Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:33 (132.3 KB)

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case hearing concerning the dispute between Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch (Petitioners) and Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioners filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about January 11, 2021, alleging the Respondent violated community Bylaws, specifically Article 4 Section 1.

The central issue was whether the HOA improperly maintained an unfilled seat on its Board of Directors. Petitioners asserted that the HOA violated the Bylaws by leaving a Board seat vacant for a period of time and attempted to prevent Petitioner Marinda Minch from joining the Board.

Respondent's defense focused on the interpretation of Article IV of the Bylaws. The Board's number is set at seven directors. A director resigned in August 2020, leaving six members. The subsequent annual meeting in October 2020 filled two regularly expiring seats via election, in which Petitioners were candidates but were not elected.

The August 2020 vacancy was subject to Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, which states that in the event of resignation, the successor "shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board" to serve the unexpired term.

Hearing Proceedings and Arguments

Petitioners' Argument: Petitioner Marinda Minch testified that the Board delayed filling the vacancy (until November 2020) because of personal dislike for her, and she had petitioned the Board three times for appointment.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent’s President, Bradley Hudson, testified that the Board decided the newly elected Board should fill the vacancy. At the November 11, 2020, virtual meeting, a motion to appoint Ms. Minch failed (2-4 vote), and the Board subsequently appointed another individual (4-2 vote), thereby filling all seven seats. Crucially, the Respondent argued, and the ALJ noted, that the Bylaws do not contain a timeframe within which a vacancy due to resignation must be filled.

Legal Points and Outcome

Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Article IV Sections 1, 2, and 3 must be read collectively. The process used by the Board to fill the August vacancy—selection by the remaining Board members—complied with Article IV, Section 3. Because the Bylaws did not mandate an immediate appointment timeframe, the Respondent was found to have acted within the scope of the community documents.

Final Decision: The Petitioners failed to sustain their burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), v. Montelena Master

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) Counsel
Respondent Montelena Master Community Association Counsel Troy Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-442, A.R.S. § 33-1806

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA

Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:31:43 (95.8 KB)

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)

This is a concise summary of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of *Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association*.

Concise Summary of Administrative Hearing

Key Facts and Parties

The hearing took place on January 27, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. Petitioner, Aaron Ricks, filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about October 27, 2020, alleging violations of community documents and statute. The dispute centered on alleged "unlawful fees ($5,000 in total)" that Petitioner claimed he was forced to pay to sell his home. The specific fee at issue was a $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser each time a parcel was sold.

Main Issues and Legal Basis

The core issue for the hearing was whether the Respondent, Montelena Master Community Association, violated A.R.S. § 33-1806, A.R.S. § 33-442, and the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) Article 6.9.2/6.9.2.9, specifically regarding the imposition of the transfer fee.

The legal focus was A.R.S. § 33-442, which generally prohibits transfer fees but provides exceptions. The key exception cited was A.R.S. § 33-442(C)(3), which allows fees if they are used exclusively for a purpose authorized in the document, touch and concern the land, and are not passed through to a specific third party or declarant (unless authorized to manage property or part of an approved development plan).

Key Arguments

  1. Respondent’s Position (Motion for Summary Judgment): Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing the Petition should be dismissed because the CC&Rs (Sections 7.15 and 6.6) authorized the fee, which touched and concerned the land. A 2010 Board Resolution specified the Transfer Fee was "to be used exclusively to fund the Master Association’s operating expenses and/or the Master Association’s reserves". Counsel argued this usage was sufficient to meet A.R.S. § 33-442(C) requirements. Respondent also asserted that the CC&R sections cited by the Petitioner (6.9.2 and 6.9.2.9) addressed a "Contribution to Reserves," not the specific Transfer Fee being contested.
  2. Petitioner’s Position: Petitioner acknowledged the statutory exception but argued that the transfer fee must be used for a very specific limited purpose (e.g., a swimming pool or landscaping project), rather than a general purpose like operating expenses or reserves, for the fee to be compliant with A.R.S. § 33-442. Petitioner also asserted that specific CC&R sections precluded the fee. (Petitioner offered no argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1806).

Legal Points and Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Petitioner failed to establish a violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442. Crucially, Petitioner offered no legal authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required the transfer fee to be designated for a more specific purpose than the association’s operating expenses and/or reserves identified in the governing documents.

The final decision was that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. This decision was done on February 16, 2021.

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Aaron Ricks (petitioner)
    Somerstone Properties, LLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (HOA attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 892670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:29 (47.7 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:33 (132.2 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:47 (132.2 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

Parties:

Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.

📔

20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Susan L Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020046-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-23
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L. Alandar Counsel
Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804
CC&R’s Article V Section C; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
CC&R’s Article III Section A; CC&R’s Article IV Section C.23; Bylaws Article IV.E.8; Ventana Lakes Rule 8.4.A
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.

Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.

Key Issues & Findings

Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.

Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.

Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
  • Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A

Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.

Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
  • Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
  • Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
  • Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
  • Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
  • Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:42 (157.4 KB)

20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:55 (157.4 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.

The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:

Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.

Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.

Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.

Case Overview

On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020046-REL

Petitioner

Susan L. Alandar

Respondent

Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

June 11, 2020

Decision Date

July 23, 2020

Final Disposition

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings

Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session

Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.

Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.

Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club

Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.

Factual Background:

◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.

◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.

◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.

◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.

Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda

Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.

Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.

Key Referenced Authority

The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:

Document

Provision

Relevance to the Case

Arizona Revised Statutes

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”

Article III, Section A

Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.

Article IV, Section C

Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.

Article V, Section C

Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.

Bylaws

Article IV.E.8

Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.

Ventana Lakes Rules

Rule 8.3.B

Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?

2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?

3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?

4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?

6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?

8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?

9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.

2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.

3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.

4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.

5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.

6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.

7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.

8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.

10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?

3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.

4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.

5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.

Common Areas

Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.

Executive Session

A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.

Select all sources
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20F-H2020046-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.

1 source

What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L. Alandar (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Represented Ventana Lakes Property Owners' Association.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge who signed the decision.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted to.

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (Staff/Clerk)
    Transmitted the decision to the attorney for the Respondent.

Douglas J Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-05-21
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Douglas J. Karolak Counsel
Respondent VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association Counsel David Fitzgibbons

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1); CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding the validity of Amended CC&Rs due to lack of required owner approval.

The Petitioner alleged that the Amended CC&Rs recorded by the Board were invalid because they were not approved by two-thirds (2/3) of the lot owners as required by the CC&Rs and statute. The ALJ agreed, finding the Board acted improperly and violated the documents and statute.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00. No civil penalty was assessed. The ALJ determined she lacked the statutory authority to order the rescission of the Amended CC&Rs requested by the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Amendment, Board Authority, Filing Fee Refund, Partial Win
Additional Citations:

  • 20F-H2020041-REL
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020041-REL Decision – 792824.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:47:41 (102.9 KB)

20F-H2020041-REL Decision – 792824.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:22 (102.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL). The central issue was whether the HOA Board had the authority to unilaterally amend and record changes to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) without the required homeowner vote.

The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, successfully argued that the HOA violated its own governing documents and Arizona state law by filing “Amended CC&Rs” on October 5, 2018, without securing the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners. The HOA contended its actions were a valid exercise of its authority to create “Association Rules.”

ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner. The decision established a clear legal distinction between the Board’s power to adopt rules and the separate, more stringent process required to formally amend the CC&Rs. The judge found the Board acted improperly, declaring Karolak the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee. Notably, while the judge found the amended document was improperly recorded, she concluded she lacked the statutory authority to order its rescission, which was the remedy the petitioner had requested.

Case Overview

Case Name

Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020041-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

May 1, 2020

Decision Date

May 21, 2020

The Central Dispute

The core of the dispute revolved around the legitimacy of a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs), which the HOA Board recorded with the Pinal County Recorder on October 5, 2018.

Petitioner’s Position (Douglas J. Karolak): The Amended CC&Rs are invalid because they were not approved by “owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots,” a requirement explicitly stated in Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs and supported by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1). Karolak argued that the Board’s action of recording an amendment is fundamentally different from its power to adopt internal “Association Rules.”

Respondent’s Position (VVE – Casa Grande HOA): The Board argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the authority granted to it under the CC&Rs. It claimed that because the only changes were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), they fell under the Board’s power to “adopt, amend, or repeal such rules and regulations as it deems reasonable and appropriate” (Section 3.4) and to “modify or waive the foregoing restrictions… by reasonable rules and regulations” (Section 7.43). The Respondent’s counsel did, however, concede that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

Factual Background and Chronology

• The VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association is a 56-lot community in Casa Grande, Arizona, with 19 lots remaining vacant at the time of the hearing.

April 30, 1999: The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” (CC&Rs) was recorded.

2014 and 2015: The HOA Board made unsuccessful attempts to amend the CC&Rs through membership votes.

2018: Following the failed votes, the Board determined it would make changes to the “rules section” of the CC&Rs under the authority it believed was granted by Section 3.4.

October 5, 2018: The Board recorded the Amended CC&Rs with the Pinal County Recorder. The HOA acknowledged that these amendments had not been approved by the required two-thirds of lot owners.

Legal Analysis and Key Provisions

The decision rested on the interpretation of specific sections of the community’s CC&Rs and Arizona state law. The judge concluded that the document’s structure clearly separates the process of rulemaking from the process of formal amendment.

Provision

Source

Summary of Stipulation

Amendment Process

CC&Rs Section 10.4

Requires an instrument “executed by the Owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots” and recorded to become effective.

Rulemaking Authority

CC&Rs Section 3.4

Empowers the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” governing the use of the property. States rules have the “same force and effect as if they were set forth in” the CC&Rs.

Statutory Requirement

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Provides that a declaration may be amended by the association via an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

The judge’s rationale emphasized that the distinct sections for rulemaking (3.4) and amendments (10.4) demonstrate that the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the power to unilaterally amend the CC&Rs. The judge stated, “The fact that the two topics are covered as separate topics in the CC&Rs leads to the conclusion that the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

The Court’s Decision and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, had successfully proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent HOA had acted improperly.

Key Findings:

• The HOA Board did not have the authority to amend the CC&Rs without the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners.

• The Board’s action of recording the Amended CC&Rs on October 5, 2018, was a violation of the community’s governing documents (Section 10.4) and Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)).

• The Board’s ability to create “Association Rules” is a separate and distinct process from the formal procedure required to amend the Declaration.

Final Order:

• The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, was deemed the prevailing party.

• The respondent HOA was ordered to pay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days of the order.

No civil penalty was found to be appropriate in the matter.

• Critically, the judge determined that under the applicable statute (A.R.S. § 32-2199.02), the Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded, despite this being the remedy requested by the petitioner.

The order is binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.

Study Guide: Karolak v. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL).

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was the petitioner’s core allegation?

2. What specific statute and section of the community documents did the petitioner claim the respondent violated?

3. According to Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs, what was the required procedure for amending the Declaration?

4. Under what authority did the VVE – Casa Grande HOA Board claim it could make changes to the community documents without a membership vote?

5. What key event occurred on or about October 5, 2018, that became the central point of the dispute?

6. What was the respondent’s primary argument for why their actions were valid?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party bears the burden of proof to establish a violation?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” was a separate process from amending the CC&Rs?

9. What remedy did the petitioner request, and why was it not granted by the Administrative Law Judge?

10. What was the final order issued by the Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Douglas J. Karolak, a homeowner. The respondent was the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association. Karolak’s core allegation was that the HOA had improperly amended the community’s governing documents.

2. The petitioner alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1817(A)(1). He also claimed a violation of Part 10, Section 10.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. Section 10.4 of the CC&Rs stipulated that the Declaration could be amended by an instrument executed by the owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the lots. The amendment would not be effective until that instrument was officially recorded.

4. The HOA Board claimed it had the authority to make the changes under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs. This section empowered the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” as it deemed reasonable and appropriate.

5. On or about October 5, 2018, the Board recorded a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs) with the Pinal County Recorder. This was done without the required two-thirds vote from the lot owners.

6. The respondent argued that because the only changes made were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), which fell under the type of rules the Board was authorized to adopt, the Amended CC&Rs were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. Their counsel did acknowledge, however, that perhaps the document should not have been recorded.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the respondent committed the alleged violations by this standard.

8. The Judge concluded they were separate processes because the CC&Rs cover the topics in different sections. This separation led the Judge to believe the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the authority to amend the CC&Rs on its own.

9. The petitioner requested that the improperly recorded Amended CC&Rs be rescinded. This remedy was not granted because the applicable statute, A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, does not give the Administrative Law Judge the specific authority to order a document rescinded.

10. The final order deemed the petitioner the prevailing party. It further ordered the respondent to repay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days, but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, using only the information presented in the legal decision.

1. Analyze the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” under Section 3.4 and the process for amending the Declaration under Section 10.4. Why was this distinction critical to the case’s outcome?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. How did the petitioner successfully meet this burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violation, and what specific facts supported this conclusion?

3. Examine the respondent’s (HOA’s) argument regarding its authority to amend the CC&Rs. What were the fundamental flaws in this argument, and how did their counsel’s acknowledgment about the recording of the Amended CC&Rs potentially weaken their position?

4. Explain the legal framework governing this dispute, citing the specific Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) mentioned in the decision. Detail the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge in resolving this type of HOA conflict.

5. Evaluate the final Order of the Administrative Law Judge. While the petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, why was their requested remedy (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) denied? What does this reveal about the specific limits of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in such cases under A.R.S. § 32-2199.02?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Office of Administrative Hearings made the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited by the petitioner. It states that a declaration may be amended by the association with an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

Amended CC&Rs

The document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates,” which the HOA Board recorded on October 5, 2018, without the required two-thirds owner approval.

Association Rules

Rules and regulations that the HOA Board is empowered to adopt, amend, or repeal under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs to govern the use of Common Areas and other parts of the Project. The Board argued their changes fell under this authority.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for a planned community. The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” was recorded on April 30, 1999.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the petitioner filed his Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, an association of 56 lot owners in Casa Grande, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The office responsible for conducting hearings for disputes filed with state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowner Douglas J. Karolak.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association.

Your HOA Just Changed the Rules? Why This Homeowner’s $500 Victory is a Warning to Everyone

For millions of Americans, living in a planned community means living under the authority of a Homeowners Association (HOA). While intended to protect property values, these relationships can often feel one-sided, with boards issuing mandates and homeowners feeling powerless to push back. It’s a common frustration, but it’s rare to see a single homeowner challenge their board and force a legal reckoning.

A recent case from Arizona, Douglas J. Karolak versus the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, provides a critical case study in board overreach and the surprising limits of legal victory. Karolak alleged his HOA board violated its own governing documents and state law by improperly changing the community’s core rules.

He took his case to an administrative law judge and, in a significant ruling, he won. But the outcome of this seemingly straightforward dispute was far from simple. The final decision reveals a shocking twist that holds critical lessons for every homeowner about the difference between being right on paper and getting the remedy you actually want.

There’s a Huge Difference Between a ‘Rule Change’ and a ‘Declaration Amendment’

The first lesson from this case is a critical one for every homeowner: understand the constitutional hierarchy of your community’s documents. The core of the dispute was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its foundational document, the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions), without getting the required approval from the homeowners.

Here are the key facts of the case:

The Original Rule: The community’s CC&Rs explicitly stated in Section 10.4 that any amendment required a vote and execution by “at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots.” This is the highest level of authority in a planned community, akin to a constitution.

The Failed Attempts: The Board had tried to get this two-thirds vote in both 2014 and 2015, but was unsuccessful.

The Workaround: In 2018, the Board decided to bypass the homeowners. It used a separate power granted in Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs—the authority to create day-to-day “Association Rules”—to make what it called changes to the “‘rules section’ of the CC&Rs, specifically targeting the Use Restrictions in Part 7.”

The judge’s conclusion was crystal clear: The CC&Rs were drafted to treat the power to create “rules” and the power to “amend” the declaration as two entirely separate processes. This separation acts as a crucial check on the board’s power, preventing a small group from unilaterally changing the fundamental property rights of all owners. As the judge noted, “the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

Recording a Document Doesn’t Magically Make It Valid

To make their changes appear official, the HOA Board took a significant step. On October 5, 2018, they filed a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates (Amended CC&Rs)” with the Pinal County Recorder.

For the average homeowner, a formally recorded document filed with the county looks final, official, and legally binding. It’s an intimidating piece of paper that suggests any challenge would be futile.

However, the judge’s ruling highlights a critical legal truth: procedural legitimacy is paramount. An official-looking document, even one filed with the county, is invalid if the legal process required to create it was ignored. The judge found that because the Board did not follow the correct internal procedure—securing the two-thirds vote from homeowners—the very act of recording the document was improper. Even the HOA’s own lawyer seemed to concede this point during the hearing, acknowledging that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

The Winner’s Paradox: You Can Be Right and Still Not Get Your Desired Fix

The final order from the Administrative Law Judge was unambiguous: Douglas Karolak, the petitioner, was officially deemed the “prevailing party.” The judge concluded that the HOA had acted in violation of its own community documents and Arizona state law. This was a clear-cut victory for the homeowner.

But here is the shocking twist. Karolak’s requested remedy was for the illegally filed “Amended CC&Rs” to be rescinded—in other words, to have them officially nullified and removed. This seems like the logical and necessary fix to the problem.

The judge, however, was bound by the limits of her authority. The final decision states plainly: “The Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority under the applicable statute to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded.” This highlights a critical jurisdictional gap. The Administrative Law Judge’s role in this venue is to determine if a violation occurred and assign limited penalties, not to perform the function of a higher court, which might have the power to void a recorded document.

So, what was the actual remedy for this clear violation? The judge ordered the HOA to repay Karolak his $500 filing fee. No other civil penalty was issued. The homeowner won the argument but did not get the one thing he asked for to correct the board’s improper action.

A Victory on Paper, A Question in Practice

The case of Douglas J. Karolak is a powerful real-world lesson. It proves that a single homeowner, armed with a thorough understanding of their community’s governing documents, can successfully challenge an overreaching HOA board and win. It confirms that procedural shortcuts, even when filed and recorded, do not make an illegal action legal.

But it also reveals the frustrating limitations that can exist within the legal process. The homeowner was proven right, but the improperly filed document remains on the books, unable to be rescinded in this specific venue. It raises a crucial question for homeowners everywhere: How do you ensure your victory has real teeth?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Douglas J. Karolak (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • David A. Fitzgibbons III (HOA attorney)
    Fitzgibbons Law Offices PLC
    Represented VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • CV Mathai (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • John Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kristi Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • William Findley (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kay Niemi (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Mark Korte (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Felicia Del Sol (property manager rep)
    Norris Management

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:35 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

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20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

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20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.

The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:32 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
    Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
    Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
    Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Clerk)
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal

Michelle Ruffo vs. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michelle Ruffo Counsel
Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1248, 33-1803(A), 33-1803(B), 33-1805; CC&Rs §§ 1.36, 1.38, 4.7, 2.8.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the governing documents or relevant statutes in assessing fines for unauthorized parking.

Why this result: Petitioner continually violated CC&R § 4.7 and failed to prove Respondent violated any CC&R or statute, particularly as A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply to disputes concerning the use of limited common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of CC&Rs and Statutes by imposing parking fines

Petitioner challenged the HOA's decision to assess continuous fines against her account totaling $2,544.00 for repeatedly parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit 52, arguing the fines and enforcement lacked proper statutory process and violated CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof and that the statute cited (A.R.S. § 33-1242) concerning property condition notices did not apply to this dispute regarding limited common elements (parking spaces).

Orders: Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: parking violation, fines, HOA enforcement, limited common elements, due process, Arizona Department of Real Estate
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
  • CC&R § 4.7
  • CC&R § 2.8.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:35 (270.9 KB)

18F-H1818044-REL Decision – 663567.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:18 (270.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, involving Petitioner Michelle Ruffo and Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association. The core of the dispute centers on a series of fines levied by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for repeatedly parking in condominium parking spaces not assigned to her unit.

The Petitioner argued that she had informal written permission from other residents to use their spaces, that the Association’s notices of violation were procedurally flawed, that she was the victim of retaliatory harassment, and that her own assigned space was frequently occupied by others. The Respondent maintained that its actions were in strict accordance with the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which unambiguously require owners to use only their assigned parking spaces and outline a formal process for reallocating them, a process the Petitioner did not follow.

The ALJ ultimately denied the petition, finding that Ms. Ruffo failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision concluded that the Association acted within its rights, that its enforcement actions were consistent with its governing documents, and that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements represented the very “evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” As of the hearing date, the outstanding balance of fines, interest, and fees on the Petitioner’s account totaled $2,544.00.

Case Background

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation / Key Details

Petitioner

Michelle Ruffo

Owner of unit 52, assigned parking space #131. Appeared on her own behalf.

Respondent

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Assoc.

The condominium unit owners’ association. Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq. of Brown Olcott, PLLC.

Adjudicator

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Witnesses

Carol Lundberg

Testified for the Petitioner.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky & Gabino Trejo

Former and current property managers, respectively, who testified for the Respondent.

Core Dispute

The central issue is the Association’s imposition of fines against Ms. Ruffo for violating the community’s parking regulations. On or about April 17, 2018, Ms. Ruffo filed a petition alleging the Association violated its CC&Rs and several Arizona statutes by fining her for parking in spaces #38 and #40, which were not assigned to her unit #52. The Association denied any violation, asserting it was enforcing valid community rules.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict escalated over a period of approximately two years, marked by a series of notices, fines, and failed attempts at resolution.

August 2, 2016: The Association sends a “Friendly Reminder” to Ms. Ruffo to cease parking in space #40 and use her assigned space, #131.

August 5, 2016: A “Notice of Violation” is sent for the same issue, serving as a second warning.

March 14, 2017: A “Final Non-Compliance Notice” is issued, noting violations in both space #40 and #38. The notice informs Ms. Ruffo of her right to a hearing with the Board of Directors if requested within 14 days.

March 30, 2017: The first fine of $50.00 is assessed after Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle is again observed in space #38.

April 17, 2017: Ms. Ruffo responds in writing, claiming she has permission to use the spaces and requests the fine be waived.

April 27, 2017: The Association’s Board reviews and denies the waiver request. Ms. Ruffo was invited to address the Board but did not attend.

June 6, 2017: A $200.00 fine is assessed for two observed violations in space #40.

June 26, 2017: Another $200.00 fine is assessed for violations in spaces #40 and #38.

July 11, 2017: The Association warns that access to community amenities (pool, fitness room) will be denied if fines remain unpaid. This action is later taken.

August 31, 2017: A Board meeting is scheduled for Ms. Ruffo and her attorney, Mark F. Williman, to attend. Neither party attends, and they fail to provide advance notice. The Association incurs a $200 legal fee for its attorney’s attendance.

September 25, 2017: Fines totaling $1,400.00 are assessed for multiple observed violations.

September 27, 2017: The Association attempts to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. The attempt is aborted after she refuses to exit the vehicle and calls the Pima County Sheriff’s Office.

October 4, 2017: The Association’s attorney informs Ms. Ruffo that another hearing will not be scheduled until she reimburses the Association for the $200 legal fee from the missed August 31 meeting.

October 2017 – January 2018: A series of additional fines are assessed for ongoing violations, and Ms. Ruffo sends multiple letters requesting a hearing and protesting the fines and the $200 reimbursement requirement.

April 17, 2018: Ms. Ruffo files the formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 18, 2018: The evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Michelle Ruffo)

Ms. Ruffo’s defense was multi-faceted, based on claims of permission, procedural errors by the Association, and alleged harassment.

Claim of Permission: Ms. Ruffo testified that since 2005, she had been parking in spaces #38 and #40 with written permission. She claimed a 2006 agreement with the Morleys, then owners of unit #56, for space #40. She also submitted a 2018 email from Julie Ruiz, a tenant in unit #53, granting permission to use space #38.

Allegations of Improper Notices: She argued the Association’s notices violated A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) because they did not always identify the person who observed the violation or provide photographic evidence.

Allegations of Harassment and Retaliation: Through an attorney, Ms. Ruffo alleged she was being “unlawfully discriminated against and harassed in retaliation for her role related to allegations that HOA President Mitch Treese misappropriated HOA funds.” The ALJ noted that no evidence was submitted at the hearing to support this claim.

Counter-Evidence: Ms. Ruffo submitted photographs dated from October 2016 to July 2017 showing other vehicles, including those of Associa maintenance and a landscaping contractor, parked in her assigned space #131.

Dispute over Hearing Preconditions: She argued that the Association’s demand for a $200 reimbursement for its attorney’s fees as a condition for a new hearing was unlawful and not permitted under the CC&Rs.

Respondent’s Position (The Association)

The Association’s case rested on the explicit language of its governing documents and its adherence to established enforcement procedures.

Primacy of the CC&Rs: The Association argued that its governing documents are unambiguous. Section 4.7 explicitly forbids owners from parking in any space other than the one assigned to their unit as a Limited Common Element.

Formal Reallocation Process: Per Section 2.8.3, reallocating a Limited Common Element like a parking space requires a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved and submitted to the Board for approval. Ms. Ruffo never followed this procedure.

Rejection of Informal Agreements: The property manager testified that such private agreements are not legally binding or enforceable by the Association and create confusion, as evidenced by complaints from subsequent owners and tenants who were unable to use their assigned spaces.

Adherence to Enforcement Policy: The Association followed its documented Violation Enforcement Policy, starting with a friendly reminder and escalating to formal notices and fines for continued non-compliance.

Opportunity to Be Heard: Ms. Ruffo was provided opportunities to address the Board on April 27, 2017, and August 31, 2017. She failed to attend either meeting, and her failure to provide notice for the latter caused the Association to incur unnecessary legal fees.

Witness Testimony: The former property manager, Ms. Chapman, testified that she had personally witnessed all the charged violations.

Governing Documents and Statutes

The case hinged on the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs and relevant Arizona state law.

Key CC&R Provisions

Section

Provision

Relevance

Motor Vehicles: “no Owner, Lessee or Occupant may park any . . . motor vehicle . . . in any Parking Spaces other than the Parking Space assigned to the Unit as a Limited Common Element.”

The central rule that the Petitioner was found to have repeatedly violated.

§ 2.8.3

Reallocation of Limited Common Elements: A reallocation requires a formal, recorded amendment executed by the owners and submitted to the Board.

The official procedure for changing parking space assignments, which the Petitioner did not follow for her informal agreements.

§ 13.1

Enforcement: Grants the Association the right to impose monetary penalties, suspend an owner’s right to use facilities, and tow vehicles in violation of the rules, after notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Provides the legal authority within the governing documents for the Association’s actions (fines, suspension of amenity access, attempted tow).

§ 1.36

“Parking Space” Definition: Defines a parking space as a portion of the Limited Common Elements.

Legally classifies the disputed parking spaces, making them subject to the rules governing Limited Common Elements.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 33-1242(C), which requires an association, upon written request from an owner, to provide details of an alleged violation, including the observer’s name and the date. The ALJ determined this statute was inapplicable to the dispute. The judge’s reasoning was that the statute applies specifically to notices regarding the “condition of the property owned by the unit owner” (i.e., her physical condo unit #52), not her use of Limited Common Elements like parking spaces, which she does not own.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision was a conclusive denial of the petition, siding entirely with the Association.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Michelle Ruffo’s petition against Respondent Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association is denied because Petitioner has not established that Respondent violated the CC&Rs or any statute in assessing fines against her for her repeated violations of CC&R § 4.7 by parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit #52.”

Key Legal Conclusions

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so.

Unambiguous Covenants: The CC&Rs regarding parking are unambiguous and must be enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. CC&R § 4.7 clearly requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

Invalidity of Informal Agreements: The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s reliance on informal agreements illustrated “the evils that the CC&Rs were designed to prevent.” These undocumented side deals create instability and conflict when properties are sold or new tenants arrive, undermining the security and order of the community’s parking plan.

Respondent’s Proper Conduct: The Association was found to have followed its own enforcement policy and provided the Petitioner with opportunities to be heard.

Attorney’s Fee Condition: While the CC&Rs do not explicitly authorize charging an owner for attorney’s fees as a precondition for a hearing, the ALJ noted that A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(18) allows an association to “exercise any . . . powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation.” Furthermore, civil statutes often require a party to pay for fees they cause an opponent to incur unnecessarily.

Futility of a Board Hearing: The ALJ concluded that, in light of the Petitioner’s arguments and her “continued violation of Respondent’s parking policy over nearly two years,” a hearing before the Association’s Board would not have changed her behavior or the outcome of the matter.

Financial Implications

The conflict resulted in significant financial penalties for the Petitioner. The fines were assessed on an escalating basis for continued violations.

March 30, 2017: $50.00

June 6, 2017: $200.00

June 26, 2017: $200.00

August 9, 2017: $200.00

September 25, 2017: $1,400.00

October 17, 2017: $100.00

November 6, 2017: $100.00

As of the hearing on September 18, 2018, the total outstanding balance on Ms. Ruffo’s account, including interest and certified letter fees, was $2,544.00.

Study Guide: Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

This guide is designed to review and assess understanding of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818044-REL, Michelle Ruffo v. Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the primary parties in this case, and what is the central dispute between them?

2. What was the Petitioner’s main justification for parking in spaces that were not assigned to her unit?

3. According to the Association’s CC&Rs, what is the formal procedure required to reallocate a Limited Common Element, such as a parking space?

4. Describe the key enforcement actions the Condo Association took against the Petitioner in response to the ongoing parking violations.

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge determine that Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1242(B) and (C) did not apply in this case?

6. Summarize the incident involving the tow truck on September 27, 2017.

7. What reason did the Association’s attorney provide for requiring the Petitioner to pay a $200 fee before another hearing would be scheduled?

8. What evidence did the Petitioner submit to demonstrate that her own assigned parking space, #131, was frequently occupied by others?

9. Identify the two property managers who provided telephonic testimony on behalf of the Respondent.

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for this decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michelle Ruffo, the Petitioner and owner of unit 52, and Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association, the Respondent. The central dispute is over fines imposed by the Association against Ms. Ruffo for her repeated violations of parking rules by parking in spaces not assigned to her unit.

2. The Petitioner justified her actions by claiming she had long-standing written permission from other unit owners or tenants to use their spaces. Specifically, she cited a 2006 agreement with the owners of unit #56 to use space #40 and more recent permission from a tenant in unit #53 to use space #38.

3. According to Section 2.8.3 of the CC&Rs, reallocating a Limited Common Element requires an amendment to the Declaration. This amendment must be executed by the owners involved, state how the element is being reallocated, and be submitted to the Board of Directors for approval before it can be recorded.

4. The Association’s enforcement actions escalated over time, beginning with a “Friendly Reminder” and moving to a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” Subsequently, the Association assessed escalating monetary fines, suspended the Petitioner’s access to amenities like the pool and fitness room, and attempted to have her vehicle towed.

5. The judge ruled the statute did not apply because it specifically pertains to written notices about the condition of the property owned by the unit owner. The dispute in this case was not about the condition of Ms. Ruffo’s unit (#52) but about her use of Limited Common Elements (parking spaces) that were not assigned to her.

6. On September 27, 2017, the Association attempted to tow the Petitioner’s vehicle from a space not assigned to her. The Petitioner was inside her vehicle and refused to leave, calling the Pima County Sheriff’s Office. The responding officer instructed the tow truck driver to remove the equipment and try again at another time.

7. The Association required the $200 fee to reimburse it for the attorney’s fees it incurred for a Board meeting scheduled on August 31, 2017. The Petitioner and her attorney at the time, Mr. Williman, failed to attend this meeting and did not provide notice of their absence until a few minutes before it was scheduled to begin.

8. The Petitioner submitted a series of dated photographs showing various other vehicles parked in her assigned space, #131. These vehicles included maintenance trucks bearing the Associa logo, a landscaping contractor’s truck and trailer, and several other private cars.

9. The two property managers who testified for the Respondent were Gabino Trejo, the current manager, and Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (referred to as Ms. Chapman), the former manager.

10. The final ruling was a denial of Michelle Ruffo’s petition. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent violated any CC&Rs or statutes, concluding that the Association was justified in assessing fines for her repeated and clear violations of CC&R § 4.7, which requires owners to park in their assigned spaces.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer in a standard essay format.

1. Analyze the arguments and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the specific CC&R sections, witness testimonies, and exhibits each side used to support their claims, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s position more convincing.

2. The concept of “Limited Common Elements” is central to this case. Using the definitions provided in the CC&Rs (Sections 1.31, 1.36, and 2.8.1(e)), explain the legal significance of this designation in the dispute over parking spaces. How did the specific rules for reallocating these elements (CC&R § 2.8.3) undermine the Petitioner’s primary defense?

3. Trace the timeline of communication and escalating enforcement actions taken by the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association against Michelle Ruffo, beginning with the “Friendly Reminder” in August 2016. Evaluate whether the Association followed its own Violation Enforcement Policy and the powers granted to it in the CC&Rs throughout this process.

4. Discuss the role of legal representation and the various attorneys involved in this case (Nathan Tennyson, Mark F. Williman, Eric J. Thomae, Jonathan Olcott). How did their actions, communications, and, in one instance, inaction, impact the proceedings and the relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent?

5. The Petitioner argued that her right to due process was violated because the violation notices she received did not contain photographs or identify the person who observed the violation. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for rejecting this argument, specifically referencing the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 and the distinction made between a violation concerning the “condition of the property owned” versus the use of common elements.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky presided over the hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Several statutes, including those under Title 33 (Property) and Title 32 (Professions and Occupations), were cited in the case.

Associa Property Management Services

The property management company employed by the Respondent to manage the condominium complex. Both Ms. Chapman and Mr. Trejo were employees of Associa.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The CC&Rs define the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members.

Gabino Trejo

The current property manager for the Respondent at the time of the hearing.

Limited Common Elements

As defined in CC&R § 1.31, a portion of the Common Elements allocated for the exclusive use of one or more, but fewer than all, of the Units. Parking spaces are explicitly defined as Limited Common Elements.

Mark F. Williman, Esq.

An attorney and friend of the Petitioner who agreed to help her resolve issues with the Board. He failed to attend a scheduled Board meeting on her behalf on August 31, 2017.

Michelle Ruffo

The Petitioner in the case, owner of condominium unit 52, and member of the Respondent association.

Parking Space

As defined in CC&R § 1.36, a portion of the Limited Common Elements intended for parking a single motor vehicle and allocated to a specific Unit Owner for their exclusive use.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, Michelle Ruffo.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development where the Petitioner resides.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Reflections in the Catalinas Condo Association.

Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (Ms. Chapman)

The former property manager for the Respondent (from 2012 to early 2018) who handled most of the interactions and sent most of the violation notices to the Petitioner.

Violation Enforcement Policy

The Respondent’s official policy that outlines the procedure for addressing violations, including sending a “Friendly Reminder” and a “Notice of Violation,” and provides for a hearing if requested within 14 days.

How a Parking Spot Deal Led to a Tow Truck Standoff and a $2,544 HOA Bill: 4 Lessons

Introduction: The Handshake Deal That Cost a Fortune

It’s a common scenario in community living: you make a friendly, informal agreement with a neighbor. Maybe you agree to switch parking spots for convenience or let them use your guest pass. These simple handshake deals seem harmless, but what happens when they collide with the ironclad rules of a homeowners’ association (HOA)?

The real-life case of Michelle Ruffo and her condo association serves as a stark cautionary tale. A long-standing, informal parking arrangement escalated into a bitter dispute that culminated in a tow truck standoff, loss of amenities, and a final bill for $2,544 in fines and fees. This case reveals several surprising and critical lessons for anyone living in a community governed by an association.

1. Your Neighbor’s Permission Can Be Legally Worthless

The core of the dispute was Ms. Ruffo’s belief that she had the right to park in spaces other than her own. Since 2006, she had an agreement with another owner to use space #40. Later, she began parking in space #38, believing she had permission from that unit’s tenant. From her perspective, she had done her due diligence. This is the core conflict in community living: the perceived authority of a neighbor’s handshake versus the legal authority of the governing documents.

The association, however, operated under its official Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Those documents told a different story.

Section 4.7 explicitly required owners to park only in their assigned spaces.

Section 2.8.3 detailed the only valid procedure for changing parking allocations. Because parking spaces are “Limited Common Elements,” any reallocation required a formal, written amendment executed by the unit owners involved, submitted to the Board for approval, and then officially recorded.

Crucially, the property manager testified that the owner of the unit assigned to space #38 had explicitly denied giving Ms. Ruffo permission and reported that his tenants were complaining. Because Ms. Ruffo never followed the formal procedure, her informal agreements were not recognized or enforceable. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlighted the critical importance of these rules:

Because Petitioner never submitted any written agreement with another owner regarding reallocation of parking spaces to Respondent’s Board for its tacit approval, as CC&R § 2.8.3 requires, subsequent tenants and owners have no notice of Petitioner’s alleged agreements with their predecessors regarding parking spaces. If everyone adopted Petitioner’s sense of entitlement as to parking spaces at the Reflections, no one would be able to park their car with any security or plan.

2. Ignoring Official Notices Leads to More Than Just Fines

This conflict didn’t begin with a massive fine. The property management company, Associa, followed a documented escalation process that provided Ms. Ruffo with multiple opportunities to comply. For any homeowner, this documented paper trail should have been a five-alarm fire, signaling a problem that required immediate and formal resolution.

The warnings began on August 2, 2016, with a “Friendly Reminder,” followed by a “Notice of Violation” and a “Final Non-Compliance Notice.” The first fine of just $50 wasn’t assessed until March 30, 2017. But as the violations continued, so did the consequences. After a July 11, 2017 letter, the association shut off Ms. Ruffo’s “electric-key access to the pool and fitness center for the community,” a tangible loss of amenities.

The financial penalties then began to skyrocket. Fines of $200 were assessed in June and August. Then, on September 25, 2017, the association dropped the hammer: a single letter assessing $1,400 for 14 separate observed violations. Just two days later, on September 27, the dispute reached its climax. The association attempted to tow Ms. Ruffo’s vehicle. She was inside the car and refused to leave, prompting her to call the Sheriff’s Office to intervene. The situation had moved from letters and fines to a physical standoff in the parking lot.

3. Skipping a Hearing Can Get You a Bill for the HOA’s Lawyer

After retaining an attorney, Ms. Ruffo was scheduled to have her case heard by the Board on August 31, 2017. The association, anticipating a formal legal discussion, also had its own attorney present. In any formal dispute, failing to appear at your own requested hearing is a critical error. In this case, it not only cost Ruffo credibility but also came with an immediate invoice.

Minutes before the meeting, while the Board and its lawyer were waiting, Ruffo’s attorney sent a message that neither he nor his client would be attending. This last-minute cancellation had a direct financial consequence. The association’s attorney charged it $200 for the time spent on the aborted meeting. The Board then refused to schedule another hearing until Ms. Ruffo reimbursed the association for that $200 fee. This failure to engage was immediately followed by the association’s most severe actions: the $1,400 fine and the attempt to tow her vehicle.

4. “But They Do It Too!” Is Not a Winning Legal Defense

A common response to a violation notice is to point out that others are breaking the rules as well. Ms. Ruffo attempted this strategy, presenting photographic evidence that her own assigned space, #131, was frequently occupied by other vehicles, including maintenance vans bearing the property management company’s logo.

While the property manager testified that she had addressed the issue with the maintenance crew, the Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive. The ruling contained a crucial insight: The lesson isn’t just that this defense failed, but why it failed. The Judge noted that Ms. Ruffo “did not present any evidence… that she made any effort to report others parking in her assigned space when there was something that the property manager or Respondent could have done about it.” By failing to formally and properly report her own issue, she undermined her claim that the association was negligent, making it impossible to excuse her own persistent violations.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print Before You Shake On It

This case serves as a powerful reminder of a fundamental truth of community living: in an HOA, the official, written governing documents are the ultimate authority. Informal “handshake deals,” no matter how reasonable they seem, can lead to serious consequences when they conflict with the rules. This dispute didn’t just involve letters; it led to escalating fines, the loss of amenities, a physical standoff with a tow truck, and ultimately a legal judgment.

This entire conflict, which cost thousands of dollars and countless hours, started with a parking spot—when was the last time you read your community’s rules?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michelle Ruffo (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf.
  • Carol Lundberg (witness)
    Resides in Unit 45; presented testimony by Petitioner.
  • Julie Ruiz (witness)
    Unit 53 Tenant
    Provided email confirming she gave Petitioner permission to park in Unit 53's space.
  • Mark F. Williman (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner; failed to attend the August 31, 2017 Board meeting.
  • Eric J. Thomae (attorney)
    Retained by Petitioner sometime after October 24, 2017.

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Chapman Lubinsky (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Former manager; referred to as Ms. Chapman in the decision.
  • Gabino Trejo (property manager)
    Associa Property Management Services
    Current manager.
  • John Pohlig (unit owner)
    Owner of unit assigned space #38; communicated he had not given Petitioner permission to park there.
  • Jonathan Olcott (HOA attorney)
  • Mitch Treese (HOA president)
    Alleged by Petitioner's attorney to have misappropriated HOA funds.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically.

Peter Biondi, Jr. vs. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818048-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Peter Biondi, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1242, 33-1243, Respondent’s Bylaw Article II, Section 3 and Article III, Sections 2 and 3, and Respondent’s CC&Rs Section 8.13

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA's remaining Director acted permissibly and reasonably upon legal advice in refusing to defend a previous legal action, as the initial Board decision to remove fellow directors was contrary to mandatory statutory procedures outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1243, which requires removal by unit owners, not by the board.

Why this result: The Board's previous action of removing directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243 because director removal must be performed by a member vote. Because the HOA lacked a legal defense to the directors' challenge, the current petition failed to prove a violation when the sole remaining Director chose not to incur unnecessary fees contesting an unwinnable case, which was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the sole remaining Director to defend a prior petition challenging the board's removal of two directors.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated governing documents and statutes when the remaining Director chose not to contest a prior Department petition filed by two removed Directors, resulting in their reinstatement. The ALJ found that the initial removal of the Directors by fellow Directors was illegal under A.R.S. § 33-1243(B) and (H), which reserves removal power to members. Because the HOA lacked a good legal defense, the remaining Director's decision not to defend the prior petition, based on legal advice, was permissive under A.R.S. § 33-1242 and not a violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, HOA Director Removal, Board Authority, Condo Bylaws
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:38 (155.5 KB)

18F-H1818048-REL Decision – 654904.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:48 (155.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in Case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, where a petition filed by homeowner Peter Biondi, Jr. against the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association (HOA) was denied. The central conflict revolved around the HOA Board’s removal of two directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, for alleged violations of the association’s leasing restrictions.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical point of law: the HOA Board acted improperly and in violation of Arizona state statute when it removed two of its own members. According to A.R.S. § 33-1243, the power to remove a board director is reserved exclusively for the association’s members (the unit owners) through a formal petition and vote, not for the Board of Directors itself.

Because the initial removal was legally invalid, the subsequent actions of the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden, were deemed reasonable and permissible. Her decision not to defend the HOA against a petition from the improperly removed directors, a choice made upon the advice of three separate attorneys, was not a violation of her duties. The governing statute (A.R.S. § 33-1242) uses the permissive term “may” regarding the defense of litigation, and the ALJ concluded that no entity is required to mount a defense that is ill-advised and likely to fail. Consequently, Henden’s reinstatement of the directors was a logical correction of the Board’s unlawful action. The factual question of whether the directors had violated the leasing rules was considered secondary to this overriding procedural and statutory failure by the Board.

Case Background and Procedural History

The dispute originated from complaints by HOA members that two serving directors, Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier, were violating Section 8.13 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rental By Owner (“VRBOs”).

1. Initial Board Action: The Board of Directors met to consider the complaints, concluded that Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs, and gave them 14 days to remedy the violation by presenting compliant long-term rental agreements.

2. Removal of Directors: At a contentious executive session on January 4, 2018, the five other directors voted to remove or disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board. Board member Bonnie Henden testified that she felt this action was a “vendetta” against the two directors for taking opposing positions on other issues.

3. Board Collapse: Following the removal, the Board structure disintegrated. The petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., and another director, Jeffrey Washburn, “decided to resign in order to restore calm in the community.” A third director was removed or resigned due to non-payment of assessments. By March or April 2018, this left Bonnie Henden as the sole remaining director.

4. Legal Challenge and Reinstatement: Luzzis and Dubasquier filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to protest their removal. After consulting with three different attorneys, Henden chose not to file an answer on behalf of the HOA. The Department subsequently issued a decision in favor of Luzzis and Dubasquier. Following this outcome, Henden reinstated them to the Board to complete their elected terms and cancelled the planned election for their replacements.

5. Petitioner’s Complaint: On May 9, 2018, Peter Biondi, Jr. filed the current petition, alleging that Henden’s refusal to defend the HOA and her decision to reinstate the two directors constituted a violation of Arizona statutes (§§ 33-1242 and 33-1243), HOA Bylaws, and CC&Rs.

Central Legal Issues and Findings

The ALJ determined that the petitioner, Biondi, bore the burden of proof but that the operative facts of the case were not in dispute. The core of the case was not a factual determination but a legal one.

The Dispositive Question: Legality of Director Removal

The judge identified the central legal question as the primary determinant of the case’s outcome:

“…the dispositive issue is not the factual issue of whether Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier violated CC&R Section 8.13 by using their units as short-term VRBOs, but the legal issue of whether the other directors on Respondent’s Board properly removed them from the Board…”

The ruling established that the Board’s method of removal was the critical point of failure, rendering the underlying CC&R violation secondary.

Analysis of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The decision was grounded in a de novo review of A.R.S. § 33-1243, which governs the powers and removal of a condominium association’s board of directors.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(B): This subsection explicitly prohibits a board from acting on behalf of the association to “determine the qualifications, powers and duties or terms of office of board of directors members.” The ALJ found that the Board’s vote to disqualify Luzzis and Dubasquier was in direct violation of this provision.

A.R.S. § 33-1243(H): This subsection establishes the exclusive procedure for removing a director, stating that its provisions apply “notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary.” The statute mandates that removal can only be accomplished by:

1. A petition signed by a specified percentage or number of eligible unit owners (e.g., 25% or 100 votes, whichever is less, for an association of 1,000 or fewer members).

2. A majority vote of the unit owners at a special meeting called for this purpose within 30 days of receiving the petition.

The ALJ’s conclusion was unequivocal: “The referenced provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1243 specifically and unequivocally require that the members who elected a director must remove the director.” Because the Board failed to follow this statutory procedure, its removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier was legally invalid, and the HOA “lacked any good legal defense” to their subsequent petition.

The Legality of the Sole Director’s Actions

Based on the finding that the initial removal was unlawful, the ALJ assessed the actions taken by the sole remaining director, Bonnie Henden.

Decision Not to Defend the HOA

The petitioner argued Henden had a duty to defend the HOA against the petition from Luzzis and Dubasquier. The ALJ rejected this argument by citing A.R.S. § 33-1242(A)(4), which states an association “may… defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings.”

The judge’s legal interpretation was that the word “may” indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. Henden was not statutorily obligated to contest the petition. Her decision was further supported by the legal advice she received from three attorneys, who advised that a defense would likely fail and result in unnecessary legal fees for the association. The ALJ affirmed this prudence, stating, “No statute requires a condominium association or a director to take an ill-advised act or to mount a defense of a previously taken ill-advised act that likely will fail on its merits.”

Reinstatement of Removed Directors

Henden’s decision to reinstate Luzzis and Dubasquier to the Board was found to be a direct and logical consequence of the legally improper removal. By reinstating them, she was correcting the Board’s previous unlawful action.

Relevant Governing Documents and Testimony

Document/Testimony

Key Provisions or Content

Relevance to Decision

A.R.S. § 33-1243

Prohibits boards from determining member qualifications and mandates that only unit owners can remove directors via a petition and vote.

This was the controlling statute that rendered the Board’s initial removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier unlawful.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

States an association “may” defend itself in litigation.

Provided the legal basis for Henden’s discretionary and permissible decision not to defend the HOA.

HOA CC&Rs Section 8.13

Prohibits leasing for “transient, hotel, club, timeshare or similar purposes” and requires all leases to be for a minimum of six months.

This section was the basis for the original complaint but was deemed not the dispositive issue in the case.

HOA Bylaws Article III

Governs director qualifications, number, and the filling of vacancies.

While relevant to Board governance, these bylaws were superseded by the conflicting and more specific state statute (A.R.S. § 33-1243).

Bonnie Henden Testimony

Stated the removal felt like a “vendetta” and that she consulted three attorneys before deciding not to defend the HOA.

Provided context for the internal Board conflict and established that her actions were taken after seeking extensive legal counsel.

Peter Biondi, Jr. Evidence

Submitted exhibits showing Luzzis and Dubasquier were continuing to advertise their units as VRBOs.

The evidence was acknowledged but deemed irrelevant to the central legal question of whether the Board had the authority to remove them.

Final Order and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

The final decision establishes a clear legal principle: a homeowners association’s Board of Directors does not have the authority to remove its own members in Arizona. That power is reserved for the unit owners through a specific statutory process. Any action taken by a board in contravention of this statute is legally invalid. Consequently, a director’s decision not to defend such an invalid action, especially when based on legal advice, is not a breach of duty but a prudent measure to avoid wasting association resources on a defense with no legal merit.

Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.

Study Guide: Biondi v. Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818048-REL, concerning a dispute between a condominium owner and a homeowners association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific event prompted the Petitioner, Peter Biondi, Jr., to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs (Section 8.13), what were the rules regarding the leasing of condominium units?

4. Why were Board Directors Jim Luzzis and Jerry Dubasquier initially removed from their positions by the other directors?

5. How did Bonnie Henden become the sole remaining member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors?

6. What was the “dispositive issue” that the Administrative Law Judge identified as central to the case?

7. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1243(H), what is the proper procedure for removing a member of a condominium association’s board of directors?

8. Why did Ms. Henden choose not to defend the association against the petition filed by Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier?

9. What does the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” mean, as defined in the decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr., who is a condominium owner and a member of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association. The Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association itself.

2. The Petitioner filed the petition because the Board’s sole remaining member, Bonnie Henden, refused to defend the association against a petition filed by two former directors. Instead of defending the board’s prior action, Ms. Henden reinstated the two directors who had been removed.

3. Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs stipulated that all leases must be for a minimum of six months and that units could not be leased for transient, hotel, or similar purposes. Owners were also limited to leasing their unit no more than two separate times in any 12-month period and had to provide a signed copy of the lease to the association.

4. Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier were removed after other Board members concluded they had violated CC&R Section 8.13 by renting their units as short-term Vacation Rentals By Owner (VRBOs). The removal occurred after they were given 14 days to remedy the violation and failed to do so to the Board’s satisfaction.

5. After the removal of Luzzis and Dubasquier, the Petitioner and another director resigned to “restore calm.” A third director was removed or resigned for failing to pay an assessment, which left Ms. Henden as the only director on the Board.

6. The dispositive issue was not the factual question of whether Luzzis and Dubasquier had violated the CC&Rs. Rather, it was the legal issue of whether the other directors had the authority to properly remove them from the Board in the first place.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1243(H) states that unit owners may remove a board member by a majority vote at a meeting. This process must be initiated by a petition signed by a specific percentage or number of the association’s members who are eligible to vote.

8. Ms. Henden consulted three different attorneys who advised her that the association would likely lose the case. Their legal advice was based on A.R.S. § 33-1243, which states that board members cannot remove other board members, and defending the improper removal would incur unnecessary legal fees.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Board’s initial removal of the two directors was improper under state law and that Ms. Henden was not required to defend that ill-advised act.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis and synthesis of the case details. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the authority granted to the Board in the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Bylaws (Article III, Sections 2 & 3) and the limitations placed upon it by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243. Explain which document takes precedence in the matter of director removal and why, citing the reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge.

2. Discuss the role and actions of Bonnie Henden after she became the sole remaining director. Evaluate her decision to reinstate Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier, considering the legal advice she received, her powers as the sole director, and the potential consequences for the homeowners association.

3. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, beginning with the initial complaints about VRBOs and culminating in the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Identify the key actions, legal filings, and turning points for each party involved (Luzzis/Dubasquier, the Board, Peter Biondi, and Bonnie Henden).

4. The judge states that the case hinges on a legal issue, not a factual one. Explain the difference between the factual issue (the VRBO rentals) and the legal issue (the removal process) and detail how this distinction was fundamental to the case’s outcome.

5. Based on the statutes cited in the decision, outline the correct, legally compliant process that the members of the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association should have followed if they wished to remove Messrs. Luzzis and Dubasquier from the Board of Directors. Contrast this with the actions the Board actually took.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The decision references several statutes from Title 33 concerning property and condominiums.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations adopted by an organization, such as a homeowners association, for its internal governance. In this case, they govern matters like annual meetings and the composition of the Board of Directors.

Abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deed that govern what homeowners can and cannot do with their property. Section 8.13 on leasing was a key CC&R in this case.

De Novo Review

A type of legal review where a court or administrative body decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusions or assumptions made by the previous party that heard the case. It is used for determining the construction and application of statutes.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings from members of condominium associations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Peter Biondi, Jr.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof (the Petitioner in this matter) to present evidence that is more convincing and more likely to be true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association.

Abbreviation for Vacation Rental By Owner, referring to the practice of renting out properties on a short-term basis, similar to a hotel. This practice was alleged to be in violation of the association’s CC&Rs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Peter Biondi, Jr. (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; also a unit owner and HOA member
  • Jeffrey Washburn (witness)
    Former Board member; presented testimony by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Maria R. Kupillas (HOA attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
    Represented Respondent
  • Bonnie Henden (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Sole remaining Director; presented testimony
  • Jim Luzzis (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated
  • Jerry Dubasquier (board member)
    Lakeshore at Andersen Springs Homeowners Association
    Director whose removal was overturned/reinstated

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

James and Shawna Larson vs. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.

Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R section 9
  • CC&R section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R section 9
  • CC&R section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:44 (105.0 KB)

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:48 (53.0 KB)

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:53 (385.9 KB)

Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.

Study Guide: Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?

3. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?

4. What was the central dispute that was ultimately decided in the November 20, 2017, hearing?

5. According to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision, what is the legal classification of the petitioners’ patio cover?

6. Which specific sections of the CC&Rs did the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, cite as the basis for its authority?

7. What key reasons did project manager Wayne King provide to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?

8. Describe the significant difference in the cost estimates for removing and replacing the patio cover as presented by the Petitioners versus the Respondent’s project manager.

9. What was the final ruling regarding who was financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the patio cover?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the Larsons’ petition following the final hearing, and which party was deemed the “prevailing party”?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which is their homeowner’s association (HOA). The dispute arose from the HOA’s plan to repair and paint the building exteriors.

2. ALJ Marwil initially recommended dismissal due to a “lack of justiciable controversy.” She found that the Petitioners had failed to cite any provision of the CC&Rs that the Respondent had currently violated, as the threatened action to remove the patio cover was speculative and had not yet occurred.

3. Commissioner Lowe rejected the dismissal because she found the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent that questioned whether “the presence of the awning [is] a violation of the Association’s governing documents,” which she interpreted as the Respondent alleging a violation.

4. The central dispute was whether the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation had the authority to mandate that homeowners, specifically the Larsons, remove their patio covers at their own expense to facilitate a building repair and painting project.

5. The final decision classifies the Petitioners’ patio cover as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). This classification was crucial to determining financial responsibility.

6. The Respondent cited sections 9 and 9(b) of the CC&Rs. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the authority to take “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep” of those exteriors.

7. Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to properly and safely complete the work using scaffolding, as required by modern safety laws. He also stated that removal was needed to repair improperly flashed areas behind the covers and to ensure the painting contractor would provide a warranty for the project.

8. The Petitioners presented bids showing the cost to remove and rebuild the cover would be between $3,980 and $5,975. In contrast, Mr. King opined these estimates were very high and that the cost should be closer to $1,000 if existing materials were reused.

9. The final ruling, based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), was that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose, the cost of reinstalling it. This is because the patio cover is a limited common element assigned specifically to their unit.

10. The final outcome was the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition. The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Use the provided documents to construct a detailed, evidence-based response.

1. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial filing to the final decision. Discuss the key turning points, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the reasoning behind the final judgment.

2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent in the November 2017 hearing. On what specific statutes and CC&R provisions did each side rely, and how did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately interpret these documents?

3. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in this case, specifically focusing on the evidence provided by project manager Wayne King. How did his testimony regarding safety, project requirements, and cost estimates influence the Administrative Law Judge’s findings on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s actions?

4. Discuss the legal concept of a “limited common element” as defined and applied in the source documents. Explain how this classification was central to the final decision regarding financial responsibility for the patio cover’s removal and reinstallation.

5. The initial Administrative Law Judge found no “justiciable controversy,” while the Commissioner later found the matter “ripe for adjudication.” Based on the details in all three documents, explain the arguments for both positions and analyze why the case ultimately proceeded to a full hearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official in the Office of Administrative Hearings who adjudicates complaints regarding condominium and planned community documents and ensures compliance with relevant statutes.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The documents that govern the community and are described as a contract between the homeowner’s association and the homeowners.

Justiciable Controversy

A real dispute that a tribunal has the authority to resolve. The initial petition was recommended for dismissal for a lack of a justiciable controversy because the Respondent’s threatened actions were deemed speculative.

Limited Common Element

A legal classification for property defined under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). In this case, the Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as such, meaning any common expense associated with its maintenance, repair, or replacement is assessed against the unit to which it is assigned.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Department of Real Estate to initiate a complaint against a homeowner’s association.

Petitioner

The party that files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowners James and Shawna Larson.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that is successful in a legal dispute. In the final order, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Ripe for Adjudication

A term used by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate to indicate that a dispute is ready to be formally heard and decided by the Administrative Law Judge.

Select all sources
583987.pdf
585505.pdf
605540.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL-RHG

3 sources

These documents chronicle the legal dispute between James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent) concerning the removal of the Larsons’ patio cover for building maintenance. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissal because the Petitioners did not allege a current violation of the governing documents, thus lacking a justiciable controversy since the association had only threatened action. However, the Department of Real Estate Commissioner rejected this recommendation, asserting that a violation of the governing documents was alleged by the Respondent, making the matter ripe for adjudication. Following a rehearing, a different ALJ issued a final decision finding that the Respondent acted reasonably in requiring the patio cover removal for safe and proper painting and repairs, concluding that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation as the cover is a limited common element.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Larson (petitioner)
  • Shawna Larson (petitioner)
  • Lisa M. Hanger (attorney)
    Counsel for Petitioners

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    Brown Alcott PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
  • Wayne King (witness)
    Project manager hired by Respondent for the painting project; provided testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Authored Recommended Order Dismissal dated August 25, 2017
  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Authored Administrative Law Judge Decision dated December 11, 2017
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Rejected Recommendation of Dismissal
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    Transmitted documents (Order Rejecting Recommendation of Dismissal)

Other Participants

  • Chris Morga (contractor)
    Jacob and Co.
    Mentioned as a vendor who could remove patio covers