Arizona HOA Case Explainer
The Court of Appeals held that a broad majority-amendment clause is not a blank check to impose brand-new membership and assessment burdens on owners who had no notice of them, especially in a community with no common areas.
Arizona Court of Appeals | 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010) | Decided 2010-03-16
Current-status note: This page is published as a litigation record based on the source files available through 2010-06-30. Later filings, appeals, mandates, settlements, or dismissal orders may change the posture; the linked court records control.
Pipeline note: the public raw-source folder contains source files that were not in the last staged NotebookLM source set. The page remains a source-linked record, but generated media should be rebuilt or rechecked after the staged source manifest catches up.
Allegations, settlements, procedural dismissals, and notices are not findings of liability unless a cited court order expressly makes that finding.
Scope note: This educational page summarizes Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey, a Arizona Court of Appeals HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.
Source note: The complete appellate docket for this case, including the opinion and mandate, is hosted below as downloadable source files.
The takeaway
A generic provision allowing recorded deed restrictions to be amended “in whole or in part” by a majority vote of lot owners cannot be used to impose substantial, previously unforeseeable new affirmative obligations – here, mandatory homeowners’-association membership and lienable assessments – on a community that has no common areas and where club membership had always been voluntary, because such owners took title without notice that these servitudes could be imposed non-consensually. The Second Amended Declarations were therefore invalid and unenforceable, and the trial court’s summary judgment for the association was reversed.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee)
Arizona nonprofit corporation; originally a voluntary recreational club that sought to become a mandatory homeowners' association through amended declarations. - Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, PC (Mesa)
Counsel for DVCC (association). - Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, PC (Mesa)
Counsel for DVCC (association).
Respondent Side
- Daryle G. Raimey (and other Dreamland Villa homeowners in sections 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18) (Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant)
Named lead among the dissenting homeowners who refused to pay the new assessments; prevailed on appeal. - Steven W. Cheifetz (Counsel)
Cheifetz Iannitelli Marcolini, PC (Phoenix)
Counsel for the homeowners. - Stewart F. Gross (Counsel)
Cheifetz Iannitelli Marcolini, PC (Phoenix)
Counsel for the homeowners. - Matthew A. Klopp (Counsel)
Cheifetz Iannitelli Marcolini, PC (Phoenix)
Counsel for the homeowners.
Neutral Parties
- Jon W. Thompson (Judge)
Presiding Judge; authored the opinion. - Daniel A. Barker (Judge)
Concurred. - Ann A. Scott Timmer (Judge)
Chief Judge; concurred.
What happened
Dreamland Villa is an age-restricted residential community of eighteen sections near Mesa, Arizona. The first section was platted in 1958 and the last in 1972, and every residence must be occupied by at least one person aged fifty-five or older. Critically, the community had no common areas – no shared park, roads, or amenities owned collectively by the lot owners.
Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (DVCC) was incorporated in 1961 as a nonprofit corporation formed by volunteers to provide recreational facilities – clubhouses, a recreation center with swimming pools, shuffleboard courts, and a ballroom – to those who chose to join. Membership was voluntary, the facilities were open only to members, and the club was funded by voluntary dues. Many homeowners never joined or used the facilities.
Each section was governed by a separate recorded Declaration of Restrictions from the 1960s and 1970s. With the exception of section 18, none mentioned DVCC, membership, or assessments; they addressed appearance and maintenance matters like single-family use, minimum floor area, and signs. Each contained a generic amendment clause allowing the covenants to be ‘changed in whole or in part or revoked in their entirety by a vote of the owners of a majority of the lots.’ Section 18’s declaration did reference an assessment, but it imposed that charge only on non-members and did not grant membership rights.
In 2003 and 2004, DVCC recorded a Second Amended Declaration of Restrictions for each section. Each Second Amended Declaration required lot owners to pay annual and special assessments to DVCC, reciting purposes including the improvement, maintenance, and replacement of ‘Common Areas’ – even though the community had none. Beginning in December 2006, DVCC filed a series of lawsuits against homeowners who refused to pay, and the suits were consolidated.
Homeowners in sections 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 answered and counterclaimed, arguing that the Second Amended Declarations were void and that they could not be forced into membership in a nonprofit corporation or made to pay assessments. On cross-motions, the trial court granted summary judgment for DVCC in September 2007, reasoning that under A.R.S. section 10-3601(B) and Shamrock v. Wagon Wheel Park HOA, a homeowner who takes a deed with a majority-amendment clause impliedly consents to a later majority vote making association membership mandatory.
On the collateral money and fee questions, the trial court declined to award DVCC its attorneys’ fees, citing the homeowners’ good-faith defenses, the novel and complex issues presented, and undue hardship. After an evidentiary hearing it capped late fees at $15 per year under A.R.S. section 33-1803(A) and applied eighteen-percent interest to unpaid assessments. The court signed twenty-five separate judgments; DVCC appealed the fee and damages rulings, and the homeowners cross-appealed the validity of the amendments.
The Court of Appeals addressed the cross-appeal first and reversed. It held that Shamrock left open whether a majority could amend to create mandatory membership, that its prior citation to Colorado’s Evergreen Highlands was not an adoption of that permissive rule, and that Evergreen was distinguishable because it involved pre-existing common areas all owners had always used. Following the Lakeland line and Armstrong v. Ledges HOA, the court held that a generic amendment power could not force the dissenting minority into a voluntary club and lien their lots, because they had no notice such servitudes could be imposed non-consensually. Having found the Second Amended Declarations invalid and unenforceable, the court did not reach DVCC’s fee and late-charge claims, and it awarded the homeowners their attorneys’ fees on appeal.
Dreamland Villa v. Raimey is a foundational Arizona authority on the outer limits of an HOA’s power to amend its governing documents. It draws a sharp line between amendments that adjust or extend obligations the community already bargained for and amendments that impose wholly new, substantial, and unforeseeable burdens – such as compulsory membership in a formerly voluntary club and lienable assessments – on owners who never had notice such servitudes could be added. The decision teaches that a broad ‘may be changed in whole or in part’ clause is not a blank check, and that the presence or absence of common areas that all owners have always used can be decisive in whether new assessments are enforceable. The case matters for boards, managers, and homeowners because it frames a recurring dispute: can a bare majority convert a voluntary arrangement into a mandatory, assessment-bearing association over the objection of a dissenting minority? Raimey answers no on these facts and situates Arizona within the Lakeland/Armstrong line rather than the more permissive Evergreen approach. Its reasoning was later reinforced at the highest level by the Arizona Supreme Court in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA (2022), which held that owners must have notice of the kinds of restrictions that may be added by amendment. Practitioners should read Raimey as a caution to build any expansive assessment or membership authority into the recorded declaration from the outset, and homeowners should read it as support for challenging after-the-fact amendments that create obligations they never bargained for.
Video overview of the case record
An AI-generated video overview of Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey (224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010)). Generic amendment language did not permit adding mandatory recreation-club membership and dues. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.
Listen: audio deep dive on the case record
An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court record and procedural posture in Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked case records below.
Litigation record
First section of Dreamland Villa is platted near Mesa, Arizona; the community will grow to eighteen sections by 1972, with no common areas.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (DVCC) is incorporated as a nonprofit to provide recreational facilities to voluntary members.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Separate Declarations of Restrictions are recorded for the sections (section 7 in 1963; sections 14-17 in 1970-1972; section 18 in 1978), each with a generic majority-amendment clause.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
DVCC records a Second Amended Declaration of Restrictions for each section, purporting to require every lot owner to pay annual and special assessments.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
DVCC begins filing lawsuits against homeowners who refuse to pay the new assessments; the cases are later consolidated.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Homeowners move for summary judgment, arguing DVCC cannot impose membership or assessments without consent.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Trial court grants DVCC's motions for summary judgment, relying on A.R.S. section 10-3601(B) and Shamrock, and denies the homeowners' Rule 56(f) request.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Trial court declines to award DVCC attorneys' fees, citing good-faith defenses, novel issues, and undue hardship; later caps late fees at $15/year under A.R.S. section 33-1803(A).
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Twenty-five separate judgments are entered; DVCC appeals and the homeowners cross-appeal (No. 1 CA-CV 08-0388).
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Court of Appeals, Division One, reverses and remands, holding the Second Amended Declarations invalid and unenforceable and awarding the homeowners appellate fees.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Reconsideration denied.
Filed by: Court record
Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.
Complete source-document index
This index contains 1 PDF, 10 other source files from the reviewed public source packet. Byte-identical copies are listed once. Files are ordered by the date and sequence in the public filename, and party filings or research materials are labeled separately from court rulings.
Div 1 Civil Notice Appellants Fee Due
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Div 1 Notice Appellees Fees Due
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Div 1 Civil Record Ordered From Superior Court
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Div 1 Inventory
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Notice Of Oral Argument Or Conference
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Under Advisement Order
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Opinion
Type: Decision or judgment
Opinion holding that a generic provision allowing recorded deed restrictions to be amended "in whole or in part" by a majority vote of lot owners cannot be used to impose substantial, previously unforeseeable new affirmative obligations – here, mandatory homeowners'-association membership and lienable assessments – on a community that has no common areas and where club membership had always been voluntary, because such owners took title without notice that these servitudes could be imposed non-consensually.
Enotification Of Opinion
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Civil Mandate Package
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
West Letter Re Mandate Issued
Type: Court notice/document
Court notice or document from the appellate upload; read it with the surrounding docket filings.
Dreamland Villa Community Club Legal Documents Summary Table 1
Type: Source roadmap CSV
Upload/source spreadsheet that helps cross-check filing order, source names, or AI review notes.
FAQ
What did Dreamland Villa v. Raimey decide?
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that a generic clause letting deed restrictions be ‘changed in whole or in part’ by a majority vote could not be used to impose brand-new, substantial obligations – mandatory HOA membership and lienable assessments – on owners in a community with no common areas where membership had always been voluntary. The Second Amended Declarations were declared invalid and unenforceable, and the trial court’s summary judgment for the association was reversed.
Why did the fact that Dreamland Villa had no common areas matter so much?
The absence of common areas was decisive. Courts (including Colorado’s Evergreen Highlands) have upheld new assessments where owners had always used shared amenities, reasoning the duty to pay for them was implicit in the original bargain. Dreamland Villa had no shared park, roads, or amenities owned in common, and the club’s facilities were open only to voluntary members. Without common areas that everyone used, there was no implicit obligation to support, so a majority could not manufacture one through amendment.
Doesn't accepting a deed with an amendment clause mean owners consented to whatever the majority later adds?
Not automatically. The court recognized that buyers who accept recorded restrictions are generally bound by them, and that A.R.S. section 10-3601(B) allows implied consent to nonprofit membership. But it held a generic ‘amend in whole or in part’ clause is not notice that a majority could later impose compulsory membership and assessments never mentioned in the original documents. Owners can only be bound by what they had notice of, so this particular new burden was not something they impliedly consented to.
What is the 'Lakeland line' versus the 'Evergreen' approach the court discussed?
The Lakeland line (including Lakeland Property Owners Ass’n v. Larson and Armstrong v. Ledges HOA) refuses to enforce amendments that impose substantial, unforeseeable new burdens on objecting owners without proper notice. Colorado’s Evergreen Highlands took a more permissive view, allowing a modification clause to add mandatory assessments – but there the association maintained pre-existing common areas all owners used. Raimey aligned Arizona with the Lakeland line on these facts, distinguishing Evergreen because Dreamland Villa had no common areas.
Is Dreamland Villa v. Raimey still good law, and how does it relate to Kalway v. Calabria Ranch?
Yes. Raimey is a published, precedential Arizona Court of Appeals decision. Its notice-based reasoning was reinforced in 2022 by the Arizona Supreme Court in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, which held that owners must have notice of the kinds of restrictions that may be added by amendment and that a general amendment power does not authorize entirely new and unforeseen restrictions. Read together, the cases limit an HOA’s ability to use a broad amendment clause to create obligations owners never bargained for.
What happened with attorneys' fees and late charges in the case?
The trial court had declined to award DVCC its fees, citing the homeowners’ good-faith defenses, novel and complex issues, and undue hardship, and it capped late fees at $15 per year under A.R.S. section 33-1803(A). Because the Court of Appeals found the amended declarations invalid and vacated the judgments for DVCC, it did not need to reach DVCC’s fee and late-charge arguments. Instead, it awarded the prevailing homeowners their reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal under A.R.S. section 12-341.01, subject to compliance with the appellate rules.
Case Dossier
This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Court of Appeals |
| Decision / key date | March 16, 2010 |
| Judge / panel | Jon W. Thompson (Presiding Judge, author), Daniel A. Barker (Judge, concurring), Ann A. Scott Timmer (Chief Judge, concurring) |
| Parties | A voluntary community recreational club turned homeowners' association (DVCC) sued dissenting homeowners in six sections to enforce mandatory membership and assessments imposed by amended deed restrictions. |
| Governing law |
|
| Topics | AmendmentsCC&RsAssessmentsCovenantsMembership |
| Outcome / holding | A generic provision allowing recorded deed restrictions to be amended "in whole or in part" by a majority vote of lot owners cannot be used to impose substantial, previously unforeseeable new affirmative obligations – here, mandatory homeowners'-association membership and lienable assessments – on a community that has no common areas and where club membership had always been voluntary, because such owners took title without notice that these servitudes could be imposed non-consensually. The Second Amended Declarations were therefore invalid and unenforceable, and the trial court's summary judgment for the association was reversed. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Reviewed source package | 1 PDF, 10 other source files |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 11 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. v. Raimey |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Featured download links | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
Dreamland Villa is an age-restricted residential community of eighteen sections near Mesa, Arizona, built between 1958 and 1972, with no common areas. Dreamland Villa Community Club, Inc. (DVCC) was incorporated in 1961 as a voluntary nonprofit recreational club, offering clubhouses, pools, shuffleboard courts, and a ballroom funded by voluntary dues. The original recorded Declarations of Restrictions for the sections at issue said nothing about DVCC, membership, or assessments; they did, however, allow amendment "in whole or in part" by a majority vote of lot owners. In 2003 and 2004, DVCC recorded Second Amended Declarations requiring every lot owner to pay annual and special assessments. When homeowners in sections 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 refused, DVCC sued and won summary judgment; the trial court reasoned that by accepting deeds with a majority-amendment clause, the owners impliedly consented to mandatory membership under A.R.S. section 10-3601(B) and Shamrock v. Wagon Wheel Park HOA. The Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded Shamrock left open whether a majority could amend to create such new obligations, distinguished Colorado's Evergreen Highlands (which involved pre-existing common areas), and followed the Lakeland/Armstrong line of authority: because Dreamland Villa had no common areas and membership had always been voluntary, a generic amendment power could not force the objecting minority into association membership and lienable assessments they never bargained for and had no notice of. The court also rejected DVCC's claim that section 18's original declaration mandated membership, finding it assessed only non-members. The Second Amended Declarations were declared invalid and unenforceable, and the homeowners were awarded appellate attorneys' fees.
The court reviewed the summary judgment de novo. It began with A.R.S. section 10-3601(B), which provides that no person may be admitted as a member of a nonprofit corporation without that person's express or implied consent. While a grantee who accepts a deed subject to recorded restrictions ordinarily assents to those restrictions, the court held that a generic clause allowing amendment "in whole or in part" by majority vote does not, standing alone, supply consent to entirely new affirmative burdens. The court read Shamrock v. Wagon Wheel Park HOA as establishing only that mandatory membership must appear in a recorded declaration (not merely in bylaws), and as leaving open whether a majority could amend a declaration to create such membership. It declined to treat its earlier favorable citation to Colorado's Evergreen Highlands as an adoption of that approach, noting Evergreen itself distinguished the Lakeland line based on 'the differing factual scenarios and severity of consequences.' In Evergreen the association maintained pre-existing common areas that all lot owners had always used, so an assessment was implicit in the original bargain; Dreamland Villa, by contrast, had no common areas, membership had always been voluntary, and many owners never joined. Following Lakeland and Armstrong v. Ledges HOA, the court held a majority could not force the dissenting 49% into a club they had chosen against and lien their lots for it, because the circumstances showed no proper notice that such servitudes could be imposed non-consensually under a generic amendment power. Rather than rest on the breadth of the amendment language, the court grounded its holding on the lack of notice and the substantial, unforeseeable nature of the new obligations. It also rejected DVCC's contention that section 18's original declaration required membership, finding that declaration assessed only non-members and conferred no membership rights.
Dreamland Villa v. Raimey is a foundational Arizona authority on the outer limits of an HOA's power to amend its governing documents. It draws a sharp line between amendments that adjust or extend obligations the community already bargained for and amendments that impose wholly new, substantial, and unforeseeable burdens – such as compulsory membership in a formerly voluntary club and lienable assessments – on owners who never had notice such servitudes could be added. The decision teaches that a broad 'may be changed in whole or in part' clause is not a blank check, and that the presence or absence of common areas that all owners have always used can be decisive in whether new assessments are enforceable.
The case matters for boards, managers, and homeowners because it frames a recurring dispute: can a bare majority convert a voluntary arrangement into a mandatory, assessment-bearing association over the objection of a dissenting minority? Raimey answers no on these facts and situates Arizona within the Lakeland/Armstrong line rather than the more permissive Evergreen approach. Its reasoning was later reinforced at the highest level by the Arizona Supreme Court in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA (2022), which held that owners must have notice of the kinds of restrictions that may be added by amendment. Practitioners should read Raimey as a caution to build any expansive assessment or membership authority into the recorded declaration from the outset, and homeowners should read it as support for challenging after-the-fact amendments that create obligations they never bargained for.