Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

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Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

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Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

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  • 32
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Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:31 (102.8 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

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18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:39 (144.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Venue and Adjudication:

Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.

Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.

How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Robert A. White vs. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 16F-H1616001-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2016-04-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The ALJ dismissed all claims. The HOA was found to be in compliance with insurance and records statutes. The maintenance issue involved a Limited Common Element for which the owner was responsible. The noise issue was barred by CC&R waivers and timing.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert A. White Counsel
Respondent Aspen Shadows Condominium Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1253
A.R.S. § 33-1247
CC&Rs 4.23
A.R.S. § 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed all claims. The HOA was found to be in compliance with insurance and records statutes. The maintenance issue involved a Limited Common Element for which the owner was responsible. The noise issue was barred by CC&R waivers and timing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all counts. The HOA demonstrated compliance with statutes (electronic records, reasonably available insurance) and the CC&Rs (Limited Common Element responsibility, noise waivers).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to Maintain All-Risk Insurance

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to maintain required insurance coverage because the insurer denied a claim for a slow leak/construction defect.

Orders: Dismissed. Respondent maintained a policy; exclusions for slow leaks/defects are common and reasonably available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 4
  • 14
  • 16
  • 54
  • 55

Failure to Maintain Common Elements (Grinder Pump)

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair a grinder pump damaged by storm runoff and improper installation.

Orders: Dismissed. Petitioner failed to prove the pump was defective. As a Limited Common Element, costs were assessable to Petitioner anyway.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 28
  • 31
  • 56
  • 57

Failure to Enforce Floor Covering Restrictions

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to enforce prohibitions against hard floor coverings in the unit above him, causing noise.

Orders: Dismissed. The flooring was installed years prior to Petitioner's purchase. Petitioner assumed risk of noise under CC&Rs.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 6
  • 41
  • 44
  • 58
  • 59

Failure to Provide Records (Resale Disclosure)

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide paper copies of governing documents upon purchase, offering electronic versions instead.

Orders: Dismissed. The statute permits electronic delivery.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 7
  • 47
  • 59
  • 60

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

16F-H1616001-BFS Decision – 488610.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:56:58 (203.0 KB)

16F-H1616001-BFS Decision – 495160.pdf

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16F-H1616001-BFS Decision – 488610.pdf

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16F-H1616001-BFS Decision – 495160.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:12:47 (59.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Robert A. White v. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative hearing and subsequent decision regarding the dispute between Robert A. White (Petitioner) and the Aspen Shadows Condominium Association (Respondent). The case (No. 16F-H1616001-BFS) was heard by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky on March 24, 2016.

The Petitioner, a homeowner in the Aspen Shadows development, alleged that the Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the community's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) across four primary areas: insurance coverage, maintenance of common elements (grinder pump), enforcement of flooring restrictions, and the provision of resale disclosure documents.

On April 1, 2016, the ALJ recommended the dismissal of the petition, finding that the Respondent had acted within its legal and contractual authority and that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for his claims. This decision was certified as final by the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety on May 9, 2016.


Analysis of Key Themes

1. Insurance Obligations and Coverage Exclusions

A central theme of the dispute was whether the Association maintained adequate property insurance as required by A.R.S. § 33-1253 and Article 8.1.1 of the CC&Rs.

  • Petitioner's Claim: He argued that the Association's insurance should have covered water damage in his unit (Unit 41) caused by a leak in the unit above (Unit 42). He contended that the Association "withdrew" the claim or held an inadequate policy that did not cover "all risks."
  • Respondent's Defense: The Association demonstrated it submitted the claim to Farmers Insurance. The insurer denied the claim based on policy exclusions for "wear and tear," "faulty installation," and damage occurring over a long period (more than 14 days).
  • ALJ Finding: The Respondent established that its policy was consistent with those "reasonably available" to condominium associations. The ALJ concluded the Association did not violate its duties simply because a specific claim was denied under standard exclusions.
2. Maintenance and Repair of Limited Common Elements

The dispute addressed the responsibility for repairing a "grinder pump" serving the Petitioner's unit.

  • The Issue: The Petitioner replaced a failing grinder pump at his own expense ($2,556.84 total) and sought reimbursement, blaming improper installation and a poorly designed diversion wall for the failure.
  • Respondent's Defense: The Association’s facilities engineer, Ty Hart, inspected the site and found the pump lid was partially off, allowing debris in. He further stated the drainage was subsequently addressed and repaired.
  • Legal Interpretation: Under CC&R Section 5.1, while the Association is generally responsible for common elements, it has the right to assess the cost of repairing "Limited Common Elements" (those serving fewer than all units) back to the benefiting owner. Because the pump served only Unit 41, the ALJ found the reimbursement claim moot.
3. CC&R Enforcement and Sound Liability

The Petitioner sought enforcement of CC&R Section 4.23, which prohibits hard floor coverings in certain unit types, alleging noise from Unit 42's hardwood floors impacted his unit's sale price.

  • Evidence of Violation: The Respondent admitted the owner of Unit 42 had hardwood floors but indicated it was investigating whether a variance had been granted in 2008.
  • Liability Release: The ALJ highlighted CC&R Section 13.20 ("Sound issues; Release of Claims"), which explicitly states that unit owners assume the risk of noise and vibrations in attached residential units and release the Association from liability regarding such claims.
  • Outcome: The ALJ determined the Petitioner did not establish the Association was responsible for the potential violation, particularly as the floors were installed years before he purchased the unit.
4. Statutory Requirements for Resale Disclosure

The final theme involved the delivery of governing documents during the property purchase process under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

  • Petitioner's Claim: He argued he never received the Bylaws and CC&Rs in the "required written" (paper) format before closing.
  • Statutory Reality: A.R.S. § 33-1260 allows associations to provide documents in "either paper or electronic format."
  • Evidence: The Respondent provided evidence that electronic access was offered and that hard copies were eventually mailed to the Petitioner eight days before closing. The ALJ ruled that the Petitioner’s refusal to accept electronic delivery did not constitute a violation by the Association.

Important Quotes with Context

Quote Source/Context Significance
"The insurance policies purchased by the Association shall… contain… A 'severability of interest' endorsement which shall preclude the insurer from denying the claim of a Unit Owner because of the negligent acts of [Respondent] or other Unit Owners." CC&R Article 8.1.1(vii)(e); quoted in the ALJ's Findings of Fact. This defines the standard for Association insurance and was the basis for the Petitioner's claim of coverage violation.
"Unfortunately, wear and tear, faulty or improper installation, mold, damages caused by mold and water damages that occur over a long period of time are all excluded from coverage under your policy." Farmers Insurance Denial Letter (Dec 7, 2015); addressed to the Community Manager. This established that the claim was denied by the carrier's independent investigation, not "withdrawn" by the Association.
"Neither the Declarant Parties, the Association nor any director, officer, agent or employee of the Association shall be liable to any Unit Owner… for any claims or damages resulting… from any noise or vibrations emanating from one unit to another." CC&R Section 13.20; quoted in the ALJ's Findings of Fact. This provided a legal shield for the Association against the Petitioner's noise-related complaints.
"A unit owner shall mail or deliver to a purchaser… all of the following in either paper or electronic format: 1. A copy of the bylaws… 2. A copy of the declaration." A.R.S. § 33-1260(A); cited in Conclusions of Law. This statute confirmed the Association's right to provide documents electronically, negating the Petitioner's demand for paper-only delivery.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners' Associations
  • Maintain Clear Records of Variances: The Association's difficulty in immediately producing a 2008 variance for a flooring violation highlights the need for organized, long-term archives of Board meeting minutes and granted exceptions.
  • Document Distribution Standards: Associations are legally permitted to use electronic delivery for resale disclosures. Standardizing this process and keeping delivery receipts (as the Association did with "HomeWiseDocs") provides a strong defense against claims of non-disclosure.
  • Insurance Policy Education: Associations should ensure members understand that "All Risk" property insurance still contains standard exclusions (e.g., slow leaks, wear and tear), and that the Association's policy is not a substitute for individual unit owner insurance.
For Property Owners
  • Due Diligence on Sound Exposure: Owners purchasing units in attached developments should be aware that CC&Rs often contain "assumption of risk" clauses regarding noise. Investigating the unit above for hard flooring prior to purchase is a critical step.
  • Burden of Proof in Administrative Hearings: To succeed in a petition against an HOA, the owner must provide a "preponderance of the evidence." In this case, the Petitioner failed to prove that his specific grinder pump was defective or that the Association had a duty to cover a denied insurance claim.
  • Limited Common Element Costs: Owners should verify which elements of their unit are classified as "Limited Common Elements," as the Association often has the right to bill the repair costs for these items back to the individual owner.

Study Guide: White v. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association (No. 16F-H1616001-BFS)

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Robert A. White v. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association. It explores the legal disputes between a condominium owner and a homeowners' association (HOA) regarding insurance coverage, maintenance responsibilities, flooring restrictions, and statutory disclosure requirements.


I. Case Overview and Key Entities

Core Parties
  • Petitioner: Robert A. White, owner of Unit 41 in the Aspen Shadows Condominium development.
  • Respondent: Aspen Shadows Condominium Association, the homeowners' association (HOA) responsible for the development located in Flagstaff, Arizona.
  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): Diane Mihalsky, who presided over the hearing on March 24, 2016.
Primary Legal Frameworks
  • Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Title 33 (Condominiums): Specifically sections 33-1247 (Maintenance and Repair), 33-1253 (Insurance), and 33-1260 (Resale Disclosure).
  • Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): The governing documents of the Aspen Shadows Condominium Association.

II. Summary of Disputes and Legal Findings

1. Insurance Coverage (A.R.S. § 33-1253 & CC&R Article 8)

The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent failed to provide adequate insurance coverage after a water leak from Unit 42 caused damage to his unit (Unit 41). The HOA's insurer, Farmers Insurance, denied the claim.

  • Evidence: The insurer determined the leak was a "repeated, slow drip" over at least 14 days, caused by faulty installation or wear and tear.
  • ALJ Finding: The Respondent maintained an "All Risk" policy as required. However, exclusions for slow leaks, mold, and faulty construction are common in policies "reasonably available" to HOAs. Therefore, the Respondent did not violate the statute or CC&Rs.
2. Maintenance of the Grinder Pump (A.R.S. § 33-1247 & CC&R Article 5)

The Petitioner claimed a grinder pump serving his unit was damaged by storm water runoff due to an improperly installed diversion wall. He sought reimbursement for replacement costs ($1,697.50 for the pump and $859.34 for installation).

  • Evidence: A facilities engineer inspected the site and found the pump lid was unsecured, allowing debris to enter. The engineer also confirmed the pump was in working order after cleaning.
  • Legal Distinction: The grinder pump was classified as a Limited Common Element because it served only Unit 41.
  • ALJ Finding: Under CC&R Section 5.1, the HOA has the right to assess the cost of maintenance or repair of a Limited Common Element back to the specific unit owner it serves. Thus, the HOA was not liable for the costs.
3. Hard Floor Restrictions (CC&R Section 4)

The Petitioner alleged the unit above him (Unit 42) violated CC&R Section 4.23, which prohibits hard floor coverings in certain areas to prevent noise disturbances.

  • Evidence: The owner of Unit 42 claimed to have obtained a variance in 2008. Furthermore, CC&R Section 13.20 contains a "Release of Claims" where owners assume the risk of noise and vibration in attached units.
  • ALJ Finding: Because the floor was installed six years before the Petitioner purchased his unit, and because of the explicit noise release in the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not held responsible for the alleged violation.
4. Resale Disclosure (A.R.S. § 33-1260)

The Petitioner argued that the Respondent failed to provide required governing documents (Bylaws, CC&Rs) in a written format during his purchase in 2014.

  • Evidence: The Respondent provided the documents electronically via a third-party website (HomeWiseDocs). When the Petitioner objected to the electronic format, hard copies were mailed eight days before closing.
  • ALJ Finding: Arizona statute allows for delivery in "either paper or electronic format." The Petitioner’s refusal to accept electronic delivery did not constitute a statutory violation by the HOA.

III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. What is the "burden of proof" in this administrative hearing, and which party carries it?
  • Answer: The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish violations by a "preponderance of the evidence."
  1. How does A.R.S. § 33-1253 define the HOA's obligation regarding property insurance?
  • Answer: The association must maintain, to the extent reasonably available, property insurance on common elements against all risks of direct physical loss.
  1. Why was the insurer's denial of the water damage claim upheld by the ALJ?
  • Answer: The damage was caused by a slow leak over time, which is a standard exclusion in insurance policies reasonably available to HOAs.
  1. What defines a "Limited Common Element" according to the Aspen Shadows CC&Rs?
  • Answer: A portion of the common elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the units.
  1. Under A.R.S. § 33-1260, in what formats is an HOA permitted to provide resale disclosure documents?
  • Answer: In either paper or electronic format.
  1. What was the outcome regarding the Petitioner's claim for the cost of the grinder pump replacement?
  • Answer: The claim was dismissed because the pump is a Limited Common Element for which the HOA can assess repair costs to the benefiting owner.

IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Interplay of Statute and Contract: Analyze how the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the Aspen Shadows CC&Rs work together to define the responsibilities of the HOA. Use the grinder pump dispute to illustrate how a specific CC&R provision (Article 5.1) can impact the application of general maintenance statutes (A.R.S. § 33-1247).
  1. "Reasonably Available" Insurance: Discuss the legal significance of the phrase "to the extent reasonably available" in the context of HOA insurance requirements. How did this phrasing protect the Aspen Shadows Condominium Association from liability when their insurer denied coverage for a slow plumbing leak?
  1. Electronic Disclosure and Modern Governance: Evaluate the ALJ’s ruling on the delivery of governing documents. Should a homeowner have the right to demand paper copies over electronic ones, or does the statutory allowance for "electronic format" reflect a necessary evolution in association management? Support your argument with details from the case.

V. Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
A.R.S. Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
CC&Rs Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing legal documents that dictate the rules for a common-interest development.
Common Elements Portions of the condominium development other than the units (e.g., roofs, grounds, structural walls).
Limited Common Element A common element reserved for the exclusive use of a specific unit or units (e.g., a specific unit's grinder pump or patio).
PEX Piping A type of flexible plastic piping used in plumbing systems; cited in this case as the source of a slow leak.
Preponderance of the Evidence The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is "more probably true than not."
Resale Disclosure The process and documents required by law to be provided to a buyer when a property within an HOA is sold.
Variance An official permit to depart from the requirements of the CC&Rs (e.g., being allowed to install hard flooring where it is usually prohibited).
Grinder Pump A device used to process sewage waste from a unit into the main sewer or septic system.

The Limits of Association Liability: Key Takeaways from White v. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association

The administrative case of Robert A. White vs. Aspen Shadows Condominium Association (No. 16F-H1616001-BFS) serves as a stark reminder of the financial and legal risks inherent in condominium ownership. The Petitioner, who purchased his unit for $427,000 in 2014, found himself under contract to sell it just two years later for only $315,000—a loss of $112,000. Attributing this loss in part to Association mismanagement, he filed a petition alleging four distinct violations of Arizona statutes and the community’s CC&Rs.

The subsequent dismissal of all claims by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provides a vital blueprint for property owners and community managers. This case highlights a common point of friction: the gap between a homeowner’s expectations of "Association responsibility" and the actual legal boundaries established by governing documents and state law.

The Insurance Gap: "All Risk" vs. The Slow Drip

This dispute highlights a critical misunderstanding of "All Risk" insurance. Following a water leak from Unit 42 into the Petitioner’s unit, the Association’s carrier, Farmers Insurance, ultimately denied the claim.

A key lesson in administrative paper trails emerged here: the Community Manager (Ms. Lashlee) initially suggested she did not wish to pursue the claim due to a $5,000 deductible, leading to a "Withdrawal of Claim" letter. However, the adjuster’s formal investigation continued, resulting in a final "Denial." The ALJ found that under A.R.S. § 33-1253, an Association is only required to maintain insurance that is "reasonably available." According to Conclusion of Law #4, the exclusions applied in this case are common industry standards, meaning the Association fulfilled its duty by providing a policy that met the "reasonably available" market standard.

Covered Loss vs. Policy Exclusion

The following table contrasts standard industry inclusions with the specific exclusions identified by the Farmers Insurance adjuster in this case:

Covered Events (Standard Inclusions) Excluded Events (Case Facts)
Sudden and accidental discharge of water Slow drips occurring over 14+ days
Bursting of frozen pipes Wear and tear (e.g., aged PEX piping)
Fire sprinkler malfunctions Faulty, inadequate, or defective installation
Accidental cracking of a system Mold and damages caused by mold

The Grinder Pump Dilemma: Navigating Limited Common Elements

The Petitioner sought nearly $2,500 in reimbursement for a failed grinder pump, alleging that an improperly installed diversion wall caused debris-laden runoff to destroy the equipment. This claim failed because of the intersection between A.R.S. § 33-1247 and the CC&Rs.

While A.R.S. § 33-1247 generally holds an association responsible for common element maintenance, it yields to specific provisions in a community’s Declaration. Here, CC&R Section 1.2.26 defines "Limited Common Elements" (LCE) as portions of the common elements reserved for the exclusive use of specific units. Because the pump served only Unit 41, it was an LCE. Under CC&R Section 5.1, the Association has the right to assess the cost of repairing an LCE back to the benefiting unit owner.

The Association’s defense was bolstered by the testimony of Ty Hart, a Grade 4 wastewater operator with 14 years of experience. Expert testimony outweighed the homeowner’s anecdotal claims; Mr. Hart noted that the pump well was designed to be debris-proof, but his inspection found the lid "half off." Despite a minor scrivener’s error in the engineer's documentation (dating the repair to 2014 instead of 2015), his expert credibility regarding owner-maintenance failure remained the deciding factor.

The Noise Factor: Hard Floors and Assumption of Risk

The Petitioner alleged the Association failed to enforce CC&R Section 4.23, which prohibits hard floor coverings, leading to noise disturbances from Unit 42. However, Section 13.20 ("Sound issues; Release of Claims") provided a robust defense for the Association.

The ALJ’s ruling against the Petitioner rested on three pillars:

  1. Pre-existing Conditions: The hard floor was installed in 2008, six years before the Petitioner’s purchase. This is a primary defense against failure-to-enforce claims; the Association is not required to retroactively litigate long-standing modifications.
  2. Contractual Assumption of Risk: By purchasing an attached unit, owners acknowledge that noise and vibrations are inherent to the property type.
  3. Liability Waivers: The CC&R language explicitly releases the Association and its directors from any claims or damages resulting from noise emanating from one unit to another.

Digital vs. Paper: Navigating Resale Disclosures

Finally, the Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide required disclosures during his 2014 purchase. He had refused to use an electronic portal (HomeWiseDocs.com) and insisted on paper copies.

The legal reality, per A.R.S. § 33-1260, is that associations may provide documents in "either paper or electronic format." The evidence showed the Association provided access via a digital portal for a nominal $21.00 fee. The ALJ ruled that a buyer’s personal refusal to accept digital copies does not constitute a statutory violation by the HOA. Furthermore, evidence showed the Association’s escrow officer had mailed hard copies as a courtesy eight days prior to closing regardless.

Conclusion: Strategy Checklist for the Informed Homeowner

The March 24, 2016, hearing resulted in a total dismissal of the petition, confirming that the Association acted within its authority and statutory obligations. For property owners, the $112,000 loss suffered by the Petitioner serves as a final warning: the "price" of not understanding your CC&Rs before closing escrow can be devastating.

Homeowner's Strategy Checklist

To protect your investment and avoid fruitless litigation, homeowners should:

  • Audit Insurance Specifics: Do not assume "All Risk" means "Any Damage." Verify exclusions for "slow leaks" (14+ days) and "wear and tear," which are standard in reasonably available HOA policies.
  • Identify Limited Common Elements (LCE): Don't just read the definition; ask for a specific list of elements (e.g., grinder pumps, AC pads, balconies) that have historically been assessed to individual units.
  • Investigate Pre-existing Conditions: If you are sensitive to noise, verify the flooring types in units above you before closing. Per Section 13.20, you assume the risk of noise the moment you sign the purchase contract.
  • Accept Electronic Disclosures: Under A.R.S. § 33-1260, electronic delivery is a legal standard. Refusing digital access only creates unnecessary friction and does not exempt you from being bound by the documents.

Ultimately, the most effective protection for any buyer is a proactive, expert-led review of the CC&Rs and insurance binders before the expiration of the inspection period.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert A. White (Petitioner)
    Owner of Unit 41

Respondent Side

  • Maria R. Kupillas (attorney)
    Choate & Seletos
    Represented Respondent
  • Melanie Lashlee (community manager)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Ty Hart (engineer)
    Flagstaff Ranch
    Facilities Engineer
  • Faith Johnson (escrow officer)
    Respondent's escrow officer, initials 'f.j.'

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Kenji Cassady (witness)
    Royal Plumbing, Inc.
    Plumber who repaired leak in Unit 42
  • Nicolas Boley (claims representative)
    Farmers Insurance
    Senior Field Claims Representative
  • Tyler (contractor)
    DC Restoration
    Mitigation contractor
  • Jacqueline Martinez (contractor)
    Damage Control AZ
    Sent email confirming leak duration
  • Dave Taylor (unit owner)
    Owner of Unit 42
  • Debra Blake (Interim Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Agency head
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Joni Cage (staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of decision copy
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Mailed/transmitted decision