Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times

Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 816310.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:18 (199.6 KB)

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 847175.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:21 (246.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision in the case of Debra K. Morin versus the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), dated January 8, 2021. The central dispute involved a homeowner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain its common areas in good condition and repair.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petitioner’s case, finding conclusively in favor of the Solera HOA. The decision rested on a critical provision within the association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which designates the Solera Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas. This clause grants the Board exclusive discretion, superseding an individual homeowner’s opinion on the timing or quality of maintenance.

Despite the petitioner presenting extensive photographic evidence documenting various maintenance issues, the ALJ concluded that this evidence failed to prove a violation of the governing documents. The petitioner did not meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had acted outside its granted authority. The ruling affirms that the authority of the Board is explicitly elevated above that of an individual homeowner in matters of common area maintenance under the controlling legal documents.

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I. Case Background and Procedural History

The case originates from a petition filed by Debra K. Morin, a four-year resident of the Solera community, against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Tribunal).

A. Initial Petition

On March 12, 2020, Ms. Morin filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company (Premier) had violated numerous governing documents, including the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules & Regulations (R&Rs).

Issue #1: Alleged that Solera did not permit “direct communication from homeowners” and sought to have this “policy” rescinded.

Issue #2: Alleged that Solera was not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in “good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included uncontrolled weeds and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other common areas.

B. Procedural Developments

Motion to Dismiss: Solera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the issues were outside the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction.

Withdrawal of Issue #1: At a May 20, 2020 hearing, the Tribunal noted its jurisdiction did not extend to non-governing documents like the Board’s Code of Ethics. Consequently, Ms. Morin withdrew Issue #1. The Tribunal denied the Motion to Dismiss for the remaining “bare-bones” maintenance allegation in Issue #2.

Initial Decision (August 19, 2020): Following the original hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Solera was the “sole judge” regarding maintenance of the AREAS and had not violated its governing documents. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Request (September 24, 2020): Ms. Morin filed a request for rehearing, citing irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and arguing the decision was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Rehearing Granted and Conducted: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing, which was conducted telephonically on December 16, 2020.

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II. Core Arguments of the Parties

The fundamental conflict centered on the interpretation of the maintenance standards outlined in the community’s CC&Rs.

A. Petitioner’s Position (Debra K. Morin)

Ms. Morin’s case was built on the principle of equal application of maintenance standards.

Central Argument: The same maintenance standard requiring homeowners to keep their lots “in good condition and repair at all times” (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2) must be applied equally to Solera’s responsibility for the common AREAS (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1).

Core Belief: Because homeowners are given no discretion regarding delays in maintenance, Solera should not be able to take months to address reported issues.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted extensive documentation, including over 80 photographs (referenced in the rehearing as “310 pictures”), emails, and other documents. This evidence was intended to show persistent maintenance failures, including:

◦ Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations

◦ Poor exterior condition of the Community Center

◦ Deficiencies in street asphalt, storm drains, sidewalks, and curbing

◦ Water pooling and intrusion issues

◦ Exposed landscaping lights and irrigation lines

◦ Unremoved tree stumps

B. Respondent’s Position (Solera HOA)

Solera’s defense relied entirely on the specific authority granted to its Board by the governing documents.

Central Argument: The association met its responsibilities, and the petitioner’s subjective opinions about what, when, or how maintenance should be done are irrelevant.

Dispositive Legal Provision: Solera consistently cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”

Interpretation: This provision grants the Board exclusive discretion and authority to determine the nature and timing of maintenance, insulating its decisions from a single homeowner’s critique.

——————————————————————————–

III. Analysis and Key Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

The Rehearing Decision provided a thorough review of the evidence and legal arguments, ultimately reinforcing the original ruling in favor of Solera.

A. The “Sole Judge” Clause and Board Authority

The ALJ’s conclusion hinged on the unambiguous language of the CC&Rs, which establishes a clear hierarchy of authority.

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1: This article was identified as the dispositive text. It states, in pertinent part: “the Board ‘shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS], but all [AREAS], and the Improvements located thereon, shall be maintained in good condition and repair at all times.'” The ALJ found that the “sole judge” provision grants the Board exclusive authority to determine how the “good condition and repair” standard is met.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5: This section further strengthens the Board’s position by granting Solera the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with its interpretation being “final, conclusive and binding.”

Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ concluded that these provisions clearly lift the Board’s authority above that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance.

B. Rejection of the “Equal Standard” Argument

The petitioner’s primary argument for an equal, non-discretionary standard for both the HOA and homeowners was explicitly rejected.

• The ALJ found that the petitioner “failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard is required to be applied to the Board as it is applied to a homeowner.”

• The governing documents themselves create different levels of authority and obligation for the Board versus individual owners.

C. Evaluation of Evidence and Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterates that the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Photographic Evidence: The ALJ acknowledged reviewing all photographs from both hearings. The decision states that this evidence successfully documented “the existence, at those dates embedded in the photographs, of items that deal with maintenance and repairs in various locations of Solera AREAS.”

Failure to Prove a Violation: Crucially, while the photos proved maintenance issues existed, they did not prove a violation of the CC&Rs. Because the Board is the “sole judge,” the existence of a weed or a cracked curb does not automatically constitute a breach of its duties, as the Board retains discretion over the timeline and method of repair.

D. Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision affirmed the Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction, noting that many of the petitioner’s underlying frustrations were not legally actionable in this venue.

Not Actionable: A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with the Board, its management company, or the General Manager is “not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

Irrelevant Documents: Arguments based on City of Chandler standards, the landscaping contract with Integrated Landscape Management (ILM), or Premier’s General Manager job description were deemed irrelevant, as the Tribunal’s review is limited to the association’s governing documents and applicable state statutes.

——————————————————————————–

IV. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on an exhaustive review of the record from both the original hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Finding: The petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The ALJ concluded that Solera is in compliance with its governing documents, including CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Order:

IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

◦ The order was issued on January 8, 2021.

◦ As a decision issued after a rehearing, the order is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative rehearing case No. 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG, between Petitioner Debra K. Morin and Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms derived from the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and who represented them at the telephonic hearing on December 16, 2020?

2. What were the two initial issues Petitioner Debra K. Morin raised in her petition filed on March 12, 2020?

3. Why did the Petitioner withdraw Issue #1 from her petition during the May 20, 2020 hearing?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?

5. What type of evidence did the Petitioner primarily present to document the alleged maintenance failures in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?

6. What specific clause in the CC&Rs did Solera (the Respondent) rely on to defend its actions and decisions regarding maintenance?

7. What were the primary reasons the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the relevance of non-governing documents, such as the City of Chandler ordinances and the Premier Management Company job description?

9. What is the legal standard of proof that a petitioner must meet in these proceedings, and how is it defined in the decision?

10. What was the final conclusion and order of the Administrative Law Judge in the Rehearing Decision issued on January 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Debra K. Morin, who represented herself, and the Respondent, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association (Solera). Solera was represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Issue #1 alleged that Solera did not allow direct communication from homeowners. Issue #2 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company were not providing proper oversight to maintain the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair.

3. The Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after the Tribunal ruled that the statutory parameters of its jurisdiction did not include the interpretation or application of a non-governing document like the Board’s Code of Ethics. The allegations regarding ethics and mismanagement based on this code were therefore removed from consideration.

4. The Petitioner’s central argument was that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that just as homeowners are required by CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 to maintain their lots in good condition at all times, Solera must be held to the same standard for common AREAS under CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

5. The Petitioner presented an “enormity” of photographic evidence to document the maintenance issues. The decision notes she presented over eighty photographs at the original hearing and an additional “310 pictures” were mentioned in the rehearing, showing weeds, debris, exposed wiring, and other issues at various dates.

6. Solera relied on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states that the Solera Board of Directors “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Solera argued that the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on maintenance were therefore not relevant.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request, which claimed: irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by evidence, or contrary to law.

8. The Judge ruled that such documents were not relevant or justiciable. City standards were not under review, and the management company’s job description and landscape contract were not Solera governing documents, so they could not be used to prove a violation of the association’s governing documents.

9. The petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, and it represents the greater weight of evidence.

10. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The Judge found Solera to be the prevailing party, in compliance with CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, and ordered that the Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the balance of power between a homeowner and an HOA as depicted in this case. Discuss how specific clauses in the CC&Rs, particularly Article 7 (Section 7.1) and Article 9 (Sections 9.5 and 9.9), grant authority to the Board and limit the recourse available to an individual owner within the association’s own framework.

2. Examine the role and limitations of evidence in this administrative hearing. Why was the Petitioner’s photographic evidence, despite its volume, ultimately insufficient to meet the burden of proof? Discuss the distinction made by the Tribunal between evidence of a maintenance issue and evidence of a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued for an equal application of the “maintenance standard” to both homeowners and the HOA, stating “[t]here must be equal consideration to have a valid contract.” Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific language found in the Solera CC&Rs. Is the concept of “equal consideration” legally applicable in the way the Petitioner suggests?

4. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (the Tribunal) in HOA disputes as described in the decision. Explain why the Tribunal could rule on the maintenance of common areas but had to dismiss claims related to the Solera Code of Ethics, City of Chandler ordinances, and Premier Management’s internal documents.

5. Based on the findings of fact, trace the procedural journey of this case from the initial petition to the final rehearing order. Identify the key turning points, such as the Motion to Dismiss and the Order Granting Rehearing, and explain their impact on the scope and outcome of the dispute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact, issues decisions, and conducts rehearings.

Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)

The common areas within the Solera community that the homeowners’ association is responsible for managing and maintaining. This includes landscaping, the Community Center exterior, street conditions, storm drains, sidewalks, walls, and curbing.

Articles of Incorporation

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit A.

By-Laws

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit B.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A primary governing document for the Solera at Springfield Lakes community. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both the homeowners and the association.

Maintenance Standard

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party (in this case, Solera) asking for a petition or case to be dismissed on the grounds that the issues are outside the Department’s jurisdiction or that the requested relief cannot be granted as a matter of law.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in the Solera community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for a petitioner to win in these proceedings. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Premier Management Company (Premier)

The management company hired by the Solera Board of Directors to handle duties including the oversight of a General Manager.

Project Documents

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.37 as the CC&Rs, any supplements to the CC&Rs, the By-Laws, the Rules and Regulations (R&Rs), and the Design Guidelines.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit D.

Tribunal

A term used to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the body responsible for conducting administrative hearings for disputes referred by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

🧑‍⚖️

20F-H2020051-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision regarding a dispute between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner initially filed a two-issue complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the HOA had violated various governing documents, primarily concerning lack of direct homeowner communication and a failure to maintain Association Responsibility Areas (AREAS) in good condition. After the first issue was withdrawn due to jurisdictional limitations, the initial decision dismissed the petition, finding the HOA was the sole judge of appropriate maintenance under the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This rehearing decision, granted due to claims of procedural irregularities and arbitrary findings, ultimately reaffirms the original dismissal, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the governing documents.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
  • Denise Frazier (general manager/witness)
    Premier Management Company / Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
    Solera's onsite general manager who testified

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative)
    Transmitted the original August 19, 2020 Decision

Susan E Abbass v. 10000 North Central Homeowners Assocciation

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020057-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-17
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan E Abbass Counsel
Respondent 10000 North Central Homeowners Association Counsel Blake Johnson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R's Article XII, Section 6 & Article XIII, Section 1(d) & 4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's single-issue petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish that the Respondent HOA violated the governing CC&R provisions.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violations; specifically, the HOA was found to have the right to enter property for certain conditions (including emergencies or maintenance) but was under no obligation to do so, and the situation was not determined to be a true emergency by the ALJ.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether 10000 North Central Homeowners Association violated the CC&R's Article XII, Section 6 & Article XIII, Section 1(d) & 4.

Petitioner claimed the Association violated specified CC&R sections by refusing to grant access to the neighboring property to determine and resolve the source of a water leak. Petitioner requested an ORDER requiring the Association to allow access. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs grant the HOA the right to enter, but not the obligation, and Petitioner failed to prove an emergency situation or a violation of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in this matter was denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article XII Section 6
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 1(d)
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Easement, Maintenance, Drainage, Property Access, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1
  • CC&R Article XII Section 6
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 1(d)
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020057-REL Decision – 839845.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:59 (108.6 KB)

20F-H2020057-REL Decision – ../20F-H2020057-REL/815490.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:02 (135.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Susan E. Abbass (Petitioner) and the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request for the HOA to compel an inspection of a neighboring property, believed to be the source of a recurring water leak into her home.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the Petitioner’s case, ruling in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a critical distinction within the community’s governing documents (CCR’s): while the HOA possesses the right to enter a property under certain conditions, it does not have an explicit obligation to do so. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the HOA had violated the CCR’s. The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted reasonably by contacting the neighbor and reviewing the provided information, and that forcing access without more definitive proof could expose the HOA to legal risk. The decision suggests the Petitioner may be pursuing relief in an incorrect venue or against the incorrect party.

Case Overview

Case Name

Susan E Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020057-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

In the Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Adam D. Stone

Petitioner

Susan E. Abbass

Respondent

10000 North Central Homeowners Association (represented by Blake Johnson, Esq.)

Hearing Date

November 24, 2020 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

December 1, 2020

Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Central Claim

The Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s) by failing to authorize an inspection on a neighboring property. The Petitioner’s home was experiencing water intrusion every time it rained, and she believed the leak originated from the adjacent lot.

Alleged Violations: The petition cited violations of the CCR’s Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4.

Argument: The Petitioner contended that the recurring water leak constituted an “emergency” situation, obligating the HOA to act.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Financial Responsibility: The Petitioner stated she was “ready, willing and able to be financially responsible for the cost of any inspections/surveys which needed to be performed on the neighboring property.”

Due Diligence: Inspections and surveys conducted on her own property determined that the leak was not originating from there.

Frustration: The Petitioner noted that over a year had passed since the leaking first occurred with no resolution from the HOA or the neighbor.

Key Concession: During the rehearing, the Petitioner “agreed that Respondent does not have an obligation to enter the property, only the right.”

Respondent’s Defense and Actions

Respondent’s Position

The HOA argued that it did not have sufficient evidence to justify compelling access to the neighboring property. The property manager, Robert Kersten, testified for the Respondent.

Lack of Proof: The HOA determined that the information provided by the Petitioner did not meet the criteria for forcing entry onto the neighbor’s property.

Legal Risk: The Respondent expressed concern that if it “overstepped its authority, it could open itself up to other causes of action.”

Actions Taken by the HOA

Despite denying the Petitioner’s request to force an inspection, the HOA took the following steps:

• It reached out to the neighboring property owner to request access.

• It sent a warning letter to the neighbor regarding “improper vegetation” on the property.

• It contacted the neighbor, who, upon information and belief, had her insurance company inspect the water flow. The insurance company reportedly determined the neighbor was not at fault.

• At the rehearing, the Respondent submitted photographic evidence (Exhibits K, L, and M) purportedly showing a fixed pipe and drainage moving away from the Petitioner’s property.

Procedural History and Rehearing

1. Petition Filed (May 5, 2020): Petitioner filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Initial Hearing (July 28, 2020): The first hearing was conducted.

3. Initial Decision (August 17, 2020): The ALJ issued a decision concluding the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof, as the HOA only had the right to enter the property, not an obligation.

4. Rehearing Request (August 31, 2020): Petitioner requested a rehearing, claiming the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. Rehearing Granted (October 14, 2020): The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing request.

6. Rehearing Conducted (November 24, 2020): The ALJ conducted a new hearing to reconsider the evidence.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Burden of Proof

The ALJ reiterated that the Petitioner bears the burden to prove the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Conclusion on Evidence: The ALJ found that on rehearing, the “Petitioner failed to provide new evidence or witness testimony demonstrating that Respondent violated Article XII and Article XIII of the CCR’s.”

Key Judicial Determinations

Right vs. Obligation: The central legal conclusion is that the HOA’s authority is discretionary. The CCR’s grant a right to enter property but do not impose an obligation to do so upon a homeowner’s request.

HOA’s Conduct: The judge determined that the HOA had acted appropriately and in compliance with the CCR’s. The decision notes, “Respondent was receptive to the information provided by Petitioner and requested the neighboring property owners cooperation. While the neighboring owner may not have fully cooperated to the liking of Petitioner, Respondent still followed the CCR’s to the best of its ability at this point.”

Statutory Limitations on ALJ: The ALJ is bound by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which limits the judge’s authority to ordering a party to “abide by the statutes, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue.” The ALJ concluded, “it too cannot force the neighbor or the Respondent to grant access to the property.”

Incorrect Venue: The decision strongly suggests the Petitioner is pursuing the wrong legal remedy: “While the possibility of future leaking is certainly frustrating, it appears that Petitioner has or the incorrect venue and possibly party to grant the relief for which it seeks.”

Final Order and Implications

Ruling: The ALJ ordered that “the Respondent is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: As a result of a rehearing, the administrative law judge order is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Abbass v. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, involving Petitioner Susan E. Abbass and Respondent 10000 North Central Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What specific articles of the community documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

3. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on July 28, 2020?

4. On what legal grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing of the case?

5. What was the Respondent’s main argument for not forcing an inspection of the neighboring property?

6. What key point regarding the Respondent’s authority did the Petitioner concede during the rehearing?

7. According to the decision, who bears the burden of proof, and what is the evidentiary standard required to meet it?

8. What evidence did the Respondent introduce during the rehearing on November 24, 2020?

9. What was the final ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, and what did the order state?

10. What specific limitation on the Administrative Law Judge’s power is cited in the Conclusions of Law?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, and the Respondent, 10000 North Central Homeowners Association. The central dispute was the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent failed to fulfill its duty by not allowing an inspection on a neighboring property to find the source of a water leak affecting the Petitioner’s home.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s).

3. Following the July 28, 2020 hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on August 17, 2020, concluding that the Petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof. The judge found that the Respondent only had the right to enter the neighboring property, not an obligation to do so.

4. The Petitioner’s request for rehearing was granted based on her claims that the initial findings of fact were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and that the decision was “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. The Respondent argued that the Petitioner had not provided sufficient proof of the neighbor’s fault to justify forcing access. The Respondent was also concerned that overstepping its authority could expose the association to other legal actions.

6. During the rehearing, the Petitioner agreed with the Respondent’s position that the association does not have an obligation to enter the neighboring property, only the right to do so.

7. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

8. At the rehearing, the Respondent introduced Exhibits K, L, and M. These were photographs that purportedly showed where a pipe was fixed and how drainage moves away from the Petitioner’s property.

9. The final ruling concluded that the Respondent had not violated the CCR’s and was the prevailing party. The order dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal.

10. The decision cites A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which states that an Administrative Law Judge may only order a party to abide by the statutes, community documents, or contract provisions at issue. The judge cannot force the Respondent or the neighbor to grant access to the property.

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Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal distinction between a “right” and an “obligation” as it pertains to the Homeowners Association’s authority under the CCR’s in this case. How was this distinction central to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision. Detail the evidence and arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent, and explain why the judge ultimately concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Identify the key dates, actions taken by each party, and the rulings made at each stage of the administrative process.

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Respondent (10000 North Central Homeowners Association) in response to the Petitioner’s complaint. Based on the Findings of Fact, did the association act reasonably and in compliance with the CCR’s?

5. Explain the jurisdiction and statutory limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings in resolving disputes between homeowners and their associations, as outlined in the decision. What remedies were available to the Petitioner through this venue, and why was the specific relief she sought beyond the judge’s power to grant?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, considers evidence, and issues a legal decision. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The government office where administrative law judges hear disputes concerning state agencies.

Order Granting Rehearing

A formal order issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate that approved the Petitioner’s request for a second hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Susan E. Abbass.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal case or dispute. In the final decision, the Respondent was named the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of disputes. In this context, it refers to the Office of Administrative Hearings where the case was heard.

Briefing Document: Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Susan E. Abbass (Petitioner) and the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request for the HOA to compel an inspection of a neighboring property, believed to be the source of a recurring water leak into her home.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the Petitioner’s case, ruling in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a critical distinction within the community’s governing documents (CCR’s): while the HOA possesses the right to enter a property under certain conditions, it does not have an explicit obligation to do so. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the HOA had violated the CCR’s. The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted reasonably by contacting the neighbor and reviewing the provided information, and that forcing access without more definitive proof could expose the HOA to legal risk. The decision suggests the Petitioner may be pursuing relief in an incorrect venue or against the incorrect party.

Case Overview

Case Name

Susan E Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020057-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

In the Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Adam D. Stone

Petitioner

Susan E. Abbass

Respondent

10000 North Central Homeowners Association (represented by Blake Johnson, Esq.)

Hearing Date

November 24, 2020 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

December 1, 2020

Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Central Claim

The Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s) by failing to authorize an inspection on a neighboring property. The Petitioner’s home was experiencing water intrusion every time it rained, and she believed the leak originated from the adjacent lot.

Alleged Violations: The petition cited violations of the CCR’s Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4.

Argument: The Petitioner contended that the recurring water leak constituted an “emergency” situation, obligating the HOA to act.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Financial Responsibility: The Petitioner stated she was “ready, willing and able to be financially responsible for the cost of any inspections/surveys which needed to be performed on the neighboring property.”

Due Diligence: Inspections and surveys conducted on her own property determined that the leak was not originating from there.

Frustration: The Petitioner noted that over a year had passed since the leaking first occurred with no resolution from the HOA or the neighbor.

Key Concession: During the rehearing, the Petitioner “agreed that Respondent does not have an obligation to enter the property, only the right.”

Respondent’s Defense and Actions

Respondent’s Position

The HOA argued that it did not have sufficient evidence to justify compelling access to the neighboring property. The property manager, Robert Kersten, testified for the Respondent.

Lack of Proof: The HOA determined that the information provided by the Petitioner did not meet the criteria for forcing entry onto the neighbor’s property.

Legal Risk: The Respondent expressed concern that if it “overstepped its authority, it could open itself up to other causes of action.”

Actions Taken by the HOA

Despite denying the Petitioner’s request to force an inspection, the HOA took the following steps:

• It reached out to the neighboring property owner to request access.

• It sent a warning letter to the neighbor regarding “improper vegetation” on the property.

• It contacted the neighbor, who, upon information and belief, had her insurance company inspect the water flow. The insurance company reportedly determined the neighbor was not at fault.

• At the rehearing, the Respondent submitted photographic evidence (Exhibits K, L, and M) purportedly showing a fixed pipe and drainage moving away from the Petitioner’s property.

Procedural History and Rehearing

1. Petition Filed (May 5, 2020): Petitioner filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Initial Hearing (July 28, 2020): The first hearing was conducted.

3. Initial Decision (August 17, 2020): The ALJ issued a decision concluding the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof, as the HOA only had the right to enter the property, not an obligation.

4. Rehearing Request (August 31, 2020): Petitioner requested a rehearing, claiming the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. Rehearing Granted (October 14, 2020): The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing request.

6. Rehearing Conducted (November 24, 2020): The ALJ conducted a new hearing to reconsider the evidence.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Burden of Proof

The ALJ reiterated that the Petitioner bears the burden to prove the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Conclusion on Evidence: The ALJ found that on rehearing, the “Petitioner failed to provide new evidence or witness testimony demonstrating that Respondent violated Article XII and Article XIII of the CCR’s.”

Key Judicial Determinations

Right vs. Obligation: The central legal conclusion is that the HOA’s authority is discretionary. The CCR’s grant a right to enter property but do not impose an obligation to do so upon a homeowner’s request.

HOA’s Conduct: The judge determined that the HOA had acted appropriately and in compliance with the CCR’s. The decision notes, “Respondent was receptive to the information provided by Petitioner and requested the neighboring property owners cooperation. While the neighboring owner may not have fully cooperated to the liking of Petitioner, Respondent still followed the CCR’s to the best of its ability at this point.”

Statutory Limitations on ALJ: The ALJ is bound by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which limits the judge’s authority to ordering a party to “abide by the statutes, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue.” The ALJ concluded, “it too cannot force the neighbor or the Respondent to grant access to the property.”

Incorrect Venue: The decision strongly suggests the Petitioner is pursuing the wrong legal remedy: “While the possibility of future leaking is certainly frustrating, it appears that Petitioner has or the incorrect venue and possibly party to grant the relief for which it seeks.”

Final Order and Implications

Ruling: The ALJ ordered that “the Respondent is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: As a result of a rehearing, the administrative law judge order is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan E Abbass (petitioner)
  • Ronald Pick (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Blake Johnson (attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Robert Kersten (property manager)
    Property manager, appeared as a witness for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Electronic transmission sender

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed after rehearing because Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner continually refused Respondent access to his locked back yard for landscaping maintenance, and the CC&Rs requiring landscaping do not mandate pool maintenance.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation due to refusal of access to the back yard and misinterpretation of CC&R obligations regarding pool maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020 and acting in bad faith, asserting that pool/hardscape maintenance was included in landscaping duties, and requesting the maximum fine. Respondent countered that they consistently maintained the front yard but were denied access to the locked backyard due to Petitioner's pool liability concerns.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed/denied as Petitioner failed to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Respondent was ordered, going forward, to communicate the days and times they will be performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner can provide access.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Duties, Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, CC&Rs, Access Refusal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:27 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:33 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:32 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:36 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:21 (124.1 KB)

Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the scope of landscaping maintenance obligations as defined by the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duties under CC&Rs § 5.1 by not maintaining his property’s unique landscaping, which he argued included replenishing rock, staining paths, and servicing his swimming pool and associated hardscape. He further claimed the HOA was acting in bad faith and failing to comply with a previous court ruling.

The Respondent countered that it had consistently performed standard landscaping on the Petitioner’s front yard since January 2020. However, it was repeatedly denied access to the backyard, a fact the Petitioner admitted, citing liability concerns due to his pool. The HOA provided evidence of multiple attempts to access the yard and testimony that its maintenance duties are uniform across the community and do not include “concierge” services or pool maintenance.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the petition in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision rested on two key points: 1) The Petitioner failed to provide access to the area in question, preventing the HOA from performing its duties. 2) The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the term “landscaping” under the CC&Rs could be reasonably interpreted to include swimming pool maintenance. This conclusion was strongly supported by the separate licensing classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pool service (R-6) issued by the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, which establishes them as distinct services under state regulation.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Personnel

Name/Entity

Affiliation / Title

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Homeowner, 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

Respondent Counsel

Nicole Payne, Esq.

Legal Representative

Respondent Witness

Diana Crites

Owner, Crites and Associates (Property Management Co.)

Respondent Witness

Rian Baas

Owner, Mowtown Landscape (HOA Landscaping Contractor)

Presiding Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Administrative Law Judge

Case Details

Details

Initial Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL

Initial Hearing

August 3, 2020

Initial Decision

August 17, 2020

Rehearing Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG

Rehearing

February 2, 2021

Rehearing Decision

February 12, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict involved the interpretation of the HOA’s maintenance obligations under its governing documents. The Petitioner argued for an expansive definition of “landscaping” that encompassed his entire property exterior, including a swimming pool. The HOA maintained that its duties were limited to standard, uniform landscaping services and that pool maintenance was explicitly excluded. The dispute was compounded by the Petitioner’s refusal to grant the HOA’s landscaper access to his backyard.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition, filed on or about April 21, 2020, and subsequent arguments in two hearings, were based on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA violated § 5.1 of its CC&Rs by failing “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.”

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: As the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the Petitioner contended it should include all types of features outside of structures. His specific demands included:

◦ Maintenance of unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Replenishment of thin or worn-out rock ground cover.

◦ Staining of walking paths.

◦ Full maintenance of his “water feature,” identified as a swimming pool. This included the pump, filter, chemicals, patio, and all related hardscape.

Refusal to Grant Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked.” He stated this was for liability reasons due to the pool and refused access to the HOA’s landscapers. At the rehearing, he argued the HOA failed to communicate its schedule to allow him to provide temporary access.

Budgetary Failure: He asserted that the HOA did not properly budget for the costs associated with maintaining his unique landscaping.

Grounds for Rehearing: After the initial denial, the Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including irregularity in proceedings, errors in evidence admission, and claims of “Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues” related to hearing loss.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a defense centered on its consistent attempts to fulfill its obligations and the Petitioner’s own actions preventing them from doing so.

Consistent Front Yard Maintenance: Both the HOA property manager and its landscaping contractor testified that the Petitioner’s front yard had been continuously maintained since landscaping services began in January 2020.

Denial of Backyard Access: The HOA’s primary defense was that it was physically prevented from servicing the backyard. Evidence presented to support this included:

Testimony from Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): His crews were at the property weekly. Between January and March 2020, he or his crew knocked and left notes or business cards four to five times with no response.

Witness Testimony: In March 2020, a woman at the residence (presumably the Petitioner’s wife) explicitly instructed a landscaper that “she does not want anyone in the back yard because she had a pool and that is the reason for the lock on gate.”

Documentary Evidence: A text message dated March 24, 2020, from Mr. Baas to property manager Diana Crites memorialized this interaction. A photograph of the locked gate was also submitted.

Scope of Services: Ms. Crites testified that HOA landscape services are uniform throughout the community and include front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing in backyards (if access is granted), and sprinkler system upkeep. They do not provide “concierge” services such as maintaining potted plants, driveways, or pools (except for the community pool, which is serviced by a separate contractor).

Access as a Prerequisite: Ms. Crites explained that backyard maintenance is contingent on homeowners leaving their gates unlocked, and some owners choose not to grant access due to pets or other reasons.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s initial petition based on a clear set of facts.

Findings of Fact: The judge found the evidence presented by the Respondent to be credible. The Petitioner’s own admission that he refused to allow access to his backyard since January 2020 was a critical factor. The evidence established that the HOA had consistently maintained the front yard and made multiple, documented attempts to access the backyard.

Conclusions of Law: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.” Because the Petitioner denied access, he could not establish that the Respondent had violated any CC&R.

Rehearing and Final Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner for the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, the judge again reviewed the case and ultimately dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool and hardscape. The Petitioner failed to offer any definition or legal authority to support his expansive interpretation.

Analysis of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the common definitions of “landscaping” from various dictionary and legal sources “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

Arizona Registrar of Contractors (ROC) Licensing: The judge’s conclusion was decisively reinforced by the State of Arizona’s contractor licensing classifications:

◦ The R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license (formerly Landscaping) is for installing garden walls, irrigation, and other landscape features. It specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

◦ The R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license is a separate classification required to service residential pools.

◦ The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services.”

Final Order: The petition was dismissed. The judge noted that because the Petitioner denied access, the Respondent was not in violation. However, the judge provided a forward-looking recommendation: “it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Represented Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
  • Diana Crites (property manager)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent’s property management company; appeared as witness
  • Rian Baas (witness)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Listed as recipient of the decision
  • Luis (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Crew member mentioned in text message regarding attempted access to petitioner's yard
  • Jill (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Printed papers for Luis regarding access to petitioner's yard

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

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20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

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Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

“Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 14.8

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Section 14.8. The provision was determined to be inapplicable, governing the Association’s obligation to provide notice, not the methods homeowners must use to send payments.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. CC&Rs Section 14.8 was inapplicable, and Petitioner's chosen restricted delivery method for assessment payments caused delays, which were not the responsibility of the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 concerning notice obligations.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 by improperly handling or failing to receive his monthly assessment payments, which he sent via restricted delivery to a board member despite receiving instructions to mail payments to the Association's designated P.O. Box address.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • CC&Rs 14.8

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner assessments, CC&Rs interpretation, restricted delivery, jurisdiction, notice provision, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
  • CC&Rs 14.8
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020049-REL Decision – 861466.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:54 (145.6 KB)

20F-H2020049-REL Decision – 811290.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:59 (131.7 KB)

Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro HOA: Case Analysis and Legal Findings

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative legal case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL). The central dispute arose when Mr. Stoltenberg, a homeowner, was assessed late fees on his monthly dues after unilaterally altering his payment method. He began sending payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific volunteer board member, which resulted in significant processing delays and non-deliveries.

The petitioner alleged the Association was acting in “bad faith” and violating Section 14.8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively found that Section 14.8, which governs notices sent from the Association to its members, was entirely inapplicable to payments sent by a member to the Association. The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions were the direct cause of the payment delays and subsequent late fees.

The petitioner’s initial petition was denied. A subsequent request for rehearing was granted, but the rehearing affirmed the original decision. The ALJ reiterated that the cited CC&R section was inapplicable, noted a lack of jurisdiction over other statutes the petitioner raised, and concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof in either proceeding.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties and Governing Documents

Petitioner: Michael J. Stoltenberg, a condominium owner within the Rancho Del Oro development and a member of the homeowners’ association.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a condominium association in Yuma, Arizona, governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.

Governing Authority: The CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner. The specific provision at the center of the dispute is Section 14.8 of the Bylaws, titled “Notices.” This section has remained unamended since the original CC&Rs were recorded on August 30, 1985.

Initial Petition and Jurisdictional Scope

On March 2, 2020, Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.” The petition cited violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, as well as Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Mr. Stoltenberg sought an order compelling the Association to comply with these regulations and the issuance of a civil penalty.

Upon filing, the Department advised the petitioner that the HOA Dispute Process lacks jurisdiction over disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Consequently, the case was narrowed to a single issue, and the petitioner was assessed a $500 filing fee. The sole issue for the hearing was formally defined as: “Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.”

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

Outcome

March 2, 2020

Petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg.

The case is initiated.

July 14, 2020

Initial evidentiary hearing is held.

Both parties present arguments.

August 3, 2020

Amended ALJ Decision is issued.

The petitioner’s petition is denied.

August 28, 2020

Petitioner submits a rehearing request.

Grounds cited: errors of law and an arbitrary decision.

September 9, 2020

Rehearing request is granted.

A new hearing is scheduled.

February 16, 2021

Rehearing is held.

The same issue is re-examined.

March 8, 2021

Final ALJ Decision is issued.

The petitioner’s petition is denied again; the order is binding.

Factual Analysis of the Dispute

Payment Instructions and Petitioner’s Actions

On January 4, 2016, the petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366. The correspondence explicitly stated, “Please send your payments to the above address.”

Despite these clear instructions, beginning in November 2019, the petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to this P.O. Box via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for pickup by board member Rhea Carlisle only.

The petitioner’s stated rationale for this change was a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company (PMC) had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments. However, the petitioner was aware of several key facts:

• The Association employed a PMC to pick up its mail.

• Ms. Carlisle was an unpaid volunteer board member, not an employee of the PMC.

• Diana Crites was the Association’s listed Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020.

Consequences of Restricted Delivery

The petitioner’s unilateral decision to restrict delivery caused significant disruption to the receipt of his payments. This led to his assessments being recorded as untimely, which in turn resulted in the Association assessing late fees against his account. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence “in danger of foreclosure by the Association.”

A timeline of payment delivery issues presented as evidence includes:

Payment Period

USPS Action

December 2019

Picked up.

January 25, 2020

Returned to petitioner by USPS.

January 30, 2020

Picked up.

February 26, 2020

Picked up.

April 17, 2020

Picked up.

June 8, 2020

Returned to petitioner by USPS.

Legal Rulings and Core Arguments

Central Legal Text: CC&Rs Section 14.8 (“Notices”)

The entire case hinged on the interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws. The text reads:

“Any notice permitted or required by this Declaration or the Bylaws may be delivered either personally or by mail. If delivery is by mail, it shall be deemed to have been delivered seventy-two (72) hours after a copy of the same has been deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to each person at the current address given by such person to the secretary of the Board or addressed to the Unit of such person if no address has been given to the secretary.”

ALJ’s Interpretation: In both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, the ALJ found the language of Section 14.8 to be clear, “neither vague nor ambiguous,” and definitively inapplicable to the case. The ruling stated that the “language of Section 14.8 speaks specifically to the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information. Section 14.8 has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.”

Arguments Presented

• He had always technically mailed his monthly payments on time to the correct P.O. Box.

• He filed the petition out of concern over incurring late fees and the potential loss of his home.

• During the rehearing, he argued that the initial decision failed to properly interpret Section 14.8 and should have also applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842 (concerning standards of conduct for nonprofit officers).

• Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was entirely inapplicable to the facts presented, as it governs the Association’s outbound notice obligations, not a member’s inbound payments.

• The Department and the Office of Administrative Hearings lack jurisdiction under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT.

• The petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof required to show a violation.

Final Conclusions and Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were definitive. The core conclusions of law were as follows:

1. Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the CC&Rs and failed to meet this burden.

2. Inapplicability of CC&Rs Section 14.8: The provision cited by the petitioner was found to be wholly irrelevant to the matter of a homeowner mailing payments to the Association.

3. Assignment of Responsibility: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner’s own choices were the cause of the issue. The decision states, “By restricting the delivery of his monthly assessment payments, Petitioner inadvertently caused delay in their ability to be picked up by the Association.” There was “no credible evidence in the record to suggest that the action(s) Petitioner volitionally took are Respondent’s responsibility.”

4. Rehearing Findings: In the final decision, the ALJ noted that the petitioner “did not introduce any evidence tending to suggest that there was an ‘error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law…'” or that the prior decision was arbitrary or capricious.

Final Order: Based on the foregoing, the ALJ ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied. The order issued on March 8, 2021, was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, procedures, and outcomes presented in the official decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided legal documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what was their relationship to one another?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Petitioner take regarding his monthly assessment payments starting in November 2019?

4. According to the Association, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs not applicable to the Petitioner’s complaint?

5. What were the negative consequences the Petitioner faced as a result of his payments being received late by the Association?

6. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did the judge find he had met it?

7. What were the two grounds upon which the Petitioner requested a rehearing after the initial decision?

8. Why was the Petitioner’s citation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) § 10-3842 dismissed during the proceedings?

9. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on March 08, 2021, following the rehearing?

10. After the final order was issued, what was the Petitioner’s sole remaining avenue for appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J Stoltenberg, the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Stoltenberg was a condominium owner and a member of the Association, which governed the residential development where he lived.

2. In his petition filed on March 2, 2020, Stoltenberg alleged the Association violated Section 14.8 of its CC&Rs and Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801. He specifically claimed the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to the Association’s P.O. Box via restricted delivery from the United States Postal Service. He specified that the mail was for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only, despite knowing she was a volunteer and not an employee of the property management company that handled mail.

4. The Association argued that Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was inapplicable because it governs the Association’s notice obligations to its members. The judge agreed, stating the section has no binding authority over how homeowners send mail to the Association.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence in danger of foreclosure.

6. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing the contention is more probably true than not. The judge concluded in both decisions that the Petitioner failed to sustain this burden of proof.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding” and because “[t]he findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

8. The citation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations, was dismissed because it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate’s HOA Dispute Process. The Petitioner was advised of these jurisdictional limitations when he filed his petition.

9. The final ruling issued on March 8, 2021, denied the Petitioner’s petition once again. The judge affirmed the original findings, concluding there was no violation of Section 14.8 and that the Petitioner had not introduced any evidence to support his grounds for a rehearing.

10. After the final order resulting from the rehearing, the Petitioner’s only remaining recourse was to seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal had to be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Formulate a comprehensive essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and details from the source documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark in her interpretation of Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs. Explain why this section was deemed inapplicable to the Petitioner’s situation and how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome in both the hearing and rehearing.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required, and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this standard in the judgment of the court.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, starting from the initial petition. Detail the key dates, filings (petition, answer, rehearing request), hearings, and decisions, explaining the significance of each step in the administrative legal process from March 2020 to March 2021.

4. Examine the actions of the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, beginning in November 2019. Evaluate his rationale for unilaterally changing his payment method, the specific steps he took, and how his choices directly led to the late fees and risk of foreclosure he sought to avoid.

5. Explain the roles and jurisdictional limitations of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in this dispute. Why were certain statutes cited by the Petitioner, such as those under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT., dismissed by the court as being outside its purview?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues decisions for state agencies.

Answer

The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on March 24, 2020, denying all items in the Petitioner’s complaint.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings regarding disputes within homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Specific statutes were cited by the Petitioner and referenced by the court.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association responsible for governing the real estate development and enforcing its CC&Rs.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The governing body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

An acronym for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the judge’s decision that details the factual background, procedural history, and evidence presented during the hearing.

Hearing

A formal proceeding before an administrative law judge where parties present evidence and arguments. In this case, hearings were held on July 14, 2020, and February 16, 2021.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Department’s jurisdiction was limited and did not extend to disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency that provides administrative law judges to conduct hearings for other state agencies, ensuring impartiality.

The final, binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the order was to deny the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg.

Petition

The formal legal document filed by the Petitioner on March 2, 2020, to initiate the hearing process with the Department.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to a party to re-examine the issues of a case, typically requested on grounds of legal error or an unjust decision. The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restricted Delivery

A service offered by the United States Postal Service (USPS) that ensures mail is delivered only to a specific addressee or their authorized agent.

Statutory Agent

An individual or entity designated to receive legal notices and service of process on behalf of a corporation or association. For the Association, this was Diana Crites.

Select all sources
811290.pdf
861466.pdf

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20F-H2020049-REL-RHG

2 sources

These documents contain the Administrative Law Judge Decisions stemming from a dispute between a homeowner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association regarding the timely delivery of monthly assessment payments. The initial decision in August 2020 denied the homeowner’s petition, finding that the Association did not violate Section 14.8 of the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), as that provision governs the Association’s notice obligation to members, not homeowners’ mail to the Association. Following a granted request for rehearing due to alleged errors of law, the subsequent March 2021 decision affirmed the original ruling, concluding that the homeowner’s self-imposed restriction on mail delivery caused the delays and that the relevant CC&R section was inapplicable to the petitioner’s complaint. Both decisions noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction over one of the statutes cited by the petitioner.

2 sources

What were the legal and procedural reasons for granting the rehearing request?
How did the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8 resolve the core dispute?
What was the Petitioner’s basis for claiming a violation against the Association?

Based on 2 sources

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Appeared telephonically for Respondent
  • Rhea Carlisle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Unpaid volunteer board member
  • Diana Crites (statutory agent)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020
  • Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (attorney contact)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Recipient of electronic transmission for Respondent in initial decision

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    ADRE
    Transmitted decision electronically (c/o Commissioner Judy Lowe)

Jean Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-30
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) or the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% without a vote, as the increase remained below the Maximum Annual Assessment and complied with the statutory 20% cap.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jean Williams Counsel
Respondent Surprise Farms II Community Association Counsel Nick Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803; CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) or the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% without a vote, as the increase remained below the Maximum Annual Assessment and complied with the statutory 20% cap.

Why this result: Petitioner’s assertion was based on an erroneous reading of the CC&Rs, confusing the maximum automatic increase of the Maximum Annual Assessment (10%) with the limit on the actual Annual Assessment increase.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the 20% increase in the Annual Assessment effective April 2020 violated statutory limits or CC&R requirements for member approval.

Petitioner alleged the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the CC&Rs by increasing the Annual Assessment by 20% (from $720 to $864) effective April 2020 without obtaining a 2/3 majority vote of the members.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: assessment increase, HOA assessments, statutory compliance, CC&R interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.2
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.4

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020054-REL Decision – 810957.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:53:01 (103.0 KB)

Briefing on Administrative Law Judge Decision: Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020054-REL, where petitioner Jean Williams alleged that the Surprise Farms II Community Association improperly increased annual homeowner assessments. The ALJ dismissed the petition, concluding that the Association acted within its authority as defined by both its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona state law.

The central finding of the case is that the petitioner erroneously interpreted the CC&Rs by confusing the “Annual Assessment” (the actual amount charged to homeowners) with the “Maximum Annual Assessment” (a calculated upper limit). The ALJ determined that the Association’s 20% increase in the Annual Assessment for 2020 was permissible because:

1. It did not exceed the 20% year-over-year cap allowed by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A) without a member vote.

2. The resulting assessment of $864 was significantly below the $2,426 Maximum Annual Assessment permitted for 2020 under the community’s own CC&Rs.

Ultimately, the decision affirms the Board’s discretion to set the Annual Assessment, provided it stays within the dual constraints of the state’s percentage increase limit and the community’s own calculated maximum charge.

Case Overview

Case Number: 20F-H2020054-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Jean Williams

Respondent: Surprise Farms II Community Association

Administrative Law Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date: July 10, 2020

Decision Date: July 30, 2020

Nature of Dispute: The petitioner contested the validity of a 20% increase in the annual homeowners association assessment implemented in April 2020, arguing it required a member vote.

Petitioner’s Allegations

Jean Williams filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on March 31, 2020, alleging that the Surprise Farms II Community Association violated its governing documents and state law.

Core Allegation: The Association illegally increased the “Maximum Monthly Assessment” by 20% without the approval of a two-thirds majority of association members.

Cited Violations:

A.R.S. § 33-1803: The statute governing assessment increases.

CC&Rs Article VII, Sections 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c): The sections of the community’s governing documents that outline assessment rules.

Petitioner’s Argument: Williams contended that the Association’s CC&Rs limited any annual assessment increase to 10% unless a vote was held. She argued that the Association’s justification for the 20% increase, which cited A.R.S. § 33-1803, was a direct violation of the community’s covenants.

Respondent’s Position and Stipulated Facts

The Surprise Farms II Community Association denied all of the petitioner’s complaints. At the hearing, the Association did not present witnesses and relied on its legal argument. The respondent stipulated to the key facts regarding the assessment increases:

April 2019 Increase: The Annual Assessment increased from $660.00 to $720.00 per year, a 9% increase, without a vote of the members.

April 2020 Increase: The Annual Assessment increased from $720.00 to $864.00 per year, a 20% increase, without a vote of the members.

Governing Rules and Document Analysis

The ALJ’s decision rested on a detailed interpretation of state law and two distinct concepts within the Association’s CC&Rs: the “Annual Assessment” and the “Maximum Annual Assessment.”

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A)

This state law establishes a default cap on assessment increases. It states that an association “shall not impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment without the approval of the majority of the members,” unless the community’s own documents impose an even lower limit.

CC&Rs Article VII: Key Definitions

The case hinged on the distinction between two terms defined in the CC&Rs:

1. Maximum Annual Assessment (Section 7.4): This section defines a ceiling for how much the Board could charge.

◦ It began at $480 in the first year.

◦ Crucially, this maximum automatically increases by up to 10% each year without a member vote.

◦ To raise the Maximum Annual Assessment above this automatic 10% annual increase, a two-thirds vote of members is required.

2. Annual Assessment (Section 7.2): This section defines the actual charge levied against each property.

◦ The Board has “sole discretion” to set this amount each year.

◦ The only limitation is that the Annual Assessment must be less than or equal to the “Maximum Annual Assessment” calculated under Section 7.4.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the CC&Rs or state law. The decision was based on the following key points of analysis:

Erroneous Reading of the CC&Rs

The ALJ found the petitioner’s entire argument was “predicated on her erroneous reading of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs.” The petitioner incorrectly believed the 10% automatic increase to the Maximum Annual Assessment was a cap on the Annual Assessment itself.

The decision explicitly clarifies this distinction:

“Petitioner repeatedly asserted that an increase in the Annual Assessment was limited to ten percent in any given year unless approved by a vote of the members even though Article VII, Section 7.4 was entitled Maximum Annual Assessment and consistently referenced the same. By definition, the existence of a Maximum Annual Assessment necessitates an Annual Assessment that may be less than the maximum.”

Calculation of the Maximum Annual Assessment

The ALJ used the CC&Rs’ formula (a 10% cumulative increase per year since 2003) to calculate the authorized Maximum Annual Assessment for each year. This demonstrated the significant gap between what the Association could charge and what it actually charged.

Maximum Annual Assessment

$480.00

$528.00

$580.80

$638.88

$702.76

$773.03

$850.33

$935.36

$1,028.89

$1,131.77

$1,244.94

$1,369.43

$1,369.43

$1,657.00

$1,822.70

$2,004.97

$2,205.46

$2,426.00

Legality of the 2020 Assessment Increase

The ALJ determined the Association’s 2020 increase was compliant with all rules for two reasons:

1. Compliance with State Law: The increase from $720 to $864 was exactly 20%, which is the maximum allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) without a member vote.

2. Compliance with CC&Rs: The new Annual Assessment of $864 was substantially lower than the calculated Maximum Annual Assessment of $2,426 allowed for 2020.

The Board therefore acted within its “sole discretion” as granted by Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs.

Final Order

Based on the finding that the Association acted properly, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. The decision is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of the order.

Study Guide: Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020054-REL, Jean Williams v. Surprise Farms II Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation Jean Williams made against the Surprise Farms II Community Association in her petition?

3. What was the specific percentage and dollar amount of the Annual Assessment increase that took effect in April 2020, and was it approved by a vote of the members?

4. According to the decision, which two governing documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

5. What limitation does Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(A) place on an association’s ability to raise regular assessments?

6. How did the community’s CC&Rs define the relationship between the “Annual Assessment” set by the Board and the “Maximum Annual Assessment”?

7. What was the calculated “Maximum Annual Assessment” for the year 2020, according to the automatic increase formula in the CC&Rs?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge, what was the petitioner’s fundamental misunderstanding of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs?

9. Who bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what legal standard was required to meet it?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and on what date was the decision made?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jean Williams, who was the Petitioner appearing on her own behalf, and the Surprise Farms II Community Association, which was the Respondent represented by Nick Nogami. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. The petitioner alleged that the association improperly increased the Maximum Monthly Assessment by 20% without the required approval from a two-thirds majority of the association members. She claimed this action violated the community’s CC&Rs and that the association incorrectly used A.R.S. § 33-1803 to justify the increase.

3. Effective April 2020, the Annual Assessment increased by twenty percent, from $720.00 per year to $864.00 per year. The respondent stipulated that this increase occurred without any vote of the members.

4. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803 and specific sections of the association’s governing documents: Article VII, Section 7.2 and 7.4(a)-(c) of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

5. A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) states that an association cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the previous fiscal year’s assessment without the approval of a majority of the members. This limit applies unless the community’s own documents impose an even lower limit.

6. Article VII, Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs granted the Board sole discretion to set the Annual Assessment. This discretion was limited by the provision that the amount must be subject to, and therefore less than or equal to, the “Maximum Annual Assessment” as calculated under Section 7.4.

7. Using the annual ten percent increase formula set forth in Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs, the calculated Maximum Annual Assessment for the year 2020 was $2,426.00.

8. The judge concluded that the petitioner’s case was predicated on her erroneous reading of the CC&Rs. She incorrectly believed the 10% figure in Section 7.4 applied to the Annual Assessment itself, when in fact it was the automatic escalator for the Maximum Annual Assessment, which served as a ceiling for the board’s discretion.

9. The Petitioner, Jean Williams, bore the burden of proof in this proceeding. She was required to prove her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

10. The final order, issued on July 30, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate the referenced provisions of the CC&Rs or A.R.S. § 33-1803(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the distinction between “Annual Assessment” and “Maximum Annual Assessment” as defined in the Surprise Farms II CC&Rs. Explain how the petitioner’s failure to differentiate between these two terms was central to the case’s outcome.

2. Explain the interplay between the community’s CC&Rs (specifically Article VII, Sections 7.2 and 7.4) and the state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)). How did the judge determine that the HOA’s actions complied with both governing authorities?

3. Describe the burden of proof in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required, and did they successfully meet it? Use specific details from the “CONCLUSIONS OF LAW” section to support your answer.

4. Trace the history of the assessment increases from April 2019 to April 2020. Detail the specific monetary and percentage increases for both years and explain why the 20% increase in 2020 was deemed legally permissible without a member vote, while an increase over 20% would not have been.

5. Discuss the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. What specific conclusions of law and interpretations of the CC&Rs led directly to the ruling that the respondent did not improperly increase the annual assessment?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions and rulings.

Annual Assessment

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the charge levied and assessed each year against each Lot and Parcel pursuant to Article VII, Section 7.2 hereof.” The Board has sole discretion to set this amount, as long as it does not exceed the Maximum Annual Assessment.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute relevant to this case is A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which governs HOA assessment increases.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the law and CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, the CC&Rs for Surprise Farms II were recorded in 2003.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Surprise Farms II Community Association is the HOA in this case.

Maximum Annual Assessment

A ceiling on the Annual Assessment, established by the CC&Rs. This amount was set at $480 initially and designed to increase automatically by ten percent each year without a member vote, serving as the upper limit for the Board’s assessment-setting discretion.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, Jean Williams was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The legal standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is met when the evidence presented has the “most convincing force” and shows that a fact is more likely to be true than not true.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Surprise Farms II Community Association was the Respondent.

Why This Homeowner Lost Her Lawsuit Against the HOA (And What You Can Learn From It)

1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter

It’s a scenario many homeowners fear: a letter from the Homeowners Association (HOA) announcing a significant and unexpected fee increase. The feeling of frustration and powerlessness can be overwhelming. When Jean Williams received notice that her HOA was raising her annual assessment by a full 20%, she believed the board had overstepped its authority. The increase seemed to be a clear violation of the community’s governing documents, so she decided to fight back and took her HOA to court. The outcome, however, was not what she—or many other homeowners—would have expected.

2.0 The Core Misunderstanding: “Maximum” Dues vs. “Actual” Dues

The foundation of Jean Williams’s case was her belief that the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) limited any annual fee increase to 10% without a vote from the members. This is where the critical misunderstanding occurred.

The judge in the case identified a crucial distinction in the legal language. The 10% limit mentioned in the CC&Rs did not apply to the Annual Assessment—the actual dollar amount billed to homeowners each year. Instead, it applied to the Maximum Annual Assessment, a theoretical ceiling on how high the fees could potentially go.

But why was this ceiling so high? The CC&Rs were designed so that this Maximum Annual Assessment would increase automatically by 10% every single year since its inception in 2003. This cumulative growth operated silently in the background for over a decade, creating a vast difference between the two figures. For the year 2020, the actual assessment billed to homeowners was $864. However, due to years of automatic increases, the allowable Maximum Annual Assessment had ballooned to $2,426. The board was operating with far more financial latitude than the petitioner realized.

3.0 How State Law Set the Real Limit at 20%

The next layer of this case involves the interplay between the HOA’s documents and state law. An Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), dictates that an HOA cannot raise regular assessments by more than 20% in a single year without a vote from the majority of members, unless the community’s own documents set a lower limit.

This is the key legal point. Williams believed her community documents did set a lower limit of 10%. Critically, however, that 10% limit applied only to the wrong variable—the theoretical Maximum Annual Assessment ceiling, not the Annual Assessment actually paid. The CC&Rs’ failure to place a specific annual cap on the actual assessment created a legal vacuum. This vacuum was automatically filled by the Arizona state statute, making its 20% cap the only legally binding limit.

The HOA’s increase from $720 to $864 was exactly 20%. This placed their action right at the maximum threshold allowed by state law without requiring a member vote, making it legally permissible.

4.0 The Fine Print: The Power of “Sole Discretion”

The HOA board’s authority was further solidified by specific language embedded in its governing documents. Article VII, Section 7.2 of the CC&Rs explicitly granted the board “sole discretion” to determine the amount of the Annual Assessment.

The true power of this clause was unlocked by its connection to the two types of assessments. The board’s “sole discretion” was the legal tool that allowed them to set the Annual Assessment at any level they chose, provided it did not exceed the automatically growing Maximum Annual Assessment ceiling. With a ceiling of $2,426 and a previous fee of only $720, the board was legally empowered to enact the 20% increase without consulting homeowners.

5.0 The Judge’s Final Word: A Cautionary Tale

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner’s entire case was built on a misreading of the governing documents. The judge’s decision offers a clear and potent lesson for all homeowners, emphasizing that the precise wording of these legal documents is everything.

In the final decision, the judge wrote:

Petitioner’s assertion that Respondent could not increase the Annual Assessment by twenty percent was predicated on her erroneous reading of Article VII, Section 7.4 of the CC&Rs. … By definition, the existence of a Maximum Annual Assessment necessitates an Annual Assessment that may be less than the maximum.

The judge’s reasoning is precise: creating a “maximum” assessment in a legal document inherently implies the existence of a separate “actual” assessment that can be lower. Williams’s case collapsed because she treated these two distinct legal concepts as one and the same.

6.0 Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Documents Say?

The case of Jean Williams serves as a powerful reminder of how interlocking legal mechanics can produce unexpected outcomes. The board’s power was not derived from a single rule, but from the synthesis of three distinct elements: a high Maximum Assessment ceiling created by a silent, cumulative growth clause; the board’s “sole discretion” to set actual fees anywhere underneath that ceiling; and the state law’s 20% backstop that became the only relevant limit in the absence of a specific cap in the CC&Rs.

This case proves that the devil is truly in the details. It begs a critical question for every homeowner living in a planned community: When was the last time you read your community’s CC&Rs?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jean Williams (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nick Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Surprise Farms II Community Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:53 (188.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.

MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date

June 19, 2020

Decision Date

July 28, 2020

The Cross-Petitions

The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.

Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”

MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.

Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.

Core Allegations:

1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.

2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.

Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

Analysis of the Disputed Amendment

The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.

Key Provisions of the Amendment

Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).

Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”

Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.

Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”

Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.

MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment

In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:

• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.

• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.

• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”

Background and History of the Dispute

Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.

Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.

Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.

Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.

Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:

December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.

April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues

The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.

Stipulated Fact #11

The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:

“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”

Conflicting Legal Standards

Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”

Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”

Parties’ Core Arguments

MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.

MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.

Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)

Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.

Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.

Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.

Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)

Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.

Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.

Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.

Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.

Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”

Final Order

1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.

3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):

◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.

◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.

4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.

Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?

2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?

3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?

4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?

5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?

6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.

7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?

8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?

Answer Key

1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.

3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.

4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.

5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.

8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.

10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.

2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.

4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.

5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.

Amendment

The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.

A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”

Declaration

The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.

Hangar Tracts

Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.

Magnus L.D. MacLeod

The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.

Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.

Petition #19

The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.

Petition #34

The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Residential Lots

Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.

Tract G

An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.

Unit 4B

The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.

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810246.pdf

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20F-H2019019-REL

1 source

This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.

1 source

What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey M. Proper (attorney)
    JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC
    Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Craig Albright (board member)
    MAP Board of Directors
    Then President of the MAP Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Magnus L.D. MacLeod (party)
    Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
  • Pat MacLeod (HOA president)
    HOA
    Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017

Susan L Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020046-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-23
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L. Alandar Counsel
Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804
CC&R’s Article V Section C; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
CC&R’s Article III Section A; CC&R’s Article IV Section C.23; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.

Key Issues & Findings

Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.

Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.

Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
  • Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
  • Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:42 (157.4 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.

The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:

Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.

Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.

Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.

Case Overview

On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020046-REL

Petitioner

Susan L. Alandar

Respondent

Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

June 11, 2020

Decision Date

July 23, 2020

Final Disposition

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings

Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session

Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.

Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.

Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club

Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.

Factual Background:

◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.

◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.

◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.

◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.

Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda

Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.

Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.

Key Referenced Authority

The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:

Document

Provision

Relevance to the Case

Arizona Revised Statutes

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”

Article III, Section A

Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.

Article IV, Section C

Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.

Article V, Section C

Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.

Bylaws

Article IV.E.8

Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.

Ventana Lakes Rules

Rule 8.3.B

Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?

2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?

3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?

4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?

6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?

8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.

2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.

3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.

4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.

6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.

7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.

8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.

10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?

3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.

4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.

5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.

Common Areas

Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.

Executive Session

A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

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809207.pdf

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20F-H2020046-REL

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.

1 source

What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L. Alandar (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Represented Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge who signed the decision.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (Staff/Clerk)
    Transmitted the decision to the attorney for the Respondent.

Werner A Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Werner A Reis Counsel
Respondent Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Counsel Edward O’Brien, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article III, section 1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the undisputed material facts supported the finding that the Association's actions were authorized by the governing documents (CC&Rs Articles II and VI) and did not deny or impede member access or use of the Common Areas.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.

Petitioner alleged that the Board's decision to paint pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players, thereby violating CC&Rs Article III section 1.

Orders: The ALJ denied the petition (on rehearing), concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The Association was authorized to manage and maintain Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not violated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, CC&Rs Interpretation, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.05(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1061(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

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Briefing Document: Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner Werner A. Reis (Petitioner) and the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Respondent) concerning the modification of a common area tennis court. The core of the dispute, adjudicated under case numbers 20F-H2019026-REL and 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG, was the Association’s decision in June 2019 to paint pickleball lines on one of its two community tennis courts. The Petitioner alleged this action violated Article III, section 1 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), infringing upon his nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment. The Association contended that its Board of Directors acted within its authority, as granted by the CC&Rs, to manage, maintain, and improve common areas for the benefit of all members.

Following an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark ruled decisively in favor of the Association. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Key findings established that the Board was fully authorized to make the modification without a member vote, that tennis play was not restricted, and that the Petitioner’s easement rights were not violated. The Petitioner’s arguments, based on a potential future conflict rather than an actual experienced impediment, were deemed “unfounded” and “without merit.” The final order, issued on July 14, 2020, denied the petition, affirming the Association’s right to manage the recreational facilities in this manner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter involves a formal complaint by a homeowner against his townhouse association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Detail

Information

Case Numbers

20F-H2019026-REL, 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Werner A. Reis

Respondent

Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark

Core Issue

Whether the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents (CC&Rs Article III, section 1) by adding pickleball lines to one of two community tennis courts.

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II. Procedural History

The dispute progressed through a formal administrative hearing process, including a petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final order.

November 18, 2019: Werner Reis files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 4, 2019: The Association files its ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

January 31, 2020: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Jenna Clark.

February 20, 2020: The ALJ issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition, finding he failed to sustain his burden of proof.

March 26, 2020: The Petitioner submits a REQUEST FOR REHEARING to the Department.

April 22, 2020: The Department grants the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

May 20, 2020: During a prehearing conference, both parties stipulate that no factual dispute exists and agree to adopt the prior hearing record and submit written closing arguments in lieu of a new hearing.

June 24, 2020: Deadline for written closing arguments. The Association submits a 17-page argument; the OAH receives no closing argument from the Petitioner.

July 14, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision, again denying the petition and ordering that the initial decision from February be the final order in the matter.

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III. Analysis of the Dispute

The central conflict was the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs regarding the Board’s authority to modify common areas versus a member’s right to their use and enjoyment.

Petitioner’s Position (Werner A. Reis)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that adding pickleball as a competing use for a tennis court fundamentally diminished the rights of tennis-playing members.

Core Allegation: The Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants every member a “nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common Areas.”

Argument on Infringement: The Petitioner argued the Association created a situation where “Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play,” which he claimed “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment.”

Impediment of Enjoyment: He contended that reducing the number of exclusively available tennis courts from two to one amounts to “an impediment of enjoyment rights.”

Creation of Competition: He accused the Association of “creating a new class of people” (pickleball players) who could access the courts, creating new competition for members on a first-come, first-served basis.

Hypothetical Conflict: The “crux” of his complaint was the possible future conflict between his desire to play two singles matches simultaneously and up to sixteen “outsiders playing a raucous game of pickleball on the other designated tennis court.”

Requested Remedy: The Petitioner requested an order requiring the Association to designate the courts for tennis playing only.

Respondent’s Position (Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association)

The Association defended its decision as a reasonable exercise of the Board’s authority to manage community property for the benefit of all residents.

Board Authority: The Board asserted that its decision was permitted by Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants it the authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” without requiring a member vote. Article VI further requires the Board to maintain and manage recreational facilities.

Benefit to Community: The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests, and was also considered as a potential means to generate revenue.

No Restriction of Use: The Association maintained that tennis play was not restricted. Both courts remained available seven days a week on a first-come, first-served basis, with no changes to the reservation system. One court remained available exclusively for tennis at all times.

Nature of Modification: The modification involved painting lines and using portable nets, which must be detached after play. The permanent tennis nets on both courts remained in place.

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IV. Summary of Evidence and Testimony

Testimony from the Association’s representatives and the Petitioner established the key undisputed facts of the case.

Testimony for the Association (Charles Mitchell & Arland Averell)

Board Authority Confirmed: Charles Mitchell, the Board Director, testified that CC&Rs Articles II and VI, along with the Association’s Articles of Incorporation, authorize the Board to manage and improve common areas, including painting lines on the tennis courts.

Historical Context: Arland Averell, a 20-year Board member, explained that a taped pickleball court had existed in 2015 but was damaged. The Board decided in April 2019 to reestablish it with painted lines in response to requests from several families.

Practical Use: Pickleball is generally played only by a few families, typically on Saturday mornings. When pickleball is being played on the modified court, the other tennis court is always available.

No Denial of Access: Director Mitchell confirmed that the Petitioner had never been denied access to the tennis courts at any time.

Testimony of the Petitioner (Werner A. Reis)

Recent Homeowner: The Petitioner described himself as a “snowbird” who had purchased his townhouse in November 2019, shortly before filing his complaint.

Conflict is Hypothetical: He admitted that he “has not played tennis in ‘years'” and, as a result, “has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.”

No Direct Observation: The Petitioner testified that he had not personally observed contemporaneous tennis and pickleball games being played. His concerns about safety and inconvenience were speculative.

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V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions consistently found the Petitioner’s arguments to be legally and factually unsupported.

Conclusions of Law

Undisputed Facts: The Judge concluded that the material facts were not in dispute. The Association’s governing documents clearly authorize the Board to maintain, manage, and improve the Common Areas, including the recreational facilities.

No Violation of Easement Rights: The ruling stated, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner’s easement rights have not been violated by the Association because the Board painted blue pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts.”

Petitioner’s Arguments Dismissed: The Judge found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “unfounded” and “without merit.” Specifically, the claim that the availability of only one dedicated court was an “impediment of enjoyment rights” was rejected.

Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: In both the initial decision and the final order, the Judge concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof” by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs.

Failure to Prosecute Rehearing: The final decision noted that the Petitioner “did not provide OAH with a closing argument in support of his request for rehearing.”

Final Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision issued on July 14, 2020, affirmed the initial February 24, 2020, decision and was designated as the FINAL ORDER in the matter, binding on both parties.

Study Guide: Reis vs. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, in his petition filed on November 18, 2019?

2. On what grounds did the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association’s Board of Directors justify its decision to add pickleball lines to a tennis court?

3. According to the testimony of Arland Averell, what prompted the Board to reestablish a pickleball court in April 2019, and what was a prior experience with a pickleball court?

4. Describe the central, or “crux,” of the Petitioner’s complaint as summarized in the hearing evidence.

5. What key admissions did the Petitioner make during his testimony regarding his own tennis activity and his personal experience with the alleged conflict?

6. According to Director Charles Mitchell’s testimony, what is the physical setup of the nets on the courts, and how does this differ between tennis and pickleball?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is that standard defined in the legal documents?

8. What was the outcome of the initial evidentiary hearing held on January 31, 2020, and on what basis did the Administrative Law Judge reach this conclusion?

9. Describe the procedural change that occurred for the rehearing after the parties’ prehearing conference on May 20, 2020.

10. What action, or lack thereof, by the Petitioner on June 24, 2020, contributed to the final ruling in the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The specific violation claimed was the modification of one of the two existing tennis courts for use as a pickleball court.

2. The Association’s Board of Directors justified the decision as an improvement to the Common Areas for the benefit of the Association, which it was permitted to do under Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs. The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests.

3. Arland Averell testified that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish the pickleball court with painted lines after several families requested it, and the Board also saw it as a way to generate additional revenue. A previous pickleball court established in 2015 had lines made of tape which were damaged approximately four months after being applied.

4. The crux of the Petitioner’s complaint was the possible future conflict between his personal desire to play two singles tennis matches on both courts simultaneously and the potential for up to sixteen “outsiders” to be playing a “raucous game of pickleball” on the modified court.

5. The Petitioner admitted that he had not played tennis in “years” and, as a result, had never actually faced the conflict he was complaining about. He also stated he had never been denied access to the courts and had not observed contemporaneous games of tennis and pickleball being played.

6. Director Mitchell testified that both tennis courts have fixed tennis nets. The pickleball court, however, has portable nets which must be attached for use and then detached at the end of play.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. Following the January 31, 2020, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proof and that the evidence showed his easement rights had not been violated, as one tennis court always remained available.

9. During the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed. They agreed to vacate the scheduled rehearing, adopt the evidentiary record from the first hearing without presenting new evidence, and submit written closing arguments instead.

10. On the deadline of June 24, 2020, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a 17-page closing argument from the Respondent (the Association). The Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, failed to submit a closing argument, which was noted in the final decision denying his petition again.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Formulate your answers by synthesizing information from across the case documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the rights granted to members under CC&Rs Article III, section 1 (“easement of use and enjoyment”) and the powers granted to the Board under CC&Rs Article II, section 1 (“manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas”). How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent tension in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of the “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain why Werner Reis’s testimony and arguments ultimately failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial petition on November 18, 2019, to the final order on July 14, 2020. Identify the key events and decisions at each stage, including the initial hearing, the request for rehearing, and the final disposition.

4. Evaluate the strength of the Petitioner’s case. Focus specifically on the evidence he presented versus the evidence presented by the Association’s witnesses, Charles Mitchell and Arland Averell.

5. The Petitioner argued that the availability of only one tennis court when pickleball is in play constituted an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” Explain the Association’s counter-arguments and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s argument to be “unfounded” and “without merit.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Jenna Clark) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders and decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for the Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature that regulate planned communities and govern the administrative hearing process.

Association

The Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association, a non-profit Arizona corporation serving as the property owner’s association for the development. In this case, it is the Respondent.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Association, empowered by the CC&Rs and Articles of Incorporation to manage, maintain, and improve the Common Areas.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce the degree of evidence required to prove their case. The standard required here was “preponderance of the evidence.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, controlling property use within the development. The Restated Declaration was recorded on June 8, 2015.

Common Areas

Property within the development, such as the tennis courts, for the mutual benefit of all owners. The Association’s Board is granted authority to manage and improve these areas.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings regarding disputes in planned communities.

Easement of use and enjoyment

A non-exclusive, perpetual right granted to every member of the Association to use and enjoy the Common Areas, as established in CC&Rs Article III, section 1.

OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)

An independent state agency to which the Department refers cases for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Werner A. Reis, a townhouse owner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and representing the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association.

Snowbird

A colloquial term used by the Petitioner to describe himself as an out-of-state retiree who resides in Arizona during the winter months.

5 Surprising Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Lawsuit Over a Pickleball Court

Introduction: The Battle for the Tennis Court

Disputes with a homeowner association (HOA) are a common feature of suburban life, often revolving around landscaping, paint colors, or parking. But when you combine the rigid world of HOA rules with the explosive popularity of pickleball, you get a conflict that is uniquely modern. In a real-life legal case from Sedona, Arizona, one homeowner took his HOA to court over the decision to add pickleball lines to one of the community’s two tennis courts.

What might seem like a minor neighborhood squabble became a formal legal challenge, complete with hearings, testimony, and an official judicial decision. The court documents from this case offer a surprisingly revealing look into community rules, personal grievances, and the peculiar nature of legal battles. More importantly, they reveal several counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living in a planned community.

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1. You Can Sue Over a Problem That Doesn’t Exist (But You Probably Won’t Win)

The core of the legal challenge was filed by Werner Reis, a new homeowner in the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association. His complaint was over the modification of one of two community tennis courts to accommodate pickleball. The “crux” of his complaint was a concern over a possible future conflict: a hypothetical scenario where he might want to play two singles tennis matches while a large group of “outsiders” played a “raucous game of pickleball.”

This seems like a specific, if forward-thinking, concern. But the timeline and testimony revealed a truly bizarre situation. According to court records, Reis purchased his townhouse in November 2019 and filed his lawsuit on or about November 18, 2019—meaning he initiated a formal legal action within days or weeks of becoming a member of the community. Even more stunning was this fact from his own testimony:

Petitioner has not played tennis in “years.” As such, Petitioner has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.

The entire legal challenge—filed almost immediately upon moving in—was based on a hypothetical grievance for a sport the petitioner hadn’t even played in years. Unsurprisingly, the Administrative Law Judge found his argument “unfounded.” The lesson is clear: a legal claim based on “what if” is unlikely to succeed without any actual harm.

2. Your HOA’s Governing Documents Are a Legally Binding Contract

Many homeowners view their HOA’s rules as guidelines, but legally, they are a binding contract called Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). When you buy a property, you agree to their terms.

In its defense, the HOA pointed directly to its governing documents. Article VI requires the Board to manage all recreational facilities, and Article II, section 1, gives it the explicit authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” for the “general welfare and benefit of the Owners”—all without a member vote. This clause was the legal bedrock of the Board’s defense; in the eyes of the law, painting lines to accommodate a popular new sport is not a degradation of an amenity, but an improvement of it, squarely within the Board’s mandate.

The tennis courts are legally defined as “Common Areas.” This gave the Board the unambiguous right to paint new lines on them. This is an impactful takeaway for all homeowners: while you may feel a sense of personal ownership over shared amenities, the Board has broad, legally-defined powers to manage them for the entire community.

3. A Board’s Duty Is to Adapt to the Community’s Evolving Interests

The HOA Board’s decision wasn’t a whim; it was a response to a persistent community interest with a history. Testimony from a 20-year Board member, Arland Averell, revealed that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish a pickleball court “after several families requested they do so.” As a secondary benefit, the Board also saw it as a way to “generate additional revenue.”

But this wasn’t the community’s first foray into the sport. Court records show that back in 2015, the association had a pickleball court with taped lines, but it was damaged after only four months. This context is crucial. The 2019 decision to paint permanent lines was not just a reaction to new requests but an institutional lesson learned. It shows the Board was responding to a long-term, evolving interest and choosing a more durable solution, fulfilling its duty to adapt common resources to meet new demands.

4. An “Infringement” Requires an Actual Impediment

The petitioner’s legal argument was very specific. He claimed that adding pickleball “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment” and that having only one guaranteed tennis court is an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” He summarized his grievance with the line:

“Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play.”

However, the facts presented in court systematically dismantled this argument. The evidence showed:

• One of the two courts remained exclusively for tennis at all times.

• Both courts were still available for tennis on a first-come, first-served basis.

• The pickleball nets were portable and had to be detached at the end of play, leaving the court ready for tennis.

• Most critically, the petitioner himself testified that he had “never been denied access to the tennis courts at issue at any time.”

The judge determined that no violation occurred because the petitioner’s rights were never actually impeded. This reveals the critical legal distinction between an inconvenience and an infringement. The petitioner’s entire case rested on a hypothetical future inconvenience, but the law requires an actual, demonstrable impediment to rights. Since his own testimony confirmed one had never occurred, his claim was impossible to prove.

5. If You Demand a Rehearing, You Should Probably Show Up with an Argument

In a final, bizarre twist, the story doesn’t end with the initial ruling in February 2020. The petitioner filed a “REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” which the court granted, giving him a second chance to make his case.

To streamline the process, both parties agreed to skip a new evidentiary hearing and instead submit written “Closing Arguments” to the judge. The HOA’s legal team submitted a detailed, 17-page argument. What happened next was documented in the final court order:

OAH did not receive a closing argument from Petitioner.

The petitioner, who had initiated the entire legal process and successfully demanded a second chance, was given the final word. He had the opportunity to submit a closing argument that could have vindicated his entire complaint. Instead, he offered only silence. By ghosting his own rehearing, he left the judge with no choice but to conclude that he had once again “failed to sustain his burden of proof” and make the original ruling against him final.

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Conclusion: The Court of Community Opinion

This case is a fascinating lesson in the difference between a personal annoyance and an actual legal violation. It demonstrates that in the world of HOAs, feelings and hypothetical concerns carry little weight compared to the cold, hard text of the governing documents. Those documents give boards significant power, but also charge them with the difficult task of balancing the desires of all residents, not just the grievance of one.

As pickleball courts continue to replace shuffleboard courts and community gardens pop up in unused green spaces, this story leaves us with a critical question: As our communities change, how do we balance protecting the familiar traditions we love with making space for the new ones our neighbors are asking for?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Werner A Reis (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Edward O’Brien (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
  • Mark Sall (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Also cited as Mark Sahl)
  • Charles Mitchell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Current Director of the Association's Board
  • Arland Averell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Served on the Board for the past twenty years

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (department contact)
    ADRE
    Electronic contact for ADRE
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Administrative staff/Clerk noted on document transmission