Deborah Masear v. Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-08-14
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's claim, finding that the HOA (Park) was in compliance with its By-Laws. Frank Maiz was found to be the spouse of the unit owner (Mercedes B.B. Maiz), making him eligible to serve on the Board of Directors.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Deborah Masear Counsel
Respondent Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association Counsel Erica L. Mortenson

Alleged Violations

Park By-Laws Article III, Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's claim, finding that the HOA (Park) was in compliance with its By-Laws. Frank Maiz was found to be the spouse of the unit owner (Mercedes B.B. Maiz), making him eligible to serve on the Board of Directors.

Why this result: Petitioner was mistaken regarding the current ownership of the unit at issue and failed to prove the respondent violated the Park By-Laws.

Key Issues & Findings

Board of Directors Qualification (Owner/Spouse Requirement)

Petitioner alleged that Frank Maiz was ineligible for the Board because his wife, Mercedes B.B. Maiz, was not the true owner of the unit, arguing that their daughter (also Mercedes B.B. Maiz) was the owner based on a recorded Beneficiary Deed. The Respondent proved that the wife owned the property, making Frank Maiz eligible as her spouse.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is dismissed. Park is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner shall bear her filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1178740.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:39 (54.4 KB)

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1202883.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:42 (42.7 KB)

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1211324.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T12:23:46 (120.7 KB)

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1178740.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:07:21 (54.4 KB)

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1202883.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:07:25 (42.7 KB)

24F-H041-REL Decision – 1211324.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:07:30 (120.7 KB)

This summary details the proceedings, key arguments, and final decision in the matter of *Deborah Masear v. Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association* (Park), Case No. 24F-H041-REL, before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The hearing convened on July 25, 2024.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The central legal issue was whether the Respondent, Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association, violated its By-Laws Article III, Section 1 by allowing Frank Maiz to run for and serve on the Board of Directors in the 2024 election.

The relevant By-Law provision stipulates that each member of the Board of Directors must be "either an owner of a Unit or the spouse of an owner".

Petitioner Deborah Masear's position was that Frank Maiz was ineligible because his spouse, Mrs. Maiz, was not the owner of Unit 245. Petitioner alleged that the true owner of the property was the daughter, identified in public records as "Mercedes B.B. Maiz". Petitioner presented documents, including a Beneficiary Deed, which Petitioner claimed showed the daughter as the property owner and the "Seller".

The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Arguments and Evidence

The Respondent, represented by Attorney Erica L. Mortenson, countered the allegations by presenting sworn testimony from Frank Maiz and his wife, Mercedes Bofill Benaches Maiz (also known as Mercedes B.B. Maiz).

Respondent’s evidence established:

  1. Ownership and Status: Mercedes B.B. Maiz testified that she married Frank Maiz in 1975 and has owned Unit 245 since 1990. Frank Maiz confirmed he has served as a director while married to the owner of Unit 245.
  2. Mistaken Identity: Mercedes B.B. Maiz clarified that she is the owner. The Petitioner's confusion arose from the fact that Mrs. Maiz shares a similar name with her daughter, Mercedes Bofill Maiz. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded the Petitioner was mistaken regarding the current ownership and the owner's name.
  3. Beneficiary Deed: Mrs. Maiz explained that she executed the Beneficiary Deed (Transfer on Death Deed) in April 2023, listing her two children as beneficiaries, because she was anticipating heart surgery. She confirmed she is still alive, meaning the interest conveyed by the deed has not yet vested; therefore, she remains the current owner.

Outcome and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Kay A. Abramsohn, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof necessary to demonstrate a violation.

The ALJ found:

  • The hearing record clearly documented that Mercedes B.B. Maiz owns Unit 245.
  • The record clearly documented that Frank German Maiz is married to Mercedes B.B. Maiz.

Based on these findings, Frank German Maiz satisfies the requirement of being the "spouse of the owner" of Unit 245.

The Order resulted in:

  • The Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed.
  • Park was deemed the prevailing party, and the Petitioner was ordered to bear her filing fee.

This decision confirms that Park was in compliance with its By-Laws. This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the person filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not automatically have to prove they are innocent; the accuser must prove the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In these proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has violated the planned community document(s’) provisions or statutes alleged to have been violated.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Can the spouse of a homeowner serve on the Board of Directors even if they are not listed on the deed?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community bylaws explicitly allow spouses of owners to serve.

Detailed Answer

If the specific HOA bylaws state that board members can be owners or the spouse of an owner, a spouse may run for and serve on the board even if they are not legally listed on the property deed.

Alj Quote

Park By-Laws Article III, Section 1 provides, in pertinent part: Each member of the Board of Directors shall be either an owner of a Unit or the spouse of an owner.

Legal Basis

Community Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • board eligibility
  • bylaws
  • elections

Question

Does a 'Beneficiary Deed' transfer ownership of a property immediately?

Short Answer

No, a Beneficiary Deed transfers title only upon the death of the owner.

Detailed Answer

The existence of a recorded Beneficiary Deed does not mean the current owner has given up their rights. The current owner remains the owner until they die, at which point the property transfers to the beneficiary.

Alj Quote

Mercedes B.B. Maiz testified that she executed the Beneficiary Deed… indicating that, upon her death, the subject property is deeded to her daughter… [and] The hearing record clearly documented that Mercedes B.B. Maiz owns Unit 245 at Park.

Legal Basis

Fact Finding / Property Law

Topic Tags

  • property ownership
  • deeds
  • evidence

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is more likely true than not. It does not require removal of all doubt, just that the evidence carries more weight than the opposing side.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence

Question

Where can a homeowner file a petition regarding violations of condo statutes or documents?

Short Answer

The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

Detailed Answer

Arizona law allows owners to petition the Department of Real Estate for a hearing if there is a dispute regarding violations of condominium documents or regulating statutes.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et al., regarding a dispute between an owner and a planned community association, the owner or association may petition the department for a hearing concerning violations of condominium documents or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • filing a complaint

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, who pays the filing fee?

Short Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must pay their own filing fee if the petition is dismissed.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge rules in favor of the HOA and dismisses the petition, the homeowner is ordered to bear the cost of the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED Petitioner shall bear her filing fee.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties

Case

Docket No
24F-H041-REL
Case Title
Deborah Masear v. Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2024-08-14
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving a violation occurred in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the person filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not automatically have to prove they are innocent; the accuser must prove the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In these proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has violated the planned community document(s’) provisions or statutes alleged to have been violated.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Can the spouse of a homeowner serve on the Board of Directors even if they are not listed on the deed?

Short Answer

Yes, if the community bylaws explicitly allow spouses of owners to serve.

Detailed Answer

If the specific HOA bylaws state that board members can be owners or the spouse of an owner, a spouse may run for and serve on the board even if they are not legally listed on the property deed.

Alj Quote

Park By-Laws Article III, Section 1 provides, in pertinent part: Each member of the Board of Directors shall be either an owner of a Unit or the spouse of an owner.

Legal Basis

Community Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • board eligibility
  • bylaws
  • elections

Question

Does a 'Beneficiary Deed' transfer ownership of a property immediately?

Short Answer

No, a Beneficiary Deed transfers title only upon the death of the owner.

Detailed Answer

The existence of a recorded Beneficiary Deed does not mean the current owner has given up their rights. The current owner remains the owner until they die, at which point the property transfers to the beneficiary.

Alj Quote

Mercedes B.B. Maiz testified that she executed the Beneficiary Deed… indicating that, upon her death, the subject property is deeded to her daughter… [and] The hearing record clearly documented that Mercedes B.B. Maiz owns Unit 245 at Park.

Legal Basis

Fact Finding / Property Law

Topic Tags

  • property ownership
  • deeds
  • evidence

Question

What is the standard of evidence required to win an administrative hearing against an HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

To win, the evidence must show that the claim is more likely true than not. It does not require removal of all doubt, just that the evidence carries more weight than the opposing side.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • evidence

Question

Where can a homeowner file a petition regarding violations of condo statutes or documents?

Short Answer

The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

Detailed Answer

Arizona law allows owners to petition the Department of Real Estate for a hearing if there is a dispute regarding violations of condominium documents or regulating statutes.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et al., regarding a dispute between an owner and a planned community association, the owner or association may petition the department for a hearing concerning violations of condominium documents or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • filing a complaint

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, who pays the filing fee?

Short Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must pay their own filing fee if the petition is dismissed.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge rules in favor of the HOA and dismisses the petition, the homeowner is ordered to bear the cost of the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED Petitioner shall bear her filing fee.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties

Case

Docket No
24F-H041-REL
Case Title
Deborah Masear v. Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2024-08-14
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Deborah Masear (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Erica L. Mortenson (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Represented Respondent at the hearing
  • Frank German Maiz (board member; witness)
    Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association
    Spouse of owner; testified for Respondent
  • Mercedes Bofill Benaches Maiz (owner; witness)
    Paradise Park Condominiums Phase II Homeowners Association
    Owner of the unit at issue; testified for Respondent
  • Ashley N. Turner (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Listed for transmission
  • GT (observer)
    Goodman Law Group
    Observing from Respondent's attorney's office

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
    Presided over the hearing and issued the decision
  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
    Signed the minute entry granting continuance
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • mneat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • lrecchia (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • gosborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • John Prieve (observer)
    Requested to observe the hearing
  • Mercedes Bofill Maiz (beneficiary; daughter)
    Daughter of owner Mercedes B.B. Maiz
  • Frank Bofill Maiz (beneficiary; son)
    Son of owner Mercedes B.B. Maiz

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times

Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 816310.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:18 (199.6 KB)

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 847175.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:21 (246.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision in the case of Debra K. Morin versus the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), dated January 8, 2021. The central dispute involved a homeowner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain its common areas in good condition and repair.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petitioner’s case, finding conclusively in favor of the Solera HOA. The decision rested on a critical provision within the association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which designates the Solera Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas. This clause grants the Board exclusive discretion, superseding an individual homeowner’s opinion on the timing or quality of maintenance.

Despite the petitioner presenting extensive photographic evidence documenting various maintenance issues, the ALJ concluded that this evidence failed to prove a violation of the governing documents. The petitioner did not meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had acted outside its granted authority. The ruling affirms that the authority of the Board is explicitly elevated above that of an individual homeowner in matters of common area maintenance under the controlling legal documents.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Background and Procedural History

The case originates from a petition filed by Debra K. Morin, a four-year resident of the Solera community, against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Tribunal).

A. Initial Petition

On March 12, 2020, Ms. Morin filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company (Premier) had violated numerous governing documents, including the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules & Regulations (R&Rs).

Issue #1: Alleged that Solera did not permit “direct communication from homeowners” and sought to have this “policy” rescinded.

Issue #2: Alleged that Solera was not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in “good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included uncontrolled weeds and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other common areas.

B. Procedural Developments

Motion to Dismiss: Solera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the issues were outside the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction.

Withdrawal of Issue #1: At a May 20, 2020 hearing, the Tribunal noted its jurisdiction did not extend to non-governing documents like the Board’s Code of Ethics. Consequently, Ms. Morin withdrew Issue #1. The Tribunal denied the Motion to Dismiss for the remaining “bare-bones” maintenance allegation in Issue #2.

Initial Decision (August 19, 2020): Following the original hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Solera was the “sole judge” regarding maintenance of the AREAS and had not violated its governing documents. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Request (September 24, 2020): Ms. Morin filed a request for rehearing, citing irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and arguing the decision was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Rehearing Granted and Conducted: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing, which was conducted telephonically on December 16, 2020.

——————————————————————————–

II. Core Arguments of the Parties

The fundamental conflict centered on the interpretation of the maintenance standards outlined in the community’s CC&Rs.

A. Petitioner’s Position (Debra K. Morin)

Ms. Morin’s case was built on the principle of equal application of maintenance standards.

Central Argument: The same maintenance standard requiring homeowners to keep their lots “in good condition and repair at all times” (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2) must be applied equally to Solera’s responsibility for the common AREAS (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1).

Core Belief: Because homeowners are given no discretion regarding delays in maintenance, Solera should not be able to take months to address reported issues.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted extensive documentation, including over 80 photographs (referenced in the rehearing as “310 pictures”), emails, and other documents. This evidence was intended to show persistent maintenance failures, including:

◦ Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations

◦ Poor exterior condition of the Community Center

◦ Deficiencies in street asphalt, storm drains, sidewalks, and curbing

◦ Water pooling and intrusion issues

◦ Exposed landscaping lights and irrigation lines

◦ Unremoved tree stumps

B. Respondent’s Position (Solera HOA)

Solera’s defense relied entirely on the specific authority granted to its Board by the governing documents.

Central Argument: The association met its responsibilities, and the petitioner’s subjective opinions about what, when, or how maintenance should be done are irrelevant.

Dispositive Legal Provision: Solera consistently cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”

Interpretation: This provision grants the Board exclusive discretion and authority to determine the nature and timing of maintenance, insulating its decisions from a single homeowner’s critique.

——————————————————————————–

III. Analysis and Key Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

The Rehearing Decision provided a thorough review of the evidence and legal arguments, ultimately reinforcing the original ruling in favor of Solera.

A. The “Sole Judge” Clause and Board Authority

The ALJ’s conclusion hinged on the unambiguous language of the CC&Rs, which establishes a clear hierarchy of authority.

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1: This article was identified as the dispositive text. It states, in pertinent part: “the Board ‘shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS], but all [AREAS], and the Improvements located thereon, shall be maintained in good condition and repair at all times.'” The ALJ found that the “sole judge” provision grants the Board exclusive authority to determine how the “good condition and repair” standard is met.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5: This section further strengthens the Board’s position by granting Solera the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with its interpretation being “final, conclusive and binding.”

Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ concluded that these provisions clearly lift the Board’s authority above that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance.

B. Rejection of the “Equal Standard” Argument

The petitioner’s primary argument for an equal, non-discretionary standard for both the HOA and homeowners was explicitly rejected.

• The ALJ found that the petitioner “failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard is required to be applied to the Board as it is applied to a homeowner.”

• The governing documents themselves create different levels of authority and obligation for the Board versus individual owners.

C. Evaluation of Evidence and Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterates that the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Photographic Evidence: The ALJ acknowledged reviewing all photographs from both hearings. The decision states that this evidence successfully documented “the existence, at those dates embedded in the photographs, of items that deal with maintenance and repairs in various locations of Solera AREAS.”

Failure to Prove a Violation: Crucially, while the photos proved maintenance issues existed, they did not prove a violation of the CC&Rs. Because the Board is the “sole judge,” the existence of a weed or a cracked curb does not automatically constitute a breach of its duties, as the Board retains discretion over the timeline and method of repair.

D. Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision affirmed the Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction, noting that many of the petitioner’s underlying frustrations were not legally actionable in this venue.

Not Actionable: A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with the Board, its management company, or the General Manager is “not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

Irrelevant Documents: Arguments based on City of Chandler standards, the landscaping contract with Integrated Landscape Management (ILM), or Premier’s General Manager job description were deemed irrelevant, as the Tribunal’s review is limited to the association’s governing documents and applicable state statutes.

——————————————————————————–

IV. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on an exhaustive review of the record from both the original hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Finding: The petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The ALJ concluded that Solera is in compliance with its governing documents, including CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Order:

IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

◦ The order was issued on January 8, 2021.

◦ As a decision issued after a rehearing, the order is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative rehearing case No. 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG, between Petitioner Debra K. Morin and Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms derived from the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and who represented them at the telephonic hearing on December 16, 2020?

2. What were the two initial issues Petitioner Debra K. Morin raised in her petition filed on March 12, 2020?

3. Why did the Petitioner withdraw Issue #1 from her petition during the May 20, 2020 hearing?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?

5. What type of evidence did the Petitioner primarily present to document the alleged maintenance failures in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?

6. What specific clause in the CC&Rs did Solera (the Respondent) rely on to defend its actions and decisions regarding maintenance?

7. What were the primary reasons the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the relevance of non-governing documents, such as the City of Chandler ordinances and the Premier Management Company job description?

9. What is the legal standard of proof that a petitioner must meet in these proceedings, and how is it defined in the decision?

10. What was the final conclusion and order of the Administrative Law Judge in the Rehearing Decision issued on January 8, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Debra K. Morin, who represented herself, and the Respondent, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association (Solera). Solera was represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Issue #1 alleged that Solera did not allow direct communication from homeowners. Issue #2 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company were not providing proper oversight to maintain the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair.

3. The Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after the Tribunal ruled that the statutory parameters of its jurisdiction did not include the interpretation or application of a non-governing document like the Board’s Code of Ethics. The allegations regarding ethics and mismanagement based on this code were therefore removed from consideration.

4. The Petitioner’s central argument was that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that just as homeowners are required by CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 to maintain their lots in good condition at all times, Solera must be held to the same standard for common AREAS under CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

5. The Petitioner presented an “enormity” of photographic evidence to document the maintenance issues. The decision notes she presented over eighty photographs at the original hearing and an additional “310 pictures” were mentioned in the rehearing, showing weeds, debris, exposed wiring, and other issues at various dates.

6. Solera relied on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states that the Solera Board of Directors “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Solera argued that the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on maintenance were therefore not relevant.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request, which claimed: irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by evidence, or contrary to law.

8. The Judge ruled that such documents were not relevant or justiciable. City standards were not under review, and the management company’s job description and landscape contract were not Solera governing documents, so they could not be used to prove a violation of the association’s governing documents.

9. The petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, and it represents the greater weight of evidence.

10. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The Judge found Solera to be the prevailing party, in compliance with CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, and ordered that the Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the balance of power between a homeowner and an HOA as depicted in this case. Discuss how specific clauses in the CC&Rs, particularly Article 7 (Section 7.1) and Article 9 (Sections 9.5 and 9.9), grant authority to the Board and limit the recourse available to an individual owner within the association’s own framework.

2. Examine the role and limitations of evidence in this administrative hearing. Why was the Petitioner’s photographic evidence, despite its volume, ultimately insufficient to meet the burden of proof? Discuss the distinction made by the Tribunal between evidence of a maintenance issue and evidence of a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued for an equal application of the “maintenance standard” to both homeowners and the HOA, stating “[t]here must be equal consideration to have a valid contract.” Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific language found in the Solera CC&Rs. Is the concept of “equal consideration” legally applicable in the way the Petitioner suggests?

4. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (the Tribunal) in HOA disputes as described in the decision. Explain why the Tribunal could rule on the maintenance of common areas but had to dismiss claims related to the Solera Code of Ethics, City of Chandler ordinances, and Premier Management’s internal documents.

5. Based on the findings of fact, trace the procedural journey of this case from the initial petition to the final rehearing order. Identify the key turning points, such as the Motion to Dismiss and the Order Granting Rehearing, and explain their impact on the scope and outcome of the dispute.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact, issues decisions, and conducts rehearings.

Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)

The common areas within the Solera community that the homeowners’ association is responsible for managing and maintaining. This includes landscaping, the Community Center exterior, street conditions, storm drains, sidewalks, walls, and curbing.

Articles of Incorporation

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit A.

By-Laws

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit B.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A primary governing document for the Solera at Springfield Lakes community. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both the homeowners and the association.

Maintenance Standard

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party (in this case, Solera) asking for a petition or case to be dismissed on the grounds that the issues are outside the Department’s jurisdiction or that the requested relief cannot be granted as a matter of law.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in the Solera community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for a petitioner to win in these proceedings. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Premier Management Company (Premier)

The management company hired by the Solera Board of Directors to handle duties including the oversight of a General Manager.

Project Documents

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.37 as the CC&Rs, any supplements to the CC&Rs, the By-Laws, the Rules and Regulations (R&Rs), and the Design Guidelines.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit D.

Tribunal

A term used to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the body responsible for conducting administrative hearings for disputes referred by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

🧑‍⚖️

20F-H2020051-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision regarding a dispute between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner initially filed a two-issue complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the HOA had violated various governing documents, primarily concerning lack of direct homeowner communication and a failure to maintain Association Responsibility Areas (AREAS) in good condition. After the first issue was withdrawn due to jurisdictional limitations, the initial decision dismissed the petition, finding the HOA was the sole judge of appropriate maintenance under the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This rehearing decision, granted due to claims of procedural irregularities and arbitrary findings, ultimately reaffirms the original dismissal, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the governing documents.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
  • Denise Frazier (general manager/witness)
    Premier Management Company / Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
    Solera's onsite general manager who testified

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative)
    Transmitted the original August 19, 2020 Decision

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:53 (188.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.

MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date

June 19, 2020

Decision Date

July 28, 2020

The Cross-Petitions

The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.

Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”

MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.

Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.

Core Allegations:

1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.

2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.

Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

Analysis of the Disputed Amendment

The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.

Key Provisions of the Amendment

Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).

Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”

Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.

Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”

Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.

MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment

In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:

• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.

• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.

• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”

Background and History of the Dispute

Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.

Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.

Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.

Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.

Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:

December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.

April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues

The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.

Stipulated Fact #11

The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:

“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”

Conflicting Legal Standards

Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”

Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”

Parties’ Core Arguments

MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.

MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.

Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)

Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.

Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.

Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.

Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)

Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.

Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.

Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.

Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.

Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”

Final Order

1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.

3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):

◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.

◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.

4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.

Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?

2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?

3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?

4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?

5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?

6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.

7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?

8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?

Answer Key

1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.

3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.

4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.

5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.

8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.

10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.

2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.

4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.

5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.

Amendment

The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.

A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”

Declaration

The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.

Hangar Tracts

Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.

Magnus L.D. MacLeod

The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.

Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.

Petition #19

The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.

Petition #34

The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Residential Lots

Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.

Tract G

An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.

Unit 4B

The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.

Select all sources
810246.pdf

Loading

20F-H2019019-REL

1 source

This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.

1 source

What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey M. Proper (attorney)
    JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC
    Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Craig Albright (board member)
    MAP Board of Directors
    Then President of the MAP Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Magnus L.D. MacLeod (party)
    Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
  • Pat MacLeod (HOA president)
    HOA
    Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017