Michael Holland v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner’s Association

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-10-20
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petition, concluding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the portion of the meeting where recording was prohibited was not effectively 'closed' (as members were allowed to remain) and therefore remained 'open' and subject to members' right to record.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Holland Counsel
Respondent Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association Counsel John A. Buric

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petition, concluding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the portion of the meeting where recording was prohibited was not effectively 'closed' (as members were allowed to remain) and therefore remained 'open' and subject to members' right to record.

Key Issues & Findings

Improperly preventing members from recording an open board meeting

The HOA Board prohibited homeowners participating in an open meeting on September 28, 2022, from recording that meeting. The HOA argued the portion was closed due to receiving legal advice/contemplated litigation, but the ALJ found the portion was not effectively 'closed' because no members were required to leave, thus the HOA lacked authority to prevent recording.

Orders: HOA found in violation; ordered to reimburse Petitioner $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meeting Law, Recording Rights, Attorney-Client Privilege, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H039-REL Decision – 1040495.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1044744.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1059207.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1059214.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1087229.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1087233.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1095655.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1095796.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1101606.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1102499.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1104514.pdf

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23F-H039-REL Decision – 1104862.pdf

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This case, *Michael Holland v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association* (No. 23F-H039-REL), centered on a dispute over the Petitioner's right to record a homeowners association board meeting in accordance with Arizona law. The matter was heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), presided over by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kay Abramsohn.

Key Facts and Legal Issue

The core dispute arose from a Tonto Forest Estates (TFE) board meeting held on September 28, 2022, which was noticed as an open meeting.

Petitioner Michael Holland alleged that the HOA board violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A) by prohibiting homeowners from recording the meeting and forcing those recording to stop. A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) grants attendees the right to audiotape or videotape portions of board meetings that are open.

The Respondent, Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association (HOA), asserted that although the meeting was open, a portion was or should have been closed to recording because the association's attorney was present to provide legal advice regarding pending or contemplated litigation. The HOA argued that they merely requested members stop recording the attorney's presentation and did not use force or threats.

Hearing Proceedings and Key Arguments

The ALJ denied the HOA's initial Motion to Dismiss, determining the Petition raised a valid and justiciable legal issue regarding the alleged improper recording prohibition.

  1. Petitioner's Argument: Holland argued that the HOA violated the statute because the board failed to properly declare and execute a closed session. Since the HOA did not record the meeting itself, they had no statutory basis to preclude members from recording the open session. Furthermore, Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1804(C), arguing that the board did not identify the specific statutory exception authorizing closure prior to entering the alleged closed portion.
  2. Respondent's Argument: The HOA argued the issue was moot since a member successfully recorded the meeting anyway. Counsel argued that the mere presence of the attorney discussing a legal claim satisfied the exception allowing the portion to be closed to recording, and no special process or "magic language" was required to close a portion of a meeting "on the fly".

Legal Conclusion and Outcome

The ALJ found that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) only permits recording restrictions during a *closed* portion of a meeting.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the September 28, 2022 meeting cannot be considered to have been "closed". This conclusion was based on the fact that the HOA President, Kurt Meister, acknowledged that no members present, or anyone attending online, had to leave the meeting for the portion that included the attorney's advice.

Because no portion of the meeting was effectively closed, the HOA had no authority under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) to prevent members from recording the meeting.

The ALJ issued a decision concluding that the Petitioner had met the burden of proof, establishing that the HOA was in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Final Decision:

The Petition was granted, and Petitioner Michael Holland was deemed the prevailing party. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee. The decision noted that a written determination would be issued and sent to the Director's Office at Real Estate for finalization.

Questions

Question

Can I record an open HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners have the statutory right to audio or video tape open portions of board and member meetings.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, persons attending HOA meetings are permitted to audiotape or videotape any portion of the meeting that is open. The HOA cannot prohibit this for open sessions.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) allows a person to record 'those portions of the meetings of the board of directors and meetings of the members that are open.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • recording meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • open meetings

Question

Can the HOA board stop me from recording if an attorney is giving legal advice?

Short Answer

Not if the meeting remains open to members. To stop recording, the board must physically close the meeting (exclude members).

Detailed Answer

Even if the board intends to receive legal advice (a valid reason to close a meeting), they cannot simply ask members to stop recording while allowing them to remain in the room. If members are allowed to stay, the meeting is not 'closed,' and the right to record remains.

Alj Quote

Because no portion of the September 28, 2022 meeting was 'closed,' the HOA had no authority under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) to prevent the HOA members from recording the meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • recording meetings
  • legal advice
  • closed sessions

Question

What actually constitutes a 'closed' meeting or executive session?

Short Answer

A meeting is considered closed only if members are required to leave or are excluded from attending.

Detailed Answer

Merely stating that a portion of the meeting is for legal advice or asking members to stop recording is not enough to close a meeting. If members are present and not asked to leave, the meeting is effectively open.

Alj Quote

However, nothing in the record demonstrates that this specific portion of the meeting was effectively 'closed.' In fact, Mr. Meister confirmed that none of the members present, or anyone online, had to leave the meeting or had to leave the meeting for the portion that included the attorney’s advice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • closed sessions
  • definitions
  • procedural requirements

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes. This means showing the contention is more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In these proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has violated the planned community document(s’) provisions or statutes alleged to have been violated.

Legal Basis

Ariz. Admin. Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I recover my $500 filing fee if I win the hearing?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the judge has the authority to order the respondent (HOA) to reimburse the statutory filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • remedies
  • fees
  • penalties

Question

What authority does the Office of Administrative Hearings have in HOA disputes?

Short Answer

OAH can decide petitions, order compliance with statutes/documents, interpret contracts, and levy civil penalties.

Detailed Answer

The tribunal has broad authority to resolve disputes regarding violations of condominium documents or statutes, including interpreting contracts between the parties and imposing penalties for proven violations.

Alj Quote

OAH has the authority to consider and decide the contested petitions, the authority to order any party to abide by the statute, community documents and contract provisions at issue, the authority to interpret the contract between the parties, and the authority to levy a civil penalty on the basis of each proven violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • OAH authority
  • civil penalties

Case

Docket No
23F-H039-REL
Case Title
Michael Holland v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association
Decision Date
2023-10-20
Alj Name
Kay Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can I record an open HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners have the statutory right to audio or video tape open portions of board and member meetings.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, persons attending HOA meetings are permitted to audiotape or videotape any portion of the meeting that is open. The HOA cannot prohibit this for open sessions.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) allows a person to record 'those portions of the meetings of the board of directors and meetings of the members that are open.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • recording meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • open meetings

Question

Can the HOA board stop me from recording if an attorney is giving legal advice?

Short Answer

Not if the meeting remains open to members. To stop recording, the board must physically close the meeting (exclude members).

Detailed Answer

Even if the board intends to receive legal advice (a valid reason to close a meeting), they cannot simply ask members to stop recording while allowing them to remain in the room. If members are allowed to stay, the meeting is not 'closed,' and the right to record remains.

Alj Quote

Because no portion of the September 28, 2022 meeting was 'closed,' the HOA had no authority under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) to prevent the HOA members from recording the meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • recording meetings
  • legal advice
  • closed sessions

Question

What actually constitutes a 'closed' meeting or executive session?

Short Answer

A meeting is considered closed only if members are required to leave or are excluded from attending.

Detailed Answer

Merely stating that a portion of the meeting is for legal advice or asking members to stop recording is not enough to close a meeting. If members are present and not asked to leave, the meeting is effectively open.

Alj Quote

However, nothing in the record demonstrates that this specific portion of the meeting was effectively 'closed.' In fact, Mr. Meister confirmed that none of the members present, or anyone online, had to leave the meeting or had to leave the meeting for the portion that included the attorney’s advice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • closed sessions
  • definitions
  • procedural requirements

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes. This means showing the contention is more probably true than not.

Alj Quote

In these proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has violated the planned community document(s’) provisions or statutes alleged to have been violated.

Legal Basis

Ariz. Admin. Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • hearing procedures

Question

Can I recover my $500 filing fee if I win the hearing?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the judge has the authority to order the respondent (HOA) to reimburse the statutory filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • remedies
  • fees
  • penalties

Question

What authority does the Office of Administrative Hearings have in HOA disputes?

Short Answer

OAH can decide petitions, order compliance with statutes/documents, interpret contracts, and levy civil penalties.

Detailed Answer

The tribunal has broad authority to resolve disputes regarding violations of condominium documents or statutes, including interpreting contracts between the parties and imposing penalties for proven violations.

Alj Quote

OAH has the authority to consider and decide the contested petitions, the authority to order any party to abide by the statute, community documents and contract provisions at issue, the authority to interpret the contract between the parties, and the authority to levy a civil penalty on the basis of each proven violation.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et seq.

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • OAH authority
  • civil penalties

Case

Docket No
23F-H039-REL
Case Title
Michael Holland v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association
Decision Date
2023-10-20
Alj Name
Kay Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Holland (petitioner)
    Represented himself
  • Jill Burns (witness)
    Recorded the meeting at issue; former officer of the Board
  • Linda L. Holland (party affiliate)
    Co-owner of the property; Michael Holland's mother

Respondent Side

  • Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association (respondent)
  • John A. Buric (HOA attorney)
    Warner Angle Hallam Jackson & Formanek PLC
    Represented Respondent HOA
  • Kurt Meister (board member)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association
    President of the Board of Directors; Testified as witness for Respondent
  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law
    Attorney who provided legal advice at the September 28, 2022 meeting
  • Steve Dower (board member)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association
    Mentioned in testimony by Petitioner
  • Melissa Jordan (property manager)
    Ogden
    Monitored the phone line during the meeting
  • Carrie Chu (board member)
    Tonto Forest Estates Homeowner's Association
    Spoke during meeting minutes discussion

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for hearing and final decision
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge on earlier orders
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmissions
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmissions
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmissions
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmissions
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of official transmissions

Other Participants

  • Mary Gura (community member)
    Attendee of the virtual hearing
  • John Cron (community member)
    Attendee of the virtual hearing; identified in relation to litigation/claim discussed by attorney Goodman
  • Janet Cron (witness)
    Listed on Petitioner's witness list; John Cron's wife
  • Chris Chopat (community member)
    Attendee of the meeting; asked for statute citation regarding recording

Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sheila

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-27
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association Counsel John Halk, Esq.
Respondent Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust Counsel Mary T. Hone, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized 2nd story addition

Respondents constructed a second-story Addition to their property without first obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee, violating the community governing documents.

Orders: Respondents’ appeal is dismissed, and Foothills is deemed the prevailing party with regard to its Petition.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural review, cc&r violation, unapproved construction, second story addition, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:53:36 (135.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust (No. 21F-H2120004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core dispute involved the construction of a second-story addition by homeowners (Respondents) without the prior approval of the Homeowners Association (Petitioner), a direct violation of the community’s governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Foothills Club West HOA. The evidence demonstrated that the Respondents not only began construction without seeking approval but continued the project even after receiving a formal denial from the HOA’s Architectural Committee. A subsequent agreement between the parties, wherein the Respondents would demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines, was not honored by the Respondents. The ALJ dismissed the Respondents’ appeal and declared the HOA the prevailing party, validating its authority to enforce the community’s architectural standards as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust, Respondent.

Case Number: 21F-H2120004-REL

Jurisdiction: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date: October 5, 2020

Decision Date: November 27, 2020

Central Issue: The petition filed by Foothills HOA on July 24, 2020, alleged that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. This action was alleged to be in violation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.

II. Chronology of Key Events

The hearing record established the following undisputed sequence of events:

Oct. 2018

Respondents begin construction of the second-story addition.

Nov. 7, 2018

The City of Phoenix issues a stop-work order, noting a permit is required.

Nov. 7, 2018

Foothills HOA issues a violation notice to the Respondents.

Dec. 17, 2018

Respondents obtain a permit from the City of Phoenix.

Jan. 18, 2019 (approx.)

Respondents submit a request for approval to the Foothills Architectural Committee.

Jan. 18, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a penalty notice to the Respondents, with further notices issued monthly.

Feb. 22, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a formal denial of the application.

Mar. 15, 2019

The City of Phoenix gives final approval to the construction and issues a Certificate of Occupancy.

Post Feb. 2019

The parties reach an agreement for Respondents to demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines.

July 24, 2020

Foothills HOA files its petition, noting Respondents have not complied with the demolition agreement.

Oct. 5, 2020

The administrative hearing is held.

Nov. 27, 2020

The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner: Foothills Club West HOA

Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA argued that the Respondents violated CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 by commencing construction without first obtaining approval from the Architectural Committee.

Disregard for Denial: The HOA asserted that the Respondents completed the addition after receiving a formal denial of their application.

Breach of Agreement: The HOA noted that the parties had reached a settlement agreement for demolition, which the Respondents failed to honor. The HOA requested that the Tribunal enforce this agreement.

Jurisdictional Distinction: The HOA maintained that approval from the City of Phoenix was a separate matter and did not negate the requirement to obtain approval from the HOA as mandated by the governing documents.

B. Respondents: Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

Initial Ignorance: Respondents claimed they were initially unaware of the HOA approval requirements.

Attempted Compliance: They argued that once notified, they followed the association’s guidance, met with the Board, and sought approval.

Vague Denial: Respondents stated they did not understand the meaning of the denial reason, “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community,” or how the addition specifically violated community rules.

Lack of Due Process: They argued they did not receive a letter indicating an appeal process was available and therefore felt they had not received a final “denial.”

Demolition Delay: While not disputing the existence of the demolition agreement, Respondents cited COVID-19 issues and safety concerns for their at-risk family as reasons for requesting more time.

Final Appeal: At the hearing, Respondents reversed their position on the agreement and requested to be allowed to keep the addition.

IV. Analysis of Governing Documents

The decision centered on specific provisions within the Foothills Club West governing documents, which constitute the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 (Architectural Approval): This section was central to the case. It states in pertinent part:

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4 (Obligation to Obtain Approval): This provision explicitly sets forth a homeowner’s obligation to secure approval from the Architectural Committee.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 (Exterior Appearance): This section clarifies that while the HOA cannot limit interior remodeling, it retains jurisdiction over any changes that are “visible from outside such [home] … or affects the exterior appearance of such [home].”

Amended Architectural Guidelines (2013): These guidelines reinforce the CC&Rs, specifying that a homeowner’s plans must be submitted for approval through the Architectural Committee on a case-by-case basis.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions of law provided a clear framework for the final order.

A. Burden of Proof

The ALJ established that in this proceeding, the petitioner (Foothills HOA) bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondents had violated the governing documents. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

B. Core Conclusion on Violations

The ALJ found that the HOA had successfully met its burden of proof. The central conclusion of law states:

“The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Foothills has demonstrated Respondents’ violation of the community governing documents, as stated in CC&R Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, because Respondents began to construct a modification, the Addition, to their existing home prior to obtaining approval from Foothills Architectural Committee and, further, Respondents continued to construct the Addition despite receiving a denial of approval from Foothills Architectural Committee.”

This finding affirmed that the Respondents committed two distinct violations: starting work without approval and continuing work after being explicitly denied approval.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ issued a decisive order.

Order:

Binding Nature: The decision notes that the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is requested. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 21F-H2120004-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What was the single issue raised in the petition filed by Foothills Club West Homeowners Association?

3. According to the Petition, which specific articles and sections of the governing documents did the Respondents allegedly violate?

4. What action did the City of Phoenix take on November 7, 2018, regarding the Respondents’ construction project?

5. What reasons did the Foothills Architectural Committee provide for denying the Respondents’ application on February 22, 2019?

6. Prior to the hearing, what agreement did the parties reach in an attempt to resolve the dispute?

7. What was the Respondents’ primary argument for their actions and for their failure to comply with the association’s denial?

8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

9. Explain the difference between the City of Phoenix’s approval and the Foothills Architectural Committee’s approval, as argued by the Petitioner.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association (“Foothills”). The Respondent is the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust. Their relationship is that of a homeowners’ association and a member homeowner residing within the planned community for 22 years.

2. The single issue raised was that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. The construction was completed even after the Foothills Architectural Committee had issued a denial of the project.

3. Foothills alleged that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. These articles pertain to the rights and obligations of the association and the architectural standards requiring prior approval for modifications.

4. On November 7, 2018, the City of Phoenix issued a stop-work order for the Respondents’ construction project. The order noted that the work being performed required a permit, which had not yet been obtained.

5. The Foothills Architectural Committee denied the application because it needed copies of the City permit, the plans were incomplete, and there was no documentation on the roof line or roofing materials. Furthermore, the denial stated that the project “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community.”

6. The parties came to an agreement wherein the Respondents would complete the demolition of the second-story addition. In exchange, Foothills agreed to waive the penalties that had been imposed on the Respondents for the violation.

7. The Respondents argued that they initially did not know what was required and that they cooperated with the association’s Board once notified. They claimed they did not understand what “Fails aesthetics” meant, did not receive a letter about an appeal process, and therefore did not feel they had received a final “denial.”

8. The legal standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Foothills, bore the burden of proving the Respondents’ violation by this standard.

9. Foothills argued that approval from the City of Phoenix and approval from the association’s Architectural Committee were two different and separate matters. Even though the Respondents eventually received a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy, this did not override the CC&R requirement to first obtain approval from Foothills.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Respondents’ appeal be dismissed. The Judge deemed Foothills the prevailing party with regard to its petition, finding that Foothills had demonstrated the Respondents’ violation of the community’s governing documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing evidence and support directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner (Foothills) and the Respondents at the hearing. Discuss the key evidence and claims each party used to support their position and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s case more persuasive.

2. Explain the distinct roles and jurisdictions of the Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee and the City of Phoenix regarding the Respondents’ construction project. Why was obtaining a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy insufficient for the Respondents to proceed without violating the community’s governing documents?

3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 21F-H2120004-REL, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Discuss key filings, motions, and deadlines mentioned in the document, including the Respondents’ attempt to consolidate another case.

4. Discuss the significance of the “contract” between the parties, as defined in footnote 15. How do the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines function as this contract, and which specific sections were central to the judge’s conclusion that a violation occurred?

5. Evaluate the Respondents’ attempt to justify their failure to demolish the addition as per their agreement with Foothills, citing COVID-19 issues. How did their request at the hearing to keep the addition conflict with their prior agreement, and what does this reveal about their position in the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions.

Architectural Committee

A committee appointed by the Foothills HOA, as established by CC&R Article 9, with the authority to review, approve, or disapprove plans for construction, modifications, and additions to properties within the community.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that form a binding contract between the homeowners association and the property owners, outlining their rights and obligations.

Disclosure

The formal process by which parties in a legal case provide evidence, exhibits, and information to each other before a hearing. The deadline for disclosure in this case was September 29, 2020.

Governing Documents

The set of rules for the planned community, including the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines, which have the same force and effect as association rules.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to initiate a hearing concerning violations of community governing documents. In this case, it was a “single-issue petition.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust.

Tribunal

The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, the state agency authorized by statute to hear and decide contested matters referred to it, such as this dispute.

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21F-H2120004-REL

1 source

This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association and the Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust. The Petitioner, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, filed a petition alleging that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized second-story addition to their property in violation of the association’s governing documents, specifically the CC&Rs Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Respondents violated these community documents by beginning construction prior to obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee and continuing the work despite receiving a denial. The judge ultimately concluded that Foothills was the prevailing party and dismissed the Respondents’ appeal, effectively upholding the violation finding.

1 source

What are the specific governing document violations alleged and proven against the homeowners?
How did the legal and administrative process address the unauthorized construction dispute?
What was the final resolution ordered regarding the unapproved second-story home addition?

Based on 1 source

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Halk (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Represented Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association
  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Counsel for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Mary T. Hone (Respondent attorney)
    Mary T. Hone, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Trustees Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar
  • Subrahmanyam Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
  • Sheila Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • AHansen (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • djones (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • DGardner (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • ncano (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:53 (188.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.

MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date

June 19, 2020

Decision Date

July 28, 2020

The Cross-Petitions

The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.

Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”

MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.

Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.

Core Allegations:

1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.

2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.

Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

Analysis of the Disputed Amendment

The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.

Key Provisions of the Amendment

Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).

Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”

Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.

Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”

Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.

MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment

In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:

• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.

• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.

• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”

Background and History of the Dispute

Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.

Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.

Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.

Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.

Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:

December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.

April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues

The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.

Stipulated Fact #11

The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:

“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”

Conflicting Legal Standards

Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”

Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”

Parties’ Core Arguments

MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.

MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.

Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)

Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.

Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.

Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.

Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)

Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.

Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.

Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.

Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.

Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.

Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”

Final Order

1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.

3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):

◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.

◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.

4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.

Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?

2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?

3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?

4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?

5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?

6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.

7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?

8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?

Answer Key

1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.

3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.

4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.

5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.

8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.

10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.

2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.

4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.

5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.

Amendment

The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.

A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”

Declaration

The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.

Hangar Tracts

Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.

Magnus L.D. MacLeod

The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.

Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.

Petition #19

The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.

Petition #34

The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Residential Lots

Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.

Tract G

An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.

Unit 4B

The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.

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20F-H2019019-REL

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This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.

1 source

What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey M. Proper (attorney)
    JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC
    Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Craig Albright (board member)
    MAP Board of Directors
    Then President of the MAP Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Magnus L.D. MacLeod (party)
    Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
  • Pat MacLeod (HOA president)
    HOA
    Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017

Colonia Del Rey Homeowners Association v. Gregory Czekaj

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-07-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner failed to prove HOA violated records, voting, or notice statutes. HOA failed to prove Petitioner violated Bylaws by misrepresenting himself as an officer.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory L. Czekaj Counsel Gary Wolf
Respondent Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaws Sections 6.1, 7.1, 9.2

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove HOA violated records, voting, or notice statutes. HOA failed to prove Petitioner violated Bylaws by misrepresenting himself as an officer.

Why this result: Petitioner's interpretations of statutes regarding notice and voting were incorrect, and HOA complied with records requests. HOA lacked evidence for its claim against Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to provide requested organizational, business, corporate, and financial records.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Invalid fee increase due to proxy vote

Petitioner alleged a $5 fee increase was invalid because a proxy vote was used in violation of statutes and rules.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide ten-day meeting notice

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to give ten-day notice for a meeting to vote on Bylaws amendments.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Petitioner exceeded rights as member

HOA alleged Petitioner misrepresented himself as an officer to obtain insurance and tax information.

Orders: The HOA did not prevail. HOA bears its filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

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Decision Documents

19F-H1919054-REL Decision – 720897.pdf

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Administrative Law Judge Decision: Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.

Executive Summary

On July 8, 2019, the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings issued a decision regarding a multi-faceted dispute between Gregory L. Czekaj (Petitioner) and Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. (Respondent). The proceedings consolidated four separate complaints: three filed by the Petitioner regarding records access, voting validity, and meeting notices, and one filed by the HOA alleging the Petitioner misrepresented himself as an officer to third-party entities.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the HOA. The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in three of the four complaints. The ALJ concluded that the HOA had fulfilled its statutory obligations regarding records disclosure and meeting notices and that a contested $5.00 assessment increase was legally valid. Regarding the fourth complaint, neither party prevailed, as the evidence was insufficient to prove the Petitioner had intentionally misrepresented himself, though the ALJ noted the Petitioner was "mistaken" in his belief that individual members possess board-level administrative authority.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Statutory Obligations vs. Member Demands for Records

A central theme of the dispute was the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs the inspection of association records. The Petitioner argued that the HOA "withheld" documents, while the HOA maintained that the Petitioner's requests were overly broad and burdensome.

  • Burdensome Requests: The ALJ determined that the Petitioner’s request to review "any and all" documents since 1984 was inherently burdensome for a small, volunteer-run HOA with no central office.
  • Response Standards: The ruling clarified that associations are permitted to ask members to narrow their requests. Once a member provides clarification and acknowledges receipt (e.g., saying "thank you"), the HOA is justified in considering the request fulfilled until a new, specific request is made.
  • Electronic Disclosure: The HOA’s provision of electronic documents at no cost was found to be an appropriate response to records requests, fulfilling the statutory requirement for reasonable availability.
2. Validity of Governance and Voting Procedures

The Petitioner challenged a $5.00 monthly assessment increase (from $75 to $80) based on the initial use of an illegal proxy vote.

  • Correction of Errors: Although a proxy vote was initially and incorrectly counted, the HOA subsequently corrected the tally.
  • Defining "Votes Cast": The ALJ found that under the HOA’s CC&Rs, the requirement for a 2/3 majority applies to the "votes cast" by those present, not 2/3 of the total membership. With 6 members present, a vote of 5 YES and 1 NO (83.3%) exceeded the required 2/3 threshold (4 votes), rendering the increase valid regardless of the discarded proxy.
  • Record Retention: The destruction of original ballots after one year was found to be in compliance with the HOA’s one-year record retention policy and A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7).
3. Standards for Meeting Notices

The dispute highlighted a common member misconception regarding notice periods. The Petitioner argued that a meeting was invalid because he did not receive the notice 10 days in advance.

  • Mailing vs. Receipt: The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) requires the HOA to "cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent" at least 10 days prior to a meeting. The law does not mandate that the member receive the notice within that timeframe.
  • Validity: The ruling confirmed that a member's failure to receive actual notice does not invalidate the actions taken at a meeting, provided the HOA can demonstrate the notice was sent (e.g., through testimony or mailing records).
4. Limits of Member Authority

The final theme involved the boundaries between individual member rights and Board administrative authority. The Petitioner attempted to contact the HOA’s insurance agent and the IRS to obtain sensitive information, such as the HOA’s Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN).

  • Administrative Rights: The ALJ concluded that HOA Bylaws vest management and administrative authority exclusively in the Board of Directors.
  • The "Right to Enforce": The Petitioner argued that CC&R provisions allowing owners to "enforce" restrictions gave him the right to contact vendors and the IRS. The ALJ rejected this, stating that the right to enforce allows a member to petition the Board or seek legal remedy, but does not bestow board-level administrative powers upon individual homeowners.

Analysis of Complaints and Outcomes

Complaint Number Subject Matter Primary Allegation Prevailing Party
One Records Access HOA withheld requested financial and corporate records. HOA
Two Assessment Vote A $5.00 fee increase was invalid due to the use of a proxy vote. HOA
Three Meeting Notice HOA failed to provide 10-day notice for a Bylaw amendment meeting. HOA
Four Misrepresentation Petitioner allegedly posed as an HOA officer to the IRS and insurance agent. Neither

Important Quotes with Context

On Burdensome Record Requests

"The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the request, as stated, was burdensome and needed to be clarified given that the HOA has been in existence since 1984, has no office, and various persons have been officers over the past years." (Finding 62)

Context: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner's claim that the HOA was "withholding" information, noting that the HOA acted reasonably by asking the Petitioner to narrow his broad request for all documents since the association's inception.

On the Definition of Statutory Notice

"The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Petitioner’s argument fails that the notice packages had to be 'received' more than ten days prior to the meeting; such a position is a misreading of the statutory requirement." (Finding 68)

Context: This quote addresses Complaint Three, establishing that the legal standard for notice is the act of mailing or sending, not the confirmed receipt by the homeowner.

On Member Privileges vs. Board Authority

"Petitioner is mistaken if he believes that he, as a member, may undertake to dictate or manage actions of the Board. The HOA Bylaws do not vest any of the Board’s authority in the members." (Finding 71)

Context: The ALJ used this statement to clarify that while members have the right to review records and vote, they do not have the right to perform administrative tasks, such as contacting the IRS or HOA vendors on behalf of the association.


Actionable Insights

For Homeowners Association Boards
  • Formalize Record Requests: Require members to clarify broad requests. Document all responses and utilize electronic delivery to satisfy statutory requirements for "reasonable availability" at minimal cost.
  • Correct Procedural Errors Promptly: As seen in the assessment vote, an initial procedural error (like an improper proxy) does not necessarily invalidate an action if the corrected tally still meets the required legal threshold.
  • Maintain Proof of Mailing: Ensure the Secretary maintains records of when meeting notices are sent. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), proving the date of mailing is the standard for legal compliance, not proof of delivery.
For Homeowners
  • Distinguish Between "Review" and "Manage": Members have a statutory right to review records, but this does not grant them the authority to act as an agent of the HOA or manage its business affairs (e.g., contacting the IRS).
  • Understand Voting Thresholds: Carefully review CC&Rs to determine if a required majority applies to the entire membership or only the votes cast by those present at a meeting where a quorum is met.
  • Verify Statutory Timelines: Be aware that "notice" is legally defined by the date the HOA initiates delivery, not the date the mail is received. Failing to receive mail does not legally excuse a member from the outcomes of a meeting.

Study Guide: Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA Administrative Case

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Gregory L. Czekaj (Petitioner/Homeowner) and Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. (Respondent/HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings on June 14, 2019. It examines the legal requirements for homeowners' associations regarding records access, voting procedures, meeting notices, and the limitations of member authority.


I. Case Overview

  • Case Numbers: 19F-H1918040-REL and 19F-H1919054-REL.
  • Parties: Gregory L. Czekaj, a homeowner since March 2017, and Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc., a nine-home association established in 1984.
  • Central Issues: Alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) regarding records requests, voting irregularities, and meeting notice timelines, as well as an HOA allegation regarding a member's unauthorized use of authority.

II. Key Legal Concepts and Statutory Interpretations

1. Access to HOA Records (A.R.S. § 33-1805)
  • Availability: All financial and other records must be made reasonably available for examination.
  • Timeline: The HOA has ten (10) business days to fulfill a written request.
  • Costs: Statutes do not require an HOA to provide copies at no cost. The HOA may charge up to 15 cents per page for copies, which must be reimbursed upon delivery.
  • Scope: Requests must be specific. Requests to review "all documents" may be considered burdensome, especially for older associations without formal offices.
2. Meeting Notices (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B))
  • Timing: Notice must be provided not fewer than ten (10) days in advance of a meeting.
  • Legal Requirement: The statute requires the HOA to "cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by [U.S.] mail."
  • Receipt vs. Sending: The legal obligation is satisfied when the notice is sent. The validity of actions taken at a meeting is not affected if a member fails to receive the actual notice, provided the HOA followed the sending procedures.
3. Voting and Proxies (A.R.S. § 33-1812)
  • Proxies: Arizona state law and specific HOA resolutions (e.g., Resolution 20140315-01) may prohibit the use of proxy votes.
  • Absentee Ballots: These are acceptable and may be cast via email if permitted by the association.
  • Quorum and Thresholds:
  • A quorum is often met by the presence of members entitled to cast 50% of the votes.
  • Assessments exceeding 10% of the previous year's amount may require a two-thirds (2/3) vote of those voting (not 2/3 of the entire membership).
4. Member vs. Board Authority
  • Member Privileges: Under HOA Bylaws (Section 3.1), privileges are limited to voting, holding office, and enjoying common areas.
  • Management Rights: Business affairs are managed by the Board of Directors (Section 6.1). Members do not possess administrative rights, authority, or responsibility to manage vendors, contractors, or government agencies (like the IRS) on behalf of the HOA.
  • Enforcement Rights: While CC&Rs may allow an owner to "enforce" restrictions (Article XIV, Section 1), this typically means the right to petition the Board to act, rather than the right to assume Board duties.

III. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. How many business days does an HOA have to fulfill a written records request under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)?
  2. Does a member’s failure to receive a meeting notice invalidate the actions taken at that meeting? Explain why or why not.
  3. According to the ALJ decision, what is the maximum fee an HOA can charge per page for copies of records?
  4. In the context of the $5 assessment increase, how was the two-thirds (2/3) majority calculated?
  5. Why was the proxy vote cast for Ed Freeman eventually disregarded in the final tabulation of the May 2017 vote?
  6. Under the Colonia Del Rey Bylaws, who is responsible for the management of the HOA's business affairs?
  7. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding his right to contact the IRS and the HOA’s insurance agent?
  8. What constitutes a "preponderance of the evidence" in an administrative hearing?

IV. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Tension Between Transparency and Burdensome Requests: Analyze the ALJ's conclusion regarding Complaint One. How should an HOA balance its statutory duty to provide records with the practical limitations of being a small, volunteer-run organization without a physical office?
  2. Statutory Interpretation of "Notice": Discuss the legal distinction between "causing notice to be sent" and the member's "actual receipt" of notice. Why is this distinction vital for the administrative functioning of a homeowners' association?
  3. The Limits of Homeowner Enforcement Rights: Petitioner argued that CC&R Article XIV gave him the right to enforce rules, which he interpreted as authority to contact vendors and the IRS. Critique this interpretation based on the ALJ’s findings regarding the separation of member privileges and Board authority.
  4. Validity of HOA Actions: Evaluate the May 6, 2017, assessment vote. Even though the HOA initially provided incorrect information on the ballot (stating 6 votes were needed) and allowed an invalid proxy, the ALJ upheld the vote. Explain the legal reasoning that allowed the vote to stand.

V. Glossary of Important Terms

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): The Arizona statute governing the requirements and timelines for notifying members of HOA meetings.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805: The Arizona statute mandating that HOA financial and other records be made reasonably available to members.
  • Absentee Ballot: A ballot cast by a member who is not physically present at a meeting; in this case, permitted via email.
  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge who presides over hearings and makes decisions in cases involving government agency rules or specialized statutes (e.g., the Department of Real Estate).
  • Bylaws: The rules governing the internal management of the HOA, including the duties of the Board and the rights of members.
  • CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The legal documents that lay out the guidelines for the community and the rights/obligations of the homeowners.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: The legal standard of proof in this case, meaning that a claim is "more probably true than not."
  • Proxy Vote: A vote cast by one person on behalf of another. In this case, the ALJ confirmed that such votes were prohibited by state law and HOA resolution.
  • Quorum: The minimum number of members who must be present (in person or by absentee ballot) at a meeting to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
  • Ramada: A common area structure in the Colonia Del Rey HOA used for records review and meetings.
  • TIN (Taxpayer Identification Number): A unique number used by the IRS to identify a business entity or organization like an HOA.

Lessons from the Courtroom: A Homeowner’s Legal Challenge to HOA Governance

1. Introduction: Small Association, Big Legal Stakes

The legal landscape of homeowner associations (HOAs) often involves sprawling master-planned communities with hundreds of residents. However, the case of Gregory L. Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918040-REL) serves as a potent reminder that legal stakes remain high regardless of community size.

Colonia Del Rey is a micro-community in Tucson, Arizona, consisting of just nine homes on a private road. It has no central office and no pool, and its Board is comprised entirely of elected volunteers. Yet, this tiny association found itself before the Office of Administrative Hearings defending its governance against four separate complaints from a single homeowner. As a legal analyst, I find this case particularly instructive because the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision provides a definitive roadmap for record requests, voting thresholds, and the strict boundaries of homeowner authority versus Board management.

2. Record Requests: "Burdensome" vs. "Legal Right"

In Complaint One, the Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide requested records. The conflict began when the Petitioner issued a sweeping request to review "any and all" association documents. The HOA President initially pushed back, labeling the request "burdensome" and asking for specificity—a move the Tribunal later interpreted as a reasonable administrative response for a small, volunteer-run entity.

The following table analyzes the friction between the Petitioner’s allegations and the HOA’s documented compliance:

Petitioner’s Allegations HOA’s Documented Responses & Legal Context
Withholding Organizational Docs: Claimed the HOA failed to provide current Articles of Incorporation, forcing him to pay $54 to the state for them. Fulfilled Electronically: The HOA provided the Articles, Bylaws, and CC&Rs via email on May 14. The Tribunal ruled the request was satisfied once the member replied "thank you."
Incomplete Financial Review: Alleged tax returns and insurance policies were missing during a November 23 records review. Coordinated Access: The HOA facilitated a two-hour review session. Remaining records (tax returns/invoices) were emailed on Nov 30 after being finalized by the CPA.
Access to Physical Copies: Challenged the logistics of obtaining hard copies of the records reviewed. Governance Rule: Per A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), HOAs may charge up to 15 cents per page for copies and have 10 business days to produce them after a specific request is made.

Analyst’s Note: The ALJ concluded the HOA complied with the law because they provided records within 10 business days of the Petitioner clarifying his broad request. For boards, the takeaway is clear: broad requests can be legally treated as burdensome, but once specified, the statutory clock starts.

3. The $5 Assessment Increase: Navigating Voting Math

Complaint Two challenged a 2017 vote that raised monthly assessments from $75 to $80. The Petitioner argued the vote was invalid because a proxy was cast for a tenant (Ed Freeman), which violated both A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) and the HOA’s own policies.

While the proxy vote was indeed improper and eventually discarded, the Tribunal’s analysis of the "Math of Governance" is where the most critical professional insight lies. Many associations struggle to distinguish between a "majority of all members" and a "majority of votes cast."

  • The Voting Requirement: Under Article IV, Section 5(b) and (f) of the CC&Rs, the increase required approval by 2/3 of the votes cast—not 2/3 of the total membership.
  • The Final Valid Tally: After discarding the invalid proxy and accounting for eligible members present, the count was 5 "YES" and 1 "NO."
  • The Calculation: 5 (Yes) / 6 (Total) = 83.3% Approval.

Governance Tip: Because the 83.3% approval rate comfortably exceeded the 66.6% (2/3) threshold, the Judge ruled the assessment increase valid. Associations must meticulously check their CC&Rs to see if thresholds apply to "total membership" or "votes cast," as this distinction often saves a vote from failure due to low turnout.

4. The Notice Requirement: "Sent" vs. "Received"

In Complaint Three, the Petitioner sought to invalidate Bylaw amendments, claiming he received the meeting notice only nine days before the vote—one day short of the 10-day requirement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(B).

The Tribunal’s interpretation reinforces a vital legal standard: The law requires the HOA to "cause notice" (hand-deliver or mail) at least 10 days in advance; it does not require the HOA to guarantee the date of receipt by the member.

The HOA Secretary proved that notice packages were mailed on November 5 for the November 18 meeting (13 days prior). Furthermore, the Board utilized a "multi-channel" approach by emailing the notice on November 4. The Judge clarified that a member's failure to receive actual notice does not invalidate the meeting's actions, provided the HOA initiated the mailing within the statutory window.

5. The Limits of Membership: You are an Owner, Not an Officer

The most contentious conflict (Complaint Four) involved the Petitioner contacting the HOA’s insurance agent and the IRS to obtain the association’s Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). The HOA filed a police report, citing fiduciary responsibility after the IRS suggested the inquiry could indicate potential identity theft.

The Judge used this as a teaching moment regarding the hierarchy of authority:

  • Privileges vs. Administrative Rights: A member’s privileges (voting, holding office, using common areas) do not grant "administrative rights."
  • The Enforcement Misconception: The Petitioner cited Article XIV, Section 1 of the CC&Rs, which gives owners the right to "enforce" restrictions. The Judge ruled this only allows an owner to petition the Board to take action—it does not authorize a homeowner to manage vendors, contact insurance agents, or engage with the IRS on the association’s behalf.

Analyst’s Note: The Judge noted the Petitioner was "propelled by certain motives" (personal disagreement with Board policy) rather than statutory violations. Neither party prevailed on this complaint because there was no "preponderance of evidence" of intentional misrepresentation, but the legal warning was clear: ownership does not equal agency.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways for HOA Members and Boards

The Final Order deemed the HOA the prevailing party on three out of four complaints. Under A.R.S. § 32-2199, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof—he had to prove his claims were "more probably true than not." His failure to do so highlights the importance of evidence over grievance.

Critical Takeaways for HOA Governance:

  1. Clarity in Record Requests: Overly broad "any and all" requests are often deemed burdensome. Boards should provide access but can insist on specificity to manage limited volunteer resources.
  2. Statutory Compliance over Perception: For meeting notices, the legal benchmark is the date the notice is sent. Associations should document mailing dates (and utilize email as a backup) to provide a "belt and suspenders" defense against notice claims.
  3. Respect the Governance Hierarchy: While owners have a right to review records, they have no authority to manage the association’s administrative affairs. A board’s fiduciary duty includes protecting sensitive data like the TIN from unauthorized member inquiries.

In the end, this case demonstrates that even in a community of nine homes, a deep understanding of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the specific language of the CC&Rs is the only way to navigate—and successfully resolve—the complexities of HOA governance.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory L. Czekaj (petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf; also Respondent in consolidated counter-claim
  • Gary Wolf (petitioner's attorney)
    Contacted HOA attorney regarding records request

Respondent Side

  • Marybeth Andree (HOA President)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Represented the HOA; testified at hearing
  • Carolyn Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Responded to Petitioner's attorney regarding records
  • Sarah Hitch (proxy holder)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Member who cast a proxy vote for Ed Freeman
  • Phil Oliver (board member)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Provided email clarification regarding the vote; wrote letter regarding irregularities
  • Susan Sotelo (HOA secretary)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Mailed the ballots for the meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing
  • Mr. Tick (witness)
    State Farm (implied)
    HOA insurance agent; testified regarding Petitioner's request for policy
  • Ed Freeman (tenant)
    Tenant living in Oregon; subject of proxy vote dispute
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:17 (139.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

Specific Violations Alleged:

Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

Evidence Presented at Hearing:

Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

Core Arguments:

Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

Actions Taken by MCIII:

Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?

3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?

4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.

5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?

6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?

7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?

9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.

2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.

3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.

4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.

5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.

6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.

7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.

9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.

2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.

4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?

5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.

Common Elements

Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.

Community Manager

An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.

Inoperable Vehicle

A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.

A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.

He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.

Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking

For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.

This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.

The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.

1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work

The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.

The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.

The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:

MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.

2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon

John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:

• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.

• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.

• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.

The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.

3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures

In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.

The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.

This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.

4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis

Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.

Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.

The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:

Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.

The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.

5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient

Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:

• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.

• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.

The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.

For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.

Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One

The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John W. Gray (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan PC
    Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
  • Andrea Lacombe (community manager)
    Curtiss Management
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically