Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

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Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

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Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

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Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:31 (102.8 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

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18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:39 (144.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Venue and Adjudication:

Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.

Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.

How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Scheinholtz, Martin F. vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association

Case Summary

Case ID 13F-H1313001-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2013-06-19
Administrative Law Judge M. Douglas
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Respondent, Corte Bella Country Club Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 or the Bylaws. The Board's appointment of a director during the 'new business' portion of a meeting, though not on the written agenda, was found to be permissible as members were allowed to comment prior to the vote.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Martin F. Scheinholtz Counsel Yvette D. Ansel
Respondent Corte Bella Country Club Association Counsel Troy B. Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Respondent, Corte Bella Country Club Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 or the Bylaws. The Board's appointment of a director during the 'new business' portion of a meeting, though not on the written agenda, was found to be permissible as members were allowed to comment prior to the vote.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the existence of a secret meeting or that the omission of the specific item from the agenda violated the statute or bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meeting Law / Agenda Violation

Petitioner alleged that the Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by meeting secretly to decide on a board appointment prior to the open meeting and by failing to list the appointment of a new director on the agenda for the December 11, 2012 meeting.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

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  • 29
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Briefing Document: Martin F. Scheinholtz vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative law case Martin F. Scheinholtz v. Corte Bella Country Club Association (No. 13F-H1313001-BFS). The dispute centered on whether the Corte Bella Board of Directors violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by appointing a new director to fill a vacancy during a meeting where the appointment was not explicitly listed on the written agenda.

The Petitioner, Martin F. Scheinholtz, alleged that four board members reached a secret agreement prior to the December 11, 2012, meeting to appoint William Blake, thereby bypassing proper open board discussion and homeowner notice. The Respondent, Corte Bella Country Club Association, argued that the appointment was a valid exercise of board authority under their Bylaws and that the meeting complied with statutory requirements by allowing member comments before the vote.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of law or association bylaws. The ruling found no evidence of a secret quorum meeting and determined that the Board acted within its rights to introduce the appointment as "new business." The decision was certified as final on July 29, 2013.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Agenda Specificity vs. "New Business"

A central theme of the case was the level of detail required in a board meeting agenda. The Petitioner argued that significant issues, such as the composition of the Board, must be explicitly listed to allow members to decide whether to attend. However, the Association demonstrated that it was common practice to introduce motions not listed on the agenda under the "new business" portion of meetings. The ALJ found that the lack of specific notice regarding the appointment did not invalidate the action, as the Board followed the procedure of allowing member comments before taking a formal vote.

2. Pre-Meeting Communications and Quorum Rules

The Petitioner alleged that a quorum of the Board (four members) had met or decided the issue privately before the open meeting. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)(4), any quorum of the board meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting provisions.

  • The Evidence: Testimony revealed that only three members (Ray Valle, Walt Kearns, and Vin Petrella) were aware the motion would likely be made.
  • The Legal Finding: Because three members do not constitute a quorum for this six-member board, their private discussions did not trigger a violation of the Open Meeting Law.
3. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The case scrutinized the state policy regarding planned communities. A.R.S. § 33-1804(E) mandates that notices and agendas provide "reasonably necessary" information to inform members and ensure they have the ability to speak. The ALJ interpreted this in favor of the Association because:

  • Members present at the meeting were permitted to speak.
  • The Board had the legal authority under Bylaw Section 3.6 to fill vacancies.
  • The statutory requirement for specific notice for "special meetings" (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B))—which includes the "proposal to remove a director"—does not explicitly mandate the same level of granular detail for appointing a director during a regular meeting.
4. Member Recourse and Post-Action Validation

The Association highlighted that homeowners had a mechanism for recourse: the recall process. Following William Blake’s appointment, a recall petition was filed. The members of the association voted on this petition, and it failed, effectively ratifying the Board's choice. The ALJ noted this as part of the context in which the Board’s actions remained within the bounds of community governance.


Important Quotes and Context

Speaker Quote Context
Vincent James Petrella "[I] orchestrated the appointment… politics at its best." Written by Petrella on a community blog, admitting he planned the surprise motion to appoint Mr. Blake.
Regina Shanney-Saborsky "Board members were expected to act in the highest fiduciary manner." Testifying as a board member who opposed the vote, arguing that notice should have been provided.
Martin F. Scheinholtz "I saw nothing of significance in the written agenda… if I had been aware… I would have certainly attended." Explaining his grievance that the omission of the appointment from the agenda effectively excluded him.
Ray Valle "The Board had ‘every right’ to rescind the motion made during the August 29, 2012 meeting." Defending the Board’s decision to change its previous plan (to wait for an election) and instead appoint a director immediately.
Administrative Law Judge "There was no credible evidence that any of the other three members of the Board had any knowledge of the expected motion." The finding that cleared the Board of the "secret quorum" allegation.

Legal Provisions Summary

Association Bylaws: Article III, Section 3.6

The Board is empowered to declare a vacancy and appoint a successor to fill that vacancy for the remainder of the director's term in the event of a death, disability, or resignation.

Arizona Revised Statutes: A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Open Meetings: All board meetings must be open to members.
  • Right to Speak: Members must be permitted to speak after the board discusses an item but before a formal vote is taken.
  • Agenda Access: The agenda must be available to all members attending the meeting.
  • Policy of Openness: Any interpretation of the law should be construed in favor of open meetings.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners' Association Boards
  • Agenda Best Practices: While "new business" motions are legally permissible, omitting significant items (like board appointments) can lead to litigation and community distrust. Listing major items on the agenda is a safeguard against allegations of transparency violations.
  • Quorum Awareness: Board members must be cautious when discussing association business in small groups. If a quorum is reached in private—even via phone or email—it may constitute an illegal "informal" meeting.
  • Member Participation: Always ensure a clear opportunity for member comment after board discussion but before the vote to satisfy A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).
For Homeowners
  • Burden of Proof: In administrative hearings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a "preponderance of the evidence" (showing it is more likely true than not).
  • Attendance Matters: If an agenda includes a "new business" or "member comments" section, homeowners should be aware that significant motions can be introduced unexpectedly.
  • Recall Mechanism: The legal system views the recall process as a primary tool for members to challenge board appointments they disagree with. If a recall fails, it serves as evidence of the community's acceptance of the board's action.

Study Guide: Martin F. Scheinholtz v. Corte Bella Country Club Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Martin F. Scheinholtz v. Corte Bella Country Club Association (No. 13F-H1313001-BFS). It examines the intersection of Arizona statutory law, homeowners' association (HOA) bylaws, and the transparency requirements of open meeting laws.


I. Key Concepts and Case Background

1. Legal Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal issue revolves around Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

  • Open Meetings: All meetings of the association and the board of directors must be open to all members or their designated representatives.
  • Member Participation: Members must be allowed to speak at an appropriate time during deliberations. Specifically, they must be permitted to speak at least once after the board discusses an item but before a formal vote is taken.
  • Agenda Availability: For meetings held after the termination of declarant control, an agenda must be made available to all members attending the meeting.
  • State Policy: Arizona law favors open meetings. Agendas and notices should contain information reasonably necessary to inform members of matters to be discussed or decided.
2. The Dispute

Petitioner Martin F. Scheinholtz alleged that the Corte Bella Country Club Association violated open meeting laws during a December 11, 2012, board meeting. The board voted 4-2 to appoint William Blake to a vacant director position. This item was not explicitly listed on the written agenda but was introduced as "new business."

3. Fiduciary Duties and Association Bylaws
  • Fiduciary Duty: Board members are expected to act in the highest fiduciary manner regarding the association's interests.
  • Bylaws (Section 3.6): The Corte Bella Bylaws explicitly authorize the board to declare a vacancy and appoint a successor to fill that vacancy for the remainder of a director's term (in cases of death, disability, or resignation).
4. Quorum and Pre-Meeting Discussions

A quorum refers to the minimum number of board members required to make proceedings valid. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)(4), if a quorum meets informally to discuss association business, they must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a formal vote is taken. In this case, only three members were aware the motion would be made, which did not constitute a quorum.


II. Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. Who was the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who presided over this case? Answer: M. Douglas.

2. What specific action did the Petitioner claim was a violation of the law? Answer: The board voted on a significant issue (appointing a new director) that was not placed on the meeting agenda, thereby preventing proper open discussion and notice to homeowners.

3. According to the Corte Bella Bylaws, what is the board's power regarding vacancies? Answer: Under Section 3.6, the board has the power to declare a vacancy (due to death, disability, or resignation) and appoint a successor to fill the remainder of the term.

4. Did the association allow members to speak before the vote on Mr. Blake's appointment? Answer: Yes. Testimony indicated that homeowners were permitted to make comments after the motion was made but before the formal vote was taken.

5. What was the outcome of the recall petition filed against William Blake after his appointment? Answer: The recall petition failed, and the majority of homeowners voted to retain Mr. Blake as a member of the board.

6. How many hours in advance must a board meeting notice be given to members under A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)? Answer: At least forty-eight hours in advance.

7. Why did the Petitioner state he did not attend the December 11, 2012, meeting? Answer: He saw nothing of significance on the written agenda and felt that major issues like board composition should have been listed to allow members to decide whether to attend.

8. What was the final ruling of the Administrative Law Judge? Answer: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof and dismissed the petition, deeming Corte Bella the prevailing party.


III. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. The Tension Between Procedural Flexibility and Transparency Analyze the conflict between the board's right to introduce "new business" and the statutory requirement that agendas provide information "reasonably necessary" to inform members. Should a board be allowed to vote on the appointment of a new director if it is not on the agenda, even if bylaws allow the board to fill vacancies? Support your argument using the findings of fact from the case.

2. The Definition of a Meeting and Quorum Ethics Discuss the legal and ethical implications of board members discussing potential motions in small groups prior to an open meeting. At what point does a series of private conversations between board members constitute an informal meeting that violates A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)(4)? Reference the testimony of Mr. Valle and Mr. Petrella regarding their "orchestration" of the vote.

3. The Role of the Membership in Overruling Board Actions Examine the significance of the failed recall election mentioned in the testimony. To what extent does a subsequent member vote (like a recall) validate or invalidate a board's previous procedural choices? Does the failure of a recall suggest that the board's decision was ultimately aligned with the community's will, regardless of the agenda omission?


IV. Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
A.R.S. Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) An official who presides over an administrative hearing and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Burden of Proof The obligation of a party (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide enough evidence to support their claim.
Declarant Control The period during which the developer (declarant) controls the homeowners' association before handing it over to the members.
Fiduciary Duty A legal obligation to act in the best interest of another party (e.g., board members acting for the association).
Motion A formal proposal by a member of a deliberative body that the body take certain action.
Preponderance of the Evidence The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the proposition is "more likely true than not."
Proxy An authorization given by one person to allow another to act or vote on their behalf.
Quorum The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Recall Petition A formal process by which members of an association can vote to remove an elected or appointed official from office.
Rescind To revoke, cancel, or repeal a previous action or motion.

Behind the Boardroom Door: Lessons in Transparency from Scheinholtz v. Corte Bella

1. Introduction: The Surprise Agenda Item

Imagine reviewing your Homeowners Association (HOA) meeting agenda and seeing only routine administrative items. You decide to stay home, assuming nothing of consequence will occur. The next day, you discover that during that same meeting, the Board of Directors performed a procedural about-face: they rescinded a previous commitment to hold an election and instead appointed a new member to a vacant seat—a decision that set the community’s leadership for the next 15 months.

This scenario is the basis of the legal dispute in Martin F. Scheinholtz vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association (No. 13F-H1313001-BFS). The case brings a pivotal question to the forefront of community governance: Does an HOA board have the legal right to vote on a major appointment if it is not explicitly listed on the meeting agenda?

2. The Conflict: A Seat at the Table

The Petitioner, Martin F. Scheinholtz, challenged the actions taken by the Corte Bella Board during their December 11, 2012, meeting. He alleged that the board had pre-planned a major leadership change behind closed doors, effectively bypassing the community's right to a transparent process.

"On or before 11/30/12 a meeting was conducted by four Board members as evidenced by Kearns proxy to Petrella to vote on specific issues not placed on the 12/11/12 board meeting agenda. Said actions were unknown to home owners, to other board members and did not allow for proper open board discussion."

Mr. Scheinholtz's claim of a "secret meeting" rested on a proxy from board member Walter Kearns, which indicated that at least some members knew the motion was coming. However, the legal threshold for an illegal meeting is a quorum—which, for this seven-member board, required four directors. While the proxy proved that three members (Kearns, Valle, and Petrella) had discussed the matter, it did not prove that a fourth member had joined them in secret.

The Petitioner testified that he felt systematically excluded. Because the agenda was not descriptive, he chose not to attend the meeting. Had the vacancy appointment—a term running from December 2012 through March 2014—been listed, he stated he "certainly would have attended" to participate in the discussion.

3. The Board’s Defense: Bylaws and "New Business"

The Board's defense highlighted a sophisticated understanding of procedural law. A critical, yet often overlooked, detail of this case is that the Board had to undo its own previous decisions. On August 29, 2012, the Board had passed a motion to fill the vacancy with the "fifth highest vote-getter" from the upcoming 2013 election. To appoint William Blake on December 11, they first had to move to rescind that previous motion during the "new business" portion of the meeting.

The following table compares the Petitioner’s expectations of transparency against the Board’s reliance on their governing documents:

Petitioner's Perspective (Transparency/Notice) Board’s Perspective (Legal Authority/Bylaws)
Major issues like Board composition must be on the written agenda so members can decide whether to attend. Bylaws § 3.6 expressly grant the Board power to declare a vacancy and appoint a successor without a community vote.
The "unknown" nature of the motion and the rescission of the previous election plan prevented open discussion. Board members have the right to introduce motions under "new business" even if they are not on the pre-printed agenda.
The lack of notice was an "orchestrated" attempt to exclude members from a "huge" leadership issue. Because members present were allowed to speak before the vote, the "open meeting" requirement was satisfied. (Bylaws § 3.6)

Vincent James Petrella, who admitted to "orchestrating" the appointment, even referred to the maneuver in a community blog as "politics at its best." Despite this admission of political strategy, the Board argued that their technical compliance with the law superseded the Petitioner's desire for better notice.

4. The Legal Framework: Understanding A.R.S. § 33-1804

To understand why the Board’s actions held up in court, we must look at the specific nuances of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. As a legal expert, I must point out a vital distinction: the law treats Board Meetings and Special Meetings of the Membership differently. While notice for a special membership meeting must explicitly state a purpose like "removing a director," the rules for regular board meetings are more flexible.

Key provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804 include:

  • The Right to Speak: The board is legally required to permit a member to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before the board takes a formal vote on that item.
  • Information Standards: Agendas must be available to those attending and should contain information "reasonably necessary" to inform members of the matters to be discussed.
  • The Policy of Openness: Arizona law directs that these statutes be construed in favor of open meetings. However, the ALJ noted that "reasonably necessary" does not strictly forbid a board from raising new business that wasn't anticipated when the agenda was posted.
  • Bylaw Seniority: Section 3.6 of the Corte Bella Bylaws specifically empowered the board to fill vacancies, providing a clear legal track for their actions independent of the state's general preference for elections.
5. The Verdict: Why the Petition Was Dismissed

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) applied the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard. In the HOA context, this means the burden of proof is on the homeowner. Mr. Scheinholtz had to prove it was "more likely than not" that a violation occurred. His feeling of being excluded, while understandable, was not enough to overcome the Board’s technical adherence to the law.

The ALJ’s dismissal was based on three primary findings:

  1. No Illegal Quorum: There was no evidence that four or more members met secretly. The "orchestration" by three members did not constitute a "meeting" under the law.
  2. The "Right to Speak" Was Honored: Despite the item not being on the agenda, two homeowners who were present were allowed to comment on the motion before the vote was taken. This single act satisfied the statutory requirement for an open meeting.
  3. Community Resolution: The ALJ noted that the community later attempted to recall the appointee, Mr. Blake. That recall petition failed, and the majority of homeowners voted to retain him, suggesting a level of finality to the Board’s controversial but legal action.
6. Critical Takeaways for Homeowners and HOA Boards

The Scheinholtz case offers three vital lessons for anyone involved in community governance:

  1. The Power of Bylaws (The "Election" Myth): Homeowners often assume that major leadership changes must involve a community-wide election. However, Bylaws (like Corte Bella’s § 3.6) often grant boards the absolute authority to fill vacancies by appointment. The written Bylaws are the final authority.
  2. The "New Business" Loophole: While state policy encourages detailed agendas, boards are legally permitted to introduce and vote on significant motions during "new business" without prior notice. As long as a quorum didn't decide the matter in a secret meeting beforehand, "pre-planning" by a minority of the board is legally permissible.
  3. The Importance of the "Right to Speak": For a Board, allowing public comment after a motion is made but before the vote is a powerful legal shield. It transforms a potentially "closed-door" maneuver into a legally compliant "open meeting" action, even if the public is surprised by the topic.
7. Conclusion: The Balance of Power

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and the Board’s actions were deemed legal. Scheinholtz v. Corte Bella demonstrates that "politics at its best" is not necessarily "governance at its worst" in the eyes of the law. While the Board's decision to rescind their election plan and appoint a member via a non-agenda motion was controversial, it stayed within the bounds of Arizona law and the Association’s Bylaws.

For homeowners, the lesson is clear: to have a voice, you must be present. Because "New Business" can change the course of a community in minutes, staying informed requires reading the fine print of both State Law and your Association Bylaws. Understanding these rules is the only way to ensure the "Boardroom Door" remains open to everyone.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Martin F. Scheinholtz (petitioner)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association (Member)
    Homeowner alleging violation of open meeting laws
  • Yvette D. Ansel (attorney)
    Hymson Goldstein & Pantiliat, PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (attorney)
    Mack Watson & Stratman, P.L.C.
  • Regina Shanney-Saborsky (witness)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Board Member; testified she voted against the appointment
  • William Blake (board member)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Appointed to fill vacant director position
  • Robert Moberly (witness)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Board Member
  • Ray Valle (witness)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Former Board Member; testified regarding the motion to appoint Blake
  • Walter E. Kearns (board member)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Mentioned in testimony/proxy
  • Vincent James Petrella (witness)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Former Board Member; admitted to 'orchestrating' the appointment
  • Robert Rosenberg (board member)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Mentioned in testimony as not being aware of the motion beforehand
  • James R. Williams (witness)
    Corte Bella Country Club Association
    Board President

Neutral Parties

  • M. Douglas (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (agency director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Cliff J. Vanell (director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the ALJ decision
  • Joni Cage (recipient)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    c/o for Gene Palma
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Mailed/faxed the certification