Category Archives: HOA Cases

Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges vs.

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges Counsel Lance Leslie
Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. Counsel Michael S. Shupe

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article VI(D)

Outcome Summary

Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.

Key Issues & Findings

View Obstruction by Pergola Approval

Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.

Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R Violation, View Obstruction, Architectural Review Committee, Filing Fee Refund, Civil Penalty Denial
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:42 (90.6 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.

The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.

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Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.

Case Number

21F-H2120005-REL

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

November 3, 2020

Decision Date

November 20, 2020

Core Allegation

Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

Petitioners’ Property

Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”

Disputed Structure

A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.

The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.

Chronology of Key Events

The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.

• February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.

• On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.

• December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.

• January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.

• July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.

• August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.

• October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.

• November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)

• Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).

• Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.

Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)

• Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:

1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.

2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.

• Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.

1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.

2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.

Findings on the Violation

• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.

• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.

Prevailing Party Status

• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.

• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.

Financial Orders and Penalties

• Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.

• Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.

Legal Framework

• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.

• Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.

Final Order

The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.

The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?

4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?

5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?

6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?

7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?

8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?

10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.

2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.

4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.

5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.

6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.

8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.

9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”

10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?

2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.

3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?

5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.

Filing Fee

The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

View Lot

A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.

View Obstructions

The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.

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21F-H2120005-REL

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This administrative law judge decision details a dispute between Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges and Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. regarding a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioners alleged that a pergola approved by the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee was a view obstruction in violation of Article VI(D) of the CC&Rs. Although the Respondent acknowledged its error and rescinded the approval for the pergola before the hearing, the matter was not dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party and ordered the Respondent to pay the petitioners’ $500 filing fee, though no additional civil penalty was assessed.

1 source

What are the core legal and procedural issues decided in this administrative hearing?
How did the Respondent’s actions impact the Petitioners’ prevailing party status and remedy?
What is the significance of the CC&Rs and view obstruction clause in this dispute?

Audio Overview

Video Overview

Video Overview

Mind Map Mind Map

Reports Reports

Flashcards

Flashcards

Quiz

Quiz

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donald S Fern (petitioner)
  • Judith A. Hedges (petitioner)
  • Lance Leslie (petitioner attorney)
    Law Office of Susan A Siwek

Respondent Side

  • Michael S. Shupe (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as recipient of transmission

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel —
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The petition was affirmed in part (Complaint #1) and denied in part (Complaint #2). The Respondent HOA was found to have improperly conducted non-privileged business via email/unanimous written consent in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fee and comply with the statute, but no civil penalty was imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged violation concerning the improper use of emergency executive sessions (Complaint #2).

Key Issues & Findings

Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session

The HOA improperly conducted association business, which should have been open to members, through unanimous written consent solicited via individual emails during the COVID-19 shutdown, violating the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward and to reimburse Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Unanimous Written Consent, COVID-19, Executive Session
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821
  • A.R.S. 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 864802.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:46 (101.9 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:50 (125.4 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:04 (125.4 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by conducting association business and making decisions without open meetings accessible to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner on her primary complaint. The investigation and subsequent hearings revealed that the HOA Board, citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, utilized a process of “unanimous written consent” to approve numerous actions. This process, facilitated through individual emails to board members, was found to be an improper substitute for the open meetings required by law. The ALJ concluded that the specific transparency requirements for homeowners’ associations in A.R.S. § 33-1804 supersede the more general provisions for non-profit corporations in A.R.S. § 10-3821, which the HOA had cited as justification.

While the violation was established, no civil penalty was assessed due to the “unprecedented global pandemic.” The HOA was ordered to comply with the open meeting law moving forward and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. A second complaint from the petitioner, alleging the improper use of emergency executive sessions, was not proven and was therefore denied. A rehearing clarified the precise method of the violation—email voting rather than conference calls—but did not alter the final judgment.

Case Background and Allegations

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed on July 10, 2020. The case centered on the actions of the Solera Chandler HOA’s Board of Directors between March and August 2020.

• Petitioner: Debra K. Morin

• Respondent: Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

• Case Number: 21F-H2120001-REL

• Key Dates:

◦ Initial Hearing: October 29, 2020

◦ Initial Decision: November 18, 2020

◦ Rehearing: February 25, 2021

◦ Final Decision After Rehearing: March 17, 2021

Petitioner’s Formal Complaints

After being ordered to clarify her initial filing, the petitioner proceeded with two specific alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1804:

1. Complaint #1: Non-Privileged Business in Closed Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions by using unanimous written consent. This practice circumvented statutory requirements for providing members with agendas, giving 48-hour notice, and allowing them an opportunity to speak on key issues before the Board took action.

2. Complaint #2: Improper Emergency Executive Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions.” This was done without properly identifying the legal exception to the open meeting law, providing an agenda or 48-hour notice, or submitting minutes at the next board meeting that stated the reason for the emergency.

Key Evidence and Factual Findings

The evidence presented centered on the HOA’s governance practices during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Respondent’s Justification

The HOA’s defense rested on two main arguments:

• The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible for the Board to meet in person, necessitating alternative methods to conduct business while protecting the health of directors and members.

• The use of unanimous written consents was authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute that permits non-profit corporations to take action without a formal meeting if all directors consent in writing. The HOA acknowledged it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.

Unanimous Written Consents

At an open Board of Directors meeting on August 5, 2020, the Board formally ratified a series of actions taken via unanimous written consent during the “Covid 19 Shutdown.” A rehearing clarified the precise mechanism: a community management company would email each board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all votes were “yes,” the Board President would sign the written consent on behalf of the Board.

The actions taken through this process included:

Action Taken by Unanimous Written Consent

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of cool decking surrounding both pools.

April 30, 2020

Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

April 30, 2020

Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

May 5, 2020

Approve the Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and the addition of 420 tons of granite.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.

May 27, 2020

Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.

June 4, 2020

Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.

July 1, 2020

Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Executive Sessions

The Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions during this period, including on March 13, March 16, March 19, March 24, April 6, April 10, May 4, May 15, May 27, June 24, and August 5, 2020. An “emergency executive session” was held on May 12, 2020. The agendas for these meetings cited specific legal exceptions under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) as justification for the closure.

Legal Analysis and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation and primacy of two competing Arizona statutes.

The Core Statutory Conflict

• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA Open Meeting Law): This statute establishes a strong state policy that all HOA board and member meetings “be conducted openly.” It mandates that members receive at least 48-hours’ notice, be provided with agendas, and be permitted to “attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The statute explicitly directs that any interpretation of its provisions must be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

• A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting for Non-Profits): This statute, which applies more broadly to non-profit corporations, allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by one or more written consents signed by all directors.

Ruling on Complaint #1 (Violation Established)

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the open meeting law. The core of the ruling is that the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for homeowners’ associations must be followed, even if A.R.S. § 10-3821 provides a different mechanism for general non-profits.

The final decision states: “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.” The use of email voting to achieve unanimous consent was deemed a violation because it denied members the notice, agenda, and opportunity to speak that are guaranteed by the HOA open meeting law.

However, the ALJ gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that “no civil penalty is appropriate given the circumstances.”

Ruling on Complaint #2 (Violation Not Established)

The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board conducted improper emergency executive sessions. The decision notes that there was “nothing in the record” to suggest the Board discussed topics outside the legally permitted exceptions for closed sessions, nor was there evidence to suggest the May 12, 2020, meeting was not a genuine emergency.

Final Order and Disposition

The final judgment, issued after the rehearing, is binding on both parties.

• Outcome: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed in part (regarding Complaint #1) and denied in part (regarding Complaint #2).

• Directives to Respondent (HOA):

1. The HOA is ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

2. The HOA is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• Appeal: Any appeal of the final order must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 21F-H2120001-REL and No. 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and outcomes.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based only on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central accusation in the Petitioner’s first complaint against the Respondent?

3. What two primary justifications did the Respondent provide for its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic?

4. According to the findings of the rehearing, what specific procedure did the Respondent use to obtain “unanimous written consents”?

5. Identify the two main Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that were central to the legal dispute and briefly describe the function of each.

6. What was the final ruling on Complaint #1, and what was the judge’s reasoning?

7. Why did the Petitioner fail to prove the allegations in Complaint #2?

8. What specific factual error in the first Administrative Law Judge Decision prompted the Respondent to request a rehearing?

9. What two orders were issued against the Respondent in the final decision?

10. What specific circumstance did the Administrative Law Judge cite as a reason for not imposing a civil penalty on the Respondent?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state law, while the Respondent defended its actions before an Administrative Law Judge.

2. The Petitioner’s first complaint accused the Solera Homeowners’ Association Board of Directors of conducting non-privileged association business in closed sessions. Specifically, she alleged they used unanimous written consent to take action without providing agendas, giving 48-hour notice, or allowing members an opportunity to speak on key issues.

3. The Respondent argued that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Board of Directors from meeting in person to protect the health of members and directors. The Respondent also asserted that its use of unanimous written consents was legally authorized for non-profit corporations under A.R.S. § 10-3821.

4. The rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members replied “yes,” the item was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document.

5. The central statutes were A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821. A.R.S. § 33-1804 is the state’s open meeting law for homeowners’ associations, requiring meetings to be open to members with proper notice, while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent.

6. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Complaint #1, affirming the violation. The judge reasoned that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, the more specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 mandate that all HOA board meetings be open to members, a requirement the Respondent violated by conducting business via email.

7. The Petitioner failed to prove Complaint #2 because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s executive sessions were improper. The judge found nothing in the record to suggest the Board discussed issues outside the legal exceptions listed in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or that the May 12, 2020, session was not a genuine emergency.

8. The Respondent requested a rehearing to correct a finding in Conclusion of Law 8 of the initial decision, which incorrectly stated that the association business at issue was conducted in closed sessions via “conference calls.” The Respondent acknowledged using conference calls for executive sessions but denied using them for the actions taken by unanimous written consent.

9. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to comply with all requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future.

10. The Administrative Law Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business.” Because of these unique circumstances, the judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Discuss the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821 as it relates to the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this imply about the hierarchy of state laws governing specific entities versus general corporations?

2. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic justified their actions. To what extent did the Administrative Law Judge accept this argument, and how did it influence the final order?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and detail how it was applied to both Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. Why did the Petitioner meet this burden for the first complaint but not the second?

4. Trace the evolution of the case from the initial hearing to the rehearing. What specific finding of fact was corrected, and why was this correction significant for the legal record, even though it did not change the ultimate outcome for either complaint?

5. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), discuss the stated policy of the state of Arizona regarding homeowner association meetings. How did the Respondent’s actions, specifically the use of email for unanimous consents, contravene this policy?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 10-3821

An Arizona Revised Statute that allows the board of directors of a non-profit corporation to take action without a formal meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and evidenced by one or more written consents.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute, also known as the open meeting law for planned communities, which mandates that all meetings of an HOA board of directors must be open to all members. It requires 48-hour notice and allows for closed “executive sessions” only for specific, limited purposes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims.

Executive Session

A portion of a meeting that is closed to association members. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), executive sessions are only permitted for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or addressing confidential personal or financial information.

Open Meeting

A meeting of an HOA’s board of directors that, according to A.R.S. § 33-1804, must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Debra K. Morin.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine specific issues or correct errors from an initial decision. A rehearing was granted in this case to clarify how the unanimous written consents were executed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the statute’s plain language.

Unanimous Written Consent

A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where a board takes action without a meeting through written consents signed by all directors. The HOA used this method via individual emails to approve business, which was found to be a violation of HOA open meeting laws.

She Sued Her HOA Over Secret Pandemic Votes—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

Introduction: The Closed Doors of Your HOA

For many homeowners, it can feel like their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) board makes its most important decisions behind closed doors. You see the results—a new rule, a major repair project, a change in vendors—but the discussion and the vote happen out of sight. While the COVID-19 pandemic forced many organizations to find new ways to operate, for one Arizona HOA, their adaptation to remote work crossed a legal line, sparking a legal challenge from a resident.

The central conflict was straightforward: a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, filed a petition against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. She alleged they were making official decisions in secret through email, violating state law that guarantees homeowners the right to open meetings. While not all of her claims were affirmed, her primary complaint—that the board was conducting business in secret—led to a landmark decision for homeowner rights. The outcome of her case reveals several surprising and crucial lessons for every person living in an HOA community.

Takeaway 1: An HOA’s Open Meeting Law Trumps General Non-Profit Rules

1. Even a Pandemic Doesn’t Suspend a Homeowner’s Right to an Open Meeting

The Solera Chandler HOA board believed it was acting within the law. They argued that because they were a non-profit corporation, they could make decisions using “unanimous written consents” without a formal meeting. This practice is allowed for many non-profits under a general Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821). During the pandemic, this seemed like a practical way to conduct business without meeting in person.

However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the HOA. The judge’s key finding was that a more specific law takes precedence. The statute governing planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804, explicitly requires that all meetings of the board must be open to all members of the association. This is a critical legal lesson: when a specific law exists to govern a specific entity (like the Open Meeting Law for HOAs), it almost always overrides a more general law (like the one for all non-profits).

While the judge acknowledged the challenges of the “unprecedented global pandemic,” this did not excuse the violation, though it was cited as a reason not to issue a civil penalty.

Takeaway 2: “Meeting” by Email Is Still a Secret Meeting

2. A String of Individual Emails Can Constitute an Illegal Meeting

In the initial ruling, the judge found the board conducted business improperly, believing it was done via conference calls. Seizing on this factual error, the HOA challenged the decision and requested a rehearing, arguing their method was different and therefore permissible. In the rehearing, they clarified their actual process: the community management company would email each board member individually to request a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The HOA argued that because there was no simultaneous group discussion, this process wasn’t technically a “meeting.”

The challenge backfired. The judge’s final decision made it clear that this distinction didn’t matter. Whether by conference call or a series of individual emails, the result was the same: an illegal secret meeting. The method effectively prevented homeowners from observing the board’s process and speaking on agenda items before a vote was taken, as required by law. The HOA won their technical correction but lost the war, as the judge affirmed that the principle of transparency is more important than the specific technology used to circumvent it.

These weren’t minor housekeeping issues. The board was making substantial financial and operational decisions entirely out of public view, including:

• Repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

• Repair and replacement of the cool decking around both pools.

• Appointing new members to the Architectural Review Committee.

• Approving a retention basin project and the purchase of 420 tons of granite.

• Approving the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Takeaway 3: The Law Is Built to Favor Transparency

3. The Law Itself Has a Built-in Bias for Openness

The judge’s decision wasn’t just a narrow interpretation; it was guided by a powerful policy statement built directly into the Arizona statute for planned communities. The law itself tells judges, board members, and community managers exactly how it should be interpreted.

The text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) leaves no room for doubt:

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken. Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions…shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

This is a critical point. The law explicitly directs anyone interpreting it—including an HOA board—to resolve any ambiguity in favor of transparency and homeowner access. The default position is openness.

Takeaway 4: A Single Homeowner Can Force a Change

4. One Determined Homeowner Can Win

This case serves as an empowering lesson for homeowners who feel their board is operating in the shadows. Morin’s persistence paid off, proving that a single homeowner can successfully force a board to follow the law.

Her victory was clear and decisive. The court orders resulted in three key outcomes:

• The judge affirmed her petition, officially recognizing that the HOA had violated the law.

• The HOA was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Morin her $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome demonstrates that the system can work. An individual homeowner with a valid complaint can navigate the process and achieve a binding legal victory that forces their HOA board to operate correctly.

Conclusion: Is Your Board Operating in the Open?

The lesson from the Solera Chandler HOA case is simple: transparency in HOA governance is not optional. It is a legal requirement designed to protect the rights of every homeowner to observe and participate in the governance of their community. The convenience of an email vote cannot replace the legal mandate for an open meeting.

Don’t assume your board is operating correctly. Review your meeting minutes. Ask questions about decisions that seem to appear without public discussion. Remember, the law explicitly favors openness, and as Debra Morin proved, it’s an enforceable right.

This case was about secret votes via email, but it highlights a larger principle of transparency. Does your HOA board make it easy for you to know what is being decided and to have your voice heard?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier
  • Joshua M. Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Gail Ryan (board member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    President of Board, resigned August 5, 2020
  • Kirk Sandquist (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Tom Dusbabek (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Ken Eller (contractor)
    Approved to be hired to draft architectural drawings

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Granted Request for Rehearing
  • f. del sol (Admin staff)
    Transmitted decisions

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel —
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 892670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:29 (47.7 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:33 (132.2 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:47 (132.2 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

• Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

• Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

◦ Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

• Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

• Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

• Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

• Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

• Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

• Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

• Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

• Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

• Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.

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20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel —
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:16 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:19 (103.9 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)

Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.

Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:

1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.

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Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.

Detail

Description

Case Numbers

21F-H2120003-REL (Original)
21F-H2120003-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Keith D. Smith (Owner in Building A)

Respondent

Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Key Dates

July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith.
October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted.
November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition.
June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.

Central Issues and Allegations

The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)

At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”

◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.

◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.

◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.

◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.

2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)

Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.

• Petitioner’s Allegations:

◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.

◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.

◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.

Evidence and Proposed Solutions

• Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.

• Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Original Decision (November 16, 2020)

The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.

• On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:

1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.

2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.

• On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.

◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.

◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.

Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)

Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.

• Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.

◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.

◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.

• Reaffirmation of Rulings:

◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.

◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.

◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.

Key Legal Standards Applied

The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.

Standard

Application in the Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Substantial Evidence

The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”

Scope of Adjudication

The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.

Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?

3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?

4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?

6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?

7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?

8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?

10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.

2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.

3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.

4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.

5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.

6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.

7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.

8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.

9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.

10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).

2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.

3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.

4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?

5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).

Common Elements

Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.

Monument Sign

A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.

Open Meeting Law

A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.

Waived

The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.

I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.

Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story

For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?

I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.

Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.

1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.

Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.

He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.

The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:

“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”

The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.

2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”

From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.

However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:

1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.

2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.

This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.

3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It

Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.

In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:

“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”

This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.

An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.

4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot

After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:

• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.

• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.

The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.

The judge’s decision was unequivocal:

“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”

The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.

The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.

Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game

A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.

This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner

Respondent Side

  • Stuart Rayburn (association president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Representative for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (email handle)

Douglas E Kupel v. Hidden Valley Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-10-30
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association's conduct did not violate ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 because the Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records were in existence and subject to disclosure.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Douglas E. Kupel Counsel —
Respondent Hidden Valley Association Counsel Timothy Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association's conduct did not violate ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 because the Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records were in existence and subject to disclosure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the requested records (communications) were in existence and subject to disclosure.

Key Issues & Findings

Failing to fulfill Petitioner’s records request

Petitioner claimed the HOA failed to provide copies of all communications (written/electronic) related to information requests, open meeting law compliance, and changes to bylaws, arguing they were not exempt from disclosure under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B). The HOA asserted no disclosable records existed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition and request for civil penalty are denied. Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Records Disclosure, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 33-1805, Burden of Proof, Preponderance of Evidence
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120006-REL Decision – 834142.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:50 (147.6 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Kupel vs. Hidden Valley Association

Executive Summary

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings denied a petition filed by homeowner Douglas E. Kupel against the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The core of the dispute was Kupel’s allegation that HVA violated Arizona statute ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill a comprehensive records request. While HVA provided its records retention policy and legal invoices, it withheld two categories of electronic and hard copy communications, claiming no such disclosable records existed.

Kupel argued that statements made in emails by HVA Board President Gary Freed—specifically that certain communications would be “filed as an HVA business record”—proved the existence of the requested records. HVA countered that this statement was a mistake on Freed’s part, resulting from an initial misunderstanding of retention requirements, and that no records subject to disclosure actually existed.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that Kupel failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim. The judge found that the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that the requested records existed and were being improperly withheld. Consequently, the petition was denied, and Kupel’s requests for reimbursement of his filing fee and the imposition of a civil penalty against HVA were also denied.

Case Overview

Case Name

Douglas E Kupel, Petitioner, vs. Hidden Valley Association, Respondent

Case Number

21F-H2120006-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone

Hearing Date

October 22, 2020

Decision Date

October 30, 2020

Key Parties

Douglas E. Kupel (Petitioner), Hidden Valley Association (Respondent), Gary Freed (HVA Board President)

Core Dispute: The Records Request

The central issue of the hearing was whether the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with a records request submitted by Kupel on June 22, 2020. HVA, through its community manager HOAMCO, provided a partial response on July 1, 2020.

Breakdown of the Records Request:

• Request 1 (Fulfilled): A copy of the HVA records retention policy adopted on January 15, 2020.

• Request 2 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding “information requests or open meeting law compliance” from July 2019 to the present.

• Request 3 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding any proposed, discussed, or adopted changes to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.

• Request 4 (Fulfilled): Copies of invoices, billing statements, and payment records for legal services associated with revisions to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.

HVA and its President, Gary Freed, asserted that the denied communications were not subject to disclosure under the exceptions outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B).

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Douglas E. Kupel)

• Allegation: Kupel accused HVA of willfully failing to fulfill his request, alleging that non-exempt records did exist and should have been disclosed.

• Primary Evidence: Kupel submitted several email messages from HVA President Gary Freed which contained the statement: “This communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record in the files maintained by HOAMCO for the benefit of HVA” or substantially similar language.

• Argument: Kupel testified that these emails proved the existence of communications that did not meet the statutory exclusions and, therefore, HVA had failed to fully respond to his request.

• Requested Relief:

1. An order compelling HVA to abide by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

2. Reimbursement of the $500 filing fee.

3. The levying of a civil penalty against HVA.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Hidden Valley Association)

• Witness Testimony: HVA Board President Gary Freed testified on behalf of the association.

• Core Defense: Freed testified that based on HVA’s records retention policy and his understanding of open meeting laws, “no records existed which were subject to disclosure.”

• Explanation of Contested Emails: Freed explained that his prior email statements about filing all communications were a mistake. He testified that he initially believed all communications needed to be retained but later learned this was incorrect.

• Search Process: Freed admitted that neither he nor other board members conducted a one-by-one search of every single email. However, he testified that he “may have scanned his personal e-mail” and did not dismiss the petitioner’s request “out-of-hand.”

• Association Practices: Freed asserted that HVA business was conducted via open meetings, with the exception of a single emergency situation, implying that no discoverable email correspondence regarding official business would exist.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Conclusion

The ALJ’s decision rested on the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as proof convincing the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner, Kupel, bore the burden of meeting this standard.

• Evaluation of Evidence: The judge found Kupel’s primary argument unpersuasive. The decision states, “Essentially, Petitioner is claiming that there must be other records in existence because of the language that Mr. Freed used… This is not persuasive as there was no evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that the records were in existence.”

• Credibility of Testimony: The judge gave weight to Freed’s testimony that he had been mistaken about record-keeping protocols. The decision also noted that HVA’s official records retention policy, adopted six months prior to the request, specifically outlined which communications were to be kept.

• Lack of Proof: The judge concluded that Freed believed any documents that might have existed were subject to statutory exemptions and that all relevant business was conducted in open meetings. Ultimately, Kupel failed to provide sufficient proof that discoverable records actually existed.

• Final Ruling: The ALJ concluded that “the Association’s conduct, as outlined above, did not violate the charged provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Denied

Request for Civil Penalty

Denied

Reimbursement of Filing Fee

Denied (Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s fee)

The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within thirty days of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Kupel v. Hidden Valley Association, No. 21F-H2120006-REL

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision in the matter of Douglas E. Kupel versus the Hidden Valley Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension of the facts, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the specific violation alleged by the Petitioner in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?

3. What four categories of records did the Petitioner request from the Hidden Valley Association (HVA) on June 22, 2020?

4. Which parts of the Petitioner’s records request did the HVA fulfill, and which parts did it deny?

5. What was the Petitioner’s central piece of evidence to argue that the HVA was improperly withholding existing communications?

6. How did HVA Board President Gary Freed explain the discrepancy between his email statements and the association’s refusal to provide the requested communications?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party was required to meet this standard?

8. According to Mr. Freed’s testimony, where was all official HVA business conducted?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the HVA’s conduct in this matter?

10. What three specific outcomes were mandated by the final ORDER issued on October 30, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, a property owner and member of the Hidden Valley Association, and the Respondent, the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The Petitioner brought the complaint against the Respondent, alleging a violation of state law.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill his records request. Specifically, he claimed the association improperly withheld communications records.

3. The Petitioner requested: (1) the records retention policy; (2) communications regarding information requests or open meeting law compliance; (3) communications regarding proposed changes to the association bylaws; and (4) legal invoices and payment records related to bylaw revisions.

4. The HVA fulfilled the request for the records retention policy and the legal invoices. It denied the two requests for communications between board and committee members, claiming the requested records were not subject to disclosure.

5. The Petitioner’s central evidence consisted of several emails from HVA Board President Gary Freed in which Mr. Freed stated, “[t]his communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record.” The Petitioner argued this proved that such communications existed and were official records.

6. Mr. Freed testified that he was initially mistaken in his belief that all communications needed to be retained and that this was why he included that language in his emails. He clarified that based on the HVA’s records retention policy and open meeting laws, no disclosable records of the type requested existed.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring the evidence to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

8. Mr. Freed testified that all HVA business was conducted via open meetings. He stated that there were no meetings conducted solely by email, with the exception of a single emergency situation.

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HVA was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. The judge found the HVA’s conduct did not violate the charged statute.

10. The final ORDER (1) denied the Petitioner’s petition, (2) denied the Petitioner’s request for a civil penalty against the Respondent, and (3) ordered that the Respondent shall not be required to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for in-depth analysis and discussion. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, and the Respondent, Hidden Valley Association. How did each party use the evidence and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 to support their position?

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.

3. Evaluate the testimony of HVA Board President Gary Freed. How did his explanations regarding his email statements and the association’s record-keeping practices influence the judge’s final decision?

4. Examine ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B), which outlines the exceptions for withholding records. Based on the case details, explain why the communications requested by the Petitioner were ultimately deemed non-disclosable or non-existent under this statute.

5. Describe the complete procedural history of the case, from the initial filing of the petition to the final order. Include key dates, entities involved (such as the Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings), and the final remedies sought by the Petitioner versus the actual outcome.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings and makes decisions on behalf of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute that governs the examination and disclosure of a homeowners’ association’s financial and other records by its members. It outlines the process for requests, a ten-business-day fulfillment window, and specific exemptions allowing an association to withhold certain records.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner that allows an administrative law judge to levy a civil penalty against a party found to be in violation of the law.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The official governing documents that establish the rules and obligations for a homeowners’ association and its members.

Department of Real Estate (“Department”)

The Arizona state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving disputes between homeowners and their associations.

Hidden Valley Association (HVA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association for the Hidden Valley Ranch subdivision in Prescott, Arizona, governed by CC&Rs and a Board of Directors.

HOAMCO

The company that served as the Community Manager for the Hidden Valley Association and initially responded to the Petitioner’s records request.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona to which the Department of Real Estate referred this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Douglas E. Kupel, a homeowner and member of the HVA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, making the contention more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Respondent was the Hidden Valley Association.

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21F-H2120006-REL

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Douglas E. Kupel and the Hidden Valley Association (HVA), a homeowners’ association. The core issue of the hearing, held on October 22, 2020, was whether the HVA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill Kupel’s records request for communications regarding open meeting law compliance and bylaw changes. Petitioner Kupel argued that undisclosed records existed based on emails sent by HVA Board President Gary Freed, while Freed testified that no disclosable records existed due to statutory exceptions and a mistaken belief about record retention. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s claim, concluding that Kupel failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute, thereby also denying his request for reimbursement and civil penalties.

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What are the legal requirements governing homeowner association record disclosure in Arizona?
What was the core dispute between the petitioner and the homeowner association?
How did the Administrative Law Judge decide the outcome of this specific case?

Audio Overview

Video Overview

Video Overview

Mind Map Mind Map

Reports Reports

Flashcards

Flashcards

Quiz

Quiz

00:00 / 00:00

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Douglas E. Kupel (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Timothy Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Hidden Valley Association
    Represented Respondent
  • Gary Freed (board member)
    Hidden Valley Association
    Hidden Valley Ranch Association Board President and witness for HVA
  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Received service of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the Administrative Law Judge Decision

Don France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020056-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Don France Counsel —
Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association Counsel B. Austin Bailio

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 2.7

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)

Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.

Orders: Don France's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R, RV storage, Estoppel, Fines
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 924655.pdf

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20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

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20F-H2020056-REL Decision – 823714.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the administrative hearing decision in case number 20F-H2020056-REL, involving petitioner Don France and respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association (the “Association”). The core of the dispute was the Association’s enforcement of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically section 2.7, which requires a six-foot-high gate for Recreational Vehicles (RVs) stored on a property.

The petitioner, Mr. France, was fined by the Association in 2019 for not having the required gate on an RV structure that the Association itself had approved in 2014. Mr. France initially filed a petition alleging the Association was in violation of its own CC&Rs. However, at the September 1, 2020 hearing, he conceded this was not the case and instead argued the Association was “estopped”—or legally prevented—from enforcing the rule due to its prior approval.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. France’s petition on procedural grounds. The judge determined that since Mr. France acknowledged his petition’s central claim was incorrect, he had failed to meet his burden of proof. The new arguments concerning estoppel and the legality of the fines were deemed not properly before the tribunal because they were not included in the original petition. The decision underscores the critical importance of aligning claims made in a formal petition with the arguments presented at a hearing.

Case Overview

Case Number

No. 20F-H2020056-REL

In the Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Don France

Respondent

Mesa East Property Owners Association

Respondent’s Counsel

B. Austin Bailio, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

September 1, 2020

Decision Date

September 21, 2020

The central issue of the case revolves around the enforcement of CC&R section 2.7, which mandates that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a six-foot-high gate. This requirement is mirrored by a City of Mesa municipal code.

Chronology of Key Events

• 2014: Mr. France applies for and receives approval from the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) to build an RV port. In his application, he acknowledges he will abide by deed restrictions and City of Mesa codes.

• October 21, 2014: The Association issues its final approval for the structure, which is built without a gate.

• Circa 2018: Following threats of litigation from other residents over non-enforcement of the CC&Rs, the Association begins a new enforcement campaign for the six-foot gate rule. The City of Mesa denies the Association’s request to “grandfather in” non-compliant homes.

• 2019: The deadline for residents to come into compliance passes.

• March 11, 2019: The Association issues a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Mr. France for lacking the required gate.

• April 5, 2019: Through an attorney, Mr. France asserts that the Association is estopped from enforcing the rule due to its 2014 approval.

• May 15, 2019: The Association’s attorney rejects the estoppel claim and informs Mr. France’s attorney that fines of $500 per week will be assessed.

• May 31, 2019: The Association assesses a $500 fine against Mr. France, with additional fines assessed later.

• July 24, 2019: The City of Mesa issues its own NOV to Mr. France, citing a violation of city code 11-34-5(B), which also requires a six-foot screening fence for RVs.

• April 16, 2020: Mr. France files a petition alleging the Association is in violation of CC&R section 2.7.

• Prior to Hearing: To comply with the City of Mesa’s NOV, Mr. France installs a temporary gate at a cost of approximately $800.

• September 1, 2020: The administrative hearing is conducted.

Analysis of Arguments and Testimonies

Petitioner’s Position (Don France)

• Initial Petition: The formal petition, filed on April 16, 2020, was based on the single issue that the Mesa East Property Owners Association had violated its own CC&R section 2.7.

• Revised Argument at Hearing: During the hearing, Mr. France acknowledged that the Association was not, in fact, violating section 2.7. His argument shifted to a claim of estoppel, asserting that the Association could not enforce the rule against him because its own ARC had approved his gateless structure in 2014.

• Requested Relief: Mr. France asked the judge to rule that the Association could not require him to install a gate and to invalidate any outstanding fines levied against him.

• Supporting Testimony: Joann Van Kirk, the chairperson of the ARC in 2014, testified on Mr. France’s behalf. She stated that she had been informed by a past chair that no gate was required for structures like Mr. France’s, citing other properties that had RV shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa at the time and was told a gate was not required if the structure was attached to the house.

Respondent’s Position (Mesa East POA)

• Basis for Enforcement: The Association began strictly enforcing the gate requirement around 2018 after being threatened with lawsuits by other members for failing to enforce the CC&Rs.

• Enforcement Actions: After an unsuccessful attempt to have the City of Mesa grandfather in non-compliant properties, the Association notified members of the requirement via its newsletter and online, setting a compliance deadline of 2019. When Mr. France did not comply, the Association issued an NOV and subsequently began assessing fines.

• Legal Stance: The Association’s counsel formally rejected Mr. France’s estoppel argument in May 2019.

• Supporting Testimony: Donald Smith testified that at the time the NOV was issued to Mr. France, eleven other residents were also non-compliant. By the hearing date, six remained in violation, five of whom had agreed to comply. This testimony was intended to show that the enforcement was not targeted solely at Mr. France.

Independent Municipal Action

The City of Mesa’s regulations played a significant and independent role in the matter.

• City Code: The City of Mesa has its own ordinance, Code section 11-34-5(B), which requires RVs taller than six feet to be screened by a six-foot-tall fence.

• Notice of Violation: On July 24, 2019, the City issued its own NOV to Mr. France for violating this code.

• Consequence: This municipal enforcement action compelled Mr. France to install a temporary gate to avoid penalties from the City, regardless of the outcome of his dispute with the Property Owners Association.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

Final Order: IT IS ORDERED that Don France’s petition is dismissed.

The judge’s decision to dismiss the case was based on a precise legal and procedural rationale, rather than the merits of the estoppel argument.

• Failure of the Core Claim: The judge noted that Mr. France’s petition was limited to the single claim that the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Mr. France himself admitted this was not the case. As the petitioner, Mr. France bore the burden of proof, and his own testimony demonstrated that the “preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation.”

• Jurisdictional Limitation: The new issues raised by Mr. France at the hearing—namely the estoppel argument and the legality of the fines—were declared “not properly before the tribunal.” The judge reasoned that these claims were not included in the original petition, a separate filing fee was not paid for a second issue, and the claims were not listed in the official Notice of Hearing. This procedural failure prevented the judge from ruling on the substance of these arguments.

Conclusion and Post-Decision Protocol

The dismissal of Mr. France’s petition represents a conclusive finding in favor of the respondent based on the specific claims filed. The decision illustrates that the scope of an administrative hearing is strictly defined by the issues raised in the initial petition.

According to the decision document, the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: France v. Mesa East Property Owners Association (No. 20F-H2020056-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision in the case between Don France (Petitioner) and the Mesa East Property Owners Association (Respondent), as decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

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Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what was the single issue alleged in the Petitioner’s original petition filed on April 16, 2020?

2. According to CC&R section 2.7 and the City of Mesa’s code, what is the specific requirement for storing a recreational vehicle (RV) on a property?

3. What enforcement actions did the Mesa East Property Owners Association take against Don France in the spring of 2019?

4. What was Don France’s primary legal argument against the Association’s enforcement, which he revealed at the September 1, 2020 hearing?

5. What was the state of compliance on Mr. France’s property regarding the RV gate as of the hearing date, and what prompted this action?

6. According to the testimony of Donald Smith, what prompted the Association to begin enforcing the six-foot gate requirement around 2018?

7. What key information did Joann Van Kirk, the 2014 chairperson of the Architectural Review Committee, provide in her testimony?

8. How did the Petitioner’s argument at the hearing differ from the allegation in his initial petition, and why was this difference critical to the case’s outcome?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decline to rule on the legality of the fines the Association had levied against Mr. France?

10. What was the ultimate order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal reasoning behind this decision?

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Answer Key for Short-Answer Questions

1. The primary parties are Don France, the Petitioner, and the Mesa East Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The single issue alleged in Mr. France’s petition was that the Association was in violation of its own CC&R section 2.7.

2. Both CC&R section 2.7 (the 1994 version) and the City of Mesa’s code (section 11-34-5(B)) require that RVs stored on a property must be screened behind a structure with a gate that is at least six feet high. The CC&Rs also specified the fence and gate must be tall enough to prevent a person from seeing the RV.

3. On March 11, 2019, the Association issued a Notice of Violation to Mr. France because his RV structure lacked a six-foot gate. Subsequently, on May 31, 2019, the Association fined him $500 for the same violation.

4. At the hearing, Mr. France’s primary argument was that the Association was “estopped” from finding him in violation of section 2.7. He argued this because the Association’s Architectural Review Committee had approved his RV structure in 2014 without the gate.

5. As of the hearing date, Mr. France had installed a temporary six-foot gate at a cost of about $800. This action was taken to comply with a Notice of Violation issued to him by the City of Mesa on July 24, 2019.

6. Donald Smith testified that around 2018, people were threatening to sue the Association if it did not enforce the CC&Rs. After meeting with the City of Mesa, which would not allow non-compliant homes to be grandfathered in, the Association began enforcing the gate requirement.

7. Joann Van Kirk testified that in 2014, she had learned from the past ARC chair that no gate was required because other owners had shelters without gates. She also testified that she called the City of Mesa and was told no gate was required if the structure was attached to the house.

8. While his petition alleged the Association had violated section 2.7, at the hearing Mr. France acknowledged this was not the case and argued instead that the Association was estopped from enforcing that section against him. This was critical because the judge could only rule on the single issue raised in the petition, which Mr. France conceded had no merit.

9. The judge declined to rule on the legality of the fines because the issue was not raised in Mr. France’s original petition. Therefore, it was not properly before the tribunal as a filing fee had not been paid for a second issue and it was not included in the Notice of Hearing.

10. The judge ordered that Don France’s petition be dismissed. The reasoning was that the petition was limited to the single issue of whether the Association had violated CC&R section 2.7, and Mr. France himself acknowledged at the hearing that no such violation by the Association had occurred.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-format response for each, citing specific facts from the case decision to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of estoppel as it applies to this case. Explain why Don France believed the Association was estopped from enforcing the gate requirement, referencing the 2014 approvals, and discuss why the Association disagreed and proceeded with enforcement actions.

2. Discuss the procedural limitations that shaped the outcome of this hearing. How did the specific wording of Mr. France’s initial petition and the rules governing administrative hearings ultimately prevent the judge from considering the central issues of estoppel and the validity of the fines?

3. Examine the conflict between a property owner’s reliance on past approvals and a Property Owners Association’s duty to enforce its CC&Rs. Use the testimony of Joann Van Kirk and Donald Smith to illustrate the differing perspectives and pressures that led to this dispute.

4. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. France’s 2014 application to the 2020 hearing. Detail the key actions taken by Mr. France, the Association’s Architectural Review Committee, the Association’s Board, and the City of Mesa, and explain how their interactions created the legal conflict.

5. Evaluate the standard of proof required in this case, the “preponderance of the evidence.” Although the case was dismissed on a procedural issue, discuss which party presented a more convincing case regarding the underlying dispute over the RV gate, and why.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee within the Property Owners Association responsible for reviewing and approving applications for property improvements, such as Mr. France’s RV port in 2014.

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, Mr. France bore the burden of proof to show the Association violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing community documents that set rules for property use, such as section 2.7 which requires a six-foot gate for RV storage.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final ruling.

Estoppel

A legal principle asserted by Mr. France arguing that the Association should be prevented from enforcing a rule (the gate requirement) against him because of its prior action (approving his structure without a gate in 2014).

Findings of Fact

A formal, numbered list of facts in the judge’s decision that are established by the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Notice of Violation (NOV)

A formal notice issued by the Association or the City of Mesa to a property owner informing them that they are in violation of a specific rule or code.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Don France is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient to incline an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Mesa East Property Owners Association is the Respondent.

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20F-H2020056-REL

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning the case of Don France versus the Mesa East Property Owners Association. The document details a dispute where Petitioner Don France alleged that the Respondent Association violated a community covenant regarding the storage of recreational vehicles (RVs), specifically CC&R section 2.7, which requires RVs to be stored behind a six-foot gate. Although Mr. France initially brought the petition alleging the Association violated the rule, he ultimately argued that the Association was estopped from enforcing the rule against him due to past approval of his RV structure without a gate. The decision includes a summary of the Findings of Fact related to Mr. France’s structure, the Association’s attempts to enforce the gate requirement against him and other residents, and the resulting fines he incurred before installing a gate to comply with a separate City of Mesa Notice of Violation. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. France failed to meet the burden of proof to show the Association violated the CC&Rs, and his petition was dismissed because he acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7.

1 source

What were the legal and factual grounds for the case’s dismissal?
How did the Association’s past actions relate to the estoppel claim?
What was the core conflict between the homeowner, HOA, and city codes?

Based on 1 source

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Don France (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified
  • Joann Van Kirk (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; was chairperson of Architectural Review Committee ('ARC') in 2014

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Bailio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Mesa East Property Owners Association
  • Michael Estey (witness)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Donald Smith (witness)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Nancy L Babington v. Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020064-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-24
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $2,500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nancy L. Babington Counsel —
Respondent Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation Counsel Mark K. Sahl and Scott B. Carpenter

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Outcome Summary

Following a rehearing based on newly discovered evidence, the Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to timely provide records it possessed. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee and pay a $2,500.00 civil penalty to the Department of Real Estate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to make association financial and other records reasonably available for examination/provide copies within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by failing to provide requested records (including bank statements and contracts) following a formal request on May 1, 2020. The Administrative Law Judge, in the rehearing, found that the evidence showed Respondent was in possession of bank statements and two signed contracts at the time of the request, contradicting prior testimony, thereby establishing a violation of the statute.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee reimbursement and pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00 to the Department of Real Estate, both payments due within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $2,500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA records request, A.R.S. 33-1258, Rehearing, Civil Penalty, Possession of Records
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020064-REL Decision – 866802.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:35 (123.5 KB)

20F-H2020064-REL Decision – 823263.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:38 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Babington v. Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative hearings concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Nancy L. Babington (Petitioner) and the Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation (Respondent). The case, No. 20F-H2020064-REL, culminated in a reversal of an initial ruling, finding the Respondent in violation of Arizona law A.R.S. § 33-1258 for failing to provide association records within the statutory timeframe.

The initial hearing on August 28, 2020, resulted in a denial of the petition. The Respondent successfully argued that it could not produce the requested documents because they were not in its possession, largely due to a dispute with a former management company. However, a rehearing was granted after the Petitioner discovered new evidence.

The rehearing on March 4, 2021, established that the Respondent, through its management company Associa Arizona, was in possession of key requested documents—specifically bank statements and signed contracts—at the time of the initial request. Evidence revealed the bank statements were held at a central corporate office in Texas and were not retrieved, while signed contracts had not been forwarded to the management company by board members. The Administrative Law Judge found this directly contradicted the Respondent’s initial defense.

As a result, the Administrative Law Judge reversed the earlier decision, ordering the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and imposing a $2,500 civil penalty payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case underscores an association’s responsibility to produce all records in its possession, regardless of physical location within the corporate structure, and affirms the court’s authority to levy penalties for violations.

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1. Case Overview

• Case Number: 20F-H2020064-REL

• Petitioner: Nancy L. Babington

• Respondent: Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation

• Core Allegation: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258, which mandates that a condominium owners’ association must make its financial and other records reasonably available for examination by a member within ten business days of a request.

• Hearings Conducted:

◦ Initial Hearing: August 28, 2020

◦ Rehearing: March 4, 2021

• Presiding Administrative Law Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The dispute originated from difficulties following a change in the Respondent’s management company and subsequent records requests by the Petitioner.

• June-July 2019: The previous management company, Community Management & Consulting, LLC (CMC), terminated its agreement with the Respondent. A “financial disagreement” led to CMC withholding records, complicating the transition.

• Post-July 2019: Respondent hired Associa Arizona as its new management company. Associa and the Respondent’s counsel attempted to obtain the withheld records from CMC.

• April 29, 2020: After previous attempts to get information, Petitioner Nancy L. Babington sent a formal email to Associa and the Respondent’s Board of Directors. In the email, she stated:

• May 1, 2020: Linda Parker, Director of Client Services with Associa, replied, stating the request was not specific and asked the Petitioner to identify the exact records needed.

• May 1, 2020: The Petitioner responded with a detailed list of nine specific items:

1. All bank statements with copies of cancelled checks since Sept 1, 2019.

2. Any and all financial statements since Sept 1, 2019.

3. Any and all 1099s issued for 2019.

4. Any and all Executive Session meeting minutes conducted in 2020 (excluding statutory exemptions).

5. Any and all contracts signed in 2020.

6. Any and all outstanding invoices with a due date over 45 days.

7. Any documentation regarding the legality of the $204.75 maintenance fee.

8. Any proof of Stephen Silberschlag’s liability insurance.

9. Any landscaping plans.

• May 4, 2020: Ms. Parker from Associa responded that the company could only provide records within its possession.

• May 15, 2020: Following another email from the Petitioner, Ms. Parker stated that Associa had scheduled a meeting with the board on May 20 to discuss the request further.

• May 28, 2020: Having not received any of the requested documents, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. The Initial Hearing and Decision (August – September 2020)

The first hearing focused on whether the Respondent had violated the statute by failing to produce the documents.

• The Respondent argued that it was unable to provide documents that were not in its possession.

• Joseph Silberschlag, Secretary of the Board of Directors, testified that issues with the former management company (CMC) meant neither the Respondent nor Associa had possession of many necessary documents.

• Specifically, he stated that without previous financial documents and starting balances from CMC, the association was unable to create current financial statements.

• The Respondent maintained it was under no statutory obligation to create documents to fulfill the Petitioner’s request.

• The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Petitioner “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).”

• The finding was based on the Respondent’s argument that it did not possess the requested documents at the time of the request.

• On September 17, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

4. The Rehearing and Reversal (March 2021)

Following the initial decision, the case was reopened based on new evidence presented by the Petitioner.

• After the September 2020 decision, the Respondent provided some of the requested documents to the Petitioner.

• Upon reviewing these documents, the Petitioner realized that the Respondent had, in fact, been in possession of several key records prior to her May 1, 2020 request.

• She filed a Rehearing Request with the Department of Real Estate, citing “newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing.” The request was granted.

The rehearing revealed crucial details about the location and accessibility of the requested records.

Record Type

Petitioner’s Evidence

Respondent’s Testimony/Explanation

Bank Statements

The documents received post-hearing showed that bank statements had been sent to Associa starting in August 2019.

Evelyn Shanley, Community Director for Associa, testified that statements for all HOAs were sent to a central office in Richardson, Texas. She admitted she did not contact the Texas office to obtain the statements for the Petitioner’s request. Counsel for the Respondent conceded the statements in Texas were in the possession of Associa.

Contracts

Petitioner presented two contracts signed by Board members on March 27 and March 31, 2020, prior to her request.

Ms. Shanley admitted the two signed contracts existed but stated that the Board of Directors members had not provided them to Associa.

1099 Forms

Petitioner noted a document indicating four vendors were eligible for 1099s.

Ms. Shanley denied that any 1099s had been issued.

• The documents were not in the “immediate possession” of the local Associa office.

• The matter was now moot because the Petitioner had received all requested documents.

• A civil penalty was inappropriate because the Petitioner did not specifically request one on her initial petition form.

• The evidence presented at the rehearing was “directly contradictory” to the representations made by the Respondent at the initial hearing.

• The Petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide documents (bank statements and contracts) that were in its possession.

• The ALJ rejected the Respondent’s argument against a civil penalty, stating that the plain language of A.R.S. § 32-2199.02 allows the judge to levy a penalty for established violations, and “nothing in the statute limits the available remedies to those specifically requested by a petitioner.”

5. Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on March 24, 2021, reversed the initial finding and imposed penalties on the Respondent.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Respondent must pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within 30 days.

2. Respondent must pay to the Department of Real Estate a civil penalty in the amount of $2,500.00 within 30 days.

Study Guide: Babington v. Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation

This study guide provides a review of the administrative case involving Petitioner Nancy L. Babington and Respondent Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, a separate answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms and entities involved in the proceedings.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the Petitioner’s central allegation?

2. What specific Arizona statute was the Respondent accused of violating, and what does this law generally require?

3. What was the Respondent’s main defense during the initial hearing on August 28, 2020, for not providing the requested records?

4. What was the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge in the first decision, issued on September 17, 2020?

5. On what legal grounds did the Petitioner successfully file for a rehearing of her case?

6. What new evidence regarding bank statements was presented by the Petitioner at the March 4, 2021, rehearing?

7. How did the Respondent’s management company, Associa Arizona, explain its failure to produce the bank statements and signed contracts in response to the initial request?

8. What was the final outcome of the rehearing, and how did it contradict the initial decision?

9. What two financial penalties were imposed upon the Respondent in the final order of March 24, 2021?

10. What was the Respondent’s argument against the imposition of a civil penalty, and why did the Administrative Law Judge reject it?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Nancy L. Babington, a property owner, and Respondent Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation, a condominium owners association. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent failed to provide association records she formally requested, in violation of Arizona law.

2. The Respondent was accused of violating A.R.S. § 33-1258. This statute requires a condominium owners association to make its financial and other records reasonably available for examination by a member and to provide copies of requested records within ten business days.

3. During the initial hearing, the Respondent’s main defense was that it was unable to provide the documents because they were not in its possession. The Respondent claimed its former management company, CMC, was withholding records and that without starting balances, it could not create new financial documents.

4. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition in the first decision. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the statute because the Respondent did not possess the documents and was not required to create them.

5. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing based on the discovery of “newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing.” After the first decision, the Respondent provided documents that proved it had, in fact, been in possession of some of the requested records prior to her request.

6. At the rehearing, the Petitioner testified that after receiving the documents, she realized bank statements had been sent to Associa’s central office in Richardson, Texas, starting in August 2019. This demonstrated that the records were in the management company’s possession when she made her request.

7. Associa’s representative testified that bank statements went to a central office in Texas and were not forwarded to the local office because financial packets could not be prepared without starting balances from the previous management company. Regarding the contracts, Associa claimed that the Board of Directors members who signed them had not provided the contracts to Associa.

8. The final outcome of the rehearing was a ruling in favor of the Petitioner. The judge found that evidence presented at the rehearing directly contradicted the Respondent’s earlier claims, establishing that the Respondent did possess bank statements and contracts and had violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).

9. In the final order, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00. Additionally, the Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $2,500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

10. The Respondent argued that a civil penalty was not appropriate because the Petitioner did not specifically request one by checking the box on the petition form. The judge rejected this, stating that the plain language of A.R.S. § 32-2199.02 allows the judge to levy a civil penalty for established violations, and this authority is not limited by the remedies requested by a petitioner.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for analytical and in-depth responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “possession” of records as it evolved from the first hearing to the second. How did the Respondent’s initial interpretation of “immediate possession” differ from the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the records held by Associa’s Texas office?

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. Explain specifically how the Petitioner failed to meet this standard in the first hearing but succeeded in the second, citing the key pieces of evidence that shifted the outcome.

3. Evaluate the role and responsibilities of the management company, Associa Arizona, in this dispute. To what extent were its internal procedures and actions (or inactions) the primary cause of the Respondent’s violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258?

4. Trace the timeline of communication between Nancy Babington and Associa Arizona from April 29, 2020, to May 15, 2020. Analyze how the responses from Associa may have contributed to the perception that the Respondent was refusing to provide information, ultimately leading to the petition being filed.

5. The Administrative Law Judge has the statutory authority to levy a civil penalty for each violation found. Based on the facts of this case, including the Respondent’s representations at the first hearing and the contradictory evidence presented at the second, construct an argument justifying the imposition of the $2,500 civil penalty.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

The Arizona Revised Statute cited as giving the Arizona Department of Real Estate jurisdiction to hear disputes between a property owner and a condominium owners association.

A.R.S. § 33-1258

The Arizona Revised Statute at the core of the dispute. It requires that an association’s financial and other records be made “reasonably available” for examination and that the association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official from the Office of Administrative Hearings (Tammy L. Eigenheer in this case) responsible for conducting the hearings, weighing evidence, and issuing a legally binding decision and order.

Associa Arizona

The management company hired by the Respondent to handle its operations after the termination of the previous management agreement. It was the primary point of contact for the Petitioner’s records request.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine levied by the Administrative Law Judge for a violation of the law. In this case, a $2,500 penalty was ordered to be paid to the Department of Real Estate.

Community Management & Consulting, LLC (CMC)

The Respondent’s former management company. CMC terminated its agreement with the Respondent and was withholding association records due to a financial disagreement, which was a key part of the Respondent’s defense in the initial hearing.

Department of Real Estate (Department)

The Arizona state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction over such disputes.

A legal argument made by the Respondent’s counsel during the rehearing. Counsel asserted that the matter was moot (no longer relevant or in dispute) because, by the time of the rehearing, the Petitioner had received all the documents she requested.

Newly Discovered Material Evidence

The legal basis upon which the Petitioner was granted a rehearing. It refers to significant evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing despite reasonable diligence.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Nancy L. Babington, a condominium owner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win her case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate to re-examine a case, which was held on March 4, 2021, after the Petitioner presented newly discovered evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation, the condominium owners association.

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20F-H2020064-REL-RHG

2 sources

These two sources are Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between Nancy L. Babington, a homeowner, and the Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation, her condominium owners association, regarding the provision of association records under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1258. The first document details the initial hearing, held in August 2020, where the judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that the association was not in violation because it lacked possession of the requested documents due to issues with its former management company. The second document outlines the rehearing, granted due to newly discovered evidence suggesting the association or its new management company, Associa Arizona, actually possessed some records, such as bank statements and contracts, despite earlier claims. Based on the rehearing’s findings, the judge determined the association violated the statute by not providing the records within the ten-day requirement and ordered the association to reimburse the petitioner’s filing fee and pay a civil penalty.

2 sources

How did newly discovered evidence lead to reversal of the initial legal decision?
What were the specific consequences for the respondent following the administrative rehearing?
How did the interpretation of statutory record possession requirements change between hearings?

Based on 2 sources

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nancy L. Babington (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent at initial hearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent at rehearing
  • Scott B. Carpenter (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent at rehearing
  • Debbie Schumacher (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
  • Marty Shuford (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
  • Joseph Silberschlag (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
    Secretary; testified
  • Angelina Rajenovich (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
  • Dermot Brown (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
  • Lori Nusbaum (board member)
    Park Scottsdale II Townhouse Corporation
  • Linda Parker (HOA staff)
    Associa Arizona
    Director of Client Services for property manager
  • Evelyn Shanley (HOA staff)
    Associa Arizona
    Community Director for property manager; testified at rehearing
  • Laura Smith (HOA staff)
    Associa Arizona

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Signed order transmission

Other Participants

  • Stephen Silberschlag (unknown)
    Subject of Petitioner's record request

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel —
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

• Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

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1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:22 (95.4 KB)

Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.

The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.

Case Background

• Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.

• Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.

• Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.

• Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.

The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.

Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1

The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:

Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)

Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.

• Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.

• Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”

• Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)

The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.

• Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

• Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.

• Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.

Legal Standards Applied

Standard

Description

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Covenant Interpretation

In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.

Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation

The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:

• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.

Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction

The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.

• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

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Review Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?

3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?

4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?

5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?

6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?

7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?

8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?

9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?

10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.

2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.

3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.

4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.

5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.

8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.

1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?

2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.

3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?

5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Declaratory Judgment

A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.

Waiver

The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.

Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons

The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.

Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation

Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.

This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:

“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.

Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase

In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The court defined this standard as:

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”

The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.

Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door

The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.

The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.

The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:

“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.

Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner

Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.

While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wendy Ellsworth (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Brian Hatch (petitioner attorney)
    Brian A. Hatch PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020061-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-03
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Samuel T Paparazzo Counsel —
Respondent Coronado Ranch Community Association Counsel Mark Stahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.

Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.

Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:49 (149.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020061-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Samuel T. Paparazzo versus the Coronado Ranch Community Association. The central conclusion of the proceeding is the denial of the Petitioner’s claims. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Arizona state statutes or its own governing bylaws in the conduct of its April 2, 2020, annual meeting.

The critical takeaways from the decision are as follows:

• Meeting Format and Notice: The Association’s decision to move its annual meeting to a virtual platform (ClickMeeting) was deemed a lawful and appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Arizona Governor’s related executive orders. The notification methods, which included physical signs and multiple emails, were found to be sufficient.

• Right to Speak: The Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the right to speak because he was “blocked” from the online chat feature was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the issue stemmed from “user error”—the Petitioner typed messages but failed to transmit them by pressing ‘enter’ or ‘send’. The fact that 26 other members successfully used the chat feature demonstrated its functionality.

• Meeting Conduct: The Association’s president properly called the meeting to order before delegating chairing responsibilities to the Association’s Managing Agent, an action the Petitioner conceded was within the president’s authority.

• Board Elections: The election of all five Board of Director positions simultaneously, rather than in staggered terms, was justified by unique circumstances. The Association’s 2019 annual meeting failed to achieve a quorum, preventing an election and resulting in a “carryover of open seats,” which necessitated filling all positions in the 2020 election.

Ultimately, the ALJ found that the Association and its Board acted within the scope of their statutory authority and that the challenges raised by the Petitioner were without merit.

I. Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 3, 2020, following an evidentiary hearing held on August 18, 2020.

• Case Number: 20F-H2020061-REL

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark

• Petitioner: Samuel T. Paparazzo (Homeowner and Association Member)

• Respondent: Coronado Ranch Community Association (HOA)

• Central Issue: The core of the dispute was whether the Coronado Ranch Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes and specific sections of its own bylaws during its annual meeting on April 2, 2020.

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

On May 15, 2020, Samuel Paparazzo filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging that the Association committed the following violations:

1. Improper Notice of Meeting: Providing less than 10-days’ notice regarding a “change in venue” for the annual meeting to only a small portion of the membership, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Association Bylaw 2.3.

2. Denial of Right to Speak: Preventing the Petitioner from exercising his right to speak by “blocking” or otherwise disabling his use of the online “chat feature” during the virtual meeting, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A).

3. Improper Meeting Conduct: Failing to properly call the annual meeting to order, in violation of Association Bylaw 2.7.

4. Improper Board Election: Conducting the Board of Directors election without the “staggered” terms required by the bylaws, in violation of Association Bylaw 3.1.

III. Factual Chronology and Key Evidence

The decision outlines a clear sequence of events, heavily influenced by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Feb. 20, 2020

The Association issues its initial notice for the annual meeting, scheduled for April 2, 2020, at Coronado Elementary School.

Mar. 12, 2020

The Association mails election ballots to all Members.

Mar. 19, 2020

Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-09, limiting certain business operations to slow the spread of COVID-19.

~Mar. 25, 2020

The Association’s President, Bob Hicks, officially moves the meeting to the virtual ClickMeeting platform.

Mar. 25 – Apr. 1

The Association notifies Members of the change via 12 signs at 6 community entrances and three separate email blasts to approximately 750 Members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.

Mar. 30, 2020

Governor Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-18, the “Stay Home, Stay Healthy, Stay Connected” order.

Apr. 1, 2020

Two signs are placed at the entrance to the original meeting location, Coronado Elementary School, informing of the change.

Apr. 2, 2020

The Annual Meeting is held via ClickMeeting.
• President Hicks calls the meeting to order and then appoints Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the remainder of the meeting.
• A quorum is achieved based on attendees and absentee ballots.
• An election is held for all 5 open Board positions due to a lack of quorum at the 2019 meeting.
• The Petitioner types messages in the chat window but fails to hit “enter” or click “send” to transmit them. He receives no response to an email for help sent during the meeting.
• At least 26 other Members successfully use the chat feature.

IV. Analysis of Key Issues and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge systematically addressed and dismissed each of the Petitioner’s four allegations, concluding that the Board acted lawfully and within its authority.

A. Meeting Notice and Venue Change

• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 2.3 (Notice of Meetings).

• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ concluded that the notice of the Association’s 2020 annual meeting was “timely and properly noticed.” The move to an online platform was not an arbitrary venue change but a necessary and reasonable measure to comply with the Governor’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Association made a multi-faceted effort to inform Members through physical signs and repeated emails.

◦ The Petitioner received notice of the modification and, crucially, “failed to raise an objection prior to or during the meeting at issue.”

◦ A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objections to defective notice, as stated in Bylaw 2.3.

B. Right to Speak

• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) (Open Meetings and Member Participation).

• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ determined the Petitioner’s inability to communicate during the meeting was the result of “user error” and not a deliberate act by the Association to silence him.

• Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Petitioner wrote messages but never finalized the action by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button.

◦ The chat feature was demonstrably functional, as it was “successfully used by no less than 26 other Members during the annual meeting.”

◦ The decision explicitly states, “The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.”

C. Conduct of Meeting

• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 2.7 (Organization and Conduct of Meeting).

• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The meeting was lawfully conducted.

• Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Association President, Bob Hicks, called the meeting to order and took roll before appointing Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the rest of the meeting.

◦ The Petitioner “conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority task Agent Bishop with chairing the annual meeting.”

D. Board of Directors Election

• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 3.1 (Number and Terms of Office).

• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The election for all five Board seats was deemed “lawful and appropriate given the circumstances.”

• Supporting Evidence:

◦ The bylaw’s provision for staggered terms could not be implemented because the 2019 annual meeting lacked a quorum, which meant no election took place that year.

◦ This lack of a 2019 vote “resulted in a carryover of open seats,” necessitating a vote for all five Board positions in 2020.

◦ The Petitioner “admitted that it had not been possible for the Association to stagger Board electees in the 2020 vote because no quorum had been reached to vote in 2019.”

V. Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.”

• Legal Standard: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the record did not establish any violations and that the Petitioner “failed to sustain his burden of proof in this matter.”

• Date of Order: The decision was issued on September 3, 2020.

Study Guide: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 20F-H2020061-REL, Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the four specific allegations the Petitioner made against the Association regarding its Annual Meeting?

3. How did the Association notify its members of the change from an in-person meeting to a virtual one?

4. What was the legal justification for the Association’s decision to move the Annual Meeting to an online platform?

5. What evidence was presented to counter the Petitioner’s claim that he was “blocked” from using the online chat feature?

6. According to the Association’s bylaws, who has the authority to chair the annual meeting and delegate that responsibility?

7. Why did the 2020 Board of Directors election involve voting for all five open positions instead of being staggered?

8. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this hearing?

9. What two key Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) relate to member meeting notices and the right to speak?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind it?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Samuel T. Paparazzo, the Petitioner, who is a property owner and member of the Association, and the Coronado Ranch Community Association, the Respondent, which is the homeowners’ association for the subdivision. The Petitioner brought the complaint, and the Respondent defended its actions.

2. The Petitioner alleged that: (i) inadequate notice of the “change in venue” was given; (ii) he was denied his right to speak by being blocked from the online chat feature; (iii) the meeting was not properly called to order; and (iv) the Board of Directors vote was not properly “staggered.”

3. The Association notified members of the move to the ClickMeeting platform by placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances, sending three separate emails to approximately 750 members, and placing 2 signs at the entrance of the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.

4. The legal justification was the need to comply with executive orders issued by Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey (2020-09, 2020-12, and 2020-18) to slow the spread of COVID-19. The online platform was adopted to allow homeowners to safely access the meeting while adhering to physical distancing mandates.

5. The evidence showed that the Petitioner wrote messages but never hit the “enter” key or “send” button to transmit them. Furthermore, the record indicates that no less than 26 other members successfully used the chat feature during the meeting.

6. According to Bylaw Section 2.7, the President of the Association, Bob Hicks, has the authority to call the meeting to order and chair it. The Petitioner conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority to delegate the chairing of the meeting to the Association’s Managing Agent, Kevin Bishop.

7. The election involved all five positions because a quorum had not been achieved at the Association’s 2019 annual meeting. This lack of a quorum prevented a vote from taking place, resulting in a carryover of all open board seats to the 2020 election.

8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof required, meaning the evidence must be more probably true than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, bore the burden of proving his allegations by this standard.

9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) requires notice to be sent not fewer than 10 nor more than 50 days in advance of a meeting. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) ensures that all meetings are open to members and that members are permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge reasoned that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof, as the evidence showed the Association’s actions were lawful and appropriate responses to the circumstances, and the Petitioner’s inability to participate was due to user error.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated executive orders in the events of this case. How did these external factors influence the Association’s actions and the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

2. The judge concluded that the Petitioner’s inability to use the chat function was due to “user error.” Discuss the evidence that supports this conclusion and explore the legal line between an association’s responsibility to provide access and a member’s responsibility to utilize the provided tools correctly.

3. Explain the relationship between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT.). How did the judge use both to evaluate the legality of the Association’s handling of the annual meeting and election?

4. The Petitioner argued that the online platform constituted a “change in venue” that required more extensive notice. Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the legal merits of this argument in the context of a virtual meeting necessitated by a public health crisis.

5. Discuss the concept of “quorum” as it applied to both the 2019 and 2020 annual meetings. How did the failure to achieve quorum in one year directly impact the procedures and outcome of the election in the following year?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judicial officer (Jenna Clark in this case) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1 specifically regulates planned communities (homeowners’ associations).

Association

The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the homeowners’ association for the residential development in Gilbert, Arizona. It is governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the Association that detail the structure of day-to-day governance, including voting processes, quorum requirements, meeting provisions, and other operating guidelines.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use within the development.

Declarant Control Period

An initial period in an association’s history where the developer (the “Declarant”) controls the Board of Directors. In this case, this period ended for the Association in 2005.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

The Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency that was referred this matter to conduct an evidentiary hearing and decide the case.

Petitioner

Samuel T. Paparazzo, the property owner and Association member who filed the petition with the Department, alleging violations by the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

Quorum

The minimum number of members required to be present or represented by ballot for a meeting to be valid and for votes to be taken. The failure to achieve quorum at the 2019 meeting resulted in a carryover of open board seats.

Respondent

The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the party against whom the petition was filed. The Respondent denied all allegations and was represented by legal counsel.

He Sued His HOA Over a Virtual Meeting—The Judge’s Ruling Contains 4 Critical Lessons for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The New Battlefield for Neighborhood Disputes

Cast your mind back to the chaotic spring of 2020. The world was locking down, businesses were scrambling to go remote, and the delicate social contracts of our neighborhoods were fraying. For millions living in Homeowners’ Associations, this meant the abrupt cancellation of in-person meetings, replaced by a frantic pivot to unfamiliar virtual platforms. In this pressure cooker of uncertainty and technical glitches, minor grievances quickly escalated into major legal battles.

The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association is a quintessential legal drama of that era. A frustrated homeowner, believing he was silenced and his rights ignored during a virtual meeting, took his HOA to court. The judge’s decision, however, serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It distills four surprising and impactful lessons that every homeowner should understand as community governance becomes increasingly digital.

1. The Takeaway: You Can’t Claim You Were Silenced If You Forgot to Hit ‘Send’

The petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, leveled a serious charge: that the HOA had denied his right to speak by “blocking” him from using the online chat feature during the annual meeting. In his view, this was an intentional act of suppression.

The digital evidence, however, told a very different story. While Mr. Paparazzo had typed several messages, he had never actually transmitted them by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button. While he did email for assistance during the meeting without receiving a timely response, the court found the chat feature was fully functional, proven by the fact that at least 26 other members used it successfully. The judge’s ruling was a stark lesson in digital accountability:

Petitioner’s inability to effectively communicate with the Association during the annual meeting was the result of user error. … The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.

This establishes a critical precedent for our digital age. The analysis here goes beyond simple “user error.” It suggests that a baseline of digital literacy is becoming a prerequisite for effective civic participation. Courts may have little sympathy for claims of disenfranchisement that stem from a failure to master the basic tools of modern communication.

2. The Takeaway: An Emergency Can Justify Last-Minute Changes

Next, the petitioner challenged the HOA on procedural grounds—a classic move in community disputes. He argued that the association failed to provide proper notice for the virtual meeting. The HOA had correctly noticed its in-person meeting for April 2, 2020, back on February 20. But by late March, holding that meeting had become impossible.

The judge’s response to this claim is a masterclass in how legal “reasonableness” can override rigid bylaws during a crisis. The court noted the rapidly evolving timeline of the pandemic: Governor Ducey issued executive orders limiting business operations on March 19, prohibiting the closure of essential services on March 23, and issuing the “Stay Home” order on March 30. Faced with these superseding government mandates, the HOA moved the meeting online on March 25.

Crucially, the HOA’s communication efforts were extensive and documented. They didn’t just send a single email. The board notified its members by:

• Placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances to the community.

• Sending three separate email blasts to approximately 750 members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.

• Placing 2 additional signs at the entrance to the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.

The judge concluded that the HOA’s actions were a justifiable response to an unprecedented emergency. This wasn’t a board ignoring its rules; it was a board taking necessary steps to comply with government orders and protect its members, legally justifying the short-notice change in format.

3. The Takeaway: Just Showing Up Can Waive Your Right to Complain

This lesson hinges on a legal concept every homeowner must understand: waiver by attendance. Buried in the association’s bylaws was Section 2.3, which states: “A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objection to the lack of notice or defective notice of the meeting.”

This is not mere legalese; it’s a common and powerful clause designed to ensure the finality of meetings. It prevents a member from strategically attending a meeting, remaining silent about a potential procedural flaw, and then launching a lawsuit later if they don’t like the outcome. The judge noted that the petitioner attended the virtual meeting but did not object to the notice “prior to or during” the event. By participating without raising a formal objection at the time, he legally accepted the meeting’s procedures and waived his right to challenge them later.

4. The Takeaway: The Past Can Haunt the Present

The petitioner’s final major complaint appeared to be a slam dunk: the election for the Board of Directors was not “staggered” as explicitly required by Bylaws Section 3.1. Instead of a mix of one- and two-year terms to ensure continuity, all five open board positions were elected at once. On its face, this was a clear violation.

But the reason for this anomaly demonstrates the domino effect of governance. The judge found that in the previous year, 2019, the association had failed to achieve a quorum for its annual meeting. Because there was no quorum, no vote could occur, creating a “carryover of open seats.” This failure in 2019 created a governance debt that had to be paid in 2020. The only lawful way to do so was to elect members to all five vacant positions. This shows that an HOA is a continuous legal entity; one year’s procedural failure doesn’t just disappear—it creates unusual but legally necessary circumstances the next.

Conclusion: A Final Thought for the Digital Neighborhood

The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association offers a clear and compelling look at the collision between established community rules, the new realities of digital life, and the chaos of unforeseen global events. It shows that while bylaws and statutes provide a framework, their application can be shaped by emergencies, past events, and even a single user’s technical skills.

As our communities increasingly operate online, who bears the greater responsibility for ensuring effective communication—the organization hosting the meeting, or the individual attending it?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Samuel Paparazzo (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Samuel T Paparazzo

Respondent Side

  • Mark Stahl (HOA attorney)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Also spelled Mark Sahl in source
  • Timothy Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
  • Kevin Bishop (community manager)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Appeared as a witness for Respondent; Also referred to as 'Agent Bishop' and chaired part of the annual meeting
  • Bob Hicks (HOA Board President)
    Coronado Ranch Community Association
    Delegated chairing of the annual meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate