. The Petitioner argued that since his neighbor was permitted to have no fence, his “invisible” glass fence should also be permitted. Deconstruct this argument and explain why it ultimately failed to persuade the Administrative Law Judge, citing the Respondent’s counterarguments regarding maintenance and responsibility.

4. Discuss the role of the governing community documents (the CC&Rs and Design Guidelines) in this dispute. Explain how specific articles, such as CC&R Article 12.3 and Design Guideline Section HH, were applied to the facts of the case to reach a final decision.

5. Define “preponderance of the evidence” as described in the legal decision. Detail the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent at the rehearing and evaluate why the Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this evidentiary standard.

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge (Antara Nath Rivera) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the final decision.

Answer

The formal written response filed by the Respondent on August 9, 2019, denying all complaint items in the Petition.

Areas of Association Responsibility

Areas that the Homeowners Association is responsible for maintaining, as defined in the CC&Rs. This includes the exterior side of boundary walls and a five-foot easement.

An acronym for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements for Cimarron Hills, a primary governing document for the community.

Design Guidelines

A document titled Cimarron Hills Design Guidelines For Community Living that supplements the CC&Rs and provides specific rules on community aesthetics, including fences.

Design Review Committee (DRC)

A committee within the HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying residents’ proposed architectural and landscape modifications.

Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Will Schreiber with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 2, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

McDowell Mountain Ranch Homeowners Association (MMRHA)

The master association of which the Cimarron Hills HOA is a subdivision. The MMRHA also considered and denied the Petitioner’s request.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action; in this case, the homeowner, Will Schreiber.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed; in this case, the Cimarron Hills at McDowell Mountain Homeowners Association.

Retroactive Approval

Approval sought for a modification or construction that has already been completed without prior authorization.

Variance

A formal exception to the standard Design Guidelines that the DRC may grant on a case-by-case basis.

The Glass Fence Standoff: 4 Critical Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle with His HOA

Introduction: The Dream Project and the Unseen Rules

Will Schreiber had a vision for his Scottsdale, Arizona home: a sleek, modern property with an uninterrupted backyard view. To preserve that stunning vista, he installed an elegant glass fence—a choice that seemed perfect for the landscape. His neighbors didn’t complain; in fact, there’s no evidence the fence bothered anyone. But his Homeowners Association (HOA) denied the project, triggering a legal dispute that went before an administrative law judge. Mr. Schreiber ultimately lost.

The conflict wasn’t driven by neighborhood animosity, but by the impersonal application of community documents. This case offers a masterclass in the often counter-intuitive world of HOA governance. The reasons he lost reveal surprising and invaluable lessons for any homeowner considering a modification to their property.

1. The most critical mistake wasn’t the fence—it was the timing.

The core reason the homeowner lost his case had less to do with the aesthetics of glass versus wrought iron and everything to do with procedural failure. He installed the fence before getting formal approval from the HOA.

The timeline of events was fatal to his argument. In November 2017, the HOA approved Mr. Schreiber’s plan for backyard improvements, but this plan made no mention of fencing. At some point after, he installed the unapproved glass fence. It wasn’t until a routine violation tour in January 2019 that the HOA discovered the new fence. Only after being caught, on January 24, 2019, did the homeowner submit a request for retroactive approval.

In the end, the judge’s decision hinged on this sequence. The key question wasn’t whether a glass fence was a good idea, but whether the HOA’s denial was reasonable “because Petitioner failed to abide by the regulations to get approval for the glass fence prior to installing it.” In any dispute with an HOA, following the established process is paramount. Once you break the rules of that process, the merits of your project often become irrelevant.

2. A logical argument can lose to a written rule.

The homeowner presented a seemingly logical and compelling argument. He contended that his neighbor didn’t have a fence at all, and a glass fence was conceptually the same thing. In his words:

A glass fence was “just as invisible” as not having a fence. In essence, both were the same concept.

To add weight to his point, he made a powerful real-world comparison, arguing the safety glass he used was similar to that of the railing of the Grand Canyon Skywalk tourist attraction.

This “common sense” approach, however, failed to persuade the judge. The HOA’s decision wasn’t based on a subjective interpretation of “invisibility” or a comparison to national landmarks. It was based on the binding community documents. The Design Guidelines were written to promote uniformity and consistency. According to the HOA, the established rules were clear: a homeowner could have a wrought iron fence or no fence at all. A glass fence was not an approved option. The lesson here is stark: the governing documents create the binding reality for every member of the community. A personal, logical argument is not a valid defense against a clearly written rule you have contractually agreed to follow.

3. The HOA’s biggest concern wasn’t curb appeal; it was risk.

While the dispute appeared to be about aesthetics, the HOA’s defense focused on much more practical and significant concerns: consistency, maintenance, and liability. These arguments reveal the often-unseen function of an HOA, which is to manage shared risk for the entire community.

The HOA presented several key points:

Consistency: Out of 3,800 homes in the master community and 656 in the sub-community, not a single one had a glass fence. Approving this one would set a precedent that could undermine the community’s uniform design.

Maintenance: The community’s CC&Rs (Article 12.3) explicitly stated the Association was responsible for maintaining “the side of the Boundary Wall which faces the Area of Association Responsibility.” This meant the HOA would be financially and logistically on the hook for repairing and maintaining an unfamiliar and potentially costly material.

Safety & Liability: The HOA raised a critical safety issue. If the glass fence were to break, “large amount of glass shards would fall onto an area of Respondent’s responsibility, causing additional liability for Respondent.”

Sensing the maintenance issue was a key obstacle, Mr. Schreiber made a reasonable offer: he was willing to waive the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the glass fence. However, this proactive solution came too late. Because he had already violated the approval process, his concession was not enough to overcome the HOA’s other concerns about precedent and liability, which remained firmly grounded in the community’s governing documents.

4. In a dispute, you are the one who has to prove the HOA is wrong.

When a homeowner takes their HOA to court, the legal scales are not perfectly balanced from the start. The legal decision in this case clearly states the principle: “Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Article 12.3 of its CC&Rs.”

In simple terms, “burden of proof” meant it was Mr. Schreiber’s job to convince the judge with a “preponderance of the evidence”—meaning it was more likely true than not—that the HOA had broken its own rules when it denied his request. It was not the HOA’s job to prove it was right; it was his job to prove they were wrong.

The judge ultimately found that the homeowner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he rightfully sought approval.” The conclusion was that the “Respondent was reasonable in its denial.” It is not enough to feel you have been wronged; in a legal setting, you must be able to demonstrate with convincing evidence that the organization violated its own governing documents.

Conclusion: The Unwritten Lessons of Community Living

HOA rules can be a source of frustration, but this case demonstrates that they form a complex web of process, liability, and shared responsibility that exists for reasons beyond simple aesthetics. The homeowner’s dream of a glass fence was shattered not by a neighbor’s complaint, but by a series of procedural missteps and a misunderstanding of the contract he was bound by.

This case wasn’t just about a fence; it was about the power of a contract you agree to when you buy a home. How well do you really know your own community’s rulebook?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Will Schreiber (petitioner)
    Complainant
  • Aaron M. Green (petitioner attorney)
    Law Office of Aaron Green, P.C.

Respondent Side

  • Nick Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Represented Respondent at hearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Whitney Bostic (witness)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitting agent for Order
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Rick & Lisa Holly v. La Barranca II Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-02-14
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, or 33-1817, or any of the cited CC&R provisions concerning intentional construction delay, conflict of interest, or retaliatory fines.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rick and Lisa Holly Counsel Kevin P. Nelson, Esq.
Respondent La Barranca II Homeowners Association Counsel Edward D. O’Brien, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B); CC&R Article 11.2.5
A.R.S. § 33-1811; CC&R Article 4.7
A.R.S. § 33-1803; CC&Rs Articles 11.3 and 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, or 33-1817, or any of the cited CC&R provisions concerning intentional construction delay, conflict of interest, or retaliatory fines.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on all three issues alleged in the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Intentional delay of construction

Petitioners alleged that Respondent intentionally delayed the approval and construction of their new home for over eleven months.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)
  • CC&R Article 11.2.5

Conflict of interest

Petitioners alleged that a Board Vice President and Secretary (who owned lots adjacent to Petitioners') were blocking approval of the home due to a conflict of interest.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • CC&R Article 4.7

Retaliatory fines

Petitioners alleged fear of prospective retaliatory imposition of fines.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • CC&R Article 11.3
  • CC&R Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Planned Communities Act, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Construction Delay, Conflict of Interest, Retaliatory Fines
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4.7
  • CC&R Article 11.2.5
  • CC&R Article 11.3
  • CC&R Article 12

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019020-REL Decision – 769746.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:42 (191.2 KB)

This decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) addresses a three-issue petition filed by Rick and Lisa Holly (Petitioners), who are members and lot owners in the La Barranca II development, against the La Barranca II Homeowners Association (Respondent). The hearing proceedings took place on February 5 and February 7, 2020.

Key Facts and Background

The dispute centered on the Petitioners' attempt to gain Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approval for the construction of a new home on their property (Lot 50). The approval process had spanned over eleven months. Petitioners alleged that the Respondent violated Arizona statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, and 33-1817) and certain Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Main Issues and Legal Arguments

Petitioners presented three specific claims:

  1. Intentional Delay of Construction: Petitioners asserted that Respondent unreasonably delayed the construction of their home. The Petitioners' timeline expectations were based on their contractor's (Brilar) estimates, not statutes or association documents. The OAH found that Petitioners did not establish any undue delay attributable to the Respondent. Evidence showed that the contractor's initial plans failed to meet the Architectural Guidelines and that delays were more likely due to the contractor's "imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements". The ARC and its consultant provided guidance and conditional preliminary approval, requiring revisions based on valid considerations. Furthermore, final construction approval in September 2019 was withheld because the required $20,000 refundable construction deposit had not been paid and the site markers (surveyor pins) were missing.
  2. Conflict of Interest: Petitioners alleged a conflict of interest because the Board's vice president, William Bohan, and secretary, Nancy Williams, jointly owned a vacant lot (Lot 49) bordering Lot 50. Petitioners offered only suppositions that Mr. Bohan and Ms. Williams were "blocking approval" due to personal negative opinions. The OAH ruled that Petitioners did not establish that Mr. Bohan had an undeclared conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811, acknowledging that in a small development, volunteers on the board and ARC will naturally be regulating their neighbors.
  3. Retaliatory Fines: Petitioners feared retaliatory imposition of fines based on the Respondent previously fining other owners for "petty offenses". The OAH concluded that this claim, which implicated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) concerning monetary penalties, failed because the Respondent had not assessed any fines or penalties against the Petitioners. The claim was based entirely on speculation.

Outcome and Final Decision

Petitioners bore the burden of proving violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Since Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated any statute or CC&R, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky issued a Recommended Order that the petition be dismissed. The Order became binding unless a rehearing was granted.

Questions

Question

Does a board member have a conflict of interest just because they own a lot next to mine?

Short Answer

No. Owning a neighboring lot does not automatically create a conflict of interest or imply bias.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ reasoned that in planned communities, especially smaller ones, board and committee members will inevitably have to regulate their neighbors. Without evidence of actual animus or discriminatory intent, simply owning a contiguous lot is not a conflict of interest that prevents a member from voting on architectural plans.

Alj Quote

In any homeowners’ association, but especially In a small development having only 71 lots, the persons who volunteer to serve on homeowners’ associations’ boards and ARCs will necessarily be regulating their neighbors.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board of Directors
  • Neighbors

Question

Is the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) required to help me design my home to meet the guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The ARC's role is to review submitted plans for compliance, not to assist in the design process.

Detailed Answer

While an ARC might offer guidance, the decision clarifies that their official duty is strictly to review plans against the governing documents. They are not obligated to help owners or builders design compliant structures.

Alj Quote

It is not ARC’s job to help an owner design a home that complies with Respondent’s Guidelines, only to review plans that are submitted for compliance.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Design Guidelines
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can I file a complaint against my HOA because I am afraid they might fine me in the future?

Short Answer

No. You cannot base a legal complaint on the speculation of future retaliatory fines.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that a petition cannot rely on fear of potential future actions. Unless the HOA has actually assessed a fine or penalty, a claim regarding retaliatory fines is considered speculative and will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

Any prospective prohibition on fines would be based on nothing but speculation. . . . Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) or Articles 11.3 or 12 by assessing retaliatory fines or penalties against Petitioners.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Retaliation
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA violated the statutes or CC&Rs. The standard of proof is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Is the HOA responsible for delays if my builder doesn't understand the design guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The HOA is not liable for delays caused by a builder's failure to submit compliant plans.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA's architectural committee is reasonably responsive to submissions, they are not at fault for construction delays resulting from a contractor's misunderstanding of the design rules or failure to meet requirements.

Alj Quote

On this record, it appears that Hoamco and the ARC were reasonably responsive . . . and that any delay in construction appears more likely based on Brilar principal’s imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Construction Delays
  • Vendor Issues

Question

Can I rely on my contractor's timeline estimates for when the HOA will approve my plans?

Short Answer

No. You should rely on the timelines specified in the CC&Rs and statutes, not third-party estimates.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that a homeowner's expectations based on their builder's estimates are not binding on the HOA. The official governing documents determine the procedural timeline, and reliance on outside estimates does not constitute a violation by the HOA.

Alj Quote

Mrs. Holly candidly testified that Petiitoners’ expectations about how long it would take to build their house was based on Brilar’s principles’ estimates, not anything in statutes or Respondent’s CC&Rs . . .

Legal Basis

N/A

Topic Tags

  • Timelines
  • Construction
  • Expectations

Question

Can the HOA charge a fee for reviewing architectural plans?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs allow for it.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that CC&Rs can grant the Architectural Review Committee the power to assess reasonable fees in connection with the review of plans.

Alj Quote

Article 11.3 of Respondent’s CC&Rs concerns general provisions for the ARC, including that it may assess reasonable fees in connection with its review of plans . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11.3

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Architectural Review
  • CC&Rs

Case

Docket No
20F-H2019020-REL
Case Title
Rick and Lisa Holly vs. La Barranca II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-02-14
Alj Name
Diane Mihalsky
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does a board member have a conflict of interest just because they own a lot next to mine?

Short Answer

No. Owning a neighboring lot does not automatically create a conflict of interest or imply bias.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ reasoned that in planned communities, especially smaller ones, board and committee members will inevitably have to regulate their neighbors. Without evidence of actual animus or discriminatory intent, simply owning a contiguous lot is not a conflict of interest that prevents a member from voting on architectural plans.

Alj Quote

In any homeowners’ association, but especially In a small development having only 71 lots, the persons who volunteer to serve on homeowners’ associations’ boards and ARCs will necessarily be regulating their neighbors.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board of Directors
  • Neighbors

Question

Is the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) required to help me design my home to meet the guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The ARC's role is to review submitted plans for compliance, not to assist in the design process.

Detailed Answer

While an ARC might offer guidance, the decision clarifies that their official duty is strictly to review plans against the governing documents. They are not obligated to help owners or builders design compliant structures.

Alj Quote

It is not ARC’s job to help an owner design a home that complies with Respondent’s Guidelines, only to review plans that are submitted for compliance.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Design Guidelines
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can I file a complaint against my HOA because I am afraid they might fine me in the future?

Short Answer

No. You cannot base a legal complaint on the speculation of future retaliatory fines.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that a petition cannot rely on fear of potential future actions. Unless the HOA has actually assessed a fine or penalty, a claim regarding retaliatory fines is considered speculative and will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

Any prospective prohibition on fines would be based on nothing but speculation. . . . Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) or Articles 11.3 or 12 by assessing retaliatory fines or penalties against Petitioners.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Retaliation
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA violated the statutes or CC&Rs. The standard of proof is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Is the HOA responsible for delays if my builder doesn't understand the design guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The HOA is not liable for delays caused by a builder's failure to submit compliant plans.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA's architectural committee is reasonably responsive to submissions, they are not at fault for construction delays resulting from a contractor's misunderstanding of the design rules or failure to meet requirements.

Alj Quote

On this record, it appears that Hoamco and the ARC were reasonably responsive . . . and that any delay in construction appears more likely based on Brilar principal’s imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Construction Delays
  • Vendor Issues

Question

Can I rely on my contractor's timeline estimates for when the HOA will approve my plans?

Short Answer

No. You should rely on the timelines specified in the CC&Rs and statutes, not third-party estimates.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that a homeowner's expectations based on their builder's estimates are not binding on the HOA. The official governing documents determine the procedural timeline, and reliance on outside estimates does not constitute a violation by the HOA.

Alj Quote

Mrs. Holly candidly testified that Petiitoners’ expectations about how long it would take to build their house was based on Brilar’s principles’ estimates, not anything in statutes or Respondent’s CC&Rs . . .

Legal Basis

N/A

Topic Tags

  • Timelines
  • Construction
  • Expectations

Question

Can the HOA charge a fee for reviewing architectural plans?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs allow for it.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that CC&Rs can grant the Architectural Review Committee the power to assess reasonable fees in connection with the review of plans.

Alj Quote

Article 11.3 of Respondent’s CC&Rs concerns general provisions for the ARC, including that it may assess reasonable fees in connection with its review of plans . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11.3

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Architectural Review
  • CC&Rs

Case

Docket No
20F-H2019020-REL
Case Title
Rick and Lisa Holly vs. La Barranca II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-02-14
Alj Name
Diane Mihalsky
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rick Holly (petitioner)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association Member
  • Lisa Holly (petitioner)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association Member
    Also referred to as Mrs. Holly
  • Kevin P. Nelson (petitioner attorney)
    Tiffany & Bosco
  • Brian Bracken (witness/contractor's principal)
    Brilar Homes, LLC
    Petitioners' general contractor
  • Larry E. Smith (witness/contractor's principal)
    Brilar Homes, LLC
    Petitioners' general contractor

Respondent Side

  • La Barranca II Homeowners Association (respondent)
    HOA party
  • Edward D. O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Alexia Firehawk (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • William Bohan (HOA board member/ARC member/witness)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association
    Board Vice President
  • Nancy Williams (HOA board member/ARC member)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association
    Board Secretary
  • Luke Hyde (property manager staff)
    Hoamco
    Architectural Department Manager
  • Josh Hall (property manager staff)
    Hoamco
    Architectural Department Staff
  • Neil True (architect consultant)
    Hoamco/ARC Consultant
    Consultant architect reviewing plans

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
  • John Davis (fire marshall)
    Sedona District Fire Marshall
    Consulted by HOA regarding dumpster placement
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate